5
20
144
-
https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b53260d8b71b1e884c7cd83c19548c36.pdf
05c51d75c317aed7f6e3c1eb1eb7d7d6
PDF Text
Text
UTILITARIANISM AS SUPEREROGATION:
Maximizing versus satisizing in value theory
One ought always to act in such a way as to maximi2e utility - or, in more
Kantian imperatival form:
Act only in such a way that you action would serve
to maximize net expected utility.
or
explained j
The5 e are ways utilitarianism is sometimes put
naturally these preliminaries have to be followed up by a lot of
{ pt9rl.~1:) :u~/J
work trying to cash out utility in terms of.,\features - such as pleasure or
happiness - of members of some other base class.
But the further detail s are
not the present concern - which is with the maximisation principles which are
in fact corrnnon to
often confused
utilitarianism and other positions, such as consequentialism,
with utilitarianism.
To maximize is however often to go far beyond what is required .
Utilitarianism is now, its main revolutionary force spent, treated with
a gen tle toleration it does not really deserve.
Certainly its application can
still serve for the underwriting of worthwhile causes, such as opposition to
racism or nuclear escalation:
so however can most rival ethical positions.
But
its application can also serve a numb er of undesirable, or even pernicious ends,
and not merely with ~aJ e:
directions.
its serious adoption forces adherents in these
Examples include approaches to world population, the maximization of
numbers being a constrained utilitarian objective, and on Lhe natural
environ-
ment, it being a mere instrument for human (or creature) uti)ity under ut i litarianism.
So, for those with environmental perception and respect, utilitarianism
should not be simply tolerated, as a reasonable and respectable ethical position:
it shou ld be rejected, and bette:, actively resisted.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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UTILITARIANISM AS SUPEREROGATION:
Maximizing versus satisizing in value theory
One ought always to act in such a way as to maximi2e utility - or, in more
Kantian imperatival form:
Act only in such a way that you action would serve
to maximize net expected utility.
or
explained j
The5 e are ways utilitarianism is sometimes put
naturally these preliminaries have to be followed up by a lot of
{ pt9rl.~1:) :u~/J
work trying to cash out utility in terms of.,\features - such as pleasure or
happiness - of members of some other base class.
But the further detail s are
not the present concern - which is with the maximisation principles which are
in fact corrnnon to
often confused
utilitarianism and other positions, such as consequentialism,
with utilitarianism.
To maximize is however often to go far beyond what is required .
Utilitarianism is now, its main revolutionary force spent, treated with
a gen tle toleration it does not really deserve.
Certainly its application can
still serve for the underwriting of worthwhile causes, such as opposition to
racism or nuclear escalation:
so however can most rival ethical positions.
But
its application can also serve a numb er of undesirable, or even pernicious ends,
and not merely with ~aJ e:
directions.
its serious adoption forces adherents in these
Examples include approaches to world population, the maximization of
numbers being a constrained utilitarian objective, and on Lhe natural
environ-
ment, it being a mere instrument for human (or creature) uti)ity under ut i litarianism.
So, for those with environmental perception and respect, utilitarianism
should not be simply tolerated, as a reasonable and respectable ethical position:
it shou ld be rejected, and bette:, actively resisted.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Box 59, Item 683: Draft of Utilitarianism as supererogatory: maximizing versus satisizing in value theory
Subject
The topic of the resource
Typescript draft, with emendations and annotations.
Description
An account of the resource
Note, one of three papers digitised from item 683.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 683
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Box 59: Nuclear
Como House
Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3
-
https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/9a0eaf07f4febb1ac32bde2cd9f153e1.pdf
05c51d75c317aed7f6e3c1eb1eb7d7d6
PDF Text
Text
UTILITARIANISM AS SUPEREROGATION:
Maximizing versus satisizing in value theory
One ought always to act in such a way as to maximi2e utility - or, in more
Kantian imperatival form:
Act only in such a way that you action would serve
to maximize net expected utility.
or
explained j
The5 e are ways utilitarianism is sometimes put
naturally these preliminaries have to be followed up by a lot of
{ pt9rl.~1:) :u~/J
work trying to cash out utility in terms of.,\features - such as pleasure or
happiness - of members of some other base class.
But the further detail s are
not the present concern - which is with the maximisation principles which are
in fact corrnnon to
often confused
utilitarianism and other positions, such as consequentialism,
with utilitarianism.
To maximize is however often to go far beyond what is required .
Utilitarianism is now, its main revolutionary force spent, treated with
a gen tle toleration it does not really deserve.
Certainly its application can
still serve for the underwriting of worthwhile causes, such as opposition to
racism or nuclear escalation:
so however can most rival ethical positions.
But
its application can also serve a numb er of undesirable, or even pernicious ends,
and not merely with ~aJ e:
directions.
its serious adoption forces adherents in these
Examples include approaches to world population, the maximization of
numbers being a constrained utilitarian objective, and on Lhe natural
environ-
ment, it being a mere instrument for human (or creature) uti)ity under ut i litarianism.
So, for those with environmental perception and respect, utilitarianism
should not be simply tolerated, as a reasonable and respectable ethical position:
it shou ld be rejected, and bette:, actively resisted.
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
UTILITARIANISM AS SUPEREROGATION:
Maximizing versus satisizing in value theory
One ought always to act in such a way as to maximi2e utility - or, in more
Kantian imperatival form:
Act only in such a way that you action would serve
to maximize net expected utility.
or
explained j
The5 e are ways utilitarianism is sometimes put
naturally these preliminaries have to be followed up by a lot of
{ pt9rl.~1:) :u~/J
work trying to cash out utility in terms of.,\features - such as pleasure or
happiness - of members of some other base class.
But the further detail s are
not the present concern - which is with the maximisation principles which are
in fact corrnnon to
often confused
utilitarianism and other positions, such as consequentialism,
with utilitarianism.
To maximize is however often to go far beyond what is required .
Utilitarianism is now, its main revolutionary force spent, treated with
a gen tle toleration it does not really deserve.
Certainly its application can
still serve for the underwriting of worthwhile causes, such as opposition to
racism or nuclear escalation:
so however can most rival ethical positions.
But
its application can also serve a numb er of undesirable, or even pernicious ends,
and not merely with ~aJ e:
directions.
its serious adoption forces adherents in these
Examples include approaches to world population, the maximization of
numbers being a constrained utilitarian objective, and on Lhe natural
environ-
ment, it being a mere instrument for human (or creature) uti)ity under ut i litarianism.
So, for those with environmental perception and respect, utilitarianism
should not be simply tolerated, as a reasonable and respectable ethical position:
it shou ld be rejected, and bette:, actively resisted.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Box 59, Item 683: Draft appendix, notes and cutting on utilitarianism
Subject
The topic of the resource
Typescript draft, with emendations and annotations. Includes photocopy of pages from publication by Hutcheson, with a note from Charles to Richard. Hutcheson F (1755) System of moral philosophy. A System of Moral Philosophy, Volume 2, Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139583688.019
Description
An account of the resource
Note, one of three papers digitised from item 683. Title in collection finding aid: Appendix: ts + ms draft - attached to xc from Hutcheson 'Adventitious Rights'. Published work redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 683
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Information about rights held in and over the resource
For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
Format
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[8] leaves. 1.93 MB.
Type
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Manuscript
Identifier
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7aded01">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7aded01</a>
Box 59: Nuclear
-
https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/382a1128067b3cf4c3bcc193ab4cac7d.pdf
b45dc2ea94eb2ca3936e966fc7a70ea7
PDF Text
Text
ETHICS PROJECTS AND ISSUES
1
l
That of putting together and justifying as
largely
evaded
Aristotelean,
outside
one
of
two
.
whole a svstem of ethics. ~t ask is ~
One
traditions.
which sets out with a
74.
R
where
it
is
tackled
is
the
conception of Man's end or uJ timate good, and
),J(
/ .'
)(~
then endeavours to show that the virtuous life - which is what ethics concerns - wilJ
1
ff/f'O
fulfil this or realise it.
By contrast,
Cicero begins with a fairly full-fledp-ed colJ ection of duties and
makes some attempt at showing personal advantage will not clash with those.
for
Duty's
together:
sake
requires a .iustification.
And collections
,-e_ 9. ~ ,; ~ru.:t:
there is a ~grneu-+: of coherence on ethical svstems .
21 Why want fallacies, such as those
fallacies?
be.
J abel1ec'l
have
naturaJ ism and
to
But nuty
be
pulled
prescriptive,
RR
Because if they weren't fallacies too much that is not determined would
Briefly,
one would not
expect
that is ohligatory or good
to fol low from the
scientific facts, because that would determine which value system to adhere to .
But
there is not a fina1 unique system delivered from the facts.
31
Def ea ting
objections
achieved by
to
consequentionalist objections
reliance
on
principles
( act - ) utilitarianism
is
that
to deontics .
sometjmes
a
One of the frequent
better outcome
or like act consequentialism ,
that ob,jection no longer carries any weight .
can
be
Under satisizing
It is· enough , at most , that application
of the principle yields a sufficiently good outcome .
T
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
ETHICS PROJECTS AND ISSUES
1
l
That of putting together and justifying as
largely
evaded
Aristotelean,
outside
one
of
two
.
whole a svstem of ethics. ~t ask is ~
One
traditions.
which sets out with a
74.
R
where
it
is
tackled
is
the
conception of Man's end or uJ timate good, and
),J(
/ .'
)(~
then endeavours to show that the virtuous life - which is what ethics concerns - wilJ
1
ff/f'O
fulfil this or realise it.
By contrast,
Cicero begins with a fairly full-fledp-ed colJ ection of duties and
makes some attempt at showing personal advantage will not clash with those.
for
Duty's
together:
sake
requires a .iustification.
And collections
,-e_ 9. ~ ,; ~ru.:t:
there is a ~grneu-+: of coherence on ethical svstems .
21 Why want fallacies, such as those
fallacies?
be.
J abel1ec'l
have
naturaJ ism and
to
But nuty
be
pulled
prescriptive,
RR
Because if they weren't fallacies too much that is not determined would
Briefly,
one would not
expect
that is ohligatory or good
to fol low from the
scientific facts, because that would determine which value system to adhere to .
But
there is not a fina1 unique system delivered from the facts.
31
Def ea ting
objections
achieved by
to
consequentionalist objections
reliance
on
principles
( act - ) utilitarianism
is
that
to deontics .
sometjmes
a
One of the frequent
better outcome
or like act consequentialism ,
that ob,jection no longer carries any weight .
can
be
Under satisizing
It is· enough , at most , that application
of the principle yields a sufficiently good outcome .
T
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Box 59, Item 683: Draft of Ethics projects and issues
Subject
The topic of the resource
Typescript draft, with emendations and annotations.
Description
An account of the resource
Note, one of three papers digitised from item 683.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 59, Item 683
Publisher
An entity responsible for making the resource available
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
Contributor
An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource
This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
Format
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[1] leaf. 794.1 KB.
Type
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Manuscript
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fa52764">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fa52764</a>
Box 59: Nuclear
Como House
Como House > Cupboard > Pile 3
-
https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/32f5493dacdd446e2ae9e35b3cc88d4d.pdf
9d3fc6065bb7275f9e8cd80f95ca58c2
PDF Text
Text
WORKING DRAFT
AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY? Investigations
of the nonexistent # MX504
'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the
possibility of a public peace,
shall be taken into consideration by
states armed for war'' (Kant,
'A [the only]
secret article for
perpetual
peace',
p.158,
an article flattering no doubt
to
philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition).
A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy.
A policy can be
merely by a list of directives as to what do in various
given
at
even
its
philosophy
policy
best it need only involve practical
into a theoretical
setting,
contrast,
integration
of
a
the
which looks at the key concepts involved:
security, stability, control,
here,
By
wisdom.
goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom,
circumstances;
protection, defence, interests, national
interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is a branch of political
and
social
philosophy,
and has long been treated as such,
though under such
more familiar and honest headings as "of war" and "of peace" (see Appendix
Like
most
of philosophy it can be applied,
parts
in
regional
3}.
among
ways
others.
defence
A
approaches
to
philosophy should embed appropriate defence arrangements
war
not merely
and peace,
or
superficially
into
and
"foreign
policy", but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on
going
culture
policy
defence
power
and
into the intended or planned
typically takes prevailing socio-political
structures for granted;
questioning
of
merits
cultural
arrangements.
arrangements
a defence philosophy again penetrates
or rejecting features of these structures,
enquiring as
things and institutions of which defence is planned,
society should be defended by what sort of appropriate
sort
of
what
lengths.
What,
for
instance,
1
is Australia
what
are
A
and
deeper,
to
asking
methods
the
what
and
Australi ans,
�concerned to defend, aiming to defend?
defending,
How much of what others have,
Abroad?
region?
defending,
Does
preserving?
defending?
Would
Indonesians
made
anyone
a
Randwick
stage
a
or what we have,
Eagle
or
racecourse,
last stand
for
is
worth
Farm,
merit
Estate?
Oaks
strike in Australia .just
lightning
In the
Here in Australia?
to
If
remove
the
B.jelke-
Petersen, should we resist?
of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in
Few
Australia,
unplanned
where
muddling
through
immediate problem - reactive contingency
1
generous
- is the main style of political
"planning",
life,
immediate
if
you
help
to
supply it with one or more,
to
problem
want
and ipso facto
of
be
to
defence
Its phi1osophers
Australia does not yet have a defence philosophy.
planning.
could
from
and to inject
some
depth
into
broader defence theorizing.
1.
Australian
defence
inappropriate
"policy";
incoherent,
obsolescent
American,
Indeed Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence
This
pol icy.
charge (made even by friends of Defence
commonplace
interested
in
2
obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).
The reasons
is
concern
not
merely
the
major unsolved issues
of
exactly
what
is
being
defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms
and
values;
and
what
role American defence facilities
in
Australia
supposed to have in this - but a range of more detailed lacunae such as:
of
clearly-defined
on what needs defending and how it is
priorities
accomplished;
doubtful
contingencies
in
are
lack
to
be
capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level
and to the north of Australia and in
maritime
zones;
and
1.
The point, which is not uncontroversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert.
2.
Amazingly,
in
the Strategic Basis Papers, Australia criticizes New
Zealand because 'it has still developed no policy for national
defence
and
tends to
look
to ...
the US as its primary source of defence
guidance''
(p.29) .
Note
that C3I abbreviates the mouthful ,
Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence.
2
�unsatisfactory (or no)
defence
civil
and
administration,
arrangements and planning for
use
of
protection
civil
infrastructure,
key facilities and
of
"defence-in-depth",
wartime
mobilisation,
areas,
and
for
post-nuclear
organization.
is
equally damaqinq, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it
3
nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.
It is
left
to
.journalists
And,
what
out
installations may be for and to make various conjectures as
defence
the
newspaper-watching academics to winkle
and
policy
may
Australian policy makers
As to coherence,
be.
local
to
what
have
only
recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role,
one.
global
they
were told by the Americans in
Hashington
to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the
designed
begins
thus
This
to look as if Australia's defence policy is as
much
not a
talks
in
It
USA.
determined
abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia.
Much
circumstantial
evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim
Australia defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA,
the last Nor Id Har (and British abandonment),
one
thing,
as it
that
before
used,
to be stamped Made in UK.
Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy,
For
so it is claimed.
That "policy" has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party,
has
governed most of the time (as senior partner in a
for ANZUS)
Hashington
the
Liberal
and still does.
US
and
in
of
US
The Strategic Basis
give virtually unqualified support
Military practices and to the American view of
situation,
the
the latest package from
packaged under a local cover.
endorsed by the Labor Government,
Papers,
planned
Party "Defence and Foreign Policy Unit" consists largely
Defence Department material
to
For instance,
But
coalition).
Party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as
Liberal
which
commit Australia to supporting,
the
global
strategic
without any due reservation,
3. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and
shared aspirations of the people - to the extent, presumably, that these
are
commendable.
3
�4
American positions in world forums.
be reached by more devious arguments.
out it had a regional defence role?
could
longer
no
The same dependent policy conclusion can
When,
for example, did Australia find
afford to police the world on their own and would
delegate some of that role
have
to
and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on
towards
and also after Labor took some faltering steps
reliable dogs-bodies;
they
After the Americans had found that
a broader foreign policy with some indigenous elements (Hayden was
developing
promptly flattened by Schultz).
Australian
but Iags it.
respects,
and
foreign policy simply copies American
older American defence policy,
American
war policy.
American
administration
main
in
The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor
to the extent that it is visible,
government,
with
defence
is conservative;
and diverges from the new
it coincides
(.post-Reagan)
the
For Australian Labor defence policy supports what
used to support, namely
DI.
nuclear
Multilateral
disarmament (within the framework of a series of treaties and agreements), and
D2.
Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual
The
presence
.justified
assured destruction.
of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to
in the framework of these assumptions.
For they are to assist
be
in
making deterrence under D2 effective and to provide verification for the
arms
There is
much
reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions).
evidence
indicating
however that American policy makers have
both DI and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms
they
4.
have
now
5
control .
moved on to the following highly destabilizing
abandoned
Certainly
doctrines;
namely
For theJe amq^ing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of
cl ient states the following Australian contribution is noteworthy:
'The
US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia
can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that
the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support'
(SB, p.28)
5.
As to DI and arms control,
see, e.g. Mack PR. As to D2, 'USA has now an
announced
first-strike
nuclear
targeting
policy'
technologically
reinforced (Hayes, p.4).
The goal
of the Reagan administration
is
superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term).
4
�war-fighting;
Nuclear
war
American
government,
al 1
Labor
1985
may
policy
nuclear wars;
Limited
of these
government.
well be accepted by
military doctrines,
and
Star
the
next
this
While
wars.
coalition
Liberal
are explicitly rejected by the
Since the American "Joint" facilities in
Australia
also facilitate the rejected objectives, the problems concerning these dubious
facilities are much aggravated.
information
withholding
their
particularly
Government
concerning the full range of
war-fighting
certainly unsatisfactory,
the
The Government's approach concerning them
appears
their
functions,
roles from Parliament and the
as several of its members realise;
in not atypical
disarray,
further
public
and
- is
and as a result
grist
for
the
incoherence theme.
is a coherent Australian defence policy somewhere
6
public exposure, it is almost certainly an ol d American policy.
If
there
away
from
But in that
case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification.
7
For American interests by no means coincide with Australian .
Consider,
for
such
instance,
matters as enriching Americans,
American business,
for
undercutting
to
Nicaragua,
differently
Allende's
government in Chile to
again,
its
escalation of the nuclear arms
and all
Europe
Southern
as
Consider,
practices
methods.
race.
against
Consider,
consider
Or
the game- and decisi on-theoretic models
concern just USA and its adversary USSR,
which
its
its extensive export of arms and violent
strategic planning,
American
American.
promoting Americans and things
American practices in Latin America (or elsewhere in the world),
differently,
from
making conditions favourable
part of the monolithic West,
perhaps
occasionally
adding
but rarely or never considering
Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America
as
the
Poland
It had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians,
no more* th-atffrNew Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even
by Americans.
7.
Nor, though this is a longer story , does Australian culture by any means
coincide with American:
see CPD.
Thus a uniform treatment is entirely
inappropriate.
Similarly,
a single overarching treatment for a mono
lithic West is thoroughly inadequate.
5
�8
may be of Russia or it is nothing.
Or consider American interests not merely
in Soviet and communist containment, but. in containing socialism such as might
(under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia.
to
answering
inappropriate
American interests is accordingly inappropriate for
Australia,
for
their
defence
thinking
applies
also
and
to
work out a policy appropriate
Australian
do
Australians should
Antipodean socialism.
for
Australia.
representatives,
political
who
implausible American views and begin on developing
parroting
and original ones.)
local
An American policy
America,
like Russia,
own
(That
should
stop
genuinely
some
is busy meddling in Africa,
(SB, p.24) .
but 'Australian security interests are not directly involved'’
Should we be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation
of
the
their free-enterprise (rip-off) capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e.
socialists
state
seriously
course
- or
of
Much
opposition
governments,
in
has,
freedom umbrella,
active
already
this
sort
What
'keeping the free
world
of
context,
multiple
what mainstream American culture
to and undermining of social and
socialist
quite
free7?
Of
meanings
and
admits
mainstream Australian culture would exclude:
bullying
they
control)?
heavily
is it laughingly - call
freedom
associations.
don't
that
under
the
for instance,
programs
and
of smal1 countries that impose barriers to US business
part of "free enterprise"), etc.
freedom Misinformation,
agree about,
to live and work where one chooses,
on. These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in
some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland)
of
the
Eastern Block.
But many of the older freedoms
century,
such as freedom to travel,
requires
permits,
8.
licences,
than in most parts
have
to work and live abroad,
passports,
...
vanished
etc.;
And many more of these
this
now one
former
Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic
and other) which include Australia.
For,
as argued below,
adandoning
the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West,
of the West as one
parish, makes very significant differences to the results yielded.
6
�are being or have been eroded;
•freedoms
restricted
zones,
nuclearism
in
soon it will be identity documents-,
as already in parts of the "free
ID cards,
Now
West".
to
protect,
[the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep
citizens
Europe 'is devouring the very freedom it is said
assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles'
from
of
security
'secrecy,
the
lack
state,
of
Further structural changes required for
pp.58-9).
(Capra and Spretnak,
incompatible
with
permanent
commentability,
freedoms,
democratic
emergency,
the
include
of
concentration
authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and
Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve
police'’ (Falk, in Feith p.24) .
remaining freedoms.
Inherited
2.
other-reliance,
and
the
populist
and
elitist___ cases—for
patronaqe.
Australia's
defence
rather than regularly
policy,
such as it is,
(re)thought through.
the legal method of precedence,
may wel1,
furthermore
But that procedure - essentially
and here does,
applied to defence.
exclude significant
The unsatisfactory decision-making practices that will
For
al ternatives.
be revealed in the
of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of
case
kind of advanced age (or aged)
1abours
those
both
inheri.ted
whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in
legalistic decision making - is defective when
precedence
is
under.
Cock
capi tali sm Australia operates under,
has summed up these practices neatly in
features of aged capitalism (what he calls
the
or rather
setting
the Corporate State)
New Left and the Alternative Australia movements were
the
down
which
reacting
revoI ting against:
Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political
interests,
rather than by rational goals and means that served public
interests.
The people were rarely consulted effectively before a
decision and often only partially informed afterwards.
Pl an ni ng..was.
based on a mere extension of the present.
...
activists felt
they
were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The
availability of space,
time,
trees and air was also determined by
others . ..(2/(p.l8 italics added).
7
or
�As also is one's defence,
military and civil, the matter of whether one lives
in a nuclear target or not, etc.
A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance,
defence depends on other more powerful allies.
Australia
That ally was firstly Britain,
but in any event the assumption is that to be
and since World War II America;
safe
that Australia's
needs a powerful patron,
a protector.
A corollary is
that
Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected
And for the most part it has;
10
policy does not come cheap.
concessions.
The
however such a defence insurance
other-reliance assumption is unsound,
important,
it
for
several
reasons.
characteristically depends upon the following themes,
Most
all
which lack solid foundation:
1.
Austral i ar/ is threatened - or at least
1A. Australia/ is likely to be threatened in the near future.
2.
Australia cannot defend itself.
3.
It can however rely upon its patron (or ally?, i.e. upon the USA.
three themes in fact make up what has been cal led the populist case for
11
the ANZUS alliance.
It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS,
These
said to hold sway with the Australian government,
which, while insisting upon
premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead
4.
Australia has a vital
interest in global stability.
9, (From previous page)
Cock goes on:
'These basic
issues
increasingly
become lost in the array of consumer choices'.
[Add Covernment__ react_ive
poi n t].
10.
It costs not only money,
but independence.'... the serf societies - more
or less willingly - accept the status of "allies",
i.e. protection with
rights and duties as in feudal societies.
They become client countries'
(Galtung, p.169).
11.
So-called by Mack PC.
But
the formulation presented follows G.
Davidson's more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8,
1985,
p.2.
Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the
'altogether more sophisticated argument
[which]
holds sway
...
in
government' (p.l).
8
�Global
5.
stability is under threat (constantly)
by an expansionist
Soviet
Un ion.
6.
Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance.
But the USA technique for holding global balance is in part through a
network
of alliances like ANZUS.
further
Obviously
premisses are required to reach the
that
conclusion
Australia should be participating in an alliance, and what is more, hosting US
defence
facilities
and so forth.
A first such premise is
no-shirking
the
theme that Australia should be contributing its part to "holding the balance".
Even this first further step is pretty shaky;
in
a
rather ramshackle case,
(and
since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly
4 may involve some equivocation).
Australia’s
vital
interests
as we shall see, one shaky step
are not
dubious
For it can be plausibly argued
guaranteed
by
US
techniques,
that
which
threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more
satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS.
contends,
Mack
it
In any case,
is unclear that our contribution enhances global
as
nuclear
stability (see Davidson).
There
is a more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist
which might be called the offshore el i t i st. position.
Australia can defend itself against regional
2R)t.
position,
This position grants
threats, and can look after
i tself regional Iy.
But
it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may
1A.
Nhat the offshore position insists is
1AH.
Since
these
interests
companies abroad,
internal
Australian
Australians
or
or whatever - may have little or nothing to
do
-perhaps
security,
concerned
with
this premiss
trade,
represents
an
extremely
important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift
war
In
grant
Australia's interests could be threatened in the near future.
Australian
with
not)
to defence).
extended
form
from
It goes further than what has been called forward defence.
the offshore position does call
9
for some
sort
of
global
�or police force ready to intervene whenever a "free port"
policeman
looks like closing its doors,.
the
elitist
position
is
anywhere
Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with
that it tends to slide
to
through
the
offshore
position (by way of now evident immediate positions).
against both the populist and elitist cases,
arguments
The
against
virtually
justify
but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points
course
a
just
couple
of themes 1 through 7 are
but there have been
through
some
indeed
familiar
sufficiently
of defections from themes 1
both cases,
defeat
logically
al 1
and
Of
involved.
would
7
to
serve
repair
interesting
attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses.
3.
The brief against the popular populist case.
While Australia is not at present under notice of
Contra
1 and 1A.
veiled
threat or harassment from abroad,
appears
to
believe that it is.
or parliamentary view,
view
as
persists,
kept
deliberately
parties
are
populist
well
case
alliance (e.g.
the public.
in
way
in
the dark (or even
purposes.
enough
false,
are
aware that the
misinformed),
main
main
this
because
assumptions
the
to
interest
In particular they have gone out of their
cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is
to
the
American
are much more difficult to sell
a
reliable
threats.
Thus long-standing Australian psychological
allowed
suits
underlying
Accordingly the parties and Government have no political
to
been
political
Australian
the reasons for which they support
those of the elitist case)
guarantor against all
been
informed,
the
The populace has
it has.
Although both
undermining the populist case.
not
not
it is worth inquiring why the popular
the opinion polls reveal
government
bipartisan
a (bare) majority of its population
As the popular view is
administrative,
threat,
stand,,
and
has
informational and educational effort.
10
not
been
insecurity about security has
assuaged
In particular,
by
any
requisite
older attitudes to Asia
�X
persist not far below the surface of popular Australia:
fear,
and
mistrust
xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism.
This
misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its
place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for
instead of the Asian view that Australia, so far as they are
Eastern picking,
as a remote desiccated place perhaps good for some trade.
aware of it at all,
to get towards more concrete assumptions,
Or,
Australians apparently tend to
view their country as affluent but underpopulated,
resource rich but
largely
Yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished,
defenceless.
12
resource poor, etc.
The view is seriously out of touch with reality.
Parts of Asia are
at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators.)
do
not see themselves as overpopulated,
as Australia.
now
They
in a way that calls for mass exodus;
and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe,
such as Java, bribes
and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively
unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire.
can
So far as they require them, they
purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more
(even
carrying significant local
cheaply
subsidies) and easily than they could obtain
13
them by seizure.
For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat,
no
other state has an interest in attempting to invade Australia.
for interests,
to
launch
so it is for capabilities.
a successful
invasion of Australia,
capacity in the near future.
TF.
No regional
As it
is
power has the capacity
or is likely to have
such
a
As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded,
The
"Asian hordes" fd\dn one of the less spoken about successors
to
Yellow Peril,
of immediate past days of the Asian communist threat
the
and
the Domino theory.
13.
As Stephenson argued,
less fortunately, 20 years ago.
Even when around
World War
II
Japan,
did have interest in access
to strategic raw
materials,
the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia
because of
the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much
impor tance.
11
�Currently
only the United States would have the physical
launch a -full scale invasion of Australia,
motive to do so (TAS, p.94) .
to
capacity
and it clearly lacks
any
As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff),
...
to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass
invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years
by other than the superpowers (TAS) .
But
neither superpower is at all
likely to expend effort or resources to such
an end.
obvious
An
which
at once arises is:
(A later serious question to entertain is:
defence?
on
question
security,
collectively provided global
forthwith
to unilateral disarmament?
now-standard
telling
bother
Why
with
why not be a free-rider
Why
such as it is?)
Mack for one,
then
not
proceed
having reassembled
the
for
the
case that Australia is not threatened 'now or
foreseeable future', and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted
by
the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia.
proceeds
and
points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss
retreat,
hasty
to claim that 'the populist case for ANZUS is
without premisses 1 and 1A.
While
it
sustained'
assumptions
which
is
approximating
appears
capabilities
it
decisive
of potential
2,
even
may sometimes take
it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A
resistance,
a
It is however a decidedly problematic retreat.
for granted that Australia can look after itself to some
some
He stages
far
from clear that
premiss 2.
given
the
invaders.
they
Consider the
(estimated)
put
up
essentially
on
extent,
depend
no-interests
argument,
limited
invasion
very
The main consideration adduced
appears
to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia s
dynamic
fighting forces.
Australia mineral
resources,
for
instance,
obtained more readily and cheaply by market methods than
simply
be
ones.
What this seems to show is that a rather minimal
military
streamlined force, if
any, would presently meet Australia's military requirements.
12
can
�It
is
as
not
if
Australia
The whole
nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well
popular training in defence methods,
character
that
apparatus
of
suited to its use, though
requisite
to
Australia would be a difficult place
govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate.
Australian
a
But even without
a population trained in its techniques.
lacking
without
defenceless'’
'entirely
1 ike a babe-in-arms.
mi 1itary force,
conventional
is
deterred
It was such features of the
the Japanese
a
on
previous
occasion
^If
the invasion is attempted,
the Australians,
in view of
their
national
character, would resist to the end.
Also,
because
the
geographical
conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in
a military sense,
it is apparent that a military venture in
that
country would be a diff icul t one** (.TAS, p.62) .
The
still hold good,
points
parts
any such program of nonmilitary
to
putting
and could be strengthened.
defence:
making
it
abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration)
it
several
There are
happen,
and
that it
has
happened.
the issue of alternative defence we are bound to
To
when
Australia is not threatened,
appropriate,
is a good occasion to reconsider
adapt defence arrangements.
now,
For
return.
and,
if
For example, it looks very much as
if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent,
But a much more effective and
to make many Australians feel secure.
largely
inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite mass education
therapy - with,
psychological
if it were well
done,
much more
and
satisfactory
results, a more secure and better informa^~popu1 ace.
Contra
2.
As
capabilities,
basically
enormous
isolation.
well
in
a
a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and
the military defence of Australia has become much easier.
matter
advantages
strategic
In
advance
of enhancing through robust
particular,
of
and
Australia enjoys by
reliable
virtue
of
systems
through modern
destroyed by precision guided munitions.
radar
warning
It is
the
geographical
any maritime invading force can now be
arrival,
C3I
detected
systems,
and
And any invaders that did manage to
gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be
13
�subject
deal
There is
to disproportionate response -from local defence.
Boys'’
of
and
weapon
Own War Games stuff concerning contemporary
great
a
which would serve to turn Australia into a pretty invulnerable
systems
C3I
armed
fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory even were the oceanic moat
crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin).
such
Under
invasion
even
armed neutrality and fortified Australia defence
from outside the region by an inimical world
resisted with reasonable prospect of success.
to
such an invasion;
mount
There is no power at all
Nonetheless the threat
their
elected
representatives.
But
the
Soviet
undertaken such a long-range massive force projection,
so,
be
likely
one
ooviet
a
of
is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees
invasion
of
could
there is apparently (according to TAS) only
the Australian population!).
of
power
our good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by
power that could,
6-77.
scenarios,
has
military
never
is ill-equipped to
do
lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see e.g.
and
The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of
D. Martin).
a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian
would be struck at by intercontinental missiles.
cities,
it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by
bad enough,
an
Soviet forces are once again not sufficent,
invasion.
sufficient
elsewhere
While this would be
by the Soviets for that sort of diversion;
in a superpower war;
and
not
thought
they would be required
and they would be devastated,
unless UoA
is
militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted.
Contra
3.
cannot
be relied upon,
rash
What will be argued is not the negation of 3,
but that premiss 3 is dubious,
to place excess reliance on American protection.
that the Americans
and that it would
That
being
so,
be
and
other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own
resources, as the American administration is kindly advising.
Especially
since the American "Vietnam debacle" and the fall of
14
Saigon,
�things
have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability
of
American patronage.
The relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined.
a.
no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity)
a
of policy,
matter
(see Appendix 1);
US world warfighting aspirations have
Its ability to act as,
reduced.
It
as
explicitly
been
and afford to be, global policeman has also
significantly declined (see further Appendix 1) .
b.
The willingness of Americans to engage in foreign wars has correspondingly
tumbled.
hawks,
sure,
be
to
American administration includes
the
Although
more
people and Congress are no longer in
the
enough
than
for
a /mood
gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in
American
This "Vietnam syndrome"
popular opposition to overseas military involvement.
has
major
a
as
served
strong
US opinion polls regularly show
Since Vietnam,
interests.
constraint
on
US
military
policy
foreign
and
involvement.
c.
One
Doctrine
manifestation
important
called
which
196'?,
of
the foregoing
of
elements
upon US regional allies
responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts.
to
the
is
take
Guam
primary
Another important
are
outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops
committed
abroad
there
must be reasonable assurance
no US vital
each
and
'such
is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries
where
national
Certainly
that
Congressional
As Mack comments,
popular support (Weinberger,
assurance
of
no
interests are at stake''.
more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which only
signatory
constitutional
consultation;
reported in PC p.14).
'act to meet the common danger in accordance
processes'
(article 4).
All
reassurances?
15
its
is
Isn't the treaty backed
None that are not undermined by
in American administrative multiple-speak.
with
the treaty strictly requires
there is no undertaking or commitment.
up by informal verbal
provide
others,
�the elite view is that Australia has to 'work ...
Even
'the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite
For
the
of US support'" and that the Americans cannot be counted upon always.
prospect
to help Australia in other ways'".
a
However
special
case
has
been made
American
for
military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran)
common
friendship,
and shared values and democratic
interests,
second,
and,
culture
earlier
traditions.
as
first,
and slow constitutional
already indicated, the basis is shaky.
And here, a
common
pleading:
hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis
evidence
in
to
as to the adequacy of the basis for the possibility
the American people,
Congress,
cases.
reliability
- on the basis of permanent
There are two difficul ties with this type of special
His tori cal
(SB, pp. 29-30) .
case - as opposed to examples of American abandonment of
Australia's
and
cannot rely upon Ub support in a
...
defence emer qen c y ar i s i n g w i t h i n ou r own n e i gh bou r h ood'
the basis,
high,
at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability
circumstances
a
to maximize
significantly on quite crucial
issues.
rather
America:
shared by Australia and
processes.
analogous
in
For there is not
values
diverge
interests always common,
Even
as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently
confirmed.
Common
Indonesia
opposing
did not appear wheir? Australia was
interests
claim
to West Papua.
It is
dubious
at
considering
least
that
American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation
with Asian nations to the North, e.g. Indonesia, Japan, etc.
special
case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates,
There was in fact no treaty in operation in
then the treaty would be otiose.
1942;
Of course if the
but
by
then
American
interests
in
countering
the
are at
present
Japanese
were
independently aroused.
14.
Although
neighbourhood
contingencies ...
impossible', as the pauper ap-i+e-’
16
assessed
a
�4.
Other-reliance and regional self-reliance
A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be
entirely reliable,
deemed
be tolerated.
yet this is a place where unreliability can hardly
for
When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won't do
Defence to call up with a message like that from Services, "We can't get there
tomorrow",
till
"Or
until
after Congress meets".
More
seriously,
handing
defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others,
nuclear defence,
given
very
which Antipodean administrations have opted
means for many of us handing our lives
likely
In principle,
Another problem is its cost.
over,
and
for,
it
literally.
quite
if a btate hires out its defence
it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if,
that
defence
is,
meterological
market
is
complexion
is
a
services,
monopolistic,
15
,
who
commodity
a
sort,
like
The trouble with global
etc.
with
currently
only one
at a national
level,
All
shipping,
national
of
supplier
right
the
i •
making
and has
this part of the case,
the
that
defence is
accordingly can exact a very high price,
the whole country a nuclear target.
appreciated
of
enough
well,
for not trying to force defence,
which
is
plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity.
When a country can provide its own defence,
it certainly makes very good
for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in
sense
its
own
defence
than
matter,
then self-reliance not Just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance
does not.
most other parties.
Should it also be cheaper
in
costs
that
But in that event, it does not need nuclear patrons, or to farm out
some of its defence.
15.
The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and
more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region,
have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects
French social and cultural
arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones
than American arrangements are.
In these days of technological warfare,
the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much
weight; we don't
after all look very hard at the American record of
defeats and incompetence.
17
�r
self-reliance
Such
as ANZUS and much of the apparent point
such
alliances
undermines an important part of the older
such
of
alliances.
newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g.
However
Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty
of
what
content it had.
little
understanding,
content,
a
but
are
merely
vague
ANZUS
clear
no
contain
of
articles
simple course is of course to allow them to be
emptied
an expensive and outdated insurance
that the alliance,
so
Since the arrangements
consultations
beyond
commitments
of
policy,
It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should
dies a natural death.
American
defence
facilities
American
nuclear
equipped or powered transport be excluded
passage
be c1osed or internationalised and
from
of
Australia.
treaty
would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the
That
for
case
16
supposedly
affords
,
while
making
way
for
the
greater
advantages
o+
neutralized nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, etc.
self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient.
But
consist of separable isolated pieces,
dramatically,
picture
Australia
will
self-sufficient
not
as becomes increasingly evident.
Most
winter.
The
such as plants which are
not
not escape the effects of nuclear
is much the same as for other objects,
internally
The world does
but depend crucially on their
environment
- and
indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional
holistic component of policy should take?
that
appropriate
the
cricket
game
move is not taking sides (as in a kids'
that is already set up) and doing one's bit for
For that will not contribute to stability,
rather
to
Put this way, it is almost obvious
sectionalism and fragmentation,
war
game
or
confrontation.
to a proper holistic approach, but
and to
bringing
nuclear
winter
cIoser .
757
If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real
deterrence
advantage because nothinq to deter.
Other advantages of
the ANZUS
alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious
(see PC, Martin) but not always guaranteed by
the alliance as the black
out of New Zealand shows.
18
�Other-re 1iance and self-reliance typically present a false contract,
certainly
do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of
partism
and
(EE,
or
p.223),
at a particular level
of
and
holism
versus
dependence
In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by
isolationism.
a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards
- might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance.
reach only certain inadequate levels,
may
which
alignment,
the monolithic East (or West).
5.
Against elitist arguments
stability,
very
as
related arguments revolve around that
securi ty
and
side,
are
value-laden
terms,
of
are
which
But
security.
not
cultural
What stability comprehends in American administrative perception
invariants.
is
other
and
4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion
Premisses
stabi1i ty
the level of modern alliances
are essentially coupled with opposition to an
e.g.
of
But integration
different from what highland villagers take it to
include.
In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state
But relevant states and
under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude.
the stationary among them are both relative to given frames of reference, /e.g,
what
is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel.
said
of the superpowers,
even
remote events can threaten their interests or their associates '
and
stability.
disturb
Trudeau
As
'they share a global perception according to
But lesser states or people,
not
counting
which
(p.10)
remote
IVA
business
or
military^ as
invariably
view
stability;
by
relevant,
report
bombs a* necessary to stability,
contrast philosophers
increasingly
terrorism and as characteristically antithetical
ad 4:
a vital
no
and the
see
nuclear
bombs
as
fix
a*
tools
of
to peace.
interest in global stability and secur i ty?
1?
Bureaucrats
instability.
Of course Australia
�have,
does
what sizeable nation does not.
interpretation conceals crucial differences,
For
Australia.
in
highly material
to the argument.
stability may well mean something different in USA from
global
means
Certainly vitai
interests are different.
interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere),
in
rhetoric at least,
popular
more
to socialism (or Mon-Soviet communism)
global
upset
to
containing
equate
communism and both with Soviet containment.
containing
motherhood
But the determinable
stability
on
American
in Latin America,
it
America
is
and it tends,
wi th
socialism
A continental
swing
or i n Africa,
wou 1 d
indeed
wou I d
and
perception
what
significant effects on US business and investment; but it wou 1 d not on its own
or affect most Australians or directly threaten
upset
and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability.
Antipodean
stability,
Australians generally are
not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing
perhaps the opposite).
(indeed
spread
not
ought
to be interested in defence of the
the
in
system,
Australia is not interested
defence
(American)
it
in,
or
enterprise"
“free
wherever
of advanced capitalism
its
is
presently
initiated or imposed.
It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss
Contra 5.
that
the Soviets are expansi onistic,
in
interested
empires,
extending their influence where they can.
including
American
academics and sales people).
spread,
Marxism-Leninism,
everywhere.
in at least a weak sense that they
The
and
are
So also
are
most
matter
are
many
Indonesian (so for that
But the Soviets have an ideological message
an
ideology
they
anticipate
Americans also have a capitalist message,
being
installed
free enterprise,
which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them;
they
need to be expansi onistic to have it adopted,
Chinese
little
would
and
whereas the Russians
and
need simply wait for history to take its determined course (though
assistance
surely
- reflecting legitimate doubt about
spread progress wi thou t interfering).
message is pernicious:
this
a
determinism?
Bu t (^he\^jreb^ Russian
both are pernicious (for familiar reasons;
20
to
see
e.g.,
�Erlichs).
some
in
threatens,
proper question is whether Soviet international activity
The
damaging
way,
stability.
global
Soviet-American
doubt
No
confrontation, as in the Cuba missile affair, does threaten stability; but not
in
way that has any bearing on Australian defence.
a
expansionary
none
Australia,
military
tendency,
or
has
otherwise,
fact
In
direct
a
of significance reaches into the Antipodes.
Russian
no
effect
on
bo what is all
the local excitement and anticipation about?
The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and
from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem,
Viewed
qet
locked
addressed.
of
into
unless the Soviets
confrontation with USA - a real
military
internationalism,
be
hardly
the
heavies
But confrontation apart, Soviet
a great success story,
does not seriously
disturb
stability, as seen from Australia.
should
distinguished
be
military
access,
involvement
World
control
involving
anything
since
influence.
War II,
In actual
of
global
on
the
militarily,
that of Afghanistan,
have
accomplished,
especially in Europe.
but
success
in
western
strategic
lacks
Europe,
has
they
the force ratio
And
21
case
little
had
concerns
might.
not
attempt
lacking much plausibility.
needed to
be
assured
of
both by their own standards of what is required
standards.
by
But the idea of Soviet military adventure
Europe is a Western invention and bogey,
military
what
striking
conspicuous
The usual Western apprehension
stability.
and
expansion
the Russian record is hardly
new territory,
Soviets
military
The one
with
influence
military,
with the USA or several other states.
comparison
effect
mere
and
potential
-military,
expansion
types of
a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism,
For
Soviet
to
problem
a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize
global
should
With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part
apart, not by seconding and inciting the USA.
in
overexploited.
the
Soviets have
no
good
The
military
and
by
reasons
or
�in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into
interests
war.
They
client
nuclear
already -Face economic difficulties and trouble with East European
states which they cannot control satisfactorily.
The
of Soviet inf1uence has largely been in the Third
extension
But it has hardly been successful,
with as many failures and losses to record
as Soviet "gains" - gains which add to the imperial burden
countries wracked with problems,
world.
such as Uietnam.
since they involve
The Third World exercises
are marred by Soviet ineptitude and limited by the state of their own economy.
They scarcely displace the global
structure enough to test its stability;
and
they produce no shock waves or even ripples in the Antipodes.
6.
Contra
the
dancers
the
in
East-West dance
confrontation between the lead dancers.
have
destabilizing
new
weapons
arms
tension
control
an
from
escalating
the
With this US policies and
Recent US
practices
and indeed highly destabilising,
and weapons systems,
because of rejection of arms
race on earth and begin a new one in space.
A
vast
practices
more
are
because of
control
and because of star wars preparation which both
and
accelerate
increase
in
and suspicion accompanies the arms race which is in large measure due
to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines,
built-in
but
than Soviet ones,
Soviet proposals,
the
death,
of
as much to do as USSR ones.
least
at
of
The main current threat to world stability comes not from one
incentives
(see FAC).
alliance
or
for pre-emption,
new weapons systems,
and deliberate abandonment
of
with
arms
Such considerations duly assembled demolish the theme that
alignment
with
USA
helps
increase
stability.
American
practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet.
6.
The East-West balance argument; alignment versus neutrality.
The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by
the
East-W^st
balance argument.
This balance argument,
which
17
premisses with the related elitist argument, runs as follows
;
7. Global
stability is the key to world peace.
shares
key
�8.
of the international order is a matter of maintaining a
Stability
global
But
balance.
5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR.
The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open
6A.
and pluralistic international
■?.
order.
indeed most vital
Australia's primary security concern,
is this
interest,
stability. Hence
Australia's
10.
role is to help America maintain the balance.
The rest of Australia's in tervolvement
to follow.
taken
then
before
practical
assumes much that has already been rebutted,
argument
threat
argument
But there are many reasons for halting the
reaches this stage of moral and
it
Soviet
with American military arrangements is
thesis is correct (i.e.
detail.
The
for instance that
the
stabilizing
5) and that US policy is
It also takes for granted,
balance
what now is at least
(part
of 6A).
doubt,
that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than
serious
in
what the administration appears to be aiming at, straight superiority.
event,
that
is not really engaged
Australia
balancing
in some longer term
so much as in helping USA win a nuclear war,
feat,
But in
contradicting the goal
of
world peace of premiss 7.
and its derivation.
Contra
10
follow
that
strength
is
indicate,
the
Ta
role is such a lackey's one.
leaning
America's direction,
in
as
be
If
most
the
Presumably
premiss
balance
of
seems
to
evidence
5A.1 is designed to exclude
putting its weight where it is effective,
this
not
does
team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war
of Australia teaming up with totalitarians.
thouqht,
should
Australia's
it
then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in
Eastern
suggest).
The derivation is inadequate;
with
would
deplorable
Nevertheless Australia
given its
own
broader
(From previous page)
After some reconstruction,
that
is.
For
the
argument, curiously referred as that of "central balance in newspaper
level publications of academics, is never presented in requisite detail
which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute.
�interests
objectives,
could
Australia
fulfil
and
principles.
which would enable it to make
to world peace,
contribution
There are several
satisfactory
more
among them nonalignment and neutrality.
A more direct approach may
Thus 10 is hardly wel1-supported or evident.
be
a
better than throwing our Australian weight unrefIectively on one
the balance.
roles
different
of
side
the balance images and argument
As a little reflection attests,
points not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment.
Contra
4A
(and
peace,
the
preserves
if of course false.
USSR in this munitions dance,
the
escalation
(the
USSR
relation).
balance,
hence
and
Again it takes two at
least
to
checks
the
the history of the dance reveals that
pace flowed from the interaction of the one partner
of
with
the
but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the
That is,
other.
the
it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and
While
tango.
The theme that US maintains
4).
interaction
is
two-way
as
with
Hegel's
master-slave
famous
Furthermore it looks as if, on a different historical
trajectory,
the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for
they have comparable combined GNP,
etc.)
Thus
it
is doubtful
see Appendix 1,
resources,
technological
that the current Soviet
build-up,
produced
in
interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US.
de
6A.1.
As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the
argument,
need only be noted that the international order the USA helps maintain
very much to be desired.
In its intervention,
militarily,
it
leaves
economically and
indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness,
as well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes,
side of American imperialism is well enough documented,
etc.
The negative
if not widely
enough
read or known by Americans.
ad
8
and
maintaining
pass,
the
the
equivocation on the balance.
While balance is
one
stabi1i ty in the world arrangements that have presently
balance
structure can only carry so much loading.
24
way
of
come
to
Add too
much
�weight (of arms,
and so forth)
tension,
The increasing probability of catastrophic
probably catastrophically.
fail,
to both sides and the structure will
breakdown, for a variety of reasons (accident, miscalculation, computer error,
human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI) .
While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for
stability,
the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not.
however,
balance argument,
neglects this dynamical situation,
illegitimately
balance
switching from a (certain) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going)
subsequent
premisses.
The
balance
argument
itself
The
breaks
in
down
through
of
removing
equivocati on.
What
dynamic picture also indicates is the importance
the
weight -from the balance,
some
reduction.
position
It
most obviously by arms limitation and
tension
to a
neutral
points to a different role for Australia,
too
within the nonaligned grouping.
It is to the emerging case
for
a
different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role,
that the positive argument will now gradually swing.
The
attacks
inadequate
upon
East-West
proposals
(its
to repair it.
alleged
good
administrators
This
For example,
Australia
than
with
American
trade
argue,
is a nonsequitur,
and
lots
to the argument, and do not
against nonalignment or neutralism is set
pervasiveness of nuclear winter.
for
for
The additions are inessential
confusion and dust.
the
for a different role
combined
The main effect of these additions is to generate extra
alliance and service.
serve
balance argument is typically
of
other
He might as well
things),
so
aligned
be
our
sagacious
because if the control balance fails we are all
worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (for it also
that balance is necessary for the stability).
dead.
suggests
But, in the main, the attack is
irrelevant because the point of nonalignment, is to help remove overload and to
break down confrontation and its escalation to war;
before winter descends,
it is a thing to do
to delay or halt its descent,
25
now,
and most important,
to
�reduce its severity.
Australia's weight may be slight,
another irrelevant addition goes,
psychologically it is important for the West.
disease" would show the weakening
f or
Sovi e t ex pan s i on ism.
virtual 1y
alignment,
Australi a
gives
the
Bell,
Any further spread of the "Kiwi
of Western resolve, and give the green light
a leading exponent of the balance argument,
impression that if Australia dropped
through
the isles to
Russians would be on the road down
18
the
tomorrow.
Much of this sort of rhetoric i =■ reminiscent of
f
such military interests,
set
route,
major
American
of
out
the
The Russians have no
baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Uietnam time,
and
but
out,
t ie
or present capabli
A
of
they would be met by substantial resistance along most
the
for one,
has
and
the
resistance obtaining Western assistance.
interests,
Philippines,
strengthening
And if they were to gear up
different
as well
the
from
Australia's,
as elsewhere in East Asia.
depends,
argument,
in
For America,
Indonesia
in both
The addition,
its "green light
from
so far
for
expansion"
comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism.
or another
In fact most of the case against alignment of one sort
it is argued. for often nonalignment and neutrality are,
au th or i tar i an
assumptions.
style,
Cat 1ey,
simply
for
denounced
example,
- turns
- when
in good old-fashioned
upon
al ready
another exponent of "central
fau1 ted
balance",
presents the following 'consideration'':
... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia
is
locked by considerations of culture,
economics,
and political
philosophy into the defence of the Western world.
It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that
cannot
easily be
defence
if necessary by hosting facilities which
located elsewhere (p.15).
The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated:
Nay
sustains the conclusion,
prescriptive
18.
and the premiss in no
the argument involving among other things,
(is-ought) fallacy.
Consider the premiss.
Australia is
See the discussion of Bell's claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC.
26
the
not,
�k
unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us,locked into
Western nuclear defence,
its
but in principle free to reconsider and rethink
use of the "facilities" is not irrevocable,
and shortly
options.
(American
comes up .
>,
economics
and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but
f©.r reconsideration.)
in principle at least,
not for nonaligned Western European states?
part
USA or altogether a client
of
frameworks
economic
and
They do not:
state;
and
philosophies
political
significantly different (for details,
defence
(as,
practices
e.g.,
ANZUS in al 1
of
culture,
Australia is not a
cultures,
the
interests,
are
nations
two
But even if the ideological
see CPD) .
frameworks were much more similar than they are,
the
How do
that would not entail
its weakness
similar
nor
shows),
any
defence obligations.
of
Most
worse.
the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley
Fortunately,
calibre
- or
the case against nonalignment is (as with several
then,
o-f the above points) developed in detail elsewhere, especially by 0. Martin in
his
examination
of counter-arguments to
Australian
armed
neutrality,
legally recognised nonbelligerent form of nonalignment he favours.
al 1
of Martin's argument is couched in negative form;
very brief.
make
this
his positive brief
us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet,
needlessless
is
exposes to other dangers,
correct enough,
Virtual 1y
alignment or alliance with the USA
It reduces to thi
including nuclear war'
and in need of wide propagation,
exhausts
the positive case for nonalignment.
posi t ive
case of much theoretical
interest,
the
it
cannot
while
means
no
In particular there is a
to be drawn from the
it
Wh i 1 e
(p.l).
by
is
more
burgeon i ng
theory of collective goods and action.
7.
Free riding, group size, and increasing variety.
The
with
strategic
more
convenience)
world situation we now confront can be viewed as
than 100 players,
major
a
game
counting in nation-states and leaving out
(for
organisations
such
as
the
largest
100
transnational
�These
compan i es.
organisational players align themselves around
two
arge
poles. East and West, as indicated:
EAST
NON-ALIGNED
N
WEST
N
India
N
Sweden#
Swi tzer 1 and#
Tanzani a
Most Latin
.
American States!
##
Costa Rica
State
commmun i st
State
capitali st
N: Nuclear weapons states
#:
Neutral states
##: Nonmi 1i tary states
Key:
There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing,
Some of these
of which are practically important for peace and for stability.
such
games,
as
representation),
World
are
Empire
and
Chicken
(already
There
are several problems about East-Nest games:
have,
the
Russian
what
under
played
played essentially between the East-Nest
representation
negative sum characters of some games.
may,
as they will with the Big One),
end after one round,
And the monolithic East -
way
simplifications may).
So game theoretical
representation
they
like
the
monolithic
Nest dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail
the
one
superplayers.
repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games
roulette,
=ome
will
(in
be
approached differently and more obliquely.
Nor 1d
security,
(technically,
in
like regional and local
joint
security,
is a collective good
supply and precluding exclusion).
28
That is not
of
�to
course
say that there are not conditions under which security
for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and
much to be desired,
intolerant despotism;
provisioning,
it can be argued,
but then,
not the particular product.
collection of N nation-states.
It is,
the trouble lies with the
It is a collective good G for the
furthermore,
a collective good
permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states.
perspective
the American complaint about its allies,
insufficient expenditure on defence,
their
leave
may
which
Looked at from this
and
Japan for example,
is a complaint about their
free
riding.
Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding
extracted by Pettit) are satisfied,
disarming states.
For
to
the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member
and
any,
unilaterally
is available to all N members of the collective if it is available
G
1.
for instance by neutral and
(as
better off.
2.
G
is
achieved iff some number m^K contribute towards
its
provision,
where under the balance of power assumption
IICTK^N and II = (USA, USSR}.
The
3.
expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less
than
the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs exceed likely benefits
except for perhaps members of II given that G is provided by II.
is
There
pegged
by
what
free-rider
problem,
members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open
- within
ran be called a pegged (or
asymmetric)
the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3
only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g.
a
war
10
years down the road so the expected costs
each—year
is
there will be
exceed
the
expected benefits).
There
regional)
is
a
straightforward
case
for
recommending
free riding on the balance of power provision of 6.
2?
Australian
(and
Some arguments,
�beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:-
Either
If it does then the region is better off than it would be if
or it does not.
(strongly)
the
as
and there is a large-scale war
stability breaks down catastrophically
aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily)
targetted.
(Here
dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes
might
well
be involved gets challenged and rejected:
see
MF).
doesn't break down then the region has the benefits in any case,
enhances global
USA
stability,
indeed, as remarked and wi11
etc.;
regional
weight
significant?
of
delusional
the
in
That
power?
framework.
Ne shouldn't:
we
believe
seriously
it
and if we do we're
is
the
in
living
in
a
Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually
strategic planning exercises,
all
do
Australian voice makes much real difference
the
Northern
Western block,
be
As regards Australasian
further argued, the evidence points to the contrary.
halls
the
without
For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with
costs.
the
stability
If
most difference-making peace
initiative^,
etc., etc.
Now
riding,
Eastern
rather
countries would hardly
block
th an
suppor t
of f ering
object
(h owever
to
free
Antipodean
c omf or t
trifling),
an d
Furthermore free riding is how the Americans,
incitement to their opposition.
the rational
would expect Australia to act,
on their theoretical principles
self interested procedure (see CPD). It is economically rational; contributing
is not.
But won't the Americans make things economically dear for Australia?
In threats and theory,
do
yes; but in practice, no more than they threatened
already in the case of New Zealand with the nuclear-ships issue.
short
term
arrangements:
aberrations,
America
will
never
give
up
trade
But
or
to
for
market
one gets the impression that America would trade with the Devil
Himself if it could open some new markets in Hell.
Despite its political stigma,
way
immoral or irregular.
voluntary payment system,
free riding need be no problem,
Perhaps the buses are free;
perhaps there
to which only some need contribute,
30
or in any
etc.
i =>
a
Hi th the
�contributing is not (see
nuclear fix, free riding is indeed the moral course;
HPI).
Free riding, though often portrayed as a problem, is only a problem in
certain
and
desirable
sufficiently
riders.
collective
of
cases
is
This
in
Australia
stays
the
the escalating treadmill or gets
is,
off
is
involved
many
too
free
which
will
whether
or
security,
and precarious way that it
curious
on
good
will not be provided because of
the situation with global
not
the
provided,
where
provisioning,
rides
and
be
not
free.
Australia's free riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia.
Interests diverge again.
of
stability
by
building,
tripod
or
bipedal
one,
for example,
if it is a wind tower or
of
supports
increases stability.
instance in the theory of "spreading the risks"
certain
a
cybernetics.
free
The
increases
and
by
similar
Then
a
than
a
has
in
diversity
ecology,
for
The related theme,
(see EH).
stability,
that
theme
The
elaborated
been
in
core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia's
and consequent nonalignment in defence
riding
variety,
variety
topple
point
the
Increasing the diversity,
with stability has been sharpened and confirmed
correlates
that
ground.
a quadrapod tower is much less likely to
and requires less guying to stay up.
variety,
certain
increasing its rigid ties or supports to the
better
terms,
pictorial
structure is typically increased up to a
it more adequately;
securing
or
a
In
riding increases stability.
free
Judicious
enhances
diversity
accordingly increases stability (especially if done in
and
concert
with other client states).
Two
hardly
interlocked
well
precarious
guyed,
structure
well dug
in
but
stability
of
the
Hhat makes engineering sense
is
not
supports in tension,
are
inadequate
of world peace.
East and Hest,
for the
long
term
however
strengthening the supports that are there,
balance
is disturbed by the Host's surging ahead and likely overburdening the
structure,
helping the East when the
but increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying
31
�group size.
East-monolithic
monolithic
The
West
picture
misconceptualism perhaps convenient ■for some players.
in conceptualism,
main reason for mistakes concerns group size.
collective
but
is
significantly
differs
behaviour of large groups
theory
in
group size is a highly significant factor (though
group
■from that of smal I
One
Whereas 11+ = (West, East) is a
N of nation-states is not.
number
the
group,
a
It may ■force mistakes
convenient simplification, e.g. for strategic thinking.
smal1
than
more
much
is
i t s pr ec i se i mpor t is increasingly contested).
N of nation-states is a large
group
The
group,
of
interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors.
the American theory of collective action applies:
that
interest,
counterintuitive way.
a
in
behave
self
essentially
So we may expect
wi 1 1
that the groups
Though expec ted to act
in
the
to obtain security in particular, the collection will not.
common
On this
account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed
by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson's rapid thinking).
there is, as experience has shown, no outside
with the collective of nations,
mediator
collective
or
influence
good.
The
But
of sufficient authority to ensure attainment
prognosis
looks very
gloomy:
this
of
the
important
most
(though far from unique) collective good will not be provided.
Fortunately the reasoning,
has
been
containing
shift
economic
virtually
(subjectively)
back
actors
though large.
highly
is
to basics,
all
privileged,
for whom costs of war exceed benefits
in perspective from the earlier free riding condi t i on
important
that
The group,
too swift.
several
like much of the "logic" of collective action,
3).
effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear
actors involved should now be
expected
in
that
(note
in
the
Indeed
an
winter
is
posit i on;
costs of nuclear war have become very high.
for
go
Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants/-----tautology
(defining 'net')
32
�gross agent benefits - gross agent costs.
net agent benefit
i.e.
A
for each agent or actor i
ymbols,
in
show
i
for virtually all
that
in N.
is positive for some i
is privi1eqed if A
group
(in collective N) ,
European
to
benefi t s
of global security are decidedly positive (e.g.
respective future GDPs would expectedly fal 1
needs
1
the
net
wi th a nuclear
war
nation-states
argument
their
It
to near zero).
The
fact
the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the
that
good i nvo1ved,
c o1 Iec t i ve
longer term.
error,
stability
■ JI
instabi1i ty.
dynamics,
An
achieved
improved
particularly in
wi11 be supplied,
secur i ty,
dynami c ;
it takes no account of mistake.
through
superiority
modelling
or
intermediate
- which can take some account
iterated games — is gained by returning to
through
the
the
of
game theoretic
ground
A free rider "problem" is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according
to
conventional wisdom,
the
contrast
Taylor
and
Hard).
it is a prisoners'
(cf.
dilemma
The argument can go this
but
Pettit,
way;- a
free
rider
problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good;
theory
the
but
of collective goods is equivalent to that
of
a
prisoners
20
dilemma.
dilemma;
in
detail
which
more
Certainly
the
global nuclear situation
as much is a commonplace claim.
appears
Elsewhere (HPI)
that it does indeed present a moral dilemma.
to
present
a
it has been argued
Here the argument
can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the
piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential
dilemma
21
(for members of N).
19.
The
less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin
(82,
p.20,
p.39),
but with agents'
costs or contributions,
C,
duly agent
relativized.
Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter,
thus
strictly falsifying the tautology.
20.
Thus Hardin who (in 82) claims to 'demonstrate the equivalence of
the
logic of collective action and the Prisoners'
Dilemma'
(p.4).
The
demonstration, which will be contested elsewhere, is given on p.x.5ff.
21.
But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect.
�the range of apparent two party games being played by the US
Hardin 83),
Union
Soviet
(labelled US and SU respectively)
administration
regards the moves of further nuclear armament.
(It is supposed,
A,
from
the
or nuclear disarmament, N.
It is important here,
as other
French
that
The American people seem rather
more
were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their
people
the
towards nuclear disarmament than their administration;
inclined
to
proceeded
German
administration
The strategy games involved are then
install.
shots
It is administrations or governments
etc.
take people into war;
to
places,
administration - which for the most part calls the
the society and the people.
generally
as
that the game is set in some background context,
naturally,
Chinese nuclear armament).
distinguish
and
1985
in
nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going
e.q.
and
(e.q.
since these have obtained some discussion
us consider -first,
Let
administration
which we can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.q.
games,
years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until
the Big
Ones explode.
The
apparent games of US and SU are those diagrammed next:
Pr i soners'
A
4,1
D
2,2
O
1,4
this
being
played.
According
professions!1ez
the
A
1,4
CP
presumably
also
represented US policy,
it
no
aggressive,
D
A
4,1
D
3,2
US
CP
1,4
to Hardin, 'giving evidence of
Dilemma
Prisoners'
ordering of virtually all
that
A
4,1
that
simplistic setting those represent the apparent games
Within
and
D
D
3,3
US
IJS
A
SU
SU
SU
D
New Initial Game
Revised Game
Dilemma Game
in
(PD)
'represents
[his]
deformation
the
preference
the articulate policy analysts in the United
the
Soviet Union'
(p.248) .
While
PD
there is considerable evidence (as already
longer does,
war-fighting,
34
That
is,
the
US has
States
may
have
indicated)
that the US administration has shifted to
phase.
are
a
interchanged
more
its
�rankings of (D,D)
Soviets,
The
have
who
been
much
more consistent
no
(and
bound to try to keep up with the Americans,
their
changed
However they are
have stuck with deterrence and no-first-strike.
but
better
doubt
appear not to have
in their policy pronouncements,
censored)
game,
and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games.
and so pushed towards the Revised
Game shown, which p1easan11y restores symmetry.
Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled.
said
be
to
stable
if neither player has
unilaterally on the strength of the game,
influencing
provide
in
broad sense,
a
and dangerous outcome.
strategy for each player;
dominant
that equilibirum
In all
All
strategies.
is
hence
its
economic fascination.
results
which
are
socially suboptimal
(and
games that might plausibly be taken to represent
situation,
and
A
recognisably
guaranteed by the independent "stable" strategies.
substantial
to
political
substantially
the
games
satisficing
the
suboptimal
superpower
outcome
socially
superior
is
there are
What is worse,
and military incentives for the superpower players
adjust their preferences in
after repeated games,
an
And the same applies to suggested
alternative
Chicken.
other
a
below
all
as
in
Pareto-
even
But as the
threshold),
such
achieved
yet in the PD game that is
these games are di 1emmas.
games
these
the apparent games arming is
and
suboptimal,
strategies
switch
i.e. to alter the outcome except by
player also to alter
other
dilemmas
undesirable
deliver
the
to
incentive
An outcome is
not
directions
but to do what the US appears to have done, to make the
situation worse.
socially preferable would be change to a coordination game of
Much
some
sort, for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey,
in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers
playing;
hence Hardin's label
diagrammed,
WN
inclined neutral
represents
a
for this game,
'Lackey's Game').
Western-inclined
(e.g. Yugos1avi a):
neutral and
EN
In the game
an
Eastern
�A
3,2
D
D
(D
A
2,3
NN
Now
4,4
dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in
the
integrated
since
[Other coordination games, with
(D,D) assigned (1,1) 1
in
settings
such as Uni ted Nations' committees
games
coordination
are
(and
games
peoples'
-frequently
but
isolation,
elsewhere,
as
well).
Superimposing the games, as applied to US and SU games, leads to the following
augmented games:
SU
SU
SU
A
D
A
2,2
4,1
1
2/3
3,3
•
1
4,1
.
2/3
1,4
•
2/3
2,2
D
J,3
■
4
1,4
■
A
2/3!
A
m represents a sequence of ms,
and 3s in some order.
As the agumented games reveal,
a stable deadlock.
on the superpowers.
4
i ■ e? ■
2/3
4
■
2/3 a sequence of 2s
m < m w rn
in fact in several ways.
on
For example,
would
For one, enough significant
much
greater
as a
Superpower
militarism
Australia's
nonaligned
free
impact,
rider
for disarmament and regional nuclear freedom (instead of by
wash polemics and token ambassadors,
US support) .
36
strategy
with less support, unilateral action by US
arms build-up can be exposed.
be
in
much more pressure can be brought to bear-
power excursions would stand naked, and unsupported.
seriously
<2,3
to play with a superpower is to help reinforce
For another,
towards disarmament.
particular,
1,4
A
a coordination game can alter the overall dominant
playing
administration
4,1
•
2/3
But playing an independent coordination game can help
breaking the deadlock,
players
3,2
■
D
1
US
US
US
A
D
D
D
New
Game, Augmented
Revi sed
Game, Augmented
Prisoners" Dilemma
Augmented
and
in
pressing
white
undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of
�8.
On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of basic structural change-
The
peace
(in
world has changed enormously since the time of Kant's proposals
and even since the time of Veblen's more cynical
(of 1795),
additions
Hard science and destructive power have grown enormously; and even
1917).
especially that admitting
knowledge of collective behaviour,
theoretical
game-theoretic treatment,
what
for
though still
has increased markedly.
slight,
be accomplished politically has in certain
can
little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761)
of
respects
But
changed
very
that governments were probably
too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace.
Governments
have
obstacles to peace.
long
of
source
been seen as Xthe main (contingent)
if the peace is
Thus Veblen rightly maintains that ' ...
to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management,
- in spite of the State rather than by its good offices'- (p.7) .
against
the
State
on the basis that 'governmental
Veblen argues
and
establishments
powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in
turn,
However
a predatory origin and of an irresponsible
of
are
character
Christian-feudal origin of the State provides only one
the
(p.r).
- and
a
coercive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13).
There are major blockages to peace proposals and projects at two main and
critical
levels
of
organisation,
that,
organisation of collectives of states and,
organisation
deep,
and
domination
of
removal
and
to
nothing
set
in part by devolution,
themselves.
these blockages,
and
exploitation of other forms,
sights rather lower,
short
organisation
of
states,
upon,
The problems involved
ones
intertangled
appears to call
genuine global
appear
adequate.
impossible in present political climates.
37
Yet even much
the
for
are
concerning
extensive
reached,
to
be
attained,
levels
of
political
stability
of extensive structural changes at both
would
of
that of the
Indeed if a permanent and satisfactory peace is to be
adjustments.
or
individual
focussed
already
smaller
changes
look
�There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural change are
to
conducive
peace and that certain fundamental
permanent peace.
for
changes would be
With that in view they have long been
least from Rousseau and Kant onwards.
transform the structures that lead to war'- (B.
theme
immune
to
criticisms,
obvious
further desiderata,
modest material
freedoms,
~ at
advocated
for
'it is also necessary
instance
to
To render this
Martin, p.12).
that
straightforward
extension of certain established structures could bring an
authoritarian
to war,
sufficient
But it has also long been supposed that
such changes are necessary for lasting peace:
some
highly
end
typically presupposed, are invoked, e.g. certain
standards of life, etc., and the type of necessity
involved is set at some lower technical
level
(not excluded however by present
These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to
practicalities).
assess, but also difficult to sustain.
are
There
part,
critical
positive
part,
part
negative
According
marxist
demolishing
and
range of arguments
a
defence,
from
a
negative
determinism,
of
comprising
direct arguments for
the
theme.
22
this enterprise will simply be illustrated.
to deterministic and mechanistic approaches,
technological
determinism,
human
nuclear
weapons,
The
large
such as that
like
of
megamachines
They are an integral part of the business of
generally,
are
no aberration.
industrial
and
ecological conquest,
a further stage in
human
intervention
which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides,
etc.
The argument tends to the fatalistic.
made,
and once made they wi11
22.
and
etc., that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and
nature,
a
parts to its assessment
two
be used.
wastes,
The megamachines of conquest are
No change in political
arrangement,
More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere,
e.g.
a critique
of
the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun
in CPD.
From
Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been supposed that
war,
like aggression,
is part of human nature,
that war is a permanent
condition of human and social existence.
38
�would
which
enthusiasts
any
make
difference,
possible.
is
their position and luck,
push
While there is, unfortunately, a
induction from the manufacture of weapons,
batches
machines
are
to this one,
depl oyed) ,
never
(and
organisation
deterministic
position
would
possible either; political
not frustrate
the
and
other,
is false,
Different political arrangements,
been
have
inductions.
broader
The
are
changes
arrangements too, like the rest of social
not
life, are
But (nonanalytical) determinism,
technologically or economically determined.
technological
many
that a change in background
of course that such background
is
made
of
But even the good inductions do not
that weapons of various sorts must be used,
political
many
invention
from
induction's:-
machines that do eventually get
many
reinvented or independently discovered).
show
of any given type (for
or the like to their manufacture are unreliable and subject to
counterexamples
or
weapon
there is no stopping progress.
But in doing so they overextend themsleves.
fair
technological
that a
even further,
once invented by humans will be used:
device
Sometimes
so it is argued
which alleviate problems,
are
possible and would be different in differently evolved worlds.
CPD).
(JB,
elsewhere
technically
Things did not
and do not have to be the way they are or the social and political sort of way
they are.
Many routes,
dominant
require
none of deductive strength,
political
extensive
lead to the conclusion that the
structures of our time,
evolved from feudal
structural alteration.
In particular,
institutions,
they need
to
superseded by alternative structures which do not promote or lead to war.
theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix (see e.g.
But
suppose,
improbable as it may seem,
thereby removing the current nuclear fix;
quietly
seif-destructing,or
nuclear
disarmament
HF I,
p.4/ft.).
that nuclear weapons all
vanished,
for instance,
thermodynamic
actually took place.
The
they turned out to be
miracle
occurred,
or
not
be
The problem of war would
t-hat of nuclear war would only be given a short respite.
23
Conventional
the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.
removed
For
a massive
be
and
even
3'?
�remain,
weapons
would
weapons
such as chemical and biological ones,
were
they
prevent
the
in sot ar
3S
could seem
be
Nu clear weapon s,
if nuclear power plants remained
especially
nothing
and
intact;
development of (Star wars) weapons more
nuclear-
as
dangerous
caches are easily hidden away),
removed ("for smal 1
replaced,
would
along with weapons perhaps as
than
diabolical
nuclear ones.
War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is
by freezing the status quo.
... The structural conditions for war
need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and
superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war
(B.
Martin, p.12).
Structural adjustments
peace.
An
can provide conditions for
Kantian
initial
for the
argument
satisfactory
lasting
proposition
that
is
peace
possible, presented by Latta (introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a
practical
ideal, a moral principle.
ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally)
Hence this ideal
to be peace.
But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible.
From
Heracleitus
philosophers
by
24
be
with war as one limit, is essential
swarm
more
widely
conceded,
ought
to
though
often
not
on
of
Some are even captivated
stop,
to motion and progress.
the recent shift in philosophical fashions the second premiss would
Kantian
grounds,
now
but
Such grounds do support the theme that peace ...is—desirable
be realised,
indicate what sort of peace.
but are more discriminating in
Unfortunately,
premiss does not sustain the conclusion,
23?
impressive
such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would
consequentialist.
and
there buzzes an
Hegel
who have rejected the second premiss.
that competition,
With
through
that
they
help
however/ it is done, the second
ought does not entail can,
as
many
(From previous page)
As B. Martin, who uses this important form of
argument for institutional change to get his thick book
started,
points
ou t (pp. 12-13).
24.
The
swarm includes some anomalies,
ecology, Spinoza: see Appendix 3.
40
such as that tarnished hero of
deep
�dilemmas reveal
moral
Fortunately
(see MD) .
conclusion that peace is possible,
method of (semantical) modelling:
societies
where
recall
persists
present in detail
scenarios
of
it may be
necessary
to
(for the sceptical
with n = 1 or n = 0).
n-human models,
the
to
That is the more
and indeed is feasible.
elaborate
peace
route
a more satisfactory and revealing
is
there
This sort of thing is of course
in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate if
25
less precisely,
by novelists.
Hhat all these scenarios point
to,
already done,
rather
however,
are societies considerably different from our own, not in the people
involved
who have their weaknesses,
forth,
and so
their power drives,
but
because of significant structural alterations in the societies depi c ted.
way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibi1i ty
By
peace,
sorts
restructured
push ahead with the argument - that societies
but
desirable alternatives to contemporary
are
For those of us
industrial arrangements.
pacific
the
alternatives,
Heilbroner
is
has
and
possible
said
thoroughly entrenched,
of
the
desirable,
human
and enforced,
power.
That has not deterred social
before
him and many after him,
Kant,
25.
in
his
search
these
military
or
then who want to move towards such
from
inference,
feasibility
and
we shou1d begin on the real work of structural change.
desirability is clear:
Peace
practical
of
of
but
the
prospect).
prospects
Present
poor
(as
arrangements
are
are
both ideologically and by much physical
theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau
were concerned with obtaining lasting
for the indispensible conditions
peace.
for__ 1 asting—peace,
Perhaps Kant had some such modellings in view in his theme that peace is
empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that it is
morally and rationally imperative.
The latter claim,
running in direct
opposition
to the longline of bellicose philosophers,
really relies on
the correct but controversial assumption that states are subject to
the
same moral relations as individual persons.
Both then have an obligation
to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from
rational autonomy , the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of
persons (or, more chauvinistically, of humanity).
41
�claimed,
others
as
have claimed since,
that peace is
not
possible
present structural arrangements of a competing nation-states kind.
times
changed,
have
and so have state structural
In particular there is now,
under
To be sure
since
arrangements,
in the shape of the United
Kant
Nations,
a
very weak reflection of what Kant looked for, a world (or European) federation
of nations.
namely,
But crucial
the
at
ingredients in Kant's resolution are still
upper level,
what is required for a standard resolution
Dilemma type situations - some surrender of
Prisoners
lacking:-
of
sovereignty,
national
26
especially as regards war;
Much
has now accumulated that more
evidence
the
and, at the lower level, "republican" state*.
nation-state level
far-reaching
changes
if peace is to be secured,
or
required
at
movement
is even to get its message through already fixed channels
control
systems.
succeed,
tn
informational
and democratic
are
practical
27.
and
not
(p.52) ,
to
alter
which
the
theoretical arguments for
not that it has fallen very
Kant's
claim,
as
well
as
arguments of an inductive sort.
Such is also the new message from America:
for the peace movement to get
through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and
revitalised,
capitalist democracy superseded by
true democracy or
"republicanism"
(see e.g.
Cohen and Ragers).
But the message, like the
US peace movements'" very limited demands for peace,
leaves the state, as
the bringer of wars, and the main source of violence, essentially intac.;
the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much
too narrowly conceived.
28.
state
has traced some of the economic consequences of 'the rise and
subsequent fall of the American imperium'’
There
to
The significant decline of the American imperium
Heilbroner
26^
peace
Movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to
channels,
27
character and membership of state control system^.
widen
APPENDIX 1;
a
need to be linked into a broader plurality of movements,
but
are
My thanks for information to David Bennett and Andrew Mack.
�'Empires
f ar .
empire
was
no
Thp =h<=pr military cost ... for the United States a 1 one ...
12
px c e p t i on «
is
always been expensive and the American
have
ten
roughly
imperial
American
dol1ars)".
GNP for the last 25 years
...
percent of
supplemented
spending
enhanced poverty,
countries fueled inflation,
what it was represented as required by,
$2X10
in
capitalist
other
by
1972
etc., and was complemented by,
counterexpenditure and efforts by the
USSR.
establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and] resulted
'The
just
in
American
large
very
capital
American-owned
billion"
payments
and
Between 1950 and 1970,
equipment abroad 1 eaped from $ 12
(negative
build-up
of
value
of
the
to
billion
"capital
flows" and
balances),
and
a
$78
growing
On this sort of basis Heilbroner speculates that
of IOUs.
operation
rapid
A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of
problem
accumulation
mere
investments abroad.
plant
(p.54).
but in the
military expenditures,
not
of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such
'the
critical
importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in
likelihood
all
a
inflationary phenomena'
the
for
the
globalisation
of
the
(p.57 with insert from p.56).
According to Heilbroner,
that
condition
sufficient
'Long before the Vietnam debacle,
it was clear
American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in
under-developed
collapse
there
world"
(p.57).
is presented by Heilbroner;
But
and seemingly there
little
is
evidence
little.
is more substantial evidence for is the marked dec H ng of *he
imperium in the period (1973-3) concerned.
decline
really very
in
America's
select leading national
share of World GDP,
economies:
43
of
What
American
One piece of evidence is the sharp
shown in the following
table
of
�POPULATION
SHARE
(1984 est)
SHARE OF WORLD GDP (X)
RANK
1968
1975
1984
USA
1
35.0
24.3
25.0
5.2
USSR
2
11.1
11.0
13.8
6.2
.JAPAN
3
5.2
3.0
9.5
2.7
GERMANY FDR
4
5.1
6.7
5.7
1.5
FRANCE
5
4.6
5.4
4.4
1.3
CHINA
6
2.9
4.8
4.3
22.6
UK
8
2.8
2.8
2.3
1.3
INDIA
12
1.3
1.5
1.1
15.1
AUSTRALIA
15
1.1
1.4
1.0
0.3
COUNTRY
The
qrand
table
empire,
also make it clear that if the USA cannot
should
nor can the USSR.
sustain
A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even
a
le=s
likely than a capitalistic Pax Americana was.
APPENDIX 2:
A pluralistic framework for defence policy
The policy (broadeni ng Cami11 er izs suggest ions)
1.
ensures Australian security to some minimal but reasonable extent;
2.
is entirely non-nuclear (.and so is not aligned);
3.
is
defensive
in
posture
with
weapons
system
devoid
of
offensive
application and capacity, focussing on direct defence of Continent,
is decentralised, comprising wel1-trained, dispersed but coordinated small
units.
is partly at least social,
defence,
nonmilitary
deploying,
in combination [?] with territorial
forms of popular resistance trained in
noncooperat i on.
44
sabotage
a
�APPENDIX 3?
The philosophical record; a preliminary tabulation.
Reflection on war and peace has had a strong polarising effect,
dividing
philosophers into two main groups:
Group B.
Those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even as desirable;
Group G.
Those who consider war an evil, capable of being replaced by lasting
and
peace through goodwill or improved social arrangements.
The groups are not however exhaustive;
fence-sitters;
and
there
are
there are ambivalent philosophers, and
those who have
the
supported
battered themes of a war to end wars and of world empire.
at one stage in his development,
to
a despotic world state,
peace.
Russell,
idealists.
reached by imposition or war,
B and G are sometimes described,
But
while
Thus, for example,
who looked, like Dante before him,
So strictly the classification is (once again)
Groups
historically-
as a guarantor
of
four valued.
respectively,
as realists
and
these overworked terms reflect accurately enough
the
historic human condition and the present prospects,
they are prejudicial, and
they conflict with other classifications using these terms; for instance, both
Plato
and
Hegel,
condition
of human existence.
idealists
would
Northedge,
accept war as
normally accounted idealists,
have
been
a
Such concoctions as war-realists
preferable
to the
labels
from whom much of the record is drawn,
the
c on serva t i ve t r ad i t i on a n d aboli t i on i sts.
the
concoctions,
45
terms
and
of
sets the contrast:
peace-
which
namely
We shall prefer adaptions
namely war-riors and peace-niks,
simply (real) baddies and goodies.
in
permanent
or,
not to be
of
partisan,
�DEFINING POLES
R adi c a 1 s
GROUP 8:
war-riors
RESIDUE GROUP
GROUP G
peace-niks
Virtually all classic
Greek phi1osophers
except early Stoics:
especially Heracleitus,
Plato (P)
Author of
Revel at ions
Early Christians
(non-violence
pr i n c i p 1 e)
Dubois (1306);
but with anti
Musi im aim
Erasmus ( 1570)
Cruce (1623; early
world order model
Roman Stoics and Christians
Scholastics: Aquinas (P)
Dante
•Just war theorists:
(Au Qu s t i n e) , SuIr ez,
Grotius (1425)
IJ t op i an s: More (war
games of modern
utopias in direct
descen t)
European peace
projects, some extended
to (Christian)
wor1d:
Bel 1ers ( 1710),
Penn (1693), abb£ de
Saint-Pierre (1713)
European peace
and hegemony:
Duke of Sully
(1620)
Nation-state theorists
Machiave1 1 i, Hobbes,
Locke, Spinoza
I-<2'1 b n /f’-j
German idealists:
Hegel, Schopenhauer
Perpetual peace:
Rousseau, Kant
Mili t ar i st s: Nietzsche;
Treitschke, Bernhardi,
Clausewi tz
Some utili tar i ans:
Bentham, the Mil Is,
Bren tano
Some anarchists and
1ibertarians:
Kropotkin (?),
Spencer
Russel 1
■James
Hi t tgenstei n
Key:
In
Dewey
P, peace a prime objective.
sort of investigation there are disappointments as
this
Spinoza
was
admiration
madness
to
a
major disappointment,
of Greek thought,
allow
Brentano a
find.
well
For,
as
finds.
despite
his
'Brentano was a decided pacifist and thought it
questions of international
fortunes of war'- (Kraus in Brentano, p.122).
46
justice to be
decided
by
the
�REFERENCES
H.G. Andrewortha
Birch,
and L.C.
University of Chicago
The Ecological Neb,
1984.
Press,
H.R. Ashby, Design -for a Brain, Second edition. Hi ley. New York,
I960.
S. Beer, Desiqninq Freedom, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, Toronto,
F. Brentano,
The
Origin of our Knowledge of Right and Wrong,
Keegan Paul, London
1969.
'Setting
the
J. Camilleri,
disarmament
agenda",
l?/4.
Routledge
and
Peace------ Studies
9,
( 1984) ,17-19.
F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green Politics, Hutchinson, London,
R. Catley,
with the Bomb ...
'Along
Australian Magazine, 7-8 April,
(Review o-f
1984.
Martin),
D.
The—Weekend
1984.
1979.
P. Cock, Alternative Australia, Qu ar t er Book s, Me1 hourn e,
J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy, Penguin, New York,
1984.
P. and A. Erlich, Popu1 ation, Resourses, Environment, Second edition, Freeman,
San Francisco,
H. Feith,
197x.
'Richard Falk,
Peace Studies 24 (June 1985)
World order radical',
24-5.
J. Galtung, There are Alternatives, Spokesman, Nottingham,
17’84.
A. Gilbert,
'The state and nature in Australia', Au s t r a 1i an Cu 1 t yral—Hist or
1981 (ed. S. Goldberg and F.B. Smith), Canberra, 1982, pp.9-28.
R. Hardin, Co 1 1 ec 1 tive Action , Resources -for the Future, Washington,
R. Hardin,
M.D.
Hayes,
Ph i 1 osop_hy—and—Pub He
236-254.
'Defending
September 1983)
mutual disarmament',
versus
'Unilateral
Affairs 12 (1983)
the sunburnt country',
Chain Reaction
33
(August
11-17.
R.L. Heilbroner, Beyond Boom and Bust, Norton, New York,
19/8.
I. Kant,
Perpetual
Peace (trans,
and
introd. M.
Campbell
Sonnerschein, London, 1903 (first published 1795).
A. Mack, 'Farewell
1?82.
Smith),
Swan
to Arms Controls' 9 (1984) 9ff.
A. Mack, 'The pros and cons of ANZUS', Fabian ANZUS Conference, Lome, 4-5 May
1985;
referred to as PC.
B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London,
1984.
D. Martin, Armed Neutrality for Australia, Drummond Books, Melbourne,
47
1984.
�Northedge,
'Peace , war and philosophy',
in Encyclopedia of Phi 1osophy
(ed. P. Edwards), Volume 6, Macmillan, New York, 1767, 63 t>< .
M. Olson, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge,
Mass.,
1965.
P. Pettit, 'Tree riding and foul
dealing', typescript, Canberra,
J.-J. Rousseau, A Project for Perpetual Peace C trans.
1927 (first published 1761).
E.M.
1985
Nut tai), London,
large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence,
'On the ethics of
R. Rout ley,
out' ,
Discussion__ Papers__ in
Environmental
and
the political
fall
School of Social Sciences, Australian National
Ph i1osophy #5,
Research
University, 1984.
R.
R.
Routlpy,
'Metaphysical fall-out from the nuclear predicament', 1 Ph 11osophy
"and 1 Social Criticism 3/4 ( 1984) 19-34; referred to as MF.
Rout ley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic^notions ,
'ni\r,.^.ign Papers in Environmen tai ..Philosophy #4,
Research School
of
SociaT~Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as MD.
P.R. Stephen son, The Foundation s of Cu1t u r e, N.J. M i1es, oydn ey,
R. Sylvan,
'Culture
Canberra,
1985;
and
the
roots of
political
divergence',
1 ? 36.
typescript,
referred to as CPD.
M. Taylor and H. Hard, 'Chickens, whales, and bumpy goods: al ternative models
of public-goods provision', Poli tical Studies 30 (19821 350 370.
The Strategic Basis of Australian Defence .Policy,
the National Times, March 30-April 5,
leaked extracts published in
1984, 23-30.
to Australian Security,
Pariiamentary Joint Committee for Foreign
Affairs and Defence, Australian Government Printer, Canberra; referred .o
3. s TAS.
T. Veblen, An
Inquiry into the Nature of Peace and the Terms of
Perpetuation, Viking Press, New York, 1945 (first published 191,).
48
its
�
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WORKING DRAFT
AUSTRALIA'S DEFENCE PHILOSOPHY? Investigations
of the nonexistent # MX504
'The opinions of philosophers, with regard to the conditions of the
possibility of a public peace,
shall be taken into consideration by
states armed for war'' (Kant,
'A [the only]
secret article for
perpetual
peace',
p.158,
an article flattering no doubt
to
philosophers, but neglecting their dominant bellicose tradition).
A defence philosophy is much more than a defence policy.
A policy can be
merely by a list of directives as to what do in various
given
at
even
its
philosophy
policy
best it need only involve practical
into a theoretical
setting,
contrast,
integration
of
a
the
which looks at the key concepts involved:
security, stability, control,
here,
By
wisdom.
goes deeper and requires theoretical wisdom,
circumstances;
protection, defence, interests, national
interests, intelligence, war, etc. Defence philosophy is a branch of political
and
social
philosophy,
and has long been treated as such,
though under such
more familiar and honest headings as "of war" and "of peace" (see Appendix
Like
most
of philosophy it can be applied,
parts
in
regional
3}.
among
ways
others.
defence
A
approaches
to
philosophy should embed appropriate defence arrangements
war
not merely
and peace,
or
superficially
into
and
"foreign
policy", but into the way and intended way of life of a country, both into on
going
culture
policy
defence
power
and
into the intended or planned
typically takes prevailing socio-political
structures for granted;
questioning
of
merits
cultural
arrangements.
arrangements
a defence philosophy again penetrates
or rejecting features of these structures,
enquiring as
things and institutions of which defence is planned,
society should be defended by what sort of appropriate
sort
of
what
lengths.
What,
for
instance,
1
is Australia
what
are
A
and
deeper,
to
asking
methods
the
what
and
Australi ans,
concerned to defend, aiming to defend?
defending,
How much of what others have,
Abroad?
region?
defending,
Does
preserving?
defending?
Would
Indonesians
made
anyone
a
Randwick
stage
a
or what we have,
Eagle
or
racecourse,
last stand
for
is
worth
Farm,
merit
Estate?
Oaks
strike in Australia .just
lightning
In the
Here in Australia?
to
If
remove
the
B.jelke-
Petersen, should we resist?
of the necessary prerequisites have been adequately thought about in
Few
Australia,
unplanned
where
muddling
through
immediate problem - reactive contingency
1
generous
- is the main style of political
"planning",
life,
immediate
if
you
help
to
supply it with one or more,
to
problem
want
and ipso facto
of
be
to
defence
Its phi1osophers
Australia does not yet have a defence philosophy.
planning.
could
from
and to inject
some
depth
into
broader defence theorizing.
1.
Australian
defence
inappropriate
"policy";
incoherent,
obsolescent
American,
Indeed Australia seems to lack even a clear and coherent defence
This
pol icy.
charge (made even by friends of Defence
commonplace
interested
in
2
obtaining extra public funding for defence and elements of C3I).
The reasons
is
concern
not
merely
the
major unsolved issues
of
exactly
what
is
being
defended, what things and objects and what interests, and whose, what freedoms
and
values;
and
what
role American defence facilities
in
Australia
supposed to have in this - but a range of more detailed lacunae such as:
of
clearly-defined
on what needs defending and how it is
priorities
accomplished;
doubtful
contingencies
in
are
lack
to
be
capacity of present defence forces to handle low-level
and to the north of Australia and in
maritime
zones;
and
1.
The point, which is not uncontroversial, is argued in effect in Gilbert.
2.
Amazingly,
in
the Strategic Basis Papers, Australia criticizes New
Zealand because 'it has still developed no policy for national
defence
and
tends to
look
to ...
the US as its primary source of defence
guidance''
(p.29) .
Note
that C3I abbreviates the mouthful ,
Command,
Control, Communications and Intelligence.
2
unsatisfactory (or no)
defence
civil
and
administration,
arrangements and planning for
use
of
protection
civil
infrastructure,
key facilities and
of
"defence-in-depth",
wartime
mobilisation,
areas,
and
for
post-nuclear
organization.
is
equally damaqinq, if its policy makers do have a coherent policy it
3
nowhere satisfactorily revealed to the peoples of Australia.
It is
left
to
.journalists
And,
what
out
installations may be for and to make various conjectures as
defence
the
newspaper-watching academics to winkle
and
policy
may
Australian policy makers
As to coherence,
be.
local
to
what
have
only
recently found out that Australia has a (purely) regional defence role,
one.
global
they
were told by the Americans in
Hashington
to clarify commitments under treaty arrangements with the
designed
begins
thus
This
to look as if Australia's defence policy is as
much
not a
talks
in
It
USA.
determined
abroad, by US policy makers, as it is locally in Australia.
Much
circumstantial
evidence can be assembled to confirm the claim
Australia defence policy can now be stamped Made in USA,
the last Nor Id Har (and British abandonment),
one
thing,
as it
that
before
used,
to be stamped Made in UK.
Australia has had a bipartisan defence policy,
For
so it is claimed.
That "policy" has however been essentially shaped by the Liberal party,
has
governed most of the time (as senior partner in a
for ANZUS)
Hashington
the
Liberal
and still does.
US
and
in
of
US
The Strategic Basis
give virtually unqualified support
Military practices and to the American view of
situation,
the
the latest package from
packaged under a local cover.
endorsed by the Labor Government,
Papers,
planned
Party "Defence and Foreign Policy Unit" consists largely
Defence Department material
to
For instance,
But
coalition).
Party simply took over US arrangements for Australia (as
Liberal
which
commit Australia to supporting,
the
global
strategic
without any due reservation,
3. An Australian policy should moreover fit with the genuine needs and
shared aspirations of the people - to the extent, presumably, that these
are
commendable.
3
4
American positions in world forums.
be reached by more devious arguments.
out it had a regional defence role?
could
longer
no
The same dependent policy conclusion can
When,
for example, did Australia find
afford to police the world on their own and would
delegate some of that role
have
to
and offload some of the heavy associated costs, on
towards
and also after Labor took some faltering steps
reliable dogs-bodies;
they
After the Americans had found that
a broader foreign policy with some indigenous elements (Hayden was
developing
promptly flattened by Schultz).
Australian
but Iags it.
respects,
and
foreign policy simply copies American
older American defence policy,
American
war policy.
American
administration
main
in
The Australian defence policy presented by the Labor
to the extent that it is visible,
government,
with
defence
is conservative;
and diverges from the new
it coincides
(.post-Reagan)
the
For Australian Labor defence policy supports what
used to support, namely
DI.
nuclear
Multilateral
disarmament (within the framework of a series of treaties and agreements), and
D2.
Deterrence in the interim, deterrence through mutual
The
presence
.justified
assured destruction.
of American military facilities in Australia is supposed to
in the framework of these assumptions.
For they are to assist
be
in
making deterrence under D2 effective and to provide verification for the
arms
There is
much
reduction arrangements under DI (both stabilizing functions).
evidence
indicating
however that American policy makers have
both DI and D2 and any serious attempts at nuclear arms
they
4.
have
now
5
control .
moved on to the following highly destabilizing
abandoned
Certainly
doctrines;
namely
For theJe amq^ing evidence that Australia falls into the inexact class of
cl ient states the following Australian contribution is noteworthy:
'The
US prefers to act as a member of a group, and a contribution by Australia
can also assist in demonstrating to Congressional and public opinion that
the objectives sought are significant enough to attract allied support'
(SB, p.28)
5.
As to DI and arms control,
see, e.g. Mack PR. As to D2, 'USA has now an
announced
first-strike
nuclear
targeting
policy'
technologically
reinforced (Hayes, p.4).
The goal
of the Reagan administration
is
superiority (a conveniently ambiguous term).
4
war-fighting;
Nuclear
war
American
government,
al 1
Labor
1985
may
policy
nuclear wars;
Limited
of these
government.
well be accepted by
military doctrines,
and
Star
the
next
this
While
wars.
coalition
Liberal
are explicitly rejected by the
Since the American "Joint" facilities in
Australia
also facilitate the rejected objectives, the problems concerning these dubious
facilities are much aggravated.
information
withholding
their
particularly
Government
concerning the full range of
war-fighting
certainly unsatisfactory,
the
The Government's approach concerning them
appears
their
functions,
roles from Parliament and the
as several of its members realise;
in not atypical
disarray,
further
public
and
- is
and as a result
grist
for
the
incoherence theme.
is a coherent Australian defence policy somewhere
6
public exposure, it is almost certainly an ol d American policy.
If
there
away
from
But in that
case it certainly lacks - what it in any case appears to lack - justification.
7
For American interests by no means coincide with Australian .
Consider,
for
such
instance,
matters as enriching Americans,
American business,
for
undercutting
to
Nicaragua,
differently
Allende's
government in Chile to
again,
its
escalation of the nuclear arms
and all
Europe
Southern
as
Consider,
practices
methods.
race.
against
Consider,
consider
Or
the game- and decisi on-theoretic models
concern just USA and its adversary USSR,
which
its
its extensive export of arms and violent
strategic planning,
American
American.
promoting Americans and things
American practices in Latin America (or elsewhere in the world),
differently,
from
making conditions favourable
part of the monolithic West,
perhaps
occasionally
adding
but rarely or never considering
Hemisphere - so that either Australia is part of America
as
the
Poland
It had better be away from too much public exposure because Australians,
no more* th-atffrNew Zealanders, mostly do not like being pushed around, even
by Americans.
7.
Nor, though this is a longer story , does Australian culture by any means
coincide with American:
see CPD.
Thus a uniform treatment is entirely
inappropriate.
Similarly,
a single overarching treatment for a mono
lithic West is thoroughly inadequate.
5
8
may be of Russia or it is nothing.
Or consider American interests not merely
in Soviet and communist containment, but. in containing socialism such as might
(under more auspicious conditions) flourish in Australia.
to
answering
inappropriate
American interests is accordingly inappropriate for
Australia,
for
their
defence
thinking
applies
also
and
to
work out a policy appropriate
Australian
do
Australians should
Antipodean socialism.
for
Australia.
representatives,
political
who
implausible American views and begin on developing
parroting
and original ones.)
local
An American policy
America,
like Russia,
own
(That
should
stop
genuinely
some
is busy meddling in Africa,
(SB, p.24) .
but 'Australian security interests are not directly involved'’
Should we be tagging along after the Americans in support of installation
of
the
their free-enterprise (rip-off) capitalism everywhere feasible (i.e.
socialists
state
seriously
course
- or
of
Much
opposition
governments,
in
has,
freedom umbrella,
active
already
this
sort
What
'keeping the free
world
of
context,
multiple
what mainstream American culture
to and undermining of social and
socialist
quite
free7?
Of
meanings
and
admits
mainstream Australian culture would exclude:
bullying
they
control)?
heavily
is it laughingly - call
freedom
associations.
don't
that
under
the
for instance,
programs
and
of smal1 countries that impose barriers to US business
part of "free enterprise"), etc.
freedom Misinformation,
agree about,
to live and work where one chooses,
on. These are certainly important freedoms, better upheld in
some parts of the unaligned West (e.g. Sweden, Switzerland)
of
the
Eastern Block.
But many of the older freedoms
century,
such as freedom to travel,
requires
permits,
8.
licences,
than in most parts
have
to work and live abroad,
passports,
...
vanished
etc.;
And many more of these
this
now one
former
Australian planning should be looking at strategic models (game-theoretic
and other) which include Australia.
For,
as argued below,
adandoning
the uniformity assumption of the monolithic West,
of the West as one
parish, makes very significant differences to the results yielded.
6
are being or have been eroded;
•freedoms
restricted
zones,
nuclearism
in
soon it will be identity documents-,
as already in parts of the "free
ID cards,
Now
West".
to
protect,
[the Greens] point to the new laws proposed in 1983 designed to keep
citizens
Europe 'is devouring the very freedom it is said
assembling to protest deployment of the Pershing II and cruise missiles'
from
of
security
'secrecy,
the
lack
state,
of
Further structural changes required for
pp.58-9).
(Capra and Spretnak,
incompatible
with
permanent
commentability,
freedoms,
democratic
emergency,
the
include
of
concentration
authority, peacetime militarism, extensive apparatus of state intelligence and
Nuclearism is not a smart strategy to preserve
police'’ (Falk, in Feith p.24) .
remaining freedoms.
Inherited
2.
other-reliance,
and
the
populist
and
elitist___ cases—for
patronaqe.
Australia's
defence
rather than regularly
policy,
such as it is,
(re)thought through.
the legal method of precedence,
may wel1,
furthermore
But that procedure - essentially
and here does,
applied to defence.
exclude significant
The unsatisfactory decision-making practices that will
For
al ternatives.
be revealed in the
of defence are by no means restricted to defence but are typical of
case
kind of advanced age (or aged)
1abours
those
both
inheri.ted
whatever its very limited satisfactoriness in
legalistic decision making - is defective when
precedence
is
under.
Cock
capi tali sm Australia operates under,
has summed up these practices neatly in
features of aged capitalism (what he calls
the
or rather
setting
the Corporate State)
New Left and the Alternative Australia movements were
the
down
which
reacting
revoI ting against:
Decisions were made from the top and on the basis of vested political
interests,
rather than by rational goals and means that served public
interests.
The people were rarely consulted effectively before a
decision and often only partially informed afterwards.
Pl an ni ng..was.
based on a mere extension of the present.
...
activists felt
they
were given little opportunity to choose how they lived or worked. The
availability of space,
time,
trees and air was also determined by
others . ..(2/(p.l8 italics added).
7
or
As also is one's defence,
military and civil, the matter of whether one lives
in a nuclear target or not, etc.
A major inherited assumption is that of other reliance,
defence depends on other more powerful allies.
Australia
That ally was firstly Britain,
but in any event the assumption is that to be
and since World War II America;
safe
that Australia's
needs a powerful patron,
a protector.
A corollary is
that
Australia adopts a suitably submissive relation to its patron, making expected
And for the most part it has;
10
policy does not come cheap.
concessions.
The
however such a defence insurance
other-reliance assumption is unsound,
important,
it
for
several
reasons.
characteristically depends upon the following themes,
Most
all
which lack solid foundation:
1.
Austral i ar/ is threatened - or at least
1A. Australia/ is likely to be threatened in the near future.
2.
Australia cannot defend itself.
3.
It can however rely upon its patron (or ally?, i.e. upon the USA.
three themes in fact make up what has been cal led the populist case for
11
the ANZUS alliance.
It is very different from the elitist case for ANZUS,
These
said to hold sway with the Australian government,
which, while insisting upon
premiss 3, essentially rejects 1 and 2 and claims instead
4.
Australia has a vital
interest in global stability.
9, (From previous page)
Cock goes on:
'These basic
issues
increasingly
become lost in the array of consumer choices'.
[Add Covernment__ react_ive
poi n t].
10.
It costs not only money,
but independence.'... the serf societies - more
or less willingly - accept the status of "allies",
i.e. protection with
rights and duties as in feudal societies.
They become client countries'
(Galtung, p.169).
11.
So-called by Mack PC.
But
the formulation presented follows G.
Davidson's more satisfactory account in Canberra Times, Wednesday, May 8,
1985,
p.2.
Mack considers that what amounts to the elitist case is the
'altogether more sophisticated argument
[which]
holds sway
...
in
government' (p.l).
8
Global
5.
stability is under threat (constantly)
by an expansionist
Soviet
Un ion.
6.
Only USA can contain the Soviet threat and hold the global balance.
But the USA technique for holding global balance is in part through a
network
of alliances like ANZUS.
further
Obviously
premisses are required to reach the
that
conclusion
Australia should be participating in an alliance, and what is more, hosting US
defence
facilities
and so forth.
A first such premise is
no-shirking
the
theme that Australia should be contributing its part to "holding the balance".
Even this first further step is pretty shaky;
in
a
rather ramshackle case,
(and
since premisses 5 and 6 are decidedly
4 may involve some equivocation).
Australia’s
vital
interests
as we shall see, one shaky step
are not
dubious
For it can be plausibly argued
guaranteed
by
US
techniques,
that
which
threaten to upset the whole applecart, and can be obtained by alternative more
satisfactory means outside of such soft alliances as ANZUS.
contends,
Mack
it
In any case,
is unclear that our contribution enhances global
as
nuclear
stability (see Davidson).
There
is a more pernicious regionalist version of the elitist
which might be called the offshore el i t i st. position.
Australia can defend itself against regional
2R)t.
position,
This position grants
threats, and can look after
i tself regional Iy.
But
it does not (as indeed other qualified elitist positions may
1A.
Nhat the offshore position insists is
1AH.
Since
these
interests
companies abroad,
internal
Australian
Australians
or
or whatever - may have little or nothing to
do
-perhaps
security,
concerned
with
this premiss
trade,
represents
an
extremely
important shift (a shift not unrelated to the inverse bureaucratic shift
war
In
grant
Australia's interests could be threatened in the near future.
Australian
with
not)
to defence).
extended
form
from
It goes further than what has been called forward defence.
the offshore position does call
9
for some
sort
of
global
or police force ready to intervene whenever a "free port"
policeman
looks like closing its doors,.
the
elitist
position
is
anywhere
Part of the difficulty in getting to grips with
that it tends to slide
to
through
the
offshore
position (by way of now evident immediate positions).
against both the populist and elitist cases,
arguments
The
against
virtually
justify
but a fairly brief outline of some of the main points
course
a
just
couple
of themes 1 through 7 are
but there have been
through
some
indeed
familiar
sufficiently
of defections from themes 1
both cases,
defeat
logically
al 1
and
Of
involved.
would
7
to
serve
repair
interesting
attempts, designed to float the arguments on diminished premisses.
3.
The brief against the popular populist case.
While Australia is not at present under notice of
Contra
1 and 1A.
veiled
threat or harassment from abroad,
appears
to
believe that it is.
or parliamentary view,
view
as
persists,
kept
deliberately
parties
are
populist
well
case
alliance (e.g.
the public.
in
way
in
the dark (or even
purposes.
enough
false,
are
aware that the
misinformed),
main
main
this
because
assumptions
the
to
interest
In particular they have gone out of their
cast doubt upon the connected assumption that US is
to
the
American
are much more difficult to sell
a
reliable
threats.
Thus long-standing Australian psychological
allowed
suits
underlying
Accordingly the parties and Government have no political
to
been
political
Australian
the reasons for which they support
those of the elitist case)
guarantor against all
been
informed,
the
The populace has
it has.
Although both
undermining the populist case.
not
not
it is worth inquiring why the popular
the opinion polls reveal
government
bipartisan
a (bare) majority of its population
As the popular view is
administrative,
threat,
stand,,
and
has
informational and educational effort.
10
not
been
insecurity about security has
assuaged
In particular,
by
any
requisite
older attitudes to Asia
X
persist not far below the surface of popular Australia:
fear,
and
mistrust
xenophobia, patched over by a pragmatic attachment to trade and tourism.
This
misplaced insecurity is fuelled by popular misconceptions of Australia and its
place in the world: metaphorically, that Australia is a luscious plum ripe for
instead of the Asian view that Australia, so far as they are
Eastern picking,
as a remote desiccated place perhaps good for some trade.
aware of it at all,
to get towards more concrete assumptions,
Or,
Australians apparently tend to
view their country as affluent but underpopulated,
resource rich but
largely
Yet not far to the north are Asian hordes who are impoverished,
defenceless.
12
resource poor, etc.
The view is seriously out of touch with reality.
Parts of Asia are
at least as affluent (on conventional economic indicators.)
do
not see themselves as overpopulated,
as Australia.
now
They
in a way that calls for mass exodus;
and in those areas which are as overpopulated as Europe,
such as Java, bribes
and force are required to move people on transmigration programs to relatively
unoccupied parts of the Indonesian empire.
can
So far as they require them, they
purchase Australian resources - which are not unique - much more
(even
carrying significant local
cheaply
subsidies) and easily than they could obtain
13
them by seizure.
For these sorts of reasons, and because Australia itself poses no threat,
no
other state has an interest in attempting to invade Australia.
for interests,
to
launch
so it is for capabilities.
a successful
invasion of Australia,
capacity in the near future.
TF.
No regional
As it
is
power has the capacity
or is likely to have
such
a
As the joint Parliamentary Committee concluded,
The
"Asian hordes" fd\dn one of the less spoken about successors
to
Yellow Peril,
of immediate past days of the Asian communist threat
the
and
the Domino theory.
13.
As Stephenson argued,
less fortunately, 20 years ago.
Even when around
World War
II
Japan,
did have interest in access
to strategic raw
materials,
the Japanese High Command decided against invading Australia
because of
the difficulty of dealing with the people - a point of much
impor tance.
11
Currently
only the United States would have the physical
launch a -full scale invasion of Australia,
motive to do so (TAS, p.94) .
to
capacity
and it clearly lacks
any
As the report also stated, quoting Synnot (former Chief of Defence Staff),
...
to raise the sort of force which would be required for a mass
invasion of Australia could not possibly be done in under five years
by other than the superpowers (TAS) .
But
neither superpower is at all
likely to expend effort or resources to such
an end.
obvious
An
which
at once arises is:
(A later serious question to entertain is:
defence?
on
question
security,
collectively provided global
forthwith
to unilateral disarmament?
now-standard
telling
bother
Why
with
why not be a free-rider
Why
such as it is?)
Mack for one,
then
not
proceed
having reassembled
the
for
the
case that Australia is not threatened 'now or
foreseeable future', and so having broken the populist argument, is confronted
by
the awkward option of unilateral disarmament for Australia.
proceeds
and
points to the dependence of premisses 1 and 1A on premiss
retreat,
hasty
to claim that 'the populist case for ANZUS is
without premisses 1 and 1A.
While
it
sustained'
assumptions
which
is
approximating
appears
capabilities
it
decisive
of potential
2,
even
may sometimes take
it is true that the arguments against 1 and 1A
resistance,
a
It is however a decidedly problematic retreat.
for granted that Australia can look after itself to some
some
He stages
far
from clear that
premiss 2.
given
the
invaders.
they
Consider the
(estimated)
put
up
essentially
on
extent,
depend
no-interests
argument,
limited
invasion
very
The main consideration adduced
appears
to depend in no essential way, indeed in no obvious way at all, on Australia s
dynamic
fighting forces.
Australia mineral
resources,
for
instance,
obtained more readily and cheaply by market methods than
simply
be
ones.
What this seems to show is that a rather minimal
military
streamlined force, if
any, would presently meet Australia's military requirements.
12
can
It
is
as
not
if
Australia
The whole
nonmilitary defence is available on a continent well
popular training in defence methods,
character
that
apparatus
of
suited to its use, though
requisite
to
Australia would be a difficult place
govern, Australians a difficult lot to subjugate.
Australian
a
But even without
a population trained in its techniques.
lacking
without
defenceless'’
'entirely
1 ike a babe-in-arms.
mi 1itary force,
conventional
is
deterred
It was such features of the
the Japanese
a
on
previous
occasion
^If
the invasion is attempted,
the Australians,
in view of
their
national
character, would resist to the end.
Also,
because
the
geographical
conditions of Australia present numerous difficulties in
a military sense,
it is apparent that a military venture in
that
country would be a diff icul t one** (.TAS, p.62) .
The
still hold good,
points
parts
any such program of nonmilitary
to
putting
and could be strengthened.
defence:
making
it
abroad (ideally with dinkum Australian exaggeration)
it
several
There are
happen,
and
that it
has
happened.
the issue of alternative defence we are bound to
To
when
Australia is not threatened,
appropriate,
is a good occasion to reconsider
adapt defence arrangements.
now,
For
return.
and,
if
For example, it looks very much as
if enormous sums, which could be valuably directed elsewhere, are being spent,
But a much more effective and
to make many Australians feel secure.
largely
inexpensive way to such results would be through requisite mass education
therapy - with,
psychological
if it were well
done,
much more
and
satisfactory
results, a more secure and better informa^~popu1 ace.
Contra
2.
As
capabilities,
basically
enormous
isolation.
well
in
a
a result of post-War developments in weapons systems and
the military defence of Australia has become much easier.
matter
advantages
strategic
In
advance
of enhancing through robust
particular,
of
and
Australia enjoys by
reliable
virtue
of
systems
through modern
destroyed by precision guided munitions.
radar
warning
It is
the
geographical
any maritime invading force can now be
arrival,
C3I
detected
systems,
and
And any invaders that did manage to
gain a foothold on Australian soil would face severe logistic problems, and be
13
subject
deal
There is
to disproportionate response -from local defence.
Boys'’
of
and
weapon
Own War Games stuff concerning contemporary
great
a
which would serve to turn Australia into a pretty invulnerable
systems
C3I
armed
fortress, and into an extremely difficult territory even were the oceanic moat
crossed and the fortress entered (see especially D. Martin).
such
Under
invasion
even
armed neutrality and fortified Australia defence
from outside the region by an inimical world
resisted with reasonable prospect of success.
to
such an invasion;
mount
There is no power at all
Nonetheless the threat
their
elected
representatives.
But
the
Soviet
undertaken such a long-range massive force projection,
so,
be
likely
one
ooviet
a
of
is taken seriously not only by the larger populace but by committees
invasion
of
could
there is apparently (according to TAS) only
the Australian population!).
of
power
our good ally the USA (reckoned however a likely invader by
power that could,
6-77.
scenarios,
has
military
never
is ill-equipped to
do
lacks any plausible reason to try such a stunt (for details see e.g.
and
The only credible Soviet threat to Australia is in the context of
D. Martin).
a superpower war, when American facilities in Australia and perhaps Australian
would be struck at by intercontinental missiles.
cities,
it is highly unlikely that it would be followed or accompanied by
bad enough,
an
Soviet forces are once again not sufficent,
invasion.
sufficient
elsewhere
While this would be
by the Soviets for that sort of diversion;
in a superpower war;
and
not
thought
they would be required
and they would be devastated,
unless UoA
is
militarily even more incompetent than sometimes depicted.
Contra
3.
cannot
be relied upon,
rash
What will be argued is not the negation of 3,
but that premiss 3 is dubious,
to place excess reliance on American protection.
that the Americans
and that it would
That
being
so,
be
and
other patrons being even less promising, Australia should look more to its own
resources, as the American administration is kindly advising.
Especially
since the American "Vietnam debacle" and the fall of
14
Saigon,
things
have changed in important ways which cast doubt on the reliability
of
American patronage.
The relative economic and military strength of the USA has declined.
a.
no longer has such a large share of world product(ivity)
a
of policy,
matter
(see Appendix 1);
US world warfighting aspirations have
Its ability to act as,
reduced.
It
as
explicitly
been
and afford to be, global policeman has also
significantly declined (see further Appendix 1) .
b.
The willingness of Americans to engage in foreign wars has correspondingly
tumbled.
hawks,
sure,
be
to
American administration includes
the
Although
more
people and Congress are no longer in
the
enough
than
for
a /mood
gratuitous foreign adventures, especially when the fun may not appear to be in
American
This "Vietnam syndrome"
popular opposition to overseas military involvement.
has
major
a
as
served
strong
US opinion polls regularly show
Since Vietnam,
interests.
constraint
on
US
military
policy
foreign
and
involvement.
c.
One
Doctrine
manifestation
important
called
which
196'?,
of
the foregoing
of
elements
upon US regional allies
responsibility for their own defence in regional conflicts.
to
the
is
take
Guam
primary
Another important
are
outcome is Defense statements to the pointed effect that before US troops
committed
abroad
there
must be reasonable assurance
no US vital
each
and
'such
is impossible to guarantee - especially for remote countries
where
national
Certainly
that
Congressional
As Mack comments,
popular support (Weinberger,
assurance
of
no
interests are at stake''.
more is assured under the ANZUS treaty which only
signatory
constitutional
consultation;
reported in PC p.14).
'act to meet the common danger in accordance
processes'
(article 4).
All
reassurances?
15
its
is
Isn't the treaty backed
None that are not undermined by
in American administrative multiple-speak.
with
the treaty strictly requires
there is no undertaking or commitment.
up by informal verbal
provide
others,
the elite view is that Australia has to 'work ...
Even
'the threshold of direct US combat involvement could be quite
For
the
of US support'" and that the Americans cannot be counted upon always.
prospect
to help Australia in other ways'".
a
However
special
case
has
been made
American
for
military undertakings (in Vietnam, Cambodia, Iran)
common
friendship,
and shared values and democratic
interests,
second,
and,
culture
earlier
traditions.
as
first,
and slow constitutional
already indicated, the basis is shaky.
And here, a
common
pleading:
hardly sustains the adequacy of the basis
evidence
in
to
as to the adequacy of the basis for the possibility
the American people,
Congress,
cases.
reliability
- on the basis of permanent
There are two difficul ties with this type of special
His tori cal
(SB, pp. 29-30) .
case - as opposed to examples of American abandonment of
Australia's
and
cannot rely upon Ub support in a
...
defence emer qen c y ar i s i n g w i t h i n ou r own n e i gh bou r h ood'
the basis,
high,
at the time could significantly limit US willingness or ability
circumstances
a
to maximize
significantly on quite crucial
issues.
rather
America:
shared by Australia and
processes.
analogous
in
For there is not
values
diverge
interests always common,
Even
as missile testing and nuclear ships issues in the South Pacific have recently
confirmed.
Common
Indonesia
opposing
did not appear wheir? Australia was
interests
claim
to West Papua.
It is
dubious
at
considering
least
that
American interests would coincide with Australian in disputes or confrontation
with Asian nations to the North, e.g. Indonesia, Japan, etc.
special
case argument did hold water, Australia and America really were mates,
There was in fact no treaty in operation in
then the treaty would be otiose.
1942;
Of course if the
but
by
then
American
interests
in
countering
the
are at
present
Japanese
were
independently aroused.
14.
Although
neighbourhood
contingencies ...
impossible', as the pauper ap-i+e-’
16
assessed
a
4.
Other-reliance and regional self-reliance
A major problem with other-reliance for defence is then that it cannot be
entirely reliable,
deemed
be tolerated.
yet this is a place where unreliability can hardly
for
When the Indonesians are rolling into Brisbane it won't do
Defence to call up with a message like that from Services, "We can't get there
tomorrow",
till
"Or
until
after Congress meets".
More
seriously,
handing
defence over to others means handing control of our lives over to others,
nuclear defence,
given
very
which Antipodean administrations have opted
means for many of us handing our lives
likely
In principle,
Another problem is its cost.
over,
and
for,
it
literally.
quite
if a btate hires out its defence
it would no doubt look, other things being equal, for the cheaper bidder - if,
that
defence
is,
meterological
market
is
complexion
is
a
services,
monopolistic,
15
,
who
commodity
a
sort,
like
The trouble with global
etc.
with
currently
only one
at a national
level,
All
shipping,
national
of
supplier
right
the
i •
making
and has
this part of the case,
the
that
defence is
accordingly can exact a very high price,
the whole country a nuclear target.
appreciated
of
enough
well,
for not trying to force defence,
which
is
plainly a collective good, into a marketable commodity.
When a country can provide its own defence,
it certainly makes very good
for it to do so, since it normally has a stronger interest in
sense
its
own
defence
than
matter,
then self-reliance not Just makes good sense but pays; other-reliance
does not.
most other parties.
Should it also be cheaper
in
costs
that
But in that event, it does not need nuclear patrons, or to farm out
some of its defence.
15.
The French, who operate a global network second only to the Americans and
more extensive than the Russians, with many forces in the Pacific region,
have never been seriously considered. Yet in certain significant respects
French social and cultural
arrangements are closer to Antipodean ones
than American arrangements are.
In these days of technological warfare,
the post-Waterloo loss record of the French should not be given too much
weight; we don't
after all look very hard at the American record of
defeats and incompetence.
17
r
self-reliance
Such
as ANZUS and much of the apparent point
such
alliances
undermines an important part of the older
such
of
alliances.
newer bipartisan approaches to defence try to combine them (thus e.g.
However
Beazley as reported by Davidson) - approaches which thus begin to empty
of
what
content it had.
little
understanding,
content,
a
but
are
merely
vague
ANZUS
clear
no
contain
of
articles
simple course is of course to allow them to be
emptied
an expensive and outdated insurance
that the alliance,
so
Since the arrangements
consultations
beyond
commitments
of
policy,
It may however be death by seizure or convulsion should
dies a natural death.
American
defence
facilities
American
nuclear
equipped or powered transport be excluded
passage
be c1osed or internationalised and
from
of
Australia.
treaty
would no doubt sacrifice the deterrence and other advantages the
That
for
case
16
supposedly
affords
,
while
making
way
for
the
greater
advantages
o+
neutralized nonalignment, of no longer being a nuclear target, etc.
self-reliance pure and simple is insufficient.
But
consist of separable isolated pieces,
dramatically,
picture
Australia
will
self-sufficient
not
as becomes increasingly evident.
Most
winter.
The
such as plants which are
not
not escape the effects of nuclear
is much the same as for other objects,
internally
The world does
but depend crucially on their
environment
- and
indeed as for States themselves. The question then is what form the additional
holistic component of policy should take?
that
appropriate
the
cricket
game
move is not taking sides (as in a kids'
that is already set up) and doing one's bit for
For that will not contribute to stability,
rather
to
Put this way, it is almost obvious
sectionalism and fragmentation,
war
game
or
confrontation.
to a proper holistic approach, but
and to
bringing
nuclear
winter
cIoser .
757
If Australia is not likely to be threatened there is no real
deterrence
advantage because nothinq to deter.
Other advantages of
the ANZUS
alliance such as access to high-level intelligence are not only dubious
(see PC, Martin) but not always guaranteed by
the alliance as the black
out of New Zealand shows.
18
Other-re 1iance and self-reliance typically present a false contract,
certainly
do with pure self-reliance - a false contrast like that of
partism
and
(EE,
or
p.223),
at a particular level
of
and
holism
versus
dependence
In between lie a range of positions, one of which - favoured by
isolationism.
a long line of peacefully-disposed philosophers from Rousseau and Kant onwards
- might be called integrated reliance or federated reliance.
reach only certain inadequate levels,
may
which
alignment,
the monolithic East (or West).
5.
Against elitist arguments
stability,
very
as
related arguments revolve around that
securi ty
and
side,
are
value-laden
terms,
of
are
which
But
security.
not
cultural
What stability comprehends in American administrative perception
invariants.
is
other
and
4 and 5 of the elitist argument turn around the crucial notion
Premisses
stabi1i ty
the level of modern alliances
are essentially coupled with opposition to an
e.g.
of
But integration
different from what highland villagers take it to
include.
In each case a system is stable if it returns to a given stationary state
But relevant states and
under perturbations of sufficiently small magnitude.
the stationary among them are both relative to given frames of reference, /e.g,
what
is stable at a macrolevel may well not be at a microlevel.
said
of the superpowers,
even
remote events can threaten their interests or their associates '
and
stability.
disturb
Trudeau
As
'they share a global perception according to
But lesser states or people,
not
counting
which
(p.10)
remote
IVA
business
or
military^ as
invariably
view
stability;
by
relevant,
report
bombs a* necessary to stability,
contrast philosophers
increasingly
terrorism and as characteristically antithetical
ad 4:
a vital
no
and the
see
nuclear
bombs
as
fix
a*
tools
of
to peace.
interest in global stability and secur i ty?
1?
Bureaucrats
instability.
Of course Australia
have,
does
what sizeable nation does not.
interpretation conceals crucial differences,
For
Australia.
in
highly material
to the argument.
stability may well mean something different in USA from
global
means
Certainly vitai
interests are different.
interested in containing socialism (in Australia as elsewhere),
in
rhetoric at least,
popular
more
to socialism (or Mon-Soviet communism)
global
upset
to
containing
equate
communism and both with Soviet containment.
containing
motherhood
But the determinable
stability
on
American
in Latin America,
it
America
is
and it tends,
wi th
socialism
A continental
swing
or i n Africa,
wou 1 d
indeed
wou I d
and
perception
what
significant effects on US business and investment; but it wou 1 d not on its own
or affect most Australians or directly threaten
upset
and it certainly need not affect nuclear stability.
Antipodean
stability,
Australians generally are
not opposed in principle to socialism or notably interested in containing
perhaps the opposite).
(indeed
spread
not
ought
to be interested in defence of the
the
in
system,
Australia is not interested
defence
(American)
it
in,
or
enterprise"
“free
wherever
of advanced capitalism
its
is
presently
initiated or imposed.
It can be conceded, without granting the main thrust of the premiss
Contra 5.
that
the Soviets are expansi onistic,
in
interested
empires,
extending their influence where they can.
including
American
academics and sales people).
spread,
Marxism-Leninism,
everywhere.
in at least a weak sense that they
The
and
are
So also
are
most
matter
are
many
Indonesian (so for that
But the Soviets have an ideological message
an
ideology
they
anticipate
Americans also have a capitalist message,
being
installed
free enterprise,
which they are working to sell pretty much everywhere accessible to them;
they
need to be expansi onistic to have it adopted,
Chinese
little
would
and
whereas the Russians
and
need simply wait for history to take its determined course (though
assistance
surely
- reflecting legitimate doubt about
spread progress wi thou t interfering).
message is pernicious:
this
a
determinism?
Bu t (^he\^jreb^ Russian
both are pernicious (for familiar reasons;
20
to
see
e.g.,
Erlichs).
some
in
threatens,
proper question is whether Soviet international activity
The
damaging
way,
stability.
global
Soviet-American
doubt
No
confrontation, as in the Cuba missile affair, does threaten stability; but not
in
way that has any bearing on Australian defence.
a
expansionary
none
Australia,
military
tendency,
or
has
otherwise,
fact
In
direct
a
of significance reaches into the Antipodes.
Russian
no
effect
on
bo what is all
the local excitement and anticipation about?
The effect of Soviet expansionism is much exaggerated and
from the Antipodes it is hardly a problem,
Viewed
qet
locked
addressed.
of
into
unless the Soviets
confrontation with USA - a real
military
internationalism,
be
hardly
the
heavies
But confrontation apart, Soviet
a great success story,
does not seriously
disturb
stability, as seen from Australia.
should
distinguished
be
military
access,
involvement
World
control
involving
anything
since
influence.
War II,
In actual
of
global
on
the
militarily,
that of Afghanistan,
have
accomplished,
especially in Europe.
but
success
in
western
strategic
lacks
Europe,
has
they
the force ratio
And
21
case
little
had
concerns
might.
not
attempt
lacking much plausibility.
needed to
be
assured
of
both by their own standards of what is required
standards.
by
But the idea of Soviet military adventure
Europe is a Western invention and bogey,
military
what
striking
conspicuous
The usual Western apprehension
stability.
and
expansion
the Russian record is hardly
new territory,
Soviets
military
The one
with
influence
military,
with the USA or several other states.
comparison
effect
mere
and
potential
-military,
expansion
types of
a proper assessment of Soviet internationalism,
For
Soviet
to
problem
a third nonaligned group which helps to referee and to prize
global
should
With that problem however, the Antipodes can better assist as part
apart, not by seconding and inciting the USA.
in
overexploited.
the
Soviets have
no
good
The
military
and
by
reasons
or
in undertaking such an exercise which would draw them into
interests
war.
They
client
nuclear
already -Face economic difficulties and trouble with East European
states which they cannot control satisfactorily.
The
of Soviet inf1uence has largely been in the Third
extension
But it has hardly been successful,
with as many failures and losses to record
as Soviet "gains" - gains which add to the imperial burden
countries wracked with problems,
world.
such as Uietnam.
since they involve
The Third World exercises
are marred by Soviet ineptitude and limited by the state of their own economy.
They scarcely displace the global
structure enough to test its stability;
and
they produce no shock waves or even ripples in the Antipodes.
6.
Contra
the
dancers
the
in
East-West dance
confrontation between the lead dancers.
have
destabilizing
new
weapons
arms
tension
control
an
from
escalating
the
With this US policies and
Recent US
practices
and indeed highly destabilising,
and weapons systems,
because of rejection of arms
race on earth and begin a new one in space.
A
vast
practices
more
are
because of
control
and because of star wars preparation which both
and
accelerate
increase
in
and suspicion accompanies the arms race which is in large measure due
to US intransigence and US war-fighting doctrines,
built-in
but
than Soviet ones,
Soviet proposals,
the
death,
of
as much to do as USSR ones.
least
at
of
The main current threat to world stability comes not from one
incentives
(see FAC).
alliance
or
for pre-emption,
new weapons systems,
and deliberate abandonment
of
with
arms
Such considerations duly assembled demolish the theme that
alignment
with
USA
helps
increase
stability.
American
practices are to be resisted as much as Soviet.
6.
The East-West balance argument; alignment versus neutrality.
The need for Australian alignment with the USA is supposed to be shown by
the
East-W^st
balance argument.
This balance argument,
which
17
premisses with the related elitist argument, runs as follows
;
7. Global
stability is the key to world peace.
shares
key
8.
of the international order is a matter of maintaining a
Stability
global
But
balance.
5. The global balance is constantly threatened by an expansionist USSR.
The threat is [only] checked by the USA, which (6A.1) guarantees an open
6A.
and pluralistic international
■?.
order.
indeed most vital
Australia's primary security concern,
is this
interest,
stability. Hence
Australia's
10.
role is to help America maintain the balance.
The rest of Australia's in tervolvement
to follow.
taken
then
before
practical
assumes much that has already been rebutted,
argument
threat
argument
But there are many reasons for halting the
reaches this stage of moral and
it
Soviet
with American military arrangements is
thesis is correct (i.e.
detail.
The
for instance that
the
stabilizing
5) and that US policy is
It also takes for granted,
balance
what now is at least
(part
of 6A).
doubt,
that American policy is directed at balance and deterrence, rather than
serious
in
what the administration appears to be aiming at, straight superiority.
event,
that
is not really engaged
Australia
balancing
in some longer term
so much as in helping USA win a nuclear war,
feat,
But in
contradicting the goal
of
world peace of premiss 7.
and its derivation.
Contra
10
follow
that
strength
is
indicate,
the
Ta
role is such a lackey's one.
leaning
America's direction,
in
as
be
If
most
the
Presumably
premiss
balance
of
seems
to
evidence
5A.1 is designed to exclude
putting its weight where it is effective,
this
not
does
team (that is what such images as the balanced tug-of-war
of Australia teaming up with totalitarians.
thouqht,
should
Australia's
it
then Australia should surely be throwing its slight weight in
Eastern
suggest).
The derivation is inadequate;
with
would
deplorable
Nevertheless Australia
given its
own
broader
(From previous page)
After some reconstruction,
that
is.
For
the
argument, curiously referred as that of "central balance in newspaper
level publications of academics, is never presented in requisite detail
which is one reason why it has proved hard to criticise and refute.
interests
objectives,
could
Australia
fulfil
and
principles.
which would enable it to make
to world peace,
contribution
There are several
satisfactory
more
among them nonalignment and neutrality.
A more direct approach may
Thus 10 is hardly wel1-supported or evident.
be
a
better than throwing our Australian weight unrefIectively on one
the balance.
roles
different
of
side
the balance images and argument
As a little reflection attests,
points not in the direction intended, but towards nonalignment.
Contra
4A
(and
peace,
the
preserves
if of course false.
USSR in this munitions dance,
the
escalation
(the
USSR
relation).
balance,
hence
and
Again it takes two at
least
to
checks
the
the history of the dance reveals that
pace flowed from the interaction of the one partner
of
with
the
but for the USA, the USA would not be required to check the
That is,
other.
the
it can be granted that the USA is interlocked with and
While
tango.
The theme that US maintains
4).
interaction
is
two-way
as
with
Hegel's
master-slave
famous
Furthermore it looks as if, on a different historical
trajectory,
the main states of Western Europe could match the Soviet Union militarily (for
they have comparable combined GNP,
etc.)
Thus
it
is doubtful
see Appendix 1,
resources,
technological
that the current Soviet
build-up,
produced
in
interaction with the USA, could only be, or have been, checked by the US.
de
6A.1.
As the premiss is only of marginal relevance to the
argument,
need only be noted that the international order the USA helps maintain
very much to be desired.
In its intervention,
militarily,
it
leaves
economically and
indirectly, USA has assisted substantially in reducing plurality and openness,
as well as in establishing or propping up rotten regimes,
side of American imperialism is well enough documented,
etc.
The negative
if not widely
enough
read or known by Americans.
ad
8
and
maintaining
pass,
the
the
equivocation on the balance.
While balance is
one
stabi1i ty in the world arrangements that have presently
balance
structure can only carry so much loading.
24
way
of
come
to
Add too
much
weight (of arms,
and so forth)
tension,
The increasing probability of catastrophic
probably catastrophically.
fail,
to both sides and the structure will
breakdown, for a variety of reasons (accident, miscalculation, computer error,
human interference, etc.), has been argued elsewhere (e.g. WPI) .
While a certain neither overloaded nor overstressed balance may serve for
stability,
the present increasingly stressed balance will probably not.
however,
balance argument,
neglects this dynamical situation,
illegitimately
balance
switching from a (certain) balance in premiss 8 to the (on-going)
subsequent
premisses.
The
balance
argument
itself
The
breaks
in
down
through
of
removing
equivocati on.
What
dynamic picture also indicates is the importance
the
weight -from the balance,
some
reduction.
position
It
most obviously by arms limitation and
tension
to a
neutral
points to a different role for Australia,
too
within the nonaligned grouping.
It is to the emerging case
for
a
different role for Australia, and to action for achieving this different role,
that the positive argument will now gradually swing.
The
attacks
inadequate
upon
East-West
proposals
(its
to repair it.
alleged
good
administrators
This
For example,
Australia
than
with
American
trade
argue,
is a nonsequitur,
and
lots
to the argument, and do not
against nonalignment or neutralism is set
pervasiveness of nuclear winter.
for
for
The additions are inessential
confusion and dust.
the
for a different role
combined
The main effect of these additions is to generate extra
alliance and service.
serve
balance argument is typically
of
other
He might as well
things),
so
aligned
be
our
sagacious
because if the control balance fails we are all
worse than ex nihilo quodlibet (for it also
that balance is necessary for the stability).
dead.
suggests
But, in the main, the attack is
irrelevant because the point of nonalignment, is to help remove overload and to
break down confrontation and its escalation to war;
before winter descends,
it is a thing to do
to delay or halt its descent,
25
now,
and most important,
to
reduce its severity.
Australia's weight may be slight,
another irrelevant addition goes,
psychologically it is important for the West.
disease" would show the weakening
f or
Sovi e t ex pan s i on ism.
virtual 1y
alignment,
Australi a
gives
the
Bell,
Any further spread of the "Kiwi
of Western resolve, and give the green light
a leading exponent of the balance argument,
impression that if Australia dropped
through
the isles to
Russians would be on the road down
18
the
tomorrow.
Much of this sort of rhetoric i =■ reminiscent of
f
such military interests,
set
route,
major
American
of
out
the
The Russians have no
baseless fear-mongering of an earlier pre-Uietnam time,
and
but
out,
t ie
or present capabli
A
of
they would be met by substantial resistance along most
the
for one,
has
and
the
resistance obtaining Western assistance.
interests,
Philippines,
strengthening
And if they were to gear up
different
as well
the
from
Australia's,
as elsewhere in East Asia.
depends,
argument,
in
For America,
Indonesia
in both
The addition,
its "green light
from
so far
for
expansion"
comparison, on the previously faulted premiss 5 of Soviet expansionism.
or another
In fact most of the case against alignment of one sort
it is argued. for often nonalignment and neutrality are,
au th or i tar i an
assumptions.
style,
Cat 1ey,
simply
for
denounced
example,
- turns
- when
in good old-fashioned
upon
al ready
another exponent of "central
fau1 ted
balance",
presents the following 'consideration'':
... whatever the Swedes or Swiss may think about the matter, Australia
is
locked by considerations of culture,
economics,
and political
philosophy into the defence of the Western world.
It has both an obligation and a duty to contribute its share to that
cannot
easily be
defence
if necessary by hosting facilities which
located elsewhere (p.15).
The premiss is false for reasons essentially indicated:
Nay
sustains the conclusion,
prescriptive
18.
and the premiss in no
the argument involving among other things,
(is-ought) fallacy.
Consider the premiss.
Australia is
See the discussion of Bell's claims in D. Martin and in Mack PC.
26
the
not,
k
unless Catley has information withheld from most of the rest of us,locked into
Western nuclear defence,
its
but in principle free to reconsider and rethink
use of the "facilities" is not irrevocable,
and shortly
options.
(American
comes up .
>,
economics
and political philosophy provide locks and chains for Australia but
f©.r reconsideration.)
in principle at least,
not for nonaligned Western European states?
part
USA or altogether a client
of
frameworks
economic
and
They do not:
state;
and
philosophies
political
significantly different (for details,
defence
(as,
practices
e.g.,
ANZUS in al 1
of
culture,
Australia is not a
cultures,
the
interests,
are
nations
two
But even if the ideological
see CPD) .
frameworks were much more similar than they are,
the
How do
that would not entail
its weakness
similar
nor
shows),
any
defence obligations.
of
Most
worse.
the arguments against nonalignment are of Catley
Fortunately,
calibre
- or
the case against nonalignment is (as with several
then,
o-f the above points) developed in detail elsewhere, especially by 0. Martin in
his
examination
of counter-arguments to
Australian
armed
neutrality,
legally recognised nonbelligerent form of nonalignment he favours.
al 1
of Martin's argument is couched in negative form;
very brief.
make
this
his positive brief
us secure against such dangers as we may one day have to meet,
needlessless
is
exposes to other dangers,
correct enough,
Virtual 1y
alignment or alliance with the USA
It reduces to thi
including nuclear war'
and in need of wide propagation,
exhausts
the positive case for nonalignment.
posi t ive
case of much theoretical
interest,
the
it
cannot
while
means
no
In particular there is a
to be drawn from the
it
Wh i 1 e
(p.l).
by
is
more
burgeon i ng
theory of collective goods and action.
7.
Free riding, group size, and increasing variety.
The
with
strategic
more
convenience)
world situation we now confront can be viewed as
than 100 players,
major
a
game
counting in nation-states and leaving out
(for
organisations
such
as
the
largest
100
transnational
These
compan i es.
organisational players align themselves around
two
arge
poles. East and West, as indicated:
EAST
NON-ALIGNED
N
WEST
N
India
N
Sweden#
Swi tzer 1 and#
Tanzani a
Most Latin
.
American States!
##
Costa Rica
State
commmun i st
State
capitali st
N: Nuclear weapons states
#:
Neutral states
##: Nonmi 1i tary states
Key:
There are various - a great many - games these state players are playing,
Some of these
of which are practically important for peace and for stability.
such
games,
as
representation),
World
are
Empire
and
Chicken
(already
There
are several problems about East-Nest games:
have,
the
Russian
what
under
played
played essentially between the East-Nest
representation
negative sum characters of some games.
may,
as they will with the Big One),
end after one round,
And the monolithic East -
way
simplifications may).
So game theoretical
representation
they
like
the
monolithic
Nest dichotomy is misleading, and, as will appear, discards crucial detail
the
one
superplayers.
repeatability of the games (clearly some nuclear games
roulette,
=ome
will
(in
be
approached differently and more obliquely.
Nor 1d
security,
(technically,
in
like regional and local
joint
security,
is a collective good
supply and precluding exclusion).
28
That is not
of
to
course
say that there are not conditions under which security
for instance where security is guaranteed by a narrow and
much to be desired,
intolerant despotism;
provisioning,
it can be argued,
but then,
not the particular product.
collection of N nation-states.
It is,
the trouble lies with the
It is a collective good G for the
furthermore,
a collective good
permits the possibility of free-riding by nation-states.
perspective
the American complaint about its allies,
insufficient expenditure on defence,
their
leave
may
which
Looked at from this
and
Japan for example,
is a complaint about their
free
riding.
Within the balance of power framework the conditions for free-riding
extracted by Pettit) are satisfied,
disarming states.
For
to
the achievement (or maintenance) of G by any will make every member
and
any,
unilaterally
is available to all N members of the collective if it is available
G
1.
for instance by neutral and
(as
better off.
2.
G
is
achieved iff some number m^K contribute towards
its
provision,
where under the balance of power assumption
IICTK^N and II = (USA, USSR}.
The
3.
expected value of contributing to G or its maintenance is less
than
the expected value of not doing so, i.e. likely costs exceed likely benefits
except for perhaps members of II given that G is provided by II.
is
There
pegged
by
what
free-rider
problem,
members of II for whom the free-rider option is not open
- within
ran be called a pegged (or
asymmetric)
the confines of the balance of power assumption - and for whom condition 3
only satisfied under certain ways of looking at the matter (e.g.
a
war
10
years down the road so the expected costs
each—year
is
there will be
exceed
the
expected benefits).
There
regional)
is
a
straightforward
case
for
recommending
free riding on the balance of power provision of 6.
2?
Australian
(and
Some arguments,
beyond or adding to those already in effect presented, are these:-
Either
If it does then the region is better off than it would be if
or it does not.
(strongly)
the
as
and there is a large-scale war
stability breaks down catastrophically
aligned because it is unlikely to be (so heavily)
targetted.
(Here
dreadful new argument that nuclear winter means that the Antipodes
might
well
be involved gets challenged and rejected:
see
MF).
doesn't break down then the region has the benefits in any case,
enhances global
USA
stability,
indeed, as remarked and wi11
etc.;
regional
weight
significant?
of
delusional
the
in
That
power?
framework.
Ne shouldn't:
we
believe
seriously
it
and if we do we're
is
the
in
living
in
a
Australia has been left out of the picture in virtually
strategic planning exercises,
all
do
Australian voice makes much real difference
the
Northern
Western block,
be
As regards Australasian
further argued, the evidence points to the contrary.
halls
the
without
For there is no clear evidence that our alignment and cooperation with
costs.
the
stability
If
most difference-making peace
initiative^,
etc., etc.
Now
riding,
Eastern
rather
countries would hardly
block
th an
suppor t
of f ering
object
(h owever
to
free
Antipodean
c omf or t
trifling),
an d
Furthermore free riding is how the Americans,
incitement to their opposition.
the rational
would expect Australia to act,
on their theoretical principles
self interested procedure (see CPD). It is economically rational; contributing
is not.
But won't the Americans make things economically dear for Australia?
In threats and theory,
do
yes; but in practice, no more than they threatened
already in the case of New Zealand with the nuclear-ships issue.
short
term
arrangements:
aberrations,
America
will
never
give
up
trade
But
or
to
for
market
one gets the impression that America would trade with the Devil
Himself if it could open some new markets in Hell.
Despite its political stigma,
way
immoral or irregular.
voluntary payment system,
free riding need be no problem,
Perhaps the buses are free;
perhaps there
to which only some need contribute,
30
or in any
etc.
i =>
a
Hi th the
contributing is not (see
nuclear fix, free riding is indeed the moral course;
HPI).
Free riding, though often portrayed as a problem, is only a problem in
certain
and
desirable
sufficiently
riders.
collective
of
cases
is
This
in
Australia
stays
the
the escalating treadmill or gets
is,
off
is
involved
many
too
free
which
will
whether
or
security,
and precarious way that it
curious
on
good
will not be provided because of
the situation with global
not
the
provided,
where
provisioning,
rides
and
be
not
free.
Australia's free riding may be a problem for America; it is not for Australia.
Interests diverge again.
of
stability
by
building,
tripod
or
bipedal
one,
for example,
if it is a wind tower or
of
supports
increases stability.
instance in the theory of "spreading the risks"
certain
a
cybernetics.
free
The
increases
and
by
similar
Then
a
than
a
has
in
diversity
ecology,
for
The related theme,
(see EH).
stability,
that
theme
The
elaborated
been
in
core eco-systemic idea to be developed is that Australia's
and consequent nonalignment in defence
riding
variety,
variety
topple
point
the
Increasing the diversity,
with stability has been sharpened and confirmed
correlates
that
ground.
a quadrapod tower is much less likely to
and requires less guying to stay up.
variety,
certain
increasing its rigid ties or supports to the
better
terms,
pictorial
structure is typically increased up to a
it more adequately;
securing
or
a
In
riding increases stability.
free
Judicious
enhances
diversity
accordingly increases stability (especially if done in
and
concert
with other client states).
Two
hardly
interlocked
well
precarious
guyed,
structure
well dug
in
but
stability
of
the
Hhat makes engineering sense
is
not
supports in tension,
are
inadequate
of world peace.
East and Hest,
for the
long
term
however
strengthening the supports that are there,
balance
is disturbed by the Host's surging ahead and likely overburdening the
structure,
helping the East when the
but increasing the variety of supports, enlarging and diversifying
31
group size.
East-monolithic
monolithic
The
West
picture
misconceptualism perhaps convenient ■for some players.
in conceptualism,
main reason for mistakes concerns group size.
collective
but
is
significantly
differs
behaviour of large groups
theory
in
group size is a highly significant factor (though
group
■from that of smal I
One
Whereas 11+ = (West, East) is a
N of nation-states is not.
number
the
group,
a
It may ■force mistakes
convenient simplification, e.g. for strategic thinking.
smal1
than
more
much
is
i t s pr ec i se i mpor t is increasingly contested).
N of nation-states is a large
group
The
group,
of
interested parties, indeed of substantially economic actors.
the American theory of collective action applies:
that
interest,
counterintuitive way.
a
in
behave
self
essentially
So we may expect
wi 1 1
that the groups
Though expec ted to act
in
the
to obtain security in particular, the collection will not.
common
On this
account (that elaborated by Olson), the common interest can only be guaranteed
by outside influence or imposition (coercion in Olson's rapid thinking).
there is, as experience has shown, no outside
with the collective of nations,
mediator
collective
or
influence
good.
The
But
of sufficient authority to ensure attainment
prognosis
looks very
gloomy:
this
of
the
important
most
(though far from unique) collective good will not be provided.
Fortunately the reasoning,
has
been
containing
shift
economic
virtually
(subjectively)
back
actors
though large.
highly
is
to basics,
all
privileged,
for whom costs of war exceed benefits
in perspective from the earlier free riding condi t i on
important
that
The group,
too swift.
several
like much of the "logic" of collective action,
3).
effect of the knowledge of an ominous nuclear
actors involved should now be
expected
in
that
(note
in
the
Indeed
an
winter
is
posit i on;
costs of nuclear war have become very high.
for
go
Olson's grand theory is based on the accountants/-----tautology
(defining 'net')
32
gross agent benefits - gross agent costs.
net agent benefit
i.e.
A
for each agent or actor i
ymbols,
in
show
i
for virtually all
that
in N.
is positive for some i
is privi1eqed if A
group
(in collective N) ,
European
to
benefi t s
of global security are decidedly positive (e.g.
respective future GDPs would expectedly fal 1
needs
1
the
net
wi th a nuclear
war
nation-states
argument
their
It
to near zero).
The
fact
the group of nation-states is privileged does not however imply that the
that
good i nvo1ved,
c o1 Iec t i ve
longer term.
error,
stability
■ JI
instabi1i ty.
dynamics,
An
achieved
improved
particularly in
wi11 be supplied,
secur i ty,
dynami c ;
it takes no account of mistake.
through
superiority
modelling
or
intermediate
- which can take some account
iterated games — is gained by returning to
through
the
the
of
game theoretic
ground
A free rider "problem" is tantamount to a dilemma of some sort; according
to
conventional wisdom,
the
contrast
Taylor
and
Hard).
it is a prisoners'
(cf.
dilemma
The argument can go this
but
Pettit,
way;- a
free
rider
problem or issue is defined in terms of the provisioning of a collective good;
theory
the
but
of collective goods is equivalent to that
of
a
prisoners
20
dilemma.
dilemma;
in
detail
which
more
Certainly
the
global nuclear situation
as much is a commonplace claim.
appears
Elsewhere (HPI)
that it does indeed present a moral dilemma.
to
present
a
it has been argued
Here the argument
can proceed through the theoretical route just sketched above or in the
piecemeal way to be indicated - is that it is also a prudential
dilemma
21
(for members of N).
19.
The
less than perspicuous symbolism is that used in Hardin
(82,
p.20,
p.39),
but with agents'
costs or contributions,
C,
duly agent
relativized.
Hardin misleadingly treats C as a fixed parameter,
thus
strictly falsifying the tautology.
20.
Thus Hardin who (in 82) claims to 'demonstrate the equivalence of
the
logic of collective action and the Prisoners'
Dilemma'
(p.4).
The
demonstration, which will be contested elsewhere, is given on p.x.5ff.
21.
But of course the two types of dilemma interconnect.
the range of apparent two party games being played by the US
Hardin 83),
Union
Soviet
(labelled US and SU respectively)
administration
regards the moves of further nuclear armament.
(It is supposed,
A,
from
the
or nuclear disarmament, N.
It is important here,
as other
French
that
The American people seem rather
more
were clearly opposed to the new nuclear missiles their
people
the
towards nuclear disarmament than their administration;
inclined
to
proceeded
German
administration
The strategy games involved are then
install.
shots
It is administrations or governments
etc.
take people into war;
to
places,
administration - which for the most part calls the
the society and the people.
generally
as
that the game is set in some background context,
naturally,
Chinese nuclear armament).
distinguish
and
1985
in
nuclear disarmament is not considered in isolation from on-going
e.q.
and
(e.q.
since these have obtained some discussion
us consider -first,
Let
administration
which we can suppose to be played over successive time intervals, e.q.
games,
years; so there is interaction and feedback as the games go on - until
the Big
Ones explode.
The
apparent games of US and SU are those diagrammed next:
Pr i soners'
A
4,1
D
2,2
O
1,4
this
being
played.
According
professions!1ez
the
A
1,4
CP
presumably
also
represented US policy,
it
no
aggressive,
D
A
4,1
D
3,2
US
CP
1,4
to Hardin, 'giving evidence of
Dilemma
Prisoners'
ordering of virtually all
that
A
4,1
that
simplistic setting those represent the apparent games
Within
and
D
D
3,3
US
IJS
A
SU
SU
SU
D
New Initial Game
Revised Game
Dilemma Game
in
(PD)
'represents
[his]
deformation
the
preference
the articulate policy analysts in the United
the
Soviet Union'
(p.248) .
While
PD
there is considerable evidence (as already
longer does,
war-fighting,
34
That
is,
the
US has
States
may
have
indicated)
that the US administration has shifted to
phase.
are
a
interchanged
more
its
rankings of (D,D)
Soviets,
The
have
who
been
much
more consistent
no
(and
bound to try to keep up with the Americans,
their
changed
However they are
have stuck with deterrence and no-first-strike.
but
better
doubt
appear not to have
in their policy pronouncements,
censored)
game,
and (A,A), presumably some time between 1978 and 1984 games.
and so pushed towards the Revised
Game shown, which p1easan11y restores symmetry.
Stable or equilibrium outcomes for each game are circled.
said
be
to
stable
if neither player has
unilaterally on the strength of the game,
influencing
provide
in
broad sense,
a
and dangerous outcome.
strategy for each player;
dominant
that equilibirum
In all
All
strategies.
is
hence
its
economic fascination.
results
which
are
socially suboptimal
(and
games that might plausibly be taken to represent
situation,
and
A
recognisably
guaranteed by the independent "stable" strategies.
substantial
to
political
substantially
the
games
satisficing
the
suboptimal
superpower
outcome
socially
superior
is
there are
What is worse,
and military incentives for the superpower players
adjust their preferences in
after repeated games,
an
And the same applies to suggested
alternative
Chicken.
other
a
below
all
as
in
Pareto-
even
But as the
threshold),
such
achieved
yet in the PD game that is
these games are di 1emmas.
games
these
the apparent games arming is
and
suboptimal,
strategies
switch
i.e. to alter the outcome except by
player also to alter
other
dilemmas
undesirable
deliver
the
to
incentive
An outcome is
not
directions
but to do what the US appears to have done, to make the
situation worse.
socially preferable would be change to a coordination game of
Much
some
sort, for instance, to the game which neutrals tend to play (and which Lackey,
in contrast to other more bellicose utilitarians, sees utilitarian superpowers
playing;
hence Hardin's label
diagrammed,
WN
inclined neutral
represents
a
for this game,
'Lackey's Game').
Western-inclined
(e.g. Yugos1avi a):
neutral and
EN
In the game
an
Eastern
A
3,2
D
D
(D
A
2,3
NN
Now
4,4
dilemmatic and coordination games are not played in
the
integrated
since
[Other coordination games, with
(D,D) assigned (1,1) 1
in
settings
such as Uni ted Nations' committees
games
coordination
are
(and
games
peoples'
-frequently
but
isolation,
elsewhere,
as
well).
Superimposing the games, as applied to US and SU games, leads to the following
augmented games:
SU
SU
SU
A
D
A
2,2
4,1
1
2/3
3,3
•
1
4,1
.
2/3
1,4
•
2/3
2,2
D
J,3
■
4
1,4
■
A
2/3!
A
m represents a sequence of ms,
and 3s in some order.
As the agumented games reveal,
a stable deadlock.
on the superpowers.
4
i ■ e? ■
2/3
4
■
2/3 a sequence of 2s
m < m w rn
in fact in several ways.
on
For example,
would
For one, enough significant
much
greater
as a
Superpower
militarism
Australia's
nonaligned
free
impact,
rider
for disarmament and regional nuclear freedom (instead of by
wash polemics and token ambassadors,
US support) .
36
strategy
with less support, unilateral action by US
arms build-up can be exposed.
be
in
much more pressure can be brought to bear-
power excursions would stand naked, and unsupported.
seriously
<2,3
to play with a superpower is to help reinforce
For another,
towards disarmament.
particular,
1,4
A
a coordination game can alter the overall dominant
playing
administration
4,1
•
2/3
But playing an independent coordination game can help
breaking the deadlock,
players
3,2
■
D
1
US
US
US
A
D
D
D
New
Game, Augmented
Revi sed
Game, Augmented
Prisoners" Dilemma
Augmented
and
in
pressing
white
undermined by a none-too-tacit policy of
8.
On the need for, possibility of, and prospect of basic structural change-
The
peace
(in
world has changed enormously since the time of Kant's proposals
and even since the time of Veblen's more cynical
(of 1795),
additions
Hard science and destructive power have grown enormously; and even
1917).
especially that admitting
knowledge of collective behaviour,
theoretical
game-theoretic treatment,
what
for
though still
has increased markedly.
slight,
be accomplished politically has in certain
can
little, since Rousseau complained (around 1761)
of
respects
But
changed
very
that governments were probably
too short-sighted to appreciate the merits of his project for perpetual peace.
Governments
have
obstacles to peace.
long
of
source
been seen as Xthe main (contingent)
if the peace is
Thus Veblen rightly maintains that ' ...
to be kept it will have to come about irrespective of governmental management,
- in spite of the State rather than by its good offices'- (p.7) .
against
the
State
on the basis that 'governmental
Veblen argues
and
establishments
powers ... are derived from feudal establishments of the Middle Ages; which in
turn,
However
a predatory origin and of an irresponsible
of
are
character
Christian-feudal origin of the State provides only one
the
(p.r).
- and
a
coercive - evolutionary pattern of organisation (pp. 12-13).
There are major blockages to peace proposals and projects at two main and
critical
levels
of
organisation,
that,
organisation of collectives of states and,
organisation
deep,
and
domination
of
removal
and
to
nothing
set
in part by devolution,
themselves.
these blockages,
and
exploitation of other forms,
sights rather lower,
short
organisation
of
states,
upon,
The problems involved
ones
intertangled
appears to call
genuine global
appear
adequate.
impossible in present political climates.
37
Yet even much
the
for
are
concerning
extensive
reached,
to
be
attained,
levels
of
political
stability
of extensive structural changes at both
would
of
that of the
Indeed if a permanent and satisfactory peace is to be
adjustments.
or
individual
focussed
already
smaller
changes
look
There is little doubt that certain sorts of structural change are
to
conducive
peace and that certain fundamental
permanent peace.
for
changes would be
With that in view they have long been
least from Rousseau and Kant onwards.
transform the structures that lead to war'- (B.
theme
immune
to
criticisms,
obvious
further desiderata,
modest material
freedoms,
~ at
advocated
for
'it is also necessary
instance
to
To render this
Martin, p.12).
that
straightforward
extension of certain established structures could bring an
authoritarian
to war,
sufficient
But it has also long been supposed that
such changes are necessary for lasting peace:
some
highly
end
typically presupposed, are invoked, e.g. certain
standards of life, etc., and the type of necessity
involved is set at some lower technical
level
(not excluded however by present
These adjustments make the necessity theme more difficult to
practicalities).
assess, but also difficult to sustain.
are
There
part,
critical
positive
part,
part
negative
According
marxist
demolishing
and
range of arguments
a
defence,
from
a
negative
determinism,
of
comprising
direct arguments for
the
theme.
22
this enterprise will simply be illustrated.
to deterministic and mechanistic approaches,
technological
determinism,
human
nuclear
weapons,
The
large
such as that
like
of
megamachines
They are an integral part of the business of
generally,
are
no aberration.
industrial
and
ecological conquest,
a further stage in
human
intervention
which has already involved substantial disruption through pesticides,
etc.
The argument tends to the fatalistic.
made,
and once made they wi11
22.
and
etc., that arrangements have to be more or less the way they are, and
nature,
a
parts to its assessment
two
be used.
wastes,
The megamachines of conquest are
No change in political
arrangement,
More of the negative enterprise is attempted elsewhere,
e.g.
a critique
of
the supposed strait-jacket of human nature is begun
in CPD.
From
Plato through Hegel and into contemporary times it has been supposed that
war,
like aggression,
is part of human nature,
that war is a permanent
condition of human and social existence.
38
would
which
enthusiasts
any
make
difference,
possible.
is
their position and luck,
push
While there is, unfortunately, a
induction from the manufacture of weapons,
batches
machines
are
to this one,
depl oyed) ,
never
(and
organisation
deterministic
position
would
possible either; political
not frustrate
the
and
other,
is false,
Different political arrangements,
been
have
inductions.
broader
The
are
changes
arrangements too, like the rest of social
not
life, are
But (nonanalytical) determinism,
technologically or economically determined.
technological
many
that a change in background
of course that such background
is
made
of
But even the good inductions do not
that weapons of various sorts must be used,
political
many
invention
from
induction's:-
machines that do eventually get
many
reinvented or independently discovered).
show
of any given type (for
or the like to their manufacture are unreliable and subject to
counterexamples
or
weapon
there is no stopping progress.
But in doing so they overextend themsleves.
fair
technological
that a
even further,
once invented by humans will be used:
device
Sometimes
so it is argued
which alleviate problems,
are
possible and would be different in differently evolved worlds.
CPD).
(JB,
elsewhere
technically
Things did not
and do not have to be the way they are or the social and political sort of way
they are.
Many routes,
dominant
require
none of deductive strength,
political
extensive
lead to the conclusion that the
structures of our time,
evolved from feudal
structural alteration.
In particular,
institutions,
they need
to
superseded by alternative structures which do not promote or lead to war.
theme has been argued directly from the nuclear fix (see e.g.
But
suppose,
improbable as it may seem,
thereby removing the current nuclear fix;
quietly
seif-destructing,or
nuclear
disarmament
HF I,
p.4/ft.).
that nuclear weapons all
vanished,
for instance,
thermodynamic
actually took place.
The
they turned out to be
miracle
occurred,
or
not
be
The problem of war would
t-hat of nuclear war would only be given a short respite.
23
Conventional
the structural arrangements for war would remain intact.
removed
For
a massive
be
and
even
3'?
remain,
weapons
would
weapons
such as chemical and biological ones,
were
they
prevent
the
in sot ar
3S
could seem
be
Nu clear weapon s,
if nuclear power plants remained
especially
nothing
and
intact;
development of (Star wars) weapons more
nuclear-
as
dangerous
caches are easily hidden away),
removed ("for smal 1
replaced,
would
along with weapons perhaps as
than
diabolical
nuclear ones.
War cannot be eliminated while leaving the rest of society as it is
by freezing the status quo.
... The structural conditions for war
need to be removed - not reinforced as appeals to elites may do - and
superseded by alternative structures which do not lead to war
(B.
Martin, p.12).
Structural adjustments
peace.
An
can provide conditions for
Kantian
initial
for the
argument
satisfactory
lasting
proposition
that
is
peace
possible, presented by Latta (introducing Permanent Peace), runs as follows:Peace, perpetual peace, is an ideal, not merely of a speculative kind but a
practical
ideal, a moral principle.
ought to be realised, i.e. there ought (morally)
Hence this ideal
to be peace.
But ought entails can; therefore peace is possible.
From
Heracleitus
philosophers
by
24
be
with war as one limit, is essential
swarm
more
widely
conceded,
ought
to
though
often
not
on
of
Some are even captivated
stop,
to motion and progress.
the recent shift in philosophical fashions the second premiss would
Kantian
grounds,
now
but
Such grounds do support the theme that peace ...is—desirable
be realised,
indicate what sort of peace.
but are more discriminating in
Unfortunately,
premiss does not sustain the conclusion,
23?
impressive
such extravagant counter-claims as that with peace everything would
consequentialist.
and
there buzzes an
Hegel
who have rejected the second premiss.
that competition,
With
through
that
they
help
however/ it is done, the second
ought does not entail can,
as
many
(From previous page)
As B. Martin, who uses this important form of
argument for institutional change to get his thick book
started,
points
ou t (pp. 12-13).
24.
The
swarm includes some anomalies,
ecology, Spinoza: see Appendix 3.
40
such as that tarnished hero of
deep
dilemmas reveal
moral
Fortunately
(see MD) .
conclusion that peace is possible,
method of (semantical) modelling:
societies
where
recall
persists
present in detail
scenarios
of
it may be
necessary
to
(for the sceptical
with n = 1 or n = 0).
n-human models,
the
to
That is the more
and indeed is feasible.
elaborate
peace
route
a more satisfactory and revealing
is
there
This sort of thing is of course
in more pleasing fashion than logicians could hope to emulate if
25
less precisely,
by novelists.
Hhat all these scenarios point
to,
already done,
rather
however,
are societies considerably different from our own, not in the people
involved
who have their weaknesses,
forth,
and so
their power drives,
but
because of significant structural alterations in the societies depi c ted.
way of such modellings we can not merely argue to the feasibi1i ty
By
peace,
sorts
restructured
push ahead with the argument - that societies
but
desirable alternatives to contemporary
are
For those of us
industrial arrangements.
pacific
the
alternatives,
Heilbroner
is
has
and
possible
said
thoroughly entrenched,
of
the
desirable,
human
and enforced,
power.
That has not deterred social
before
him and many after him,
Kant,
25.
in
his
search
these
military
or
then who want to move towards such
from
inference,
feasibility
and
we shou1d begin on the real work of structural change.
desirability is clear:
Peace
practical
of
of
but
the
prospect).
prospects
Present
poor
(as
arrangements
are
are
both ideologically and by much physical
theorists such as Kant, who like Rousseau
were concerned with obtaining lasting
for the indispensible conditions
peace.
for__ 1 asting—peace,
Perhaps Kant had some such modellings in view in his theme that peace is
empirically possible, which he coupled with his striking claim that it is
morally and rationally imperative.
The latter claim,
running in direct
opposition
to the longline of bellicose philosophers,
really relies on
the correct but controversial assumption that states are subject to
the
same moral relations as individual persons.
Both then have an obligation
to seek peace derived from forms of the categorial morality, notably from
rational autonomy , the universality of maxims, and the ultimate value of
persons (or, more chauvinistically, of humanity).
41
claimed,
others
as
have claimed since,
that peace is
not
possible
present structural arrangements of a competing nation-states kind.
times
changed,
have
and so have state structural
In particular there is now,
under
To be sure
since
arrangements,
in the shape of the United
Kant
Nations,
a
very weak reflection of what Kant looked for, a world (or European) federation
of nations.
namely,
But crucial
the
at
ingredients in Kant's resolution are still
upper level,
what is required for a standard resolution
Dilemma type situations - some surrender of
Prisoners
lacking:-
of
sovereignty,
national
26
especially as regards war;
Much
has now accumulated that more
evidence
the
and, at the lower level, "republican" state*.
nation-state level
far-reaching
changes
if peace is to be secured,
or
required
at
movement
is even to get its message through already fixed channels
control
systems.
succeed,
tn
informational
and democratic
are
practical
27.
and
not
(p.52) ,
to
alter
which
the
theoretical arguments for
not that it has fallen very
Kant's
claim,
as
well
as
arguments of an inductive sort.
Such is also the new message from America:
for the peace movement to get
through to the administration, American democracy must be overhauled and
revitalised,
capitalist democracy superseded by
true democracy or
"republicanism"
(see e.g.
Cohen and Ragers).
But the message, like the
US peace movements'" very limited demands for peace,
leaves the state, as
the bringer of wars, and the main source of violence, essentially intac.;
the structural changes suggested, which will be slow to achieve, are much
too narrowly conceived.
28.
state
has traced some of the economic consequences of 'the rise and
subsequent fall of the American imperium'’
There
to
The significant decline of the American imperium
Heilbroner
26^
peace
Movements on a single front, such as peace, are unlikely to
channels,
27
character and membership of state control system^.
widen
APPENDIX 1;
a
need to be linked into a broader plurality of movements,
but
are
My thanks for information to David Bennett and Andrew Mack.
'Empires
f ar .
empire
was
no
Thp =h<=pr military cost ... for the United States a 1 one ...
12
px c e p t i on «
is
always been expensive and the American
have
ten
roughly
imperial
American
dol1ars)".
GNP for the last 25 years
...
percent of
supplemented
spending
enhanced poverty,
countries fueled inflation,
what it was represented as required by,
$2X10
in
capitalist
other
by
1972
etc., and was complemented by,
counterexpenditure and efforts by the
USSR.
establishment of an American hegemony [consisted and] resulted
'The
just
in
American
large
very
capital
American-owned
billion"
payments
and
Between 1950 and 1970,
equipment abroad 1 eaped from $ 12
(negative
build-up
of
value
of
the
to
billion
"capital
flows" and
balances),
and
a
$78
growing
On this sort of basis Heilbroner speculates that
of IOUs.
operation
rapid
A result of the expenditure abroad was a serious balance of
problem
accumulation
mere
investments abroad.
plant
(p.54).
but in the
military expenditures,
not
of the American imperium by itself - deemed of such
'the
critical
importance to preserve the peace and security of the capitalist world - was in
likelihood
all
a
inflationary phenomena'
the
for
the
globalisation
of
the
(p.57 with insert from p.56).
According to Heilbroner,
that
condition
sufficient
'Long before the Vietnam debacle,
it was clear
American arms could not prevent the rise of revolutionary governments in
under-developed
collapse
there
world"
(p.57).
is presented by Heilbroner;
But
and seemingly there
little
is
evidence
little.
is more substantial evidence for is the marked dec H ng of *he
imperium in the period (1973-3) concerned.
decline
really very
in
America's
select leading national
share of World GDP,
economies:
43
of
What
American
One piece of evidence is the sharp
shown in the following
table
of
POPULATION
SHARE
(1984 est)
SHARE OF WORLD GDP (X)
RANK
1968
1975
1984
USA
1
35.0
24.3
25.0
5.2
USSR
2
11.1
11.0
13.8
6.2
.JAPAN
3
5.2
3.0
9.5
2.7
GERMANY FDR
4
5.1
6.7
5.7
1.5
FRANCE
5
4.6
5.4
4.4
1.3
CHINA
6
2.9
4.8
4.3
22.6
UK
8
2.8
2.8
2.3
1.3
INDIA
12
1.3
1.5
1.1
15.1
AUSTRALIA
15
1.1
1.4
1.0
0.3
COUNTRY
The
qrand
table
empire,
also make it clear that if the USA cannot
should
nor can the USSR.
sustain
A totalitarian Pax Sovietica is even
a
le=s
likely than a capitalistic Pax Americana was.
APPENDIX 2:
A pluralistic framework for defence policy
The policy (broadeni ng Cami11 er izs suggest ions)
1.
ensures Australian security to some minimal but reasonable extent;
2.
is entirely non-nuclear (.and so is not aligned);
3.
is
defensive
in
posture
with
weapons
system
devoid
of
offensive
application and capacity, focussing on direct defence of Continent,
is decentralised, comprising wel1-trained, dispersed but coordinated small
units.
is partly at least social,
defence,
nonmilitary
deploying,
in combination [?] with territorial
forms of popular resistance trained in
noncooperat i on.
44
sabotage
a
APPENDIX 3?
The philosophical record; a preliminary tabulation.
Reflection on war and peace has had a strong polarising effect,
dividing
philosophers into two main groups:
Group B.
Those who regard war as inevitable, perhaps even as desirable;
Group G.
Those who consider war an evil, capable of being replaced by lasting
and
peace through goodwill or improved social arrangements.
The groups are not however exhaustive;
fence-sitters;
and
there
are
there are ambivalent philosophers, and
those who have
the
supported
battered themes of a war to end wars and of world empire.
at one stage in his development,
to
a despotic world state,
peace.
Russell,
idealists.
reached by imposition or war,
B and G are sometimes described,
But
while
Thus, for example,
who looked, like Dante before him,
So strictly the classification is (once again)
Groups
historically-
as a guarantor
of
four valued.
respectively,
as realists
and
these overworked terms reflect accurately enough
the
historic human condition and the present prospects,
they are prejudicial, and
they conflict with other classifications using these terms; for instance, both
Plato
and
Hegel,
condition
of human existence.
idealists
would
Northedge,
accept war as
normally accounted idealists,
have
been
a
Such concoctions as war-realists
preferable
to the
labels
from whom much of the record is drawn,
the
c on serva t i ve t r ad i t i on a n d aboli t i on i sts.
the
concoctions,
45
terms
and
of
sets the contrast:
peace-
which
namely
We shall prefer adaptions
namely war-riors and peace-niks,
simply (real) baddies and goodies.
in
permanent
or,
not to be
of
partisan,
DEFINING POLES
R adi c a 1 s
GROUP 8:
war-riors
RESIDUE GROUP
GROUP G
peace-niks
Virtually all classic
Greek phi1osophers
except early Stoics:
especially Heracleitus,
Plato (P)
Author of
Revel at ions
Early Christians
(non-violence
pr i n c i p 1 e)
Dubois (1306);
but with anti
Musi im aim
Erasmus ( 1570)
Cruce (1623; early
world order model
Roman Stoics and Christians
Scholastics: Aquinas (P)
Dante
•Just war theorists:
(Au Qu s t i n e) , SuIr ez,
Grotius (1425)
IJ t op i an s: More (war
games of modern
utopias in direct
descen t)
European peace
projects, some extended
to (Christian)
wor1d:
Bel 1ers ( 1710),
Penn (1693), abb£ de
Saint-Pierre (1713)
European peace
and hegemony:
Duke of Sully
(1620)
Nation-state theorists
Machiave1 1 i, Hobbes,
Locke, Spinoza
I-<2'1 b n /f’-j
German idealists:
Hegel, Schopenhauer
Perpetual peace:
Rousseau, Kant
Mili t ar i st s: Nietzsche;
Treitschke, Bernhardi,
Clausewi tz
Some utili tar i ans:
Bentham, the Mil Is,
Bren tano
Some anarchists and
1ibertarians:
Kropotkin (?),
Spencer
Russel 1
■James
Hi t tgenstei n
Key:
In
Dewey
P, peace a prime objective.
sort of investigation there are disappointments as
this
Spinoza
was
admiration
madness
to
a
major disappointment,
of Greek thought,
allow
Brentano a
find.
well
For,
as
finds.
despite
his
'Brentano was a decided pacifist and thought it
questions of international
fortunes of war'- (Kraus in Brentano, p.122).
46
justice to be
decided
by
the
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47
1984.
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R.
Routlpy,
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48
its
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Discussion Papers
in environmental phiiosophy
_.
Phitosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 9
WAR AND PEACE. II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY
RICHARD ROUTLEY
��FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
by
R. Routley
Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1983
��ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
Pacifism,
despite
its
limited
revival
through
the
nonviolent
action
1
movement
and
as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues
to have a bad philosophical press.
one
way
or
another,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as inconsistent.
as
incoherent
Even philosophical
defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding
pacifism
is
in
only
that
consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
2
position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the
prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic
methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;
from
rights.
an
In
influential
and
and arguments from irresponsibility and
widely
disseminated
set
of articles
3
attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory ...
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
be
better characterised by the more sweeping
1.
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle:
see Origins 12
(1982) pp.310-311.
The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.
2.
In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.
Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists'
belief
vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.
as
"bizarre
and
�P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
The
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
sense
which
is
narrower
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily
elsewhere.
the
But
if
violence
Pacifism, as a
universally and not merely in war.
violence
is impermissible, then it should be so
what
is
out
rule
position,
moral
should
be
comprehensive.
On its own showing, it is contended,
proper
action
to
preventative action
commitment
to
prevent,
what
would
involve,
it
use
in
the
case
Narveson's
or
of
pacifism.
of
incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism:
claims
prohibits,
acclaimedly
sometimes,
precluded
from
taking
violence;
But
force.
genuine
actively
defend
on
them,
pain
Hence
the
initial
that it cannot underwrite its
of
inconsistency.
However
location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several
connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force.
initial
for
a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action
of a type logically excluded
own
is
pacifism
The
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it
should
be
'to
use
violence',
namely
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and
'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted
in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
1970, pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed.
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425.
Page references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further
elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page
references prefixed by 'N' are to this article.
2
�It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
R2.
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
It is
cases
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
to
resist
The
violence).
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
pacifists
by
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
4
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however what
assault
on
pacifism
Narveson
clearing
(after
several
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
pacifism,
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
of
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
unless
a
slide
(tentatively)
by
is
without
fighting
pacifism
does
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
Nor
does
comprehensive
made.
theses
on
ought,
T1
T2,
and
imply
that
pacifism,
characterised
we have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will
not
apply
violent
methods.
Nor
therefore
does
it
imply
that
all
conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some,
good
4.
deal,
of
that
machinery
is.
One
hardly
the
or
a
needs to be a comprehensive
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in
his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.
3
�pacifist to coherently think the latter.
the
This provides
confirmation
some
for
key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident
in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are
legitimate
morally
are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
The
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
stunt
connotation of violence or at least of force which
equate with violence.
use of force is taken to by implied in R2.
cannot
here
resist
Hence
(p.415).
violence,
or
force
and
to
so
Hence
the
against attack' (pp.417-8).
also
Narveson's
and
so
to
a
much
less
can
be
resisted,
But
without
violence.
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
even
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence.
force, but not vice versa;
and
defensible position.
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
Things
be
If the stunt were got away with, it would
pacifism
render
a
unwarranted
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
resistance,
be
that
assumption
"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
to
proceeds
Hence the conflation of T2 and
excluded from among admissible pacifist methods.
pacifist
Narveson
Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing,
and defending are taken to imply (use of)
R2;
the
Violence implies
and it is violence, not all applications
of
force,
that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
to
castrate
practices,
any case indefensible.
development
and
themselves
from
compromise,
pacifism,
by
depriving
it
of
the
range
of
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
It enjoys some popularity even
among
those
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance
older
mediation,
pacifism,
whose
methods
they
see
as
confined
to
negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions.
The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification;
for
pacifism
has
often
by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods
jeen
presented,
(cf.
even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously
4
said
�of
pacifism
'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by
that
negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the
hostilities
added).
and
of
total
doctrine
of
non-resistance
non-cooperation with any form of warfare':
But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether
or standard, need so limit its admissible methods:
to
italics
comprehensive
nothing excludes resistance,
uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.^
It
is
simply
that
comprehensive
pacifism
has
not yet developed its fuller
potential, especially in conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
on
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in
terms
of
'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist's
'opposition
to
If
violence'.
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
to violence.
it
is
Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
5.
In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see
for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social
Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston,
1980,
p.198.
Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent
action from pacifism;
and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism
can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.
But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile
positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law
reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,
1961, p.212.
5
�A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument
on
based
inconsistency
pacifism theme,
the
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
transformed to the claim
No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).
P2(R).
For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in
notion
The
right.
of
very
initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from
breaches of a right and of
Because
the
against
action
preventative
infringement
'a right just i_s a status justifying preventative action ...
it.
of
what does
follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent
infringements of his right' (p.419).
That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out
to
to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide
such
incorporate
things
as social pressure.
Moreover 'it is a logical truth,
not merely a contingent one, that what might be
For
action must have the notion of violence built into it.
the
against
question
nonviolent
(p.421)!
quite indefensibly strong.
him
To block the argument it is enough for
rights
with
The argument accordingly
to
be,
to
or
be
to,
limited
In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is
action.
entitle
pacifism.
associated
preventative action
not
force
logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative
these
begs
is
necessary
to
For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does
kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if
such action is necessary in the circumstances to
prevent
infringement
his
of
right.
to
How the argument from rights leads
inconsistency
is
summed
up
thus
(p.421):
SAI.
'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence
done
to us', as a consequence of the.o&f^e&i^fi to avoid violence.
But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is
self-contradictory,
both
granting
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
Narveson
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
6
is
mistaken
p.423).
in
That a
�right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
action
does
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in
by
simply
rejecting
the
Narveson
not
slide^.
What
for
SAI,
appears in place of SAI is
something like
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
SAI#.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
give
facto,
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
not,
does
ipso
Without the slide there is
The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
violence
and
In
evil.
lesser
outline
the
argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must
admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the
violence
would
where
those
Inconsistency
be
some
is
morally
use
of
immediate
permissible
violence
by T2.
and morally justified.
would
prevent
evil,
of
The cases are
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
use
to
admit
both
that
the
some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible because it involves violence.
An argument
like
this
as gets summarized as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that
[E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of
force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force
(by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing
between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and
(0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights'
occur without stuffing.
This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in
between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to
violence.
An account of rights which will serve is given in R.
and V.
Routley
'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy
(ed. D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff.
7
�supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under
circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force .
these
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches.
It
is
important
to
them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the
get
ethical place of pacifism
is
to
The
result.
from
argument,
basic
lesser
violence, goes as follows:—
Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence,
the
since in this way, in any arbitrary one of
minimized.
""P2.
indicated,
cases
violence
is
Therefore
It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
to
it
which
is
mora
y
wrong, always, to use violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
this
argument,
together
with
pulled together from Narveson's work.
support
for
the
He not only espouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
the
argument with the lesser evil argument:-
El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
is,
the
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
J.
8
9.
Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
8
�Neither argument is decisive;
of
reference
that
they
both in fact begin easing pacifists into a
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
should
moral relatives, where obligations give way
to
obligations-other-things-being-
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
frame
got
into
it.
E3
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
involved, e.g.
has
rooting it out, which may
involve
nonminimization
strategies.
Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to 02
- a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being
to
accept
prepared
violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social
justice.
Nor do El and E2 entail 02;
so neither does
principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.
by
commitment
evil-perpetrating
Narveson's
such
e.g.
violence
but
argument
some
increases
well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an
dictator.
non-violent
fails
to
For in particular, violence
is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
in
pacifists
for
similar
reasons.
Regan's
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically
3.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
4.
Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must
quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
be
preferred
to
a
great
an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering
force, even when force is an evil.
of
It is enough to observe that increasing force may
still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.
Resort to the theme that
Elt.
Violence is an irredeemable evil
(proposed by Regan in his "defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and
by
Narveson,
Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty.
subsequently
considered
An irredeemable evil is
figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser
violence.
9
�will lighten its hue;
now
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2,
but
What are the grounds for that?
the problem with the argument shifts to Elt.
As
Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared
to
countenance
some
small
amount
of violence in exchange for considerable goods.
(But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing
it
was
not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get
gross.)
pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence;
deeper,
It does break the argument however;
underwriting C2.
by
indeed it seems to get
them
in
for it removes Cl
and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument
from
lesser evil, which starts from
DI.
There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil,
evil
than that tainted with violence;
requires.
however
pacifism
is
no
of
pacifism
(see
into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous
(utilitarian
through
as
violence
an
irredeemable
evil
which
Rp.80ff.),
position (Rp.86),
extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines
But the approach
greater
and there are accordingly no cases such as DI
This is the core of Regan's defence
converts
there
is
a
.
mistaken
inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is,
like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such absolutes are adequately
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby,
as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons
otherwise
don't
arise,
or
for
acting
other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not
11.
That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of
Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss 5. If
any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater
quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.
While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation,
there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.
10
�Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions,
come what may, period.
such
is
pacifism
as
collide
bottom,
at
more fashionable, highly
with
head-on
malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at
time) were working from.
The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ...
for the utility 'that will be brought out
is incompatible with pacifism':
some
one who acts
by
may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121)
violence
the
according
to
the
to
utilitarian-commandment
maximize
doing
13
So
.
utility
may
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false
little:
position
every
doctrine
inconsistency
suffers
such
with
very
many
false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism
odds
the
with
contractarianism.
correct,
other
ethical
positions
But this argument would
only
position
insidious,
is
however,
for
have
Firstly, as we
generally,
have
provisional.
theory-saving
seen,
made
also
libertarianism
were
it
at
and
otherwise
however they are not, including
has
which
happened
is
more
it
utilitarianism,
seem
as
climate
unfavourable
to
incompatible
There are two more specific damaging features.
and
consequentialist
approaches
more
no deontic principle were firm, but all are
if
The theory of prima facie principles
This is entirely mistaken.
is
a
device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties
such as moral dilemmas.
13.
weight,
is
that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of
such as pacifism.
positions
What
instance.
ethical thought, thus helping to establish a
ethical
carry
if the positions were suitably exhaustive;
no deeper ecological
presents,
he
shows
utilitarianism
as
Secondly, consequentialist positions tend
to
suggest
that
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in
using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has
also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents
can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist,
rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting
that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig
in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force
will
reduce
evil,
so no one is justified in using force.
This is
sceptically-based pacifism.
11
�only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try
such
positions,
as
pacifism,
into
offering
to
ease
rival
incongruous consequential
sometimes
support for their themes.
Narveson
assumptions
takes
such
procedures
upon pacifists:
a
stage
further,
and
utilitarian
foists
thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence
is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain,
in
the
(p.425).
recipients'
These
incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for
objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and
what
it
does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators
as
well
as
those
on
whom
it
is
inflicted.
Even
more
astonishing,
such
utilitarian—style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following
three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as morally good) is to will the
it
(at
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the
means
to
least prima facie).
[N]2.
greater.
[N]3.
There are no "privileged" moral persons ...
(p.425)^.
'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist's problem',
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it
is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as
an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral
doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).
It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax
out
of the statements given.
consequences
such
For implications to hold the substantive terms such as
'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or
otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds.
another,
in
the
implicans;
The intended argument to the
"commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of
variant
on
the
lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles, N3 to
stop exceptions being made for oneself
and
one's
group,
and
N1
to
ensure
that
14. Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of these
may be
defended on purely
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim
as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive
ethical theories.
12
�violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g.
in
in
Cl,
ethical
an
end.
for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least
But,
dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed,
which
is
reflected
as
the
begs
bound morally to shun violent means.
pacifism,
against
question
Under pacifist reformulation Nl will
give way to something more like
To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally
Nl#.
acceptable
means
to it.
For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need
pacifists since nothing damaging emerges;
worry
not
the three principles duly adjusted;
they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.
More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has
countered.
This
and
E2
N2
or
inconsistency
is
of
evil)
comprehensive
to
pacifism
Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one
what is the moral situation here?
to
(admissibility
What
of
are
them
these
being
of
violence)
dilemma,
Indeed the example is very similar to
the
turns
that
on
Jim
shoots
one
of
what account is given of moral dilemmas.
pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to
utilitarian
line
and
where
situation
N
But
ought
The situation is that
of
a
paradigmatic
that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing
squad about to shoot several captives if
everything
be
cases
difficult
N ought to prevent mass murder, but also
kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
of a moral dilemma.
moral
03
N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
person
not
to
the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil)
(minimization
in
yet
of
trying
them^.
almost
Now
What a comprehensive
take
the
inadequate
to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever
occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were
prima
facie, negotiable, etc., etc.
No, the conflicting obligations stand.
to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try
to
determine
What is
the
best
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is
that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to
conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases
involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted
in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.
13
�thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to
in
the
In
circumstances.
trying
N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied.
the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g.
that
B.
No inconsistency in pacifism follows.
minimize
that
Even granted
it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence.
N had better shoot
is
preferable
to
On the contrary the situation
N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had
fix.
a
it
Suppose
and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized,
evil,
remains
to
is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate,
what
determine
do
There is the real-life complication
better do so^.
of
a
dilemma,
moral
but
no
inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.
the
Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of
rights, can now be met.
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
justified in that case? (p.420)
its
is
use
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where
to
be
No, it is not deonticly justified^.
is a qualified No:
and
amount to making out a case.
But
justification
on
proposes
is
solution,
back-up
ambiguous,
in
p.423).
against
may
just
situation.
dilemma
a
another
argument, taking his proposals as evident.
pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not
argument
and
the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is
morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing
no
It is certainly not morally
The response is qualified then because some force might
be consequentially justified, as a second-best
presents
is
it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its
deontic origin in 'making right'.
Narveson,
one
Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer
raped.
obligatory,
from
pacifism
person
-
but
he
As it is not — the
lead
to
a
decisive
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.
What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
17.
This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
14
�The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral
its
adherence
to
principles
unexceptionable
Insofar
fanaticism, so Hare contends.
such
manages
Hare
as
as
insensitivity.
P2,
to
Through
pacifism is a form of
get
his
remarkable
accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism:
the
pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought,
but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others
(p.174).
Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting
moral
stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's
dilemmas
deceptively neat two-level
critical.
thought,
into
intuitive
himself
to,
without
any
Hare
of the requisite supporting argument, according to
which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time,
violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf.
Hare s
redefinition,
a
Harey—fanatic,
e.g.
p.175).
Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism.
on
and
pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme
Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution
pacifism.
helps
comprehensive
But
moral
of
classification
A fanatic
is a person who adheres to ideals which
diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf.
Since
p.170)!
comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as
already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson)
tends,
namely
the
towards
pacifists are Harey—fanatics.
usual
sense:
whether
position
their
bigoted .
they
whether
The
idea
appropriateness
violence
This does not of course make
are
'wild
in many situations, such
them
or
extravagant
opinions'
of
some
pacifist principles
of
.
the
or
(OED)
is
pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an
appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers,
founders
in
fanatics,
depends on the very different matter of
fanatics
comprises
that
of
and
the
the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to
But the relevant opinions
hardly be, all of the condemned type.
of
such
thinkers
Whence the conclusion follows.
are
not,
can
By this simple
syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.
19.
R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1981,
p.173.
references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.
15
All
page
�Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's
satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism:
is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as
being
Jewish,
as
relevance
is
completed,
it
there^ fanaticism
wearing
beads
Naturally, given that using of characterising
can
or
moral
hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant
matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to
violence:
blue
For however the sensitive task matter of using
morally relevant.
violence as morally irrelevant.
more
earlier,
those
applying
of
this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up
at the end of §4).
Does it really matter then that
fanatics?
it
Although
argument that it does.
homework
appears
pacifists,
that
though
Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had
guess
what,
they
their
done
the
Thus, e.g.
go
over
to
Hare's
As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great
store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ...
20.
Harey-
properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would
utilitarianism).
of
are
it does not matter in the least, Hare has an
abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and,
logic
fanatics,
not
concepts
A.
based [entirely] on
involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several
Naess, Gandhi and Group
Conflict,
Universitetsforlaget,
p.15:
...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of
ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of
nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in
defence, the exception.
21.
the
R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral Philosophy, Macmillan, London,
1972,
p.78.
Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this
article on peace - from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and
nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to
utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are
present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone
wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just
alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer
prototype argument developed against nationalism.
16
Oslo,
�crucial points.
objectionable
getting
Before
feature
some
to
these
of
The
theory.
highly
a
Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in
of
which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework
two-level
is
there
details,
procedure
adopted
methodologically
is
Hare's
of
own
radically unsound
because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at
the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently
rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way
rejected
above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic
Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt.
which
logic,
already
But
that
since
Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over
As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some
to Hare's utilitarianism).
important opponents of utilitarianism.
In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and
comprise
moral
intuitionists
and
pure
impure.
deontologists,
fanatics
Impure
who stick to their deontic
principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what
calls
'critical
thinking'.
Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme
pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal
clearly'
Hare
or
inability
to
face
facts
or
to
think
involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking,
(p.170)
originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion
accommodating
ff.).
But
cases
this
comprehensive
bit
intuitive
principles
conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28
dirty-trick
philosophy
can
where
of
pacifists
are
presumably
"pure
willing to think critically, but somehow survived
opinions
different
from
be
here
fanatics";
the
ordeal
those of the utilitarian' (p.171).
set
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen.
any fanatics of this type, if
his
argument
is
for they are 'able and
still
holding
moral
They are in fact "pure
to
be
According to Hare there cannot be
correct
argument is not correct.
See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid.
17
since
aside,
fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out
22.
of
(p.171).
Therefore,
his
�One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure
to
consider
the
possibility
that
a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical
assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians
reasons.
other
substitution,
preferences
For
which
can
be
one,
argument (e.g.
Hare's
requires
a
base
class
intersubstituted.
representation
to
ff.).
are
There
p.177 ff.) depends on preference
the
of
course
whom
among
preference-havers,
in
Hare,
chauvinistically contracts this base class
whole
of
p.176
(cf.
his
discussion
humans.Differently,
certain
the
of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to
familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.
As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this
an
less
is
argument
a
than
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical
mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and
complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
applied
to
avert
greater
Regan is envisaging
violence
where
situations
and he points to what he takes to be the evident
evil;
moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free
from
an
aspiring
rapist'
is
Interestingly,
(Rp.86).
has
Regan
situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand:
herself
not described the
there is nothing
in
to
prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and
fleeing.
What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the
(perhaps
wilful)
that
infliction
death, by forceful means^ (cf.
mere
use
of
of
damage,
non-negligible
Np.110);
that is, which
physical force or power (or energy).
including pain, injury or
involves
much
more
than
And it is by no means so evident
that the woman is entitled to
inflict
violence
from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way
is
duly
separated
violence
upon
the
aspiring
rapist.
Once
that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
23.
On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base
Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.
18
class,
see
R. and
V.
�But
a
straightforward
action
violence
disentangling
abounds
as
It
with
is
subcase
matter as may at first seem.
defective
of
not
depend
force
is
by
means
no
violence.
of
on
tight
a
Fortunately
characterisation
what
indicate
some
done, in the way of inflicting damage.
constraints
Firstly,
presupposed.
force:
is
legalised force,
violence,
so
violence,
a
on
satisfactory
violence
is
not
applied
on
behalf
adequately
of
of
account
some
violence,
where no force is applied.
violence.)
24.
supposed
that
and
are
which
distinguished as illegitimate
"legitimate"
authority,
long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated.
so often mistakenly
of
However it is important to
is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.2$ Secondly, violence is not
of
the
enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of
actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means
through
so
Indeed the literature on nonviolent
characterisations
arguments developed in this paper do
violence.
a
the
is
Violence
threat
(This only needs emphasizing because it is
threats,
intimidation
and
the
like,
involve
Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems
such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live
(goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not
necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy,
or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy
habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent"
destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.
It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of
violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not
involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation
and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds
related to those that tell against violence proper.
For similar reasons,
"economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such
procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to
be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence
or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity.
Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many
difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical
practices involve violence.
19
�There can be unintentional violence, e.g.
the women may have applied violent
without intending to, in escaping the rapist.
Fourthly, such matters as the distance
at which force is applied and the indirectness of
military operations, are irrelevant.
modern
means,
the
for
as
means,
instance
in
The submarine operator who, by causally
pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian
city
instigates
a
violent
By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not
act.
in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent
confined
to
action
done
against
persons,
means.
but
can
violence
Finally,
be
directed
not
is
against
other
life-forms, as will soon emerge.
Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and
from
the
fact
that
one
of
derives
them^
violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that
there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts
violence greater than zero.
of
Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to
matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us
on
most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on
small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral
will
certainly
problems.
They
give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2
they mean 'nontrivial violence'.
Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not
taking
obvious
steps
passivity and pacifity.
to
prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of
Both Regan and Narveson (e.g.
p.425) assume
that
pacifism
25.
The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political
Freedom, op.cit., p.288n.
Note however that Sharp's account of 'political
violence' is defective in various other respects.
It is curious,
but
understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action,
Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence,
and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with
force and threat with use.
26.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent
action.
20
�is a passive do-nothing position.
This is far from true, as the variety of methods
or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain.
considered
Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of
Narveson
Otherwise,
would
negative
later
Narveson's
nonviolent
action.
hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping)
way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not
(p.425).
Neither Regan nor
doing
assessment
nonviolence' does not change the situation:
for this
of
anything
about'
violence
what
calls
'positive
he
positive
is
approach
simply
nonviolence practised in an exemplary ;.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will
follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential
or effectiveness of nonviolent practices.
extent
when
reduce
assembledmuch
the
of
training
and
the
Fuller details of these practices,
of
impact
nonviolent
the argument
from
social
irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.
§4.
The
argument from
corollaries.
The
radical
practice
political
by
definition.
But
from
other
awkward
of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war.
For
Standard pacifism takes
out
war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
war
and
corollaries
the
position
Although normally war would be excluded,
of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear.
what
of
dilemma
situations?
War
would
always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances
it might be the (second-) best thing
27.
to
do.
A
strange
pacifism!
Comprehensive
The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going
off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components
have been removed.
As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types:
protest, noncooperation and intervention;
op.
cit.
pp.32-3.
Of course
pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations
are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).
28.
See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear
war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein
pp.152-3, especially G.
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit.,
(referred to as Politics) and V.
Coover and others, Resource Manual for a
Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981.
21
�pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast
extreme
to
pacifism.
Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to
extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
is
given
a
large
suitably
If
that
evil
weighting then second-best choices will yield the same
results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that
eliminate
since
wars,
are
war
of
an
as
or
mounted from
rely
the
institutions.
exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all
upon
only
arrangements
social
and
nation-states
particular,
obviously police and military forces but
of
violence-underpinned
many of their institutions, most
state
legal
arrangements,
States are however desirable social institutions,
typically depend on violent means.
and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just
comprehensive
pacifism
implies
the
of
inadmissibility
institutions, such as police forces and states typically are;
be ruled out either
individuals,
directly
delegates,
as
violence-dispensing
effect
who
forces,
by
nonviolent
nonviolent means.
state;
but
it
substitutes,
recently
or
such organisations may
because
else
their behalf.
evolved
will
which
is
nonviolent
methods
Pacifism
institutions concerned with
does
not
public
that
order
have
Pacifism does not
organisations
maintain
they
by
fully
as
police
alternative
nonviolent
will be applied, where necessary, to
The force of the objection should thus not
entail
order,
sweeping charges of social irresponsibility.
22
the
and
are
coercive
actively
Law and authority can still operate then in the
back-up authority and "enforce" laws.
overestimated.
on
violence
however exclude the replacement of such
wars,
A more telling objection, then, is
no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils).
that
which
institutions
these
directly
less
or
and a more general argument may be
inevitability,
or
not without much further ado.
least
extensively:
violence
desirability,
In
at
institution,
However wars are by no means the
dispense
would
nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the
reasonable costs;
desirability
wars
it
elimination
accordingly
of
does
Nor is it true that
prominent
not
be
social
succumb
to
�pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is,
the illegitimacy of
government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the
sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).
or (differently)
A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent,
political
noncoercive,
arrangements.
arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible.
imply
the
absence
or
illegitimacy
of
government,
political community organised under a government.
state
with
authority
and
not
necessarily
pacifism does not entail anarchism.
main
Accordingly,
that
implies
not
does
it
or therefore of a state, of a
Nor does
even
it
that
imply
a
certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral
dilemmas of political organisation.
and
only
pacifism
Comprehensive
objective,
not
attained,
was
Since it admits of states with frameworks of law
based
on
the free agreements of individuals,
Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample:
a
nonviolent
Indian
state;
replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society.
his
it was not the
Granted there
are
genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism 2", they are not so
simple as derivability.
Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a
moral
so
ideal
easily
brought down by its political corollaries.
Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than
concerning
like:
external
and
internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the
it also tells against the received treatment of
example.
While
other
species,
animals
for
it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating
of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals.
29.
those
At least it does this
so
long
Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without
moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of
violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on
replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The
irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they
differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied
(see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially
Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit,
anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state
authority)
and
restrictions on liberty, to a limit.
Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi:
'The ideally nonviolent
state will be an ordered anarchy'
(unreferenced citation at the end of the
Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).
23
�as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as
is
There is little good basis
humans (or persons).
restriction.^
controversial
euthanasia,
any
in
And,
moral
areas
concerning
the
corollaries
killing
a
such
for
however
similar
case,
spread
humans,
of
At
violence?
the
suicide,
But
must
creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms.
the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature
simply
killing
of
No force need be applied:
in
a
eats
and dies painlessly and without a struggle.
The
or
pill
is
given
life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence?
technical
purely
arrangements
pacifist
will
to
objections
solve,
in
eating
meat
worthwhile
On the face of
obtained.
so
New
any rate, the disruption of
at
principle
an
Then the proper objections to
such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that
it, there are no
they
risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples
like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing.
injection
several
into
e.g.
So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices.
involve
chauvinistic
indeed wherever violence plays a significant role.
punishment,
capital
and
the category by restriction of the application of violence to
from
removed
not
violence,
practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.
But suppose now that the new technology
is
extended
scientists, working in their accustomed military role:
as the anti—neutron bomb, which selectively destroys
devices
which
much
but
clever
'weapons , such
newly devised
property
by
further
not
people,
or
"dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence.
just
Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid
these
reaches
of
technological
fantasy.
For "dissolving" people requires energy,
which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in
violence:
Was
(upgraded)
account
of
that is, the new wars will still involve violence.
there
old-fashioned
however
violent
anything
methods
so
such
wrong
as
with
hunting
eating
meat
obtained
by
more
or raising and killing one's own?
Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural"
M.
an
behaviour
of
creatures
to
See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op.
cit.
Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g.
Politics,
p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and
predation.
24
�which the principles are supposed to apply.
Aggression is a fairly common feature of
and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made
animal
The force of the
out) erupts in violence.
various
for
ways,
example
along
these
argument
lines.
can
however
Aggression
assumed to be an
is
evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for
themselves
(of
their offspring) in their natural environment.
and
ir
mitigated
be
survival
But most humans
for
now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations
which
evolution
gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance).
as
Much
humans
have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they
should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices,
ill-adapted
now
to
their
and mostly counterproductive.
situation
So
argues the pacifist.
There is a residual problem,
practices
like
that
vegetarianism.
the
Are
creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as predators
of
and tribal people, to be condemned as morally
Sometimes,
confronting
yes,
be attained:
when
wrong
these
violence?
involve
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to
Though a way
but always?
can
problem 3 1, it is a rather unsatisfactory way.
be
beaten
the
around
of
edge
this
What this suggests is that nonviolence
is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal.
The arguments for
nonviolence
-
which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence
and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings -
sort
of
But
conclusion.
exclude.
nonviolent
what
is
called
charge
for
state,
is
is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at
This is^ to concede
an
of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as
P2 remains unqualified.
31.
would
The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral
sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2.
attentuated
similar
approaches
thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive
that
a
the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least,
since it opens the door a chink to other options which
categorically
suggest
The sheer moral power of such pacifism
As Singer has in the analogous case of
Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
25
vegetarianism:
is
one
see
reason
e.g.,
for
Animal
�There is no reason however why
giving its adoption some pause.
a
genuine
pacifism
(making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits
such natural phenomena as predation.
Nothing logically rules out such a genuine
and
more sensitive pacifism.
There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as
In
particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts
similar to those using violence:
This
is
a
of
requirement
otherwise they could have a case made against them.
in a different sense from the pure logical
consistency
sense, namely that of keeping to the same story.
for
well.
pacifism,
Again there need be no deep problem
so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must
be a single principle
just
(e.g.
P2)
-
as
distinct
from
bundle
a
of
moral
principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving
violence.32 io meet the rationality requirement the position should,
be
integrated
into
a
in
larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a
piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices
to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g.
mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic
and
oceans.
In
an
does
not
destructive
such things as strip
wastes
in
streams
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property
picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism.
vandalism
particular,
cover
violence
But
even
metaphorically,
against persons (and certainly not nonphysical
violence such as "psychological violence").
What is sought then
is
an
appropriate
of these notions covering destructive practices;
and also an accompanying
synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'.
Then P2 is superseded by
synthesis
an appropriately qualified
P2#.
It is morally wrong to use vandolence.
It remains to characterise
the
cluster
of
destructive
practices
that
count
as
vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
32.
It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject
assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences.
Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.
13.
The position has been called 'pacifism.
26
�APPENDICES
§5.
The
from
arguments
impracticality
impracticality
and
pacifism in the real world.
of
the
reality:
social
alleged
Even if it is conceded that pacifism
is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still
the
feasibility
of
pacifism
as a sensible practice to live by will be contested -
And it has
despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi.
to
be
admitted
the
that
real
world,
with
all its horror and squalor, does put
But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.
pacifism to severe tests.
Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less
than in replacing war^.
prepared
or
for
succeed
Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual
violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they
properly
to
likely
given
a
dress rehearsal.
have
been
never
The prospects for success of
nonviolent defence of,a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war
is
convention
observed
or not.
If the convention is observed then pacifism stands
reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
perhaps
unleashed,
in
broken,
is
massive ways, on noncombatants.
and
violence
is
According to Walzer, in his
superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance,
'success
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention -
...
and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^).
attained
-
there
is
conventions are flouted.
reasons,
some
got homesick.
ruthless
of
This is
presumably
be
never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some
The invaders may give
them irrelevant, e.g.
up
and
depart
for
all
sorts
or
they needed a quick decisive victory, they
What Walzer no doubt means is something like this:
invaders
may
Success
false.
that
sufficiently
in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support
34.
The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source of
considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit.
35.
Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op. cit.
references given there.
36.
All page references prefixed by 'W' are to
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
27
See also
M. Walzer,
Martin,
Just
and
war)
op.cit.,
Unjust
is
and
Wars,
�lines, etc., can eventually succeed.
defending
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
to violence.
resorts
side
But that sort of thing is also true even if the
is
if the defence "forces" are well-armed it
to
invaders
start
and
with
difficult
more
civil
well -prepared
with
than
afterwards
easier
the
for
costly
and
resistance.
Walzer is
inappropriate examples.
in
command,
model
the
of
way
the
Jews,
The
way.The
Nazis,
to
jump
who
that
conclusion
the
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian
the
enslaved
misleading
many
like
cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of
defence
nonviolent
however,
thinking,
who
in
state,
total
Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the
the
population,
by
The
"resistance"
picture
is
highly
and large, did not resist extermination in an organised
never
invaded
Germany,
were
in
control
all
or
the
infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population.
Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army
took
over
and
managed
all
key
Australia it is not even so clear
largely
united
and
actively
resisting
this
is
which
With island territories such as
infrastructure.
that
For
logistically
population.
Walzer's
feasible
against
impression
resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g.
a
of the
Wp.332)
might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers
ready to leave.
Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate
present
state-determined circumstances.
No state would be prepared to risk
way
in
37.
It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish,
opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country
comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue,
R.L.
Rubenstein, The Cunning of History:
the Holocaust and the American
Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.
38.
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by
Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
28
�training its
populace
different).
It
full
in
techniques
(civil
is
defence
all too easy for them to "rout" the police:
be
then
would
action
nonviolent
civil
obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.
thus
The argument
initial sketchings.
far
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism:
has
been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
That in itself is revealing.
deviations
from
are
it
Pacifism is the
require
what
rest
position
(inertial
and
state)
The reason for this is simple
explanation.
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of
enough:
it is what has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of
and
merely
justified.
case
try
dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be
in
that
the
defender
(person
or
nation)
is
morally-excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral
the
position
privileged
The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent:
curious
is
to
its
already
the
in
bounds.
a
Still
defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma
And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have
situation.
to
use
it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:-
Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic
already glimpsed will begin.
None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are
deductively
tight
assumptions
can
be
challenged
arguments for pacifism particularly good ones.
for
pacifism,
(as
above).
Nor
One of the poorer positive
are all the
arguments
for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory
29
�of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited,
nuclear
that
or
chemical
hope
weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an
illusion, escalation is inevitable.
are bound to be overstepped.
case is overstated.
the
e.g.
The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are
-
Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the
Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible.
Wars are much
more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows.
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped
things intervene (e.g.
support
(as
midstream
more
should
the
for
first
inevitably,
premiss
for
those
mixture
a
above)
suffering
and
anguish
violent
of
methods,
the
They
nonviolence.
injustice
characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of
means-ends
of
the
consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g.
pain,
important
a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are,
include
in
cost
that
in
violence
violence
within
the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained
by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
more
less furtive, society.
open,
the why of
pacifism)
considerable.
These
are
None of these well-known types of reason (giving
separately
decisive,
but
their
cumulative
affords a model for one way of proceeding^;
Mill's
defence
Mill's
procedure
works
(at
least
As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.
30
of
liberty
nonviolence,
it works as well as it works for
liberty).
39.
is
it is enough (a nonelementary exercise)
to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for
otherwise
effect
reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong
positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence.
as
a
�A
more
decisive
consequentialist
data ,
argument,
takes
a
but
making
semantical
preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds
modelling
nonviolence
Again
principles.
use
of
route.
are
similar
practical
and
The data is used to arrive at
then
pacifism
in
applied
is
derived
semantically
as
principled
nonviolence.^0
R.
40.
Routley*
*
The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R.
and V.
Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical
foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.
* With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and
participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.
The main outlines of the paper were drafted
associate at Simon Fraser University.
31
while
the
author
was
a
research
�OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School publications:
R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second
edition 1974, Third edition 1975.
Departmental publications:
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.
D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental
Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
2. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
3. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
4. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
5. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
6. R.K. Meyer, A note on R-^ matrices, 1979.
7. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
8^ C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
9. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980.
10. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981.
11. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
12. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used,
and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983.
13. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 198314. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983
15.
R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983.
Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I.
Types of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
moo
R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning of life?, 1982.
R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics.
R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war
and war-deterrence and the political fall out.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deonti
R°"ouU.y and V. Plumwood, A. expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
7.
10.
R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing:
rational behaviour under rival paradigms.
the difference 1
�����
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Discussion Papers
in environmental phiiosophy
_.
Phitosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 9
WAR AND PEACE. II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY
RICHARD ROUTLEY
FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
by
R. Routley
Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1983
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
Pacifism,
despite
its
limited
revival
through
the
nonviolent
action
1
movement
and
as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues
to have a bad philosophical press.
one
way
or
another,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as inconsistent.
as
incoherent
Even philosophical
defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding
pacifism
is
in
only
that
consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
2
position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the
prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic
methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;
from
rights.
an
In
influential
and
and arguments from irresponsibility and
widely
disseminated
set
of articles
3
attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory ...
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
be
better characterised by the more sweeping
1.
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle:
see Origins 12
(1982) pp.310-311.
The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.
2.
In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.
Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists'
belief
vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.
as
"bizarre
and
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
The
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
sense
which
is
narrower
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily
elsewhere.
the
But
if
violence
Pacifism, as a
universally and not merely in war.
violence
is impermissible, then it should be so
what
is
out
rule
position,
moral
should
be
comprehensive.
On its own showing, it is contended,
proper
action
to
preventative action
commitment
to
prevent,
what
would
involve,
it
use
in
the
case
Narveson's
or
of
pacifism.
of
incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism:
claims
prohibits,
acclaimedly
sometimes,
precluded
from
taking
violence;
But
force.
genuine
actively
defend
on
them,
pain
Hence
the
initial
that it cannot underwrite its
of
inconsistency.
However
location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several
connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force.
initial
for
a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action
of a type logically excluded
own
is
pacifism
The
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it
should
be
'to
use
violence',
namely
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and
'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted
in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
1970, pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed.
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425.
Page references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further
elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page
references prefixed by 'N' are to this article.
2
It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
R2.
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
It is
cases
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
to
resist
The
violence).
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
pacifists
by
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
4
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however what
assault
on
pacifism
Narveson
clearing
(after
several
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
pacifism,
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
of
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
unless
a
slide
(tentatively)
by
is
without
fighting
pacifism
does
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
Nor
does
comprehensive
made.
theses
on
ought,
T1
T2,
and
imply
that
pacifism,
characterised
we have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will
not
apply
violent
methods.
Nor
therefore
does
it
imply
that
all
conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some,
good
4.
deal,
of
that
machinery
is.
One
hardly
the
or
a
needs to be a comprehensive
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in
his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.
3
pacifist to coherently think the latter.
the
This provides
confirmation
some
for
key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident
in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are
legitimate
morally
are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
The
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
stunt
connotation of violence or at least of force which
equate with violence.
use of force is taken to by implied in R2.
cannot
here
resist
Hence
(p.415).
violence,
or
force
and
to
so
Hence
the
against attack' (pp.417-8).
also
Narveson's
and
so
to
a
much
less
can
be
resisted,
But
without
violence.
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
even
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence.
force, but not vice versa;
and
defensible position.
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
Things
be
If the stunt were got away with, it would
pacifism
render
a
unwarranted
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
resistance,
be
that
assumption
"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
to
proceeds
Hence the conflation of T2 and
excluded from among admissible pacifist methods.
pacifist
Narveson
Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing,
and defending are taken to imply (use of)
R2;
the
Violence implies
and it is violence, not all applications
of
force,
that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
to
castrate
practices,
any case indefensible.
development
and
themselves
from
compromise,
pacifism,
by
depriving
it
of
the
range
of
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
It enjoys some popularity even
among
those
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance
older
mediation,
pacifism,
whose
methods
they
see
as
confined
to
negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions.
The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification;
for
pacifism
has
often
by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods
jeen
presented,
(cf.
even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously
4
said
of
pacifism
'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by
that
negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the
hostilities
added).
and
of
total
doctrine
of
non-resistance
non-cooperation with any form of warfare':
But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether
or standard, need so limit its admissible methods:
to
italics
comprehensive
nothing excludes resistance,
uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.^
It
is
simply
that
comprehensive
pacifism
has
not yet developed its fuller
potential, especially in conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
on
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in
terms
of
'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist's
'opposition
to
If
violence'.
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
to violence.
it
is
Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
5.
In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see
for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social
Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston,
1980,
p.198.
Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent
action from pacifism;
and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism
can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.
But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile
positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law
reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,
1961, p.212.
5
A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument
on
based
inconsistency
pacifism theme,
the
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
transformed to the claim
No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).
P2(R).
For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in
notion
The
right.
of
very
initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from
breaches of a right and of
Because
the
against
action
preventative
infringement
'a right just i_s a status justifying preventative action ...
it.
of
what does
follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent
infringements of his right' (p.419).
That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out
to
to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide
such
incorporate
things
as social pressure.
Moreover 'it is a logical truth,
not merely a contingent one, that what might be
For
action must have the notion of violence built into it.
the
against
question
nonviolent
(p.421)!
quite indefensibly strong.
him
To block the argument it is enough for
rights
with
The argument accordingly
to
be,
to
or
be
to,
limited
In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is
action.
entitle
pacifism.
associated
preventative action
not
force
logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative
these
begs
is
necessary
to
For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does
kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if
such action is necessary in the circumstances to
prevent
infringement
his
of
right.
to
How the argument from rights leads
inconsistency
is
summed
up
thus
(p.421):
SAI.
'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence
done
to us', as a consequence of the.o&f^e&i^fi to avoid violence.
But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is
self-contradictory,
both
granting
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
Narveson
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
6
is
mistaken
p.423).
in
That a
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
action
does
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in
by
simply
rejecting
the
Narveson
not
slide^.
What
for
SAI,
appears in place of SAI is
something like
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
SAI#.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
give
facto,
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
not,
does
ipso
Without the slide there is
The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
violence
and
In
evil.
lesser
outline
the
argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must
admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the
violence
would
where
those
Inconsistency
be
some
is
morally
use
of
immediate
permissible
violence
by T2.
and morally justified.
would
prevent
evil,
of
The cases are
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
use
to
admit
both
that
the
some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible because it involves violence.
An argument
like
this
as gets summarized as follows
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that
[E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of
force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force
(by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing
between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and
(0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights'
occur without stuffing.
This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in
between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to
violence.
An account of rights which will serve is given in R.
and V.
Routley
'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy
(ed. D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff.
7
supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under
circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force .
these
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches.
It
is
important
to
them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the
get
ethical place of pacifism
is
to
The
result.
from
argument,
basic
lesser
violence, goes as follows:—
Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence,
the
since in this way, in any arbitrary one of
minimized.
""P2.
indicated,
cases
violence
is
Therefore
It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
to
it
which
is
mora
y
wrong, always, to use violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
this
argument,
together
with
pulled together from Narveson's work.
support
for
the
He not only espouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
the
argument with the lesser evil argument:-
El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
is,
the
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
J.
8
9.
Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
8
Neither argument is decisive;
of
reference
that
they
both in fact begin easing pacifists into a
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
should
moral relatives, where obligations give way
to
obligations-other-things-being-
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
frame
got
into
it.
E3
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
involved, e.g.
has
rooting it out, which may
involve
nonminimization
strategies.
Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to 02
- a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being
to
accept
prepared
violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social
justice.
Nor do El and E2 entail 02;
so neither does
principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept C2.
by
commitment
evil-perpetrating
Narveson's
such
e.g.
violence
but
argument
some
increases
well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an
dictator.
non-violent
fails
to
For in particular, violence
is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
in
pacifists
for
similar
reasons.
Regan's
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically
3.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
4.
Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must
quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
be
preferred
to
a
great
an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering
force, even when force is an evil.
of
It is enough to observe that increasing force may
still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.
Resort to the theme that
Elt.
Violence is an irredeemable evil
(proposed by Regan in his "defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and
by
Narveson,
Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty.
subsequently
considered
An irredeemable evil is
figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser
violence.
9
will lighten its hue;
now
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2,
but
What are the grounds for that?
the problem with the argument shifts to Elt.
As
Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared
to
countenance
some
small
amount
of violence in exchange for considerable goods.
(But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing
it
was
not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get
gross.)
pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence;
deeper,
It does break the argument however;
underwriting C2.
by
indeed it seems to get
them
in
for it removes Cl
and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument
from
lesser evil, which starts from
DI.
There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil,
evil
than that tainted with violence;
requires.
however
pacifism
is
no
of
pacifism
(see
into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous
(utilitarian
through
as
violence
an
irredeemable
evil
which
Rp.80ff.),
position (Rp.86),
extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines
But the approach
greater
and there are accordingly no cases such as DI
This is the core of Regan's defence
converts
there
is
a
.
mistaken
inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is,
like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such absolutes are adequately
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby,
as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons
otherwise
don't
arise,
or
for
acting
other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not
11.
That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of
Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss 5. If
any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater
quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.
While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation,
there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.
10
Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions,
come what may, period.
such
is
pacifism
as
collide
bottom,
at
more fashionable, highly
with
head-on
malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at
time) were working from.
The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ...
for the utility 'that will be brought out
is incompatible with pacifism':
some
one who acts
by
may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121)
violence
the
according
to
the
to
utilitarian-commandment
maximize
doing
13
So
.
utility
may
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false
little:
position
every
doctrine
inconsistency
suffers
such
with
very
many
false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism
odds
the
with
contractarianism.
correct,
other
ethical
positions
But this argument would
only
position
insidious,
is
however,
for
have
Firstly, as we
generally,
have
provisional.
theory-saving
seen,
made
also
libertarianism
were
it
at
and
otherwise
however they are not, including
has
which
happened
is
more
it
utilitarianism,
seem
as
climate
unfavourable
to
incompatible
There are two more specific damaging features.
and
consequentialist
approaches
more
no deontic principle were firm, but all are
if
The theory of prima facie principles
This is entirely mistaken.
is
a
device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties
such as moral dilemmas.
13.
weight,
is
that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of
such as pacifism.
positions
What
instance.
ethical thought, thus helping to establish a
ethical
carry
if the positions were suitably exhaustive;
no deeper ecological
presents,
he
shows
utilitarianism
as
Secondly, consequentialist positions tend
to
suggest
that
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in
using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has
also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents
can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist,
rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting
that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig
in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force
will
reduce
evil,
so no one is justified in using force.
This is
sceptically-based pacifism.
11
only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try
such
positions,
as
pacifism,
into
offering
to
ease
rival
incongruous consequential
sometimes
support for their themes.
Narveson
assumptions
takes
such
procedures
upon pacifists:
a
stage
further,
and
utilitarian
foists
thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence
is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain,
in
the
(p.425).
recipients'
These
incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for
objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and
what
it
does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators
as
well
as
those
on
whom
it
is
inflicted.
Even
more
astonishing,
such
utilitarian—style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following
three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as morally good) is to will the
it
(at
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the
means
to
least prima facie).
[N]2.
greater.
[N]3.
There are no "privileged" moral persons ...
(p.425)^.
'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist's problem',
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it
is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as
an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral
doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).
It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax
out
of the statements given.
consequences
such
For implications to hold the substantive terms such as
'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or
otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds.
another,
in
the
implicans;
The intended argument to the
"commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of
variant
on
the
lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles, N3 to
stop exceptions being made for oneself
and
one's
group,
and
N1
to
ensure
that
14. Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of these
may be
defended on purely
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim
as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive
ethical theories.
12
violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g.
in
in
Cl,
ethical
an
end.
for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least
But,
dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed,
which
is
reflected
as
the
begs
bound morally to shun violent means.
pacifism,
against
question
Under pacifist reformulation Nl will
give way to something more like
To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally
Nl#.
acceptable
means
to it.
For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need
pacifists since nothing damaging emerges;
worry
not
the three principles duly adjusted;
they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.
More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has
countered.
This
and
E2
N2
or
inconsistency
is
of
evil)
comprehensive
to
pacifism
Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one
what is the moral situation here?
to
(admissibility
What
of
are
them
these
being
of
violence)
dilemma,
Indeed the example is very similar to
the
turns
that
on
Jim
shoots
one
of
what account is given of moral dilemmas.
pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to
utilitarian
line
and
where
situation
N
But
ought
The situation is that
of
a
paradigmatic
that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing
squad about to shoot several captives if
everything
be
cases
difficult
N ought to prevent mass murder, but also
kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
of a moral dilemma.
moral
03
N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
person
not
to
the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil)
(minimization
in
yet
of
trying
them^.
almost
Now
What a comprehensive
take
the
inadequate
to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever
occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were
prima
facie, negotiable, etc., etc.
No, the conflicting obligations stand.
to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try
to
determine
What is
the
best
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is
that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to
conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases
involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted
in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.
13
thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to
in
the
In
circumstances.
trying
N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied.
the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g.
that
B.
No inconsistency in pacifism follows.
minimize
that
Even granted
it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence.
N had better shoot
is
preferable
to
On the contrary the situation
N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had
fix.
a
it
Suppose
and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized,
evil,
remains
to
is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate,
what
determine
do
There is the real-life complication
better do so^.
of
a
dilemma,
moral
but
no
inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.
the
Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of
rights, can now be met.
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
justified in that case? (p.420)
its
is
use
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where
to
be
No, it is not deonticly justified^.
is a qualified No:
and
amount to making out a case.
But
justification
on
proposes
is
solution,
back-up
ambiguous,
in
p.423).
against
may
just
situation.
dilemma
a
another
argument, taking his proposals as evident.
pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not
argument
and
the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is
morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing
no
It is certainly not morally
The response is qualified then because some force might
be consequentially justified, as a second-best
presents
is
it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its
deontic origin in 'making right'.
Narveson,
one
Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer
raped.
obligatory,
from
pacifism
person
-
but
he
As it is not — the
lead
to
a
decisive
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.
What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
17.
This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
14
The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral
its
adherence
to
principles
unexceptionable
Insofar
fanaticism, so Hare contends.
such
manages
Hare
as
as
insensitivity.
P2,
to
Through
pacifism is a form of
get
his
remarkable
accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism:
the
pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought,
but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others
(p.174).
Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting
moral
stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's
dilemmas
deceptively neat two-level
critical.
thought,
into
intuitive
himself
to,
without
any
Hare
of the requisite supporting argument, according to
which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time,
violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf.
Hare s
redefinition,
a
Harey—fanatic,
e.g.
p.175).
Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism.
on
and
pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme
Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution
pacifism.
helps
comprehensive
But
moral
of
classification
A fanatic
is a person who adheres to ideals which
diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf.
Since
p.170)!
comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as
already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson)
tends,
namely
the
towards
pacifists are Harey—fanatics.
usual
sense:
whether
position
their
bigoted .
they
whether
The
idea
appropriateness
violence
This does not of course make
are
'wild
in many situations, such
them
or
extravagant
opinions'
of
some
pacifist principles
of
.
the
or
(OED)
is
pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an
appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers,
founders
in
fanatics,
depends on the very different matter of
fanatics
comprises
that
of
and
the
the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to
But the relevant opinions
hardly be, all of the condemned type.
of
such
thinkers
Whence the conclusion follows.
are
not,
can
By this simple
syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.
19.
R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1981,
p.173.
references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.
15
All
page
Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's
satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism:
is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as
being
Jewish,
as
relevance
is
completed,
it
there^ fanaticism
wearing
beads
Naturally, given that using of characterising
can
or
moral
hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant
matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to
violence:
blue
For however the sensitive task matter of using
morally relevant.
violence as morally irrelevant.
more
earlier,
those
applying
of
this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up
at the end of §4).
Does it really matter then that
fanatics?
it
Although
argument that it does.
homework
appears
pacifists,
that
though
Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had
guess
what,
they
their
done
the
Thus, e.g.
go
over
to
Hare's
As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great
store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ...
20.
Harey-
properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would
utilitarianism).
of
are
it does not matter in the least, Hare has an
abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and,
logic
fanatics,
not
concepts
A.
based [entirely] on
involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several
Naess, Gandhi and Group
Conflict,
Universitetsforlaget,
p.15:
...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of
ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of
nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in
defence, the exception.
21.
the
R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral Philosophy, Macmillan, London,
1972,
p.78.
Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this
article on peace - from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and
nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to
utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are
present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone
wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just
alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer
prototype argument developed against nationalism.
16
Oslo,
crucial points.
objectionable
getting
Before
feature
some
to
these
of
The
theory.
highly
a
Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in
of
which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework
two-level
is
there
details,
procedure
adopted
methodologically
is
Hare's
of
own
radically unsound
because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at
the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently
rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way
rejected
above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic
Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt.
which
logic,
already
But
that
since
Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over
As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some
to Hare's utilitarianism).
important opponents of utilitarianism.
In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and
comprise
moral
intuitionists
and
pure
impure.
deontologists,
fanatics
Impure
who stick to their deontic
principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what
calls
'critical
thinking'.
Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme
pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal
clearly'
Hare
or
inability
to
face
facts
or
to
think
involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking,
(p.170)
originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion
accommodating
ff.).
But
cases
this
comprehensive
bit
intuitive
principles
conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28
dirty-trick
philosophy
can
where
of
pacifists
are
presumably
"pure
willing to think critically, but somehow survived
opinions
different
from
be
here
fanatics";
the
ordeal
those of the utilitarian' (p.171).
set
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen.
any fanatics of this type, if
his
argument
is
for they are 'able and
still
holding
moral
They are in fact "pure
to
be
According to Hare there cannot be
correct
argument is not correct.
See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid.
17
since
aside,
fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out
22.
of
(p.171).
Therefore,
his
One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure
to
consider
the
possibility
that
a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical
assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians
reasons.
other
substitution,
preferences
For
which
can
be
one,
argument (e.g.
Hare's
requires
a
base
class
intersubstituted.
representation
to
ff.).
are
There
p.177 ff.) depends on preference
the
of
course
whom
among
preference-havers,
in
Hare,
chauvinistically contracts this base class
whole
of
p.176
(cf.
his
discussion
humans.Differently,
certain
the
of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to
familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.
As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this
an
less
is
argument
a
than
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical
mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and
complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
applied
to
avert
greater
Regan is envisaging
violence
where
situations
and he points to what he takes to be the evident
evil;
moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free
from
an
aspiring
rapist'
is
Interestingly,
(Rp.86).
has
Regan
situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand:
herself
not described the
there is nothing
in
to
prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and
fleeing.
What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the
(perhaps
wilful)
that
infliction
death, by forceful means^ (cf.
mere
use
of
of
damage,
non-negligible
Np.110);
that is, which
physical force or power (or energy).
including pain, injury or
involves
much
more
than
And it is by no means so evident
that the woman is entitled to
inflict
violence
from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way
is
duly
separated
violence
upon
the
aspiring
rapist.
Once
that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
23.
On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base
Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.
18
class,
see
R. and
V.
But
a
straightforward
action
violence
disentangling
abounds
as
It
with
is
subcase
matter as may at first seem.
defective
of
not
depend
force
is
by
means
no
violence.
of
on
tight
a
Fortunately
characterisation
what
indicate
some
done, in the way of inflicting damage.
constraints
Firstly,
presupposed.
force:
is
legalised force,
violence,
so
violence,
a
on
satisfactory
violence
is
not
applied
on
behalf
adequately
of
of
account
some
violence,
where no force is applied.
violence.)
24.
supposed
that
and
are
which
distinguished as illegitimate
"legitimate"
authority,
long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated.
so often mistakenly
of
However it is important to
is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.2$ Secondly, violence is not
of
the
enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of
actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means
through
so
Indeed the literature on nonviolent
characterisations
arguments developed in this paper do
violence.
a
the
is
Violence
threat
(This only needs emphasizing because it is
threats,
intimidation
and
the
like,
involve
Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems
such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live
(goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not
necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy,
or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy
habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent"
destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.
It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of
violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not
involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation
and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds
related to those that tell against violence proper.
For similar reasons,
"economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such
procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to
be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence
or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity.
Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many
difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical
practices involve violence.
19
There can be unintentional violence, e.g.
the women may have applied violent
without intending to, in escaping the rapist.
Fourthly, such matters as the distance
at which force is applied and the indirectness of
military operations, are irrelevant.
modern
means,
the
for
as
means,
instance
in
The submarine operator who, by causally
pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian
city
instigates
a
violent
By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not
act.
in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent
confined
to
action
done
against
persons,
means.
but
can
violence
Finally,
be
directed
not
is
against
other
life-forms, as will soon emerge.
Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and
from
the
fact
that
one
of
derives
them^
violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that
there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts
violence greater than zero.
of
Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to
matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us
on
most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on
small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral
will
certainly
problems.
They
give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2
they mean 'nontrivial violence'.
Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not
taking
obvious
steps
passivity and pacifity.
to
prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of
Both Regan and Narveson (e.g.
p.425) assume
that
pacifism
25.
The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political
Freedom, op.cit., p.288n.
Note however that Sharp's account of 'political
violence' is defective in various other respects.
It is curious,
but
understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action,
Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence,
and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with
force and threat with use.
26.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent
action.
20
is a passive do-nothing position.
This is far from true, as the variety of methods
or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain.
considered
Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of
Narveson
Otherwise,
would
negative
later
Narveson's
nonviolent
action.
hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping)
way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not
(p.425).
Neither Regan nor
doing
assessment
nonviolence' does not change the situation:
for this
of
anything
about'
violence
what
calls
'positive
he
positive
is
approach
simply
nonviolence practised in an exemplary ;.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will
follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential
or effectiveness of nonviolent practices.
extent
when
reduce
assembledmuch
the
of
training
and
the
Fuller details of these practices,
of
impact
nonviolent
the argument
from
social
irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.
§4.
The
argument from
corollaries.
The
radical
practice
political
by
definition.
But
from
other
awkward
of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war.
For
Standard pacifism takes
out
war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
war
and
corollaries
the
position
Although normally war would be excluded,
of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear.
what
of
dilemma
situations?
War
would
always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances
it might be the (second-) best thing
27.
to
do.
A
strange
pacifism!
Comprehensive
The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going
off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components
have been removed.
As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types:
protest, noncooperation and intervention;
op.
cit.
pp.32-3.
Of course
pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations
are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).
28.
See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear
war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein
pp.152-3, especially G.
Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit.,
(referred to as Politics) and V.
Coover and others, Resource Manual for a
Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981.
21
pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast
extreme
to
pacifism.
Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to
extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
is
given
a
large
suitably
If
that
evil
weighting then second-best choices will yield the same
results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that
eliminate
since
wars,
are
war
of
an
as
or
mounted from
rely
the
institutions.
exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all
upon
only
arrangements
social
and
nation-states
particular,
obviously police and military forces but
of
violence-underpinned
many of their institutions, most
state
legal
arrangements,
States are however desirable social institutions,
typically depend on violent means.
and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just
comprehensive
pacifism
implies
the
of
inadmissibility
institutions, such as police forces and states typically are;
be ruled out either
individuals,
directly
delegates,
as
violence-dispensing
effect
who
forces,
by
nonviolent
nonviolent means.
state;
but
it
substitutes,
recently
or
such organisations may
because
else
their behalf.
evolved
will
which
is
nonviolent
methods
Pacifism
institutions concerned with
does
not
public
that
order
have
Pacifism does not
organisations
maintain
they
by
fully
as
police
alternative
nonviolent
will be applied, where necessary, to
The force of the objection should thus not
entail
order,
sweeping charges of social irresponsibility.
22
the
and
are
coercive
actively
Law and authority can still operate then in the
back-up authority and "enforce" laws.
overestimated.
on
violence
however exclude the replacement of such
wars,
A more telling objection, then, is
no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils).
that
which
institutions
these
directly
less
or
and a more general argument may be
inevitability,
or
not without much further ado.
least
extensively:
violence
desirability,
In
at
institution,
However wars are by no means the
dispense
would
nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the
reasonable costs;
desirability
wars
it
elimination
accordingly
of
does
Nor is it true that
prominent
not
be
social
succumb
to
pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is,
the illegitimacy of
government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the
sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).
or (differently)
A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent,
political
noncoercive,
arrangements.
arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible.
imply
the
absence
or
illegitimacy
of
government,
political community organised under a government.
state
with
authority
and
not
necessarily
pacifism does not entail anarchism.
main
Accordingly,
that
implies
not
does
it
or therefore of a state, of a
Nor does
even
it
that
imply
a
certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral
dilemmas of political organisation.
and
only
pacifism
Comprehensive
objective,
not
attained,
was
Since it admits of states with frameworks of law
based
on
the free agreements of individuals,
Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample:
a
nonviolent
Indian
state;
replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society.
his
it was not the
Granted there
are
genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism 2", they are not so
simple as derivability.
Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a
moral
so
ideal
easily
brought down by its political corollaries.
Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than
concerning
like:
external
and
internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the
it also tells against the received treatment of
example.
While
other
species,
animals
for
it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating
of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals.
29.
those
At least it does this
so
long
Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without
moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of
violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on
replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The
irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they
differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied
(see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially
Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit,
anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state
authority)
and
restrictions on liberty, to a limit.
Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi:
'The ideally nonviolent
state will be an ordered anarchy'
(unreferenced citation at the end of the
Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).
23
as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as
is
There is little good basis
humans (or persons).
restriction.^
controversial
euthanasia,
any
in
And,
moral
areas
concerning
the
corollaries
killing
a
such
for
however
similar
case,
spread
humans,
of
At
violence?
the
suicide,
But
must
creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms.
the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature
simply
killing
of
No force need be applied:
in
a
eats
and dies painlessly and without a struggle.
The
or
pill
is
given
life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence?
technical
purely
arrangements
pacifist
will
to
objections
solve,
in
eating
meat
worthwhile
On the face of
obtained.
so
New
any rate, the disruption of
at
principle
an
Then the proper objections to
such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that
it, there are no
they
risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples
like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing.
injection
several
into
e.g.
So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices.
involve
chauvinistic
indeed wherever violence plays a significant role.
punishment,
capital
and
the category by restriction of the application of violence to
from
removed
not
violence,
practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.
But suppose now that the new technology
is
extended
scientists, working in their accustomed military role:
as the anti—neutron bomb, which selectively destroys
devices
which
much
but
clever
'weapons , such
newly devised
property
by
further
not
people,
or
"dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence.
just
Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid
these
reaches
of
technological
fantasy.
For "dissolving" people requires energy,
which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in
violence:
Was
(upgraded)
account
of
that is, the new wars will still involve violence.
there
old-fashioned
however
violent
anything
methods
so
such
wrong
as
with
hunting
eating
meat
obtained
by
more
or raising and killing one's own?
Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural"
M.
an
behaviour
of
creatures
to
See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op.
cit.
Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g.
Politics,
p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and
predation.
24
which the principles are supposed to apply.
Aggression is a fairly common feature of
and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made
animal
The force of the
out) erupts in violence.
various
for
ways,
example
along
these
argument
lines.
can
however
Aggression
assumed to be an
is
evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for
themselves
(of
their offspring) in their natural environment.
and
ir
mitigated
be
survival
But most humans
for
now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations
which
evolution
gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance).
as
Much
humans
have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they
should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices,
ill-adapted
now
to
their
and mostly counterproductive.
situation
So
argues the pacifist.
There is a residual problem,
practices
like
that
vegetarianism.
the
Are
creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as predators
of
and tribal people, to be condemned as morally
Sometimes,
confronting
yes,
be attained:
when
wrong
these
violence?
involve
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to
Though a way
but always?
can
problem 3 1, it is a rather unsatisfactory way.
be
beaten
the
around
of
edge
this
What this suggests is that nonviolence
is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal.
The arguments for
nonviolence
-
which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence
and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings -
sort
of
But
conclusion.
exclude.
nonviolent
what
is
called
charge
for
state,
is
is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at
This is^ to concede
an
of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as
P2 remains unqualified.
31.
would
The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral
sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2.
attentuated
similar
approaches
thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive
that
a
the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least,
since it opens the door a chink to other options which
categorically
suggest
The sheer moral power of such pacifism
As Singer has in the analogous case of
Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
25
vegetarianism:
is
one
see
reason
e.g.,
for
Animal
There is no reason however why
giving its adoption some pause.
a
genuine
pacifism
(making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits
such natural phenomena as predation.
Nothing logically rules out such a genuine
and
more sensitive pacifism.
There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as
In
particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts
similar to those using violence:
This
is
a
of
requirement
otherwise they could have a case made against them.
in a different sense from the pure logical
consistency
sense, namely that of keeping to the same story.
for
well.
pacifism,
Again there need be no deep problem
so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must
be a single principle
just
(e.g.
P2)
-
as
distinct
from
bundle
a
of
moral
principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving
violence.32 io meet the rationality requirement the position should,
be
integrated
into
a
in
larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a
piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices
to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g.
mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic
and
oceans.
In
an
does
not
destructive
such things as strip
wastes
in
streams
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property
picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism.
vandalism
particular,
cover
violence
But
even
metaphorically,
against persons (and certainly not nonphysical
violence such as "psychological violence").
What is sought then
is
an
appropriate
of these notions covering destructive practices;
and also an accompanying
synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'.
Then P2 is superseded by
synthesis
an appropriately qualified
P2#.
It is morally wrong to use vandolence.
It remains to characterise
the
cluster
of
destructive
practices
that
count
as
vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
32.
It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject
assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences.
Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.
13.
The position has been called 'pacifism.
26
APPENDICES
§5.
The
from
arguments
impracticality
impracticality
and
pacifism in the real world.
of
the
reality:
social
alleged
Even if it is conceded that pacifism
is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still
the
feasibility
of
pacifism
as a sensible practice to live by will be contested -
And it has
despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi.
to
be
admitted
the
that
real
world,
with
all its horror and squalor, does put
But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.
pacifism to severe tests.
Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less
than in replacing war^.
prepared
or
for
succeed
Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual
violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they
properly
to
likely
given
a
dress rehearsal.
have
been
never
The prospects for success of
nonviolent defence of,a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war
is
convention
observed
or not.
If the convention is observed then pacifism stands
reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
perhaps
unleashed,
in
broken,
is
massive ways, on noncombatants.
and
violence
is
According to Walzer, in his
superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance,
'success
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention -
...
and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^).
attained
-
there
is
conventions are flouted.
reasons,
some
got homesick.
ruthless
of
This is
presumably
be
never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some
The invaders may give
them irrelevant, e.g.
up
and
depart
for
all
sorts
or
they needed a quick decisive victory, they
What Walzer no doubt means is something like this:
invaders
may
Success
false.
that
sufficiently
in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support
34.
The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source of
considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit.
35.
Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op. cit.
references given there.
36.
All page references prefixed by 'W' are to
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
27
See also
M. Walzer,
Martin,
Just
and
war)
op.cit.,
Unjust
is
and
Wars,
lines, etc., can eventually succeed.
defending
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
to violence.
resorts
side
But that sort of thing is also true even if the
is
if the defence "forces" are well-armed it
to
invaders
start
and
with
difficult
more
civil
well -prepared
with
than
afterwards
easier
the
for
costly
and
resistance.
Walzer is
inappropriate examples.
in
command,
model
the
of
way
the
Jews,
The
way.The
Nazis,
to
jump
who
that
conclusion
the
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian
the
enslaved
misleading
many
like
cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of
defence
nonviolent
however,
thinking,
who
in
state,
total
Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the
the
population,
by
The
"resistance"
picture
is
highly
and large, did not resist extermination in an organised
never
invaded
Germany,
were
in
control
all
or
the
infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population.
Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army
took
over
and
managed
all
key
Australia it is not even so clear
largely
united
and
actively
resisting
this
is
which
With island territories such as
infrastructure.
that
For
logistically
population.
Walzer's
feasible
against
impression
resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g.
a
of the
Wp.332)
might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers
ready to leave.
Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate
present
state-determined circumstances.
No state would be prepared to risk
way
in
37.
It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish,
opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country
comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue,
R.L.
Rubenstein, The Cunning of History:
the Holocaust and the American
Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.
38.
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by
Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
28
training its
populace
different).
It
full
in
techniques
(civil
is
defence
all too easy for them to "rout" the police:
be
then
would
action
nonviolent
civil
obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.
thus
The argument
initial sketchings.
far
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism:
has
been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
That in itself is revealing.
deviations
from
are
it
Pacifism is the
require
what
rest
position
(inertial
and
state)
The reason for this is simple
explanation.
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of
enough:
it is what has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of
and
merely
justified.
case
try
dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be
in
that
the
defender
(person
or
nation)
is
morally-excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral
the
position
privileged
The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent:
curious
is
to
its
already
the
in
bounds.
a
Still
defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma
And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have
situation.
to
use
it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:-
Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic
already glimpsed will begin.
None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are
deductively
tight
assumptions
can
be
challenged
arguments for pacifism particularly good ones.
for
pacifism,
(as
above).
Nor
One of the poorer positive
are all the
arguments
for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory
29
of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited,
nuclear
that
or
chemical
hope
weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an
illusion, escalation is inevitable.
are bound to be overstepped.
case is overstated.
the
e.g.
The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are
-
Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the
Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible.
Wars are much
more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows.
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped
things intervene (e.g.
support
(as
midstream
more
should
the
for
first
inevitably,
premiss
for
those
mixture
a
above)
suffering
and
anguish
violent
of
methods,
the
They
nonviolence.
injustice
characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of
means-ends
of
the
consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g.
pain,
important
a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are,
include
in
cost
that
in
violence
violence
within
the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained
by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
more
less furtive, society.
open,
the why of
pacifism)
considerable.
These
are
None of these well-known types of reason (giving
separately
decisive,
but
their
cumulative
affords a model for one way of proceeding^;
Mill's
defence
Mill's
procedure
works
(at
least
As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.
30
of
liberty
nonviolence,
it works as well as it works for
liberty).
39.
is
it is enough (a nonelementary exercise)
to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for
otherwise
effect
reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong
positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence.
as
a
A
more
decisive
consequentialist
data ,
argument,
takes
a
but
making
semantical
preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds
modelling
nonviolence
Again
principles.
use
of
route.
are
similar
practical
and
The data is used to arrive at
then
pacifism
in
applied
is
derived
semantically
as
principled
nonviolence.^0
R.
40.
Routley*
*
The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R.
and V.
Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical
foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.
* With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and
participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.
The main outlines of the paper were drafted
associate at Simon Fraser University.
31
while
the
author
was
a
research
OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School publications:
R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second
edition 1974, Third edition 1975.
Departmental publications:
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.
D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental
Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
2. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
3. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
4. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
5. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
6. R.K. Meyer, A note on R-^ matrices, 1979.
7. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
8^ C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
9. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980.
10. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981.
11. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
12. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used,
and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983.
13. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 198314. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983
15.
R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983.
Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I.
Types of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
moo
R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning of life?, 1982.
R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics.
R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war
and war-deterrence and the political fall out.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deonti
R°"ouU.y and V. Plumwood, A. expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
7.
10.
R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing:
rational behaviour under rival paradigms.
the difference 1
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Box 149, Item 3: War and peace II - on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism
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Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; number 9. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy. Published under Richard Sylvan's previous name Richard Routley.
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Box 149: Publications (to como)
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https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0c83abcc7b181b7f6a2ccf4330f20536.pdf
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Text
Discussion Papers
in environmental philosophy
Philosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 5
WAR AND PEACE
Zgt
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
<
RICHARD ROUTLEY
��FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
I
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
by
R. Routley
Number 5
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1984
��INTRODUCTION.
Virtually all the philosophical literature on nuclear war is written from
either a superpower (predominantly American) or else European (mainly German,
British or French) viewpoint.
This article,
after connecting in initial
sections with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different Antipodean
stance.
Such regional perspectives, while the should not affect
the morality
of the matter, are highly politically relevant.
Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the
USA, also fails the test of morality.
It is concerned only or primarily with
what is good or "rational" or prudential for Americans, or for the American
state,
to do - whereas morality is independent of place, race, nationality and
the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the
resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously.
It
concludes, among other things, that the American and Russian states have no
moral business putting nonaligned peoples at such grave risk as present nuclear
arrangements involve.
CONTENTS AND OUTLINE: Italicised headings §3-§8 indicate the main
structure of the argument
Page No
§0.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wars, and new moral
issues. Large-scale (LSN) vs limited nuclear wars, the focus on the
former, but the implications for the latter.
§1. How nuclear wars differ from other wars; wars and states, and the
resulting limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
War characterised. The essential role of the state. New and different
features of nuclear wars.
§2. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations
to become entirely submerged in the context of war.
The ancient distinction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
based on expediency. Arguments that war must be expediency-based refuted.
Morality does not have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Utilitarianism and expediency distinguished. Limits to consensus:
supermen and superhawks. National interest and expediency assimilated.
Limits of state entitlement.
§3. The initial argument to the immorality of LSN wars.
One key argument, from the wrongness of killing noncombatants in mass, is
presented, assessed, and criticisms met. Arguments for the premisses of
the key argument elaborated.
§4. Arguments from historical requirements on just wars, the important
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
Arguments from just war requirements: discrimination, proportionality,
prospect of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from environmental principles.
§5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: arguments to its immorality.
Deterrence seen as the only practical way to satisfy major desiderata:
prevention of war and maintenance of prudential values. Pure deterrence
not the policy. Deterrence as practiced has increased the probability of
nuclear war. The first argument to immorality of deterrence, from the
plausibility of probability of immorality. Further arguments through
deontic connecting principles: the probability linkage. Refuting the
counterargument from the success of deterrence. The way the onus of
1
2
5
11
14
17
�Page No
proof falls on deterrence policy, which cannot meet evidential require
ments. The second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
preparation for nuclear war. The general form of connecting principles;
separating out those that are correct. The third connecting principle:
the wrongness of serious threats of nuclear devastation. Criticism of
this principle leads to further connecting principles, through intention
and through commitment. Meeting counterarguments from utilitarianism.
Applying the connecting principles to argue to the immorality of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti-utilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with deterrence.
§6. Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from national
dangers to nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of
nuclear dilemmas.
The arguments from nuclear blackmail and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial argument from basic rights and
fundamental values. The argument from isolated people to superstate
immorality. The superstate theme, and reasons for its appeal. The much
less persuasive dependent state theme. Challenging the assumptions of
the underlying relatiatory model.
§7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas - for aligned states and their
supporters.
Character of the nuclear fix. Subsidiary dilemmas: national security vs
freedom and democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontic dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-best escape from the
nuclear fix. The nuclear fix a fix of states' own making. Interconnections
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangements.
§8. Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: initial political fall-out from the
ethical results.
The inevitability of limitations on national sovereignty. Interstate
and extrastate approaches. The Way Up and the Way Down of extrastate
approaches. Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case against it.
Failure of international agreements, especially on human rights and
genocide. Exclusion of nuclear deterrence under the Genocide Convention.
Need for the reexamination of current political arrangements imposed by
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated political arrange
ments revealed by nuclear problems. Further arguments from the nuclear
fix for political reassessment. The weak link: the sovereign nation
state. Forfeiture of political obligation by many states. Alternative
political arrangements vs nuclear time horizons.
The multi-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main political
means lie outside state governmental apparatus. Laying the spectre of
ideological domination. Social restructuring and devolution of power.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments from national dangers. State resistance to
loss of power. Further lines of organised action against nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to
Schell and Anders.
Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption.
Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro
pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death
dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence.
ii
37
43
49
�Page No
Appendix 2:
On matters of collective and individual responsibility
and on regional strategies.
Individual and state responsibility. Opt-out positions, and arguments
to them.
Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group cooperation.
Arguments to direct obligations of individuals to the nuclear
dissociation.
Limitations of rival political obligations.
Different policy reorganisation for different regions.
Shallower and
deeper goals.
The important opportunity for deeper reorganisation
afforded by nuclear dilemmas.
Obligations of those in the Antipodes:
what is required, and justified.
Social and economic reorganisation
in the Antipodes, and reducing costs involved.
Blockages to social
and political adjustment.
iii
73
��ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large-scale nuclear wars raise ethical questions not generated,
either
at
or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military encounters.This is at
all
bottom because of their projected effects, which are often
to
said
differ
so
those of even the largest conventional wars (the World Wars) as to yield a
from
difference in kind of war.
involve,
and
threatened
Certainly massive exchanges
such
as
nuclear
exchanges such as nuclear deterrence presupposes, are
neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of
Much
wars
just
wars.
new philosophical reflection and investigation is required, even if rather
well-tested and old-fashioned moral principles will
serve
as
initial
ethical
base.
Although nuclear wars are, thus
nonexistent
objects,
nuclear
wars
(extrapolated from a very limited
varieties.
In
far, only a decidedly
class
menacing
of
proper have several distinctive properties
nuclear
experience^)
and
come
in
several
particular, confined or limited nuclear wars, of which tactical
or strategic are subvarieties, contrast with Idrge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)
1.
The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forcefully:
'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral
issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could
imagine:
we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God's]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position,
it differs
significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features
and, it is hoped,
in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop and its the associated unity-of-evil
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL,
p.323:- Firstly,
peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with
it:
religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there
implied.
Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to
give it,
e.g.
sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence,
pornography can operate without it, etc.
It is a serious mistake to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms of violence) along with war as if they stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note that referencing, where not through an author's name, is by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.
2.
an
The isolated, and unnecessary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will be very different and very much more horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper,
though elements of uncomfortably adjacent possible worlds,
ought therefore to be confined to merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to actuality.
�2
A large-scale nuclear
which need not however be unlimited 3.
explosion
war
it is
of large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region;
a function of two main parameters:
distribution.
war
strategic) nuclear
of
quantities
war
a
Such
quantity
markedly
differs
which
limited,
is
where
and
explosives,
(megatonnage
a
from
targets
to
are
and
explosive)
limited
assumption,
by
the
of
the
involves
(tactical
much
or
smaller
characteristically
circumscribed, for instance confined in principle to military installations in a
given
region.
Though
focus
the
in
what follows is upon LSN wars and their
prevention, limited nuclear wars are by no
a
separate
wars to LSN wars are high (given usual reasonable assumptions
second
strike,
since
issue,
a
is a prerequisite, and the probabilities of escalation of such
arsenal
nuclear
means
etc.).^
Because
of
these
of
follow-up
or
connections, much of the case made
against LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as will become evident.
§1.
How nuclear wars
resulting
differ
from
other
wars
wars:
and
party
and
limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
of war that has dominated much thinking, including strategic
two
states
(or
thinking,
the
A model
is
the
several person) game or, as a complication of that, the clan or
tribe battle3.
A picture of
war
thus
on
requirements
for
legitimate and just wars, which technological
reflection
advances have
traditional
now
theory
rendered
of
war,
emerged,
inappropriate
hardly
and
especially
sometimes
surprisingly,
as
a
result
inapplicable.
of
The
made no allowance for such
3.
Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially
the type of strike involved.
Though the sequence is important for the
moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it in no way alters the
immorality of LSN wars, as will emerge.
4.
'The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no
limits'
(PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars:
that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive
undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LSN war by its probability given
a limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and
present communication arrangements,
the idea of a highly circumscribed
purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European
"theatre", is really a myth.
5.
There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of
prowess)
in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological
wars. Nuclear wars may be not just unsporting, in that no notice is given,
etc.,
they are also remote and impersonal, and differently unjust, in a
much deeper way.
�3
phenomena as mass bombing of large cities, such as
with
Dresden
and
nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass
And
Tokyo.
occurred
bombing, adds further new dimensions.
Yet it is important for the argument
anchors,
retain
historical
were
accounted
unjust
war is essentially a matter of states and their control:
the Oxford English Dictionary account, war is 'hostile contention
armed
protagonists, antagonists or players;
of
contention
or
combat;
exchange is the actual experience.
but
other
are not literal, but transferred, metaphoric, etc.8
'war'
means
and
or
wrong.
to elaborate
by
means
of
forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties
in the same nation or state' for control of the state?;
noun
linkages
to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and
of when, and why, wars and military actions
Firstly,
to
always
a
function
of
senses
of
the
States are the
forces comprising armed soldiers are
the
and combat or forceful and typically violent
Thus wars are external or internal
states or their rule.
(civil),
Thus too wars have grown in
quantity and frequency as states have expanded, wars have changed as states have
transformed,
and
nuclear
war
has
emerged 'with
nuclear states.
theoretical way then to eliminate wars is to remove states:
An obvious
in short, wars
are
6.
There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term
'war', which was derived from a term meaning 'confusion'. In particular,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had
in living use any word properly meaning 'war'':
Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) on war.
7.
But of course there can be something quite analogous to war waged between
clans,
gangs, multinational firms,
even against Nature, and still more
metaphorically against poverty, etc. To this extent, a strict definition
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structures
the argument will direct us to, has to extend beyond just the break-down of
nation-states .
8.
Into this category (since Nature is no nation)
falls the ubiquitous and
unwarranted war against Nature of modern times, which features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism. As could have been guessed,
someone it was James - suggested channelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical
sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature.
James
proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a
war against Nature (see Wasserstrom,
p.12).
What it boiled down to,
however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil,
especially discipline,
but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical
substitute for wars proper (in American ecotopian literature) is through
war games and other games of competitive cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for those bringing out the "best" in human males, etc.
�4
an outcome of political and associated technological structure, and are
by
structure.
the
altering
state arrangements,
arrangements.
be
to
can thus be seen as a structural problem of
War
from
along
defective)
political organisation of states;
they are a
helps
these
This semantically based picture
situational fix, a structural malformation.
war
with
(otherwise
removed
arise
Wars
of
explain why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence
argument
devolves into an
war-makers,
against
against
In
states.
the
fact
(self-legitimised)
on
and
war-declarers
traditional theory, wars were
the
restricted to external wars, which were construed as
the
right
or
states
of
rulers (princes) to conduct for certain political purposes;
their
removed
the argument
was that private persons with grievances had access to the courts^, while states
did
not (wars were, so to speak, the international analogue of the law courts).
But this is itself a very statist conception of the legitimate
place
of
wars;
the semantics is not so restrictive and permits internal wars within states, for
example to end wars, injustice, etc.
Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention
a
basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or sets (axes)
of states, two-player external wars,
games,
competitive
could
be
won,
attentuated form for some "victors")
the World Wars.
agglomerations
surrounding
traditionally
firstly
for
massive
armed
like
wars,
such
exchanges
as
there may well be no winning
in
areas
Northern
the
of
very
hemisphere
countryside.
Thus,
and
the
secondly,
for
waste
laying
the
point
of
of
substantially
substantially
obliterated^,
(exercised
and
most
as
nothing
all
worse off than at the outset of the "play".
are
huge
war
seen, to settle serious interstate disputes, is removed:
another point of difference, the phenomenon of wars that
prepared
that
That assumption still held good (though in
With LSN wars it no longer holds;
is settled with main protagonists
players
It was assumed
An LSN war could involve destruction of all main Western metropolitan
strategy.
9.
to
main
Hence
elaborately
for, etc.), but which can never be pointfully fought;
Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes,
p.776,
top).
The
argument
presupposes rather a lot,
including a neat public/private
distinction. Put Aquinas's way,
it looks as if it could be readily
transferred into an argument for international government, or at least
effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be
one state!
�5
hence the inevitable emphasis on pure deterrence.
and
the
other
elements of gamesmenship had a role in earlier wars, but it was
not pure deterrence.
military
to
Certainly, deterrence, bluff,
Lastly, traditional wars could be confined in
targets
and
military
principle
This feature is fundamental as
exchanges.
for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross
regards just wars;
ways
to
The special effects of
uninvolved parties sacrifice any pretension to morality.
nuclear explosives, especially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
cannot
wars
be
legitimately
horrifying detail in popular sources
ozone
destruction,
These
confined.
shockwaves,
such
effects
gigantic fumigations
and
become
entirely
rapid
speed
include
pulses, fireball or firestorm
etc., etc.
As a result
of
these
of exchange, LSN wars will resemble
the
recent
tendency
submerged in the context of war.
of
moral
and expediency.
considerations
to
It is particularly important
in the case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the ancient
morality
radioactivity,
more than they resemble older-style wars.
The moral situation:
§2.
the
Schell)
electromagnetic
devastation, rogue bacteria and viruses, ...
compounded
as
special effects (presented in
distinction
between
What is done in war, especially for local or national
advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the
10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as involving annihilation or
extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while
not being entirely annihilated oneself:
the side that somehow "survives"
sufficiently to rebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely tenuous sense of winning, which in any case neglects the medical
evidence concerning nuclear destruction.
Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of
pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective
medical intervention ...
(PL, p.313).
Moreover any such phoenix war is radically unjust, because of violation of
the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons
developed in the text.
Unfortunately as documented in Scheer,
significant officials who are
responsible for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived by Americans and
that a global nuclear war can actually be "won"!
They rely, among other
things, on an incredibly low, and unacceptable, redefinition of "winning".
11.
In practice they often were not,they drained limited economies, they layed
waste countryside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
chemical warfare or modern mining), impoverishing inhabitants, etc.
�6
latter is determined using the codes and conventions
Much
not to be done in war i^ done, for one (alleged) advantage or
ought
that
otherwise^.
or
war,
of
another, despite modern military codes and conventions and the like.
we
not
live
go
a rather barbarous age:
in
unremarked,
the
if
Militarily
the horrors of the twentieth century will
history
gets
written
that
(accurately)
is.
Furthermore military thinking and strategic planning tend (as Nagel explains) to
induce a certain moral numbing, so that a range
as
such
wiping
rural populations, become real possibilities, included in
out
calculations.
consequentialist
characteristically
based
on
is
that
strategic
Each
side
in a military encounter
reasont
The
expediency
only
disadvantages,
its
own
gains
and
own
its
planning
advantages
is
and
losses as a result of alternative possible
it ought, morally, to consider those of the other side(s) as
moves:
actions,
excluded
morally
of
well.
In
this way strategic planning displaces morality.
Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted
way,
a
no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without
limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of
etc.).
Such
the
classical
through
"bald
an
incremental
limit)
escalation
distinct
argument
terms.
from
an
that
the
It
would
And
(but
The
externally
will be broken by each player in turn for advantage.
an extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed.
the
argument
man" fallacy *3), that there can be no limit.
assumption is that any merely selected limit (as
enforced
force,
is the so-called "classic" view of Clausewicz, oft repeated.
Clausewicz tries to argue,
really
this
Thus too
follow
from
idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in
But it is not, though breaking off in the heat of war, or the
of a supposedly limited nuclear exchange, may be singularly improbable.
confusion
Nuclear
12.
For as Nagel contends (early on),
there are moral restrictions on the
conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
arbitrary nor merely conventional, nor a matter of usefulness.
These
themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausewicz - a
theory outlined in Walzer.
13.
As one less hair doos not, at any stage, distinguish a bald man from a
hirsute man,
there are, starting from the hirsute end, no bald men. The
progressive escalation argument concerning war is an incremental argument
like the technical Sorites syllogisms, formalising the type of fallacious
argument which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
The
fallacious escalation argument is part of the so-called "logic of war", for
more on which see the conclusion of Appendix 1.
�7
wars thus appear decidedly Clausewiczian.
the
for
players
Still the argument
inconclusive;
is
can choose, at least in smaller calmer wars, not to escalate,
and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types of weapons, etc.^
A state engaged in war seldom sees itself as entirely bound by
of
morality:
it is taken to be mere prudence on the part of those attacked to
take account of the no-immoral-holds-barred approach they
from the other side.
especially
constraints
the question not only
as
to
may
encounter,
well
So each group potentially engaged in war faces
ought
it
what
do
to
in
permissible
morally
situations, but also both what it ought really do, and what it can morally do in
the morally flawed situations it finds itself.
not,
But the last question does
in that case, reduce to one of expediency.
There is no question, then, of morality giving or having
even
expediency,
For it is not as if shaky considerations of
involves.
give
bound
are
morality
theoretical
fact
is
that
miraculously
deliver
us
from
value
the
theory.
to
Expediency
fact,
but
that
local values - of self, family, clan, class, or nation - are
considerations.
proper characterisation, a
therefore,
much
universalizable
more
universal
fairness,
equitability and
principles,
justice.
distribution
value
of
and,
And morality thereby imposes, through
principles.
intersubstitutivity
certain
requirements
of
general
Expediency yields an unfair, inequitable
value system, one that subscribers would not adhere to if differently
placed
\
deep theoretical unsatisfactoriness of expediency, and associated strategic
thinking, also derives from this failure
evaluations
14.
remote
By contrast, morality requires, as a matter of its
resultant
The
takes
It assumes, or
what really count, and override or are to be maximized at the expense of
foreign
not
does
simply
narrowly-construed local advantage or power as what is valuable.
urges,
crucial
But the
morality and* expediency fall within the same,
both
equally shaky or equally solid, domain of value
or
to
to the firm ground of expediency when the chips are down, since often
way
enough such moral erosion does not occur in crisis situations.
even
to
circumstances such as the prospect of LSN war
extreme
under
way
give
to
of
interreplacement,
from
the
same
and results not holding when persons X and Y are interchanged under
As Walzer argues, p.24. An historical example is the era of genuinely
limited wars in Europe following the barbarism of the Thirty Years war.
�8
For expediency does not elude
expediency assessments^.
it
deontic
presentation:
be presented as through such popular slogans as "local might is right",
can
or given tight formal
characterisation.
The
will
characterisation
normally
that of utilitarianism, except that utilities are only assigned to, or
resemble
are biassed in favour of, certain individuals.
However, theories of utility
not have to be positions of expediency if utility is not locally confined.
do
Thus
utilitarianism proper is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency;
meet intersubstitutivity requirements of morality;
can
it
it does not, unlike the
methods of war game theory, assign different weights to the
individual
utility
of (certain) Americans, as opposed to Russians, say.
are
There
especially,
deontologists
regarding war^.
which
differences,
between
or
justify, ugly strategies and practices as regards
to
some
render
to
seemed
enemy civilians, that deontological principles would not permit.
effect
and
utilitarians
serve to further complicate the moral picture
In particular, utilitarian approaches have
permissible,
morally
significant
however
utilitarians
this
But
is
would
reject the
description of practices permitted under their principles as 'ugly';
whereas an
to
already
in
aim
what
follows
since
partisanship,
is
to
avoid
meta-ethical
meta-ethical neutrality, though of course not
there
is
a
moral
partisanship,
neutrality.
to
achieve
And
morally
large area of consensus, or at least moral convergence, from which
argument can begin.
Virtually all positions
agree
that
obliteration
of
several major cities in a LSN war would be wrong, indeed morally outrageous.
If
the
there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to
feel
no qualms when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian
ones, simply increase the costs
involved,
up
to
loss
of
whole
nations
if
15.
The severe limitations of those lesser "virtues",
nationalism
and
patriotism, also come from the failure of replacement which excessive
applications of nationalism easily engender. Try for example swapping a
person from inside the homeland with one from outside as regards treatment.
The point of, and reasons for,
intersubstitutivity as a requirement of
morality,
is well explained in Hare, p.78ff. Hare applies the requirement
to make a telling case against nationalism (a case which extends to
strategic decision-theory).
Nationalism,
along with fanaticism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare contends, p.72.
16.
The case against expediency was developed in detail
especially the criticism of Thrasymachus in The Republic.
17.
Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare
the other, in Cohen et al.
by
Plato;
see
on
�9
then try to work down
necessary, until moral repugnance ijs encountered;
The
again.
fact remains however that in the nuclear area things have got substantially
abandon
tended
Strategic thinking, in particular, has
out of perspective, morally.
to
suppress moral considerations (as indeed theories of the state also
or
do, sometimes flamboyantly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does
mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that
not
total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be
Consider
the
rising
world empire.
be
southern
(hemisphere)
no
advantage.
one's
strongman, SS, who has visions of
While the superpowers of the north remain, SS's dream can
realised.
Thus
his
best
strategy,
having
rid
submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try
nuclear
to
exchange
in
the
North.
There
be
would
waters
southern
to
encourage
a
hardly
of US
all-out
an
point then in securing
institutional arrangements so that potential SS's do not accumulate much
given
especially
the
apparent instability of crucial world arrangements.
that is to anticipate:
the present point is that (the fact of) moral
has
and
its
power,
limitations,
is
an
inadequate
But
consensus
constraint without accompanying
structural adjustments.
national
For, typically,
differently
to
impose
interest
is
taken
hostages
or
override
morality,
even
holding
civilian
populations
as
of those
those of Eastern Europe.
things.
substitution
of
justification;
fails
in
The
first,
expediency
classes
regimes,
But morally national interest can do neither
the
overriding
for
morality,
of
morality,
which
the second, the alleged moral dominance of
important
And,
killing millions in the national interest*8).
unfortunately, these assumptions are not confined to more totalitarian
such
or
irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary
ethical considerations (such as those concerning
nuclear
to
is
entirely
national
simply
lacks
the
moral
interests,
of cases, including, so the argument will go, the
case of LSN war.
18.
As Schell bluntly puts it, 'What is being claimed is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents
in the name of certain beliefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity, since the beliefs may be morally grounded rather
than based on national interests.
�10
States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis,
let
it
not
be
that
pretended
expediency (namely,
that
of
is
it
a moral basis as distinct from one of
There
egoism").
"group
but
moral
special
no
is
dispensation
for governments.
individuals:
there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or
analysis of obligation.
Morality works in the same way for groups as for
For example, what ought to be as regards X is (analysed
semantically) what would happen as regards X in all ideal worlds;
no
whether
difference
is
an
reasons
aside,
just
behaving
as
system, group or
individual
or
individual
States such as Israel (in its recent invasion
organisation.
extenuating
X
immorally
of
as brigands or mass
Certainly there are grounds on which states or their agents
conceded, special moral dispensations;
been
more than that and do not stand up to criticism.
cannot
furnish
two
(incompatible)
claimed,
have
but the excuses offered are no
A
moralities,
satisfactory
a
state
theory
moral
or public one and a
private or individual citizen one — state expediency and individual
morality
because this would lead to violations of substitutivity, neutrality, etc.
instance, a state operative X could use state
cover
morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g.
Y are permuted.
special
are,
Lebanon)
there is no moral difference.
killers:
or
makes
and it
to
considerations
citizen
*
For
Y
in
by state interests) when X and
A group or organisation or person can be
derivative
damage
19
bound
of
course
by
in virtue of role, but these are derivative
principles - good for any such institution - which fit within and answer back to
general
moral principles.
So it is also with a state which is an institutional
arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)
of
its
citizens:
its
charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly
moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency.
particular,
a
survival.
In
state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its
own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even
own
(at
for
its
Thus it is not entitled to do what both nuclear war and nuclear
deterrence require, as will emerge.
19.
There are also other arguments against two (or
see Routley and Plumwood.
multiple)
morality
lines:
�11
§3.
The initial argument
pacifism
yield
arguments
to
the
immorality
of
to
the
immorality
of war.
controversial in an area where there is no
LSN
for
But such arguments are
be
to
reason
good
Arguments
wars.
controversial.
Pacifism can accordingly be set aside as a special case, since the immorality of
LSN wars follows.
All but pacifist positions concede that war in itself is not a crime.
all
wars are immoral, though even inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior
Among more or less admissible
ways of settling political issues between states.
wars
who
Not
are
the international "tournaments" of aristocratic young men or warriors
volunteer
as
and
soldiers
action
whose
not
does
spill
over
onto
noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, where few or even no combatants
were killed in war.
conscription,
Since the establishment
press-gangs
and
recruitment
of
such
of
the
largely ceased to take these less offensive forms;
induction
practices
as
near-destitute, wars have
modern massive wars are
far
removed from the ideal war-tournament types (which feature now only in ecotopian
portrayals, in ways that are increasingly dubious).
immoral,
sorts
Most
of
wars
are
because of what is done to the essentially uninvolved, but few to such
an extent as LSN wars.
The first argument to the
immorality
of
LSN
and
wars
sufficiently
of
large-scale wars generally, takes the following form:
Pl.
The (deliberate) killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong.
P2.
LSN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants.
P3.
What involves what is wrong is wrong.
- (KA)
LSN wars are wrong.
The particular argument given is just one representative of a set
of
this
type.
taken
off
killing:
the
on
(KA)
replaces
But the
quite
'killing
sufficiently
evil.
creatures'.
can
Thus
a
first
in mass of noncombatants' by a suitable
clause concerning 'huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or
involved
focus
destruction of lifestyle of nonhumans and humans
alike that an LSN war will bring is
variation
arguments
Characteristically, in Western culture, it is thought that mass
killing of humans is about the worst thing that can happen.
be
of
not
directly
Other variations will emerge in the discussion (including
�that where the bracketed 'deliberate' figures).
but
The argument is valid,
attacked)
on
the
of
basis
be
may
attacked
(and
of its premisses.
each
has
in
effect
been
Let us consider these in
reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves "what
is wrong" is wrong, has been challenged on rather Scholastic grounds. There are,
in particular, problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,
purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
assisting an injured robbed person is said
robbed;
but, since the robbing is wrong,
"involve"
to
providing
For
which
instance,
that person's
assistance
being
is also wrong.
But these problems derive from too slack a notion of involvement; with a tighter
account of involvement the problems disappear and P3 stands.
As against P2, it may
legitimately
directed
be
argued
against
that
military
nuclear
targets.
20
can
wars
be
encounters
But given the character of
There is
nuclear weapons, LSN wars could in no way be confined to such targets.
not
merely
the likelihood that many missiles explode off target, there are all
the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings.
fallout
down-wind
from
military
people, especially in the case of
targets
US
and
For example, the radioactive
will affect large concentrations of
European
targets,
and
may
affect
uninvolved countries such as Canada.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties
by
appeal
effect)21.
to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side
if missiles were characteristically
reliably
on
target,
and
one
20.
The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obligation over entailment" principle, can be removed by a tighter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
details see Routley and Plumwood, where Good Samaritan problems are
diagnosed.
21.
According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are
responsible
only
for the intended effects or consequences of our
freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even if these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
consequences.
Unless carefully hedged, the doctrine is
pernicious,
allowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect, have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the issues concerning double effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
distinguished acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions.
�13
which was
intended
unfortunately
went
only
off
to
destroy
an
underground
unmanned
course and destroyed a large city, it could be claimed
that the (unintended) mass destruction is legitimised under
principle.
a
make
Nonetheless
effect
double
the
circumstances
difference, for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible
for firing the missile, since it was not as if they had
deliberately
aimed
at
The double effect principle conflates [diminution of] responsibility
city.
the
the
the action would be wrong, and the
Such claims should be rejected:
wrongness not lessened by the given intention.
could
silo
missile
assigned for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act.
As against Pl, and as regards the middle term of
argued
that there is an important equivocation.
While it will
the bracketed term, 'deliberate'.
killing
and
Pl
P2,
may
it
be
The equivocation is induced by
conceded
be
that
deliberate
of genuine innocents is impermissible, two challenges will be made.
It
will be charged firstly that noncombatants, insofar as they are distinguishable,
are
no means all innocent, many being directly involved in military effort,
by
whether just as taxpayers or as suppliers of
military,
e.g.
farmers
or
goods
or
services
bootmakers or entertainers.
as
innocent.
The
second
defensible — version of premiss P2.
and
for
other
reasons,
it
properly
point concerns a much narrower - and less
Because P2 so amended is
is best to leave out the
less
defensible,
"modifier" 'deliberate'.
What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is
not
a
mixture
that with the motives of the perpetrators.
of
require
the
qualification
'deliberate'
or
done,
So 'deliberate'
gets left out, equivocation is avoided, P2 stands, and so does Pl.
not
the
Secondly, it will be
contended that LSN wars do not involve the deliberate killing of those
excluded
by
used
For Pl
does
'intentional' or the like.22
Admittedly also 'noncombatant' is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and
there
is
noserious
people who are
is,
moreover,
problem
in
marking out a class of
notdirectly involved in the command and action
no need
to
adopt the practice, deriving
stating an initialversion of Pl in terms of innocents -
22.
clear noncombatants,
at
chains.
There
from Catholicism, of
least as problematic
Despite Nagel's suggestion that it does (p.158).
The suggestion depends
upon similar mistaken assimilations, of act with intention, and wrongness
with responsibility, to those of the double effect doctrine.
�14
a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then
endeavouring
to make the difficult transition to noncombatants.
Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met,
are
arguments
the
for
there
premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pl
they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort
and
tend
will
For example, one argument for
vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory.
Pl, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one,
(to
seriously
understate
point)
the
doing
to
that
fails to treat them with the
so
minimal respect owed to them as persons 2 3.
§4.
Arguments
from
historical
requirements
on
just
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
wars,
The conclusion that LSN
wars cannot be justly waged - and accordingly are unjustified something
dreamed
up
by
contemporary
"free-enterprise" capitalist state (and
opponents
communist
important
the
of
is
America
inspired,
merely
not
or
the
of
The
etc).
same
conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked out in medieval
times, for just wars.
One of the requirements gives but a variant on the
first
argument (KA). 2** For a necessary condition for fighting a war justly was that it
not be the case that large numbers of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killed (cf.
to
be
Barnes, p.775).
A just war requires just means, that the war should be
means,
fought
by
morally
which
implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate
killing of noncombatants.
The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle
legitimate
of
discrimination
(between combatants and others) which 'prohibits all actions
directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)
25
.
civilians
and
of
noncombatants'
(PL,
LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
this requirement 2 6.
23.
Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from the military
angle in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants.
One
favored argument is a variation on the Bald Man:
there is no clear line
between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there
are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g.
in
carrying or using arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of
their harmfulness, the threat they offer.
See also PL,
p.312, where a
simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied.
24.
Note that throughout, the text adopts the OED equations, reflecting common
usage,
of just with morally right or correct, and unjust with morally
�15
Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of
being that of net evil to net good:
proportion
proportionality ,
'the damage to be inflicted and
costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected
up
arms'
(PL,
requirement:
the damage and costs,
to
goods
moral
proportionality requirement is
of
the
achieved
nationally
not
that
in
doctrine
through war.
"improvement"
are
which
way.
overall
consequences
of
war
conditions
way
bad,
(Barnes, p.782).
'a nation wages war
justly
the
than
Similarly
only
if
the
for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent
chance of being better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no
and
According to the first, 'X wages war
abstaining from war'
improvement "puts wrongs to rights":
are
Entangled with the
"ameliorative"
of
confined,
justly upon Y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less
the
taking
by
p.312).2? It is not difficult to see that LSN wars violate this
disproportionate
criterion
the
satisfy
LSN wars can
in
these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such
wars reveal.
Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are also
wars,
for
example
that
of
infringed
reasonable expectation of success.
by
LSN
It seems that
there can be no reasonable expectation of state success in an LSN war - whatever
the
very
differently,
exchanges.
limited
prospects
of
success
for
some
whatever the prospects of success in
What
small
strictly
state
limited
elite,
or
nuclear
is less clearcut is the question of whether LSN wars conflict
with the requirements of just cause or due fault, and of right
intention.
For
25.
The principle can be argued to in various ways.
One (by no means
conclusive) way is Nagel's way, from the requirements of directness and
relevance in combat, the underlying (controversial) principle being that,
'whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as
a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).
26.
The situation with strictly limited nuclear wars where the targets are
essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"indirectly",would be different.
Such wars are not however excused by the
pernicious doctrine of double effect.
For such wars remain unjust on
several counts, e.g.
they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
on life
systems,
etc.
As Zuckermann says,
'It is still inevitable that were
military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of
nuclear attack, millions,
even tens of millions of civilians would be
killed ...' (quoted in Thompson and Smith,
p.14, where the italics are
added).
27.
This is not to be confused with what is very different, the vicious ancient
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest official policy of
flexible response, adjusted to the level of attack.
�16
this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are
seen
as
basic human rights and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can
While the mainstream position
be ideologically justified.
theory
medieval
opposed to ideologically justified wars and "humanitarian" wars, these were
was
not definitively excluded by the traditional theory (cf.
is
of
merit,
little
when
(and
issues will arise again subsequently).
historical requirements
are
arguments
not
do
simply
not
There
in puzzling over dubiously effective requirements,
however,
when so many are decisive against LSN wars
sensitive
Barnes, p.778).
commit
arguments
any
from
matters
the
underlying
Finally, these arguments from
prescriptive
fallacy;
historical
authority
for
to
the
moral
conclusions, but use also premisses to the effect that the requirements imposed,
and sometimes applied, were justified.
As they are.
In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the
moral
rightness
justness of wars, the just war theory and a rival pacifist
or
strand, prominent in early Christianity, but largely submerged from Augustine on
contemporary
until
times.
Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they
are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and
This
is
the
beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars:
that
is
duly
expediency
such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once
removed
(and
even,
very
frequently, when it is not).
however you look at it morally.
consensus
violence^^.
involve
argument;
it
The argument is not
proceeds
They are morally wrong
the
same
as
the
weaker
from similar results from the full sweep of
genuinely ethical positions, not from massive agreement of opinion.
The detailed convergence argument is an exhaustive case by case
each
type
of
moral
theory.
Fortunately
details
can
be
deontological and contractual theories lead back to requirements
28.
one,
from
shortcut.
For
for
just
war
These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear.
For
the aim of just war theory is not 'to legitimize war but to prevent it.
The presumption is against the use of force' (PL, p.312). And most types
of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent
revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction
between the alternatives.
In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at
least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may
be condemned 'the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of
lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims'
(PL, p.311).
Under recent international law, defence, narrowly construed, is the only
legitimate basis for war;
Roman law was only slightly more generous,
in
allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780).
�17
which, it has already been shown, LSN wars violate.
war
arrived
sometimes
were
defended through principles of such moral
or
at
In fact conditions for just
work
theories, so that a good deal of the requisite argumentative
been
The latter point holds also as regards utilitarianism, where it has
done.
in effect been shown that whatever brand of utilitarianism is
maximisation
utility
already
has
is
finally
LSN
accomplished,
adopted,
wars
however
excluded
are
utilitarian grounds.The reason for such convergence is not far to seek;
LSN
such massive infliction of pain and colossal removal of pleasure,
involve
wars
on
that this dominates in assessments however they are accomplished in
utilitarian
Thus any genuine alternative to LSN war is better30.
fashion.
The arguments
so
moral
overwhelming
far
case
outlined
against
principles
are
derivable
some
from
war
worse
substantially
are
of the theories just considered).
These
the obligation to maintain
to
accountable,
condition
than
the
these
we
violate
would
earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems:
we
exhaust
not
(again
LSN
principles include environmental ones, such as:
generations, to whom
do
wars
For there are other significant
wars.
such
moral principles which the waging of an
LSN
against
the
the responsibility to future
the
world
it".
Such
"pass
"received
on"
not
in
conservative
bound
principles - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are
to
be violated in the event of an LSN war.
§5.
The shift to nuclear deterrence:
support
nuclear
arguments to its immorality.
Those
arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,
certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars,
engagement
done is, it is claimed, quite different from
is
most
important
precisely
in
preventing
LSN
in
such
war:
is
continued,
deterrence
is
the
only
practical
desiderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.
way
indeed
wars from ever
occurring, as well as in maintaining other fundamental Western values.
it
by
What is being
pointing out that there is no actual engagement in any such wars.
deterrence
who
Indeed,
of obtaining both
Similar arguments
are
But compare Hardin.
29.
For details see, e.g., Lackey, especially MM.
30.
An argument of this sort is developed in more detail,
complete generality, in Goodin, especially 'Disarmament'.
though
not
in
�18
advanced for all the various guises that deterrence is presented
in:
mutually
assured destruction as formerly, flexible response as latterly, or otherwise.
Such claims as to the roles and
dubious,
several
for
reasons.
objectives
of
If it were, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.
superiority.
than
this,
and
sometimes
goal.
In fact there has
renewed
a
even
military
drive
for
Pure deterrence can account neither for actual nuclear weapons nor
for orthodox Western military strategy32.
process
decidedly
A first reason is that there is much evidence,
despite pronouncements, that deterrence is not the - the only -
been a quest for more
are
deterrence
Nor has deterrence set in motion
the
of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels appropriate
f<?r deterrence.
On the contrary, under "its"
impulse
there
has
been
almost
unlimited acceleration in building arms (to paraphrase PL p.318).
Another major reason for serious doubt about what
sold
31.
is
being
under "deterrence" labels concerns the probability factor:
marketed
and
deterrence has
It is important to observe that the discussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies to all forms of response likely to engender LSN war. This includes
"flexible response",
since the likely further development is massive
retaliation to an initial Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for this
is the extreme vulnerability of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes and to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the resulting great confusion, escalation appears the likely
outcome. In any case, flexible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its range and is ultimately backed by it.
It is also important to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) attack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nuclear power.
It is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.
32.
As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive
for superiority (often represented as "negotiating" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular
intervention in other nations;
there have been repeated US threats to use
nuclear weapons,
especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the
third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war;
and in official
military strategy no sharp line has been drawn between conventional and
nuclear weapons:
on these and other related points see further Lackey MM,
p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
further, to the alarming conclusion that deterrence is largely a front,
which plays only a minor,
but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among further evidence is behavioural data:
a government with a genuine
deterrence policy would repeatedly emphasize its strength (even when it
lacks strength), whereas the US government often parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public. For other evidence see Smith, e.g.
p.46ff.
�19
of
increased the probability
type
arms-race
that
war.
LSN
deterrence
precisely,
More
of
the
is being practised, which involves full-scale preparation
for total nuclear war, has prepared the conditions for nuclear war to occur, and
has
to
that
extent
reasons also, connected with pure
the last 30 years.
deterrence
with
and
(its
war"
"cold
the
probability of a LSN war has increased considerably in
the
setting),
original
For other
least enhanced its prospects of occurring.
at
The reasons include the threatening posture
called
for
by
deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to maintain credibility
overridden
or
with
"sacrificed
a
for
etc.
many
there
analysts
century, i.e
think
before 2000.
real
The situation has
is
a
high
There are several
are
interests
being
the dangerous and risky
military objectives!
state of military readiness;
sober
whose
population
now
where
reached
been
probability of an LSN war this
routes
to
a
such
probability
assignment.33 It would only require one incident with a 20% chance of leading to
an escalating war every 8 years between 1960 and
2000.
alerts,
Cuban missile crisis, carry a considerably higher chance
been
have
lucky
already.
In
of
nuclear
For
markedly.
the years ahead it appears likely that the
the
danger
supplicant
nations
resources declines.
and
the
worsens
and
the
extent
The danger is enhanced by
connected
increasing
chance
of
the
lot.
33.
Cox).
easily
as
the
plight
extractable
continuation
of
of
crucial
the
arms
of nuclear accident and human or
technical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf.
increase
zones separating the superstates are increasing in
size and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and
reveals
the
exchange.
number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war will
race,
on
side alone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes, as with the
American
We
Full
past
experience
copiously
Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a
Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,
and
many
are
Another route to a more than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' assessments.
In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only "nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in recent years.
American officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
realising the strategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear war (Ball, p.128).
�20
For better
contentious (though not always for good reasons).
way
no
seems
worse,
or
there
to make such an overall probability argument particularly tight;
and there are plausible arguments, from the complexity of the data concerned and
the contingency of the future, that it cannot be made tight.
It is bad enough however that it is decidedly plausible that it
that
probable
LSN
an
war
distribution principles) that it
probable
that
century.
And that is enough
grossly
a
is
immoral
to
decidedly
morally
on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy
is
immoral.
that
plausible
it
highly
is
sequence of events will be perpetrated this
evasive
warrant
morally to take action to avert the outcome.
deterrence
highly
For then it follows (by
occur this century.
will
is
action.
ought
We
That in turn implies taking steps,
presently
practised.
Thus
present
That is but the first of several ways we shall
arrive at that damaging conclusion for present super-state deterrence policies.
The plausibility of claims as to the high or increasing probability of
war has of course been disputed.
*
The main counterargument runs as follows:
Nuclear war is unlikely, because the consequences are too horrifying.
The underlying assumption is that wars and the like, with
are
LSN
improbable.
assumption.
Unfortunately
however
horrifying
outcomes,
much available evidence counters this
More than enough humans have not shrunk from brutal
exchanges
horrifying wars, or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.
Kuper).
What is less assailable than the high probability claim, what the
certainly
have
already
got
into
since
LSN
thereby perhaps helping to bring it about, in the sense
war,
the probability.
immoral
of
raising
The more detailed underlying arguments, then,to the immorality
of nuclear deterrence proceed by
LSN
an
deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for
situation,
against
evidence
seems to support, is that there is a non-negligible probability of an
Thereby, through deterrence, we
LSN war.
and
way
of
principles
mapping
war into arguments against deterrence of LSN war
might appropriately be called deontic
connecting
principles
moral
arguments
Such principles
The
first
of
these principles takes the following preliminary form:
Cl.
should
If it is wrong that X should occur, then not only
be
probable
is
it
wrong
that
it
that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly
�21
increase the probability that X occur.
Thus, for
example,
it
since
wrong
is
to
kill
large
a
noncombatant
population in LSN war (by §4) it is also wrong to put the population at risk and
wrong to increase the chance that the hostage population is wiped out,
which
both
of
For similar reasons a superstate is not morally
nuclear deterrence does.
entitled to impose nuclear risks upon uninvolved noncombatants, especially those
of third party nonaligned states.
most
Like
situations.
defeat by
example,
substantive
moral
Unless
counterexamples,
X
that
in
and
of
accordingly,
Cl
encounters
to
into
runs
require
dilemma
For
complication.
apparent trouble where clash of
order
to
that
the
passenger
he
plane
is
flying
sure that the troubled aircraft does not hit city
make
Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of
where
deterrence,
Consider for example the
to avoid a greater evil.
occurs
apartment buildings 3**.
nuclear
Cl
dilemmas are duly allowed for, Cl appears liable to
pilot who increases the probability
crashes,
ethics,
in
Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the
principles occurs.
probability
part
second
the
principles
(though
there
explains) wrongness of a practice is not
is
a
offset
or
principles, as §6
of
clash
removed
by
its
role
in
avoiding greater evil.
It can be argued that it is:
argument
the
from
previous
argument deserves little
perhaps
from
more
such is part of
success
credence
the
deterrence.
than
the
of
the
popular
However this inductive
driver's
racing
world
As Barnett argues,
argument,
'the
happy
accident
has survived the first thirty-five years of the nuclear era is
unimpressive evidence that we can avoid nuclear war
34.
point
a similar time base, that because he hasn't had a fatal crash yet
(despite some close calls), he won't.
that
of
the
in
the
coming
era,
...'
This dilemma example was supplied by D.
Johnston.
There are more
difficult putative counterexamples.
For example, in inciting people to
civil disobedience, the risk of state violence in retaliation is increased.
Thus,
to take C.
Pigden's example, in encouraging disobedience, Gandhi
increased the probability of wrongdoing by the British Raj.
But surely
Gandhi, unlike the Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
did not directly increase the probability of violence.
But spelling out
what
'directly'
means - in terms of short causal chains over which
responsibility can be distributed - is not only problematic but leads on to
other connecting principles.
�22
(p.100).
He offers familiar reasons such as the changing power
increase
in
Russian
the
strength,
rise
the
relations,
of other nuclear powers, etc.
(cf.
similarly Cox).
There are, accordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Deterrence will not continue to work,
DI.
and, more important for the present argument, that
Deterrence does increase the probability of LSN war.
D2.
The themes are of course interrelated, and the reasons for them (which are again
persuasive but inconclusive) can be taken together:
some respects) weaker D2 - the probability factor.
proliferation,
the
but the focus is on the (in
An initial
of lesser nuclear powers.
emergence
reason
concerns
As a result there are
many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagration, and so enhanced prospect
it.3$
Some analysts consider that a very likely route to LSN war is the initial
use of nuclear weapons by
confrontation
a
lesser
state.
Moreover
scarcity
the
growing
and
weapon
systems,
more
or
terror
situations,
deterrence
power
involves 36,
being maintained:
balance
of
have an exceedingly bad historical track record.
increasing as the race proceeds.
of
With so many more
Arms races, and interwoven
There is substantial inductive evidence that
present
costs
widely distributed, the probability of war
through accident or error is increased.
power
resource
A second group of reasons concerns the
of cheaper supplies, etc.
nuclear arms race which deterrence, as practised, is tied to.
weapons
for
opportunities
to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political
instability, relating to third world economic decline,
and
of
lead
escalating
eventually
to
races,
arms
war,
with
such
as
probability
Next, deterrence depends on a certain
balance
if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen
during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for
supposing
that
deterrence
practice
increases
the
35.
It can be theoretically argued
that the fewer the nations
nuclear weapons,
the less the chance of nuclear war: cf.
p.230n.
36.
The standard argument for
deterrence as significantly decreasing
the
probability of war,would
be decidedly better if the arms race were
abandoned, and weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
deterrence.
Of course such a probability-well assumption is only one of
several things required if deterrence is to be justified.
armed with
Lackey, MM,
�23
probability of war concerns the continuing shifts in US policy,
especially
the
renewed quest for superiority which is increasing the incentive of both sides to
resort to nuclear war, the USSR to avoid being
of
advantage
the
overwhelmed,
USA
to
take
superiority achieved.3? Recent dangerous shifts in US policy
the
towards war fighting are in part induced by a much increased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrence (since military targets
can be selected for strike and cities to some extent removed as
thereby
also
weakens
against
case
the
resort
to
leaders, and even some
nuclear
shared
understanding,
mutual
principles,
and
cooperation
Finally,
level
judgement
among
information
of
and
important)
of
soundness
transmission
war.
nuclear
deterrence requires a certain (admittedly rather minimal, yet
of
hostages),
between
It is not just that the increasing numbers of operators
super-states.
in a position to launch nuclear weapons must remain of "sound mind" and not, for
through on delusions of one sort or another.
follow
instance,
deterrence depends upon judgements
seriously
mistaken:
'each
is
regarding
other
the
It is also that
which
side,
side's
is to the other' (PL, p.313).
threat
we
But
think'.38
about
what
the
other
considerable, and perhaps catastrophic, margin of
evidence,
that
one
perception of what is
possible
result
As
side
thinks
side
error.
Not
thinks,
there
only
not
can be a
is
there
side (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,
as
regards
limited
nuclear
war,
of a first strike countered by massive retaliation;
must now be severe doubts
effectively.
"convincing"
There is a grain of truth in
the claim that 'deterrence is primarily about what the other
what
be
at the mercy of the other's perception of what
strategy is "rational", what kind of damage is "unacceptable", how
one
may
as
to
whether
rational
principles
are
with
the
but there
operating
to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous
37.
The point is discussed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
superiority is documented. The vicissitudes of US "defence" policy - not
to say its shiftiness and occasional incoherence (as in strategic forward
defence) - have confused many of its supporters even. Perhaps there is
some advantage in the very incomplete and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies:
we don't see, with alarm,
their incoherence and
irrationality.
38.
Pym, quoted in Thompson, p.19. Yet a fundamental problem Russia and the
West face,
it is sometimes claimed,
is not merely that they do not
understand one another but that 'there is a lack of a wish to understand'.
This casts into doubt the psychological basis of nuclear deterrence.
�idea (already alluded to, as held in high places of power in USA and in UK) that
LSN war can be survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won.
The supporter of deterrence
connecting
such
principles
has
not
defeat
to
only
arguments
Cl, but, more difficult, to field a convincing
as
For the onus of proof lies in showing that the costly
rival case.
deterrence is justified.
through
practice
of
But far from the fairly decisive case that is required
(to contrast with the argument through Cl),
feeble
a
only
through
case
the
questionable obverse of Cl,
Clt.
If X is wrong then it is right to reduce the probability of X,
For it has to be shown that
appears open.
*
deterrence (substantially) reduces the probability of LSN war,
and strictly (this indicates part of the trouble with Clt) that
*
deterrence does this better (more morally) than available options.
The latter uniqueness condition certainly fails, so it will be argued.
reasons already given, does the probability claim.
up the very
conditions
probability
of
such
for
a
LSN
an
war,
it
So,
for
When nuclear deterrence sets
can
hardly
reduced
have
the
war, especially over the situation a mere 25 years ago
when such an LSN war was not technically possible.
More generally, in showing that nuclear deterrence is justified, it is
refute the theme that deterrence is wrong.
enough to
out that deterrence is permissible, or alright.
alternative
permissible
courses
action
of
deterrence, which appear more morally satisfactory.
uniqueness
condition has to be established;
to be not merely
alright,
but
right.
But
It is not enough to make
For there certainly seem to
without
not
be
the costs or problems of
To surpass these options, a
nuclear deterrence has to be shown
establishing
such
a
claim,
to
fear
or
acceptable evidential standards, is virtually impossible.39
Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by
threats
including
fright
OED)**°.
(cf.
For
most
people,
portraying the horror of LSN wars would serve adequately enough
from
39.
LSN
wars,
without
all
the
enormous
expense,
trouble
vivid scenarios
to
deter
them
and wastage of
An analogous point will appear when it is asked whether deterrence is the
way out of the nuclear fix, the thing to persist with in the circumstances.
Given that there are apparently superior, less dangerous procedures,
the
answer has to be, No.
�25
preparing to engage in them.
deterrence
And
deterrence
by
such
means
(which
in any case depends upon) is of course not immoral.
military
(Schell was not
immoral in publishing his graphic descriptions of the nuclear destruction of New
York.)
But though deterrence per se is permissible, nuclear deterrence, that is
deterrence by complete preparation for the object to be prevented, is not, where
this
object,
a
war, itself is not permissible.
LSN
The argument for this is
through the principle
If X is wrong then complete preparation for (carrying out) X is wrong.
C2.
Hence
since
preparation,
LSN
wars
nuclear
are
wrong
and
nuclear
deterrence
deterrence of LSN wars is wrong.
claimed that preparing for X is just as bad as doing X:
wrong and Z (much) worse than Y.
complete
It is not however being
Y and
may
Z
both
What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil
In 1945 there would have been little doubt that
LSN war was wrong.
implies
complete
preparation
be
41
for
Among the three types of crime specified in Article 6 of the
Charter for the International Military Tribunals
(which
tried
the
major
war
criminals at Nuremburg) were
Crimes against peace: namely planning,
preparation,
initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the following (cited in
Kuper, p.21;
italics added).
But after many years of nuclear deterrence, the
become
increasingly
liable
to
question.
wrongness
implied
in
C2
has
However the doubts mainly come from
40.
Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity,
deception,
misinformation, that is elements of what are, for the most part, morally
undesirable traits.
41.
Nor are
ordered
because
wrong,
equally
degrees of wrongness required:
wrongs can simply be partially
as regards relative worseness. The point requires some labouring
it has been quite erroneously assumed that if Y and Z are both
categorically or absolutely, then they must be equally "wrong" or
evil. Thus, e.g. Williams:
there is no moral difference between running a deterrent strategy
on the one hand, and intentionally - indeed wantonly - starting a
nuclear war on the other;
so that the first is as totally evil
as the second.
This is because both are held to be absolutely
forbidden.
Not at all. The arguments from "Y and Z are both absolutely forbidden"
to
"So Y is as totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefore Y and Z do not differ
morally" are both entirely without validity.
Compare:
2 is a number,
and
3 is a number;
so 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numerically from 3!
�26
assuming that complete preparation includes less than it needs to or does.
Complete preparation for something, such as
several
other
LSN
war,
already
writes
in
In particular, it presupposes the preparation is not
features.
half-hearted but is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply
pretence.
Observe that mere pretence, or other more psychological ploys, cannot substitute
for complete preparation in nuclear deterrence.
too
sophisticated
bluff
for
alone
to
there
succeed:
preparation for war accompanying the threats involved in
the
other
has
is
now
be serious
to
deterrence.
But,
on
complete preparation does not imply that what is prepared for
hand,
will be attempted other than conditonally:
imply attempted X.
complete preparation for X does
not
It does however involve a conditional undertaking to proceed
with what is prepared
whether
intelligence
Military
under
for
certain
Complete
conditions.
preparation,
for a wedding or murder or whatever, would be pointless otherwise, so a
(proclaimed) commitment to proceed under given circumstances can
for
be
taken
of
connecting
granted.
Principle C2
A
principles.
is
part
way
not
the
in
line
a
series
principle of the same sort that is higher in the series is that
if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong
connecting X with attempted X:
perhaps
down
as bad), whether X succeeds or not.
But the series ends;
off well before the lower limits of intensionality, contrary to
various religious positions.
then
the
contemplation
consideration
of
of
it cuts
claims
of
For example, it does not follow that if X is wrong
X
is
wrong
carrying out X is wrong.
or
that
mere
non-action-oriented
The point applies equally to sexual
fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear nightmares.
nothing
the
(though
In
particular,
there
is
wrong with contemplating nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:
nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable,
and in some senses are all too thinkable.
Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles appeal is that each
commonly
involves
it connects with.
decidedly increased probability of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanying the increased probability are
certain
reprehensible attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves;
not
those
of
mere
passive
contemplation*^.
However
all
the
sets
of
these are
connecting
�27
principles
except Cl hold, where they do, even when the probability of
invoked
wrongdoing eventuating is not increased.
One reason for this is that the
means
to reprehensible ends may be inefficacious, for instance intending to do
chosen
someone harm using witchcraft.
The increased probability
evil
an
of
outcome
simply makes things worse.
announcement
Nuclear deterrence involves not only war preparation, but
this
threats
by
accompanied
and
a threatening posture.
For some party, the
if
potential enemy, has to be suitably frightened or moved,
of
deterrence
succeed:
the threat must be recognised as such and be credible.
nuclear
deterrence yields a further connecting principle:
is
to
This aspect of
If X is wrong then serious threatening of X under given conditions is also
C3.
or, in brief, If X is wrong then conditional threatening of X is wrong.
wrong;
The remaining connecting conditions invoked all take this general form
CG.
If X is wrong so is a conditional
requires
further
some
explanation.
intension
to
is some intensional functor,
threatening
from
Apart
intentions
that).
C
to
'the
the
most
is the
not
are
impossible
or even remote or improbable:
claim
in
what
(specifically those involving
commitment)
for
follows
certain
is
that
sorts
there
of
discussed
an
conditions
the conditions
typically concern those specifying a nuclear strike by a potential
fundamental
credible
functor:
To remove complication it can be assumed henceforth that the
involved
which
it is obligatory
in propositional rather than event style:
(or
form
a
e.g.
themselves,
conditional intensions are conditional obligations where
obligation
-
A conditional intension is a judgement of
the form, ^(X if C), where
of'.**3
X
do
enemy.
The
are intensional functors
threatening,
intending,
and
which CG holds, and that these versions suffice to demonstrate
of
Naturally
again
many
the
immorality
42.
There is plenty of scope for further
elaboration
here.
Passive
spectatorship of evil events where one is in an appropriate position to
make a difference is quite another thing,
from contemplation of other
worlds where evil occurs.
43.
The conditional intension, ^(X if C), which is an intension, should not be
confused with the provisional form,
if C then^X, which is not. The
Americans are threatening the Russians with retaliatory action if they
strike:
it is not that if the Russians strike the Americans will threaten
them with retaliatory action.
Such confusion has arisen because of the
problems of formalising conditional obligation given usual defective
theories of conditionality.
nuclear
deterrence.
there
are
�28
non-action-oriented functors for which versions
contemplation,
thinking,
dreaming, etc.
GC
of
fail,
of
those
e.g.
There is also an interesting group of
more borderline functors, those of hoping (for),
expecting,
the
and
awaiting
like, for which CG is only dubiously correct.
Connecting principle C3 evolved from the simpler principle, if X
then
threatening
to do...
into
X is also wrong, or, as formulated by Ramsay:
is wrong to threaten...'**** The reason is that
practice
(e.g.
'What is wrong
putting
if
wrong
is
something
committing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into
threatening to put that into practice, in particular the declared intent to
that
into
practice.
beginning as follows:
The
point
can
if worlds where
alternatively
X
are
happens
be
put
argued semantically,
excluded
so
then
are
adjacent worlds where X is poised to happen.
The complication of the simple form is required for two reasons.
only conditionally threatened, i.e.
is
should certain conditions
nuclear
war
obtain.
However the required conditional form can be derived
through
form,
the
following
argument:-
which is perfectly general, X if C.
particular,
by
earlier
arguments
44.
so
also
is
the
simple
Observe, furthermore that if something X is
if it weren't it wouldn't
(The converse route fails
(of
§§3-4)
LSN
opposition has struck, or not, and so wrong when it
wrong,
from
substitute for X in the simple form,
wrong, it is also wrong under restrictive conditions;
have been wrong in the first place.
Firstly,
threatening X if C.
war
has.
of
course.)
In
is wrong whether the
Hence,
where
X
is
More generally, to establish CG it is
Ramsay's formulation of simplified C3 is considered in Walzer,
p.272.
It
is this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk, into the awkward position he ends in, which as
Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue o
simplified 03 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten a
also
in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral
non-combatant populations.
It appears that Ramsay's position,
if worked
out, would be inconsistent.
see
Simplified principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops:
PL
p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
simplified C3 is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
However
the moral status of a threat by way of expected utility. This is
assess all the objections to expected utility as a test of morality
open to
mentioned below.
�29
enough to establish the simpler
If X is wrong so is an intension to do X.
CG'.
The second complication in C3, modifying the threat to
causes
threat,
Some modification appears required, because it is often
trouble.
more
serious
a
contended that empty threats or bluff are warranted on occasion even where
is wrong, to prevent the occurrence of something worse .**$ And in
threatened
is
what
fact one way of trying to vindicate deterrence, as morally permissible, has been
by presenting deterrence as involving threats which do not involve any intention
at all to proceed to action on
plausible
threats.
it
the
support
removes
basis
for
of
simplified C3.
sense
one that is not a pretence, empty or a bluff, but credible.
says
which
intended,
consider a
For the challenge
immoral
grossly
where
case
conduct
under
certain
not
and calls for moral double-think.
the
circumstances*
result
To bring this
an
from
improbable
intricate
Either the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by
Doomsday Machine circuitry, etc.) or with further choice, or - somehow -
not.
is
Principle C3 is not
simplified and unqualified C3.
is unconvincing,
conditions,
accident.
is
in effect that itis perfectly morally permissible to issue serious
threats to undertake
out
this
Hence the shift to serious
A serious threat then, in the slightly technical
open to thesame challenges as
as
Insofar
threats.
Either
it
is
way the outcome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously, in
the second case because the intermediate reconsideration makes it plain that the
threat
nor
ought not to have been issued at all, being justifiable on neither moral
more
"practical"
representatives
Furthermore,
grounds.
natures,
to
the
kinds
of
themselves to be (as Benn explains).
insignificant
their
and
may accept moral double attitudes, such as morally assenting to
immoral threats, less corrupt agents cannot:
moral
states
while
proportion
morally
it
would
run
counter
to
their
principled agents they are or take
For such agents, who may
comprise
a
not
of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such
as C3 are not in doubt.
The argument against nuclear deterrence using C3 is as follows:- Either the
45.
For a discussion of threats where the threatener has no intention of
carrying out the threat, or incentive to do so, see Schelling, p.35ff. The
question of the morality of these threats, where the item threatened is
immoral, can be left open.
�30
threat involved in deterrence is serious or it is not.
is
then by C3 deterrence
wrong.
The
sub-argument
depends on serious threats is a practical one:
not
is
it
inadequate, so deterrence is not maintained.
is
it
then
If
serious
But if it is serious
nuclear
that
deterrence
namely, that if the threats were
not serious, but merely gave the impression that they would be followed through,
then
would find out, in one way or another.
opposition
the
could not be endorsed in an open or democratic political
A policy of bluff
system,
for
example,
gaining some discussion, and so giving the game away to the opposition.
without
Even in closed non-democratic systems
maintaining
a
such
policy
weapons, especially
during
there
the
down
of
times
would
be
major
difficulties
in
chains of command involved with nuclear
in
change
governing
elites,
and
the
opposition intelligence.
But then,
since the bluff could be called, deterrence would not have succeeded.
There are
as
likely
would
information
through
escape
well other arguments that the threats involved must be serious.
One is that
nuclear deterrence already faces a credibility problem, namely that doubts about
the
rationality
of
carrying out the big nuclear threat weaken the credibility
essential to its effectiveness.
To be effective then it must
serious
be
(cf.
Benn).
Meeting objections to principle C3 leads on to two further versions of
one
centred on intention, one on commitment.
CG,
Principle C3 is intimately linked
with, and it sometimes considered but a variant upon, the principle
C4.
If X is wrong then to conditionally intend to do X [knowing it is wrong] is
also wrong.
The principles are intimately associated because a threat is, according to
dictionaries,
etc.'.
of
'a
declaration
of
intent
to inflict punishment, loss, injury,
It is their interconnection which lies at the bottom of
which
deterrence,
intending to go to war.
principle,
that
turn
C4
is
some
paradoxes
on the problem of credibly threatening war without
Principle
04
is
justified
through
the
simplified
intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is intending to do
wrong unless favourable circumstances for one's
principle
some
an
extremely
position
prevail.
Simplified
widely assumed moral thesis,*^ perhaps for the
excellent reason that it holds analytically.
Its elaboration C4 can be used
to
�31
since proceeding to LSN war when
against nuclear deterrence, as follows:
argue
the enemy duly misbehaves is wrong (by §§3-4), by C4, intending to go to LSN war
the enemy duly misbehaves is also wrong.
when
Nuclear deterrence involves such
Hence
an intention, all the available evidence shows.
deterrence
nuclear
is
wrong.
But like virtually every
utilitarian
themselves,
principles
utilitarian grounds.
deontic
principle,
principles
For it is not difficult to
those
except
from
flowing
C3 and C4 can be challenged on
outline
strategic
situations
where maximum expected utility results from a policy of nuclear deterrence.
But
on its own this concession casts but little doubt upon
C4.
For
it
likewise
is
not
principles
difficult to outline situations where the hanging of
innocent people, or other injustices, are sanctioned or enjoined by
maximum
expected
and
C3
utility.
pursuit
Those who appeal to utilitarian assumptions try to
avoid such more obvious difficulties with reliance upon utilitarianism,
scrapping
the
spots
not
by
doctrine, but by hedging applications of their principles around
with qualifications, which, they hope, will
trouble
of
with
utilitarianism.
enable
it
So
them
evade
to
the
worst
is with Kavka, whose work nicely
illustrates that whatever (little) deterrence has in its
moral
favour
depends
upon utilitarian assumptions.
Kavka 'begin[s] by noting that any reasonable system of
substantial
utilitarian
elements'
(PD,
p.287).
Even
observation were correct — it is not, depending for one
consequential
elements
systems
include
must
infiltrate,
an
with
the
'assumption
if
thing
ethics
this
upon
must
have
astonishing
conflating
utilitarian - it would not follow that reasonable
particular
that
assumption
produces
normative assumption involved is that the
act
Kavka
thereupon
tries
the paradoxes of deterrence'.
with
maximum
expected
to
The
utility
'(the most useful act) should be performed whenever a very great deal of utility
46.
Kavka, who labels simplified C4 the Wrongful Intentions Principle (PD,
p.289), attributes the principle to Abelard, Aquinas, Butler, Bentham,
Kant, Sidgwick, Kenny and Narveson.
Kavka also gives reasons as to why the
principle appears 'so obviously true'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue,
like the US Catholic Bishops, that 'nuclear deterrence is immoral'
(cf.
Kavka p.291).
It is the clash of C4 with certain utilitarian principles (especially the
maximisation principle of p.287)
that directly generates Kavka's first
paradox of deterrence and lies behind his other "paradoxes":
see PD.
�32
is at stake' (p.287).
objections
This assumption is open to essentially the same batch
utilitarianism
as
it is mainly a matter of increasing or
itself:
varying the stakes involved sufficiently in any counterexample.
strategy
usual
of
Kavka tries the
weakening and fudging the normative assumption to avoid the
of
worst problems of distributive injustice, and the like, that maximising
utility
can morally enjoin.
But the crucial defect in Kavka's argument lies
follow
normative
the
from
overridden
supposed
to
assumptions
utilitarian
by
way, as if it dominated C4 (see especially p.290), what
C4
is
Though Kavka tends to apply the fudged normative assumptions in this
(p.287).**?
and
what
assumption however fudged, namely that 'this means
other moral assumptions are
that ...
in
when
produce,
situations,
are
moral
combined
situations
in
dilemmas.
These
are
the
cases
assumption
special
as
such
not
fudged
deterrent
one
where
deontic
principle, that yielded by utilitarianism, overrides others, but where there are
competing, even contradictory deontic principles, such as that it
is
right
to
to proceed to LSN war when the enemy misbehaves (on specious utilitarian
intend
grounds) and also wrong to intend to do so (by C4).
that judgement is not overriden.
wrong:
remains
Nuclear deterrence
Nor does it in any way follow that C4
is in need of qualification as a result (Kavka's assumption,
p.290).
situations,
However,
there
are
countervailing utilitarian considerations suggesting different imperatives.
For
what
is
in
these
is
wrong.
the
also
case
is
that
these
in
special
special circumstances a greater utility can be realised by doing what
However
it
is
hardly
news,
but
a
objection,
standing
that
utilitarianism sometimes enjoins what is wrong.
Special
sponsonship
deterrent
may
appear
situations,
where
under
utilitarian
to get a foot in the moral door, are very special.
characterised by Kavka, they are such that the
47
deterrence
deterrence
is
very
likely
As
to
Lackey's utilitarian approach rests on a similar fallacy, that utilitarian
considerations predominate where stakes are large enough:
see his argument
for the approach in MM p.192.
What happens is not that important consequences override moral principles,
but that application of one principle with important consequences conflicts
with that of another principle with less significant consequences,
and in
the weigh-up of what to do in the problematic circumstances the principle
with important consequence prevails.
�33
succeed, and nothing else is likely to succeed (see p.286), i.e.
is
deterrence
This is very far removed from the real world
lodged in a deep probability-well.
situation where nuclear deterrence appears to be increasing the
probability
of
LSN war, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as likely to succeed as deterrence.
that
principles
deontic
Even if it were
supposed
mistakenly
to real-life dilemmas should be qualified to
subject
avoid dilemmas, there is little point in qualifying working
deontic
principles
such as C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situations.
Instead of pulling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral intentions it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly through the commitments it requires,
by way of the following principle:
If X is wrong then a conditional commitment to carry out X is also wrong.
C5.
The reason is that the commitment is a commitment
and
circumstances;
that
commitment
is
to
act
in
wrongly
certain
Nuclear deterrence is
itself wrong.
however a policy which commits states to war under certain conditions.
with
conditional
intention,
that
superstates
and
and
commitment
controlling
to
use
representatives
nuclear weapons.
not
did
occur)
is
to
enough
establish
have
relevant
the
The dangerous strategy of
launch-on-warning (which could, for instance, result in a
that
as
so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt
their
intention
And
response
to
attacks
the point, for which there is
otherwise quite sufficient factual evidence.
are
Now the connecting principles
suffice
but
logically,
nuclear
deterrence,
for
weighty
case.
instance
conditional commitment to LSN war, is wrong.
This
one
principle
would
By
detachment
from
the
by complete preparation for and
Deterrence of this type is
wrong.
also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence
trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
paradoxical:
deterrence.
itself
sound
when all are liable to be disputed, several defensible
ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles
applied:
it
out
the
connections
between
and
not
be
engaged
in
(unless
its
has
appeared
nuclear war and nuclear
Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that
should
changed, e.g.
left
bizarre
nuclear
war
direction can be drastically
at least limited, per impossibile in the case of nuclear warfare,
�34
to purely military targets).
The arguments through connecting principles, can be reinforced by different
sorts
arguments against the moral correctness of nuclear deterrence.
of
There
are arguments from limited convergence of ethical theories, which start from the
commonplace observation that
All the ethical arguments in
*
favour
of
nuclear
deterrence
broadly
are
utilitarian.
In fact most of the arguments in favour of deterrence, including many
that
infiltrated
have
the
ethical
literature,
are
of
those
generally drawn from game theory, and primarily interested in the
one
player,
the
USA.
Utilitarianism,
though
still
looking
of
those
expediency advantage
of
basically
at
advantages, interests and (typically individual) utilities, has to take
a
partisan
pain of
position,
and
forfeiting its claim to morality
supported
by
other
consider
nationalities
otherwise.
The
as
well,
commonplace
on
less
observation
is
the fact that such qualified moral support as deterrence obtains,
derives from utilitarianism.
48
There are two directions on to a general claim against
deterrence,
either
by way of the pro-utilitarian theme
*
Utilitarianism properly applied also comes out against deterrence
or, more strongly, by way of the anti-utilitarian theme,
*
Utilitarianism does not furnish satisfactory moral arguments.
Then, by the anti-utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in
favour
direction:
48.
of deterrence.
moral
arguments
Naturally, it would be easy to strengthen the second
after all it is widely
thought
that
utilitarianism
is
a
false,
Thus the hedged utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and Joynt, and
Showing that cogent
also within the broadly utilitarian range, of Gautier.
______
defences of nuclear deterrence have to take
a utilitarian route would be a
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
much tougher enterprise.
T'
' , much would depend on what was
enterprise could be carried through,
For certainly bizarre principles, e.g. obverses of the
connecting principles, can be introduced, which afford deontological routes
to deterrence.
despite some backsliding by bishops, all other ethical positions; can
A deontological
made to speak against deterrence and its continuation,
be 1___ —
.
connecting
deontic
case against deterrence,
primarily the way
of
principles, has been argued in some detail.
In the light of these
principles, it is not difficult to see how cases from other ethical
2 go..
After all C4 has been defended from a wide range of
positions would
Af--- -1......
And
stances, e.g.
contractual,
natural law, utilitarian even.
<—
�35
seriously astray, or even shabby ethical position.
political
which
system
depends
in
some
utilitarian arguments for its policies.
It hardly does
measure
for
then
a
upon consensus, to rely on
Yet with nuclear deterrence
just
that
appears to be happening, with readily overturned arguments at that.
For whether even utilitarianism supports deterrence depends essentially on:
it
how
with
applied;
is
which
maximisation recipes; along with what other
restrictive assumptions (such as those of a deep probability-well);
are
generous
With
sovereignty, national security, etc.
or
assumptions,
different
arguably
(and
superior)
varying the guestimation methods, very different results
upon
The
emerge, opposing deterrence and favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament.
reason for this is straightforward (and like that ending §4).
basic
LSN war has an extremely large negative utility.
deterrence
out to
recipes
Any
policy
such
It is that
as
nuclear
which increases the probability of this, or even risks it, must lose
feasible
other
of
how
for such things as preservation of national
assignments
utility
and on
a
alternatives,
consequentialist
type
whatever
are
initially
applied
(e.g.
plausible
decision
Minimax, Dominance,
Disaster Avoidance, Expected Value).
The anti-utilitarian theme can be defended either by a full-scale criticism
of
utilitarianism,
beginning for instance with its well-known justification of
localised injustices, $0 or else
utilitarianism
when
applied
One obvious deficiency is this:
by
to
addressing
some
of
the
inadequacies
of
issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrence.
on standard utilitarianism, what to do, whether
to proceed with deterrence, depends on the probability of its success and on the
improbability of other options working.
deep,
utilitarianism
If the deterrence
probability-well
is
morally requires deterrence, otherwise not.$* But what is
morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are
probable.
49.
The instability of utilitarianism is illustrated by the
discussion
involving Kavka, Lackey and Hardin,
continued in Philosophy and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilitarianism, diametrically
opposed conclusions are reached.
(Hardin's approach tends however to
expediency reasoning of the strategic type.)
50.
Such wider criticisms of utilitarianism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-known to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considered in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilitarianism' .
The point that utilitarianism gives no firm place to
stand comes from L. Mirlin.
�36
Whether deterrence is morally wrong or not, is
likely
work
to
independent
it
is
are
princip]gs
Moral
not
through expected values, whether utilities or otherwise - though how
determined
bad some outcome is may be.
are
deterrence
decidedly
essentially
nowhere
whether
If nuclear deterrence is wrong where it increases the
or not.
probability of war, then is it wrong, simpliciter.
depend
of
upon
firm to stand.
Worse, since the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these
of
the results utilitarianism delivers
and
uncertainty
measures,
offers
utilitarianism
In contrast with the solid deontic ground of principle,
utilitarianism provides only shifting sand.
The objections made apply especially against act utilitarianism.
form
shows
special
interests,
such
as
conditions
security
(the
probability-well
state,
of
estimation rules are pulled in).
high
have
is
deep,
utilities,
nation-state
and
special
It does not yield a deterrence policy;
indeed
hardly yields policies at all (other than act utilitarianism itself).
and certain other difficulties may be avoided by considering instead a
of
act
most that nuclear deterrence is "wrong" according to its lights
at
under very
it
The
acts.52 But the method lacks stability;
These
sequence
different prescriptions will result
depending upon how the sequence is selected, what is included and what left
(as
also
associated probabilities depend critically on the sequence selected).
No unequivocal recipe is delivered.
selected
out
to
To
see
this,
suppose
the
sequence
is
include worst cases, for instance cases where deterrence fails and
war breaks out.
In this event it can hardly be argued that
deterrence
is
the
policy that maximizes utility over the sequence.
Along with the arguments, there are
dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence.
other
conventional wars.
for
Firstly, the peace it has provided
only nuclear peace, or rather lack of nuclear war, as there
smaller-scale
reasons
concomitant
is
deep
is
shortage of
no
And the "peace" provided is at best a tenuous
peace, which is not stable, but liable to upset at
any
stage
by
a
range
of
51.
Though this is to oversimplify, the points made are not affected by the
simplification.
In any case the simplified picture reflects well enough
the differences between Kavka and Lackey that matter in their debate
(referred to in footnote 49).
52.
Whether this is rule utilitarianism, or still act utilitarianism
the sequence can be construed as one long act, may be left open.
because
�37
factors, including error, both human and technical.
It does not
genuine
offer
of the sort required for a stable international life, but only a fragile
Peace,
peace of a sort
opportunity
is
enormous
the
cost,
moral
cost of deterrence, because expenditure on it excludes other urgent
moral priorities.
way,
Marxist
Secondly, there
(PL, p.316).
in
The US Bishops put this familiar
terms
of
'the
destructive capacity and what
is
for
in
between
contradiction
needed
point,
spent
is
what
constructive
surprisingly
a
for
(PL,
development'
p.316).
§6 -
Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from
dangers
national
nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas.
to
While
there are arguments to the immorality of nuclear war preparation, there are also
counter-arguments,
that
have
Americans), to the moral
proved
justifiability
persuasive
remarkably
of
nuclear
war
(especially
preparation
in
to
the
present circumstances .
The underlying style of argument is simply an elaboration, or state-uplift,
of that for the escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or
for stocking-up the neighbourhood armoury - and every bit
argument
from
local dangers.
and
domination;
dubious
first
of
all
second of nuclear destruction.
atomic
surrender
and
so
avoid the destruction' (Walzer, p.273).
preparation is supposed to guard against more than these;
third
element,
namely,
loss
of
basic
rights
there
with these.
blackmail
of
foreign
appeasement
In fact nuclear
is
a
crucial
of
ways
life
This further set of elements is linked to the danger of
foreign domination - which is really a separate element from risk of
Though
and
(freedom, equality, etc.) and
fundamental values (upholding of truth, human dignity, etc.) and
integrated
that
The two go together,
since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy
or
as
It is that nuclear preparation, 'so we have been
told, guards against the double danger:
foreign
as
blackmail.
domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does
imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various
national objectives;
conversely loss or erosion or infringement of basic values
can occur without foreign domination, for instance, as
is
commonplace
in
the
�38
"free" world, by internal change of government or governmental approach, through
the increased security and control a
nuclear
risks,
increasingly
preparation
state
nuclear
demands,
But
etc.
what
nuclear destruction, also
extensive
involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction
of
the
material
of the cherished life-style.^ So nuclear preparation is hardly a clearcut
base
means of guaranteeing basic values.5^
In other respects too the argument from loss of
lacks
cogency
rings
and
It
hollow.
is
basic
values
and
rights
hard to avoid the feeling that the
oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
citation
values at political ceremonies;
religious
of
clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
demands
from
of
of
wealth
private
appealed
to
category:
in
and
them
to
having
arising
with
do
the
an argument isn't, or
However
associations.
And
rights
the
and
But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into
particular nationalistic ones do not.
And one of the main
alleged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or
many
another,
are, mostly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,
and worth much sacrifice.
this
of
power.
and
oughtn't to be, defeated by its unsavoury
values
that the argument is a
military-industrial complex, many concerned with foreign
the
domination of other lesser states, and many
concentration
pious
"communism"
of
of "socialism", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention
of capitalism.
communism
has
happened
What has
been
here
with
confused
of
(the
totalitarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms
(of
opinion,
association,
is
course
that
reality
basic
information,
of)
values,
etc.,
(the
ideal
of)
socialist
state
namely
certain
and
so does
etc.),
derivatively threaten basic values.
One critical question, then, is whether extensive nuclear
LSN
war,
and
indeed
for
rational way of preserving
nuclear
those
holocaust,
fundamenmtal
preparation
for
is a good or effective or even
values,
which
we
have
left.
53.
The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerful state imposes its values and way of life.
54.
The argument from freedom, advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives, is further considered early in Appendix 1.
�39
arise
Similar questions
and
domination
as
regards
arguments
the
preparation depends essentially on an arrangement of hostile
structure
which
itself
is
open
questioned (in §8), both from the
serious
to
question,
view
of
point
foreign
of
danger
of the methods of extensive nuclear
Justification
blackmail.
from
and
basic
of
states,
nation
a
is subsequently
values,
such
as
freedom, and otherwise.
But whether ultimately justified or
dangers
not,
these
national
those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear
are
preparation, and
have
They
justification.
been
accepted
outlook.
moral
by
policy
Within
particular, that extensive nuclear
the
as
affording
moral
arguments
preparation
do
not
such
Northern
conventional
a
It is within such a framework, in
framework the moral justification holds good.
however,
makers
fact been widely accepted, and undoubtedly form
in
have
part of many people's
others,
from
arguments
engenders
establish
moral
a
fix.
For
the morality of extensive
nuclear preparation, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
face a nuclear dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it is
also
not a specifically moral one.
And
for
many
others
and their respective rights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
people
who
not
are
who
again,
so
or as familiar with Soviet and American culture and ways of life,
by
impressed
Such
beyond
live
For such
the "beneficial" reach of the superstates, prudential
counter-arguments from national dangers carry little weight, and the moral
case
against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged.
This is the genesis of the argument from isolated
people
who
Consider
some
a comparatively remote area, whose freedoms are not (yet)
in
live
people.
under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nuclear
(as under principle Cl).
deterrence
For such isolated people, who may
have little interest in the preservation of nuclear states, there is no
nuclear
dilemma,
and
nuclear
locations may have problems
to
national
is wrong.
dangers,
People in less fortunate
but
in
meeting
these
they are not entitled to impose grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
problems
people.
as
deterrence
genuine
In doing so
immorally;
and
for
through
similar
nuclear
reasons
deterrence, superstates
the
are
proceeding
conventional Northern framework is
�40
The same conclusion can be alternatively reached
impugned.
argument:
a
put
isolated person, and check
the
resulting
substitution
Russian in the position of such an
or
American
reflective
a
by
assessment
of
nuclear
deterrence.
it would be the same as that of a reflective isolated person, stripped of
Since
superstate bias, morally opposed to deterrence and not morally
transfixed,
the
conventional framework fails to satisfy requirements of morality.
The outcome of the arguments from dangers is, then,very different depending
on
the
whether
are
arguments
applied
regards a superstate or not.
as
The
superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because of multiple connected dangers from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obliged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Hence, by detachment, a super-nation-state, such as USA, ought to have something
in
the
the nuclear armoury that it has.
of
order
meet objections concerning excess,
a
least
at
retain
Or, weakening the theme to
"overkill" capacity, it
core of the nuclear devices it has.
solid
[morally]
ought
to
For subsequent
argument it can be left open whether the obligation involved is a moral one, for
instance
of
because
the
character
of
the
protected, or only (as argued above) one of
to
grounds
supporting
those
against
disarmament
a
the
SS
reason $5.
prudential
theme
nuclear
dangerous
Northern values supposedly being
on
similar
it can be argued that unilateral
opponent
would
be
prudentially
irrational.
It will be freely admitted that what is prudentially or morally required is
a
suboptimal
strategy,
like the familiar strategies of the prisoners' dilemma
situations and of certain related competitive games.
that
like could be achieved, would
agreement
would
be
cooperative
draining
of
For
such
resources,
the details are well-enough known.
future
55.
admitted
arrangements.
Cooperation
and
be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a
range of other respects.
expensive,
be
strategy for nuclear adversaries, if sufficient trust and the
superior
a
So it should
arrangements
would
be
much
less
risky,
destructive of the environment, and so on;
However for the present and the
foreseeable
the prospects of cooperation appear - so we are repeatedly told by state
It can
still,
and
presumably
does,
amount
to
more
than
mere
expediency, since the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.
local
�41
representatives, who are (not always wittingly) helping to make
true
-
unfortunately
rather
remote:
only
the
policies
their
sure insurance is extensive
nuclear preparation and full preparedness to apply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate:
proceed,
largely
unabated.
nuclear
preparation
Where one is not a superstate, but a lesser state
one must, the representatives continue, rely on a larger ally who has a
arsenal,
one's
nuclear
preparation,
one
under
huddles
and
which
contrasts
the lack of trust displayed, and encouraged elsewhere.
Does a
state, one which relies for its nuclear cover on a super-ally,
ground
for
another's
But here a level of trust and cooperation is^ called for, by
umbrella.
dependent states, which is far from foolproof,
with
nuclear
insurance (which is presumably not free) is obtained indirectly
through some superstate's
nuclear
confidence
in
its
rather
super-ally
strangely
dependent
have
exchange
on its territory?
much
that
its ally's opponent?
than
Confidence, for instance, that its ally will not render it a target or
nuclear
must
stage
a
Given the proclivity of states, especially
large states, to resort to expediency, and given the recent historical record of
superstates and their leaders, too much faith would.be misplaced.
Thus, whatever the limited force of the argument for the superstate
it
does
theme,
not extend to the analogous theme for a dependent state, which differs
from SST and ends as follows:
DST.
Because ..., a state without adequate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to rely upon a superstate ally, and within that arrangement, to accommodate the
facilities and nuclear installations of the protecting ally.
In part for reasons already given, principle DST is not very plausible (and
same
goes for more obvious variants upon it).
Nor do the arguments offered for
SST transpose particularly well to direct arguments
strikingly
illustrated
by
the
case
the
for
DST.56
This
is
more
of more remote nuclear dependent states.
Consider the argument from basic values, for instance, from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.
Basic values in Australia are not threatened by, or put in
jeopardy through, the actions or plans
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Nor
are
they
threatened by the other superstate, the USA, the only country with 'the physical
56.
As is widely known, inadmissible and usually much overrated considerations
of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign
nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g.
economic considerations
such as trade or local revenue and short-term jobs.
�42
capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia', but
'clearly
lack[ing]
motive to do so', so far.5? Clearly the argument from basic values does not
any
look convincing.
carries
reasons
For similar
In
weight.
little
the
with
fact,
from
argument
little care, the present level of
a
economic and political domination could be much reduced.
of
force
For there
only
is
questionable
of
because
danger
such
superstate
In this way
too,
nuclear
umbrella,
and
facilities
superstate
the
that would be removed with
danger
non-aligned practices.$8 With less remote dependent European states these
of
the
from danger of nuclear destruction could be nullified.
argument
the
domination
foreign
sorts
arguments from national dangers are only marginally more convincing, and may
be defeated along analogous lines.
The differences in the situations of states, and
peoples,
break
the
theme
of
a
of
situated
differently
This is a theme especially
monolithic West.
favoured by US and the West European representatives, who present the West,
its
freedom,
as threatened by Soviet domination.
undifferentiated unit.
dependent
states
with
But
this
leading
idea,
NATO
designed
powers,
and
In this the West is a single
in
part
to
align
lesser
to justify putting them at
and
nuclear risk is as much a myth as the idea of the Golden West.
not
The West is
so monolithic, it is not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free, much of it
(including the Antipodes) is not threatened by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - likewise what it depends upon, SST - is
now
under
coming
attack by European disarmament groups, who challenge the core assumptions of the
underlying retaliatory model that
*
Safety lies in weapons,
*
More weapons imply more securityS9.
Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand,
safety
from
nuclear
attack lies not in weapons but in excluding nuclear facilities (including visits
from nuclear submarines).
present
system
is
more
Europeans are arguing in
of
a
similar
way,
that
the
a risk, indeed liability, than a protection (e.g.
57.
For the quoted claim, and some of the
Australia's Security, p.94.
58.
The issue is further pursued in Appendix 2.
59.
See, for example, the last article in Thompson.
argument
for
it,
see
Threats
to
�43
envisaged
the
and that without nuclear installations, Europe cannot be
Thompson, p.251);
theatre
limited nuclear war, in the way it is now seen by US
a
for
(but not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons
assumptions
are
questioned,
other
the
assumptions of
and its variants come up for examination, namely
retaliatory model
*
Whether
the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
,
Whether
the proper response is through nuclear armament,
asopposed,
say, to other military responses, such as conventional arms, or,
taking off from the previous point,
Whether military approaches and procedures (through
*
are
proper
methods,
etc.)
armaments,
or should be such dominant methods, of conflict
resolution at the international level.
It is plausibly argued, against military procedures, that at no
level
ordinary
do we sensibly set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
really
frontier
warranted,
ethics.
This leads into the issue of alternative
defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary6°
and
explanation
it
deserves,
questioning of the framework
of
but
never
one
that
nation-states.
already
While
emphasis
anticipates subsequent
the
state
system
is
intact, force is far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expected
and are likely inevitable.
nation-state
system':
For 'force has
[a]
...
permanent
place
the
in
thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very
orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.
The resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned states
Assembling
referred
the
to
as
themes
the
so
far
nuclear
developed
fix:-
States
war-deterrence, because (as argued in §3-§5)
to engage in war-deterrence, at least
60.
the
yields
both
and__ their—supporter^.
deontic dilemma, often
ought
not
for prudential reasons (as
conversion to such arrangements.
engage
in
it is immoral, and also ought
Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alternative systems, see
survey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangements, and a growing literature on
i.e.
to
argued
using
China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,
�44
SST and DST).
the
This dilemma is no idle construction
paraconsistent
of
virtues
but
logic),
(concocted
to
demonstrate
a serious real-life dilemma, the
outlines of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on
nuclear
and
war
its
aspects 61, as well as being virtually ubiquitous in nuclear war discussions.
The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense
dilemma
produced
by
the
deontic
war itself &2, or at least war which spreads beyond purely
military targets, as larger wars inevitably
do
(since
military
arrangements,
The main dilemma arises
rail transport, typically rely on civilian ones).
e.g.
of
version
from a combination of the retaliatory model with the features of
War
war.
is
required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold);
but war also involves immoral acts and evil consequences.
can
war"
under
certain
justified.
be
also
seen
as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that
circumstances
Thus
'some
these
really
justifications
evil
consequences
aegis
of
war'
(Walls,
p.260).
acceptable than fallacious asymptotic
are
morally
of war aim to show that actions deemed
normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible
the
The doctrine of "just
But
this
arguments
when
under
performed
is no better or more morally
for
utilitarianism
being
as
correct when the stakes are large.
War and preparedness for
61.
war
also
generate
subsidiary
dilemmas
-
for
Thus Green, along with many others, 'find[s] nuclear deterrence ...
the
best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of
world politics' but 'still demur[s] because of moral qualms'
(p.xii).
Green
also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy,
even while
asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional ethical codes' (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he
is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets
down):
'...
though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no
other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue.
Similarly the US Catholic Bishops
dilemma;
they speak of 'the
dilemma of how to prevent the use
Paskins and Dockrill and in Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.
present the situation in terms of a moral
political paradox of deterrence ...
the
of nuclear weapons ...' (PL, p.313).
In
too the nuclear situation is presented in
The nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admissibility of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the arguments from national dangers.
But
it is a dilemma for those locked into the conventional framework.
62.
Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account
of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein.
�45
authority:
instance, a severe tension between freedom and
difficult
'one
of
most
the
of war involves defending a free society without destroying
problems
p.324).
the values that give it meaning and validity' (PL,
The
problems
are
greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arrangements.
The nuclear fix not only intensifies and complicates other dilemmas induced
by
the
contemporary sovereign state^^, in particular the deep tensions between
national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (such
individual
liberty, popular control of institutions, etc).
other more personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for
(political)
obligations
to
example
question
(the
It also accentuates
the
extent
one's
of
a nuclear state, and role-induced dilemmas such as
one's conflicting obligations as a doctor or a nuclear
researcher
as
of
political
obligations
armaments
and
their
processor
or
evasion
is
considered further in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, that of individual and group action, there
several
questions
be disentangled - questions different from the key issue
to
'What should my state
be
doing
and
influence, depending on who one is.
do?',
on
which
one
may
exert
lives,
and
influences, i.e.
in
what
little
There is not only the question 'What should
I do?' - a question which will have a quite different force depending
one
are
on
where
sort of state, where one works, what one controls or
on who one is and one's roles - but also the
questions
'What
sort of person do I want to be?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'^"
Answers to these latter character questions will feed back to influence those to
action-oriented
questions.
Each
of those questions can, in given situations,
induce subsidiary dilemmas.
The essential feature of a deontic dilemma is that both A and the
of
A
are
wrong
(or
differently,
pursuing a nuclear defence policy.
obligatory),
negation
for some suitable A, such as
The place and essential role of deontic
and
63.
The nuclear dilemma is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas.
Large-scale nuclear power generation, and other types of warfare and
security arrangements, also contribute.
But a conflict of
ree om a
authority is already an outcome of the large central state.
64.
For group formulation of the questions replace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
importance of distilling out these questions, and the moral undesirability
of deterrence in terms of what it does to people morally, are brought out
in Benn, where however the issues are made to look somewhat more separate
than they are.
�46
moral dilemmas are not
widely
well
or
particularly
understood,
ethical
in
This is partly because currently dominant ethical positions like
literature^^.
utilitarianism cannot at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which
gives
to
rise
them
then such positions do not really offer reportive
but
-
accounts of wrong and obligation anyway.
Contrary to utilitarian perceptions
a
dilemma does not necessarily have any moral solution, though there may be better
and worse ways out.
By
assessments,
form
which
contrast
the
with
ethical
such
preanalytical
theories,
of sensitive theories, do recognise moral
basis
dilemmas and reflect their features.
Reactions and responses that are characteristic of deontic dilemmas
the
from
There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to
fix.
nuclear
do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to
temporary
crutch.
for
Thus,
as
way
a
of
never
exercising
"morally
our
world'66, that is in a morally-strapped world.
best"
ethical
Bishops who
the
of
A similar
'strictly
conditional'
Deterrence has a strictly temporary role
the
object
must
and
deterrence
circumstances.
deterrence,
is
"morally
in a fallen
acceptability'
certainly
one
strictly
wrong,
is
of
from the
conditional
option
as
to
of
what
nuclear
the
to
do
nevertheless
the
policy
to
fix.
awkward
in
Thus Walzer, for example, struggles to the conclusion
though
"second
a
to
be to move beyond deterrence, 'towards a
world free of the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And
be
try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.
moral fix.
but
shift
'moral
while
acceptability,
can
good",
responsibility
moral
deterrence
we
a
(as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic
functor
speak
as
grasp
example, the Bishop of London contends that the
possession of nuclear weapons 'while
acceptable"
emerge
that
war
in
the
pursue
circumstances (p.274).6? However as more than an immediate stepping stone
to
a
65.
There are exceptions of course, e.g.
in the Catholic educated such as
Sartre;
and Nagel's final example is very instructive. For a fuller
theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood.
66.
Reported in The Economist;
reprinted in
1983, Weekend Magazine p.2.
67.
As a response to a moral dilemma, Walzer's approach is perfectly in order
logically. Those who, like Benn, 'find it neither coherent nor acceptable'
The
have not grasped the logic of moral dilemmas.
Australian,
February
12-13
�47
superior
it
policy,
(in
assembled
is
reasons
§5-§6),
of
option,
poor
decidedly
a
the
sort
reasons
for
are
that
decisive
for those,
outside the conventional Northern framework, who find
sufficiently
already
no
genuine
of
nuclear
nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix is, furthermore,
own making.
states'
a
fix
It is not something they blundered into, by accident.
initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by the
the
the USA and the USSR in interaction.
and
In these respects the
situation
is
like
people who deliberately let themselves be involved in two incompatible
of
relationships, and build up conflicting obligations
though
USA,
has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again mainly by
escalation
that
The
build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response
nuclear
to
Soviet
The fact is that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has
build-up.
frequently led escalation, and apparently still does.
programme is to be in addition to existing
resources
myth,
a
is
some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, and nuclear
with
one
It
thereby.
are
(which
agreed
generally
The recent (1980)
United
States'
strategic
be already in excess of
to
Russia's, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21).
The present dilemma, that many people feel acutely, is then a direct outcome
state
policy,
allies, and
Naturally
not
the
USSR policies.
that
indicates
especially
a
merely
route
by
taken
advanced
response
to
capitalist
the
USA and its NATO
nations,
Soviets
(or
of
socialism).
state
would not have been feasible without complementing
And independent evidence,
such
as
Soviet-Sino
confrontation,
is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist
there
nations.
There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements
nation-states
the
and
nuclear
fix.
arrangements are an evident source of the
nuclear
situation
is
increasingly
present world political structure.
is
widely
promulgated
arrangements:
it is '...
seen
On
the
dilemma
as
one
hand,
with
the
these
result
through
political
that
the
indicating the inadequacy of the
Indeed it is no longer a radical
theme
but
that the source of the nuclear problem comes from state
a world of sovereign states ...
which
brought
the
�48
world
the present dangerous situation' (PL, p.313).
to
nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into
On the other hand, the
the
statist
form,
into
The
arrangements of an increasingly authoritarian and centralist cast.
statist
espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the
national
defend
to
and
security,
interests,
reasons such as perpetuating the system
state
advantageous
confrontation,
and
provide
to
but underneath there are other
sovereign
of
(!),
peace
and
states
of
framework
the
military-industrial interests, dependent state exploitation, and
politically
favoured
inequality
it
supports.
The emerging theme is then that the very nuclear situation arising from the
statist
and
arrangements
interrelations
(economic
ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock
arrangements
of
states and zones of interest.
sovereign
theme is a piecemeal practical one.
where
side
the
pattern
world
the
conflicting
rivalries,
into
the
present
The argument to this
Consider first, the matter from the
Soviet
of national control and progressive military-economic
reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer.
The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for
the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and
social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own borders.
In the West we have ... carefully controlled
...
and selective release of 'official information' (Thompson, p.20).
"We" in the West, especially the Americans, also
integrated
with
state
apparatus,
have,
in
forms
increasingly
the military-industrial complex, which is a
major beneficiary and promoter of the nuclear arms race.68
Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements,
by
things
such
as
the
SALT negotiations;
there are fixed superpowers and a
(growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a
rules, partly held in place by deterrence.
shown
as
flimsy
negotiated
set
Connected with this, there are cases
revealing the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US is
68.
of
The
invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so the
not
overduly
worried
about
Afghanistan
and
its
people.
What
was
The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched in Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism, would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would freely
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.
�49
different, what it was worried about and made nuclear threats
adjacent
Western
oil
supplies:
were
concerning,
these lay within the US zone of interest (cf.
the discussion in Schell, p.212).
§8.
initial political fall-out from the ethical
Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:
Virtually all the ways are ways of limitation, and they all involve in
results.
one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limitations
the
on
thus inevitable.
and
more
powers of states.
Limitations on national sovereignty are
The limitations may be reached by agreement
and
negotiation,
less voluntarily agreed to^^, or they may be imposed, or possibly
or
worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war.
As with other fixes produced by
are
there
suggested
the
structural
arrangements
of
states,
out which do not interfere with these arrangements,
ways
interstate approaches, and there are ways which do seriously alter the structure
and
power
relations
extrastate approaches.
of
states
(and,
in the limit, remove them altogether),
All the familiar, allegedly
practical
and
realistic ,
attempts to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations, etc., are interstate;
sovereign
state.
The
same
goes
(graduated) unilateral disarmament.
about the nation-state;
they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the
for
less
"realistic"
But in fact there is
proposals,
nothing
or
empirical
fact,
is it particularly a stable one.
nor,
and
its
replacement by alternative arrangements.
as
a
We are certainly
free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as
demise
sacred
it is not a particularly well justified political form;
it is not even a very long-standing form of political arrangement;
matter
very
such as
to
its
And nuclear dilemmas
should have encouraged such reflection.
69.
In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through
fighting in some form, but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers,
lawyers, or etc.
In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives
are never much considered in these days of superstates. Animals, by
contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like
these.
Even the ancient Greeks - though they had a clear appreciation of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enlightenment leaders - regarded the
institution of war as final (allegedly inevitable) means of arbitration
between city-states, not seeing
its
social,
structurally-emergent,
character.
�50
Extrastate approaches take one of
international
of states.
routes,
the
way
up,
to
genuine
power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation
The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;
but they are
Some of the important machinery, for a way up to
necessarily incompatible.
not
two
world government,is already there in the
international
Were
law-courts.
the
courts assigned sufficient authority and power, the remedy, namely through legal
action, that medieval
theorists
saw
all
to
intrastate
and T superseded by the just case of S versus T.
sufficient
war deterrence,
though
Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
equivalent
super—statist
But if
the
law
courts
were
power then their authority and efficacy would likely rely (at
upon
least initially)
their
in
could
be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war between states S
principle
given
disputes,
back-up
equivalent
for
of
economic
perhaps
not by military means.
effective without police and jails or
and
other
penalties;
and
the
either will involve the capacity to inflict quite
substantial amounts of damage on "delinquents" - which, because delinquents will
be
typically
organisations,
will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps
dissenting, participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In
parties.
uninvolved
short, such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to
repeat it.
The Way Up is one more statist, legalistic, authoritarian way of trying
get
to
grips
with
the
nuclear
though mostly in passing to be
70.
to
problem, and accordingly is often mentioned,
dismissed
in
orthodox
strategic
texts
on
Americans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the USSR)
is
a union, of fairly recent origin, and that a differently-oriented State of
the Union message could well consider dissolution of the union.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular support at present.
By
contrast, there are significant separation movements,
some deserving aid
and encouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR,
UK and France. The USSR already has trouble in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated)
satellite empire together;
and the one recent
attempted addition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor should powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
fostered elsewhere.
The same applies to state empire expansion, as
illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Most important,
the reunification
of
Germany
should be resisted;
instead a more rational regional
deunification than the present East-West division of post-war Germany
should be sought, along with removal of nuclear weapons from the border
region, and so on.
71.
Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical, etc.
Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour
with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations.
�51
the
By contrast, the Way Down, though like
thermonuclear war.
an appearance (a comeback) in some more radical discussions,
with the Way Up (in "world order" models:
combined
unlike the Way Down, is
considered
however
beginning
is
and
more
much
international
system';
and
'the
'towards
a
no
sometimes
sympathetically
There is
by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.
a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching
by
The Way Up,
Galtung).
cf.
be
to
Up
but it is making
new, is scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;
means
Way
integrated
morally
missing element of world order today is the
absence of a properly constituted political authority' (PL, p.320).
A main argument for the Way Up is
just
repetition
a
that
of
which
is
commonly supposed to underpin statist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners'
of the Commons.
Tragedy
traditionally,
ecological order.
not
as
best
regards
problems
to
solutions
nation-states,
of superstate.
of
organisation,
and one of the prospects is destruction of a
said
to
be
some
Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application
of the "tragedy" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some
their
order—imposing
correspondingly weakened.
arguments
role,
and
But all
obligation
political
this
is
assume
to
,
only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.
There are, then, many problems
through
that
states
will
these
tragedy
A
further
theoretical
with
the
hitch
is
Way
Up,
that
a
both
theoretical
and
the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.
It
is
contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations
nearby, that the problems of interstate relations are not repeated
72.
be
72
statist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only
to
of
good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are
are
practical.
the
public order and, more recently, as to
good part of the commons by nuclear war, the solution is now
sort
as
So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are
but
herdsmen
such
It is that authority and coercion - in the form of the
state * are required to ensure
especially,
Dilemma,
See further Routley and Routley
and
material
referred
to
a
level
therein,
up
and
especially Griffin.
The real reasons for the state are of course very different from the
theoretical cover such arguments afford. Among other things, the state
enables and guarantees the accumulation of power, privilege and capital.
�The major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting
again.
such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended purpose.
In reality, we are no nearer a world government than we were a century
ago,
....
In fact, it is even arguable that since World War II we
have moved further away from a world government than we were before
World
War
II.
The disintegration of empires has multiplied
sovereignties. It is true that we have something called the United
Nations, but even the United Nations has declined in power as it has
grown in membership. By the beginning of the 1970's the United
Nations had become, in some ways, a less powerful and even less
influential organisation than it was at the end of the 1950's (Mazrui,
pp.2-3).
For
The reasons for this Mazrui goes on to outline.
future
foreseeable
the
nuclear
ideological differences between states, including especially differences
as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude any prospect of
an
world government or a world legal system capable of resolving nuclear
operative
In some ways, this is just as well.
hostilities.
monolithic,
extremely
would
World
would
government
foster economism, would entrench bureaucracy with
all its damaging features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism.
whatever
certainly,
its
be
(gray?)
colour,
political
exploitative economic system which would do immense
impose
damage
It
would
the world an
on
many
remaining
crucial
respects,
to
natural systems.?3
The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely
undesirable
ideological,
requisite
of
level
indeed
unity
political
cannot
be
economic
and
paradigmatic,
and,
separation
in
some
Moreover,
unity.
of
main
Northern
within nuclear deadlines.
expected
given
cultures,
When not even
nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out, how much less likely is
more
much
sovereignty, could
blockages
agreements,
sweeping
and
be
negotiated?
deadlocks
in
the
involving
genuine
There
an
way
is
endless
(e.g.
of
of
state
series
of such state reconciliation.
applies to interstate arrangements, which may make limited use
that
it
limitations
almost
the
the
of
The same
Way
Up
negotiations or other conciliation procedures within a framework arranged
through the United Nations) .?**
73.
For a more detailed (but decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
government,
see Galtung.
Naturally the objections to world
government, and difficulties in the way of obtaining it, do not extend to
more flexible world arrangements, such a world federation of cultures (cf.
Mazrui).
Such a pluralistic anarchistic Way Up can
be
genuinely
synthesized with the Way Down.
�53
There is
regrettably
and
arrangements
much
also
conventions
are
evidence
frequently
concerning war and human rights?$), and are
sentiments
smoothly
not
not
observed (especially those
worth
into despicable deeds.
not
bode
convention
in
great
a
deal:
Even agreements states have
openly
violated.
Indeed there already appears to be at least one
any
force,
of
It
to
which
international
all the major nuclear states are signatories,
which would rule out LSN war and nuclear deterrence, that on genocide.
includes
lofty
for nuclear arms limitations, should sufficient agreement
well
ever be reached.
treaties,
international
are often enough disregarded, skirted around, or
signed
does
slide
that
the
following
Genocide
acts committed, in time of peace or war, with
intent to destroy in whole or part a natural, ethical, racial or religious group
killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to
as such:
the members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions of life
to
bring about physical
destruction
direct
and
public
shall
conspiracy to
commit
be
Persons committing genocide or any of
punished,
whether
they
are
the
other
acts
responsible rulers, private
individuals or public officials.?6 it is not difficult to argue
nuclear
genocide,
incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide.
mentioned
Beside genocide the
in whole or in part.
following associated acts are also punishable:
calculated
that
larger
a
strike (such as deterrence policy requires as a back-up response) would
almost certainly constitute an act of genocide, through what
minority
groups.
to
does
some
But then, by virtue of connecting principles like 05, nuclear
deterrence stands indicted
particular
it
conspiracy
representatives of the
and
as
involving
incitement.
nuclear
states
acts
associated
with
genocide,
in
Some well-known political and military
would
thus
appear
to
be
liable
to
indictment and punishment under international law.
74.
Even Dahlitz, who gives a detailed and sympathetic account of nuclear arms
control attempts and lost opportunities,
is by no means confident that
suitable arrangements can now be achieved (see pp.
210-13).
Reasons
include technological advances now taking place, and the renewed American
drive for strategic superiority.
75.
See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty International reports.
in this paragraph were suggested by C. Pigden.
76.
The account of genocide given is taken directly from the
Genocide Convention, which is reproduced in Kuper, p.210ff.
Most of the points
text
of
the
�54
The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the
impotence
apparent
interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed
of
with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
nearer
to
the
nuclear
"brink"
—
taken
now
is
to
contemporary angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political
has
given
new
impetus
sovereignty
the best-seller
and
to consideration of other extrastate resolutions.
The
the
indicates
the
namely
nuclear
in
The
Schell's
situation
should
reexamination of the foundations of political thought'
world's
political
unsatisfactoriness
radical
of
the present system of nation states has even reached
stands
Schell
to
According
and
book
a new
arrangements,
thesis that the nuclear problem
national
(from
indicate
and
of
Fate
lead
to
required
Earth.
the
a
full-scale
to
make
'the
consonant with the global reality in which
institutions ...
they operate ...' and in 'work[ing] out the practical steps by which mankind ...
can
reorganise
political
its
life' (p.219).
However Schell himself tries to
avoid these 'awesome urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by
the
political
work of our age' ??.
else overimpressed
by
the
history,
constitute
So, not feeling the pressures of history or
realities
of
(unstable)
nation-states,
do
most
But there is no good reason to avoid the task of political
political theorists.
reassessment, made so much more urgent by the nuclear situation.
There is little doubt but that we live (too
unthinkingly)
with
an
antiquated
system
many
present
state
arrangements,
communications
condition;
especially,
were
in
a
of
(allegedly
when
17th
century
very
different
and
the main outlines of the modern totalitarian state
and its manifold deficiencies recognised, even earlier.
77.
willingly,
The features
representative
government, were largely fashioned in the
us
even
of political arrangements which the
nuclear impasse, among others, calls into question.
best
of
even
democratic)
technology,
more
were
the
and
primitive
discerned,
In the briefs presented
A similar theme, similarly questioning 'such sacred traditions as absolute
national sovereignty', was pressed by Bradley, a significant US general
(see Cox, p.225).
Schell (like Bradley) does not make it entirely clear whether he is
thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up.
So does the main thrust of what he says, e.g.
'Thus the peril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival"
but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide itself up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210),
as if the natural or original state were an
undivided one? On Schell's position, see further Appendix 1.
�55
for political arrangements such as representative government, the excessive size
and complexity of modern states was not envisaged.
But such systems continue to
operate, insufficiently questioned, though their justificatory bases
undermined.
present
Nuclear
representative
emphasized
have
problems
political
have
been
several other deficiencies in
arrangements.
particular,
In
they
have
revealed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident
will of the people on an issue, for instance in installing US missiles
European
Now that modern communications and information-processing
countries.
make it feasible to determine the mix of public positions on major
case for representative procedures is dissolved.
century
19th
issues,
a
issues.
The
reduced
power
excessive
back
at
developments,
issue-regulated
and
large
imposes
complex
other
modern
What
requirements.
by
states
government
recent
technological
Firstly,
smaller
initial
grouping
than
giant
states,
integration of groups by principles of federation.
as it is
to
informed
citizens
of
satisfactory
a
approximate
goodwill.
As
there are serious deficiencies in
the
information
in
present
progressive
and
procedure,
depends
control,
nation-states,
even
and
release
the
distribution
information,
channels, and so forth.
acceptable
the
from
These
distortion
restrictive
of
most liberal of them (and
Again, especially with new and less
But there are
evidently vested interests which stand to benefit from the limited
of
upon
nuclear problems have again made patent,
systems, there is little excuse for this.
information
upward
Secondly, democracy, insofar
political
related deficiencies as regards education).
publicly
democratic
like many other social arrangements, appear to function better with
procedures,
flow
and
called for are smaller
are
groupings, information flow, communication and education.
and
major
on
governmental power to more participatory democratic forms, a route made
possible even in
expensive
least
of governments would, to that extent at
But the route down through
least, be reduced.
much
elected
way that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues) are not given an almost
free hand on every issue, but are required to answer
policy
the
It is past time
for more issue-controlled democratic procedures, where governments once
(in
some
in
of
data
features
in
have
availability
major communication
helped
in
making
present deliberately fostered pattern of nation-state
�56
confrontation, and in establishing the prisoner's
superstates
nuclear
are
often
seen
to
be
dilemma
type
the
situation
locked into (on which see, e.g.,
Hardin).
A central argument, arising from the nuclear fix, for
current
questioning
arrangements and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at
political
least), takes the following shape:e
Political arrangements should answer back to certain
in
justified
terms
doing
of
at
where
least
are
so.These requirements include such things as
enabling good and meaningful and moral lives for those
arrangements,
and
requirements
(as
certainly
in
who
under
operate
the
much of the West) the basic
material conditions for such lives are met.
*
Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have
these
requirements.
For
guarantee the prospect of
arrangements.
nation-states,
good
and
at least in the North, can no longer
meaningful
to
lives
their
yet there is a non-negligible probability that
person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged
a
under
those
such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way.
support
meet
A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before
its prime in a nuclear disaster;
many
to
ceased
state
to
Furthermore a
in
acquiesce
or
engaged in nuclear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.
Benn).
Therefore, nation-state arrangements have
should
be
not all) nation-states:
have
their
justification,
and
Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though
amended.
nation-states
forfeited
it is not only because of the
forfeited
their
mandate.
nuclear
Political
fix
that
some
obligations to such
states are correspondingly dissolved.
There is enough evidence that power-brokers who control
sight
of,
or
worse
have
lost
don't care about, the point of political arrangements, of
what justifies or is supposed to justify their states.
78.
states
This
applies
both
to
How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
underlying political theory.
Rawls,
for example,
puts it in familiar
contractual form:
that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage' (p.4). Mao puts it in a standard democratic way:
'since
the purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and their interests,
it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the government' (see Soo, p.68).
�57
more powerful states and to lesser states, both
claim
popular
to
a
put
value
higher
on
military situations:
sovereignty
they do on human
than
for copious evidence see
principles
the
just
of
warfare
repeatedly, as have many other principles.
violated
'nuclear
where
Kuper).
This
by Israel, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear
illustrated
already
some
have
more often, they act without it or
as
national
survival' (Schell's conclusion, p.210;
is
brokers
The situation has been reached
against the will of the people.
powers
where,
and
mandate
the
where
blatantly
been
have
Such states have forfeited
much of what claim they had to external respect or internal political obedience;
so, on other grounds, have many other states.
It could just be, of course, as is often
alternatives,
that have
or
been
insinuated,
though
effort
little
but
option of world government).
for
dismissed,
As
to
all
whether
little
opportunity
not
do
to
and
work,
appear
to
we
Down.
There
working towards the weakening
especially
on
the
alternatives
can
be
may
and
have
given
been
know very little about how humans
sufficient
give
organising and trying out alternative
Way
such
alternatives
But,
operate under substantially different arrangements.
accessible
expended
been
has
instance as lacking feasibility, it is difficult to be entirely
sure without taking the risk of being dogmatic;
deadlines
no
the range of alternatives or their features (except perhaps for the
researching
very
are
there
But alternatives there are,
no possibly better alternatives.
glimpsed,
that
to
time
arrangements,
even
again,
once
very far on
proceed
those
nuclear
of
the
more
be time to proceed a little way however, in
breakdown
of
the
larger
superunions, which are the immediate problem.
invalid to simply conclude that alternative political and
nuclear
states,
Thus it would be
social
arrangements,
theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do not presently
while
offer a part of the practical response to the nuclear fix.
But there is no need to insist upon a single-track Way Out of
dilemma
to
the
exclusion of all others:
quite the contrary.
the
nuclear
We can not only
afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches and embrace whatever
seems to be working or looks like helping, within recognised ethical (and other)
constraints;
indeed, given the urgency,
the
direness
of
the
situation,
we
�58
should
as
fairly catholic and not inflexibly committed to narrow methods, such
be
bogged
down
(and
very
on
arms
limitations
negotiations
should
methods
perservered
be
unrepresentative)
certainly
and
between main nuclear states.
made
attempts
and
with,
No-first-use declaration, a ban on weapons in space, etc.
But even such
to
e.g.
superstates,
the
from
concessions
significant
undemocratic
further
wring
jointly
a
signed
The direction of most
hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially
The political means of the Way Out are what they have
new.
larger
every
liberal
on
issue that has mattered:
humanitarian
or
been
from outside
state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from within or
and
it,
characteristically Bottom-Up
methods
are
considerations
familiar
alternatives
self-organising
furnishing
by
and
practically
virtually
upon
without
bypass
which
it,
Top-Down.
never
Such
but part of the more general, and very effective,
case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
but
supply,
which
can
almost
that
effectively and for
invariably
matter
be
obtained, where required, more
expensively
less
without
(and
them
their
monopolies).
In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions,
imposed,
or
frequently
The opposition to the
local
from
have
in, military solutions involving nuclear installations
acquiesced
and nuclear weapons.
that
neighbourhood
and
escalating
groups,
fix
nuclear
has
come
some of them now federated
across nations (so the direction is not really interstate).
These
have
groups
been successful in blocking some nuclear installations and establishing, for the
time
being,
against
movement
nuclear-free
some
nuclear
neighbourhoods.
equipment
The
patchwork
grass-roots
is strongest in Europe, which is - as the
movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a leading theatre, on US strategic
thinking,
for
a
limited
nuclear
war
not
touching
extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and American
Europe
will
make
it
a
safer
place:
American shores.
nuclear
installations
removed
installations
in
on the contrary it seems probable that
Europe will become much safer if the anti-nuclear movements
these
It is
succeed
and Europe rendered nuclear-free.
grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced.
in
having
The chances of
�59
What of the spectre of Soviet domination, military, ideological and
in
Except
case
the
Europe,
of
other?
where the inexcusable suppression of Eastern
Europe all too evidently persists, this is an obvious fabrication.
Does
anyone
expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canada
seriously
or Brasil say?
And even in Western Europe the spectre is
failing
partly
giant
fashioned
financially
dominated
and
economically
politically and ideologically, by the USA.
ideologically,
dominated
propped
exaggerated,
up by the NATO powers'
and
some
in
and,
some measure,
Indeed much of the "free"
world
is
adequately
not
countered
military
by
The
means.
domination to which nuclear weapons are considered relevant
insofar
as
is
basic
any
in
mode of
But
military.
military, and associated political, domination of Western Europe by
the Soviets is a
problem,
there
are
several
ways
other
predominantly American nuclear weapons to mitigate it.
only local defence arrangements - whether top-down
alternative
is
it dominated economically, by the USA.
of
That is not generally considered so much of a problem (as it is?9), and
case
a
Since the last World War, Western Europe has been
military-industrial alliance.
increasingly
largely
and
much
methods
social
—
but
also
some
on
methods,
or
restructuring, such as
social
power
to
dispersed
local
more cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and
much
and
reliance
These should include not
state-supplied
decentralisation, regionalisation and devolution of
organisations,
than
Eastern Europe.
Part of the point of
whether
external
or
restructuring
internal,
so
is
especially
situations, is to
state-contrived
79.
break
make
military
any
takeover,
much more difficult and pointless, and the
restoration of local control easier.Part of
interchange,
to
the
point
of
cooperation
and
at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down
conditions
of
hostility
and
distrust
and
to
sabotage
the
West-East confrontations, and thereby to remove
For many peoples of the world, and in its impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppressive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast with austere Marxism-Leninism which would improve the lot of
some of the oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corporate capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
more individual rights and liberties. Certainly Marxism-Leninism which
appears to degenerate in practice to an authoritarian and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative.
It is fortunate, then, that we need
be saddled with neither:
there are superior options.
�60
other
expenditures.81
popular
and
for,
motives
Western
support
Europe,
for
for,
long
military
much
too
adventures
partial
to
and
military
adventures, should now be helping itself rather than relying on a leaky American
nuclear
umbrella
for its defence.
Moreover it ought to be, at the very least,
uncomfortable about the risks of catastrophically damaging
the
world
in
the
of
interests
its own security.
extensive
parts
of
Nor should other "nuclear
dependent" states be prepared to acquiesce in this not uncharacteristic European
imposition.
world, what
There
LSN
is
war
no
risks,
enormous
for
virtue
Western
in sacrificing other parts of the
Europe,
military-based domination to other parts of the world.
which
has
long
exported
There are better options
than dubious and risky nuclear shields for Europe.
80.
Thus, for example, to the extent that local defence groups are integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle that
surrender of the central directing section absolved the federated groups
from following suit or following further directions. That is, through
devolution of power,
surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or basic groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
would hold only limited information about the federated
units
it
integrated.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would merge
with local populations, would be trained in tactics of passive resistance,
sabotage,
(nonviolent) guerilla warfare, etc.
The net effect (as C.
Pigden, who made most of these points, argues) would be to make the cost of
military conquest, occupations and exploitation prohibitively high.
One reason why the Japanese Army High Command decided against invasion of
Australia in March 1942 was the character of Australians and the fact that
they 'would resist to the end' (Threats to Australia's Security, p.62).
Yet
the 1942 (war reduced) Australian population was substantially
untrained and unorganised for locally—based defence. With such a defence
restructuring, Australia would not only much reduce its vulnerability to
military adventures, but remove standard reasons for succumbing to threats
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.
81.
In particular, with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separate, are removed.
So too a main model supporting deterrence policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would be
further corroded.
In the same direction, it is important to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below the level of state trade deals, e.g.
in grain and gas,
to communication and cooperation between people. For such commercial deals
there is sufficient trust, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also at more significant people-to-people levels? Many
further sorts of interrelationship are feasible, and inexpensive by
military standards, e.g. sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gift projects.
If, for instance, 100,000 or more ordinary Americans were
living, working or holidaying in USSR (and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclear missiles into Russia (or vice
versa).
Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; on the contrary, a lot of resources have been expended
to encourage precisely the opposite attitudes, e.g.
as part of the
strategy of the "cold war".
�61
What the anti-nuclear movements must press
for
and disarmament (and, on the more
perceptive
transarmament,
to
conversion
i.e.
outer
of
edges
graduated
movements,
the
alternative social defence arrangements).
But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go,
through
in
in part it is what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction
broad outline:
way
clear
accordingly
is
namely
all
the
disarmament^^ to total nuclear disarmament,
unilateral
certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet's
surface,
including
especially
Europe.
For
once
state is demoted, its
the
importance and the necessity of its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance
on
decision-making
its
diminished
decision-making - once all that is
happen),
in
duly
of
favour
more localised control and
for
allowed
not
does
(it
need
to
major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the problem
one
of reduction or even loss of state sovereignty.
Maintenance of that sovereignty
has been assigned a mistaken importance, which in turn accounts for the mistaken
weight assigned to the arguments from national dangers.
What is
and
important
worth preserving is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
state.
The nation-state and dangers to it, and accompanying
features
such
as
misplaced nationalism, are the weakest links in the nuclear fix situation.
Once the demise of the sovereign nation-state is allowed for, the arguments
from
national
concerning
particular.
dangers
individual
also
and
group
rights
and
In
freedoms,
by
the
that
nation-state.
matter
The
are
82.
to
arguments
liberties
in
for
them,
as
smaller
exclusively
or
nation-state is neither sufficient for
are
disappearing,
nor
community arrangements can ensure them.
But
arguments from individual and group dangers remain, do they not?
risks
are
civil
necessarily
them, since in increasingly many states these liberties
necessary
place
their
None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.
None of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed
disintegrate.
individuals and groups remain:
To
be
sure,
that has always been so,83 and is not
The initial but important steps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Were deterrence really the policy there would be little case for more than
a fraction of present nuclear arsenals.
The steps to disarmament are
well-known, e.g.
the scrapping of obsolete weapons, and an end to
modernisation, the removal of nuclear weapons in crucial theatres such as
Europe, etc.
�62
being changed but only worsened in this age of
mostly
to
want
that
sure
be
or
other
outsiders.
People
their lives will continue to run their course,
ideally in a flourishing fashion, and will not be
Russians
nation-states.
nuclear
controlled
Americans
by
or
Nuclear arrangements which threaten their lives
are not a rational route to these ends.
In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way
as
dilemmas
the
out
of
deontic
such
fix and its subsidiary dilemmas, there are then much
nuclear
more important elements than features of the nation-state, namely some of
those
the state is supposed to safeguard, such as individual and local welfare
things
and autonomy;
weapons.
but those things are better ensured by
main reasons are familiar:
The
threaten the loss of basic values,
such
removal
the
nuclear
of
in particular, nuclear circumstances
as
and
welfare
autonomy,
many
for
creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general much greater than in
a nuclear-free situation (even should another
with
example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of
the
opportunity
remain
armed
There are also well-known supplementary reasons;
weapons).
nuclear
party
ideological
welfare
for
(because
costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the
accompanying security measures).
Thus
the
appropriately
devices
and
fix
nuclear
resolved,
it
can
deploy,
and
considerable reduction of state sovereignty.
how),
and
since
rate,
any
by
by
allowing
for
the
But, although that is a reasonable
Way Out, at little cost in the circumstances, it will be
practice,
at
theoretically
sovereignty of the state (especially as to what nuclear
limiting
weapons
is
strongly
resisted
in
those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the
auspices of the state.
This is a main reason why people must organise
and
act
against the state.
Again the resolution also looks practical enough, since
sovereignty
reduction
in
need apply essentially only to the the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons.
83.
the
Indeed
it
could
in
principle
be
obtained
by
negotiated
It will remain so under any satisfactory political arrangements.
Until
human social arrangements change substantially, there is no substitute for
on-going vigilance to ensure or maintain political liberty.
�63
agreement (at the top levels of state).
However
to
get
this
far
with
the
superstates, the limitations of state-power will likely have to proceed further:
for nuclear weaponry does not stand in splendid isolation.
into
both
concerned.
systems
military
and
(civil)
Rather
it
tied
is
industrial production of the states
So, unsurprisingly, practical-looking resolutions are being
solidly
resisted by superstates.
Accordingly more popular (bottom up) action against nuclear-involved states
especially
and
the superstates, after all the states causing the most
against
serious dilemmas, will have to be taken much further.
variety
of
organised
forms.
Once again it will take a
These include a refusal to contribute to nuclear
of
war preparation, either directly or
indirectly.
widely,
blockading of shipments of uranium, and the
from
such
steps
as
the
forms
The
action
range
refusal of supplies and services to sailors on nuclear ships and submarines,
to
withholding or redirection of taxes destined for nuclear security purposes.
the
They include as well the whole
nuclear
installations
and
range
of
nonviolent
facilities
protest
which
(methods
methods
against
do
exclude
not
incapacitation and decommissioning of equipment, and which do include new
model
resistance and defence organisations). 8**
It is important to realise that petitioning of
power
state
representatives
and
holders, for instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct
appeal, is far from a complete strategy, and may be ineffective or ignored,
the results discouraging.
and
This is one reason why popular action should be based
on a more comprehensive political
strategy,
which
also
involves
withdrawing
support from prevailing state arrangements, and working out and participating in
alternative arrangements, especially
alternative
defence
forms.Sufficient
details as to what to do are already known, enough to make an immediate start.
84.
For some impression of the range of methods, see again Sharp.
85.
For much more on all these points, see e.g.
further Appendix 2.
Martin.
As to what to do, see
�64
APPENDIX 1. ON THE FATE OF MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Schell, and to Anders.
A
series
of
nuclear
prophets
has
produced
a
series
of
philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war and the alleged implications of
human extinction.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
nuclear dilemma, down to metaphysical levels;
in this the series contrasts with
the transient superficialities of much of the political commentary.
The most
widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
slightest of the "prophets , Schell's The Fate of the Earth.
This skillful
piece of media—philosophy uncannily redeploys some of the apparently deep
phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and Anders can often be considered together. To criticise their assumptions is
not of course to belittle their work.
In particular, Schell's little book, for
all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect
in shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually,
severe
defects.
Some of it is simply garbage:
to select one example,
consider
the
claim
that
'without ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the
[human] species .... nothing else that we undertake together can make
any practical or moral sense ...
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate
moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally
neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues:
they don't cease to be so when
compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges
elsewhere, p.130). And the claim should also be junked on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rabbits in Australia a survivor
species,
unlikely to be exterminated under
presently
arranged
nuclear
holocausts.
1.
The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many of the
leading prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered
there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work (which might equally
well have been translated as The Fate of Mankind) comes out in entirely the
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophical attire
to
the
better-dead-than-red abomination.
A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being
red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans
a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but
total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity.
But Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention
is that there are circumstances where and principles for which a person or
group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such:
a
life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted
without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the
sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective)
way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a
possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain.
To this
extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to__ all
fallacy.
Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all
possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to
all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all:
that is not a possible route to life even.
�65
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes,
two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders:
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the
extinction assumption);
and
52.
In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality
and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).
It is applications of S2 which give Anders'
and Schell's work ^ some of its
apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications
of S2 depend essentially on SI. For without total extinction there will be
humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Granted the factual assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real
possibility; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct;^
granted the prospect of nuclear war does
threaten leading centres of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so SI
appears unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medical studies). Schell's argument to SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of
contracting the world to North America.
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civilization,
is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly
out of date. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
well from North to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schell's,
by Preddey and others,
indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisphere, New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa and Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.*'
Both Anders and Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" the
means of manufacturing nuclear bombs.
It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibility, would furnish a good medium for
unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theory of an earlier "high" technology). In virtue of S2, they would
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.
For a detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
of S2, see Foley JS.
3.
Thus the Last Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
urgency.
It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics
and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer
are out of the same technological Pandora's box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
4.
However, new modellings and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange,
the
immunity of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned.
In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence, has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
differences in temperature between south and north,
shifting normal wind
patterns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p.56).
Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many statesmen have an interest in minimizing
them.
�66
that the notion no longer made sense.
But what they seem to want to suggest
with the impossibility-of-unlearning message is the inevitability of the
development and eventual use of the technology - as if having learnt the means
all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of
choice. Certainly such views have been floated $.
But they are not tenable.
There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken
advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have
been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special
about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about
nuclear weapons, in particular that they do not allow "experiments . Even if
this were true - it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not tell
against the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the
limits to nuclear scientific work,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere with the observers and those outside the
"laboratories".
Again they have latched onto major points:
in particular, we
have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear
weapons in concert, e.g.
for more holistic effects such as fireballs or
firestorms, electromagnetic pulse or ozone destruction. Short of an LSN war,
and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested
and hypothetical in character.
The penetration of human chauvinism, as in S2, is not something peculiar to
Schell, but is a product of Western philosophy, European philosophy especially.
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders'
version of S2
being just one striking illustration(cf. AA
p.252ff.).
It has also deeply
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy,
and has
recently been extended
by
Wittgenstein's work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to
be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans!
Such are
alleged implications of
extinction;
but the
fact is that the truths of
arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of
gods or giraffes.
In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly
powerful and obnoxious Kantian form.
Thoughts and propositions, time and
tenses, history and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving
presence of human beings — past or future or merely potential humans are not
enough,
persons that are not humans are certainly not enough. Thus, according
to Schell (p.140, e.g.), '...
the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an
impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as tt is, we^ are not.
In
imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the
stream of human time,
...
'. The thought is however perfectly possible for
humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
rational creature may well be able to have it truly.
Schell erroneously denies
that:
there is no "later" '... outside the human tenses of past, present, and
future
...'
(p.140)6.
Human extinction eliminates 'the creature that divides
time into past, present and future':
so annihilation cannot
'come to pass'
(p.143).
But it is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tenses depend
on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but
not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other
times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location,
evident to
other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North
at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to
exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human
beings.
5.
Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a former US general, argues by straight induction, that if the US military
has a weapon it will use it.
6.
The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future
repeated elsewhere, e.g.
p.173.
(etc.)
is
�67
Anders' argument for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no longer
be even what has been', is also explicitly and narrowly verificationist:
'for
what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
if there is no one to remember the things that have been' (AA p.245). There
would still remain many sorts of difference;
for one, the history recorded in
many
other organisms would be different.
Temporal themes do not lack
'legitimacy because not registered [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification.
Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism
and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in
talking about what does not exist).
Thus,
for example, Schell takes over
dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to
imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are in fact still present as spectators" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good distance towards refuting the first.
In fact there is no great difficulty
in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud's claims.
The same goes for Schell's extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main
traditional strongholds, value theory:
'...
the simple and basic fact [sic!]
that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing
there must be life', human life (p.171).
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenched
philosophical
dogmas which have been exposed and criticised
elsewhere?.
Naturally some things will disappear with the extinction of humans:
trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
recreated), and thus no more human institutions,
human activities, human
emotions, and so forth. But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that there will accordingly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope,
no comfort, no sacrifice, no image, no song
For there are, and
may continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion,
struggles,
songs..........
Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to
pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless,
and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of
the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not
worthwhile.
Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from their shared assumptions SI and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both.
'The death of
mankind', under SI, is reckoned a 'second death', because by S2 and SI remaining
life is rendered meaningless and already 'seems to be dead' (AA p.244, S p.166)
and is already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a
person faces 'a second death', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
death of the species and all future generations (S p.166, p.115). However even
if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated,
because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of
preceding life and on the
very
questionable
representation
of
this
meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a solid metaphysical base.
From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an
absolute doesn't differ in degree, comes the universality of peril theme that
'we are all exposed to peril in the same degree', which is accordingly
'disguised' and 'difficult to recognise', because there is no contrast (AE p.64;
S p.150). This theme falls with SI.
In any event, not all peoples are equally
imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.
See, e.g., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics',
in Environmental
Philosophy (edited D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.
8.
Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.
argument
from
�68
rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe. Nor are all people
equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it;
as explained, the
position is different in different countries and places.
Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, an obnoxious theme,
which Schell (in contrast to Anders) repeatedly infiltrates. This is the Pogo
theme, according to which
S3. Responsibility for the present
nuclear
situation (fiasco,
really)
distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeruns as follows:
'...
the world's political leaders ...
though they now menace the earth with
nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
At
least,
this is true for democracies'
(pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated
elsewhere:
'... we are the authors of that extinction. (For the populations
of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of
the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anything about the danger)'
(p.152).
But this is more of an
argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and
unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention
those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely
foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points:
'...
we are
potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is that it makes of
all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions'
(p.152).
And
again '[as]
perpetrators
... we convey the steady message ...
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless;
that ...
it had been judged acceptable
for everyone to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign
against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as
is possible,
and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply
distribute onto them. Nor does responsibility - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone - fall on those who have done
less.
Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by
representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among
9.
An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is
responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version
of this no-responsibility theme is discussed shortly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for
reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going,
which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which
bear considerable responsibility, include the military weapons industry,
and research and academic communities. Under pressures for re-election
especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control
of political processes. The argument fails at its final stage. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus political
processes
tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of
political control.
10.
Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows:
'The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit' (p.186). Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
'the world
... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons'
(p.194):
the world?
This
connects
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals,
e.g.
for liberty,
for the (USA) nation,
and against
socialism.
In the course of this argument yet another fallacious
assumption is rolled out:
'The means to the end are not limited, for the
end itself sets the limits in each case' (p.189).
�69
many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which
offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter
may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility,
still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
every one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related
theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person (this theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes,
part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system,
etc.
(the whole earth
theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used,
unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scattered and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8),
Schell arrives at the
conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
political institutions more 'consonant with the global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.
At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Way Up.
Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come,
if not easily,
in a similar
simplistic way,
from the Top Down;
those who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations
(such as SALT) and in world government (as with the United Nations).
Given the
record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators,
it
is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology,
to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness,
to consider effective changes to
military-industrial organisation and ways of life.
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and,
more generally,
of the roots of war can be found elsewhere.*2 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of
nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies.
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the
arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial
feature is the drive for power and domination.^ Thus the push for [nuclear]
superiority by the super-states,
to be achieved through military-oriented
science and technology, which involves and enables domination, in several
interrelated forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the
high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base,
it is also important to alter key components of the state,
the nation-state;
and, more sweepingly,
to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements, namely patterns of domination, patterns
manifested not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
male-female
relations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations;
to remove, in short, chauvinistic relations. However not everything
and especially p.227, bottom paragraph.
11.
See p.225ff.
12.
In Anders and elaborated in Foley, and more straightforwardly,
in Martin.
The incomplete list of items given above, to be investigated in a deeper
analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164.
�70
needs to be accomplished at once;
and the cluster of damaging power and
domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of states.
In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states,
Schell repeats
the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast
between "raison d'etat and the Socratic—Christian ethics.
The teaching that
'the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times,
have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort'
(p.134).
So
'states
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival'.
Schell
then argues however,
that extinction nullifies end-means justification by
destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions.
Even if
all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends—means
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections:
instead it is
13.
These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated
package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge,
control, wealth,
energy, speed,
satisfaction,
...,
for the "newer" Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference—satisfaction for instance, or utility. And the
type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisation, of the virtues.
Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however,
into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisation of power, as with the
Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel
maximisation
of knowledge,
paradoxes of omniscience.
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
maximum consistency,
often taken to be the epitome of rationality, also
leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories,
such as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
theorems).
14.
R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also
drives the arms race. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
science.
have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix.
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out
of control,
that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those
who
control
them,
for they are simply caught up by this
out—of—control machine;
but sometimes the state itself is seen as a
machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like
other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists;
it was deliberated, funded and
promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging
technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitrant
technologies.
They also admit of being made to look
ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if
it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation.
�71
claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the
realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context,
those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its
nuclear policies.1$
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So even from an expediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe criticism, for example as motivationally irrational.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves
us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the
right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via
jealous nation states (p.188).
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having
sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
contends, necessary for people to organise for war. On the other side, without
war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty. Neither of these contentions is
transparently clear as they stand. The first is damaged by civil war and the
like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the
macro-state system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
particular)
to argue from the "realities" of international life, which include
self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred.
It is on this basis that peace
arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as
extremist (cf. p.185).
Schell's further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens, however, to
undermine his case against the sovereign state;
for example, his ends-means
argument and the argument based on its nuclear war-making capacity. Fortunately
the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous
characterisation of war as 'a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
(p.189):
but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is
right (so it is argued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different from
earlier conventional wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
which nuclear "war" does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends
(even if LSN wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
are won).
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness;
on one side being
defeated on a decision by arms. But in nuclear "war" this doesn't happen, 'no
one's strength fails until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just
wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional
wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme
that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between
nations, for the final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192-193). The theme
depends on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative
behaviour,
e.g. joint referenda). The theme also imports the social-Darwinian
assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were
thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for
winning,
surrender,
etc.) and rule-less activities. On the contrary, wars are
parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of
understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if not a logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war" but from what
is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic]
planning". The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
nuclear arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound,
15.
This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell's context.
�72
reasonable,
rational.
However this represents little more than a cheap
semantical trick.
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or
anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of decision
(as presented, e.g.,
in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning;
but it does not yield specific results without desirability measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes,
that is without values being pumped in,
extralogically.
There are various ways these value assignments may
be
determined,
to meet moral requirements or not;
but in nuclear strategic
planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency.In
fact,
'logic of'
tends to be used very generously,
as a word of general
commendation, to cover something like 'rational considerations entering into the
policy or strategy of'.
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing
with the term 'logic of', should write of 'the illogic of deterrence',
for he
emphasizes (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening
use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest
viewpoint)
of actually using them should the threat fail: 7 yet the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat
of
this
unjustifiable and irrational use.
Indeed Schell wants to go still further and
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
pp.201-2): but the argument depends
on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,18 along with the
assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well
be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
16.
Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that 'the logic of
deterrence' is based on eye—for—eye and tooth—for—tooth assumptions.
17.
Even the irrationality of the use has been contested, e.g.
it
wishfully
thought that America will rise like a phoenix
radioactive ashes.
has been
from the
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of the missing
motive for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive
one, but an ideological one:
eliminate the prospect of the future
dominance of the rival ideology.
18.
An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction;
although
involving negation they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of
intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proceed to LSN war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention
to proceed.
Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an
intention,
is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed
- how satisfactorily i& another matter - by a distinction between
longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing
contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.
�73
APPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility
and on Regional Strategies
What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what means one
has, as well as on what one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be.
So too what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is, on national as well as on moral considerations.
In
present circumstances states have an evident responsibility to work out their
policies.
There are however some persuasive arguments that this is where all
responsibility ends:
these major responsibilities accrue entirely to states,
and there is no individual, or (smaller scale) collective, responsibility to
work out a policy or stance on such matters as nuclear arrangements and still
less to act, perhaps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-responsibility or opt-out position no doubt suits many people - many for
themselves,
some (especially more authoritarian power-holders) on behalf of
others - it does involve inadmissibly opting out of moral responsibilities,
responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of
certain social arrangements.
Now there is no doubt that individuals and groups can do this, can opt out.
They can neglect their moral responsibilities;
but they are not justified in
doing so. Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person's
being set in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they
like it or not so long as they choose to live with others, there are some neat
arguments which appear to permit, or even warrant, opting out. One influential
argument takes the following lines:
1.
The (ordinary) individual,
or group, has no possibility of making a
difference to what happens. Therefore
2.
Such individuals,
or groups, have no obligation to try to make a
difference. Hence
3.
Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when
things go wrong.
There are two main assumptions in this argument, both of which should be
resisted:
firstly, in getting from 1 to 2, a variant of the "ought implies can"
themel, and secondly, the assumption that individuals can't make a difference.
While it is true that individuals cannot accomplish much on their own, together
they can. What an individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many
other individuals do.
In highly competitive communities,
full of hopeful
free-riders, a person may encounter a familiar impasse:
that he or she acts in
manner
M
(e.g.
morally,
against nuclear arrangements, rationally), at
considerable personal cost, with no guarantee that others will also act M-ly.
Such an impasse no longer faces so many in the West, at least as regards initial
steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in
ways that do make a difference.
An individual is not exonerated from
responsibility by the argument.
While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are
directed at making some difference, many individuals also have the option of
more individualistic action in such forms as boycotts, go slows,
political
disobedience.
An important form of individual resistance, already adopted in
Canada and north-western USA, is refusal to pay income taxes directed towards
defence
or various parts thereof (e.g.
nuclear weapons production and
deployment), or alternatively redirection of such taxes, for instance to peace
funds.
Evidently,
however,
all these more individualistic forms of political
activity work more effectively if individuals integrate their activities,
since
the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). As
well collective action helps in distributing the impact of retribution or
punitive action by state authorities.
1.
Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due
seriousness is bound
to reject this theme.
There are also independent
grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme:
see Routley and Plumwood.
�74
There are, furthermore, arguments of some weight that individuals are under
some sort of moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate
themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
action this is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether it is a nuclear power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilities,
etc.,
and on such complicating issues as what kind of preventive action the
state is likely to take in return.
(Any state seriously practising deterrence
is bound to take some action against effective protest,
or risk losing
credibility;
but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individual need bear.)
One argument - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
weapons to,
for example,
providing facilities for them - proceeds from the
wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is not right to be making the
weapons for such war.
The argument here applies connecting principles (like
those of §5), while appealing to such background information as that the
manufacture and deployment of such weapons increases the risk of such war. But
if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to disaffiliate themselves from such defence
production, and disaffiliation includes not paying for such production through
defence taxes .
The argument is not without substantive assumption, but the
assumptions appear morally reasonable and defensible.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be:
Does one want to be, or effectively to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destruction of human populations?
Or with making
credible a threat to do so, or the like?
What follows applies primarily to
people who do not want to be, or be seen as, such people.
Arguments like these not only put opt-outers and do-nothingers on the spot
insofar as
they contribute to national objectives;
they also raise questions,
perhaps even dilemmas, as to political obligation for those who would take
action,
even limited action such as redirection of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligations to the state, such as paying due taxes and supporting the
national defence effort?
It is usually assumed that there are. However, no
dilemma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligations to be
regulated in some fashion by moral obligations;
for in this case moral
obligations override political obligations.
In fact political obligations are
already significantly limited by moral constraints. The nuclear situation does
not so much bring out new limits on political obligation,
as emphasize the
respects in which those obligations are already limited, and introduce further
moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements.
An obligation to try ** to dissociate oneself from
preparation
for
nuclear
war or from nuclear-deterrence,
for instance by not spending part of one's
working life contributing indirectly to it, does not commit one to more than
this:
to an obligation, for example,
to work for an alternative national
defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this would be a good
thing to try to contribute towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
where one lives, the level of one's commitments, e.g.
to nonviolence, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorientation appropriate for
different nations and regions, but there are more superficial and deeper
reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, e.g.
schemes that leave
2.
An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthaussen of
support of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3.
This dilemma and option is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes apparently introduced to give
the state interest on gross earnings,
but obviously very effective in
removing taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferring
power from individuals to the state.
4.
Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little
more than try, without giving up one's work and thereby one's ability to
contribute to other deserving causes. For example,
it may be virtually
impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is
investing in projects which one opposes or ought to oppose, or both.
Seattle
in
�75
"conventional" warfare apparatus more or less intact,
schemes that change that.
and
deeper
(ecological)
The US Bishops, for example, present a rather shallow set of goals for a
superpower such as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and working
for better control of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
situation affords an important opportunity to press however for a much deeper
set of changes in the superstates.
For those whose very limited political
influence is exerted in considerably less powerful states, even the shallow
goals may look quite different:
there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
those of another power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to better
control.
The view from the very minor powers in the Antipodes is furthermore
different from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect in
much of the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and others).
There
is accordingly some obligation — an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
there in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local
and regional self-interest would also suggest substantial steps
towards
self-preservation that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
What is broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
Steps include withdrawal from the American alliance,
the goals are glimpsed.
which is in any case of questionable merit since its main advantages lie with
the US and it affords no guarantee of local defence;$ closure of American bases
and withdrawal of American access rights for nuclear—carrying equipment to
ports, air bases and other facilities, especially so as to remove local nuclear
targets; pursuit of a more evenhanded policy of nonalignment (something quite
small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve).
That much is easy, in
principle;
and justified.
It is justified because local commitment to the
American military operations in the region lacks a solid foundation;
it is
premissed primarily on the acceptance of deterrence, which,
so it has been
argued (in §5ff.),
lacks justification. That Australian commitment to joint
Australian—US facilities and to US military operations in the region is
explicitly based on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
statements of government policy. The joint facilities are 'part of a system of
deterrence'. &
More difficult to ensure, at least without much preparation, is that
economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Secondly, then, the building of increased socio-economic independence in the
Antipodes is required. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone
not worth targeting militarily:
the region must also have a sustainable life of
its own. For a small region, that looks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives;
for example,
in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand's economic independence.? For a larger region which included
Australia,
the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northern military budgets, and have the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive.
If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structural
readjustment were combined with the independently desirable aims of moving the
5.
See the discussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.140-1.
How slight
the commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
emphasized again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA.
Of course,
the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparatively minor
one, of the many military treaties that should be terminated:
from a
European and world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
arrangements, and the removal of American and Russian forces from Europe
(and elsewhere), are very much more important.
A fuller discussion of Australia's defence philosophy
will appear in a subsequent publication in this series.
and
alternatives,
�76
whole region towards a multi-cultural conserver society and perhaps even
diverting "defence" spending to connected self—management and social defence
goals, the costs would be very considerably lessened. They only appear so great
in the setting of a consumer-satellite society.
In any case, where life and
culture themselves are concerned, the costs do not appear excessive.
In sum, Southern countries should be severing their military linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers^,
and
should be preparing now,
socially and
economically, for the time after the LSN war, the great Northern war.
However
there are serious blockages in the way of such things in the Antipodes, and
indeed impeding any substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive again from the fact that present nuclear arrangements
favour many of the power holders and suit strong corporate interests which wield
political power.
But the main blockages to more popular action are sloganised
in the false dichotomy:
"either it won't happen or we're all dead anyway;
so
why bother".
One reason for blockage is then the extinction assumption (SI of
Appendix 1), the unwarranted adoption of which is excessively nihilistic.
A
more important reason is that most people, and most of their political
representatives, do not believe that major repercussions of LSN war are going to
befall them.
These are events which, like starvation and torture, happen to
other (remote) people, not them.
It is not that LSN war is unthinkable:
rather it is that it seems
unbelievable that it should make any difference. Most people in the Antipodes
really do not believe that their lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear
war.
Waking up and mobilising these people is a major part of the problem in
6.
See the letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Minister, replying to a symposium on
consequences of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, 1983. The
point is also made by the Foreign Minister in his Evatt Memorial Lecture,
as Hawke notes.
The point is softened by representing the facilities as
also having a role in verification, as well as deterrence, 'that makes arms
control and reduction feasible':
the known role of the facilities in war
fighting is not alluded to, and nor is the fact that any verification role
can be alternatively accomplished using satellites. However the matter is
not in any doubt:
'successive Australian governments ...
have taken the
view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the
United States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence;
quoted in Threats to Australia's Security, p.17).
Government representatives (e.g. Hawke) concede that the joint facilities
put Australia at nuclear risk.
'However it is the judgement of this
Government that the benefits to Australia in terms of its immediate
interest and global strategic consideration outweigh potential risks'. A
proper decision-theoretic analysis would not support Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclear target because of American bases (cf.
Ball, pp.130-8),
the potential risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-negligible probability far outweigh any immediate benefits.
Since
Australia has only a regional strategic role,
the global strategic
considerations are, as could be otherwise inferred, primarily those of the
main user of the facilities, the USA. The Government is prepared to put
Australia,
its peoples and ecosystems, at what is decidedly serious risk
for immediate and American interests.
A
worthwhile
representative
government does not hold its peoples hostage for such reasons. Not only is
that short-sighted expediency decision making:
it seems virtually certain
that the details of the decision making, were they ever revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, but
would turn on such things as present trade advantages and short-term
commercial considerations.
7.
As to the economic and social problems Australia would face in the event of
an LSN war, see Coombs for a preliminary assessment.
8.
Ideally the removal of significant nuclear targets should take place across
the whole Southern Hemisphere, because this is the zone that is relatively
insulated, atmospherically, from the Northern Hemisphere.
�77
achieving requisite social and political adjustment.
Even those who believe
that LSN war is not improbable (but may well not be totally destructive of life)
do little to reorganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessment.
Richard Routley*
9.
Again, for some of what to do,
for
some
ways
to
reorganise,
see
e.g.
Martin.
There is also much intellectual work to be undertaken, for
example, searching out details of alternative arrangements, and also
discrediting establishment experts, especially economists and political
scientists, who intellectually underwrite present nuclear arrangements.
*
The text has been much improved as a result of detailed comments by C.
Pigden, R.
Goodin, N.
Griffin, B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
correspondence with G.
Foley.
J.
Norman has helped in its final
organisation.
The initial outlines of the paper were worked out in
Victoria, Canada;
and an early version was read at Simon Fraser University
in 1982.
�78
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���n
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Discussion Papers
in environmental philosophy
Philosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600.
NUMBER 5
WAR AND PEACE
Zgt
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
<
RICHARD ROUTLEY
FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
I
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR
AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
by
R. Routley
Number 5
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1984
INTRODUCTION.
Virtually all the philosophical literature on nuclear war is written from
either a superpower (predominantly American) or else European (mainly German,
British or French) viewpoint.
This article,
after connecting in initial
sections with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different Antipodean
stance.
Such regional perspectives, while the should not affect
the morality
of the matter, are highly politically relevant.
Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the
USA, also fails the test of morality.
It is concerned only or primarily with
what is good or "rational" or prudential for Americans, or for the American
state,
to do - whereas morality is independent of place, race, nationality and
the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the
resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously.
It
concludes, among other things, that the American and Russian states have no
moral business putting nonaligned peoples at such grave risk as present nuclear
arrangements involve.
CONTENTS AND OUTLINE: Italicised headings §3-§8 indicate the main
structure of the argument
Page No
§0.
Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wars, and new moral
issues. Large-scale (LSN) vs limited nuclear wars, the focus on the
former, but the implications for the latter.
§1. How nuclear wars differ from other wars; wars and states, and the
resulting limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
War characterised. The essential role of the state. New and different
features of nuclear wars.
§2. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations
to become entirely submerged in the context of war.
The ancient distinction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning
based on expediency. Arguments that war must be expediency-based refuted.
Morality does not have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency.
Utilitarianism and expediency distinguished. Limits to consensus:
supermen and superhawks. National interest and expediency assimilated.
Limits of state entitlement.
§3. The initial argument to the immorality of LSN wars.
One key argument, from the wrongness of killing noncombatants in mass, is
presented, assessed, and criticisms met. Arguments for the premisses of
the key argument elaborated.
§4. Arguments from historical requirements on just wars, the important
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
Arguments from just war requirements: discrimination, proportionality,
prospect of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral
positions. Arguments from environmental principles.
§5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: arguments to its immorality.
Deterrence seen as the only practical way to satisfy major desiderata:
prevention of war and maintenance of prudential values. Pure deterrence
not the policy. Deterrence as practiced has increased the probability of
nuclear war. The first argument to immorality of deterrence, from the
plausibility of probability of immorality. Further arguments through
deontic connecting principles: the probability linkage. Refuting the
counterargument from the success of deterrence. The way the onus of
1
2
5
11
14
17
Page No
proof falls on deterrence policy, which cannot meet evidential require
ments. The second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious
preparation for nuclear war. The general form of connecting principles;
separating out those that are correct. The third connecting principle:
the wrongness of serious threats of nuclear devastation. Criticism of
this principle leads to further connecting principles, through intention
and through commitment. Meeting counterarguments from utilitarianism.
Applying the connecting principles to argue to the immorality of
deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti-utilitarian
versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with deterrence.
§6. Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from national
dangers to nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of
nuclear dilemmas.
The arguments from nuclear blackmail and foreign domination, and from
risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial argument from basic rights and
fundamental values. The argument from isolated people to superstate
immorality. The superstate theme, and reasons for its appeal. The much
less persuasive dependent state theme. Challenging the assumptions of
the underlying relatiatory model.
§7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas - for aligned states and their
supporters.
Character of the nuclear fix. Subsidiary dilemmas: national security vs
freedom and democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features
of deontic dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-best escape from the
nuclear fix. The nuclear fix a fix of states' own making. Interconnections
between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangements.
§8. Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: initial political fall-out from the
ethical results.
The inevitability of limitations on national sovereignty. Interstate
and extrastate approaches. The Way Up and the Way Down of extrastate
approaches. Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case against it.
Failure of international agreements, especially on human rights and
genocide. Exclusion of nuclear deterrence under the Genocide Convention.
Need for the reexamination of current political arrangements imposed by
the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated political arrange
ments revealed by nuclear problems. Further arguments from the nuclear
fix for political reassessment. The weak link: the sovereign nation
state. Forfeiture of political obligation by many states. Alternative
political arrangements vs nuclear time horizons.
The multi-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main political
means lie outside state governmental apparatus. Laying the spectre of
ideological domination. Social restructuring and devolution of power.
Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty
go. Dissolving the arguments from national dangers. State resistance to
loss of power. Further lines of organised action against nuclear states.
Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to
Schell and Anders.
Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption.
Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro
pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death
dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of
responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole
earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality.
Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence.
ii
37
43
49
Page No
Appendix 2:
On matters of collective and individual responsibility
and on regional strategies.
Individual and state responsibility. Opt-out positions, and arguments
to them.
Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group cooperation.
Arguments to direct obligations of individuals to the nuclear
dissociation.
Limitations of rival political obligations.
Different policy reorganisation for different regions.
Shallower and
deeper goals.
The important opportunity for deeper reorganisation
afforded by nuclear dilemmas.
Obligations of those in the Antipodes:
what is required, and justified.
Social and economic reorganisation
in the Antipodes, and reducing costs involved.
Blockages to social
and political adjustment.
iii
73
ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE
AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT
Large-scale nuclear wars raise ethical questions not generated,
either
at
or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military encounters.This is at
all
bottom because of their projected effects, which are often
to
said
differ
so
those of even the largest conventional wars (the World Wars) as to yield a
from
difference in kind of war.
involve,
and
threatened
Certainly massive exchanges
such
as
nuclear
exchanges such as nuclear deterrence presupposes, are
neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of
Much
wars
just
wars.
new philosophical reflection and investigation is required, even if rather
well-tested and old-fashioned moral principles will
serve
as
initial
ethical
base.
Although nuclear wars are, thus
nonexistent
objects,
nuclear
wars
(extrapolated from a very limited
varieties.
In
far, only a decidedly
class
menacing
of
proper have several distinctive properties
nuclear
experience^)
and
come
in
several
particular, confined or limited nuclear wars, of which tactical
or strategic are subvarieties, contrast with Idrge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars)
1.
The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point
forcefully:
'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral
issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could
imagine:
we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God's]
work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows
has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position,
it differs
significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features
and, it is hoped,
in bringing out the logical structure of the argument
more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with
removal of the religious backdrop and its the associated unity-of-evil
theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL,
p.323:- Firstly,
peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with
it:
religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there
implied.
Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to
give it,
e.g.
sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence,
pornography can operate without it, etc.
It is a serious mistake to try to
heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading
(forms of violence) along with war as if they stood and fell together, e.g.
abortion and nuclear war.
Note that referencing, where not through an author's name, is by way of
acronym explained in the references at the end.
2.
an
The isolated, and unnecessary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very
end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear
wars proper will be very different and very much more horrifying.
Nuclear
wars proper,
though elements of uncomfortably adjacent possible worlds,
ought therefore to be confined to merely possible worlds. Enough of their
features we can appreciate without their being brought to actuality.
2
A large-scale nuclear
which need not however be unlimited 3.
explosion
war
it is
of large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region;
a function of two main parameters:
distribution.
war
strategic) nuclear
of
quantities
war
a
Such
quantity
markedly
differs
which
limited,
is
where
and
explosives,
(megatonnage
a
from
targets
to
are
and
explosive)
limited
assumption,
by
the
of
the
involves
(tactical
much
or
smaller
characteristically
circumscribed, for instance confined in principle to military installations in a
given
region.
Though
focus
the
in
what follows is upon LSN wars and their
prevention, limited nuclear wars are by no
a
separate
wars to LSN wars are high (given usual reasonable assumptions
second
strike,
since
issue,
a
is a prerequisite, and the probabilities of escalation of such
arsenal
nuclear
means
etc.).^
Because
of
these
of
follow-up
or
connections, much of the case made
against LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as will become evident.
§1.
How nuclear wars
resulting
differ
from
other
wars
wars:
and
party
and
limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war.
of war that has dominated much thinking, including strategic
two
states
(or
thinking,
the
A model
is
the
several person) game or, as a complication of that, the clan or
tribe battle3.
A picture of
war
thus
on
requirements
for
legitimate and just wars, which technological
reflection
advances have
traditional
now
theory
rendered
of
war,
emerged,
inappropriate
hardly
and
especially
sometimes
surprisingly,
as
a
result
inapplicable.
of
The
made no allowance for such
3.
Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially
the type of strike involved.
Though the sequence is important for the
moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it in no way alters the
immorality of LSN wars, as will emerge.
4.
'The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no
limits'
(PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars:
that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war,
and the risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by
straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive
undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LSN war by its probability given
a limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and
present communication arrangements,
the idea of a highly circumscribed
purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European
"theatre", is really a myth.
5.
There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of
prowess)
in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological
wars. Nuclear wars may be not just unsporting, in that no notice is given,
etc.,
they are also remote and impersonal, and differently unjust, in a
much deeper way.
3
phenomena as mass bombing of large cities, such as
with
Dresden
and
nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass
And
Tokyo.
occurred
bombing, adds further new dimensions.
Yet it is important for the argument
anchors,
retain
historical
were
accounted
unjust
war is essentially a matter of states and their control:
the Oxford English Dictionary account, war is 'hostile contention
armed
protagonists, antagonists or players;
of
contention
or
combat;
exchange is the actual experience.
but
other
are not literal, but transferred, metaphoric, etc.8
'war'
means
and
or
wrong.
to elaborate
by
means
of
forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties
in the same nation or state' for control of the state?;
noun
linkages
to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and
of when, and why, wars and military actions
Firstly,
to
always
a
function
of
senses
of
the
States are the
forces comprising armed soldiers are
the
and combat or forceful and typically violent
Thus wars are external or internal
states or their rule.
(civil),
Thus too wars have grown in
quantity and frequency as states have expanded, wars have changed as states have
transformed,
and
nuclear
war
has
emerged 'with
nuclear states.
theoretical way then to eliminate wars is to remove states:
An obvious
in short, wars
are
6.
There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term
'war', which was derived from a term meaning 'confusion'. In particular,
'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had
in living use any word properly meaning 'war'':
Oxford English Dictionary
(OED) on war.
7.
But of course there can be something quite analogous to war waged between
clans,
gangs, multinational firms,
even against Nature, and still more
metaphorically against poverty, etc. To this extent, a strict definition
of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structures
the argument will direct us to, has to extend beyond just the break-down of
nation-states .
8.
Into this category (since Nature is no nation)
falls the ubiquitous and
unwarranted war against Nature of modern times, which features just as
large in Marxism as in capitalism. As could have been guessed,
someone it was James - suggested channelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical
sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature.
James
proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a
war against Nature (see Wasserstrom,
p.12).
What it boiled down to,
however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in
that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil,
especially discipline,
but also service, devotion, physical fitness,
constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical
substitute for wars proper (in American ecotopian literature) is through
war games and other games of competitive cast.
Again specious arguments
enter for those bringing out the "best" in human males, etc.
4
an outcome of political and associated technological structure, and are
by
structure.
the
altering
state arrangements,
arrangements.
be
to
can thus be seen as a structural problem of
War
from
along
defective)
political organisation of states;
they are a
helps
these
This semantically based picture
situational fix, a structural malformation.
war
with
(otherwise
removed
arise
Wars
of
explain why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence
argument
devolves into an
war-makers,
against
against
In
states.
the
fact
(self-legitimised)
on
and
war-declarers
traditional theory, wars were
the
restricted to external wars, which were construed as
the
right
or
states
of
rulers (princes) to conduct for certain political purposes;
their
removed
the argument
was that private persons with grievances had access to the courts^, while states
did
not (wars were, so to speak, the international analogue of the law courts).
But this is itself a very statist conception of the legitimate
place
of
wars;
the semantics is not so restrictive and permits internal wars within states, for
example to end wars, injustice, etc.
Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention
a
basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or sets (axes)
of states, two-player external wars,
games,
competitive
could
be
won,
attentuated form for some "victors")
the World Wars.
agglomerations
surrounding
traditionally
firstly
for
massive
armed
like
wars,
such
exchanges
as
there may well be no winning
in
areas
Northern
the
of
very
hemisphere
countryside.
Thus,
and
the
secondly,
for
waste
laying
the
point
of
of
substantially
substantially
obliterated^,
(exercised
and
most
as
nothing
all
worse off than at the outset of the "play".
are
huge
war
seen, to settle serious interstate disputes, is removed:
another point of difference, the phenomenon of wars that
prepared
that
That assumption still held good (though in
With LSN wars it no longer holds;
is settled with main protagonists
players
It was assumed
An LSN war could involve destruction of all main Western metropolitan
strategy.
9.
to
main
Hence
elaborately
for, etc.), but which can never be pointfully fought;
Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes,
p.776,
top).
The
argument
presupposes rather a lot,
including a neat public/private
distinction. Put Aquinas's way,
it looks as if it could be readily
transferred into an argument for international government, or at least
effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be
one state!
5
hence the inevitable emphasis on pure deterrence.
and
the
other
elements of gamesmenship had a role in earlier wars, but it was
not pure deterrence.
military
to
Certainly, deterrence, bluff,
Lastly, traditional wars could be confined in
targets
and
military
principle
This feature is fundamental as
exchanges.
for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross
regards just wars;
ways
to
The special effects of
uninvolved parties sacrifice any pretension to morality.
nuclear explosives, especially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear
cannot
wars
be
legitimately
horrifying detail in popular sources
ozone
destruction,
These
confined.
shockwaves,
such
effects
gigantic fumigations
and
become
entirely
rapid
speed
include
pulses, fireball or firestorm
etc., etc.
As a result
of
these
of exchange, LSN wars will resemble
the
recent
tendency
submerged in the context of war.
of
moral
and expediency.
considerations
to
It is particularly important
in the case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the ancient
morality
radioactivity,
more than they resemble older-style wars.
The moral situation:
§2.
the
Schell)
electromagnetic
devastation, rogue bacteria and viruses, ...
compounded
as
special effects (presented in
distinction
between
What is done in war, especially for local or national
advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the
10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as involving annihilation or
extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while
not being entirely annihilated oneself:
the side that somehow "survives"
sufficiently to rebuild is said to "win".
But this is, at best, an
extremely tenuous sense of winning, which in any case neglects the medical
evidence concerning nuclear destruction.
Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must
reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear
war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of
pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective
medical intervention ...
(PL, p.313).
Moreover any such phoenix war is radically unjust, because of violation of
the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons
developed in the text.
Unfortunately as documented in Scheer,
significant officials who are
responsible for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived by Americans and
that a global nuclear war can actually be "won"!
They rely, among other
things, on an incredibly low, and unacceptable, redefinition of "winning".
11.
In practice they often were not,they drained limited economies, they layed
waste countryside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or
chemical warfare or modern mining), impoverishing inhabitants, etc.
6
latter is determined using the codes and conventions
Much
not to be done in war i^ done, for one (alleged) advantage or
ought
that
otherwise^.
or
war,
of
another, despite modern military codes and conventions and the like.
we
not
live
go
a rather barbarous age:
in
unremarked,
the
if
Militarily
the horrors of the twentieth century will
history
gets
written
that
(accurately)
is.
Furthermore military thinking and strategic planning tend (as Nagel explains) to
induce a certain moral numbing, so that a range
as
such
wiping
rural populations, become real possibilities, included in
out
calculations.
consequentialist
characteristically
based
on
is
that
strategic
Each
side
in a military encounter
reasont
The
expediency
only
disadvantages,
its
own
gains
and
own
its
planning
advantages
is
and
losses as a result of alternative possible
it ought, morally, to consider those of the other side(s) as
moves:
actions,
excluded
morally
of
well.
In
this way strategic planning displaces morality.
Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted
way,
a
no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without
limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of
etc.).
Such
the
classical
through
"bald
an
incremental
limit)
escalation
distinct
argument
terms.
from
an
that
the
It
would
And
(but
The
externally
will be broken by each player in turn for advantage.
an extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed.
the
argument
man" fallacy *3), that there can be no limit.
assumption is that any merely selected limit (as
enforced
force,
is the so-called "classic" view of Clausewicz, oft repeated.
Clausewicz tries to argue,
really
this
Thus too
follow
from
idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in
But it is not, though breaking off in the heat of war, or the
of a supposedly limited nuclear exchange, may be singularly improbable.
confusion
Nuclear
12.
For as Nagel contends (early on),
there are moral restrictions on the
conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither
arbitrary nor merely conventional, nor a matter of usefulness.
These
themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausewicz - a
theory outlined in Walzer.
13.
As one less hair doos not, at any stage, distinguish a bald man from a
hirsute man,
there are, starting from the hirsute end, no bald men. The
progressive escalation argument concerning war is an incremental argument
like the technical Sorites syllogisms, formalising the type of fallacious
argument which shows that one more straw never makes a heap.
The
fallacious escalation argument is part of the so-called "logic of war", for
more on which see the conclusion of Appendix 1.
7
wars thus appear decidedly Clausewiczian.
the
for
players
Still the argument
inconclusive;
is
can choose, at least in smaller calmer wars, not to escalate,
and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types of weapons, etc.^
A state engaged in war seldom sees itself as entirely bound by
of
morality:
it is taken to be mere prudence on the part of those attacked to
take account of the no-immoral-holds-barred approach they
from the other side.
especially
constraints
the question not only
as
to
may
encounter,
well
So each group potentially engaged in war faces
ought
it
what
do
to
in
permissible
morally
situations, but also both what it ought really do, and what it can morally do in
the morally flawed situations it finds itself.
not,
But the last question does
in that case, reduce to one of expediency.
There is no question, then, of morality giving or having
even
expediency,
For it is not as if shaky considerations of
involves.
give
bound
are
morality
theoretical
fact
is
that
miraculously
deliver
us
from
value
the
theory.
to
Expediency
fact,
but
that
local values - of self, family, clan, class, or nation - are
considerations.
proper characterisation, a
therefore,
much
universalizable
more
universal
fairness,
equitability and
principles,
justice.
distribution
value
of
and,
And morality thereby imposes, through
principles.
intersubstitutivity
certain
requirements
of
general
Expediency yields an unfair, inequitable
value system, one that subscribers would not adhere to if differently
placed
\
deep theoretical unsatisfactoriness of expediency, and associated strategic
thinking, also derives from this failure
evaluations
14.
remote
By contrast, morality requires, as a matter of its
resultant
The
takes
It assumes, or
what really count, and override or are to be maximized at the expense of
foreign
not
does
simply
narrowly-construed local advantage or power as what is valuable.
urges,
crucial
But the
morality and* expediency fall within the same,
both
equally shaky or equally solid, domain of value
or
to
to the firm ground of expediency when the chips are down, since often
way
enough such moral erosion does not occur in crisis situations.
even
to
circumstances such as the prospect of LSN war
extreme
under
way
give
to
of
interreplacement,
from
the
same
and results not holding when persons X and Y are interchanged under
As Walzer argues, p.24. An historical example is the era of genuinely
limited wars in Europe following the barbarism of the Thirty Years war.
8
For expediency does not elude
expediency assessments^.
it
deontic
presentation:
be presented as through such popular slogans as "local might is right",
can
or given tight formal
characterisation.
The
will
characterisation
normally
that of utilitarianism, except that utilities are only assigned to, or
resemble
are biassed in favour of, certain individuals.
However, theories of utility
not have to be positions of expediency if utility is not locally confined.
do
Thus
utilitarianism proper is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency;
meet intersubstitutivity requirements of morality;
can
it
it does not, unlike the
methods of war game theory, assign different weights to the
individual
utility
of (certain) Americans, as opposed to Russians, say.
are
There
especially,
deontologists
regarding war^.
which
differences,
between
or
justify, ugly strategies and practices as regards
to
some
render
to
seemed
enemy civilians, that deontological principles would not permit.
effect
and
utilitarians
serve to further complicate the moral picture
In particular, utilitarian approaches have
permissible,
morally
significant
however
utilitarians
this
But
is
would
reject the
description of practices permitted under their principles as 'ugly';
whereas an
to
already
in
aim
what
follows
since
partisanship,
is
to
avoid
meta-ethical
meta-ethical neutrality, though of course not
there
is
a
moral
partisanship,
neutrality.
to
achieve
And
morally
large area of consensus, or at least moral convergence, from which
argument can begin.
Virtually all positions
agree
that
obliteration
of
several major cities in a LSN war would be wrong, indeed morally outrageous.
If
the
there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to
feel
no qualms when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian
ones, simply increase the costs
involved,
up
to
loss
of
whole
nations
if
15.
The severe limitations of those lesser "virtues",
nationalism
and
patriotism, also come from the failure of replacement which excessive
applications of nationalism easily engender. Try for example swapping a
person from inside the homeland with one from outside as regards treatment.
The point of, and reasons for,
intersubstitutivity as a requirement of
morality,
is well explained in Hare, p.78ff. Hare applies the requirement
to make a telling case against nationalism (a case which extends to
strategic decision-theory).
Nationalism,
along with fanaticism, is the
main cause of war, so Hare contends, p.72.
16.
The case against expediency was developed in detail
especially the criticism of Thrasymachus in The Republic.
17.
Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare
the other, in Cohen et al.
by
Plato;
see
on
9
then try to work down
necessary, until moral repugnance ijs encountered;
The
again.
fact remains however that in the nuclear area things have got substantially
abandon
tended
Strategic thinking, in particular, has
out of perspective, morally.
to
suppress moral considerations (as indeed theories of the state also
or
do, sometimes flamboyantly, in favour of partisan values).
Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does
mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that
not
total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be
Consider
the
rising
world empire.
be
southern
(hemisphere)
no
advantage.
one's
strongman, SS, who has visions of
While the superpowers of the north remain, SS's dream can
realised.
Thus
his
best
strategy,
having
rid
submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try
nuclear
to
exchange
in
the
North.
There
be
would
waters
southern
to
encourage
a
hardly
of US
all-out
an
point then in securing
institutional arrangements so that potential SS's do not accumulate much
given
especially
the
apparent instability of crucial world arrangements.
that is to anticipate:
the present point is that (the fact of) moral
has
and
its
power,
limitations,
is
an
inadequate
But
consensus
constraint without accompanying
structural adjustments.
national
For, typically,
differently
to
impose
interest
is
taken
hostages
or
override
morality,
even
holding
civilian
populations
as
of those
those of Eastern Europe.
things.
substitution
of
justification;
fails
in
The
first,
expediency
classes
regimes,
But morally national interest can do neither
the
overriding
for
morality,
of
morality,
which
the second, the alleged moral dominance of
important
And,
killing millions in the national interest*8).
unfortunately, these assumptions are not confined to more totalitarian
such
or
irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary
ethical considerations (such as those concerning
nuclear
to
is
entirely
national
simply
lacks
the
moral
interests,
of cases, including, so the argument will go, the
case of LSN war.
18.
As Schell bluntly puts it, 'What is being claimed is that one or two
countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents
in the name of certain beliefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it
leaves room for ambiguity, since the beliefs may be morally grounded rather
than based on national interests.
10
States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis,
let
it
not
be
that
pretended
expediency (namely,
that
of
is
it
a moral basis as distinct from one of
There
egoism").
"group
but
moral
special
no
is
dispensation
for governments.
individuals:
there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or
analysis of obligation.
Morality works in the same way for groups as for
For example, what ought to be as regards X is (analysed
semantically) what would happen as regards X in all ideal worlds;
no
whether
difference
is
an
reasons
aside,
just
behaving
as
system, group or
individual
or
individual
States such as Israel (in its recent invasion
organisation.
extenuating
X
immorally
of
as brigands or mass
Certainly there are grounds on which states or their agents
conceded, special moral dispensations;
been
more than that and do not stand up to criticism.
cannot
furnish
two
(incompatible)
claimed,
have
but the excuses offered are no
A
moralities,
satisfactory
a
state
theory
moral
or public one and a
private or individual citizen one — state expediency and individual
morality
because this would lead to violations of substitutivity, neutrality, etc.
instance, a state operative X could use state
cover
morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g.
Y are permuted.
special
are,
Lebanon)
there is no moral difference.
killers:
or
makes
and it
to
considerations
citizen
*
For
Y
in
by state interests) when X and
A group or organisation or person can be
derivative
damage
19
bound
of
course
by
in virtue of role, but these are derivative
principles - good for any such institution - which fit within and answer back to
general
moral principles.
So it is also with a state which is an institutional
arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some
least)
of
its
citizens:
its
charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly
moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency.
particular,
a
survival.
In
state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its
own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even
own
(at
for
its
Thus it is not entitled to do what both nuclear war and nuclear
deterrence require, as will emerge.
19.
There are also other arguments against two (or
see Routley and Plumwood.
multiple)
morality
lines:
11
§3.
The initial argument
pacifism
yield
arguments
to
the
immorality
of
to
the
immorality
of war.
controversial in an area where there is no
LSN
for
But such arguments are
be
to
reason
good
Arguments
wars.
controversial.
Pacifism can accordingly be set aside as a special case, since the immorality of
LSN wars follows.
All but pacifist positions concede that war in itself is not a crime.
all
wars are immoral, though even inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior
Among more or less admissible
ways of settling political issues between states.
wars
who
Not
are
the international "tournaments" of aristocratic young men or warriors
volunteer
as
and
soldiers
action
whose
not
does
spill
over
onto
noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, where few or even no combatants
were killed in war.
conscription,
Since the establishment
press-gangs
and
recruitment
of
such
of
the
largely ceased to take these less offensive forms;
induction
practices
as
near-destitute, wars have
modern massive wars are
far
removed from the ideal war-tournament types (which feature now only in ecotopian
portrayals, in ways that are increasingly dubious).
immoral,
sorts
Most
of
wars
are
because of what is done to the essentially uninvolved, but few to such
an extent as LSN wars.
The first argument to the
immorality
of
LSN
and
wars
sufficiently
of
large-scale wars generally, takes the following form:
Pl.
The (deliberate) killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong.
P2.
LSN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants.
P3.
What involves what is wrong is wrong.
- (KA)
LSN wars are wrong.
The particular argument given is just one representative of a set
of
this
type.
taken
off
killing:
the
on
(KA)
replaces
But the
quite
'killing
sufficiently
evil.
creatures'.
can
Thus
a
first
in mass of noncombatants' by a suitable
clause concerning 'huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or
involved
focus
destruction of lifestyle of nonhumans and humans
alike that an LSN war will bring is
variation
arguments
Characteristically, in Western culture, it is thought that mass
killing of humans is about the worst thing that can happen.
be
of
not
directly
Other variations will emerge in the discussion (including
that where the bracketed 'deliberate' figures).
but
The argument is valid,
attacked)
on
the
of
basis
be
may
attacked
(and
of its premisses.
each
has
in
effect
been
Let us consider these in
reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves "what
is wrong" is wrong, has been challenged on rather Scholastic grounds. There are,
in particular, problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments,
purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing.
assisting an injured robbed person is said
robbed;
but, since the robbing is wrong,
"involve"
to
providing
For
which
instance,
that person's
assistance
being
is also wrong.
But these problems derive from too slack a notion of involvement; with a tighter
account of involvement the problems disappear and P3 stands.
As against P2, it may
legitimately
directed
be
argued
against
that
military
nuclear
targets.
20
can
wars
be
encounters
But given the character of
There is
nuclear weapons, LSN wars could in no way be confined to such targets.
not
merely
the likelihood that many missiles explode off target, there are all
the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings.
fallout
down-wind
from
military
people, especially in the case of
targets
US
and
For example, the radioactive
will affect large concentrations of
European
targets,
and
may
affect
uninvolved countries such as Canada.
There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties
by
appeal
effect)21.
to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side
if missiles were characteristically
reliably
on
target,
and
one
20.
The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of
obligation over entailment" principle, can be removed by a tighter
involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment.
For
details see Routley and Plumwood, where Good Samaritan problems are
diagnosed.
21.
According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are
responsible
only
for the intended effects or consequences of our
freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences,
even if these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended
consequences.
Unless carefully hedged, the doctrine is
pernicious,
allowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility
for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme
command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under
double effect, have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American
and Canadian cities!
Taking the issues concerning double effect to a more
satisfactory
conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly
distinguished acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions.
13
which was
intended
unfortunately
went
only
off
to
destroy
an
underground
unmanned
course and destroyed a large city, it could be claimed
that the (unintended) mass destruction is legitimised under
principle.
a
make
Nonetheless
effect
double
the
circumstances
difference, for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible
for firing the missile, since it was not as if they had
deliberately
aimed
at
The double effect principle conflates [diminution of] responsibility
city.
the
the
the action would be wrong, and the
Such claims should be rejected:
wrongness not lessened by the given intention.
could
silo
missile
assigned for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act.
As against Pl, and as regards the middle term of
argued
that there is an important equivocation.
While it will
the bracketed term, 'deliberate'.
killing
and
Pl
P2,
may
it
be
The equivocation is induced by
conceded
be
that
deliberate
of genuine innocents is impermissible, two challenges will be made.
It
will be charged firstly that noncombatants, insofar as they are distinguishable,
are
no means all innocent, many being directly involved in military effort,
by
whether just as taxpayers or as suppliers of
military,
e.g.
farmers
or
goods
or
services
bootmakers or entertainers.
as
innocent.
The
second
defensible — version of premiss P2.
and
for
other
reasons,
it
properly
point concerns a much narrower - and less
Because P2 so amended is
is best to leave out the
less
defensible,
"modifier" 'deliberate'.
What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is
not
a
mixture
that with the motives of the perpetrators.
of
require
the
qualification
'deliberate'
or
done,
So 'deliberate'
gets left out, equivocation is avoided, P2 stands, and so does Pl.
not
the
Secondly, it will be
contended that LSN wars do not involve the deliberate killing of those
excluded
by
used
For Pl
does
'intentional' or the like.22
Admittedly also 'noncombatant' is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and
there
is
noserious
people who are
is,
moreover,
problem
in
marking out a class of
notdirectly involved in the command and action
no need
to
adopt the practice, deriving
stating an initialversion of Pl in terms of innocents -
22.
clear noncombatants,
at
chains.
There
from Catholicism, of
least as problematic
Despite Nagel's suggestion that it does (p.158).
The suggestion depends
upon similar mistaken assimilations, of act with intention, and wrongness
with responsibility, to those of the double effect doctrine.
14
a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then
endeavouring
to make the difficult transition to noncombatants.
Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met,
are
arguments
the
for
there
premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pl
they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort
and
tend
will
For example, one argument for
vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory.
Pl, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one,
(to
seriously
understate
point)
the
doing
to
that
fails to treat them with the
so
minimal respect owed to them as persons 2 3.
§4.
Arguments
from
historical
requirements
on
just
argument from convergence, and environmental arguments.
wars,
The conclusion that LSN
wars cannot be justly waged - and accordingly are unjustified something
dreamed
up
by
contemporary
"free-enterprise" capitalist state (and
opponents
communist
important
the
of
is
America
inspired,
merely
not
or
the
of
The
etc).
same
conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked out in medieval
times, for just wars.
One of the requirements gives but a variant on the
first
argument (KA). 2** For a necessary condition for fighting a war justly was that it
not be the case that large numbers of [innocent] noncombatants are bound
killed (cf.
to
be
Barnes, p.775).
A just war requires just means, that the war should be
means,
fought
by
morally
which
implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate
killing of noncombatants.
The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle
legitimate
of
discrimination
(between combatants and others) which 'prohibits all actions
directly intended to take the lives of
p.312)
25
.
civilians
and
of
noncombatants'
(PL,
LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate
this requirement 2 6.
23.
Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from the military
angle in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants.
One
favored argument is a variation on the Bald Man:
there is no clear line
between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there
are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g.
in
carrying or using arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of
their harmfulness, the threat they offer.
See also PL,
p.312, where a
simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied.
24.
Note that throughout, the text adopts the OED equations, reflecting common
usage,
of just with morally right or correct, and unjust with morally
15
Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of
being that of net evil to net good:
proportion
proportionality ,
'the damage to be inflicted and
costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected
up
arms'
(PL,
requirement:
the damage and costs,
to
goods
moral
proportionality requirement is
of
the
achieved
nationally
not
that
in
doctrine
through war.
"improvement"
are
which
way.
overall
consequences
of
war
conditions
way
bad,
(Barnes, p.782).
'a nation wages war
justly
the
than
Similarly
only
if
the
for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent
chance of being better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20).
no
and
According to the first, 'X wages war
abstaining from war'
improvement "puts wrongs to rights":
are
Entangled with the
"ameliorative"
of
confined,
justly upon Y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less
the
taking
by
p.312).2? It is not difficult to see that LSN wars violate this
disproportionate
criterion
the
satisfy
LSN wars can
in
these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such
wars reveal.
Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are also
wars,
for
example
that
of
infringed
reasonable expectation of success.
by
LSN
It seems that
there can be no reasonable expectation of state success in an LSN war - whatever
the
very
differently,
exchanges.
limited
prospects
of
success
for
some
whatever the prospects of success in
What
small
strictly
state
limited
elite,
or
nuclear
is less clearcut is the question of whether LSN wars conflict
with the requirements of just cause or due fault, and of right
intention.
For
25.
The principle can be argued to in various ways.
One (by no means
conclusive) way is Nagel's way, from the requirements of directness and
relevance in combat, the underlying (controversial) principle being that,
'whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as
a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15).
26.
The situation with strictly limited nuclear wars where the targets are
essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed
"indirectly",would be different.
Such wars are not however excused by the
pernicious doctrine of double effect.
For such wars remain unjust on
several counts, e.g.
they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g.
on life
systems,
etc.
As Zuckermann says,
'It is still inevitable that were
military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of
nuclear attack, millions,
even tens of millions of civilians would be
killed ...' (quoted in Thompson and Smith,
p.14, where the italics are
added).
27.
This is not to be confused with what is very different, the vicious ancient
doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so
on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest official policy of
flexible response, adjusted to the level of attack.
16
this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are
seen
as
basic human rights and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can
While the mainstream position
be ideologically justified.
theory
medieval
opposed to ideologically justified wars and "humanitarian" wars, these were
was
not definitively excluded by the traditional theory (cf.
is
of
merit,
little
when
(and
issues will arise again subsequently).
historical requirements
are
arguments
not
do
simply
not
There
in puzzling over dubiously effective requirements,
however,
when so many are decisive against LSN wars
sensitive
Barnes, p.778).
commit
arguments
any
from
matters
the
underlying
Finally, these arguments from
prescriptive
fallacy;
historical
authority
for
to
the
moral
conclusions, but use also premisses to the effect that the requirements imposed,
and sometimes applied, were justified.
As they are.
In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the
moral
rightness
justness of wars, the just war theory and a rival pacifist
or
strand, prominent in early Christianity, but largely submerged from Augustine on
contemporary
until
times.
Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they
are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and
This
is
the
beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars:
that
is
duly
expediency
such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once
removed
(and
even,
very
frequently, when it is not).
however you look at it morally.
consensus
violence^^.
involve
argument;
it
The argument is not
proceeds
They are morally wrong
the
same
as
the
weaker
from similar results from the full sweep of
genuinely ethical positions, not from massive agreement of opinion.
The detailed convergence argument is an exhaustive case by case
each
type
of
moral
theory.
Fortunately
details
can
be
deontological and contractual theories lead back to requirements
28.
one,
from
shortcut.
For
for
just
war
These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear.
For
the aim of just war theory is not 'to legitimize war but to prevent it.
The presumption is against the use of force' (PL, p.312). And most types
of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent
revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction
between the alternatives.
In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at
least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may
be condemned 'the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of
lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims'
(PL, p.311).
Under recent international law, defence, narrowly construed, is the only
legitimate basis for war;
Roman law was only slightly more generous,
in
allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780).
17
which, it has already been shown, LSN wars violate.
war
arrived
sometimes
were
defended through principles of such moral
or
at
In fact conditions for just
work
theories, so that a good deal of the requisite argumentative
been
The latter point holds also as regards utilitarianism, where it has
done.
in effect been shown that whatever brand of utilitarianism is
maximisation
utility
already
has
is
finally
LSN
accomplished,
adopted,
wars
however
excluded
are
utilitarian grounds.The reason for such convergence is not far to seek;
LSN
such massive infliction of pain and colossal removal of pleasure,
involve
wars
on
that this dominates in assessments however they are accomplished in
utilitarian
Thus any genuine alternative to LSN war is better30.
fashion.
The arguments
so
moral
overwhelming
far
case
outlined
against
principles
are
derivable
some
from
war
worse
substantially
are
of the theories just considered).
These
the obligation to maintain
to
accountable,
condition
than
the
these
we
violate
would
earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems:
we
exhaust
not
(again
LSN
principles include environmental ones, such as:
generations, to whom
do
wars
For there are other significant
wars.
such
moral principles which the waging of an
LSN
against
the
the responsibility to future
the
world
it".
Such
"pass
"received
on"
not
in
conservative
bound
principles - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are
to
be violated in the event of an LSN war.
§5.
The shift to nuclear deterrence:
support
nuclear
arguments to its immorality.
Those
arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating,
certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars,
engagement
done is, it is claimed, quite different from
is
most
important
precisely
in
preventing
LSN
in
such
war:
is
continued,
deterrence
is
the
only
practical
desiderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values.
way
indeed
wars from ever
occurring, as well as in maintaining other fundamental Western values.
it
by
What is being
pointing out that there is no actual engagement in any such wars.
deterrence
who
Indeed,
of obtaining both
Similar arguments
are
But compare Hardin.
29.
For details see, e.g., Lackey, especially MM.
30.
An argument of this sort is developed in more detail,
complete generality, in Goodin, especially 'Disarmament'.
though
not
in
18
advanced for all the various guises that deterrence is presented
in:
mutually
assured destruction as formerly, flexible response as latterly, or otherwise.
Such claims as to the roles and
dubious,
several
for
reasons.
objectives
of
If it were, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal.
superiority.
than
this,
and
sometimes
goal.
In fact there has
renewed
a
even
military
drive
for
Pure deterrence can account neither for actual nuclear weapons nor
for orthodox Western military strategy32.
process
decidedly
A first reason is that there is much evidence,
despite pronouncements, that deterrence is not the - the only -
been a quest for more
are
deterrence
Nor has deterrence set in motion
the
of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels appropriate
f<?r deterrence.
On the contrary, under "its"
impulse
there
has
been
almost
unlimited acceleration in building arms (to paraphrase PL p.318).
Another major reason for serious doubt about what
sold
31.
is
being
under "deterrence" labels concerns the probability factor:
marketed
and
deterrence has
It is important to observe that the discussion is not restricted to one
form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but
applies to all forms of response likely to engender LSN war. This includes
"flexible response",
since the likely further development is massive
retaliation to an initial Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for this
is the extreme vulnerability of the US defence systems, especially the
communication systems, e.g.
to early strikes and to electromagnetic
pulses.
In the resulting great confusion, escalation appears the likely
outcome. In any case, flexible response includes massive retaliations, as
part of its range and is ultimately backed by it.
It is also important to observe that deterrence as practised is not
confined to responses to (nuclear) attack. The threat of nuclear action
has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a
nuclear power.
It is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses
to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of
deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does.
32.
As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive
for superiority (often represented as "negotiating" strength) but the
matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the
second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular
intervention in other nations;
there have been repeated US threats to use
nuclear weapons,
especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the
third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war;
and in official
military strategy no sharp line has been drawn between conventional and
nuclear weapons:
on these and other related points see further Lackey MM,
p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith.
The argument can be pressed
further, to the alarming conclusion that deterrence is largely a front,
which plays only a minor,
but justificatory, role in actual US policy.
Among further evidence is behavioural data:
a government with a genuine
deterrence policy would repeatedly emphasize its strength (even when it
lacks strength), whereas the US government often parades its vulnerability
and weakness in public. For other evidence see Smith, e.g.
p.46ff.
19
of
increased the probability
type
arms-race
that
war.
LSN
deterrence
precisely,
More
of
the
is being practised, which involves full-scale preparation
for total nuclear war, has prepared the conditions for nuclear war to occur, and
has
to
that
extent
reasons also, connected with pure
the last 30 years.
deterrence
with
and
(its
war"
"cold
the
probability of a LSN war has increased considerably in
the
setting),
original
For other
least enhanced its prospects of occurring.
at
The reasons include the threatening posture
called
for
by
deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated
to maintain credibility
overridden
or
with
"sacrificed
a
for
etc.
many
there
analysts
century, i.e
think
before 2000.
real
The situation has
is
a
high
There are several
are
interests
being
the dangerous and risky
military objectives!
state of military readiness;
sober
whose
population
now
where
reached
been
probability of an LSN war this
routes
to
a
such
probability
assignment.33 It would only require one incident with a 20% chance of leading to
an escalating war every 8 years between 1960 and
2000.
alerts,
Cuban missile crisis, carry a considerably higher chance
been
have
lucky
already.
In
of
nuclear
For
markedly.
the years ahead it appears likely that the
the
danger
supplicant
nations
resources declines.
and
the
worsens
and
the
extent
The danger is enhanced by
connected
increasing
chance
of
the
lot.
33.
Cox).
easily
as
the
plight
extractable
continuation
of
of
crucial
the
arms
of nuclear accident and human or
technical error, none of them negligible factors as
(cf.
increase
zones separating the superstates are increasing in
size and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and
reveals
the
exchange.
number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war will
race,
on
side alone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes, as with the
American
We
Full
past
experience
copiously
Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a
Even so every substantial point involved can be contested,
and
many
are
Another route to a more than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi
methods:
weigh up the experts' assessments.
In this regard it is worth
noting that it is not only "nuclear doves" who consider the probability of
nuclear war has increased in recent years.
American officials have themselves admitted that the policies of
realising the strategic potential of counterforce attacks and of
selective and flexible responses have increased the probability
of nuclear war (Ball, p.128).
20
For better
contentious (though not always for good reasons).
way
no
seems
worse,
or
there
to make such an overall probability argument particularly tight;
and there are plausible arguments, from the complexity of the data concerned and
the contingency of the future, that it cannot be made tight.
It is bad enough however that it is decidedly plausible that it
that
probable
LSN
an
war
distribution principles) that it
probable
that
century.
And that is enough
grossly
a
is
immoral
to
decidedly
morally
on moral grounds, to change deterrence as
policy
is
immoral.
that
plausible
it
highly
is
sequence of events will be perpetrated this
evasive
warrant
morally to take action to avert the outcome.
deterrence
highly
For then it follows (by
occur this century.
will
is
action.
ought
We
That in turn implies taking steps,
presently
practised.
Thus
present
That is but the first of several ways we shall
arrive at that damaging conclusion for present super-state deterrence policies.
The plausibility of claims as to the high or increasing probability of
war has of course been disputed.
*
The main counterargument runs as follows:
Nuclear war is unlikely, because the consequences are too horrifying.
The underlying assumption is that wars and the like, with
are
LSN
improbable.
assumption.
Unfortunately
however
horrifying
outcomes,
much available evidence counters this
More than enough humans have not shrunk from brutal
exchanges
horrifying wars, or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf.
Kuper).
What is less assailable than the high probability claim, what the
certainly
have
already
got
into
since
LSN
thereby perhaps helping to bring it about, in the sense
war,
the probability.
immoral
of
raising
The more detailed underlying arguments, then,to the immorality
of nuclear deterrence proceed by
LSN
an
deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for
situation,
against
evidence
seems to support, is that there is a non-negligible probability of an
Thereby, through deterrence, we
LSN war.
and
way
of
principles
mapping
war into arguments against deterrence of LSN war
might appropriately be called deontic
connecting
principles
moral
arguments
Such principles
The
first
of
these principles takes the following preliminary form:
Cl.
should
If it is wrong that X should occur, then not only
be
probable
is
it
wrong
that
it
that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly
21
increase the probability that X occur.
Thus, for
example,
it
since
wrong
is
to
kill
large
a
noncombatant
population in LSN war (by §4) it is also wrong to put the population at risk and
wrong to increase the chance that the hostage population is wiped out,
which
both
of
For similar reasons a superstate is not morally
nuclear deterrence does.
entitled to impose nuclear risks upon uninvolved noncombatants, especially those
of third party nonaligned states.
most
Like
situations.
defeat by
example,
substantive
moral
Unless
counterexamples,
X
that
in
and
of
accordingly,
Cl
encounters
to
into
runs
require
dilemma
For
complication.
apparent trouble where clash of
order
to
that
the
passenger
he
plane
is
flying
sure that the troubled aircraft does not hit city
make
Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of
where
deterrence,
Consider for example the
to avoid a greater evil.
occurs
apartment buildings 3**.
nuclear
Cl
dilemmas are duly allowed for, Cl appears liable to
pilot who increases the probability
crashes,
ethics,
in
Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the
principles occurs.
probability
part
second
the
principles
(though
there
explains) wrongness of a practice is not
is
a
offset
or
principles, as §6
of
clash
removed
by
its
role
in
avoiding greater evil.
It can be argued that it is:
argument
the
from
previous
argument deserves little
perhaps
from
more
such is part of
success
credence
the
deterrence.
than
the
of
the
popular
However this inductive
driver's
racing
world
As Barnett argues,
argument,
'the
happy
accident
has survived the first thirty-five years of the nuclear era is
unimpressive evidence that we can avoid nuclear war
34.
point
a similar time base, that because he hasn't had a fatal crash yet
(despite some close calls), he won't.
that
of
the
in
the
coming
era,
...'
This dilemma example was supplied by D.
Johnston.
There are more
difficult putative counterexamples.
For example, in inciting people to
civil disobedience, the risk of state violence in retaliation is increased.
Thus,
to take C.
Pigden's example, in encouraging disobedience, Gandhi
increased the probability of wrongdoing by the British Raj.
But surely
Gandhi, unlike the Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi
did not directly increase the probability of violence.
But spelling out
what
'directly'
means - in terms of short causal chains over which
responsibility can be distributed - is not only problematic but leads on to
other connecting principles.
22
(p.100).
He offers familiar reasons such as the changing power
increase
in
Russian
the
strength,
rise
the
relations,
of other nuclear powers, etc.
(cf.
similarly Cox).
There are, accordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that
Deterrence will not continue to work,
DI.
and, more important for the present argument, that
Deterrence does increase the probability of LSN war.
D2.
The themes are of course interrelated, and the reasons for them (which are again
persuasive but inconclusive) can be taken together:
some respects) weaker D2 - the probability factor.
proliferation,
the
but the focus is on the (in
An initial
of lesser nuclear powers.
emergence
reason
concerns
As a result there are
many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagration, and so enhanced prospect
it.3$
Some analysts consider that a very likely route to LSN war is the initial
use of nuclear weapons by
confrontation
a
lesser
state.
Moreover
scarcity
the
growing
and
weapon
systems,
more
or
terror
situations,
deterrence
power
involves 36,
being maintained:
balance
of
have an exceedingly bad historical track record.
increasing as the race proceeds.
of
With so many more
Arms races, and interwoven
There is substantial inductive evidence that
present
costs
widely distributed, the probability of war
through accident or error is increased.
power
resource
A second group of reasons concerns the
of cheaper supplies, etc.
nuclear arms race which deterrence, as practised, is tied to.
weapons
for
opportunities
to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political
instability, relating to third world economic decline,
and
of
lead
escalating
eventually
to
races,
arms
war,
with
such
as
probability
Next, deterrence depends on a certain
balance
if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen
during escalation, deterrence may well fail.
A related reason for
supposing
that
deterrence
practice
increases
the
35.
It can be theoretically argued
that the fewer the nations
nuclear weapons,
the less the chance of nuclear war: cf.
p.230n.
36.
The standard argument for
deterrence as significantly decreasing
the
probability of war,would
be decidedly better if the arms race were
abandoned, and weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for
deterrence.
Of course such a probability-well assumption is only one of
several things required if deterrence is to be justified.
armed with
Lackey, MM,
23
probability of war concerns the continuing shifts in US policy,
especially
the
renewed quest for superiority which is increasing the incentive of both sides to
resort to nuclear war, the USSR to avoid being
of
advantage
the
overwhelmed,
USA
to
take
superiority achieved.3? Recent dangerous shifts in US policy
the
towards war fighting are in part induced by a much increased accuracy of nuclear
missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrence (since military targets
can be selected for strike and cities to some extent removed as
thereby
also
weakens
against
case
the
resort
to
leaders, and even some
nuclear
shared
understanding,
mutual
principles,
and
cooperation
Finally,
level
judgement
among
information
of
and
important)
of
soundness
transmission
war.
nuclear
deterrence requires a certain (admittedly rather minimal, yet
of
hostages),
between
It is not just that the increasing numbers of operators
super-states.
in a position to launch nuclear weapons must remain of "sound mind" and not, for
through on delusions of one sort or another.
follow
instance,
deterrence depends upon judgements
seriously
mistaken:
'each
is
regarding
other
the
It is also that
which
side,
side's
is to the other' (PL, p.313).
threat
we
But
think'.38
about
what
the
other
considerable, and perhaps catastrophic, margin of
evidence,
that
one
perception of what is
possible
result
As
side
thinks
side
error.
Not
thinks,
there
only
not
can be a
is
there
side (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's)
rational,
as
regards
limited
nuclear
war,
of a first strike countered by massive retaliation;
must now be severe doubts
effectively.
"convincing"
There is a grain of truth in
the claim that 'deterrence is primarily about what the other
what
be
at the mercy of the other's perception of what
strategy is "rational", what kind of damage is "unacceptable", how
one
may
as
to
whether
rational
principles
are
with
the
but there
operating
to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous
37.
The point is discussed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for
superiority is documented. The vicissitudes of US "defence" policy - not
to say its shiftiness and occasional incoherence (as in strategic forward
defence) - have confused many of its supporters even. Perhaps there is
some advantage in the very incomplete and limited exposure of USSR war and
imperial policies:
we don't see, with alarm,
their incoherence and
irrationality.
38.
Pym, quoted in Thompson, p.19. Yet a fundamental problem Russia and the
West face,
it is sometimes claimed,
is not merely that they do not
understand one another but that 'there is a lack of a wish to understand'.
This casts into doubt the psychological basis of nuclear deterrence.
idea (already alluded to, as held in high places of power in USA and in UK) that
LSN war can be survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won.
The supporter of deterrence
connecting
such
principles
has
not
defeat
to
only
arguments
Cl, but, more difficult, to field a convincing
as
For the onus of proof lies in showing that the costly
rival case.
deterrence is justified.
through
practice
of
But far from the fairly decisive case that is required
(to contrast with the argument through Cl),
feeble
a
only
through
case
the
questionable obverse of Cl,
Clt.
If X is wrong then it is right to reduce the probability of X,
For it has to be shown that
appears open.
*
deterrence (substantially) reduces the probability of LSN war,
and strictly (this indicates part of the trouble with Clt) that
*
deterrence does this better (more morally) than available options.
The latter uniqueness condition certainly fails, so it will be argued.
reasons already given, does the probability claim.
up the very
conditions
probability
of
such
for
a
LSN
an
war,
it
So,
for
When nuclear deterrence sets
can
hardly
reduced
have
the
war, especially over the situation a mere 25 years ago
when such an LSN war was not technically possible.
More generally, in showing that nuclear deterrence is justified, it is
refute the theme that deterrence is wrong.
enough to
out that deterrence is permissible, or alright.
alternative
permissible
courses
action
of
deterrence, which appear more morally satisfactory.
uniqueness
condition has to be established;
to be not merely
alright,
but
right.
But
It is not enough to make
For there certainly seem to
without
not
be
the costs or problems of
To surpass these options, a
nuclear deterrence has to be shown
establishing
such
a
claim,
to
fear
or
acceptable evidential standards, is virtually impossible.39
Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by
threats
including
fright
OED)**°.
(cf.
For
most
people,
portraying the horror of LSN wars would serve adequately enough
from
39.
LSN
wars,
without
all
the
enormous
expense,
trouble
vivid scenarios
to
deter
them
and wastage of
An analogous point will appear when it is asked whether deterrence is the
way out of the nuclear fix, the thing to persist with in the circumstances.
Given that there are apparently superior, less dangerous procedures,
the
answer has to be, No.
25
preparing to engage in them.
deterrence
And
deterrence
by
such
means
(which
in any case depends upon) is of course not immoral.
military
(Schell was not
immoral in publishing his graphic descriptions of the nuclear destruction of New
York.)
But though deterrence per se is permissible, nuclear deterrence, that is
deterrence by complete preparation for the object to be prevented, is not, where
this
object,
a
war, itself is not permissible.
LSN
The argument for this is
through the principle
If X is wrong then complete preparation for (carrying out) X is wrong.
C2.
Hence
since
preparation,
LSN
wars
nuclear
are
wrong
and
nuclear
deterrence
deterrence of LSN wars is wrong.
claimed that preparing for X is just as bad as doing X:
wrong and Z (much) worse than Y.
complete
It is not however being
Y and
may
Z
both
What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil
In 1945 there would have been little doubt that
LSN war was wrong.
implies
complete
preparation
be
41
for
Among the three types of crime specified in Article 6 of the
Charter for the International Military Tribunals
(which
tried
the
major
war
criminals at Nuremburg) were
Crimes against peace: namely planning,
preparation,
initiation or
waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international
treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan
or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the following (cited in
Kuper, p.21;
italics added).
But after many years of nuclear deterrence, the
become
increasingly
liable
to
question.
wrongness
implied
in
C2
has
However the doubts mainly come from
40.
Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity,
deception,
misinformation, that is elements of what are, for the most part, morally
undesirable traits.
41.
Nor are
ordered
because
wrong,
equally
degrees of wrongness required:
wrongs can simply be partially
as regards relative worseness. The point requires some labouring
it has been quite erroneously assumed that if Y and Z are both
categorically or absolutely, then they must be equally "wrong" or
evil. Thus, e.g. Williams:
there is no moral difference between running a deterrent strategy
on the one hand, and intentionally - indeed wantonly - starting a
nuclear war on the other;
so that the first is as totally evil
as the second.
This is because both are held to be absolutely
forbidden.
Not at all. The arguments from "Y and Z are both absolutely forbidden"
to
"So Y is as totally evil as Z"
and
to "Therefore Y and Z do not differ
morally" are both entirely without validity.
Compare:
2 is a number,
and
3 is a number;
so 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ
numerically from 3!
26
assuming that complete preparation includes less than it needs to or does.
Complete preparation for something, such as
several
other
LSN
war,
already
writes
in
In particular, it presupposes the preparation is not
features.
half-hearted but is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply
pretence.
Observe that mere pretence, or other more psychological ploys, cannot substitute
for complete preparation in nuclear deterrence.
too
sophisticated
bluff
for
alone
to
there
succeed:
preparation for war accompanying the threats involved in
the
other
has
is
now
be serious
to
deterrence.
But,
on
complete preparation does not imply that what is prepared for
hand,
will be attempted other than conditonally:
imply attempted X.
complete preparation for X does
not
It does however involve a conditional undertaking to proceed
with what is prepared
whether
intelligence
Military
under
for
certain
Complete
conditions.
preparation,
for a wedding or murder or whatever, would be pointless otherwise, so a
(proclaimed) commitment to proceed under given circumstances can
for
be
taken
of
connecting
granted.
Principle C2
A
principles.
is
part
way
not
the
in
line
a
series
principle of the same sort that is higher in the series is that
if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong
connecting X with attempted X:
perhaps
down
as bad), whether X succeeds or not.
But the series ends;
off well before the lower limits of intensionality, contrary to
various religious positions.
then
the
contemplation
consideration
of
of
it cuts
claims
of
For example, it does not follow that if X is wrong
X
is
wrong
carrying out X is wrong.
or
that
mere
non-action-oriented
The point applies equally to sexual
fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear nightmares.
nothing
the
(though
In
particular,
there
is
wrong with contemplating nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are:
nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable,
and in some senses are all too thinkable.
Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles appeal is that each
commonly
involves
it connects with.
decidedly increased probability of the wrongdoing or outcome
Accompanying the increased probability are
certain
reprehensible attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves;
not
those
of
mere
passive
contemplation*^.
However
all
the
sets
of
these are
connecting
27
principles
except Cl hold, where they do, even when the probability of
invoked
wrongdoing eventuating is not increased.
One reason for this is that the
means
to reprehensible ends may be inefficacious, for instance intending to do
chosen
someone harm using witchcraft.
The increased probability
evil
an
of
outcome
simply makes things worse.
announcement
Nuclear deterrence involves not only war preparation, but
this
threats
by
accompanied
and
a threatening posture.
For some party, the
if
potential enemy, has to be suitably frightened or moved,
of
deterrence
succeed:
the threat must be recognised as such and be credible.
nuclear
deterrence yields a further connecting principle:
is
to
This aspect of
If X is wrong then serious threatening of X under given conditions is also
C3.
or, in brief, If X is wrong then conditional threatening of X is wrong.
wrong;
The remaining connecting conditions invoked all take this general form
CG.
If X is wrong so is a conditional
requires
further
some
explanation.
intension
to
is some intensional functor,
threatening
from
Apart
intentions
that).
C
to
'the
the
most
is the
not
are
impossible
or even remote or improbable:
claim
in
what
(specifically those involving
commitment)
for
follows
certain
is
that
sorts
there
of
discussed
an
conditions
the conditions
typically concern those specifying a nuclear strike by a potential
fundamental
credible
functor:
To remove complication it can be assumed henceforth that the
involved
which
it is obligatory
in propositional rather than event style:
(or
form
a
e.g.
themselves,
conditional intensions are conditional obligations where
obligation
-
A conditional intension is a judgement of
the form, ^(X if C), where
of'.**3
X
do
enemy.
The
are intensional functors
threatening,
intending,
and
which CG holds, and that these versions suffice to demonstrate
of
Naturally
again
many
the
immorality
42.
There is plenty of scope for further
elaboration
here.
Passive
spectatorship of evil events where one is in an appropriate position to
make a difference is quite another thing,
from contemplation of other
worlds where evil occurs.
43.
The conditional intension, ^(X if C), which is an intension, should not be
confused with the provisional form,
if C then^X, which is not. The
Americans are threatening the Russians with retaliatory action if they
strike:
it is not that if the Russians strike the Americans will threaten
them with retaliatory action.
Such confusion has arisen because of the
problems of formalising conditional obligation given usual defective
theories of conditionality.
nuclear
deterrence.
there
are
28
non-action-oriented functors for which versions
contemplation,
thinking,
dreaming, etc.
GC
of
fail,
of
those
e.g.
There is also an interesting group of
more borderline functors, those of hoping (for),
expecting,
the
and
awaiting
like, for which CG is only dubiously correct.
Connecting principle C3 evolved from the simpler principle, if X
then
threatening
to do...
into
X is also wrong, or, as formulated by Ramsay:
is wrong to threaten...'**** The reason is that
practice
(e.g.
'What is wrong
putting
if
wrong
is
something
committing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into
threatening to put that into practice, in particular the declared intent to
that
into
practice.
beginning as follows:
The
point
can
if worlds where
alternatively
X
are
happens
be
put
argued semantically,
excluded
so
then
are
adjacent worlds where X is poised to happen.
The complication of the simple form is required for two reasons.
only conditionally threatened, i.e.
is
should certain conditions
nuclear
war
obtain.
However the required conditional form can be derived
through
form,
the
following
argument:-
which is perfectly general, X if C.
particular,
by
earlier
arguments
44.
so
also
is
the
simple
Observe, furthermore that if something X is
if it weren't it wouldn't
(The converse route fails
(of
§§3-4)
LSN
opposition has struck, or not, and so wrong when it
wrong,
from
substitute for X in the simple form,
wrong, it is also wrong under restrictive conditions;
have been wrong in the first place.
Firstly,
threatening X if C.
war
has.
of
course.)
In
is wrong whether the
Hence,
where
X
is
More generally, to establish CG it is
Ramsay's formulation of simplified C3 is considered in Walzer,
p.272.
It
is this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian
who is a nuclear hawk, into the awkward position he ends in, which as
Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move.
For in virtue o
simplified 03 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible
to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to
be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten a
also
in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral
non-combatant populations.
It appears that Ramsay's position,
if worked
out, would be inconsistent.
see
Simplified principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops:
PL
p.316.
They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared
intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong.
simplified C3 is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to
However
the moral status of a threat by way of expected utility. This is
assess all the objections to expected utility as a test of morality
open to
mentioned below.
29
enough to establish the simpler
If X is wrong so is an intension to do X.
CG'.
The second complication in C3, modifying the threat to
causes
threat,
Some modification appears required, because it is often
trouble.
more
serious
a
contended that empty threats or bluff are warranted on occasion even where
is wrong, to prevent the occurrence of something worse .**$ And in
threatened
is
what
fact one way of trying to vindicate deterrence, as morally permissible, has been
by presenting deterrence as involving threats which do not involve any intention
at all to proceed to action on
plausible
threats.
it
the
support
removes
basis
for
of
simplified C3.
sense
one that is not a pretence, empty or a bluff, but credible.
says
which
intended,
consider a
For the challenge
immoral
grossly
where
case
conduct
under
certain
not
and calls for moral double-think.
the
circumstances*
result
To bring this
an
from
improbable
intricate
Either the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by
Doomsday Machine circuitry, etc.) or with further choice, or - somehow -
not.
is
Principle C3 is not
simplified and unqualified C3.
is unconvincing,
conditions,
accident.
is
in effect that itis perfectly morally permissible to issue serious
threats to undertake
out
this
Hence the shift to serious
A serious threat then, in the slightly technical
open to thesame challenges as
as
Insofar
threats.
Either
it
is
way the outcome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously, in
the second case because the intermediate reconsideration makes it plain that the
threat
nor
ought not to have been issued at all, being justifiable on neither moral
more
"practical"
representatives
Furthermore,
grounds.
natures,
to
the
kinds
of
themselves to be (as Benn explains).
insignificant
their
and
may accept moral double attitudes, such as morally assenting to
immoral threats, less corrupt agents cannot:
moral
states
while
proportion
morally
it
would
run
counter
to
their
principled agents they are or take
For such agents, who may
comprise
a
not
of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such
as C3 are not in doubt.
The argument against nuclear deterrence using C3 is as follows:- Either the
45.
For a discussion of threats where the threatener has no intention of
carrying out the threat, or incentive to do so, see Schelling, p.35ff. The
question of the morality of these threats, where the item threatened is
immoral, can be left open.
30
threat involved in deterrence is serious or it is not.
is
then by C3 deterrence
wrong.
The
sub-argument
depends on serious threats is a practical one:
not
is
it
inadequate, so deterrence is not maintained.
is
it
then
If
serious
But if it is serious
nuclear
that
deterrence
namely, that if the threats were
not serious, but merely gave the impression that they would be followed through,
then
would find out, in one way or another.
opposition
the
could not be endorsed in an open or democratic political
A policy of bluff
system,
for
example,
gaining some discussion, and so giving the game away to the opposition.
without
Even in closed non-democratic systems
maintaining
a
such
policy
weapons, especially
during
there
the
down
of
times
would
be
major
difficulties
in
chains of command involved with nuclear
in
change
governing
elites,
and
the
opposition intelligence.
But then,
since the bluff could be called, deterrence would not have succeeded.
There are
as
likely
would
information
through
escape
well other arguments that the threats involved must be serious.
One is that
nuclear deterrence already faces a credibility problem, namely that doubts about
the
rationality
of
carrying out the big nuclear threat weaken the credibility
essential to its effectiveness.
To be effective then it must
serious
be
(cf.
Benn).
Meeting objections to principle C3 leads on to two further versions of
one
centred on intention, one on commitment.
CG,
Principle C3 is intimately linked
with, and it sometimes considered but a variant upon, the principle
C4.
If X is wrong then to conditionally intend to do X [knowing it is wrong] is
also wrong.
The principles are intimately associated because a threat is, according to
dictionaries,
etc.'.
of
'a
declaration
of
intent
to inflict punishment, loss, injury,
It is their interconnection which lies at the bottom of
which
deterrence,
intending to go to war.
principle,
that
turn
C4
is
some
paradoxes
on the problem of credibly threatening war without
Principle
04
is
justified
through
the
simplified
intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is intending to do
wrong unless favourable circumstances for one's
principle
some
an
extremely
position
prevail.
Simplified
widely assumed moral thesis,*^ perhaps for the
excellent reason that it holds analytically.
Its elaboration C4 can be used
to
31
since proceeding to LSN war when
against nuclear deterrence, as follows:
argue
the enemy duly misbehaves is wrong (by §§3-4), by C4, intending to go to LSN war
the enemy duly misbehaves is also wrong.
when
Nuclear deterrence involves such
Hence
an intention, all the available evidence shows.
deterrence
nuclear
is
wrong.
But like virtually every
utilitarian
themselves,
principles
utilitarian grounds.
deontic
principle,
principles
For it is not difficult to
those
except
from
flowing
C3 and C4 can be challenged on
outline
strategic
situations
where maximum expected utility results from a policy of nuclear deterrence.
But
on its own this concession casts but little doubt upon
C4.
For
it
likewise
is
not
principles
difficult to outline situations where the hanging of
innocent people, or other injustices, are sanctioned or enjoined by
maximum
expected
and
C3
utility.
pursuit
Those who appeal to utilitarian assumptions try to
avoid such more obvious difficulties with reliance upon utilitarianism,
scrapping
the
spots
not
by
doctrine, but by hedging applications of their principles around
with qualifications, which, they hope, will
trouble
of
with
utilitarianism.
enable
it
So
them
evade
to
the
worst
is with Kavka, whose work nicely
illustrates that whatever (little) deterrence has in its
moral
favour
depends
upon utilitarian assumptions.
Kavka 'begin[s] by noting that any reasonable system of
substantial
utilitarian
elements'
(PD,
p.287).
Even
observation were correct — it is not, depending for one
consequential
elements
systems
include
must
infiltrate,
an
with
the
'assumption
if
thing
ethics
this
upon
must
have
astonishing
conflating
utilitarian - it would not follow that reasonable
particular
that
assumption
produces
normative assumption involved is that the
act
Kavka
thereupon
tries
the paradoxes of deterrence'.
with
maximum
expected
to
The
utility
'(the most useful act) should be performed whenever a very great deal of utility
46.
Kavka, who labels simplified C4 the Wrongful Intentions Principle (PD,
p.289), attributes the principle to Abelard, Aquinas, Butler, Bentham,
Kant, Sidgwick, Kenny and Narveson.
Kavka also gives reasons as to why the
principle appears 'so obviously true'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue,
like the US Catholic Bishops, that 'nuclear deterrence is immoral'
(cf.
Kavka p.291).
It is the clash of C4 with certain utilitarian principles (especially the
maximisation principle of p.287)
that directly generates Kavka's first
paradox of deterrence and lies behind his other "paradoxes":
see PD.
32
is at stake' (p.287).
objections
This assumption is open to essentially the same batch
utilitarianism
as
it is mainly a matter of increasing or
itself:
varying the stakes involved sufficiently in any counterexample.
strategy
usual
of
Kavka tries the
weakening and fudging the normative assumption to avoid the
of
worst problems of distributive injustice, and the like, that maximising
utility
can morally enjoin.
But the crucial defect in Kavka's argument lies
follow
normative
the
from
overridden
supposed
to
assumptions
utilitarian
by
way, as if it dominated C4 (see especially p.290), what
C4
is
Though Kavka tends to apply the fudged normative assumptions in this
(p.287).**?
and
what
assumption however fudged, namely that 'this means
other moral assumptions are
that ...
in
when
produce,
situations,
are
moral
combined
situations
in
dilemmas.
These
are
the
cases
assumption
special
as
such
not
fudged
deterrent
one
where
deontic
principle, that yielded by utilitarianism, overrides others, but where there are
competing, even contradictory deontic principles, such as that it
is
right
to
to proceed to LSN war when the enemy misbehaves (on specious utilitarian
intend
grounds) and also wrong to intend to do so (by C4).
that judgement is not overriden.
wrong:
remains
Nuclear deterrence
Nor does it in any way follow that C4
is in need of qualification as a result (Kavka's assumption,
p.290).
situations,
However,
there
are
countervailing utilitarian considerations suggesting different imperatives.
For
what
is
in
these
is
wrong.
the
also
case
is
that
these
in
special
special circumstances a greater utility can be realised by doing what
However
it
is
hardly
news,
but
a
objection,
standing
that
utilitarianism sometimes enjoins what is wrong.
Special
sponsonship
deterrent
may
appear
situations,
where
under
utilitarian
to get a foot in the moral door, are very special.
characterised by Kavka, they are such that the
47
deterrence
deterrence
is
very
likely
As
to
Lackey's utilitarian approach rests on a similar fallacy, that utilitarian
considerations predominate where stakes are large enough:
see his argument
for the approach in MM p.192.
What happens is not that important consequences override moral principles,
but that application of one principle with important consequences conflicts
with that of another principle with less significant consequences,
and in
the weigh-up of what to do in the problematic circumstances the principle
with important consequence prevails.
33
succeed, and nothing else is likely to succeed (see p.286), i.e.
is
deterrence
This is very far removed from the real world
lodged in a deep probability-well.
situation where nuclear deterrence appears to be increasing the
probability
of
LSN war, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at
least as likely to succeed as deterrence.
that
principles
deontic
Even if it were
supposed
mistakenly
to real-life dilemmas should be qualified to
subject
avoid dilemmas, there is little point in qualifying working
deontic
principles
such as C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situations.
Instead of pulling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral intentions it
involves, it can be criticized more broadly through the commitments it requires,
by way of the following principle:
If X is wrong then a conditional commitment to carry out X is also wrong.
C5.
The reason is that the commitment is a commitment
and
circumstances;
that
commitment
is
to
act
in
wrongly
certain
Nuclear deterrence is
itself wrong.
however a policy which commits states to war under certain conditions.
with
conditional
intention,
that
superstates
and
and
commitment
controlling
to
use
representatives
nuclear weapons.
not
did
occur)
is
to
enough
establish
have
relevant
the
The dangerous strategy of
launch-on-warning (which could, for instance, result in a
that
as
so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt
their
intention
And
response
to
attacks
the point, for which there is
otherwise quite sufficient factual evidence.
are
Now the connecting principles
suffice
but
logically,
nuclear
deterrence,
for
weighty
case.
instance
conditional commitment to LSN war, is wrong.
This
one
principle
would
By
detachment
from
the
by complete preparation for and
Deterrence of this type is
wrong.
also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence
trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so
paradoxical:
deterrence.
itself
sound
when all are liable to be disputed, several defensible
ones, ideally in concert, make for a
principles
applied:
it
out
the
connections
between
and
not
be
engaged
in
(unless
its
has
appeared
nuclear war and nuclear
Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that
should
changed, e.g.
left
bizarre
nuclear
war
direction can be drastically
at least limited, per impossibile in the case of nuclear warfare,
34
to purely military targets).
The arguments through connecting principles, can be reinforced by different
sorts
arguments against the moral correctness of nuclear deterrence.
of
There
are arguments from limited convergence of ethical theories, which start from the
commonplace observation that
All the ethical arguments in
*
favour
of
nuclear
deterrence
broadly
are
utilitarian.
In fact most of the arguments in favour of deterrence, including many
that
infiltrated
have
the
ethical
literature,
are
of
those
generally drawn from game theory, and primarily interested in the
one
player,
the
USA.
Utilitarianism,
though
still
looking
of
those
expediency advantage
of
basically
at
advantages, interests and (typically individual) utilities, has to take
a
partisan
pain of
position,
and
forfeiting its claim to morality
supported
by
other
consider
nationalities
otherwise.
The
as
well,
commonplace
on
less
observation
is
the fact that such qualified moral support as deterrence obtains,
derives from utilitarianism.
48
There are two directions on to a general claim against
deterrence,
either
by way of the pro-utilitarian theme
*
Utilitarianism properly applied also comes out against deterrence
or, more strongly, by way of the anti-utilitarian theme,
*
Utilitarianism does not furnish satisfactory moral arguments.
Then, by the anti-utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory
in
favour
direction:
48.
of deterrence.
moral
arguments
Naturally, it would be easy to strengthen the second
after all it is widely
thought
that
utilitarianism
is
a
false,
Thus the hedged utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and Joynt, and
Showing that cogent
also within the broadly utilitarian range, of Gautier.
______
defences of nuclear deterrence have to take
a utilitarian route would be a
Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the
much tougher enterprise.
T'
' , much would depend on what was
enterprise could be carried through,
For certainly bizarre principles, e.g. obverses of the
connecting principles, can be introduced, which afford deontological routes
to deterrence.
despite some backsliding by bishops, all other ethical positions; can
A deontological
made to speak against deterrence and its continuation,
be 1___ —
.
connecting
deontic
case against deterrence,
primarily the way
of
principles, has been argued in some detail.
In the light of these
principles, it is not difficult to see how cases from other ethical
2 go..
After all C4 has been defended from a wide range of
positions would
Af--- -1......
And
stances, e.g.
contractual,
natural law, utilitarian even.
<—
35
seriously astray, or even shabby ethical position.
political
which
system
depends
in
some
utilitarian arguments for its policies.
It hardly does
measure
for
then
a
upon consensus, to rely on
Yet with nuclear deterrence
just
that
appears to be happening, with readily overturned arguments at that.
For whether even utilitarianism supports deterrence depends essentially on:
it
how
with
applied;
is
which
maximisation recipes; along with what other
restrictive assumptions (such as those of a deep probability-well);
are
generous
With
sovereignty, national security, etc.
or
assumptions,
different
arguably
(and
superior)
varying the guestimation methods, very different results
upon
The
emerge, opposing deterrence and favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament.
reason for this is straightforward (and like that ending §4).
basic
LSN war has an extremely large negative utility.
deterrence
out to
recipes
Any
policy
such
It is that
as
nuclear
which increases the probability of this, or even risks it, must lose
feasible
other
of
how
for such things as preservation of national
assignments
utility
and on
a
alternatives,
consequentialist
type
whatever
are
initially
applied
(e.g.
plausible
decision
Minimax, Dominance,
Disaster Avoidance, Expected Value).
The anti-utilitarian theme can be defended either by a full-scale criticism
of
utilitarianism,
beginning for instance with its well-known justification of
localised injustices, $0 or else
utilitarianism
when
applied
One obvious deficiency is this:
by
to
addressing
some
of
the
inadequacies
of
issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrence.
on standard utilitarianism, what to do, whether
to proceed with deterrence, depends on the probability of its success and on the
improbability of other options working.
deep,
utilitarianism
If the deterrence
probability-well
is
morally requires deterrence, otherwise not.$* But what is
morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are
probable.
49.
The instability of utilitarianism is illustrated by the
discussion
involving Kavka, Lackey and Hardin,
continued in Philosophy and Public
Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilitarianism, diametrically
opposed conclusions are reached.
(Hardin's approach tends however to
expediency reasoning of the strategic type.)
50.
Such wider criticisms of utilitarianism, in all its forms, as an ethical
theory are too well-known to repeat.
Some of the main defects are
considered in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for
utilitarianism' .
The point that utilitarianism gives no firm place to
stand comes from L. Mirlin.
36
Whether deterrence is morally wrong or not, is
likely
work
to
independent
it
is
are
princip]gs
Moral
not
through expected values, whether utilities or otherwise - though how
determined
bad some outcome is may be.
are
deterrence
decidedly
essentially
nowhere
whether
If nuclear deterrence is wrong where it increases the
or not.
probability of war, then is it wrong, simpliciter.
depend
of
upon
firm to stand.
Worse, since the expected utilities in the case
uncertain,
these
of
the results utilitarianism delivers
and
uncertainty
measures,
offers
utilitarianism
In contrast with the solid deontic ground of principle,
utilitarianism provides only shifting sand.
The objections made apply especially against act utilitarianism.
form
shows
special
interests,
such
as
conditions
security
(the
probability-well
state,
of
estimation rules are pulled in).
high
have
is
deep,
utilities,
nation-state
and
special
It does not yield a deterrence policy;
indeed
hardly yields policies at all (other than act utilitarianism itself).
and certain other difficulties may be avoided by considering instead a
of
act
most that nuclear deterrence is "wrong" according to its lights
at
under very
it
The
acts.52 But the method lacks stability;
These
sequence
different prescriptions will result
depending upon how the sequence is selected, what is included and what left
(as
also
associated probabilities depend critically on the sequence selected).
No unequivocal recipe is delivered.
selected
out
to
To
see
this,
suppose
the
sequence
is
include worst cases, for instance cases where deterrence fails and
war breaks out.
In this event it can hardly be argued that
deterrence
is
the
policy that maximizes utility over the sequence.
Along with the arguments, there are
dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence.
other
conventional wars.
for
Firstly, the peace it has provided
only nuclear peace, or rather lack of nuclear war, as there
smaller-scale
reasons
concomitant
is
deep
is
shortage of
no
And the "peace" provided is at best a tenuous
peace, which is not stable, but liable to upset at
any
stage
by
a
range
of
51.
Though this is to oversimplify, the points made are not affected by the
simplification.
In any case the simplified picture reflects well enough
the differences between Kavka and Lackey that matter in their debate
(referred to in footnote 49).
52.
Whether this is rule utilitarianism, or still act utilitarianism
the sequence can be construed as one long act, may be left open.
because
37
factors, including error, both human and technical.
It does not
genuine
offer
of the sort required for a stable international life, but only a fragile
Peace,
peace of a sort
opportunity
is
enormous
the
cost,
moral
cost of deterrence, because expenditure on it excludes other urgent
moral priorities.
way,
Marxist
Secondly, there
(PL, p.316).
in
The US Bishops put this familiar
terms
of
'the
destructive capacity and what
is
for
in
between
contradiction
needed
point,
spent
is
what
constructive
surprisingly
a
for
(PL,
development'
p.316).
§6 -
Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from
dangers
national
nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas.
to
While
there are arguments to the immorality of nuclear war preparation, there are also
counter-arguments,
that
have
Americans), to the moral
proved
justifiability
persuasive
remarkably
of
nuclear
war
(especially
preparation
in
to
the
present circumstances .
The underlying style of argument is simply an elaboration, or state-uplift,
of that for the escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or
for stocking-up the neighbourhood armoury - and every bit
argument
from
local dangers.
and
domination;
dubious
first
of
all
second of nuclear destruction.
atomic
surrender
and
so
avoid the destruction' (Walzer, p.273).
preparation is supposed to guard against more than these;
third
element,
namely,
loss
of
basic
rights
there
with these.
blackmail
of
foreign
appeasement
In fact nuclear
is
a
crucial
of
ways
life
This further set of elements is linked to the danger of
foreign domination - which is really a separate element from risk of
Though
and
(freedom, equality, etc.) and
fundamental values (upholding of truth, human dignity, etc.) and
integrated
that
The two go together,
since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy
or
as
It is that nuclear preparation, 'so we have been
told, guards against the double danger:
foreign
as
blackmail.
domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does
imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various
national objectives;
conversely loss or erosion or infringement of basic values
can occur without foreign domination, for instance, as
is
commonplace
in
the
38
"free" world, by internal change of government or governmental approach, through
the increased security and control a
nuclear
risks,
increasingly
preparation
state
nuclear
demands,
But
etc.
what
nuclear destruction, also
extensive
involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction
of
the
material
of the cherished life-style.^ So nuclear preparation is hardly a clearcut
base
means of guaranteeing basic values.5^
In other respects too the argument from loss of
lacks
cogency
rings
and
It
hollow.
is
basic
values
and
rights
hard to avoid the feeling that the
oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like
citation
values at political ceremonies;
religious
of
clean cover for economic consideration of one sort
demands
from
of
of
wealth
private
appealed
to
category:
in
and
them
to
having
arising
with
do
the
an argument isn't, or
However
associations.
And
rights
the
and
But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into
particular nationalistic ones do not.
And one of the main
alleged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment
or
many
another,
are, mostly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental,
and worth much sacrifice.
this
of
power.
and
oughtn't to be, defeated by its unsavoury
values
that the argument is a
military-industrial complex, many concerned with foreign
the
domination of other lesser states, and many
concentration
pious
"communism"
of
of "socialism", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention
of capitalism.
communism
has
happened
What has
been
here
with
confused
of
(the
totalitarianism, which does remove certain more
freedoms
(of
opinion,
association,
is
course
that
reality
basic
information,
of)
values,
etc.,
(the
ideal
of)
socialist
state
namely
certain
and
so does
etc.),
derivatively threaten basic values.
One critical question, then, is whether extensive nuclear
LSN
war,
and
indeed
for
rational way of preserving
nuclear
those
holocaust,
fundamenmtal
preparation
for
is a good or effective or even
values,
which
we
have
left.
53.
The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and
cherished
life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation,
as when a more powerful state imposes its values and way of life.
54.
The argument from freedom, advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by
state representatives, is further considered early in Appendix 1.
39
arise
Similar questions
and
domination
as
regards
arguments
the
preparation depends essentially on an arrangement of hostile
structure
which
itself
is
open
questioned (in §8), both from the
serious
to
question,
view
of
point
foreign
of
danger
of the methods of extensive nuclear
Justification
blackmail.
from
and
basic
of
states,
nation
a
is subsequently
values,
such
as
freedom, and otherwise.
But whether ultimately justified or
dangers
not,
these
national
those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear
are
preparation, and
have
They
justification.
been
accepted
outlook.
moral
by
policy
Within
particular, that extensive nuclear
the
as
affording
moral
arguments
preparation
do
not
such
Northern
conventional
a
It is within such a framework, in
framework the moral justification holds good.
however,
makers
fact been widely accepted, and undoubtedly form
in
have
part of many people's
others,
from
arguments
engenders
establish
moral
a
fix.
For
the morality of extensive
nuclear preparation, but only make a prudential case for such preparation.
people
face a nuclear dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it is
also
not a specifically moral one.
And
for
many
others
and their respective rights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma.
people
who
not
are
who
again,
so
or as familiar with Soviet and American culture and ways of life,
by
impressed
Such
beyond
live
For such
the "beneficial" reach of the superstates, prudential
counter-arguments from national dangers carry little weight, and the moral
case
against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged.
This is the genesis of the argument from isolated
people
who
Consider
some
a comparatively remote area, whose freedoms are not (yet)
in
live
people.
under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by
nuclear
(as under principle Cl).
deterrence
For such isolated people, who may
have little interest in the preservation of nuclear states, there is no
nuclear
dilemma,
and
nuclear
locations may have problems
to
national
is wrong.
dangers,
People in less fortunate
but
in
meeting
these
they are not entitled to impose grave risks on the uninvolved isolated
problems
people.
as
deterrence
genuine
In doing so
immorally;
and
for
through
similar
nuclear
reasons
deterrence, superstates
the
are
proceeding
conventional Northern framework is
40
The same conclusion can be alternatively reached
impugned.
argument:
a
put
isolated person, and check
the
resulting
substitution
Russian in the position of such an
or
American
reflective
a
by
assessment
of
nuclear
deterrence.
it would be the same as that of a reflective isolated person, stripped of
Since
superstate bias, morally opposed to deterrence and not morally
transfixed,
the
conventional framework fails to satisfy requirements of morality.
The outcome of the arguments from dangers is, then,very different depending
on
the
whether
are
arguments
applied
regards a superstate or not.
as
The
superstate theme which emerges is, in brief,
SST.
Because of multiple connected dangers from other states which have
nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states
- is obliged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons.
Hence, by detachment, a super-nation-state, such as USA, ought to have something
in
the
the nuclear armoury that it has.
of
order
meet objections concerning excess,
a
least
at
retain
Or, weakening the theme to
"overkill" capacity, it
core of the nuclear devices it has.
solid
[morally]
ought
to
For subsequent
argument it can be left open whether the obligation involved is a moral one, for
instance
of
because
the
character
of
the
protected, or only (as argued above) one of
to
grounds
supporting
those
against
disarmament
a
the
SS
reason $5.
prudential
theme
nuclear
dangerous
Northern values supposedly being
on
similar
it can be argued that unilateral
opponent
would
be
prudentially
irrational.
It will be freely admitted that what is prudentially or morally required is
a
suboptimal
strategy,
like the familiar strategies of the prisoners' dilemma
situations and of certain related competitive games.
that
like could be achieved, would
agreement
would
be
cooperative
draining
of
For
such
resources,
the details are well-enough known.
future
55.
admitted
arrangements.
Cooperation
and
be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a
range of other respects.
expensive,
be
strategy for nuclear adversaries, if sufficient trust and the
superior
a
So it should
arrangements
would
be
much
less
risky,
destructive of the environment, and so on;
However for the present and the
foreseeable
the prospects of cooperation appear - so we are repeatedly told by state
It can
still,
and
presumably
does,
amount
to
more
than
mere
expediency, since the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue.
local
41
representatives, who are (not always wittingly) helping to make
true
-
unfortunately
rather
remote:
only
the
policies
their
sure insurance is extensive
nuclear preparation and full preparedness to apply nuclear force.
At least this is so where one is a superstate:
proceed,
largely
unabated.
nuclear
preparation
Where one is not a superstate, but a lesser state
one must, the representatives continue, rely on a larger ally who has a
arsenal,
one's
nuclear
preparation,
one
under
huddles
and
which
contrasts
the lack of trust displayed, and encouraged elsewhere.
Does a
state, one which relies for its nuclear cover on a super-ally,
ground
for
another's
But here a level of trust and cooperation is^ called for, by
umbrella.
dependent states, which is far from foolproof,
with
nuclear
insurance (which is presumably not free) is obtained indirectly
through some superstate's
nuclear
confidence
in
its
rather
super-ally
strangely
dependent
have
exchange
on its territory?
much
that
its ally's opponent?
than
Confidence, for instance, that its ally will not render it a target or
nuclear
must
stage
a
Given the proclivity of states, especially
large states, to resort to expediency, and given the recent historical record of
superstates and their leaders, too much faith would.be misplaced.
Thus, whatever the limited force of the argument for the superstate
it
does
theme,
not extend to the analogous theme for a dependent state, which differs
from SST and ends as follows:
DST.
Because ..., a state without adequate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged
to rely upon a superstate ally, and within that arrangement, to accommodate the
facilities and nuclear installations of the protecting ally.
In part for reasons already given, principle DST is not very plausible (and
same
goes for more obvious variants upon it).
Nor do the arguments offered for
SST transpose particularly well to direct arguments
strikingly
illustrated
by
the
case
the
for
DST.56
This
is
more
of more remote nuclear dependent states.
Consider the argument from basic values, for instance, from the angle of nuclear
dependent Australia.
Basic values in Australia are not threatened by, or put in
jeopardy through, the actions or plans
of
the
Soviet
Union.
Nor
are
they
threatened by the other superstate, the USA, the only country with 'the physical
56.
As is widely known, inadmissible and usually much overrated considerations
of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign
nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g.
economic considerations
such as trade or local revenue and short-term jobs.
42
capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia', but
'clearly
lack[ing]
motive to do so', so far.5? Clearly the argument from basic values does not
any
look convincing.
carries
reasons
For similar
In
weight.
little
the
with
fact,
from
argument
little care, the present level of
a
economic and political domination could be much reduced.
of
force
For there
only
is
questionable
of
because
danger
such
superstate
In this way
too,
nuclear
umbrella,
and
facilities
superstate
the
that would be removed with
danger
non-aligned practices.$8 With less remote dependent European states these
of
the
from danger of nuclear destruction could be nullified.
argument
the
domination
foreign
sorts
arguments from national dangers are only marginally more convincing, and may
be defeated along analogous lines.
The differences in the situations of states, and
peoples,
break
the
theme
of
a
of
situated
differently
This is a theme especially
monolithic West.
favoured by US and the West European representatives, who present the West,
its
freedom,
as threatened by Soviet domination.
undifferentiated unit.
dependent
states
with
But
this
leading
idea,
NATO
designed
powers,
and
In this the West is a single
in
part
to
align
lesser
to justify putting them at
and
nuclear risk is as much a myth as the idea of the Golden West.
not
The West is
so monolithic, it is not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free, much of it
(including the Antipodes) is not threatened by Soviet domination.
Principle DST - likewise what it depends upon, SST - is
now
under
coming
attack by European disarmament groups, who challenge the core assumptions of the
underlying retaliatory model that
*
Safety lies in weapons,
*
More weapons imply more securityS9.
Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand,
safety
from
nuclear
attack lies not in weapons but in excluding nuclear facilities (including visits
from nuclear submarines).
present
system
is
more
Europeans are arguing in
of
a
similar
way,
that
the
a risk, indeed liability, than a protection (e.g.
57.
For the quoted claim, and some of the
Australia's Security, p.94.
58.
The issue is further pursued in Appendix 2.
59.
See, for example, the last article in Thompson.
argument
for
it,
see
Threats
to
43
envisaged
the
and that without nuclear installations, Europe cannot be
Thompson, p.251);
theatre
limited nuclear war, in the way it is now seen by US
a
for
(but not Soviet) strategists.
Once the weapons
assumptions
are
questioned,
other
the
assumptions of
and its variants come up for examination, namely
retaliatory model
*
Whether
the proper response to danger is armament, in particular
,
Whether
the proper response is through nuclear armament,
asopposed,
say, to other military responses, such as conventional arms, or,
taking off from the previous point,
Whether military approaches and procedures (through
*
are
proper
methods,
etc.)
armaments,
or should be such dominant methods, of conflict
resolution at the international level.
It is plausibly argued, against military procedures, that at no
level
ordinary
do we sensibly set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal
weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and
really
frontier
warranted,
ethics.
This leads into the issue of alternative
defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary6°
and
explanation
it
deserves,
questioning of the framework
of
but
never
one
that
nation-states.
already
While
emphasis
anticipates subsequent
the
state
system
is
intact, force is far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expected
and are likely inevitable.
nation-state
system':
For 'force has
[a]
...
permanent
place
the
in
thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very
orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements.
§7.
The resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned states
Assembling
referred
the
to
as
themes
the
so
far
nuclear
developed
fix:-
States
war-deterrence, because (as argued in §3-§5)
to engage in war-deterrence, at least
60.
the
yields
both
and__ their—supporter^.
deontic dilemma, often
ought
not
for prudential reasons (as
conversion to such arrangements.
engage
in
it is immoral, and also ought
Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in
Mohists.
For contemporary work on alternative systems, see
survey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature
and social defence arrangements, and a growing literature on
i.e.
to
argued
using
China by the
especially the
on non-violent
transarmament,
44
SST and DST).
the
This dilemma is no idle construction
paraconsistent
of
virtues
but
logic),
(concocted
to
demonstrate
a serious real-life dilemma, the
outlines of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on
nuclear
and
war
its
aspects 61, as well as being virtually ubiquitous in nuclear war discussions.
The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense
dilemma
produced
by
the
deontic
war itself &2, or at least war which spreads beyond purely
military targets, as larger wars inevitably
do
(since
military
arrangements,
The main dilemma arises
rail transport, typically rely on civilian ones).
e.g.
of
version
from a combination of the retaliatory model with the features of
War
war.
is
required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold);
but war also involves immoral acts and evil consequences.
can
war"
under
certain
justified.
be
also
seen
as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that
circumstances
Thus
'some
these
really
justifications
evil
consequences
aegis
of
war'
(Walls,
p.260).
acceptable than fallacious asymptotic
are
morally
of war aim to show that actions deemed
normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible
the
The doctrine of "just
But
this
arguments
when
under
performed
is no better or more morally
for
utilitarianism
being
as
correct when the stakes are large.
War and preparedness for
61.
war
also
generate
subsidiary
dilemmas
-
for
Thus Green, along with many others, 'find[s] nuclear deterrence ...
the
best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of
world politics' but 'still demur[s] because of moral qualms'
(p.xii).
Green
also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having 'rather
agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy,
even while
asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the
traditional ethical codes' (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he
is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets
down):
'...
though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no
other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states'
(p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue.
Similarly the US Catholic Bishops
dilemma;
they speak of 'the
dilemma of how to prevent the use
Paskins and Dockrill and in Benn
terms of moral dilemmas.
present the situation in terms of a moral
political paradox of deterrence ...
the
of nuclear weapons ...' (PL, p.313).
In
too the nuclear situation is presented in
The nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who
think they have seen the clear admissibility of deterrence, or differently
for those who have seen through the arguments from national dangers.
But
it is a dilemma for those locked into the conventional framework.
62.
Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas:
see Routley
and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account
of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein.
45
authority:
instance, a severe tension between freedom and
difficult
'one
of
most
the
of war involves defending a free society without destroying
problems
p.324).
the values that give it meaning and validity' (PL,
The
problems
are
greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arrangements.
The nuclear fix not only intensifies and complicates other dilemmas induced
by
the
contemporary sovereign state^^, in particular the deep tensions between
national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (such
individual
liberty, popular control of institutions, etc).
other more personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for
(political)
obligations
to
example
question
(the
It also accentuates
the
extent
one's
of
a nuclear state, and role-induced dilemmas such as
one's conflicting obligations as a doctor or a nuclear
researcher
as
of
political
obligations
armaments
and
their
processor
or
evasion
is
considered further in Appendix 2).
At the more personal level, that of individual and group action, there
several
questions
be disentangled - questions different from the key issue
to
'What should my state
be
doing
and
influence, depending on who one is.
do?',
on
which
one
may
exert
lives,
and
influences, i.e.
in
what
little
There is not only the question 'What should
I do?' - a question which will have a quite different force depending
one
are
on
where
sort of state, where one works, what one controls or
on who one is and one's roles - but also the
questions
'What
sort of person do I want to be?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'^"
Answers to these latter character questions will feed back to influence those to
action-oriented
questions.
Each
of those questions can, in given situations,
induce subsidiary dilemmas.
The essential feature of a deontic dilemma is that both A and the
of
A
are
wrong
(or
differently,
pursuing a nuclear defence policy.
obligatory),
negation
for some suitable A, such as
The place and essential role of deontic
and
63.
The nuclear dilemma is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas.
Large-scale nuclear power generation, and other types of warfare and
security arrangements, also contribute.
But a conflict of
ree om a
authority is already an outcome of the large central state.
64.
For group formulation of the questions replace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The
importance of distilling out these questions, and the moral undesirability
of deterrence in terms of what it does to people morally, are brought out
in Benn, where however the issues are made to look somewhat more separate
than they are.
46
moral dilemmas are not
widely
well
or
particularly
understood,
ethical
in
This is partly because currently dominant ethical positions like
literature^^.
utilitarianism cannot at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which
gives
to
rise
them
then such positions do not really offer reportive
but
-
accounts of wrong and obligation anyway.
Contrary to utilitarian perceptions
a
dilemma does not necessarily have any moral solution, though there may be better
and worse ways out.
By
assessments,
form
which
contrast
the
with
ethical
such
preanalytical
theories,
of sensitive theories, do recognise moral
basis
dilemmas and reflect their features.
Reactions and responses that are characteristic of deontic dilemmas
the
from
There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to
fix.
nuclear
do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to
temporary
crutch.
for
Thus,
as
way
a
of
never
exercising
"morally
our
world'66, that is in a morally-strapped world.
best"
ethical
Bishops who
the
of
A similar
'strictly
conditional'
Deterrence has a strictly temporary role
the
object
must
and
deterrence
circumstances.
deterrence,
is
"morally
in a fallen
acceptability'
certainly
one
strictly
wrong,
is
of
from the
conditional
option
as
to
of
what
nuclear
the
to
do
nevertheless
the
policy
to
fix.
awkward
in
Thus Walzer, for example, struggles to the conclusion
though
"second
a
to
be to move beyond deterrence, 'towards a
world free of the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out
And
be
try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e.
moral fix.
but
shift
'moral
while
acceptability,
can
good",
responsibility
moral
deterrence
we
a
(as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic
functor
speak
as
grasp
example, the Bishop of London contends that the
possession of nuclear weapons 'while
acceptable"
emerge
that
war
in
the
pursue
circumstances (p.274).6? However as more than an immediate stepping stone
to
a
65.
There are exceptions of course, e.g.
in the Catholic educated such as
Sartre;
and Nagel's final example is very instructive. For a fuller
theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood.
66.
Reported in The Economist;
reprinted in
1983, Weekend Magazine p.2.
67.
As a response to a moral dilemma, Walzer's approach is perfectly in order
logically. Those who, like Benn, 'find it neither coherent nor acceptable'
The
have not grasped the logic of moral dilemmas.
Australian,
February
12-13
47
superior
it
policy,
(in
assembled
is
reasons
§5-§6),
of
option,
poor
decidedly
a
the
sort
reasons
for
are
that
decisive
for those,
outside the conventional Northern framework, who find
sufficiently
already
no
genuine
of
nuclear
nuclear dilemma.
To make matters worse the nuclear fix is, furthermore,
own making.
states'
a
fix
It is not something they blundered into, by accident.
initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by the
the
the USA and the USSR in interaction.
and
In these respects the
situation
is
like
people who deliberately let themselves be involved in two incompatible
of
relationships, and build up conflicting obligations
though
USA,
has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again mainly by
escalation
that
The
build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response
nuclear
to
Soviet
The fact is that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has
build-up.
frequently led escalation, and apparently still does.
programme is to be in addition to existing
resources
myth,
a
is
some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, and nuclear
with
one
It
thereby.
are
(which
agreed
generally
The recent (1980)
United
States'
strategic
be already in excess of
to
Russia's, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21).
The present dilemma, that many people feel acutely, is then a direct outcome
state
policy,
allies, and
Naturally
not
the
USSR policies.
that
indicates
especially
a
merely
route
by
taken
advanced
response
to
capitalist
the
USA and its NATO
nations,
Soviets
(or
of
socialism).
state
would not have been feasible without complementing
And independent evidence,
such
as
Soviet-Sino
confrontation,
is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist
there
nations.
There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements
nation-states
the
and
nuclear
fix.
arrangements are an evident source of the
nuclear
situation
is
increasingly
present world political structure.
is
widely
promulgated
arrangements:
it is '...
seen
On
the
dilemma
as
one
hand,
with
the
these
result
through
political
that
the
indicating the inadequacy of the
Indeed it is no longer a radical
theme
but
that the source of the nuclear problem comes from state
a world of sovereign states ...
which
brought
the
48
world
the present dangerous situation' (PL, p.313).
to
nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into
On the other hand, the
the
statist
form,
into
The
arrangements of an increasingly authoritarian and centralist cast.
statist
espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the
national
defend
to
and
security,
interests,
reasons such as perpetuating the system
state
advantageous
confrontation,
and
provide
to
but underneath there are other
sovereign
of
(!),
peace
and
states
of
framework
the
military-industrial interests, dependent state exploitation, and
politically
favoured
inequality
it
supports.
The emerging theme is then that the very nuclear situation arising from the
statist
and
arrangements
interrelations
(economic
ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock
arrangements
of
states and zones of interest.
sovereign
theme is a piecemeal practical one.
where
side
the
pattern
world
the
conflicting
rivalries,
into
the
present
The argument to this
Consider first, the matter from the
Soviet
of national control and progressive military-economic
reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer.
The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet
perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for
the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and
social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within
their own borders.
In the West we have ... carefully controlled
...
and selective release of 'official information' (Thompson, p.20).
"We" in the West, especially the Americans, also
integrated
with
state
apparatus,
have,
in
forms
increasingly
the military-industrial complex, which is a
major beneficiary and promoter of the nuclear arms race.68
Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements,
by
things
such
as
the
SALT negotiations;
there are fixed superpowers and a
(growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a
rules, partly held in place by deterrence.
shown
as
flimsy
negotiated
set
Connected with this, there are cases
revealing the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example.
Soviet
US is
68.
of
The
invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so the
not
overduly
worried
about
Afghanistan
and
its
people.
What
was
The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is
sketched in Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism, would
assign even more weight to this point.
As some of them would freely
concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation.
49
different, what it was worried about and made nuclear threats
adjacent
Western
oil
supplies:
were
concerning,
these lay within the US zone of interest (cf.
the discussion in Schell, p.212).
§8.
initial political fall-out from the ethical
Ways out of nuclear dilemmas:
Virtually all the ways are ways of limitation, and they all involve in
results.
one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and
limitations
the
on
thus inevitable.
and
more
powers of states.
Limitations on national sovereignty are
The limitations may be reached by agreement
and
negotiation,
less voluntarily agreed to^^, or they may be imposed, or possibly
or
worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war.
As with other fixes produced by
are
there
suggested
the
structural
arrangements
of
states,
out which do not interfere with these arrangements,
ways
interstate approaches, and there are ways which do seriously alter the structure
and
power
relations
extrastate approaches.
of
states
(and,
in the limit, remove them altogether),
All the familiar, allegedly
practical
and
realistic ,
attempts to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms
limitations, etc., are interstate;
sovereign
state.
The
same
goes
(graduated) unilateral disarmament.
about the nation-state;
they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the
for
less
"realistic"
But in fact there is
proposals,
nothing
or
empirical
fact,
is it particularly a stable one.
nor,
and
its
replacement by alternative arrangements.
as
a
We are certainly
free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as
demise
sacred
it is not a particularly well justified political form;
it is not even a very long-standing form of political arrangement;
matter
very
such as
to
its
And nuclear dilemmas
should have encouraged such reflection.
69.
In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement
of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military
ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through
fighting in some form, but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers,
lawyers, or etc.
In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives
are never much considered in these days of superstates. Animals, by
contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like
these.
Even the ancient Greeks - though they had a clear appreciation of
limits, which has been lost by post-Enlightenment leaders - regarded the
institution of war as final (allegedly inevitable) means of arbitration
between city-states, not seeing
its
social,
structurally-emergent,
character.
50
Extrastate approaches take one of
international
of states.
routes,
the
way
up,
to
genuine
power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation
The ways up and down are by no means one and the same;
but they are
Some of the important machinery, for a way up to
necessarily incompatible.
not
two
world government,is already there in the
international
Were
law-courts.
the
courts assigned sufficient authority and power, the remedy, namely through legal
action, that medieval
theorists
saw
all
to
intrastate
and T superseded by the just case of S versus T.
sufficient
war deterrence,
though
Law courts, as usually conceived, are not
equivalent
super—statist
But if
the
law
courts
were
power then their authority and efficacy would likely rely (at
upon
least initially)
their
in
could
be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war between states S
principle
given
disputes,
back-up
equivalent
for
of
economic
perhaps
not by military means.
effective without police and jails or
and
other
penalties;
and
the
either will involve the capacity to inflict quite
substantial amounts of damage on "delinquents" - which, because delinquents will
be
typically
organisations,
will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps
dissenting, participants in those organisations, as well as to other
In
parties.
uninvolved
short, such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to
repeat it.
The Way Up is one more statist, legalistic, authoritarian way of trying
get
to
grips
with
the
nuclear
though mostly in passing to be
70.
to
problem, and accordingly is often mentioned,
dismissed
in
orthodox
strategic
texts
on
Americans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the USSR)
is
a union, of fairly recent origin, and that a differently-oriented State of
the Union message could well consider dissolution of the union.
Regional
movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular support at present.
By
contrast, there are significant separation movements,
some deserving aid
and encouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR,
UK and France. The USSR already has trouble in holding its (supposedly
voluntarily integrated)
satellite empire together;
and the one recent
attempted addition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant.
Nor should powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be
fostered elsewhere.
The same applies to state empire expansion, as
illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Most important,
the reunification
of
Germany
should be resisted;
instead a more rational regional
deunification than the present East-West division of post-war Germany
should be sought, along with removal of nuclear weapons from the border
region, and so on.
71.
Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as,
impractical, etc.
Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour
with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations.
51
the
By contrast, the Way Down, though like
thermonuclear war.
an appearance (a comeback) in some more radical discussions,
with the Way Up (in "world order" models:
combined
unlike the Way Down, is
considered
however
beginning
is
and
more
much
international
system';
and
'the
'towards
a
no
sometimes
sympathetically
There is
by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint.
a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching
by
The Way Up,
Galtung).
cf.
be
to
Up
but it is making
new, is scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions;
means
Way
integrated
morally
missing element of world order today is the
absence of a properly constituted political authority' (PL, p.320).
A main argument for the Way Up is
just
repetition
a
that
of
which
is
commonly supposed to underpin statist arrangements in the first place, namely an
argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners'
of the Commons.
Tragedy
traditionally,
ecological order.
not
as
best
regards
problems
to
solutions
nation-states,
of superstate.
of
organisation,
and one of the prospects is destruction of a
said
to
be
some
Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application
of the "tragedy" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some
their
order—imposing
correspondingly weakened.
arguments
role,
and
But all
obligation
political
this
is
assume
to
,
only sound under quite restrictive assumptions.
There are, then, many problems
through
that
states
will
these
tragedy
A
further
theoretical
with
the
hitch
is
Way
Up,
that
a
both
theoretical
and
the Way Up merely repeats
arrangements.
It
is
contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations
nearby, that the problems of interstate relations are not repeated
72.
be
72
statist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate
only
to
of
good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are
are
practical.
the
public order and, more recently, as to
good part of the commons by nuclear war, the solution is now
sort
as
So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are
but
herdsmen
such
It is that authority and coercion - in the form of the
state * are required to ensure
especially,
Dilemma,
See further Routley and Routley
and
material
referred
to
a
level
therein,
up
and
especially Griffin.
The real reasons for the state are of course very different from the
theoretical cover such arguments afford. Among other things, the state
enables and guarantees the accumulation of power, privilege and capital.
The major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting
again.
such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended purpose.
In reality, we are no nearer a world government than we were a century
ago,
....
In fact, it is even arguable that since World War II we
have moved further away from a world government than we were before
World
War
II.
The disintegration of empires has multiplied
sovereignties. It is true that we have something called the United
Nations, but even the United Nations has declined in power as it has
grown in membership. By the beginning of the 1970's the United
Nations had become, in some ways, a less powerful and even less
influential organisation than it was at the end of the 1950's (Mazrui,
pp.2-3).
For
The reasons for this Mazrui goes on to outline.
future
foreseeable
the
nuclear
ideological differences between states, including especially differences
as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude any prospect of
an
world government or a world legal system capable of resolving nuclear
operative
In some ways, this is just as well.
hostilities.
monolithic,
extremely
would
World
would
government
foster economism, would entrench bureaucracy with
all its damaging features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism.
whatever
certainly,
its
be
(gray?)
colour,
political
exploitative economic system which would do immense
impose
damage
It
would
the world an
on
many
remaining
crucial
respects,
to
natural systems.?3
The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely
undesirable
ideological,
requisite
of
level
indeed
unity
political
cannot
be
economic
and
paradigmatic,
and,
separation
in
some
Moreover,
unity.
of
main
Northern
within nuclear deadlines.
expected
given
cultures,
When not even
nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out, how much less likely is
more
much
sovereignty, could
blockages
agreements,
sweeping
and
be
negotiated?
deadlocks
in
the
involving
genuine
There
an
way
is
endless
(e.g.
of
of
state
series
of such state reconciliation.
applies to interstate arrangements, which may make limited use
that
it
limitations
almost
the
the
of
The same
Way
Up
negotiations or other conciliation procedures within a framework arranged
through the United Nations) .?**
73.
For a more detailed (but decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a
world
government,
see Galtung.
Naturally the objections to world
government, and difficulties in the way of obtaining it, do not extend to
more flexible world arrangements, such a world federation of cultures (cf.
Mazrui).
Such a pluralistic anarchistic Way Up can
be
genuinely
synthesized with the Way Down.
53
There is
regrettably
and
arrangements
much
also
conventions
are
evidence
frequently
concerning war and human rights?$), and are
sentiments
smoothly
not
not
observed (especially those
worth
into despicable deeds.
not
bode
convention
in
great
a
deal:
Even agreements states have
openly
violated.
Indeed there already appears to be at least one
any
force,
of
It
to
which
international
all the major nuclear states are signatories,
which would rule out LSN war and nuclear deterrence, that on genocide.
includes
lofty
for nuclear arms limitations, should sufficient agreement
well
ever be reached.
treaties,
international
are often enough disregarded, skirted around, or
signed
does
slide
that
the
following
Genocide
acts committed, in time of peace or war, with
intent to destroy in whole or part a natural, ethical, racial or religious group
killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to
as such:
the members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions of life
to
bring about physical
destruction
direct
and
public
shall
conspiracy to
commit
be
Persons committing genocide or any of
punished,
whether
they
are
the
other
acts
responsible rulers, private
individuals or public officials.?6 it is not difficult to argue
nuclear
genocide,
incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide,
complicity in genocide.
mentioned
Beside genocide the
in whole or in part.
following associated acts are also punishable:
calculated
that
larger
a
strike (such as deterrence policy requires as a back-up response) would
almost certainly constitute an act of genocide, through what
minority
groups.
to
does
some
But then, by virtue of connecting principles like 05, nuclear
deterrence stands indicted
particular
it
conspiracy
representatives of the
and
as
involving
incitement.
nuclear
states
acts
associated
with
genocide,
in
Some well-known political and military
would
thus
appear
to
be
liable
to
indictment and punishment under international law.
74.
Even Dahlitz, who gives a detailed and sympathetic account of nuclear arms
control attempts and lost opportunities,
is by no means confident that
suitable arrangements can now be achieved (see pp.
210-13).
Reasons
include technological advances now taking place, and the renewed American
drive for strategic superiority.
75.
See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty International reports.
in this paragraph were suggested by C. Pigden.
76.
The account of genocide given is taken directly from the
Genocide Convention, which is reproduced in Kuper, p.210ff.
Most of the points
text
of
the
54
The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the
impotence
apparent
interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed
of
with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation
nearer
to
the
nuclear
"brink"
—
taken
now
is
to
contemporary angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political
has
given
new
impetus
sovereignty
the best-seller
and
to consideration of other extrastate resolutions.
The
the
indicates
the
namely
nuclear
in
The
Schell's
situation
should
reexamination of the foundations of political thought'
world's
political
unsatisfactoriness
radical
of
the present system of nation states has even reached
stands
Schell
to
According
and
book
a new
arrangements,
thesis that the nuclear problem
national
(from
indicate
and
of
Fate
lead
to
required
Earth.
the
a
full-scale
to
make
'the
consonant with the global reality in which
institutions ...
they operate ...' and in 'work[ing] out the practical steps by which mankind ...
can
reorganise
political
its
life' (p.219).
However Schell himself tries to
avoid these 'awesome urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by
the
political
work of our age' ??.
else overimpressed
by
the
history,
constitute
So, not feeling the pressures of history or
realities
of
(unstable)
nation-states,
do
most
But there is no good reason to avoid the task of political
political theorists.
reassessment, made so much more urgent by the nuclear situation.
There is little doubt but that we live (too
unthinkingly)
with
an
antiquated
system
many
present
state
arrangements,
communications
condition;
especially,
were
in
a
of
(allegedly
when
17th
century
very
different
and
the main outlines of the modern totalitarian state
and its manifold deficiencies recognised, even earlier.
77.
willingly,
The features
representative
government, were largely fashioned in the
us
even
of political arrangements which the
nuclear impasse, among others, calls into question.
best
of
even
democratic)
technology,
more
were
the
and
primitive
discerned,
In the briefs presented
A similar theme, similarly questioning 'such sacred traditions as absolute
national sovereignty', was pressed by Bradley, a significant US general
(see Cox, p.225).
Schell (like Bradley) does not make it entirely clear whether he is
thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the
Way Up.
So does the main thrust of what he says, e.g.
'Thus the peril of
extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival"
but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide itself up into
sovereign nations'
(p.210),
as if the natural or original state were an
undivided one? On Schell's position, see further Appendix 1.
55
for political arrangements such as representative government, the excessive size
and complexity of modern states was not envisaged.
But such systems continue to
operate, insufficiently questioned, though their justificatory bases
undermined.
present
Nuclear
representative
emphasized
have
problems
political
have
been
several other deficiencies in
arrangements.
particular,
In
they
have
revealed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident
will of the people on an issue, for instance in installing US missiles
European
Now that modern communications and information-processing
countries.
make it feasible to determine the mix of public positions on major
case for representative procedures is dissolved.
century
19th
issues,
a
issues.
The
reduced
power
excessive
back
at
developments,
issue-regulated
and
large
imposes
complex
other
modern
What
requirements.
by
states
government
recent
technological
Firstly,
smaller
initial
grouping
than
giant
states,
integration of groups by principles of federation.
as it is
to
informed
citizens
of
satisfactory
a
approximate
goodwill.
As
there are serious deficiencies in
the
information
in
present
progressive
and
procedure,
depends
control,
nation-states,
even
and
release
the
distribution
information,
channels, and so forth.
acceptable
the
from
These
distortion
restrictive
of
most liberal of them (and
Again, especially with new and less
But there are
evidently vested interests which stand to benefit from the limited
of
upon
nuclear problems have again made patent,
systems, there is little excuse for this.
information
upward
Secondly, democracy, insofar
political
related deficiencies as regards education).
publicly
democratic
like many other social arrangements, appear to function better with
procedures,
flow
and
called for are smaller
are
groupings, information flow, communication and education.
and
major
on
governmental power to more participatory democratic forms, a route made
possible even in
expensive
least
of governments would, to that extent at
But the route down through
least, be reduced.
much
elected
way that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues) are not given an almost
free hand on every issue, but are required to answer
policy
the
It is past time
for more issue-controlled democratic procedures, where governments once
(in
some
in
of
data
features
in
have
availability
major communication
helped
in
making
present deliberately fostered pattern of nation-state
56
confrontation, and in establishing the prisoner's
superstates
nuclear
are
often
seen
to
be
dilemma
type
the
situation
locked into (on which see, e.g.,
Hardin).
A central argument, arising from the nuclear fix, for
current
questioning
arrangements and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at
political
least), takes the following shape:e
Political arrangements should answer back to certain
in
justified
terms
doing
of
at
where
least
are
so.These requirements include such things as
enabling good and meaningful and moral lives for those
arrangements,
and
requirements
(as
certainly
in
who
under
operate
the
much of the West) the basic
material conditions for such lives are met.
*
Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have
these
requirements.
For
guarantee the prospect of
arrangements.
nation-states,
good
and
at least in the North, can no longer
meaningful
to
lives
their
yet there is a non-negligible probability that
person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged
a
under
those
such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way.
support
meet
A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before
its prime in a nuclear disaster;
many
to
ceased
state
to
Furthermore a
in
acquiesce
or
engaged in nuclear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf.
Benn).
Therefore, nation-state arrangements have
should
be
not all) nation-states:
have
their
justification,
and
Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though
amended.
nation-states
forfeited
it is not only because of the
forfeited
their
mandate.
nuclear
Political
fix
that
some
obligations to such
states are correspondingly dissolved.
There is enough evidence that power-brokers who control
sight
of,
or
worse
have
lost
don't care about, the point of political arrangements, of
what justifies or is supposed to justify their states.
78.
states
This
applies
both
to
How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the
underlying political theory.
Rawls,
for example,
puts it in familiar
contractual form:
that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for
mutual advantage' (p.4). Mao puts it in a standard democratic way:
'since
the purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people
and their interests,
it is the people who should control in a meaningful
way, the government' (see Soo, p.68).
57
more powerful states and to lesser states, both
claim
popular
to
a
put
value
higher
on
military situations:
sovereignty
they do on human
than
for copious evidence see
principles
the
just
of
warfare
repeatedly, as have many other principles.
violated
'nuclear
where
Kuper).
This
by Israel, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear
illustrated
already
some
have
more often, they act without it or
as
national
survival' (Schell's conclusion, p.210;
is
brokers
The situation has been reached
against the will of the people.
powers
where,
and
mandate
the
where
blatantly
been
have
Such states have forfeited
much of what claim they had to external respect or internal political obedience;
so, on other grounds, have many other states.
It could just be, of course, as is often
alternatives,
that have
or
been
insinuated,
though
effort
little
but
option of world government).
for
dismissed,
As
to
all
whether
little
opportunity
not
do
to
and
work,
appear
to
we
Down.
There
working towards the weakening
especially
on
the
alternatives
can
be
may
and
have
given
been
know very little about how humans
sufficient
give
organising and trying out alternative
Way
such
alternatives
But,
operate under substantially different arrangements.
accessible
expended
been
has
instance as lacking feasibility, it is difficult to be entirely
sure without taking the risk of being dogmatic;
deadlines
no
the range of alternatives or their features (except perhaps for the
researching
very
are
there
But alternatives there are,
no possibly better alternatives.
glimpsed,
that
to
time
arrangements,
even
again,
once
very far on
proceed
those
nuclear
of
the
more
be time to proceed a little way however, in
breakdown
of
the
larger
superunions, which are the immediate problem.
invalid to simply conclude that alternative political and
nuclear
states,
Thus it would be
social
arrangements,
theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do not presently
while
offer a part of the practical response to the nuclear fix.
But there is no need to insist upon a single-track Way Out of
dilemma
to
the
exclusion of all others:
quite the contrary.
the
nuclear
We can not only
afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches and embrace whatever
seems to be working or looks like helping, within recognised ethical (and other)
constraints;
indeed, given the urgency,
the
direness
of
the
situation,
we
58
should
as
fairly catholic and not inflexibly committed to narrow methods, such
be
bogged
down
(and
very
on
arms
limitations
negotiations
should
methods
perservered
be
unrepresentative)
certainly
and
between main nuclear states.
made
attempts
and
with,
No-first-use declaration, a ban on weapons in space, etc.
But even such
to
e.g.
superstates,
the
from
concessions
significant
undemocratic
further
wring
jointly
a
signed
The direction of most
hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially
The political means of the Way Out are what they have
new.
larger
every
liberal
on
issue that has mattered:
humanitarian
or
been
from outside
state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from within or
and
it,
characteristically Bottom-Up
methods
are
considerations
familiar
alternatives
self-organising
furnishing
by
and
practically
virtually
upon
without
bypass
which
it,
Top-Down.
never
Such
but part of the more general, and very effective,
case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to
but
supply,
which
can
almost
that
effectively and for
invariably
matter
be
obtained, where required, more
expensively
less
without
(and
them
their
monopolies).
In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions,
imposed,
or
frequently
The opposition to the
local
from
have
in, military solutions involving nuclear installations
acquiesced
and nuclear weapons.
that
neighbourhood
and
escalating
groups,
fix
nuclear
has
come
some of them now federated
across nations (so the direction is not really interstate).
These
have
groups
been successful in blocking some nuclear installations and establishing, for the
time
being,
against
movement
nuclear-free
some
nuclear
neighbourhoods.
equipment
The
patchwork
grass-roots
is strongest in Europe, which is - as the
movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a leading theatre, on US strategic
thinking,
for
a
limited
nuclear
war
not
touching
extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and American
Europe
will
make
it
a
safer
place:
American shores.
nuclear
installations
removed
installations
in
on the contrary it seems probable that
Europe will become much safer if the anti-nuclear movements
these
It is
succeed
and Europe rendered nuclear-free.
grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced.
in
having
The chances of
59
What of the spectre of Soviet domination, military, ideological and
in
Except
case
the
Europe,
of
other?
where the inexcusable suppression of Eastern
Europe all too evidently persists, this is an obvious fabrication.
Does
anyone
expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canada
seriously
or Brasil say?
And even in Western Europe the spectre is
failing
partly
giant
fashioned
financially
dominated
and
economically
politically and ideologically, by the USA.
ideologically,
dominated
propped
exaggerated,
up by the NATO powers'
and
some
in
and,
some measure,
Indeed much of the "free"
world
is
adequately
not
countered
military
by
The
means.
domination to which nuclear weapons are considered relevant
insofar
as
is
basic
any
in
mode of
But
military.
military, and associated political, domination of Western Europe by
the Soviets is a
problem,
there
are
several
ways
other
predominantly American nuclear weapons to mitigate it.
only local defence arrangements - whether top-down
alternative
is
it dominated economically, by the USA.
of
That is not generally considered so much of a problem (as it is?9), and
case
a
Since the last World War, Western Europe has been
military-industrial alliance.
increasingly
largely
and
much
methods
social
—
but
also
some
on
methods,
or
restructuring, such as
social
power
to
dispersed
local
more cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and
much
and
reliance
These should include not
state-supplied
decentralisation, regionalisation and devolution of
organisations,
than
Eastern Europe.
Part of the point of
whether
external
or
restructuring
internal,
so
is
especially
situations, is to
state-contrived
79.
break
make
military
any
takeover,
much more difficult and pointless, and the
restoration of local control easier.Part of
interchange,
to
the
point
of
cooperation
and
at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary
down
conditions
of
hostility
and
distrust
and
to
sabotage
the
West-East confrontations, and thereby to remove
For many peoples of the world, and in its impact on the natural world,
advanced corporate capitalism is an oppressive and damaging doctrine. But,
in contrast with austere Marxism-Leninism which would improve the lot of
some of the oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural
world, corporate capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many
more individual rights and liberties. Certainly Marxism-Leninism which
appears to degenerate in practice to an authoritarian and totalitarian
position is a less welcome alternative.
It is fortunate, then, that we need
be saddled with neither:
there are superior options.
60
other
expenditures.81
popular
and
for,
motives
Western
support
Europe,
for
for,
long
military
much
too
adventures
partial
to
and
military
adventures, should now be helping itself rather than relying on a leaky American
nuclear
umbrella
for its defence.
Moreover it ought to be, at the very least,
uncomfortable about the risks of catastrophically damaging
the
world
in
the
of
interests
its own security.
extensive
parts
of
Nor should other "nuclear
dependent" states be prepared to acquiesce in this not uncharacteristic European
imposition.
world, what
There
LSN
is
war
no
risks,
enormous
for
virtue
Western
in sacrificing other parts of the
Europe,
military-based domination to other parts of the world.
which
has
long
exported
There are better options
than dubious and risky nuclear shields for Europe.
80.
Thus, for example, to the extent that local defence groups are integrated
under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle that
surrender of the central directing section absolved the federated groups
from following suit or following further directions. That is, through
devolution of power,
surrender becomes structurally impossible (though
individuals or basic groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section
would hold only limited information about the federated
units
it
integrated.
The locally organised groups themselves, which would merge
with local populations, would be trained in tactics of passive resistance,
sabotage,
(nonviolent) guerilla warfare, etc.
The net effect (as C.
Pigden, who made most of these points, argues) would be to make the cost of
military conquest, occupations and exploitation prohibitively high.
One reason why the Japanese Army High Command decided against invasion of
Australia in March 1942 was the character of Australians and the fact that
they 'would resist to the end' (Threats to Australia's Security, p.62).
Yet
the 1942 (war reduced) Australian population was substantially
untrained and unorganised for locally—based defence. With such a defence
restructuring, Australia would not only much reduce its vulnerability to
military adventures, but remove standard reasons for succumbing to threats
of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like.
81.
In particular, with sufficient cooperation
and
trust,
competitive
prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept
separate, are removed.
So too a main model supporting deterrence policy
would be undercut.
And the arguments from national dangers would be
further corroded.
In the same direction, it is important to extend cooperation between USA
and USSR down below the level of state trade deals, e.g.
in grain and gas,
to communication and cooperation between people. For such commercial deals
there is sufficient trust, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why
should it not be so also at more significant people-to-people levels? Many
further sorts of interrelationship are feasible, and inexpensive by
military standards, e.g. sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges,
gift projects.
If, for instance, 100,000 or more ordinary Americans were
living, working or holidaying in USSR (and vice versa), Americans would
feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclear missiles into Russia (or vice
versa).
Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual
respect and trust; on the contrary, a lot of resources have been expended
to encourage precisely the opposite attitudes, e.g.
as part of the
strategy of the "cold war".
61
What the anti-nuclear movements must press
for
and disarmament (and, on the more
perceptive
transarmament,
to
conversion
i.e.
outer
of
edges
graduated
movements,
the
alternative social defence arrangements).
But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go,
through
in
in part it is what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction
broad outline:
way
clear
accordingly
is
namely
all
the
disarmament^^ to total nuclear disarmament,
unilateral
certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet's
surface,
including
especially
Europe.
For
once
state is demoted, its
the
importance and the necessity of its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance
on
decision-making
its
diminished
decision-making - once all that is
happen),
in
duly
of
favour
more localised control and
for
allowed
not
does
(it
need
to
major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the problem
one
of reduction or even loss of state sovereignty.
Maintenance of that sovereignty
has been assigned a mistaken importance, which in turn accounts for the mistaken
weight assigned to the arguments from national dangers.
What is
and
important
worth preserving is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the
state.
The nation-state and dangers to it, and accompanying
features
such
as
misplaced nationalism, are the weakest links in the nuclear fix situation.
Once the demise of the sovereign nation-state is allowed for, the arguments
from
national
concerning
particular.
dangers
individual
also
and
group
rights
and
In
freedoms,
by
the
that
nation-state.
matter
The
are
82.
to
arguments
liberties
in
for
them,
as
smaller
exclusively
or
nation-state is neither sufficient for
are
disappearing,
nor
community arrangements can ensure them.
But
arguments from individual and group dangers remain, do they not?
risks
are
civil
necessarily
them, since in increasingly many states these liberties
necessary
place
their
None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life.
None of the rights and freedoms
guaranteed
disintegrate.
individuals and groups remain:
To
be
sure,
that has always been so,83 and is not
The initial but important steps are at zero cost as regards deterrence.
Were deterrence really the policy there would be little case for more than
a fraction of present nuclear arsenals.
The steps to disarmament are
well-known, e.g.
the scrapping of obsolete weapons, and an end to
modernisation, the removal of nuclear weapons in crucial theatres such as
Europe, etc.
62
being changed but only worsened in this age of
mostly
to
want
that
sure
be
or
other
outsiders.
People
their lives will continue to run their course,
ideally in a flourishing fashion, and will not be
Russians
nation-states.
nuclear
controlled
Americans
by
or
Nuclear arrangements which threaten their lives
are not a rational route to these ends.
In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way
as
dilemmas
the
out
of
deontic
such
fix and its subsidiary dilemmas, there are then much
nuclear
more important elements than features of the nation-state, namely some of
those
the state is supposed to safeguard, such as individual and local welfare
things
and autonomy;
weapons.
but those things are better ensured by
main reasons are familiar:
The
threaten the loss of basic values,
such
removal
the
nuclear
of
in particular, nuclear circumstances
as
and
welfare
autonomy,
many
for
creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general much greater than in
a nuclear-free situation (even should another
with
example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local
of
the
opportunity
remain
armed
There are also well-known supplementary reasons;
weapons).
nuclear
party
ideological
welfare
for
(because
costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the
accompanying security measures).
Thus
the
appropriately
devices
and
fix
nuclear
resolved,
it
can
deploy,
and
considerable reduction of state sovereignty.
how),
and
since
rate,
any
by
by
allowing
for
the
But, although that is a reasonable
Way Out, at little cost in the circumstances, it will be
practice,
at
theoretically
sovereignty of the state (especially as to what nuclear
limiting
weapons
is
strongly
resisted
in
those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the
auspices of the state.
This is a main reason why people must organise
and
act
against the state.
Again the resolution also looks practical enough, since
sovereignty
reduction
in
need apply essentially only to the the production and deployment of
nuclear weapons.
83.
the
Indeed
it
could
in
principle
be
obtained
by
negotiated
It will remain so under any satisfactory political arrangements.
Until
human social arrangements change substantially, there is no substitute for
on-going vigilance to ensure or maintain political liberty.
63
agreement (at the top levels of state).
However
to
get
this
far
with
the
superstates, the limitations of state-power will likely have to proceed further:
for nuclear weaponry does not stand in splendid isolation.
into
both
concerned.
systems
military
and
(civil)
Rather
it
tied
is
industrial production of the states
So, unsurprisingly, practical-looking resolutions are being
solidly
resisted by superstates.
Accordingly more popular (bottom up) action against nuclear-involved states
especially
and
the superstates, after all the states causing the most
against
serious dilemmas, will have to be taken much further.
variety
of
organised
forms.
Once again it will take a
These include a refusal to contribute to nuclear
of
war preparation, either directly or
indirectly.
widely,
blockading of shipments of uranium, and the
from
such
steps
as
the
forms
The
action
range
refusal of supplies and services to sailors on nuclear ships and submarines,
to
withholding or redirection of taxes destined for nuclear security purposes.
the
They include as well the whole
nuclear
installations
and
range
of
nonviolent
facilities
protest
which
(methods
methods
against
do
exclude
not
incapacitation and decommissioning of equipment, and which do include new
model
resistance and defence organisations). 8**
It is important to realise that petitioning of
power
state
representatives
and
holders, for instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct
appeal, is far from a complete strategy, and may be ineffective or ignored,
the results discouraging.
and
This is one reason why popular action should be based
on a more comprehensive political
strategy,
which
also
involves
withdrawing
support from prevailing state arrangements, and working out and participating in
alternative arrangements, especially
alternative
defence
forms.Sufficient
details as to what to do are already known, enough to make an immediate start.
84.
For some impression of the range of methods, see again Sharp.
85.
For much more on all these points, see e.g.
further Appendix 2.
Martin.
As to what to do, see
64
APPENDIX 1. ON THE FATE OF MANKIND AND THE EARTH,
according to Schell, and to Anders.
A
series
of
nuclear
prophets
has
produced
a
series
of
philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war and the alleged implications of
human extinction.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the
nuclear dilemma, down to metaphysical levels;
in this the series contrasts with
the transient superficialities of much of the political commentary.
The most
widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the
slightest of the "prophets , Schell's The Fate of the Earth.
This skillful
piece of media—philosophy uncannily redeploys some of the apparently deep
phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell
and Anders can often be considered together. To criticise their assumptions is
not of course to belittle their work.
In particular, Schell's little book, for
all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect
in shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements.
It is especially valuable
for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack.
Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually,
severe
defects.
Some of it is simply garbage:
to select one example,
consider
the
claim
that
'without ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the
[human] species .... nothing else that we undertake together can make
any practical or moral sense ...
(p.173, rearranged).
This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate
moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally
neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues:
they don't cease to be so when
compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges
elsewhere, p.130). And the claim should also be junked on more factual grounds.
Humans form a highly resilient species, like rabbits in Australia a survivor
species,
unlikely to be exterminated under
presently
arranged
nuclear
holocausts.
1.
The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many of the
leading prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered
there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work (which might equally
well have been translated as The Fate of Mankind) comes out in entirely the
wrong direction.
For it gives heavy philosophical attire
to
the
better-dead-than-red abomination.
A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being
red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some
of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans
a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but
total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity.
But Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention
is that there are circumstances where and principles for which a person or
group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such:
a
life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted
without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it.
While the
sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective)
way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a
possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain.
To this
extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to__ all
fallacy.
Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all
possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to
all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all:
that is not a possible route to life even.
65
The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes,
two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders:
51.
Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the
extinction assumption);
and
52.
In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality
and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put
it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their
sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption).
It is applications of S2 which give Anders'
and Schell's work ^ some of its
apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement
through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications
of S2 depend essentially on SI. For without total extinction there will be
humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense!
Granted the factual assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real
possibility; granted the technological means are now available to make it true,
to render Homo sapiens extinct;^
granted the prospect of nuclear war does
threaten leading centres of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so SI
appears unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information.
Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life
should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian
medical studies). Schell's argument to SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for
example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern
Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of
contracting the world to North America.
(All that matters, all worthwhile
civilization,
is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America
and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be
eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for
example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly
out of date. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less
well from North to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than
Schell's,
by Preddey and others,
indicates that parts of the Southern
Hemisphere, New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa and Latin America could
escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.*'
Both Anders and Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" the
means of manufacturing nuclear bombs.
It would seem that extinction, which they
both foresee as at least a live possibility, would furnish a good medium for
unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van
Daniken's theory of an earlier "high" technology). In virtue of S2, they would
however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly
2.
For a detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions
of S2, see Foley JS.
3.
Thus the Last Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer
merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new
urgency.
It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics
and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer
are out of the same technological Pandora's box.
Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only
Pandora's box.
Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more
effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished.
4.
However, new modellings and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep
appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario,
generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange,
the
immunity of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern
LSN war has been questioned.
In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching
the evidence, has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous
differences in temperature between south and north,
shifting normal wind
patterns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7
1983, p.56).
Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a
vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust
for life on earth, much as many statesmen have an interest in minimizing
them.
66
that the notion no longer made sense.
But what they seem to want to suggest
with the impossibility-of-unlearning message is the inevitability of the
development and eventual use of the technology - as if having learnt the means
all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of
choice. Certainly such views have been floated $.
But they are not tenable.
There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken
advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have
been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special
about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations.
Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about
nuclear weapons, in particular that they do not allow "experiments . Even if
this were true - it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not tell
against the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And
in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the
limits to nuclear scientific work,
to large-scale weapons and independent
experiments which do not interfere with the observers and those outside the
"laboratories".
Again they have latched onto major points:
in particular, we
have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear
weapons in concert, e.g.
for more holistic effects such as fireballs or
firestorms, electromagnetic pulse or ozone destruction. Short of an LSN war,
and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested
and hypothetical in character.
The penetration of human chauvinism, as in S2, is not something peculiar to
Schell, but is a product of Western philosophy, European philosophy especially.
This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders'
version of S2
being just one striking illustration(cf. AA
p.252ff.).
It has also deeply
penetrated Anglo-American philosophy,
and has
recently been extended
by
Wittgenstein's work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to
be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans!
Such are
alleged implications of
extinction;
but the
fact is that the truths of
arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of
gods or giraffes.
In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly
powerful and obnoxious Kantian form.
Thoughts and propositions, time and
tenses, history and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving
presence of human beings — past or future or merely potential humans are not
enough,
persons that are not humans are certainly not enough. Thus, according
to Schell (p.140, e.g.), '...
the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an
impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as tt is, we^ are not.
In
imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the
stream of human time,
...
'. The thought is however perfectly possible for
humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later
rational creature may well be able to have it truly.
Schell erroneously denies
that:
there is no "later" '... outside the human tenses of past, present, and
future
...'
(p.140)6.
Human extinction eliminates 'the creature that divides
time into past, present and future':
so annihilation cannot
'come to pass'
(p.143).
But it is simply false that the tenses are human;
the tenses depend
on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but
not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other
times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location,
evident to
other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons).
And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North
at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to
exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human
beings.
5.
Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth,
a former US general, argues by straight induction, that if the US military
has a weapon it will use it.
6.
The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future
repeated elsewhere, e.g.
p.173.
(etc.)
is
67
Anders' argument for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no longer
be even what has been', is also explicitly and narrowly verificationist:
'for
what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been,
if there is no one to remember the things that have been' (AA p.245). There
would still remain many sorts of difference;
for one, the history recorded in
many
other organisms would be different.
Temporal themes do not lack
'legitimacy because not registered [or
verified]
by
anyone';
truth,
significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification.
Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting
metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism
and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in
talking about what does not exist).
Thus,
for example, Schell takes over
dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to
imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that
we are in fact still present as spectators" (p.138). The second clause goes a
good distance towards refuting the first.
In fact there is no great difficulty
in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud's claims.
The same goes for Schell's extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main
traditional strongholds, value theory:
'...
the simple and basic fact [sic!]
that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing
there must be life', human life (p.171).
These are no facts, but deeply
entrenched
philosophical
dogmas which have been exposed and criticised
elsewhere?.
Naturally some things will disappear with the extinction of humans:
trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are
recreated), and thus no more human institutions,
human activities, human
emotions, and so forth. But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders
does, that there will accordingly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain,
no hope,
no comfort, no sacrifice, no image, no song
For there are, and
may continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion,
struggles,
songs..........
Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to
pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless,
and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of
the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not
worthwhile.
Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive
from their shared assumptions SI and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical
notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both.
'The death of
mankind', under SI, is reckoned a 'second death', because by S2 and SI remaining
life is rendered meaningless and already 'seems to be dead' (AA p.244, S p.166)
and is already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a
person faces 'a second death', not merely one's own but in addition that greater
death of the species and all future generations (S p.166, p.115). However even
if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated,
because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of
preceding life and on the
very
questionable
representation
of
this
meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die
just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks
even a solid metaphysical base.
From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an
absolute doesn't differ in degree, comes the universality of peril theme that
'we are all exposed to peril in the same degree', which is accordingly
'disguised' and 'difficult to recognise', because there is no contrast (AE p.64;
S p.150). This theme falls with SI.
In any event, not all peoples are equally
imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being
7.
See, e.g., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics',
in Environmental
Philosophy (edited D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social
Sciences, Australian National University, 1980.
8.
Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the
perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin.
argument
from
68
rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe. Nor are all people
equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it;
as explained, the
position is different in different countries and places.
Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, an obnoxious theme,
which Schell (in contrast to Anders) repeatedly infiltrates. This is the Pogo
theme, according to which
S3. Responsibility for the present
nuclear
situation (fiasco,
really)
distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world.
But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the
stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is
compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeruns as follows:
'...
the world's political leaders ...
though they now menace the earth with
nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding.
At
least,
this is true for democracies'
(pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated
elsewhere:
'... we are the authors of that extinction. (For the populations
of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction
and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of
the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail
to try to do anything about the danger)'
(p.152).
But this is more of an
argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and
unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention
those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely
foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points:
'...
we are
potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is that it makes of
all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions'
(p.152).
And
again '[as]
perpetrators
... we convey the steady message ...
that life not
only is not sacred but is worthless;
that ...
it had been judged acceptable
for everyone to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign
against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as
is possible,
and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential
destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply
distribute onto them. Nor does responsibility - or the unlikely opinions as to
worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone - fall on those who have done
less.
Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by
representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything
as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among
9.
An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is
responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version
of this no-responsibility theme is discussed shortly. More satisfactory is
the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for
reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going,
which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which
bear considerable responsibility, include the military weapons industry,
and research and academic communities. Under pressures for re-election
especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control
of political processes. The argument fails at its final stage. For many
politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus political
processes
tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of
political control.
10.
Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows:
'The
self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane
or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it
to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit' (p.186). Even
for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan",
but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in
the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning.
Further
'the world
... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of
sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons'
(p.194):
the world?
This
connects
of
course with the ideological argument from defence of
fundamentals,
e.g.
for liberty,
for the (USA) nation,
and against
socialism.
In the course of this argument yet another fallacious
assumption is rolled out:
'The means to the end are not limited, for the
end itself sets the limits in each case' (p.189).
69
many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which
offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter
may vote for zero or more policies of this package.
Only in the (uncommon)
event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility,
still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to
every one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related
theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation
generates responsibilities for every socially involved person (this theme is
discussed in Appendix 2).
When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes,
part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely
S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us]
have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out
of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system,
etc.
(the whole earth
theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the
state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used,
unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8).
Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large,
scattered and fragmentary.
As observed (in §8),
Schell arrives at the
conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new
political institutions more 'consonant with the global reality' are required as
a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out
viable alternatives.
At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing
towards the Way Up.
Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come,
if not easily,
in a similar
simplistic way,
from the Top Down;
those who can must appeal to the Top (cf.
p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations
(such as SALT) and in world government (as with the United Nations).
Given the
record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators,
it
is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of
the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology,
to
explore the roots of nuclear blindness,
to consider effective changes to
military-industrial organisation and ways of life.
But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and,
more generally,
of the roots of war can be found elsewhere.*2 The roots of the
nuclear fix are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of
nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their
military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies.
And
both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the
arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial
feature is the drive for power and domination.^ Thus the push for [nuclear]
superiority by the super-states,
to be achieved through military-oriented
science and technology, which involves and enables domination, in several
interrelated forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough
surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from
nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the
high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and
energy.
In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of
nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base,
it is also important to alter key components of the state,
the nation-state;
and, more sweepingly,
to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these
social and political arrangements, namely patterns of domination, patterns
manifested not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured
relations,
male-female
relations,
human-animal
relations,
human-nature
relations;
to remove, in short, chauvinistic relations. However not everything
and especially p.227, bottom paragraph.
11.
See p.225ff.
12.
In Anders and elaborated in Foley, and more straightforwardly,
in Martin.
The incomplete list of items given above, to be investigated in a deeper
analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164.
70
needs to be accomplished at once;
and the cluster of damaging power and
domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the
problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key
components of states.
In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states,
Schell repeats
the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast
between "raison d'etat and the Socratic—Christian ethics.
The teaching that
'the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times,
have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort'
(p.134).
So
'states
may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival'.
Schell
then argues however,
that extinction nullifies end-means justification by
destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on
human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions.
Even if
all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for
nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends—means
argument can however be repaired to remove such objections:
instead it is
13.
These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated
package,
comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge,
control, wealth,
energy, speed,
satisfaction,
...,
for the "newer" Enlightenment (but
Faustian) virtues.
Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for
excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one
main component, preference—satisfaction for instance, or utility. And the
type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry
about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational,
which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it,
consists in maximisation, of the virtues.
Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however,
into limitation
theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisation of power, as with the
Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel
maximisation
of knowledge,
paradoxes of omniscience.
There are no
consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient.
The drive for
maximum consistency,
often taken to be the epitome of rationality, also
leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories,
such as
arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative
theorems).
14.
R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also
drives the arms race. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral
science.
have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological
determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single,
source of the nuclear fix.
It is technology, the mega-machine, running out
of control,
that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss.
Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and
those
who
control
them,
for they are simply caught up by this
out—of—control machine;
but sometimes the state itself is seen as a
machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like
other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false.
Nuclear
technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political
dispute involving distinguished scientists;
it was deliberated, funded and
promoted, while other alternatives were not.
Damaging
technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable,
but
deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And
much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted
with.
The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of
refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often
recalcitrant
technologies.
They also admit of being made to look
ridiculous.
If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if
it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve
as a human population control device, a matter also determined.
That is,
the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation.
71
claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the
realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context,
those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its
nuclear policies.1$
An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe
enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state
ends.
So even from an expediency perspective, superstate policies are open to
severe criticism, for example as motivationally irrational.
As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves
us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the
right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187).
War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via
jealous nation states (p.188).
Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having
sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell
contends, necessary for people to organise for war. On the other side, without
war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty. Neither of these contentions is
transparently clear as they stand. The first is damaged by civil war and the
like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the
macro-state system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in
particular)
to argue from the "realities" of international life, which include
self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred.
It is on this basis that peace
arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as
extremist (cf. p.185).
Schell's further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens, however, to
undermine his case against the sovereign state;
for example, his ends-means
argument and the argument based on its nuclear war-making capacity. Fortunately
the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous
characterisation of war as 'a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an
end'
(p.189):
but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is
right (so it is argued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different from
earlier conventional wars.
Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end
which nuclear "war" does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends
(even if LSN wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games
are won).
It is also claimed that war depends on weakness;
on one side being
defeated on a decision by arms. But in nuclear "war" this doesn't happen, 'no
one's strength fails until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what
these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear
wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just
wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and
improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional
wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that
nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme
that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between
nations, for the final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192-193). The theme
depends on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war
and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of
appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests
that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative
behaviour,
e.g. joint referenda). The theme also imports the social-Darwinian
assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war" theme criticised in §2) that war
has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were
thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for
winning,
surrender,
etc.) and rule-less activities. On the contrary, wars are
parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of
understandings, conventions and rules.
They are a social phenomenon, with a
rule structure, if not a logic.
Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war" but from what
is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic]
planning". The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive
nuclear arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound,
15.
This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main
qualification can be inferred from Schell's context.
72
reasonable,
rational.
However this represents little more than a cheap
semantical trick.
Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or
anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of decision
(as presented, e.g.,
in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning;
but it does not yield specific results without desirability measures being
assigned to alternative outcomes,
that is without values being pumped in,
extralogically.
There are various ways these value assignments may
be
determined,
to meet moral requirements or not;
but in nuclear strategic
planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency.In
fact,
'logic of'
tends to be used very generously,
as a word of general
commendation, to cover something like 'rational considerations entering into the
policy or strategy of'.
In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing
with the term 'logic of', should write of 'the illogic of deterrence',
for he
emphasizes (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening
use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest
viewpoint)
of actually using them should the threat fail: 7 yet the success of
deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat
of
this
unjustifiable and irrational use.
Indeed Schell wants to go still further and
locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g.
pp.201-2): but the argument depends
on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,18 along with the
assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well
be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent.
16.
Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically;
for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own
advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that 'the logic of
deterrence' is based on eye—for—eye and tooth—for—tooth assumptions.
17.
Even the irrationality of the use has been contested, e.g.
it
wishfully
thought that America will rise like a phoenix
radioactive ashes.
has been
from the
There is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of the missing
motive for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive
one, but an ideological one:
eliminate the prospect of the future
dominance of the rival ideology.
18.
An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration
appears in recent US "star war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to
"negate" incoming USSR missiles.
Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction;
although
involving negation they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of
intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in §5) derives from
a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to
proceed to LSN war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention
to proceed.
Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the
number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an
intention,
is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed
- how satisfactorily i& another matter - by a distinction between
longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing
contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions.
73
APPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility
and on Regional Strategies
What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what means one
has, as well as on what one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be.
So too what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located and
what sort of power it is, on national as well as on moral considerations.
In
present circumstances states have an evident responsibility to work out their
policies.
There are however some persuasive arguments that this is where all
responsibility ends:
these major responsibilities accrue entirely to states,
and there is no individual, or (smaller scale) collective, responsibility to
work out a policy or stance on such matters as nuclear arrangements and still
less to act, perhaps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such
a no-responsibility or opt-out position no doubt suits many people - many for
themselves,
some (especially more authoritarian power-holders) on behalf of
others - it does involve inadmissibly opting out of moral responsibilities,
responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of
certain social arrangements.
Now there is no doubt that individuals and groups can do this, can opt out.
They can neglect their moral responsibilities;
but they are not justified in
doing so. Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person's
being set in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they
like it or not so long as they choose to live with others, there are some neat
arguments which appear to permit, or even warrant, opting out. One influential
argument takes the following lines:
1.
The (ordinary) individual,
or group, has no possibility of making a
difference to what happens. Therefore
2.
Such individuals,
or groups, have no obligation to try to make a
difference. Hence
3.
Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when
things go wrong.
There are two main assumptions in this argument, both of which should be
resisted:
firstly, in getting from 1 to 2, a variant of the "ought implies can"
themel, and secondly, the assumption that individuals can't make a difference.
While it is true that individuals cannot accomplish much on their own, together
they can. What an individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many
other individuals do.
In highly competitive communities,
full of hopeful
free-riders, a person may encounter a familiar impasse:
that he or she acts in
manner
M
(e.g.
morally,
against nuclear arrangements, rationally), at
considerable personal cost, with no guarantee that others will also act M-ly.
Such an impasse no longer faces so many in the West, at least as regards initial
steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in
ways that do make a difference.
An individual is not exonerated from
responsibility by the argument.
While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are
directed at making some difference, many individuals also have the option of
more individualistic action in such forms as boycotts, go slows,
political
disobedience.
An important form of individual resistance, already adopted in
Canada and north-western USA, is refusal to pay income taxes directed towards
defence
or various parts thereof (e.g.
nuclear weapons production and
deployment), or alternatively redirection of such taxes, for instance to peace
funds.
Evidently,
however,
all these more individualistic forms of political
activity work more effectively if individuals integrate their activities,
since
the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). As
well collective action helps in distributing the impact of retribution or
punitive action by state authorities.
1.
Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due
seriousness is bound
to reject this theme.
There are also independent
grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme:
see Routley and Plumwood.
74
There are, furthermore, arguments of some weight that individuals are under
some sort of moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate
themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of
action this is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance,
whether it is a nuclear power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilities,
etc.,
and on such complicating issues as what kind of preventive action the
state is likely to take in return.
(Any state seriously practising deterrence
is bound to take some action against effective protest,
or risk losing
credibility;
but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one
individual need bear.)
One argument - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear
weapons to,
for example,
providing facilities for them - proceeds from the
wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is not right to be making the
weapons for such war.
The argument here applies connecting principles (like
those of §5), while appealing to such background information as that the
manufacture and deployment of such weapons increases the risk of such war. But
if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a
state that is doing so ought to disaffiliate themselves from such defence
production, and disaffiliation includes not paying for such production through
defence taxes .
The argument is not without substantive assumption, but the
assumptions appear morally reasonable and defensible.
Another
effective
argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be:
Does one want to be, or effectively to be seen as, the kind of person who goes
along with the nuclear destruction of human populations?
Or with making
credible a threat to do so, or the like?
What follows applies primarily to
people who do not want to be, or be seen as, such people.
Arguments like these not only put opt-outers and do-nothingers on the spot
insofar as
they contribute to national objectives;
they also raise questions,
perhaps even dilemmas, as to political obligation for those who would take
action,
even limited action such as redirection of taxes 3. For are there not
political obligations to the state, such as paying due taxes and supporting the
national defence effort?
It is usually assumed that there are. However, no
dilemma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligations to be
regulated in some fashion by moral obligations;
for in this case moral
obligations override political obligations.
In fact political obligations are
already significantly limited by moral constraints. The nuclear situation does
not so much bring out new limits on political obligation,
as emphasize the
respects in which those obligations are already limited, and introduce further
moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements.
An obligation to try ** to dissociate oneself from
preparation
for
nuclear
war or from nuclear-deterrence,
for instance by not spending part of one's
working life contributing indirectly to it, does not commit one to more than
this:
to an obligation, for example,
to work for an alternative national
defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this would be a good
thing to try to contribute towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on
where one lives, the level of one's commitments, e.g.
to nonviolence, and so
forth. For not only are different types of policy reorientation appropriate for
different nations and regions, but there are more superficial and deeper
reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, e.g.
schemes that leave
2.
An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthaussen of
support of his refusal to pay defense taxes.
3.
This dilemma and option is now removed in practice for most wage earners by
Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes apparently introduced to give
the state interest on gross earnings,
but obviously very effective in
removing taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferring
power from individuals to the state.
4.
Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little
more than try, without giving up one's work and thereby one's ability to
contribute to other deserving causes. For example,
it may be virtually
impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is
investing in projects which one opposes or ought to oppose, or both.
Seattle
in
75
"conventional" warfare apparatus more or less intact,
schemes that change that.
and
deeper
(ecological)
The US Bishops, for example, present a rather shallow set of goals for a
superpower such as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the
development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and working
for better control of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear
situation affords an important opportunity to press however for a much deeper
set of changes in the superstates.
For those whose very limited political
influence is exerted in considerably less powerful states, even the shallow
goals may look quite different:
there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps
those of another power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to better
control.
The view from the very minor powers in the Antipodes is furthermore
different from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect in
much of the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LSN war,
while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and others).
There
is accordingly some obligation — an obligation little considered and not grasped
by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve
there in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local
and regional self-interest would also suggest substantial steps
towards
self-preservation that (foolishly) have not been initiated.
What is broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once
Steps include withdrawal from the American alliance,
the goals are glimpsed.
which is in any case of questionable merit since its main advantages lie with
the US and it affords no guarantee of local defence;$ closure of American bases
and withdrawal of American access rights for nuclear—carrying equipment to
ports, air bases and other facilities, especially so as to remove local nuclear
targets; pursuit of a more evenhanded policy of nonalignment (something quite
small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve).
That much is easy, in
principle;
and justified.
It is justified because local commitment to the
American military operations in the region lacks a solid foundation;
it is
premissed primarily on the acceptance of deterrence, which,
so it has been
argued (in §5ff.),
lacks justification. That Australian commitment to joint
Australian—US facilities and to US military operations in the region is
explicitly based on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent
statements of government policy. The joint facilities are 'part of a system of
deterrence'. &
More difficult to ensure, at least without much preparation, is that
economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North.
Secondly, then, the building of increased socio-economic independence in the
Antipodes is required. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone
not worth targeting militarily:
the region must also have a sustainable life of
its own. For a small region, that looks a very costly exercise unless combined
with other desirable objectives;
for example,
in Preddey and others it is
estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build
up New Zealand's economic independence.? For a larger region which included
Australia,
the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many
Northern military budgets, and have the advantage that much of the expenditure
is genuinely productive.
If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structural
readjustment were combined with the independently desirable aims of moving the
5.
See the discussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.140-1.
How slight
the commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been
emphasized again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the
USA.
Of course,
the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparatively minor
one, of the many military treaties that should be terminated:
from a
European and world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact
arrangements, and the removal of American and Russian forces from Europe
(and elsewhere), are very much more important.
A fuller discussion of Australia's defence philosophy
will appear in a subsequent publication in this series.
and
alternatives,
76
whole region towards a multi-cultural conserver society and perhaps even
diverting "defence" spending to connected self—management and social defence
goals, the costs would be very considerably lessened. They only appear so great
in the setting of a consumer-satellite society.
In any case, where life and
culture themselves are concerned, the costs do not appear excessive.
In sum, Southern countries should be severing their military linkages with
Northern
nuclear
powers^,
and
should be preparing now,
socially and
economically, for the time after the LSN war, the great Northern war.
However
there are serious blockages in the way of such things in the Antipodes, and
indeed impeding any substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war.
Some
of the blockages derive again from the fact that present nuclear arrangements
favour many of the power holders and suit strong corporate interests which wield
political power.
But the main blockages to more popular action are sloganised
in the false dichotomy:
"either it won't happen or we're all dead anyway;
so
why bother".
One reason for blockage is then the extinction assumption (SI of
Appendix 1), the unwarranted adoption of which is excessively nihilistic.
A
more important reason is that most people, and most of their political
representatives, do not believe that major repercussions of LSN war are going to
befall them.
These are events which, like starvation and torture, happen to
other (remote) people, not them.
It is not that LSN war is unthinkable:
rather it is that it seems
unbelievable that it should make any difference. Most people in the Antipodes
really do not believe that their lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear
war.
Waking up and mobilising these people is a major part of the problem in
6.
See the letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Minister, replying to a symposium on
consequences of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, 1983. The
point is also made by the Foreign Minister in his Evatt Memorial Lecture,
as Hawke notes.
The point is softened by representing the facilities as
also having a role in verification, as well as deterrence, 'that makes arms
control and reduction feasible':
the known role of the facilities in war
fighting is not alluded to, and nor is the fact that any verification role
can be alternatively accomplished using satellites. However the matter is
not in any doubt:
'successive Australian governments ...
have taken the
view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the
United States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence;
quoted in Threats to Australia's Security, p.17).
Government representatives (e.g. Hawke) concede that the joint facilities
put Australia at nuclear risk.
'However it is the judgement of this
Government that the benefits to Australia in terms of its immediate
interest and global strategic consideration outweigh potential risks'. A
proper decision-theoretic analysis would not support Hawke's claim:
since
Australia is known to be a nuclear target because of American bases (cf.
Ball, pp.130-8),
the potential risks given that an LSN war has
a
non-negligible probability far outweigh any immediate benefits.
Since
Australia has only a regional strategic role,
the global strategic
considerations are, as could be otherwise inferred, primarily those of the
main user of the facilities, the USA. The Government is prepared to put
Australia,
its peoples and ecosystems, at what is decidedly serious risk
for immediate and American interests.
A
worthwhile
representative
government does not hold its peoples hostage for such reasons. Not only is
that short-sighted expediency decision making:
it seems virtually certain
that the details of the decision making, were they ever revealed, would not
justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, but
would turn on such things as present trade advantages and short-term
commercial considerations.
7.
As to the economic and social problems Australia would face in the event of
an LSN war, see Coombs for a preliminary assessment.
8.
Ideally the removal of significant nuclear targets should take place across
the whole Southern Hemisphere, because this is the zone that is relatively
insulated, atmospherically, from the Northern Hemisphere.
77
achieving requisite social and political adjustment.
Even those who believe
that LSN war is not improbable (but may well not be totally destructive of life)
do little to reorganise their lives in a way that would reflect their
assessment.
Richard Routley*
9.
Again, for some of what to do,
for
some
ways
to
reorganise,
see
e.g.
Martin.
There is also much intellectual work to be undertaken, for
example, searching out details of alternative arrangements, and also
discrediting establishment experts, especially economists and political
scientists, who intellectually underwrite present nuclear arrangements.
*
The text has been much improved as a result of detailed comments by C.
Pigden, R.
Goodin, N.
Griffin, B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through
correspondence with G.
Foley.
J.
Norman has helped in its final
organisation.
The initial outlines of the paper were worked out in
Victoria, Canada;
and an early version was read at Simon Fraser University
in 1982.
78
REFERENCES
G. Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen,
toasAA.
G. Anders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken zur atomaren
Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE.
1956;
Situation,
referred
C.H.
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OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School Publications
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1974, Third edition 1975.
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
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can be correctly used, and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of
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action, 1982.
2. R. Routley,
In defence of cannibalism I. Types
of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
3. R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meanings of life?, 1982.
4. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics, 1983.
5. R. Routley, War and peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and
nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out, 1984.
6. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions.
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8. N. Griffin, Lifeboat U.S.A., 1984.
9. R. Routley, War and peace II.
On the alleged inconsistency, moral
insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism, 1983.
n
w
w
[j
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Discussion Papers
in environmental philosophy
Philosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600
NUMBER 9
WAR AND PEACE. II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY
AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
RICHARD ROUTLEY
��FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
by
R. Routley
Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1983
��ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
Pacifism,
despite
its
revival
limited
through
the
nonviolent
action
1
movement
and
as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues
to have a bad philosophical press.
one
way
or
another,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as inconsistent.
as
incoherent
Even philosophical
defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding
pacifism
is
in
only
that
consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
2
position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the
prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic
methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;
from
rights.
an
In
influential
and
and arguments from irresponsibility and
widely
disseminated
set
of articles
3
attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
be
better characterised by the more sweeping
1.
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle:
see Origins 12
(1982) pp.310-311.
The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.
2.
In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.
Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists' belief
vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.
as
"bizarre
and
�P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
The
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
is
which
sense
narrower
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily
elsewhere.
the
But
if
violence
is
violence
is impermissible, then it should be so
what
Pacifism, as a
universally and not merely in war.
out
rule
moral
position,
should
be
comprehensive.
On its own showing, it is contended,
proper
action
to
preventative action
commitment
to
prevent,
what
would
involve,
it
pacifism
acclaimedly
in
the
case
of
pacifism.
incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism:
claims
Narveson's
or
of
from
taking
violence;
But
force.
genuine
actively
defend
on
them,
pain
Hence
the
initial
that it cannot underwrite its
of
inconsistency.
However
location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several
connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force.
initial
for
a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action
of a type logically excluded
own
prohibits,
use
sometimes,
precluded
is
The
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it
should
be
'to
use
violence',
namely
3
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and
'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted
in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
1970 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed.
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425.
Page references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further
elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia,
1980, pp.109-147. Page
references prefixed by 'N' are to this article.
2
�It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
R2.
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
It is
cases
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
to
violence).
resist
The
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
by
pacifists
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however what
assault
on
pacifism
(after
Narveson
several
clearing
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
pacifism,
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
of
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
unless
a
slide
(tentatively)
by
is
without
fighting
pacifism
does
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
Nor
does
comprehensive
made.
theses
on
ought,
T1
T2,
and
imply
that
pacifism,
characterised
we have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will
not
apply
violent
methods.
Nor
therefore
does
it
imply
that
conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some,
good
4.
deal,
of
that
machinery
is.
One
hardly
the
all
or
a
needs to be a comprehensive
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in
his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.
3
�pacifist to coherently think the latter.
the
This provides
some
for
confirmation
key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident
in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are
legitimate
morally
are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
stunt
The
connotation of violence or at least of force which
and defending are taken to imply (use of)
or
force
use of force is taken to by implied in R2.
resist
cannot
proceeds
Hence
(p.415).
and
violence,
so
to
Hence
the
also
Narveson's
assumption
that
against attack' (pp.417-8).
to
and
so
pacifism
render
a
much
less
can
be
resisted,
without
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence.
force, but not vice versa;
and
violence.
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
even
be
But
defensible position.
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
Things
a
If the stunt were got away with, it would
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
resistance,
be
unwarranted
"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
to
Hence the conflation of T2 and
excluded from among admissible pacifist methods.
pacifist
here
Narveson
Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing,
equate with violence.
R2;
the
Violence implies
and it is violence, not all applications
of
force,
that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
to
castrate
practices,
any case indefensible.
development
themselves
compromise,
and
from
pacifism,
by
of
it
depriving
the
range
of
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
It enjoys some popularity even
among
those
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance
older
mediation,
pacifism,
whose
methods
they
see
as
confined
to
negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions.
The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification;
for
pacifism
has
often
by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods
oeen
presented,
(cf.
even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously
4
said
�pacifism
of
'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by
that
negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the
hostilities
added).
and
of
total
doctrine
of
non-resistance
non-cooperation with any form of warfare':
But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether
or standard, need so limit its admissible methods:
to
italics
comprehensive
nothing excludes resistance,
uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.
It
is
simply
that
comprehensive
pacifism
has
not yet developed its fuller
potential, especially in conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
on
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in
terms
of
'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist's
'opposition
to
If
violence'.
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
to violence.
it
is
Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
5.
In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see
for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social
Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston,
1980,
p.198.
Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent
action from pacifism;
and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism
can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.
But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile
positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law
reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,
1961, p.212.
5
�A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument
inconsistency
based
pacifism theme,
P2(R).
on
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
the
transformed to the claim
No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).
For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in
notion
of
The
right.
initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from
breaches of a right and of
Because
very
the
action
preventative
against
infringement
'a right just is a status justifying preventative action ...
of
it.
what does
follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent
infringements of his right' (p.419).
That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out
to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide - to
such
incorporate
things
Moreover 'it is a logical truth,
as social pressure.
not merely a contingent one, that what might be
For
these
necessary
the
against
question
(p.421)!
nonviolent
quite indefensibly strong.
him
be,
to
to
or
be
limited
to,
In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is
action.
entitle
rights
with
The argument accordingly
To block the argument it is enough for
pacifism.
associated
preventative action
not
force'
logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative
action must have the notion of violence built into it.
begs
is
to
For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does
kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if
such action is necessary in the circumstances to
prevent
infringement
of
his
right.
to
How the argument from rights leads
inconsistency
is
summed
thus
up
(p.421):
SAI.
'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence
done
to us', as a consequence of the objection to avoid violence.
But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is
self-contradictory,
both
granting
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
Narveson
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
6
is
mistaken
p.423).
in
That a
�right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
action
does
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in
by
simply
rejecting
the
Narveson
not
slide^.
What
for
SAI,
appears in place of SAI is
something like
SAI#.
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
facto,
give
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
not,
does
ipso
Without the slide there is
The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
violence
and
In
evil.
lesser
outline
the
argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must
admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the
violence
those
be
would
where
Inconsistency
some
is
morally
use
of
immediate
permissible
violence
by T2.
and morally justified.
would
evil,
of
The cases are
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
prevent
use
to
admit
both
that
the
some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible because it involves violence.
An argument
like
this
as gets summarized as follows:-
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that
[E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of
force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force
(by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing
between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and
(0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like
'rights'
occur without stuffing.
This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in
between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to
violence.
An account of rights which will serve is given in R.
and V.
Routley
'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy
(ed. D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff.
7
�supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under
circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force ?.
these
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches.
It
is
to
important
them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the
get
ethical place of pacifism
is
to
result.
The
from
argument,
basic
lesser
violence, goes as follows:Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence,
since in this way, in any arbitrary one of
minimized.
*^P2.
the
indicated,
cases
violence
is
Therefore
It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
to
it
which
is
morally
wrong, always, to use violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
this
argument,
together
with
pulled together from Narveson's work.
support
for
the
He not only espouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
the
argument with the lesser evil argument:El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
is,
the
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
7.
J.
8.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
9.
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
8
�Neither argument is decisive;
of
that
reference
they
both in fact begin easing pacifists into a
frame
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
should
moral relatives, where obligations give way
to
obligations-other-things-being-
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
got
E3
it.
into
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
rooting it out, which may
involved, e.g.
has
involve
nonminimization
strategies.
Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to C2
- a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being
to
prepared
violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social
accept
justice.
Nor do El and E2 entail 02;
so neither does
principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept 02.
by
commitment
violence^",
evil—perpetrating
Narveson's
such
e.g.
but
argument
some
increases
well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an
non-violent
fails
to
For in particular, violence
is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
in
pacifists
for
dictator.
similar
reasons.
Regan's
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically
3.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
4.
Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must
quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
be
preferred
to
a
great
an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering
force, even when force is an evil.
of
It is enough to observe that increasing force may
still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.
Resort to the theme that
Elt.
Violence is an irredeemable evil
(proposed by Regan in his
by
Narveson,
defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and
Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty.
subsequently
considered
An irredeemable evil is
figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser
violence.
9
�will lighten its hue;
now
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2,
but
What are the grounds for that?
the problem with the argument shifts to Elt.
As
Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared
to
countenance
some
small
amount
of violence in exchange for considerable goods.
(But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing
it
was
not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get
gross.)
pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence;
deeper,
by
indeed it seems to get
It does break the argument however;
underwriting C2.
them
in
for it removes Cl
and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument
from
lesser evil, which starts from
DI.
There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil,
evil
than that tainted with violence;
requires.
however
pacifism
is
no
of
pacifism
(see
(utilitarian
which
Rp.80ff.),
into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous' position (Rp.86),
extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines
But the approach
greater
and there are accordingly no cases such as DI
This is the core of Regan's defence
converts
there
through
violence
as
an
irredeemable
evil
is
a
.
mistaken
inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is,
like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such absolutes are adequately
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby,
as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons
otherwise
don't
arise,
or
for
acting
other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not
11.
That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of
Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If
any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater
quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.'
While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation,
there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.
10
�come what may, period.
such
pacifism
as
is
Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions,
at
collide
bottom,
head-on
more fashionable, highly
with
malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at
time) were working from.
The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ...
is incompatible with pacifism':
some
one who acts
for the utility 'that will be brought out
by
may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121)
violence
the
according
to
the
to
utilitarian-commandment
maximize
doing
13
So
.
utility
may
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false
little:
every
position
doctrine
inconsistency
suffers
such
with
utilitarianism
as
very
many
false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism
odds
the
with
contractarianism.
other
ethical
positions
But this argument would
only
no deeper ecological
position
insidious,
is
however,
for
Firstly, as we
such as pacifism.
generally,
have
have
provisional.
theory-saving
seen,
made
at
also
libertarianism
were
it
and
otherwise
however they are not, including
has
which
happened
is
more
it
utilitarianism,
seem
as
climate
unfavourable
to
incompatible
There are two more specific damaging features.
and
consequentialist
approaches
more
no deontic principle were firm, but all are
if
The theory of prima facie principles
This is entirely mistaken.
is
a
device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties
such as moral dilemmas.
13.
weight,
is
that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of
ethical thought, thus helping to establish a
positions
What
instance.
presents,
carry
if the positions were suitably exhaustive;
correct,
ethical
he
shows
Secondly, consequentialist positions tend
to
suggest
that
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in
using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18.
It has
also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents
can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist,
rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting
that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig
in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force
will
reduce
evil,
so no one is justified in using force. This is
sceptically-based pacifism.
11
�only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try
such
positions,
as
into
pacifism,
offering
sometimes
to
rival
ease
incongruous consequential
support for their themes.
Narveson
assumptions
takes
such
procedures
upon pacifists:
stage
a
further,
and
utilitarian
foists
thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence
is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain,
in
the
recipients'
These
(p.425).
incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for
objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and
what
it
does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators
as
well
as
those
on
whom
it
is
inflicted.
Even
more
astonishing,
such
utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following
three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as morally good) is to will the
to
it
(at
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the
means
least prima facie).
[N]2.
greater.
[N]3.
There are no "privileged" moral persons ...
(p.425)^ .
'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist s problem ,
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it
is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as
an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral
doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).
It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax
out
of the statements given.
such
consequences
For implications to hold the substantive terms such as
'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or
otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds.
another,
in
the
implicans;
The intended argument to the
"commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of
variant
on
the
lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles , N3 to
stop exceptions being made for oneself
14.
and
one's
group,
and
N1
to
ensure
that
:se may be defended on purely
Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim
as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive
ethical theories.
12
�violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g.
in
Cl,
in
ethical
an
end.
But,
is
reflected
for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least
dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed,
which
as
the
begs
bound morally to shun violent means.
question
pacifism,
against
Under pacifist reformulation Nl will
give way to something more like
To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally
Nl#.
means
acceptable
to it.
For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need
the three principles duly adjusted;
pacifists since nothing damaging emerges;
worry
not
they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.
More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has
countered.
This
and
E2
N2
or
inconsistency
is
of
evil)
comprehensive
to
pacifism.
Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one
what is the moral situation here?
to
not
(admissibility
What
of
these
are
them
being
violence)
of
difficult
the
Indeed the example is very similar to
dilemma,
situation
where
turns
on
Jim
shoots
one
of
what account is given of moral dilemmas.
pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to
utilitarian
line
N
But
ought
The situation is that
of
a
paradigmatic
that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing
squad about to shoot several captives if
everything
that
and
cases 15?
N ought to prevent mass murder, but also
kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
of a moral dilemma.
moral
03
N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
person
be
the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil)
(minimization
in
to
yet
of
trying
them^,
almost
Now
What a comprehensive
take
the
inadequate
to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever
occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were
prima
facie, negotiable, etc., etc.
No, the conflicting obligations stand.
to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try
to
determine
What is
the
best
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is
that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to
conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases
involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted
in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.
13
�do
thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to
the
In
circumstances.
trying
N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied.
the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g.
that
B.
No inconsistency in pacifism follows.
evil,
minimize
it
Suppose
N had better shoot
is
preferable
to
and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized,
On the contrary the situation
N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had
fix.
a
that
Even granted
it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence.
remains
to
is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate,
what
determine
in
There is the real-life complication
better do so^.
of
dilemma,
moral
a
but
no
inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.
Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of
rights, can now be met.
the
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
justified in that case? (p.420)
is
its
use
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where
to
be
raped.
No, it is not deonticly justified^.
and
amount to making out a case.
But
justification
on
proposes
is
solution,
back-up
ambiguous,
in
p.423).
against
may
dilemma
a
another
argument, taking his proposals as evident.
pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not
argument
and
just
situation.
the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is
morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing
no
It is certainly not morally
The response is qualified then because some force might
be consequentially justified, as a second-best
presents
is
it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its
deontic origin in 'making right'.
Narveson,
one
Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer
is a qualified No:
obligatory,
from
pacifism
-
person
but
he
As it is not - the
lead
to
a
decisive
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.
What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
17.
This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
14
�The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral
§3.
its
adherence
to
unexceptionable
fanaticism, so Hare contends.^
principles
Insofar
as
such
Hare
as
manages
insensitivity.
P2,
to
Through
pacifism is a form of
get
his
remarkable
accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism:
the
pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought,
but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others
(P.174).
Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting
stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's
dilemmas
moral
deceptively neat two-level
thought,
into
intuitive
Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution
pacifism.
himself
helps
moral
of
to,
without
any
violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf.
redefinition,
a
Harey-fanatic,
e.g.
p.175).
Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism.
Hare's
Hare
of the requisite supporting argument, according to
which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time,
on
and
pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme
comprehensive
But
critical.
classification
A fanatic
is a person who adheres to ideals which
diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf.
p.170)!
Since
comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as
already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson)
namely
tends,
towards the
pacifists are Harey—fanatics. This
usual
whether they are
sense:
whether
The
'bigoted'.
idea
that
violence
in many situations, such
does not of course make them
fanatics
position comprises
their
of
appropriateness
'wild
of
some
of
pacifist principles^.
the
depends on the very different matter of
or
extravagant opinions'
or
(OED)
is
pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an
appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers,
founders
in
fanatics,
and
the
the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to
But the relevant opinions
hardly be, all of the condemned type.
of
such
thinkers
Whence the conclusion follows.
are
not,
can
By this simple
syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.
19.
R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1981,
p.173.
references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.
15
All
page
�Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's
satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism:
is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as
being
as
Jewish,
is
completed,
it
there^^ fanaticism
wearing
beads
Naturally, given that using of characterising
or
moral
hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant
can
matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to
violence:
blue
For however the sensitive task matter of using
morally relevant.
violence as morally irrelevant.
relevance
more
earlier,
those
of
applying
this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up
at the end of §4).
Does it really matter then that
fanatics?
it
Although
argument that it does.
homework
appears
pacifists,
that
though
not
Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had
guess
what,
they
their
done
the
Thus, e.g.
p.15:
go
over
to
Hare's
As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great
store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ...
20.
Harey-
properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would
utilitarianism).
of
are
it does not matter in the least, Hare has an
abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and,
logic
fanatics,
concepts
A.
based [entirely] on
involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several
Naess, Gandhi and Group
Conflict,
Universitetsforlaget,
...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of
ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of
nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in
defence, the exception.
21.
the
R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral philosophy, Macmillan, London,
1972,
p.78.
Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this
article on peace — from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and
nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to
utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are
present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone
wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just
alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer
prototype argument developed against nationalism.
16
Oslo,
�crucial points.
objectionable
to
getting
Before
of
feature
these
of
some
theory.
The
a
highly
Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in
which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework
two-level
is
there
details,
procedure
adopted
is
methodologically
Hare's
of
own
radically unsound
because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at
the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently
rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way
above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic
rejected
Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt.
which
logic,
already
But
since
that
Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over
As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some
to Hare's utilitarianism).
important opponents of utilitarianism.
In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and
comprise
intuitionists
moral
and
pure
Impure
impure.
fanatics
who stick to their deontic
deontologists,
principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what
calls
'critical
thinking'.
Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme
pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal
clearly'
Hare
or
inability
to
facts
face
or
to
think
involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking,
(p.170)
originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion
accommodating
ff.).
But
cases
this
comprehensive
bit
intuitive
principles
conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28
dirty-trick
philosophy
can
where
of
pacifists
are
presumably
"pure
willing to think critically, but somehow survived
opinions
different
from
here
be
fanatics";
the
ordeal
those of the utilitarian' (p.171).
set
aside,
still
holding
his
argument
is
correct
argument is not correct.
See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid.
17
moral
They are in fact "pure
to
be
According to Hare there cannot be
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen.
any fanatics of this type, if
since
for they are 'able and
fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out
22.
of
(p.171).
Therefore,
his
�One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure
to
consider
the
possibility
a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical
that
assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians
(cf.
other
p.177 ff.) depends on preference
reasons.
substitution,
preferences
For
which
can
be
one,
argument (e.g.
Hare's
requires
a
base
class
intersubstituted.
Hare,
chauvinistically contracts this base class
representation
whole
of
to
ff.).
p.176
preference-havers,
in
the
of
course
There
are
whom
among
his
discussion
humans.Differently,
certain
the
of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to
familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.
As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this
is
less
an
argument
a
than
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical
mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and
complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
applied
to
avert
greater
Regan is envisaging
where
situations
violence
and he points to what he takes to be the evident
evil;
moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free
from
an
aspiring
rapist'
is
Interestingly,
(Rp.86).
has
Regan
situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand:
herself
not described the
there is nothing
in
to
prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and
fleeing.
What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the
(perhaps
wilful)
that
infliction
death, by forceful means^ (cf.
mere
use
of
of
damage,
non-negligible
Np.110);
that is, which
physical force or power (or energy).
including pain, injury or
involves
much
more
than
And it is by no means so evident
that the woman is entitled to
inflict
violence
from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way
is
duly
separated
violence
upon
the
aspiring
rapist.
Once
that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
23.
On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base
Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.
18
class,
see
R. and
V.
�But
a
straightforward
action
violence
disentangling
defective
It
is
of
subcase
not
depend
force
by
is
means
no
of
on
violence.
a
tight
Fortunately
characterisation
what
indicate
some
done, in the way of inflicting damage.
constraints
Firstly,
presupposed.
force:
is
legalised force,
violence,
so
violence,
a
on
satisfactory
violence
is
not
applied
on
behalf
account
adequately
of
some
of
violence,
where no force is applied.
violence.)
24.
supposed
that
and
are
which
distinguished as illegitimate
"legitimate
authority,
long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated.
so often mistakenly
of
However it is important to
is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.25 Secondly, violence is not
of
the
enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of
actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means
through
so
Indeed the literature on nonviolent
characterisations
arguments developed in this paper do
violence.
a
matter as may at first seem.
with
abounds
as
the
is
Violence
threat
(This only needs emphasizing because it is
threats,
intimidation
and
the
like,
involve
Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems
such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live
(goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not
necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy,
or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy
habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent
destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.
It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of
violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not
involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation
and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds
related to those that tell against violence proper.
For similar reasons,
"economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such
procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to
be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence
or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity.
Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many
difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical
practices involve violence.
19
�There can be unintentional violence, e.g.
the women may have applied violent
Fourthly, such matters as the distance
without intending to, in escaping the rapist.
at which force is applied and the indirectness of
military operations, are irrelevant.
modern
means,
the
means,
as
instance
for
in
The submarine operator who, by causally
pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian
city
instigates
violent
a
By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not
act.
in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent
confined
to
action
done
against
persons,
means.
but
can
violence
Finally,
be
directed
not
is
against
other
life-forms, as will soon emerge.
Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and
the
from
fact
that
one
of
them^
derives
violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that
there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts
violence greater than zero.
of
Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to
matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us
on
most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on
small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral
certainly
will
problems.
They
give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2
they mean 'nontrivial violence'.
Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not
taking
obvious
steps
passivity and pacifity.
to
prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of
Both Regan and Narveson (e.g.
p.425) assume
that
pacifism
25.
The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political
Freedom, op.cit., p.288n.
Note however that Sharp's account of 'political
violence'
is defective in various other respects.
It is curious,
but
understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action,
Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence,
and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with
force and threat with use.
26.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent
action.
20
�This is far from true, as the variety of methods
is a passive do-nothing position.
or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain.
considered
Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of
Otherwise,
Narveson
negative
later
Narveson's
action.
nonviolent
hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping)
would
way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not
(p.425).
Neither Regan nor
doing
assessment
nonviolence' does not change the situation:
for this
of
anything
about'
violence
what
calls
'positive
positive
he
approach
simply
is
nonviolence practised in an exemplary :.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will
follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential
or effectiveness of nonviolent practices.
extent
when
assembled^,
much
the
reduce
of
and
training
the
Fuller details of these practices,
the
of
impact
nonviolent
argument
from
social
irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.
§4.
The
argument
corollaries.
The
from
radical
practice
political
corollaries
by
definition.
But
from
other
awkward
of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war.
war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
war
and
the
position
Although normally war would be excluded,
Standard pacifism takes
For
out
of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear.
what
of
dilemma
situations?
War
would
always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances
it might be the (second-) best thing
27.
to
do.
A
strange
pacifism!
Comprehensive
The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going
off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components
have been removed.
As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types:
protest, noncooperation and intervention;
op.
cit.
pp.32-3.
Of course
pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations
are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).
28.
See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear
war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein
pp.152-3, especially G. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit.,
(referred to as Politics) and V.
Coover and others, Resource Manual for a
Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981.
21
�pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast
to
extreme
pacifism.
Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to
If
extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
is
given
a
large
suitably
that
evil
weighting then second-best choices will yield the same
results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that
eliminate
since
wars,
of
war
an
as
or
mounted from
upon
rely
the
institutions.
only
obviously police and military forces but
many of their institutions, most
legal
state
arrangements,
States are however desirable social institutions,
typically depend on violent means.
and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just
comprehensive
implies
pacifism
the
of
inadmissibility
institutions, such as police forces and states typically are;
be ruled out either
individuals,
as
directly
delegates,
who
violence-dispensing
violence
effect
however exclude the replacement of such
forces,
by
nonviolent
nonviolent means.
state;
but
it
substitutes,
is
nonviolent
methods
or
such organisations may
else
because
their behalf.
evolved
will
Pacifism
institutions concerned with
does
not
public
that
order
have
Pacifism does not
organisations
maintain
they
by
fully
as
police
alternative
nonviolent
will be applied, where necessary, to
The force of the objection should thus not
entail
order,
sweeping charges of social irresponsibility.
22
the
and
are
coercive
actively
Law and authority can still operate then in the
back-up authority and "enforce" laws.
overestimated.
on
recently
which
wars,
A more telling objection, then, is
no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils).
that
which
violence-underpinned
these
of
directly
less
institutions
and a more general argument may be
and
nation-states
particular,
or
arrangements
social
inevitability,
or
not without much further ado.
least
extensively:
violence
desirability,
In
at
institution,
However wars are by no means the
dispense
exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all
nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the
reasonable costs;
desirability
are
wars
would
it
elimination
accordingly
of
does
Nor is it true that
prominent
not
be
social
succumb
to
�pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is,
the illegitimacy of
government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the
sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).
A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent,
noncoercive,
arrangements.
political
arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible.
imply
the
absence
or
illegitimacy
of
government,
political community organised under a government.
state
with
authority
and
not
necessarily
pacifism does not entail anarchism.
main
implies
it
Accordingly,
that
not
does
or therefore of a state, of a
Nor does
it
even
that
imply
a
certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral
dilemmas of political organisation.
and
only
pacifism
Comprehensive
or (differently)
objective,
attained,
not
was
Since it admits of states with frameworks of law
based
on
the free agreements of individuals,
Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample:
a
nonviolent
Indian
genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism
simple as derivability.
Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a
it was not the
state;
replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society.
moral
his
Granted there
are
they are not so
so
ideal
easily
brought down by its political corollaries.
Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than
concerning
like:
external
and
internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the
it also tells against the received treatment of
example.
While
other
species,
animals
for
it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating
of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals.
29.
those
At least it does this
so
long
Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without
moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of
violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on
replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The
irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they
differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied
(see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially
Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit,
anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state
authority)
and
restrictions on liberty, to a limit.
Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi:
'The ideally nonviolent
state will be an ordered anarchy'
(unreferenced citation at the end of the
Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).
23
�as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as
is
humans (or persons).
restriction.
30
controversial
euthanasia,
the category by restriction of the application of violence to
from
removed
not
There is little good basis
in
And,
humans,
of
violence?
At
the
suicide,
But
must
creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms.
simply
the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature
killing
of
No force need be applied:
in
a
eats
and dies painlessly and without a struggle.
The
or
pill
given
is
life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence?
technical
purely
arrangements
pacifist
will
to
objections
in
solve,
eating
meat
worthwhile
On the face of
obtained.
so
New
any rate, the disruption of
at
principle
an
Then the proper objections to
such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that
it, there are no
they
risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples
like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing.
injection
several
into
e.g.
So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices.
involve
chauvinistic
spread
corollaries
killing
a
such
indeed wherever violence plays a significant role.
punishment,
capital
the
concerning
for
however
similar
case,
any
areas
moral
and
violence,
practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.
But suppose now that the new technology
is
as the anti-neutron bomb, which selectively destroys
which
by
further
clever
newly devised "weapons", such
scientists, working in their accustomed military role:
devices
much
extended
property
but
not
people,
or
"dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence.
just
Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid
these
reaches
of
technological
For "dissolving" people requires energy,
fantasy.
which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in
violence:
Was
(upgraded)
account
of
that is, the new wars will still involve violence.
there
old-fashioned
however
violent
anything
methods
wrong
so
such
as
with
hunting
eating
meat
obtained
by
more
or raising and killing one's own?
Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural"
iO.
an
behaviour
of
creatures
to
cit.
See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op.
Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g.
Politics, p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and
predation.
24
�which the principles are supposed to apply.
Aggression is a fairly common feature of
and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made
animal
out) erupts in violence.
ways,
various
for
The force of the
example
along
these
argument
can
however
Aggression
lines.
is
assumed to be an
evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for
(of
their offspring) in their natural environment.
and
themselves
ir
mitigated
be
survival
But most humans
now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations
which
evolution
for
gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance).
Much
humans
as
have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they
should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices,
now
ill-adapted
to
their
and mostly counterproductive.
situation
So
argues the pacifist.
is a residual problem,
There
like
that
of
and tribal
people, to be condemned as morally
Sometimes,
yes,
Are
wrong
when
predators
involve
these
the
violence?
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to
Though a way
but always?
can
it is a rather unsatisfactory way.
problem
vegetarianism.
creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as
practices
be attained:
confronting
beaten
be
the
around
of
edge
this
What this suggests is that nonviolence
is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal.
The arguments for
nonviolence
-
which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence
and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings -
sort
of
But
conclusion.
exclude.
nonviolent
what
is
called
charge
for
state,
is
is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at
This is^ to concede
an
of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as
P2 remains unqualified.
31.
would
The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral
sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2.
attentuated
similar
approaches
thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive
that
a
the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least,
since it opens the door a chink to other options which
categorically
suggest
The sheer moral power of such pacifism
As Singer has in the analogous case of
Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
25
vegetarianism:
is
one
see
reason
e.g.,
for
Animal
�There is no reason however why
giving its adoption some pause.
a
genuine
pacifism
(making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits
such natural phenomena as predation.
Nothing logically rules out such a genuine
and
more sensitive pacifism.
There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as
In
particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts
similar to those using violence:
This
is
a
requirement
of
otherwise they could have a case made against them.
in a different sense from the pure logical
consistency
sense, namely that of keeping to the same story.
for
well.
pacifism,
Again there need be no deep problem
so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must
be a single principle
(e.g.
just
P2)
-
as
distinct
from
a
bundle
of
moral
principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving
violence.32 To meet the rationality requirement the position should,
be
integrated
into
a
in
larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a
piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices
to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g.
mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic
and
oceans.
In
an
does
not
destructive
such things as strip
wastes
in
streams
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property
picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism.
vandalism
particular,
cover
violence
But
even
metaphorically,
against persons (and certainly not nonphysical
violence such as "psychological violence").
What is sought then
is
an
appropriate
of these notions covering destructive practices;
and also an accompanying
synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'.
Then P2 is superseded by
synthesis
an appropriately qualified
P2#.
It is morally wrong to use vandolence.
It remains to characterise
the
cluster
of
destructive
practices
that
count
as
vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
32.
It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject
assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences.
Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.
33.
The position has been called 'pacifism.
26
�APPENDICES
§ 5.
from
arguments
The
and
pacifism in the real world.
of
impracticality
impracticality
reality:
social
the
alleged_
Even if it is conceded that pacifism
is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still
the
feasibility
of
pacifism
as a sensible practice to live by will be contested -
despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi.
to
be
that
admitted
the
pacifism to severe tests.
real
world,
with
all its horror and squalor, does put
But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.
Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less
than in replacing war^.
prepared
for
to
likely
succeed
Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual
violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they
properly
And it has
or
given
a
have
been
never
The prospects for success of
dress rehearsal.
nonviolent defence of a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war
convention
is
observed
or not.
If the convention is observed then pacifism stands
reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
perhaps
unleashed,
in
broken,
is
and
violence
is
According to Walzer, in his
massive ways, on noncombatants.
superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance,
'success
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention -
...
and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^).
attained
-
there
is
conventions are flouted.
reasons,
some
got homesick.
ruthless
of
This is
presumably
be
never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some
The invaders may give
them irrelevant, e.g.
up
and
depart
for
all
sorts
or
they needed a quick decisive victory, they
What Walzer no doubt means is something like this:
invaders
may
Success
false.
that
sufficiently
in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support
34.
The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source
considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit
35.
Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op.cit.
references given there.
36.
All page references prefixed by 'W' are to
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
27
See also
M. Walzer,
Martin,
Just
and
of
war)
op.cit.,
Unjust
is
and
Wars,
�But that sort of thing is also true even if the
lines, etc., can eventually succeed.
defending
to violence.
resorts
side
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
is
if the defence "forces" are well-armed it
invaders
to
easier
and
with
start
difficult
more
than
afterwards
and
with
costly
the
for
civil
well -prepared
resistance.
Walzer is
nonviolent
the
of
model
the
in
way
enslaved
Jews,
misleading
The
way.The
Nazis,
many
like
who
to
jump
that
conclusion
the
cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of
defence
inappropriate examples.
command,
however,
thinking,
who
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian
the
in
state,
total
Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the
the
population,
by
The
"resistance"
picture
is
highly
and large, did not resist extermination in an organised
invaded
never
Germany,
were
in
control
the
all
or
For
infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population.
Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army
took
over
and
managed
all
key
Australia it is not even so clear
largely
united
and
actively
With island territories such as
infrastructure.
that
resisting
this
is
which
logistically
population.
Walzer's
feasible
against
impression
resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g.
a
of the
Wp.332)
might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers
ready to leave.
Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate
No state would be prepared to risk
way
in
37.
It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish,
opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country
comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue,
R.L.
Rubenstein, The Cunning of History:
the Holocaust and the American
Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.
38.
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by
Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
present
state-determined circumstances.
28
�training its
populace
different).
It
in
would
full
techniques
defence
(civil
all too easy for them to "rout" the police:
be
then
action
nonviolent
is
civil
obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.
The argument
thus
far
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism:
has
been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
That in itself is revealing.
deviations
from
it
are
initial sketchings.
Pacifism is the
what
require
rest
position
explanation.
(inertial
and
state)
The reason for this is simple
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of
enough:
it is what has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of
and
merely
justified.
case
try
privileged
dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be
to
in
that
the
defender
(person
or
nation)
is
morally—excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral
the
position
The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent:
curious
is
its
the
in
already
a
Still
bounds.
defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma
And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have
situation.
to
use
it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:-
Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic
already glimpsed will begin.
None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are
deductively
tight
assumptions
can
be
challenged
arguments for pacifism particularly good ones.
for
pacifism,
(as
above).
Nor
One of the poorer positive
are all the
arguments
for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory
29
�of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited,
that
nuclear
or
chemical
case is overstated.
hope
weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an
illusion, escalation is inevitable.
are bound to be overstepped.
the
e.g.
The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are
-
Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the
Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible.
Wars are much
more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows.
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped
things intervene (e.g.
(as
support
more
should
midstream
for
first
the
those
inevitably,
premiss
above)
for
mixture
a
suffering
and
anguish
of
violent
the
methods,
They
nonviolence.
of
consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g.
pain,
important
a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are,
include
in
injustice
characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of
means-ends
cost
the
in
violence
that
violence
within
the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained
by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
more
less furtive, society.
open,
the why of
pacifism)
considerable.
These
are
None of these well-known types of reason (giving
separately
decisive,
but
their
cumulative
affords a model for one way of proceeding^:
Mill's
defence
Mill's
procedure
works
(st
least
As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.
30
of
liberty
nonviolence,
it works as well as it works for
liberty).
39.
is
it is enough (a nonelementary exercise)
to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for
otherwise
effect
reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong
positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence.
as
a
�A
decisive
more
consequentialist
data.,
argument,
takes
a
but
making
semantical
preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds
modelling
nonviolence
Again
principles.
use
and
The data is used to arrive at
route.
are
practical
similar
of
then
pacifism
in
applied
is
derived
semantically
principled
as
nonviolence.0
R.
40.
Routley*
*
The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R.
and V.
Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical
foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.
* With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and
participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.
The main outlines of the paper were drafted
associate at Simon Fraser University.
31
while
the
author
was
a
research
�OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School publications:
R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second
edition 1974, Third edition 1975.
Departmental publications:
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.
D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental
Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
and
13.
14.
15.
R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, A note on R_
* matrices, 1979.
R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980.
C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981.
R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used,
N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983.
R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 1983R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983.
R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983.
Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
10.
R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning$of life?, 1982.
R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics.
R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war
and war—deterrence and the political fall-out.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in
rational behaviour under rival paradigms.
����/
/-
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�
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Discussion Papers
in environmental philosophy
Philosophy Departments
The Australian National University
PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600
NUMBER 9
WAR AND PEACE. II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY
AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
RICHARD ROUTLEY
FOR CIRCULATION AND
EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT
WAR AND PEACE.
II
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
by
R. Routley
Number 9
Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy
Department of Philosophy
Australian National University
1983
ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND
FANATICISM OF PACIFISM
Pacifism,
despite
its
revival
limited
through
the
nonviolent
action
1
movement
and
as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues
to have a bad philosophical press.
one
way
or
another,
It is commonly portrayed
characteristically
as inconsistent.
as
incoherent
Even philosophical
defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding
pacifism
is
in
only
that
consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral
2
position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive .
What follows challenges the
prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic
methods.
§1.
Slide arguments to inconsistency;
from
rights.
an
In
influential
and
and arguments from irresponsibility and
widely
disseminated
set
of articles
3
attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is
not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally
wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence.
This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine.
What I
shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely
radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory
(p.408, italics added).
Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would
be
better characterised by the more sweeping
1.
According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is
'a valid Christian
position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early
Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle:
see Origins 12
(1982) pp.310-311.
The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified
one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves
from traditional pacifism.
2.
In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of
Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed
by R.
Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists' belief
vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'.
as
"bizarre
and
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
However T2 captures the cases that
orthodox
opposition.
separate
comprehensive
pacifism
from
main form of pacifism under investigation is called
The
'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual
is
which
sense
narrower
restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably
opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily
elsewhere.
the
But
if
violence
is
violence
is impermissible, then it should be so
what
Pacifism, as a
universally and not merely in war.
out
rule
moral
position,
should
be
comprehensive.
On its own showing, it is contended,
proper
action
to
preventative action
commitment
to
prevent,
what
would
involve,
it
pacifism
acclaimedly
in
the
case
of
pacifism.
incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism:
claims
Narveson's
or
of
from
taking
violence;
But
force.
genuine
actively
defend
on
them,
pain
Hence
the
initial
that it cannot underwrite its
of
inconsistency.
However
location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several
connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force.
initial
for
a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action
of a type logically excluded
own
prohibits,
use
sometimes,
precluded
is
The
slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion
of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it
should
be
'to
use
violence',
namely
3
J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and
'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted
in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California,
1970 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part
of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed.
J.
Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425.
Page references without further citation are to this latter article.
Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further
elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed.
T.
Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia,
1980, pp.109-147. Page
references prefixed by 'N' are to this article.
2
It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence -
R2.
and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related
of
R2 (e.g.
It is
cases
from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S,
forbidden
to
violence).
resist
The
slide
is
illegitimate
because
commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2;
for
one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence,
worked
out
by
pacifists
and others, which do not involve use of violence (or
perhaps force).
The initial slide is however what
assault
on
pacifism
(after
Narveson
several
clearing
exploits
confusions,
explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way).
irresponsibility
of
in
This
his
first
main
which he takes to
argument,
from
the
does not actually lead to contradiction, but it
pacifism,
does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method
of
maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible:
... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral
principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked
... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the
right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that
we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of
criminal justice is, in fact, unjust.
Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents
this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6).
Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression
back
violence),
(with
unless
a
slide
(tentatively)
by
is
without
fighting
pacifism
does
not mean what Narveson claims it means,
Nor
does
comprehensive
made.
theses
on
ought,
T1
T2,
and
imply
that
pacifism,
characterised
we have no right to punish
criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will
not
apply
violent
methods.
Nor
therefore
does
it
imply
that
conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some,
good
4.
deal,
of
that
machinery
is.
One
hardly
the
all
or
a
needs to be a comprehensive
Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced
back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods
see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston,
1971.
As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in
his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent.
3
pacifist to coherently think the latter.
the
This provides
some
for
confirmation
key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident
in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are
legitimate
morally
are mistaken.
The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon,
initial
slide.
is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the
stunt
The
connotation of violence or at least of force which
and defending are taken to imply (use of)
or
force
use of force is taken to by implied in R2.
resist
cannot
proceeds
Hence
(p.415).
and
violence,
so
to
Hence
the
also
Narveson's
assumption
that
against attack' (pp.417-8).
to
and
so
pacifism
render
a
much
less
can
be
resisted,
without
by
Force can be applied, as in opening
sliding out of handcuffs and running away).
a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence.
force, but not vice versa;
and
violence.
things like arrest, without violence (e.g.
even
be
But
defensible position.
positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field,
Things
a
If the stunt were got away with, it would
deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action
resistance,
be
unwarranted
"recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever
defended
to
Hence the conflation of T2 and
excluded from among admissible pacifist methods.
pacifist
here
Narveson
Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing,
equate with violence.
R2;
the
Violence implies
and it is violence, not all applications
of
force,
that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude.
The attempt
nonviolent
to
castrate
practices,
any case indefensible.
development
themselves
compromise,
and
from
pacifism,
by
of
it
depriving
the
range
of
is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in
It enjoys some popularity even
among
those
advocating
expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance
older
mediation,
pacifism,
whose
methods
they
see
as
confined
to
negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions.
The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification;
for
pacifism
has
often
by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods
oeen
presented,
(cf.
even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously
4
said
pacifism
of
'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by
that
negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the
hostilities
added).
and
of
total
doctrine
of
non-resistance
non-cooperation with any form of warfare':
But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether
or standard, need so limit its admissible methods:
to
italics
comprehensive
nothing excludes resistance,
uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.
It
is
simply
that
comprehensive
pacifism
has
not yet developed its fuller
potential, especially in conflict resolution.
Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against
just
variations
qualifier.
on
those
pacifism
are
given, writing violence-involving in as an internal
Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in
terms
of
'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat
perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the
pacifist's
'opposition
to
If
violence'.
this
slide
were
pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in
case
of
the
permissible any
being
opposed
to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed
to violence.
it
is
Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though
not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make
much of in his main inconsistency argument.
5.
In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see
for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social
Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston,
1980,
p.198.
Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent
action from pacifism;
and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism
can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well.
But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile
positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law
reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press,
1961, p.212.
5
A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument
inconsistency
based
pacifism theme,
P2(R).
on
to
notion of rights, especially as it figures in the
the
transformed to the claim
No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418).
For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in
notion
of
The
right.
initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from
breaches of a right and of
Because
very
the
action
preventative
against
infringement
'a right just is a status justifying preventative action ...
of
it.
what does
follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent
infringements of his right' (p.419).
That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out
to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide - to
such
incorporate
things
Moreover 'it is a logical truth,
as social pressure.
not merely a contingent one, that what might be
For
these
necessary
the
against
question
(p.421)!
nonviolent
quite indefensibly strong.
him
be,
to
to
or
be
limited
to,
In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is
action.
entitle
rights
with
The argument accordingly
To block the argument it is enough for
pacifism.
associated
preventative action
not
force'
logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative
action must have the notion of violence built into it.
begs
is
to
For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does
kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if
such action is necessary in the circumstances to
prevent
infringement
of
his
right.
to
How the argument from rights leads
inconsistency
is
summed
thus
up
(p.421):
SAI.
'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent
the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'.
SA2.
We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence
done
to us', as a consequence of the objection to avoid violence.
But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is
self-contradictory,
both
granting
and not granting the right to use violence.
The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected.
claiming
Narveson
that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf.
6
is
mistaken
p.423).
in
That a
right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending
require that that action is violent.
action
does
Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis
of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in
by
simply
rejecting
the
Narveson
not
slide^.
What
for
SAI,
appears in place of SAI is
something like
SAI#.
If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them.
But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc.,
facto,
give
an entitlement to the use of violence.
no dilemma for the pacifist.
not,
does
ipso
Without the slide there is
The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide
are
two aspects of the one thing.
The arguments from lesser
§2.
violence
and
In
evil.
lesser
outline
the
argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must
admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the
violence
those
be
would
where
Inconsistency
some
is
morally
use
of
immediate
permissible
violence
by T2.
and morally justified.
would
evil,
of
The cases are
greater
violence.
More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms
which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have
lesser
much
prevent
use
to
admit
both
that
the
some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and
that it is not admissible because it involves violence.
An argument
like
this
as gets summarized as follows:-
It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that
[E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of
force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force
(by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the
6.
Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing
between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and
(0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like
'rights'
occur without stuffing.
This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in
between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to
violence.
An account of rights which will serve is given in R.
and V.
Routley
'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy
(ed. D.
Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff.
7
supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under
circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force ?.
these
Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches.
It
is
to
important
them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the
get
ethical place of pacifism
is
to
result.
The
from
argument,
basic
lesser
violence, goes as follows:Cl.
There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence.
C2.
One ought to minimize violence.
Therefore
C3.
There are cases where one ought to use violence,
since in this way, in any arbitrary one of
minimized.
*^P2.
the
indicated,
cases
violence
is
Therefore
It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence,
contradicting the pacifist principle, P2,
according
to
it
which
is
morally
wrong, always, to use violence.
All the ingredients
premisses,
can
be
of
this
argument,
together
with
pulled together from Narveson's work.
support
for
the
He not only espouses
C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects
the
argument with the lesser evil argument:El.
(Use of) violence is an evil.
E2.
Evil should be minimized.
The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2,
E3.
One ought not to undertake violence
-
period;
that
is,
the
level
of
violence ought to be zero.
Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148.
7.
J.
8.
Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that
Regan lands himself in:
he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like
senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78).
9.
See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be
minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil.
That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson
is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off
against other evils.
8
Neither argument is decisive;
of
that
reference
they
both in fact begin easing pacifists into a
frame
resist, where moral absolutes are warped into
should
moral relatives, where obligations give way
to
obligations-other-things-being-
In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at
equal, etc.
all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one
compatible
got
E3
it.
into
is
directives quite different from minimization where violence is
with
rooting it out, which may
involved, e.g.
has
involve
nonminimization
strategies.
Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to C2
- a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being
to
prepared
violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social
accept
justice.
Nor do El and E2 entail 02;
so neither does
principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept 02.
by
commitment
violence^",
evil—perpetrating
Narveson's
such
e.g.
but
argument
some
increases
well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an
non-violent
fails
to
For in particular, violence
is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by
in
pacifists
for
dictator.
similar
reasons.
Regan's
reconstruction
of
Regan argues from premisses
concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically
3.
The use of force is a substantive evil.
4.
Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must
quantity of force (Rp.79).
The argument is invalid:
be
preferred
to
a
great
an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering
force, even when force is an evil.
of
It is enough to observe that increasing force may
still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable.
Resort to the theme that
Elt.
Violence is an irredeemable evil
(proposed by Regan in his
by
Narveson,
defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and
Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty.
subsequently
considered
An irredeemable evil is
figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods)
10.
An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to
undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser
violence.
9
will lighten its hue;
now
it always dominates.
Elt together with E2 will yield C2,
but
What are the grounds for that?
the problem with the argument shifts to Elt.
As
Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared
to
countenance
some
small
amount
of violence in exchange for considerable goods.
(But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing
it
was
not
too
Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get
gross.)
pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence;
deeper,
by
indeed it seems to get
It does break the argument however;
underwriting C2.
them
in
for it removes Cl
and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument
from
lesser evil, which starts from
DI.
There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil.
For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil,
evil
than that tainted with violence;
requires.
however
pacifism
is
no
of
pacifism
(see
(utilitarian
which
Rp.80ff.),
into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous' position (Rp.86),
extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines
But the approach
greater
and there are accordingly no cases such as DI
This is the core of Regan's defence
converts
there
through
violence
as
an
irredeemable
evil
is
a
.
mistaken
inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is,
like other deontological positions, grounded upon.
But such absolutes are adequately
expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby,
as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons
otherwise
don't
arise,
or
for
acting
other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not
11.
That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of
Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If
any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater
quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.'
While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation,
there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations.
12.
Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use
violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an
extreme position even if a consistent one.
Such a priority rule is an
unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below.
10
come what may, period.
such
pacifism
as
is
Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions,
at
collide
bottom,
head-on
more fashionable, highly
with
malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at
time) were working from.
The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ...
is incompatible with pacifism':
some
one who acts
for the utility 'that will be brought out
by
may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121)
violence
the
according
to
the
to
utilitarian-commandment
maximize
doing
13
So
.
utility
may
sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles.
On its own inconsistency with a false
little:
every
position
doctrine
inconsistency
suffers
such
with
utilitarianism
as
very
many
false doctrines.
Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism
odds
the
with
contractarianism.
other
ethical
positions
But this argument would
only
no deeper ecological
position
insidious,
is
however,
for
Firstly, as we
such as pacifism.
generally,
have
have
provisional.
theory-saving
seen,
made
at
also
libertarianism
were
it
and
otherwise
however they are not, including
has
which
happened
is
more
it
utilitarianism,
seem
as
climate
unfavourable
to
incompatible
There are two more specific damaging features.
and
consequentialist
approaches
more
no deontic principle were firm, but all are
if
The theory of prima facie principles
This is entirely mistaken.
is
a
device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties
such as moral dilemmas.
13.
weight,
is
that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of
ethical thought, thus helping to establish a
positions
What
instance.
presents,
carry
if the positions were suitably exhaustive;
correct,
ethical
he
shows
Secondly, consequentialist positions tend
to
suggest
that
To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in
using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18.
It has
also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents
can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist,
rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting
that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig
in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force
will
reduce
evil,
so no one is justified in using force. This is
sceptically-based pacifism.
11
only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try
such
positions,
as
into
pacifism,
offering
sometimes
to
rival
ease
incongruous consequential
support for their themes.
Narveson
assumptions
takes
such
procedures
upon pacifists:
stage
a
further,
and
utilitarian
foists
thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence
is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain,
in
the
recipients'
These
(p.425).
incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for
objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and
what
it
does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators
as
well
as
those
on
whom
it
is
inflicted.
Even
more
astonishing,
such
utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following
three statements, one of which however he must deny (!):
[N]l.
To will the end (as morally good) is to will the
to
it
(at
Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to
the
means
least prima facie).
[N]2.
greater.
[N]3.
There are no "privileged" moral persons ...
(p.425)^ .
'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist s problem ,
among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it
is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as
an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral
doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425).
It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax
out
of the statements given.
such
consequences
For implications to hold the substantive terms such as
'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or
otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds.
another,
in
the
implicans;
The intended argument to the
"commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of
variant
on
the
lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles , N3 to
stop exceptions being made for oneself
14.
and
one's
group,
and
N1
to
ensure
that
:se may be defended on purely
Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of
logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim
as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive
ethical theories.
12
violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g.
in
Cl,
in
ethical
an
end.
But,
is
reflected
for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least
dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed,
which
as
the
begs
bound morally to shun violent means.
question
pacifism,
against
Under pacifist reformulation Nl will
give way to something more like
To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally
Nl#.
means
acceptable
to it.
For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need
the three principles duly adjusted;
pacifists since nothing damaging emerges;
worry
not
they hardly leave pacifism as untenable.
More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has
countered.
This
and
E2
N2
or
inconsistency
is
of
evil)
comprehensive
to
pacifism.
Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one
what is the moral situation here?
to
not
(admissibility
What
of
these
are
them
being
violence)
of
difficult
the
Indeed the example is very similar to
dilemma,
situation
where
turns
on
Jim
shoots
one
of
what account is given of moral dilemmas.
pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to
utilitarian
line
N
But
ought
The situation is that
of
a
paradigmatic
that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing
squad about to shoot several captives if
everything
that
and
cases 15?
N ought to prevent mass murder, but also
kill B, because that is murder and involves violence.
of a moral dilemma.
moral
03
N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119).
person
be
the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil)
(minimization
in
to
yet
of
trying
them^,
almost
Now
What a comprehensive
take
the
inadequate
to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever
occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were
prima
facie, negotiable, etc., etc.
No, the conflicting obligations stand.
to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try
to
determine
What is
the
best
15.
A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is
that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to
conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases
involve.
16.
The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted
in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82.
13
do
thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to
the
In
circumstances.
trying
N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied.
the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g.
that
B.
No inconsistency in pacifism follows.
evil,
minimize
it
Suppose
N had better shoot
is
preferable
to
and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized,
On the contrary the situation
N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had
fix.
a
that
Even granted
it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence.
remains
to
is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate,
what
determine
in
There is the real-life complication
better do so^.
of
dilemma,
moral
a
but
no
inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil.
Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of
rights, can now be met.
the
argument
The question presents a dilemma:
If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case,
justified in that case? (p.420)
is
its
use
Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where
to
be
raped.
No, it is not deonticly justified^.
and
amount to making out a case.
But
justification
on
proposes
is
solution,
back-up
ambiguous,
in
p.423).
against
may
dilemma
a
another
argument, taking his proposals as evident.
pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not
argument
and
just
situation.
the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is
morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing
no
It is certainly not morally
The response is qualified then because some force might
be consequentially justified, as a second-best
presents
is
it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its
deontic origin in 'making right'.
Narveson,
one
Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer
is a qualified No:
obligatory,
from
pacifism
-
person
but
he
As it is not - the
lead
to
a
decisive
(though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g.
What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again.
17.
This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical
detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear;
also available in this Discussion Paper series.
18.
An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No.
14
The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral
§3.
its
adherence
to
unexceptionable
fanaticism, so Hare contends.^
principles
Insofar
as
such
Hare
as
manages
insensitivity.
P2,
to
Through
pacifism is a form of
get
his
remarkable
accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism:
the
pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought,
but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others
(P.174).
Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting
stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's
dilemmas
moral
deceptively neat two-level
thought,
into
intuitive
Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution
pacifism.
himself
helps
moral
of
to,
without
any
violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf.
redefinition,
a
Harey-fanatic,
e.g.
p.175).
Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism.
Hare's
Hare
of the requisite supporting argument, according to
which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time,
on
and
pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme
comprehensive
But
critical.
classification
A fanatic
is a person who adheres to ideals which
diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf.
p.170)!
Since
comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as
already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson)
namely
tends,
towards the
pacifists are Harey—fanatics. This
usual
whether they are
sense:
whether
The
'bigoted'.
idea
that
violence
in many situations, such
does not of course make them
fanatics
position comprises
their
of
appropriateness
'wild
of
some
of
pacifist principles^.
the
depends on the very different matter of
or
extravagant opinions'
or
(OED)
is
pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an
appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers,
founders
in
fanatics,
and
the
the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to
But the relevant opinions
hardly be, all of the condemned type.
of
such
thinkers
Whence the conclusion follows.
are
not,
can
By this simple
syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted.
19.
R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1981,
p.173.
references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text.
15
All
page
Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's
satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism:
is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as
being
as
Jewish,
is
completed,
it
there^^ fanaticism
wearing
beads
Naturally, given that using of characterising
or
moral
hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant
can
matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to
violence:
blue
For however the sensitive task matter of using
morally relevant.
violence as morally irrelevant.
relevance
more
earlier,
those
of
applying
this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up
at the end of §4).
Does it really matter then that
fanatics?
it
Although
argument that it does.
homework
appears
pacifists,
that
though
not
Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had
guess
what,
they
their
done
the
Thus, e.g.
p.15:
go
over
to
Hare's
As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great
store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ...
20.
Harey-
properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would
utilitarianism).
of
are
it does not matter in the least, Hare has an
abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and,
logic
fanatics,
concepts
A.
based [entirely] on
involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several
Naess, Gandhi and Group
Conflict,
Universitetsforlaget,
...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of
ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of
nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in
defence, the exception.
21.
the
R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral philosophy, Macmillan, London,
1972,
p.78.
Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this
article on peace — from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and
nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to
utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are
present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone
wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just
alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer
prototype argument developed against nationalism.
16
Oslo,
crucial points.
objectionable
to
getting
Before
of
feature
these
of
some
theory.
The
a
highly
Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in
which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework
two-level
is
there
details,
procedure
adopted
is
methodologically
Hare's
of
own
radically unsound
because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at
the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently
rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way
above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic
rejected
Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt.
which
logic,
already
But
since
that
Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over
As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some
to Hare's utilitarianism).
important opponents of utilitarianism.
In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and
comprise
intuitionists
moral
and
pure
Impure
impure.
fanatics
who stick to their deontic
deontologists,
principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what
calls
'critical
thinking'.
Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme
pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal
clearly'
Hare
or
inability
to
facts
face
or
to
think
involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking,
(p.170)
originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion
accommodating
ff.).
But
cases
this
comprehensive
bit
intuitive
principles
conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28
dirty-trick
philosophy
can
where
of
pacifists
are
presumably
"pure
willing to think critically, but somehow survived
opinions
different
from
here
be
fanatics";
the
ordeal
those of the utilitarian' (p.171).
set
aside,
still
holding
his
argument
is
correct
argument is not correct.
See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid.
17
moral
They are in fact "pure
to
be
According to Hare there cannot be
inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen.
any fanatics of this type, if
since
for they are 'able and
fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out
22.
of
(p.171).
Therefore,
his
One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure
to
consider
the
possibility
a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical
that
assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians
(cf.
other
p.177 ff.) depends on preference
reasons.
substitution,
preferences
For
which
can
be
one,
argument (e.g.
Hare's
requires
a
base
class
intersubstituted.
Hare,
chauvinistically contracts this base class
representation
whole
of
to
ff.).
p.176
preference-havers,
in
the
of
course
There
are
whom
among
his
discussion
humans.Differently,
certain
the
of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to
familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast.
As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this
is
less
an
argument
a
than
damaging charge:
A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical
mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and
complexities of human existence (Rp.86).
The smear is not without basis.
applied
to
avert
greater
Regan is envisaging
where
situations
violence
and he points to what he takes to be the evident
evil;
moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free
from
an
aspiring
rapist'
is
Interestingly,
(Rp.86).
has
Regan
situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand:
herself
not described the
there is nothing
in
to
prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and
fleeing.
What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the
(perhaps
wilful)
that
infliction
death, by forceful means^ (cf.
mere
use
of
of
damage,
non-negligible
Np.110);
that is, which
physical force or power (or energy).
including pain, injury or
involves
much
more
than
And it is by no means so evident
that the woman is entitled to
inflict
violence
from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way
is
duly
separated
violence
upon
the
aspiring
rapist.
Once
that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity.
23.
On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base
Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section.
18
class,
see
R. and
V.
But
a
straightforward
action
violence
disentangling
defective
It
is
of
subcase
not
depend
force
by
is
means
no
of
on
violence.
a
tight
Fortunately
characterisation
what
indicate
some
done, in the way of inflicting damage.
constraints
Firstly,
presupposed.
force:
is
legalised force,
violence,
so
violence,
a
on
satisfactory
violence
is
not
applied
on
behalf
account
adequately
of
some
of
violence,
where no force is applied.
violence.)
24.
supposed
that
and
are
which
distinguished as illegitimate
"legitimate
authority,
long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated.
so often mistakenly
of
However it is important to
is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.25 Secondly, violence is not
of
the
enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of
actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means
through
so
Indeed the literature on nonviolent
characterisations
arguments developed in this paper do
violence.
a
matter as may at first seem.
with
abounds
as
the
is
Violence
threat
(This only needs emphasizing because it is
threats,
intimidation
and
the
like,
involve
Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage.
Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems
such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live
(goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not
necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy,
or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy
habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent
destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different.
It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of
violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not
involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation
and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds
related to those that tell against violence proper.
For similar reasons,
"economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such
procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to
be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence
or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity.
Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many
difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical
practices involve violence.
19
There can be unintentional violence, e.g.
the women may have applied violent
Fourthly, such matters as the distance
without intending to, in escaping the rapist.
at which force is applied and the indirectness of
military operations, are irrelevant.
modern
means,
the
means,
as
instance
for
in
The submarine operator who, by causally
pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian
city
instigates
violent
a
By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not
act.
in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent
confined
to
action
done
against
persons,
means.
but
can
violence
Finally,
be
directed
not
is
against
other
life-forms, as will soon emerge.
Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and
the
from
fact
that
one
of
them^
derives
violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that
there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts
violence greater than zero.
of
Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to
matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us
on
most sides when we look.
Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on
small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral
certainly
will
problems.
They
give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2
they mean 'nontrivial violence'.
Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not
taking
obvious
steps
passivity and pacifity.
to
prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of
Both Regan and Narveson (e.g.
p.425) assume
that
pacifism
25.
The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political
Freedom, op.cit., p.288n.
Note however that Sharp's account of 'political
violence'
is defective in various other respects.
It is curious,
but
understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action,
Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence,
and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with
force and threat with use.
26.
Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent
action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent
action.
20
This is far from true, as the variety of methods
is a passive do-nothing position.
or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain.
considered
Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of
Otherwise,
Narveson
negative
later
Narveson's
action.
nonviolent
hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping)
would
way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not
(p.425).
Neither Regan nor
doing
assessment
nonviolence' does not change the situation:
for this
of
anything
about'
violence
what
calls
'positive
positive
he
approach
simply
is
nonviolence practised in an exemplary :.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will
follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential
or effectiveness of nonviolent practices.
extent
when
assembled^,
much
the
reduce
of
and
training
the
Fuller details of these practices,
the
of
impact
nonviolent
argument
from
social
irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity.
§4.
The
argument
corollaries.
The
from
radical
practice
political
corollaries
by
definition.
But
from
other
awkward
of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war.
war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale.
war
and
the
position
Although normally war would be excluded,
Standard pacifism takes
For
out
of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear.
what
of
dilemma
situations?
War
would
always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances
it might be the (second-) best thing
27.
to
do.
A
strange
pacifism!
Comprehensive
The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going
off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components
have been removed.
As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types:
protest, noncooperation and intervention;
op.
cit.
pp.32-3.
Of course
pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations
are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68).
28.
See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear
war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein
pp.152-3, especially G. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit.,
(referred to as Politics) and V.
Coover and others, Resource Manual for a
Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981.
21
pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast
to
extreme
pacifism.
Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to
If
extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence.
is
given
a
large
suitably
that
evil
weighting then second-best choices will yield the same
results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war.
Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that
eliminate
since
wars,
of
war
an
as
or
mounted from
upon
rely
the
institutions.
only
obviously police and military forces but
many of their institutions, most
legal
state
arrangements,
States are however desirable social institutions,
typically depend on violent means.
and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just
comprehensive
implies
pacifism
the
of
inadmissibility
institutions, such as police forces and states typically are;
be ruled out either
individuals,
as
directly
delegates,
who
violence-dispensing
violence
effect
however exclude the replacement of such
forces,
by
nonviolent
nonviolent means.
state;
but
it
substitutes,
is
nonviolent
methods
or
such organisations may
else
because
their behalf.
evolved
will
Pacifism
institutions concerned with
does
not
public
that
order
have
Pacifism does not
organisations
maintain
they
by
fully
as
police
alternative
nonviolent
will be applied, where necessary, to
The force of the objection should thus not
entail
order,
sweeping charges of social irresponsibility.
22
the
and
are
coercive
actively
Law and authority can still operate then in the
back-up authority and "enforce" laws.
overestimated.
on
recently
which
wars,
A more telling objection, then, is
no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils).
that
which
violence-underpinned
these
of
directly
less
institutions
and a more general argument may be
and
nation-states
particular,
or
arrangements
social
inevitability,
or
not without much further ado.
least
extensively:
violence
desirability,
In
at
institution,
However wars are by no means the
dispense
exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all
nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the
reasonable costs;
desirability
are
wars
would
it
elimination
accordingly
of
does
Nor is it true that
prominent
not
be
social
succumb
to
pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is,
the illegitimacy of
government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the
sense that defines a state at all (Np.127).
A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent,
noncoercive,
arrangements.
political
arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible.
imply
the
absence
or
illegitimacy
of
government,
political community organised under a government.
state
with
authority
and
not
necessarily
pacifism does not entail anarchism.
main
implies
it
Accordingly,
that
not
does
or therefore of a state, of a
Nor does
it
even
that
imply
a
certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral
dilemmas of political organisation.
and
only
pacifism
Comprehensive
or (differently)
objective,
attained,
not
was
Since it admits of states with frameworks of law
based
on
the free agreements of individuals,
Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample:
a
nonviolent
Indian
genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism
simple as derivability.
Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a
it was not the
state;
replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society.
moral
his
Granted there
are
they are not so
so
ideal
easily
brought down by its political corollaries.
Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than
concerning
like:
external
and
internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the
it also tells against the received treatment of
example.
While
other
species,
animals
for
it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating
of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals.
29.
those
At least it does this
so
long
Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without
moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of
violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on
replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The
irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they
differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied
(see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially
Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit,
anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state
authority)
and
restrictions on liberty, to a limit.
Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi:
'The ideally nonviolent
state will be an ordered anarchy'
(unreferenced citation at the end of the
Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24).
23
as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as
is
humans (or persons).
restriction.
30
controversial
euthanasia,
the category by restriction of the application of violence to
from
removed
not
There is little good basis
in
And,
humans,
of
violence?
At
the
suicide,
But
must
creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms.
simply
the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature
killing
of
No force need be applied:
in
a
eats
and dies painlessly and without a struggle.
The
or
pill
given
is
life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence?
technical
purely
arrangements
pacifist
will
to
objections
in
solve,
eating
meat
worthwhile
On the face of
obtained.
so
New
any rate, the disruption of
at
principle
an
Then the proper objections to
such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that
it, there are no
they
risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples
like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing.
injection
several
into
e.g.
So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices.
involve
chauvinistic
spread
corollaries
killing
a
such
indeed wherever violence plays a significant role.
punishment,
capital
the
concerning
for
however
similar
case,
any
areas
moral
and
violence,
practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries.
But suppose now that the new technology
is
as the anti-neutron bomb, which selectively destroys
which
by
further
clever
newly devised "weapons", such
scientists, working in their accustomed military role:
devices
much
extended
property
but
not
people,
or
"dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence.
just
Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid
these
reaches
of
technological
For "dissolving" people requires energy,
fantasy.
which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in
violence:
Was
(upgraded)
account
of
that is, the new wars will still involve violence.
there
old-fashioned
however
violent
anything
methods
wrong
so
such
as
with
hunting
eating
meat
obtained
by
more
or raising and killing one's own?
Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural"
iO.
an
behaviour
of
creatures
to
cit.
See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op.
Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g.
Politics, p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and
predation.
24
which the principles are supposed to apply.
Aggression is a fairly common feature of
and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made
animal
out) erupts in violence.
ways,
various
for
The force of the
example
along
these
argument
can
however
Aggression
lines.
is
assumed to be an
evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for
(of
their offspring) in their natural environment.
and
themselves
ir
mitigated
be
survival
But most humans
now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations
which
evolution
for
gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to
adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance).
Much
humans
as
have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they
should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent
practices,
now
ill-adapted
to
their
and mostly counterproductive.
situation
So
argues the pacifist.
is a residual problem,
There
like
that
of
and tribal
people, to be condemned as morally
Sometimes,
yes,
Are
wrong
when
predators
involve
these
the
violence?
when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to
Though a way
but always?
can
it is a rather unsatisfactory way.
problem
vegetarianism.
creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as
practices
be attained:
confronting
beaten
be
the
around
of
edge
this
What this suggests is that nonviolence
is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal.
The arguments for
nonviolence
-
which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence
and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings -
sort
of
But
conclusion.
exclude.
nonviolent
what
is
called
charge
for
state,
is
is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at
This is^ to concede
an
of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as
P2 remains unqualified.
31.
would
The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral
sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2.
attentuated
similar
approaches
thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive
that
a
the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least,
since it opens the door a chink to other options which
categorically
suggest
The sheer moral power of such pacifism
As Singer has in the analogous case of
Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975.
25
vegetarianism:
is
one
see
reason
e.g.,
for
Animal
There is no reason however why
giving its adoption some pause.
a
genuine
pacifism
(making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits
such natural phenomena as predation.
Nothing logically rules out such a genuine
and
more sensitive pacifism.
There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as
In
particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts
similar to those using violence:
This
is
a
requirement
of
otherwise they could have a case made against them.
in a different sense from the pure logical
consistency
sense, namely that of keeping to the same story.
for
well.
pacifism,
Again there need be no deep problem
so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must
be a single principle
(e.g.
just
P2)
-
as
distinct
from
a
bundle
of
moral
principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving
violence.32 To meet the rationality requirement the position should,
be
integrated
into
a
in
larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a
piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices
to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g.
mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic
and
oceans.
In
an
does
not
destructive
such things as strip
wastes
in
streams
extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property
picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism.
vandalism
particular,
cover
violence
But
even
metaphorically,
against persons (and certainly not nonphysical
violence such as "psychological violence").
What is sought then
is
an
appropriate
of these notions covering destructive practices;
and also an accompanying
synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'.
Then P2 is superseded by
synthesis
an appropriately qualified
P2#.
It is morally wrong to use vandolence.
It remains to characterise
the
cluster
of
destructive
practices
that
count
as
vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks.
32.
It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject
assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences.
Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter.
33.
The position has been called 'pacifism.
26
APPENDICES
§ 5.
from
arguments
The
and
pacifism in the real world.
of
impracticality
impracticality
reality:
social
the
alleged_
Even if it is conceded that pacifism
is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still
the
feasibility
of
pacifism
as a sensible practice to live by will be contested -
despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi.
to
be
that
admitted
the
pacifism to severe tests.
real
world,
with
all its horror and squalor, does put
But in this regard pacifism is not an exception.
Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less
than in replacing war^.
prepared
for
to
likely
succeed
Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual
violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they
properly
And it has
or
given
a
have
been
never
The prospects for success of
dress rehearsal.
nonviolent defence of a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war
convention
is
observed
or not.
If the convention is observed then pacifism stands
reasonable prospects of success.
The difficult cases are where the war convention
perhaps
unleashed,
in
broken,
is
and
violence
is
According to Walzer, in his
massive ways, on noncombatants.
superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance,
'success
is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention -
...
and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^).
attained
-
there
is
conventions are flouted.
reasons,
some
got homesick.
ruthless
of
This is
presumably
be
never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some
The invaders may give
them irrelevant, e.g.
up
and
depart
for
all
sorts
or
they needed a quick decisive victory, they
What Walzer no doubt means is something like this:
invaders
may
Success
false.
that
sufficiently
in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support
34.
The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source
considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit
35.
Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op.cit.
references given there.
36.
All page references prefixed by 'W' are to
Allen Lane, London, 1977.
27
See also
M. Walzer,
Martin,
Just
and
of
war)
op.cit.,
Unjust
is
and
Wars,
But that sort of thing is also true even if the
lines, etc., can eventually succeed.
defending
to violence.
resorts
side
The difference lies in the pattern of events;
is
if the defence "forces" are well-armed it
invaders
to
easier
and
with
start
difficult
more
than
afterwards
and
with
costly
the
for
civil
well -prepared
resistance.
Walzer is
nonviolent
the
of
model
the
in
way
enslaved
Jews,
misleading
The
way.The
Nazis,
many
like
who
to
jump
that
conclusion
the
cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of
defence
inappropriate examples.
command,
however,
thinking,
who
He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian
the
in
state,
total
Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the
the
population,
by
The
"resistance"
picture
is
highly
and large, did not resist extermination in an organised
invaded
never
Germany,
were
in
control
the
all
or
For
infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population.
Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army
took
over
and
managed
all
key
Australia it is not even so clear
largely
united
and
actively
With island territories such as
infrastructure.
that
resisting
this
is
which
logistically
population.
Walzer's
feasible
against
impression
resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g.
a
of the
Wp.332)
might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers
ready to leave.
Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate
No state would be prepared to risk
way
in
37.
It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish,
opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country
comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue,
R.L.
Rubenstein, The Cunning of History:
the Holocaust and the American
Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5.
38.
The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would
increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by
Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in
comparable wars.
present
state-determined circumstances.
28
training its
populace
different).
It
in
would
full
techniques
defence
(civil
all too easy for them to "rout" the police:
be
then
action
nonviolent
is
civil
obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means.
The argument
thus
far
§6.
On the positive case for pacifism:
has
been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism.
That in itself is revealing.
deviations
from
it
are
initial sketchings.
Pacifism is the
what
require
rest
position
explanation.
(inertial
and
state)
The reason for this is simple
violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of
enough:
it is what has to be justified.
Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of
and
merely
justified.
case
try
privileged
dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be
to
in
that
the
defender
(person
or
nation)
is
morally—excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral
the
position
The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent:
curious
is
its
the
in
already
a
Still
bounds.
defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma
And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have
situation.
to
use
it, he should not resort to it.
An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can
be
adapted
to give a similar result:-
Violence is (intrinsically) wrong
Violence in any excepted cases (e.g.
self-defence) is still violence
Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong.
Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic
already glimpsed will begin.
None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are
deductively
tight
assumptions
can
be
challenged
arguments for pacifism particularly good ones.
for
pacifism,
(as
above).
Nor
One of the poorer positive
are all the
arguments
for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory
29
of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited,
that
nuclear
or
chemical
case is overstated.
hope
weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an
illusion, escalation is inevitable.
are bound to be overstepped.
the
e.g.
The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are
-
Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the
Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible.
Wars are much
more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows.
Wars can, for example, be started and stopped
things intervene (e.g.
(as
support
more
should
midstream
for
first
the
those
inevitably,
premiss
above)
for
mixture
a
suffering
and
anguish
of
violent
the
methods,
They
nonviolence.
of
consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g.
pain,
important
a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states).
The main reasons for pacifism are,
include
in
injustice
characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of
means-ends
cost
the
in
violence
that
violence
within
the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained
by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as
more
less furtive, society.
open,
the why of
pacifism)
considerable.
These
are
None of these well-known types of reason (giving
separately
decisive,
but
their
cumulative
affords a model for one way of proceeding^:
Mill's
defence
Mill's
procedure
works
(st
least
As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion.
30
of
liberty
nonviolence,
it works as well as it works for
liberty).
39.
is
it is enough (a nonelementary exercise)
to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for
otherwise
effect
reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong
positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence.
as
a
A
decisive
more
consequentialist
data.,
argument,
takes
a
but
making
semantical
preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds
modelling
nonviolence
Again
principles.
use
and
The data is used to arrive at
route.
are
practical
similar
of
then
pacifism
in
applied
is
derived
semantically
principled
as
nonviolence.0
R.
40.
Routley*
*
The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R.
and V.
Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical
foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear.
* With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and
participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences,
Australian National University.
The main outlines of the paper were drafted
associate at Simon Fraser University.
31
while
the
author
was
a
research
OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL
SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
School publications:
R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second
edition 1974, Third edition 1975.
Departmental publications:
M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974.
D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental
Philosophy, 1980.
R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980.
Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
and
13.
14.
15.
R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978.
R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979.
R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979.
R.K. Meyer, A note on R_
* matrices, 1979.
R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980.
C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980.
R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980.
C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981.
R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983.
R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment
and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used,
N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983.
R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 1983R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983.
R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983.
Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy):
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
10.
R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and
action, 1982.
R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and
inadmissible cannibalism, 1982.
R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning$of life?, 1982.
R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics.
R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war
and war—deterrence and the political fall-out.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic
notions.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism.
R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in
rational behaviour under rival paradigms.
/
/-
'
nw^4)
4
---------- =^A,W7/7/////7//7777 r/
)r
% ./
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Box 149: Publications (to como)
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Text
13.6.96
GREEN POLITICAL THEORY:
a different account
Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul
according to Caesar, into three parts:
—a green theory of value,
—a subordinate green theory of agency, and
—a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle
recommendations.
While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has
captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political
theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass
unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up
for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination.
That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action,
no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical
matters can be subsumed under these.2
In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a
background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that
green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of
agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of
political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the
fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental
justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions
most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives
to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban
bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are
simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important
part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from
what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional
political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining
power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral
1
R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book
worth criticizing.
2
See the appendix.
�2
success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall
encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of
green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is
that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps
undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment
ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human
goodness and dominance, and so on.3
The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political
theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4
Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited
unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent
support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in
green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is
presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will
appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation
will not yield a lode of green gold.
As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another
Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors
armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles,
(as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by
a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given
considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to
politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green
theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The
text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be
3
For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM.
4
In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I
decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate).
Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip
lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable.
And they tend to be very light on argument.
5
Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will
encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and
climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves.
6
They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers'
work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover
featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they
�3
tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of
the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on.
Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book,
which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features
is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written
book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages,
and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel.
It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple
structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a
weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues
seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens.
But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on
greens that is the trouble.
For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary
condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to
believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green
attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is
methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To
rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green
approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles
should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle
recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without
deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any
relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment).
At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has
more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to
green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it
certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly
informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is
a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core
concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to
remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there
behind the Green Man's work*.
7
P. viii - p.vii, itals added.
�4
fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are
far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such
obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose.
The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is
said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will
turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form
pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests
theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby
made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features
are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided.
At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning
limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that
past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others
in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as
illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized.
Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument
itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive
evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often
and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas
triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine.
[Simple enumerative
induction is not reliable in such settings.]
On this-here green theory of value.
Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock
descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is
occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly
to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing
4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological
fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they
know what is good for them.
A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset.
Not so, unless the rest
of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing,
8
P.viii.
9
See the beginning of the main text p.l.
10
This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As
to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87.
�5
considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to
effect a reduction).
It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not.
The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central,
value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly
informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a
perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive
and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate
then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short
changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at
that.
There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular,
does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily
ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what
identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a
pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking.
Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims
to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories
have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray,
because of pluralistic alternatives.
According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value,
naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness).
How does Goodin arrive at this
identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a
consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such
an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions
are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value"
from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and
capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the
land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that
anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure"
theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of
these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them.
11
P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions.
12
Ibid. p.30.
�6
The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e.
good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What
gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13
In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument,
along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to
see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is
provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between
their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony
within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the
external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we
can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to
what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly
instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak,
each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of
naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the
naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the
basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15
Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory,
reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be
reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were
some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it
13
find quote
14
Ibid p.3&
15
An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore.
It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6):
For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and
non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as
proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it
seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be
displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For
those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the
challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a
resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the
potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more
than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called
'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is
indeed a great deal more than that.
�7
were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither
descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it
is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”，
a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails,
to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear.
As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some,
greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no
evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16
Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value,
but various different, sometimes competing, positions.
Nor could a single essence be
satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble
Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep
ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a
single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green
critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be
found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist
grounding of value.
Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green
positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what
greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to
amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any
practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified.
But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's
theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly
influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident,
damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens.
A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be
rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural
items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection,
valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic,
some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way,
16
It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does
not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a
little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high
redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence
courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to
say, or says.
�8
are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included
therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal
waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural)
variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical
origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European
intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the
best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event,
because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal
morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole
disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so
exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human
activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these
would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human
intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid
pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was
with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of
4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events.
Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a
privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of
monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly
deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden
away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs.
It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid
products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist
17
It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he
undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected
issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]):
[1]
[2]
A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system.
Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has
(presumptively) value.
I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological
life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such
value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new
disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the
moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption.
�9
who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful
work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some
larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in
Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with
variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and
modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory.
Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely
multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19
There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce
value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For
naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but
objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt
Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to
be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in
some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers,
excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of
a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become
destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the
circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like.
The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the
specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only
an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that
[3]
I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life,
somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures.
Anyway, more on that some other time.
[4]
I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life,
while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it.
A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than
greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding
presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory,
again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of
theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the
counterexamples.
18
Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting.
19
See e.g. EE or FF.
�10
is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural.
Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known
that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot
be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated
that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this
respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the
qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable,
not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests,
that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at
best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which
covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects:
naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor.
It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in
Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon
greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much
of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical
factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only
one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of
that different green account alluded to above.
On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism.
Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral
vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably
the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and
unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it
illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try
picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all
the rest of its demands as well.20
The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed
cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined
are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not
enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to
proceed 'more impressionistically *.
20
p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92.
Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision.
�11
Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of
Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy
proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below,
that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that
established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively,
the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the
impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature
informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22
Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures
regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses.
Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out
eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but
these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he
claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do
so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value,
because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green
programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel.
All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme
helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic.
Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what
is required.
Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating
that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly
'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really,
a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole
approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different
programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and
deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new-
age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose
conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very
loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green
packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is
21
Ibid p.87.
22
Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88.
23
Note & p.8&
�12
no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what
empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very
selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of
the early Values party in New Zealand.
'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily
explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply
wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The
truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in
this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory
and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective
borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far
too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value
theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We
cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without
being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible.
Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument.
The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and
should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that
greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing
basis5.26
On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・
The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter
consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political
structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation,
notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act
locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally,
'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and
'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots
democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep
and generality.
The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually
nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote
24
p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme.
25
p.168? [check, locate]
26
Back cover.
�13
referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their
lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of
operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating
mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And
really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and
practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account,
furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens:
roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated
individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted
and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a
standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a
theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability.
The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No
doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement
in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing
opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too
optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they
are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces
within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to
enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must
look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other
coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie
with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the
perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the
greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then,
that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into
coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29
Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness.
These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in
Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal
green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems
fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however
27
See e.g. p.l 14 top.
28
To cite Goodin p.179.
29
Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled.
�14
even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of
former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed
genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is
that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the
cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry
about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that
emphases and contrasts are different.
Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak.
Consider what is offered:
• living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role
for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives
as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued
items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter
arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance
appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals
and Churches, ritual and practice.
• to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance
between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative
lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards
subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change
envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too
impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with
regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some
people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many
people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right
living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people
endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily
living.
• Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green
heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects
negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game
can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every
social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its
30
Thus p.81ff.
31
pp.78-81.
�15
practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32
• local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental
problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for
preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very
important.
Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural
changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something
like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous.
To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are
extremely valuable.
APPENDIX: a defective setting.
Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing
off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is
implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary
resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental
philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or
reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly
expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist
productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who
simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of
Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests.
It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely
within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy
paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the
present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on
the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of
arguments, both that
—the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove
effective
—the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required
to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.).
It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what
arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged
32
This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay.
33
Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800.
�16
in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly
impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than
by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we
are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even
now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much
ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive
claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us
concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously
compromised human interests\34
Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed
remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy
consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily
tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail.
As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting
interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests).
The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a
shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more
important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through
any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin
himself has provided it in susequent work.
A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is
towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and
economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem
made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying
decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales
they have seemed
able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim
to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a
course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable
with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated
with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by
fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and
objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate
power in business, government, and even universities. But this
rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by
everyone, including economists themselves.35
34
Ibid p.8 (check).
35
Brennan p.807.
�17
The reasons are now entirely familiar ones.
References
Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994).
Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5
Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster),
Pluto Press, London, 1987.
Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994.
McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x.
Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of
differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker
and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2.
Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5,
typsescript, 1996.
Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE
Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF.
�
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13.6.96
GREEN POLITICAL THEORY:
a different account
Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul
according to Caesar, into three parts:
—a green theory of value,
—a subordinate green theory of agency, and
—a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle
recommendations.
While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has
captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political
theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass
unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up
for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination.
That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action,
no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical
matters can be subsumed under these.2
In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a
background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that
green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of
agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of
political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the
fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental
justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions
most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives
to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban
bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are
simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important
part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from
what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional
political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining
power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral
1
R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book
worth criticizing.
2
See the appendix.
2
success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall
encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of
green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is
that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps
undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment
ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human
goodness and dominance, and so on.3
The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political
theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4
Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited
unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent
support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in
green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is
presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will
appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation
will not yield a lode of green gold.
As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another
Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors
armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles,
(as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by
a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given
considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to
politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green
theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The
text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be
3
For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM.
4
In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I
decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate).
Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip
lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable.
And they tend to be very light on argument.
5
Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will
encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and
climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves.
6
They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers'
work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover
featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they
3
tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of
the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on.
Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book,
which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features
is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written
book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages,
and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel.
It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple
structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a
weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues
seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens.
But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on
greens that is the trouble.
For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary
condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to
believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green
attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is
methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To
rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green
approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles
should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle
recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without
deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any
relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment).
At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has
more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to
green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it
certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly
informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is
a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core
concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to
remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there
behind the Green Man's work*.
7
P. viii - p.vii, itals added.
4
fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are
far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such
obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose.
The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is
said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will
turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form
pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests
theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby
made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features
are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided.
At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning
limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that
past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others
in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as
illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized.
Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument
itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive
evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often
and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas
triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine.
[Simple enumerative
induction is not reliable in such settings.]
On this-here green theory of value.
Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock
descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is
occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly
to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing
4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological
fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they
know what is good for them.
A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset.
Not so, unless the rest
of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing,
8
P.viii.
9
See the beginning of the main text p.l.
10
This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As
to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87.
5
considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to
effect a reduction).
It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not.
The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central,
value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly
informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a
perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive
and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate
then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short
changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at
that.
There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular,
does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily
ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what
identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a
pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking.
Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims
to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories
have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray,
because of pluralistic alternatives.
According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value,
naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness).
How does Goodin arrive at this
identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a
consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such
an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions
are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value"
from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and
capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the
land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that
anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure"
theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of
these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them.
11
P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions.
12
Ibid. p.30.
6
The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e.
good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What
gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13
In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument,
along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to
see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is
provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between
their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony
within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the
external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we
can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to
what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly
instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak,
each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of
naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the
naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the
basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15
Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory,
reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be
reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were
some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it
13
find quote
14
Ibid p.3&
15
An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore.
It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6):
For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and
non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as
proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it
seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be
displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For
those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the
challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a
resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the
potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more
than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called
'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is
indeed a great deal more than that.
7
were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither
descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it
is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”，
a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails,
to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear.
As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some,
greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no
evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16
Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value,
but various different, sometimes competing, positions.
Nor could a single essence be
satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble
Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep
ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a
single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green
critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be
found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist
grounding of value.
Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green
positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what
greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to
amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any
practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified.
But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's
theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly
influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident,
damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens.
A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be
rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural
items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection,
valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic,
some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way,
16
It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does
not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a
little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high
redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence
courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to
say, or says.
8
are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included
therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal
waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural)
variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical
origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European
intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the
best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event,
because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal
morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole
disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so
exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human
activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these
would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human
intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid
pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was
with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of
4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events.
Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a
privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of
monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly
deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden
away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs.
It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid
products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist
17
It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he
undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected
issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]):
[1]
[2]
A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system.
Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has
(presumptively) value.
I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological
life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such
value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new
disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the
moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption.
9
who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful
work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some
larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in
Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with
variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and
modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory.
Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely
multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19
There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce
value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For
naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but
objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt
Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to
be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in
some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers,
excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of
a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become
destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the
circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like.
The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the
specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only
an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that
[3]
I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life,
somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures.
Anyway, more on that some other time.
[4]
I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life,
while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it.
A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than
greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding
presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory,
again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of
theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the
counterexamples.
18
Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting.
19
See e.g. EE or FF.
10
is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural.
Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known
that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot
be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated
that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this
respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the
qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable,
not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests,
that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at
best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which
covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects:
naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor.
It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in
Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon
greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much
of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical
factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only
one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of
that different green account alluded to above.
On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism.
Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral
vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably
the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and
unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it
illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try
picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all
the rest of its demands as well.20
The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed
cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined
are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not
enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to
proceed 'more impressionistically *.
20
p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92.
Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision.
11
Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of
Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy
proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below,
that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that
established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively,
the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the
impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature
informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22
Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures
regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses.
Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out
eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but
these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he
claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do
so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value,
because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green
programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel.
All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme
helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic.
Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what
is required.
Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating
that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly
'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really,
a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole
approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different
programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and
deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new-
age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose
conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very
loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green
packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is
21
Ibid p.87.
22
Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88.
23
Note & p.8&
12
no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what
empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very
selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of
the early Values party in New Zealand.
'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily
explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply
wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The
truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in
this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory
and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective
borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far
too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value
theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We
cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without
being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible.
Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument.
The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and
should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that
greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing
basis5.26
On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・
The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter
consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political
structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation,
notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act
locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally,
'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and
'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots
democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep
and generality.
The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually
nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote
24
p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme.
25
p.168? [check, locate]
26
Back cover.
13
referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their
lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of
operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating
mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And
really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and
practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account,
furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens:
roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated
individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted
and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a
standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a
theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability.
The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No
doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement
in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing
opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too
optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they
are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces
within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to
enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must
look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other
coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie
with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the
perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the
greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then,
that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into
coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29
Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness.
These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in
Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal
green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems
fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however
27
See e.g. p.l 14 top.
28
To cite Goodin p.179.
29
Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled.
14
even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of
former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed
genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is
that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the
cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry
about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that
emphases and contrasts are different.
Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak.
Consider what is offered:
• living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role
for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives
as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued
items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter
arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance
appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals
and Churches, ritual and practice.
• to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance
between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative
lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards
subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change
envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too
impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with
regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some
people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many
people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right
living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people
endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily
living.
• Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green
heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects
negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game
can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every
social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its
30
Thus p.81ff.
31
pp.78-81.
15
practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32
• local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental
problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for
preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very
important.
Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural
changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something
like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous.
To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are
extremely valuable.
APPENDIX: a defective setting.
Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing
off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is
implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary
resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental
philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or
reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly
expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist
productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who
simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of
Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests.
It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely
within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy
paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the
present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on
the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of
arguments, both that
—the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove
effective
—the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required
to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.).
It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what
arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged
32
This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay.
33
Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800.
16
in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly
impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than
by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we
are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even
now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much
ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive
claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us
concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously
compromised human interests\34
Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed
remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy
consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily
tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail.
As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting
interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests).
The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a
shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more
important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through
any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin
himself has provided it in susequent work.
A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is
towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and
economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem
made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying
decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales
they have seemed
able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim
to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a
course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable
with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated
with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by
fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and
objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate
power in business, government, and even universities. But this
rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by
everyone, including economists themselves.35
34
Ibid p.8 (check).
35
Brennan p.807.
17
The reasons are now entirely familiar ones.
References
Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994).
Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5
Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992.
Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster),
Pluto Press, London, 1987.
Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994.
McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x.
Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of
differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker
and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2.
Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5,
typsescript, 1996.
Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE
Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF.
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Description
An account of the resource
One of seven papers digitised from item 1225.
Australian National University Office
Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk
Box 18: Green Projects in Progress
-
https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8834aaf1b324714f2e3774aef33d071c.pdf
d06136786af094263b1bdde256ccf526
PDF Text
Text
ps re Walzer’s discussion of obliteration bombing of German cities
in WWII, have you seen Stephen E Lammers, ’Area Bombing in
World War II: The Argument of Michael Walzer’ (Journal of Religious
Ethics, Vol. 11, Spring 1983)? Lammers offers a much better critiaue
of Walzer’s argument than mine.
The 'alternative defence systems' have, in fact, a much longer history
th^n you let on, and have been studied more intensively than you suggest.
There's a st^ongish pacifist tradition: £.g. in a number of works
by Tolstoy mi 1900-1910 (e.g. The Law of Violence and the Law of Love,
Engl, transl. 1959; ak masses of smaller pamphlets), also Gandhi'is
work (esp. Non-violence in Peace and War, 2 vols. 1942, 1948), and
some work done by Allied pacifists during World War II and slightly
earlier (e.g. J.W. |(ughan, Pacifism and Invasion, published by War
Resisters' League, 19^2). Perhaps most relevant however, are two
post-nuclear collections: Adam Roberts et.al. Civilian Defence
(1965) and Quincy Wright et.al., Preventing World War III: Some
Proposa1s (1962). As I recall, these take one outside a purely
pacifist tradition. Ar^e NaEss has written on the topic - e.g.
'Nonmilitary defence' in Wright, op.cit.; 'A systematization of
Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution' Jrul of Conflict Resolution
(1958). Gene Sharp, who^you cite, has written very extensively on the
topic. But presumably you don't want to get too involved in this
issue - not in this paper anyway.
�Notes
1
Aldridge Bob, The Counterforce SyndromeiA Gu^de__toU^
NuclearrWeapons aAd-^-Sn^egTc-^rine.
Washington, D.0..
Barnet, Hlchard, The Giants.
TransnatTonal Institute, 19?87.
Simon and Schuster, 1977» Barnet, Richard, Real^^Z
New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981J Ellsberg, Lanlex, **}ter
New York:
See also Sidney Lens, The Day Before
in Current, June 1981.
An Anatomy*of the Nuclear Arms Race.
Bostont
Beacon
Doomsday:
____________ ______
Press, 1977 •
j
Lens, Op. Cit.
2.
3.
"Challenging the Myths of National Securl y , y Rl-h
3.
Barnet, in New York Time_s_Masazln£» Apr^ X’ ^79. Cited ar
elaborated T7I Questions and_Answers_orLthe Sovlet_Threatand
National SecurVtyT^ubilihed by the Disarmament Program of
^Tta^i^TFH^nds Service Committee.
(1501 Cherry Street,
Philadelphia Pennsylvania.)
“Interview**, in Current, June, 19^1*
T
1
Tv-rnnnv
New York: Warner Books, 1979*
5.
See Robert Jungk’ ^^^TcK^topher Trump); Richard Rashdie.
(Tvonoi nted from the German by onrisuopn^x
. r T*
1077
industry.
6. meh.ed Pelt. ■"“^“.r'^rSo^J^rKd.SVr^S!"12"1”’
New York 10036.
Hovt, "The Bishops and the Bomb" (Christianity and
7.
See Robert G. 1982.)| Michael Novak, "Nuclear Morality and
Crisis, August 9»
Man’s Primer on Nuclear Morality" (AmerJ^.
J.A. C’Hare, ’’One 1982); Francis X. Winters, "Catholic Debate
June 26 - July 3#
and Division on Deterrence ' ~merl
_ °christian Century, March 3, 1982.)
Walter Wink, "Nuclear Paralysis
8. John Leslie of the University of
who has reflected
™ preseSte<l «t the Cmedlm Philosophical
ii"
ESX
X' to
I
7 - z/7 zTco> w
�The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of three pages (65-67) from unidentified publication, on Peace, war and philosophy,
and Peano Giuseppe. (3 leaves)
�/A/rzw
)(/>
I
�
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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ps re Walzer’s discussion of obliteration bombing of German cities
in WWII, have you seen Stephen E Lammers, ’Area Bombing in
World War II: The Argument of Michael Walzer’ (Journal of Religious
Ethics, Vol. 11, Spring 1983)? Lammers offers a much better critiaue
of Walzer’s argument than mine.
The 'alternative defence systems' have, in fact, a much longer history
th^n you let on, and have been studied more intensively than you suggest.
There's a st^ongish pacifist tradition: £.g. in a number of works
by Tolstoy mi 1900-1910 (e.g. The Law of Violence and the Law of Love,
Engl, transl. 1959; ak masses of smaller pamphlets), also Gandhi'is
work (esp. Non-violence in Peace and War, 2 vols. 1942, 1948), and
some work done by Allied pacifists during World War II and slightly
earlier (e.g. J.W. |(ughan, Pacifism and Invasion, published by War
Resisters' League, 19^2). Perhaps most relevant however, are two
post-nuclear collections: Adam Roberts et.al. Civilian Defence
(1965) and Quincy Wright et.al., Preventing World War III: Some
Proposa1s (1962). As I recall, these take one outside a purely
pacifist tradition. Ar^e NaEss has written on the topic - e.g.
'Nonmilitary defence' in Wright, op.cit.; 'A systematization of
Gandhian ethics of conflict resolution' Jrul of Conflict Resolution
(1958). Gene Sharp, who^you cite, has written very extensively on the
topic. But presumably you don't want to get too involved in this
issue - not in this paper anyway.
Notes
1
Aldridge Bob, The Counterforce SyndromeiA Gu^de__toU^
NuclearrWeapons aAd-^-Sn^egTc-^rine.
Washington, D.0..
Barnet, Hlchard, The Giants.
TransnatTonal Institute, 19?87.
Simon and Schuster, 1977» Barnet, Richard, Real^^Z
New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1981J Ellsberg, Lanlex, **}ter
New York:
See also Sidney Lens, The Day Before
in Current, June 1981.
An Anatomy*of the Nuclear Arms Race.
Bostont
Beacon
Doomsday:
____________ ______
Press, 1977 •
j
Lens, Op. Cit.
2.
3.
"Challenging the Myths of National Securl y , y Rl-h
3.
Barnet, in New York Time_s_Masazln£» Apr^ X’ ^79. Cited ar
elaborated T7I Questions and_Answers_orLthe Sovlet_Threatand
National SecurVtyT^ubilihed by the Disarmament Program of
^Tta^i^TFH^nds Service Committee.
(1501 Cherry Street,
Philadelphia Pennsylvania.)
“Interview**, in Current, June, 19^1*
T
1
Tv-rnnnv
New York: Warner Books, 1979*
5.
See Robert Jungk’ ^^^TcK^topher Trump); Richard Rashdie.
(Tvonoi nted from the German by onrisuopn^x
. r T*
1077
industry.
6. meh.ed Pelt. ■"“^“.r'^rSo^J^rKd.SVr^S!"12"1”’
New York 10036.
Hovt, "The Bishops and the Bomb" (Christianity and
7.
See Robert G. 1982.)| Michael Novak, "Nuclear Morality and
Crisis, August 9»
Man’s Primer on Nuclear Morality" (AmerJ^.
J.A. C’Hare, ’’One 1982); Francis X. Winters, "Catholic Debate
June 26 - July 3#
and Division on Deterrence ' ~merl
_ °christian Century, March 3, 1982.)
Walter Wink, "Nuclear Paralysis
8. John Leslie of the University of
who has reflected
™ preseSte<l «t the Cmedlm Philosophical
ii"
ESX
X' to
I
7 - z/7 zTco> w
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of three pages (65-67) from unidentified publication, on Peace, war and philosophy,
and Peano Giuseppe. (3 leaves)
/A/rzw
)(/>
I
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Box 106, Item 2: Miscellaneous notes and cutting on defence
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Handwritten notes on scrap paper, and cutting from unidentified publication.
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Verso of scrap papers not digitised. Cutting redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Notes and cutting housed in unnumbered folder marked Australia's Defence. Item number assigned by library staff. One of three notes/papers digitised from item 2.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 106, Item 2
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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Box 106: Culture, Politics, Environment, Economics [War and Peace]
-
https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/979159be0f3d1109bd5b22759db1f0fd.pdf
249a2a5345757b3734cdd80aed300e08
PDF Text
Text
WORKING DRAFT 1'l}l' T1 1,,i··)
CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
Many of you know that Canberra was originally designed by Walter Burley
'lO
Griffin.
This talk is dedicated to him. You may not know that Griffin, an
c111,d l,ee,tJ>,, I! a ,~cJ/2...ru/.1t-l/ '";~1/n,-,l,c1...
American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was
not
simply
an
architect
and
A
lantlscape
designer_, but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists.
key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially
on
making
nature
the
servant
of
man',
'land
to
be
accorded
the
'concentration
and discerned instead elements of a
different 'consciousness' (the word is his).
took
the
He rejected
His approach was holistic, and
respect
he
due to a highly developed and
perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or
as
a
mere
section of a map'.
Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still,
for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere
.eco~osic-.w,
city;
but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception
but far from deep ecological ideals.
*
*
*3
*
*
*
*
The objective of the larger investigation, of which this
part,
is
to
gauge
the
extent
to
which
Australian
contrasted with American culture, contains developable
will
underpin
a
under which many
suffers.
talk
sketches
a
culture, especially as
elements
(seeds)
which
different political framework from the bastardised capitalism
people
presently
labour
and
local
environment
frequently
It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the
political course
interested
to
in
charted
as
environmentally
alternative structures:
socially
disastrous
to
be
it is enough, for example, to view them
r ,i,v~c~ntL..:f- [.<-ol"l,-"
hd<--t r7' <-.~ .::..
P,r~t- f tl. /~J
1
or
J
I
C-IJll·A-r~u... )
~ tn "S.
�those
as far from satisfactory, or very far from
the
of
best
to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to
worlds,
increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against
vandalism
and
like, and ecological construction [direct positive action].
the
grounds
give
remarkable level of environmental activism that has
the
especially
hope,
damage,
environment
There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that
for
attainable
of
somehow emerged among the people.
It is worth trying to pull together
some
of
these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts,
and increasing the level of concern and activism.
the
towards
practices,
and
attitudes
different approaches, different
1
Indeed appreciation of,
environment.
have
cultures
different
Without doubt
practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally
dependent:
and where they still survive uncorrupted still have -
nonimperial cultures had
much
exploitative
less
whose
North,
industrial
exploitation
approaches
to
practices
not
vandalism
and
the
environment
merely
environmental
but to a marked extent depend upon such practices.
control"
their
of
local
typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination.
in
But occasionally, notably
retained
the
of
those
than
gross
permit
Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost
environments,
Most
American Jews and American Indians.
instance,
for
compare,
sufficient
autonomy
the
to
adjacent
Pacific,
regional
cultures
2
have
slow or even halt environmental destruction.
Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked
in
Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land.
One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially
in
the
South,
is
to
foster
certain
both
sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy;
socialism
and
indigenous
for
cultural
instance
land rights movements.
2
differences
to
support
and, more
Melanesian
For, where the cultures have
�not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is
rapid
way
of
paradigms.
in
the
a
cultural
differences
can
also
serve
Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in
transition to different
Such
comparatively
activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social
The question arises whether
elsewhere
a
less
environmentally
exploitative
social
paradigms.
transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture.
Can
features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite
differences?
In the case of Australia, a basis
culture,
is
there
both
in
the
land
and
the
and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of
the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation.
the
need
for
change,
at
least
if the natural environment is to retain some
It
semblance of integrity, there is little doubt.
that
there
is,
in
is
becoming
platitudinous
the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many
local natural environments and ecosystems
loose
Of
3
unless
we
in
the
Antipodes
break
from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised
North and
work
destructive
towards
establishment
of
a
less
in
some
parts,
rising
tide
war.
of
For despite
environmental
the industrialised North still appears in the grip of
established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of
nuclear
environmentally
culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy.
elements of regionalism in the North, despite a
concern
different
disaster,
such
Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority
movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go
largely
alone.
Nor
is
the
Australia because as well as the
location,
the
advantage
of
the
ground
and
its
southern
seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing.
cultivation.
Such
a
it
task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in
like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and
speedy
as
careful
But
if
task is rendered urgent also by other matters of
3
�environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs
but
colossal
biological
losses
through
of
nuclear
rapid destruction of, e.g.
war,
tropical
rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere
humans now establish.
How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to
alter approaches to the environment?
As in the title of the talk it operates in
the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like
and
design
culture.
principles
A working
picture
that
the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like
most images of the more abstract distorts across
organising
of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the
environmental way on the ropes of regional
links
the
is
that
of
a
suspension
the gap often separating people from the natural environment.
bridge
There are
people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment,
like
so:-
approach
➔
Natural
Environment
People
(Of course people may be part of the natural environment:
the
picture
doesn't
exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different
sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot
traffic,
through
the
monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able
to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans.
of
But it is the structure
all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly.
The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if
4
you
�will.
~
{dC"' CULTURE
l
(--.__ APPROACH ~
____,___.- ·'---
So
with
approaches.
different
------- ----- -
cultures,
different
carrying
bridges
different
It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy,
but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and
rivets
of
the
structures.
types,
bridges,
but
rather
It has its analytical
computing
the
loads
and
as
parts,
the
design
looking
stresses
at
on them;
and
engineering of the
the
components,
and it also has its more
holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and
of
them
their
- the social paradigms embedded in the cultures.
select
substructures
Philosophy, the link
subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business.
Less
figuratively,
assumptions
of
a
philosophy
replacement,
or marxist philosophies.
deep ecology, asks deeper
assumptions
of
all
and
and
assumptions
paradigms.
the
operative
for
example
of
free
Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not
deeper
questions,
extracting
the
fundamental
other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions
embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e.
social
assembles
culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions,
that is, to be considered for
enterprise
isolates
In
what are sometimes called the
this respect philosophy - which includes much more than
conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects,
as
logic,
the
science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of
arguments and methodology of all other sciences.
philosophical
investigation
extracts,
5
The
deeper
assumptions
such
when put together yield a philosophy in
�the more popular sense (as e.g.
enterprise
philosophy):
in
philosophy
of
life
or
again
the
free
in any case the result will be a philosophical theory
or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done.
By largely philosophical investigation then,
assumptions
of
the
techniques we try
contrasted
base.
with
operative
to
test
apparent
we
trace
and
Northern social paradigms;
the
adequacy
social
of
the
organise
the
and by sociological
assemblage,
especially
as
alternatives with some environmental support
So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some
results are illustrated in diagram 1.
Details of other positions, the old
culture
(as
positions
typically
offer
environmental
a
projected),
transition
alternative.
are
from
And
and
new
left
and
the
counter
included in the diagram because these
the
while
the
dominant
it
may
Western
appear
paradigm
to
indeed is - a long
political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative,
of
the
intermediate
taken one at a time.
details
steps is not so great;
To illustrate the way transitions can
of the first line (row) in macro-economic form.
construed
as
representing
package typically includes
environment,
so
the
in
components
each
and the steps can, and have, been
be
made,
consider
The dominant objective
is to maximize some economic package of goods and services
being
such
as
GDP,
a rough way standard of living.
minimal
to
quality
of
life
this
But the
and
and
pollution,
and
perhaps
with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness.
this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective
to considerable reservations, X(RR).
of
material
goes
back
to
Greek
philosophy;
6
In
growth
The real break however comes with
members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example,
idea
the
objective function to be maximized gets much complicated,
with subtractions for externalities such as noise
subject
the
though
the
namely, the abandonment of growth and
�maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing
the
macroeconomic
steady-state
objective
or
will
level,
for
economy,
something
economists have so far sketched.
which
Daly
for
At
the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a
sustainable
be
goals.
example
though
the
alternative
environmental
much less inflexible and nationalistic than
In fact the "emerging steady-state
advocates,
paradigm",
affords only a shallow alternative to the
dominant paradigm, differing only as to
growth
and
reserves
themes.
But
a
fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate
capitalism
the
higher-dimensional
steady
state
position;
involve
would
However, the higher dimensional
how a better argued transition can be made;
diagram
essentially by combining
steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions
the
Left-socialist
combination, which
framework
would
a
diagram, and remove the convenient ~simplification of the
two dimensional left-right transition.
indicates
it
so
case
does
not
against microeconomic themes.
touch
human
relations,
a
with
Even so, even with the
narrower
anthropocentric
have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would
have only began to enter.
Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying
social
model takes us towards the following familiar picture:
society consists
of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g.
they are not
genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort
of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have
(e.g.
a
certain
ability
to
calculate).
but
few
of
these
At bottom, these individuals have
utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize;
and
so
they
are
competitive (by virtue of scarcity).
that they are possessive, and possess
capital.
The
distinctive
the
feature
means
of
Their other feature is
production,
e.g.
land,
of the American model is of course is that
individuals can separately accumulate the means of production.
7
To ensure
their
�rABLI J.
COMPLll NG SOC IAL l'ARAD IGMS
<ENVIRONMENTALLY - OR I [ifl [D REPRESEIITAT IONJ
.... RIGHT - LEFT POLITICAL ORIENTAT!Otl
DOMINANT (XJ
WESTERN PARADIGM
CORE
THEMES
ECONOMIC
ORGANISATIONAL
POLITICAL
FURTHER
ENVIRONMENTAL
MATERIAL (ECONOMIC)
GROWTH
DOMINANCE OVER NATURE
NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A
RESOURCE
MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY
REGULATED, PRODUCTIVITY
AND PROFIT MAXIMIZING)
PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PRODUCTIVE
MEANS
I ND IV I DUALI ST I c/
COMPETITIVE ETHOS
ELITIST/REWARDS FOR
APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT
CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED
URBAN-INDUSTRIAL
COMMODITY/CULTURAL
PACKAGING
CENTRALISED : URBAN
CENTRED
LARGE-SCALE: ORDERED
(POWER-) HIERARCHICAL
HUMAN RELATIONS
SECONDARY
/OLD
1LEFT
/NEW
LEFT
1
I
X
1X<R)
X
X
I X
IX
1X<RRl I y
IX<R) I X ➔ Y
1X<Rl I X(RR)
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X
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X
X
1X<Q>
IX(Q)
i X
I
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FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
SEPARATION OF REASON/
EMOTION, FACT/VALUE,
SCIENTIFIC/UTILITARIAN
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REDUCTIONISTIC
y
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ASSUMPTIOt-j
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SOCIAL (NON-
/VIOLENT) DEFENCE
/
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/REGULATION
/EARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED
y
/NATURE DELICATELY
BALANCED
1NATURE BENIGN
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INTENTIONAL
X➔Y
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EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED
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(E,G, SELF- REALISATION)
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lowNERSHIP
X
X
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NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL
NONHUMANS ESSENTIALLY
ME CHAN I ST! C
EPISTEMIC/
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DOMINANT
ISTATE
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...
I
LIMITS TO SCIENCE:
IAPPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
! INTEGRATION OF REASON/
EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , ,
I~/J DER RATIONALITY (OR)
REJECTION OF NARROWER;
/HOLi ST IC
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I
I ..•
•
I
�entitlement
to
this
is
the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive
apparatus of the (minimal) state.
natural,
this
about
self-interested
Features
There is nothing compulsory, or
Individuals
picture.
competing
individuals
are
matter
of
these
nurture,
abstract
not
nature.
of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of
training, not human nature, as a comparison
where
approximating
particularly
individuals
are
not
like
this,
individuals embody rationality either:
with
helps
other
traditional
show.
cultures,
Nor do these archtypal
only a question-begging
argument
leads
to the American model as something naturally required.
The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model.
certain
introduces
human
The
relations.
chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they
do
left
not
models
omit
are
social
The left
still
human
relations:
the
further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to
full community relations,
independent
value.
recognising
That
is
a
creatures
and
nonhuman
things
as
of
bigger step, a step that no Western political
institutions make requisite allowance
for,
and
that
mainstream
underpinning
Western value theories do not accommodate.
The arguments from traditional cultures can also be
illustrated
paradigms
and
cultures such as those
the
of
models
Melanesia
that
and
directed
underlie
Polynesia,
them.
many
of
against
the
In traditional
the
operative
assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted.
Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there
is
good
prospect
of
thwarting
more
environmentally
destructive practices.
Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed.
But much of the
inhabited
and
there are
already
New
governed
and
by
environmentally
less
unscathed
World
peoples of predominantly European stock.
distinctive
features
8
observable
in
New
World
is
now
Although
cultures,
�assumptions
of
the
dominant
Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently
questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the manag~rial
other,
or
even
lesser,
features
of
surprisingly
leave
out
There are
cultures
significant
as
artistic
and
intellectual
usually
cultural
industrial culture, though economically dominated
accompanying
other
conspicuous
The incomplete social paradigms outlined do
not exhaust features of the accompanying
rather
to
be
icing.
discerned,
features.
sure,
This
does
affords
European
culture.
This
alternatives.
a
discrepancies.
established
have
an
somewhat
as
that
in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian
gives
*l
but
Northern
precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such
evidenced
So
the cultures will have to be invoked if
change in approach is to be hastened in this way.
cultural features to be considered.
classes.
But
the
basis
there
of
are
the
as
aesthetic
well
more
route
to
important
environmental
omissions
and
In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to
religion;
also
neglected
are
many
of
the connected older and
formerly more prominent values of American culture.
The
American
search
for
environmentally
acceptable
alternatives
has
regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or
spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 •
establish
"the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken
a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way.
and
Indeed the primary attempts to
representative
new environmentalism:
(For example, Nash provides a
sample
list of the books he considers important in the rise of the
virtually all that proceed beyond ecology
depend
on
an
appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.)
In the context of American culture the appeal
something
to
be
said for it.
to
religious
features
has
For, firstly, a high proportion of the American
population profess some active religious commitment;
•
9
and, unlike
Australia,
a
�substantial
do
proportion
act
response.
And, secondly, religious values do clash with
dominant
Northern
paradigm.
This
sort
of
socially
that
with
accordance
in
conflict
precepts
the
was
approved
of
perceived,
considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the
case
the
with
of
Melanesian society (p.9):
The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was
torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which
•••
carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of
Both aspects were a direct contradiction
enlightened self-interest.
of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of
Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the
While the Christian religion was widely
minds of the people.
compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism,
with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another,
it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow.
and
individualism
of
religion
It ran also contrary to the
self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was
followed by the majority of Europeans •••
It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant
paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved
Northern
There is
it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans.
a
compartmentalisation.
partial answer:
Religion for most is a separate thing
fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not
the
upset
standard
penetrate deep.
business
to
Thus for most believers religion does not
week.
Only for a minority does it directly
such as human poverty:
escape
touch
immediate
matters
why should we expect it to work for the Environment?
Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious
perceptions
within
the
American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter
things.
But even if some of the effects of a religious return would
beneficial,
and
to
nature
domination
highly
be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a
narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable.
of
be
were
Unless moreover the position
abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious
traditions the environmental effects would
10
be
negative
(as
Watt
testifies).
�Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset.
Religion in America has lost out to
with any depth to it appears most unlikely.
the
There
existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc.
no
But nor is the so-called scientific
front-end-in.
cannot account for;
it is that this perspective, a paradigm,
a richer
more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g.
view).
such
great
the
incorporates
There are
it is far from uniquely determined.
So
paradigm.
social
dominant
in
view
world
is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or
It
shape.
is
view with these sorts of weaknesses
the
to
return
to
trying
in
virtue
rival
Consider, for instance, the matter of the
view could explain.
scientific
much
for
world view was seriously deficient and it did not account
more
the case for its
In part it failed deservedly:
view".
world
scientific
"the
In any case such a reversal
intensional
scientific
These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking
a theological way.
character
quasi-religious
reasons
of
set
second
There is a
of
some
sort,
for
not
endeavouring
Christian,
strongly
These
on
turn
the
irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion
is unlikely to have much
as
understood
a
(the
Australia,
success.
first)
post-Christian
it
has
been
irreligious
character
the
of
understanding much else about the culture,
society
e.g.
'best
is
said,
society, in which religion (is)
barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an
generally
a
Pantheistic or
Jewish,
whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia.
impose
to
exaggeration
the
is a fact and is the key to
the
curious
extent
of
the
state's protrusion into Australian social life.
If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach
to
hastened
paradigm
transition - and a related approach through mysticism or
transcendentalism excluded for analogous reasons and because of
11
the
earthiness
�of
the
culture
-
what
alternatives
are
open?
There are other significant
features of the culture running against major elements of the
dominant
paradigm,
effectively
which
can
perhaps
applied
be
much
quasi-religious approaches to turn matters around.
more
Western
than
To indicate the prospects of
applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how
Australian culture contrasts with American.
Australian mainstream culture
transition
from
the
dominant
is
already
American
political left has much stronger support in
difficult
to
some
culture.
Australia
way
It
along
the
leftward
is not merely that the
than
USA.
It
is
not
indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show
its left-displacement from the dominant Western paradigm.
some elements of the contrast:-
12
The next table
lists
�TABLE 2.
CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE
SCALE OF INCREASE
*2
individualistic ethos
inacceptability of socialist institutions
inegalitarian attitudes
POSITIVE
inegalitarian practices
ITEMS (PER
level of consumerism
CAPITA
maximization quest
WHERE
imperialist drive
RELEVANT)
extent of violence
police and military commitment
high technology involvement
functional rationality
environmental inactivism
USA
AUSTRALIA
SCALE OF
INCREASE
level of urbanisation
legal obstacles to environmental action
NEGATIVE
official opposition to environmental
practices, such as dedication of
ITEMS
wilderness
administrative delays in implementing
environmental practices, such as
pollution requirements, recycling, etc.
13
�Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items
in
the
in
the
contrast.
Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on
first
diagram
of
rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as
opposed to American, it appears that prospects
indeed better.
themes
for
applying
the
culture
are
This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation.
The
task can profitably be combined with others:
there is much work here
both
for
environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists.
A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires
and
what
ought to be done (ideologically).
and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly
theses:
A weak
confirmation,
Let us focus on transition theses,
factual
and
normative
transition
factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is
undergoing a transition
away
from
the
dominant
confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g.
better results could be obtained in Australia;
social
Marsh).
paradigm,
has
been
Presumably similar or
but appropriate samplings of the
community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being
a
neglected
undoubtedly
field
also
in
Another
Australia.
weak
factual
transition
thesis
holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the
each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia
have
come
to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm.
But again comparative-figures
sociological
work
are
entirely
of
data
to
Though
impressionistic
tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia
than USA - indeed more intensive than
piece
lacking.
anywhere
else,
an
immensely
build upon - we lack solid confirmation.
sociogeographers to do.
14
important
There is much for
�Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been
taken
largely
for
granted,
that
Australian
culture, indeed Western culture
generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm
Western
paradigms
and
their
away
from
dominant
variations (such as those of advocated corporate
capitalism and of the post-industrial society),
transiting
shift,
and
towards an environmental alternative.
furthermore
ought
the
arguments.
It
is
also
be
That complex normative thesis
is argued for in environmental philosophy, and fortunately there isn't
repeat
to
time
to
argued against there, but, to sum up the
opposition case cavalierly, unconvincingly.
Given then that the transition is going on,
indeed
emerging
are
are
clear
doing
environmental
encourage
enough.
for
it
in
Australia?
example,
directing
action
going
be
aiming
swing
major
Preliminary
against
the
to
organisations.
on,
answers
sources
of
They
should
increase their support bases, but not merely by membership
They should be
endeavouring
to
influence
the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there
for a considerably greater change than has thus far been
two
be
despoilation and the like, primarily industrial organisations and
drives and environmental education.
and
to
Not only should activists be continuing with what
those supposed to regulate them, further (public)
also
ought
ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how
do environmental activists
they
and
parts
to
this
further
practice
which
achieved.
There
are
can run in tandem, a more
negative and a more positive part:
•
More negatively, it involves
cutting
down
and
countering
the
flow
of
propaganda
in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from
the North.
That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option.
includes
gently
a
range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as
lopping
anti-American
It
off
the
tall
poppies
pedalling
and anti-Northern activities.
15
the
stuff,
and
careful
The latter practices (which should
�not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well
other
regional
environmental
with
aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence
policies.
•
More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other also
despised
features
of
alternative paradigms.
ambassadors,
Australian
It
is
culture that work directly towards themes of
commonly
are,
of
course,
those
Lawrence).
like
nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones,
appreciation
Northern
intellectuals
of
local
natural
the
The features to be
egalitarian,
along
environments.
with
the
combines
enough:
cultural
with
promoted
or
anti-authoritarian,
rapidly
increasing
Nonmaximizing, for example, is
reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often
and
and
note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the
cultural characters are held (e.g.
adapted
commonly
taken
to
things,
egalitarian methods as encapsulated in Fair go and Enough's
consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics, in local
markets.
As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its
restriction in practice to
extension
male
relationships:
to communities (including nonhumans).
is there for deep cultural transformation:
but
why
not
encourage
its
So, to conclude, the potential
we must help to realise it.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The term 'approaches' is intended to include both theory and
both espoused ideology and behaviour.
2.
They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual
positions.
At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no
more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much
weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often
applied in violent fashion.
3.
By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples
of this and that system or species;
not representative southern
sassafras, parma wallabies
and
Torres
Strait
Islanders,
but
sufficiently many.
16
practice,
�4.
Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American
naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise
some have seen in it.
*1
The aesthetic route
Highwater.
is
well-illustrated
by
the
main
approach
in
*2
Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is
egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less
inegalitarian than American. The hard data underlying the claim---ri
assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence'.
*3
For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which
included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best
source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in
Birrell, p.178;
the second is from Griffin's article in Australian
Wild Life.
*4
P.
O'Farrell.
REFERENCES
J.
Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision
Harper & Row, New York, 1981.
J.
Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964.
W.B.
Griffin,
(,0· cc,,/' «.,PL'0"1 d I
(on
and
Reality
in
Indian
America,
· __ ,.,.,,
ja,n;~, Australian Wild Life J_
(f9Jt-f/), ty ·-J,
W.
Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings
a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982.
P.
O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in
Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1
(1982) Canberra.
R.
Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the
new environmentalism', typescript, University of California at Santa
Barbara, 1982.
A.
Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousness, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977.
s.
Cotgrove, Catastrophe
R.
Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms
action', in Elliot and Qlre, 260-293.
R.
Elliot and A.
Gare, Environmental Philosophy.
Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983.
or-
aae
Cornucopia, Wiley,
17
~~J~rh ,
of
1982.
in environmental
thought
A Collection
and
of
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�r
r"
WORKING DRAFT
·. , ' I
·
CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
Many of you know tha~ Canberra was originally
Griffin.
This
talk
is
(, ,~ ,/ h (: (tJ m,
, .
designed
by
Walter
Burley
'i.C
to him. You may not know that Griffin, an
dedicated
/ 1,• <, , ' ' ! I ·,/ .• r : , J,,--.T~- l, c :....
American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was
not
simply
an
architect
and
,1
lantlscape
designe ~ but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists.
key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially
on
making
nature
the
servant
of
man',
'land
to
be
accorded
the
'concentration
and discerned instead elements of a
different 'consciousness' (the word is his).
took
the
He rejected
His approach was holistic, and
respect
he
due to a highly developed and
perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or
as
a
mere
section of a map'.
Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still,
,.,i/f . ,:i:.
for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere
~~l-0gical
city;
*
to
*
*
*
*
*
gauge
the
extent
to
which
Australian
contrasted with American culture, contains developable
will
underpin
a
under which many
suffers.
-,/
/h ,1 ;1 ~11._r
talk
sketches
a
culture, especially as
elements
(seeds)
which
different political framework from the bastardised capitalism
people
presently
labour
and
local
environment
frequently
It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the
political course
interested
aeeper
*3
The objective of the larger investigation, of which this
is
a
but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception
but far from deep ecological ideals.
part,
to
in
charted
as
environmentally
alternative structures:
f) '
r ,nt
1
or
socially
disastrous
to
be
it is enough, for example, to view them
t__
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---1
n__
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1
,.
(•✓ L / ~• • }
'
<: l7' 1 •-rt,,,_
c, ,
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I
�as far from satisfactory, or very far from
worlds,
those
of
the
best
attainable
to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to
increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against
vandalism
and
the
environment
hope,
damage,
like, and ecological construction [direct positive action].
There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that
for
of
especially
the
give
grounds
remarkable level of environmental activism that has
somehow emerged among the people.
It is worth trying to pull together
some
of
these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts,
and increasing the level of concern and activism.
Without doubt
attitudes
and
different
practices,
cultures
towards
have
the
different
environment.
approaches,
1
different
Indeed appreciation of,
practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally
dependent:
compare,
for
nonimperial cultures had
much
less
North,
exploitation
and
American Jews and American Indians.
whose
approaches
to
practices
not
vandalism
the
environment
merely
permit
those
of
the
environmental
gross
control"
of
their
local
typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination.
But occasionally, notably
retained
than
but to a marked extent depend upon such practices.
Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost
environments,
Most
and where they still survive uncorrupted still have -
exploitative
industrial
instance,
sufficient
in
autonomy
the
to
adjacent
Pacific,
regional
cultures
2
have
slow or even halt environmental destruction.
Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked
in
Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land.
One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially
in
the
South,
is
to
foster
both
certain
sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy;
socialism
and
indigenous
for
cultural
instance
land rights movements.
2
differences
to
support
and, more
Melanesian
For, where the cultures have
�not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is
rapid
way
of
paradigms.
in
the
a
cultural
differences
can
also
serve
Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in
transition to different
Such
comparatively
activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social
The question arises whether
elsewhere
a
less
environmentally
exploitative
social
paradigms.
transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture.
Can
features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite
differences?
In the case of Australia, a basis
culture,
is
there
both
in
the
land
and
and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of
the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation .
the
need
for
change,
at
least
there
is,
in
It
is
becoming
platitudinous
the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many
local natural environments and ecosystems
loose
Of
if the natural environment is to retain some
semblance of integrity, there is little doubt.
that
3
unless
we
in
the
Antipodes
break
from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised
North and
work
destructive
towards
establishment
of
a
concern
in
different
less
some
parts,
rising
tide
war.
of
For despite
environmental
the industrialised North still appears in the grip of
established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of
nuclear
environmentally
culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy.
elements of regionalism in the North, despite a
disaster,
such
largely
alone.
Nor
is
the
Australia because as well as the
location,
the
as
Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority
movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go
advantage
of
the
ground
and
its
southern
seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing.
cultivation.
Such
a
it
task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in
like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and
speedy
the
careful
But
if
task is rendered urgent also by other matters of
3
�environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs
but
colossal
biological
losses
through
of
nuclear
rapid destruction of, e.g.
war,
tropical
rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere
humans now establish.
How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to
alter approaches to the environment?
As in the title of the talk it operates in
the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like
and
design
culture.
principles
A
working
picture
that
the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like
most images of the more abstract distorts across
organising
of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the
environmental way on the ropes of regional
links
the
is
that
of
a
suspension
the gap often separating people from the natural environment.
bridge
There are
people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment,
like
so:-
approach
➔
People
Natural
Environment
(Of course people may be part of the natural environment:
the
picture
doesn't
exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different
sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot
traffic,
through
the
monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able
to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans.
of
But it is the structure
all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly.
The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if
4
you
�will.
\
\
\
\
)
(......._ APPROACH
_ .,__ _.
So
with
approaches.
different
'--
--------- ---~
cultures,
__,.;::;f
---
different
carrying
bridges
different
It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy,
but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and
rivets
of
the
structures.
types,
bridges,
but
rather
It has its analytical
computing
the
loads
and
as
parts,
the
design
looking
stresses
at
on them;
and
engineering of the
the
components,
and it also has its more
holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and
of
them
their
- the social paradigms embedded in the cultures.
select
substructures
Philosophy, the link
subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business.
Less
figuratively,
assumptions
of
a
philosophy
replacement,
or marxist philosophies.
deep ecology, asks deeper
assumptions
of
all
and
and
assumptions
paradigms.
the
operative
for
example
of
free
Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not
deeper
questions,
extracting
the
fundamental
other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions
embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e.
social
assembles
culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions,
that is, to be considered for
enterprise
isolates
In
what are sometimes called the
this respect philosophy - which includes much more than
conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects,
as
logic,
the
science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of
arguments and methodology of all other sciences.
philosophical
investigation
extracts,
5
The
deeper
assumptions
such
when put together yield a philosophy in
�the more popular sense (as e.g.
enterprise
philosophy):
in
philosophy
of
life
or
again
the
free
in any case the result will be a philosophical theory
or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done.
By largely philosophical investigation then,
assumptions
of
the
techniques we try
contrasted
base.
with
operative
to
test
apparent
we
trace
and
Northern social paradigms;
the
adequacy
social
of
the
organise
the
and by sociological
assemblage,
especially
as
alternatives with some environmental support
So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some
results are illustrated in diagram 1.
Details of other positions, the old
culture
(as
positions
typically
offer
environmental
a
projected),
transition
alternative.
are
from
And
and
new
left
and
the
counter
included in the diagram because these
the
while
the
dominant
it
may
Western
appear
paradigm
to
indeed is - a long
political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative,
of
the
intermediate
taken one at a time.
details
steps is not so great;
To illustrate the way transitions can
of the first line (row) in macro-economic form.
construed
as
representing
package typically includes
environment,
so
the
in
components
be
made,
consider
The dominant objective
such
as
GDP,
a rough way standard of living.
minimal
to
quality
of
life
this
But the
and
and
pollution,
and
perhaps
with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness.
this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective
to considerable reservations, X(RR).
of
material
goes
back
to
Greek
philosophy;
6
In
growth
The real break however comes with
members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example,
idea
the
objective function to be maximized gets much complicated,
with subtractions for externalities such as noise
subject
each
and the steps can, and have, been
is to maximize some economic package of goods and services
being
the
though
the
namely, the abandonment of growth and
�maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing
the
macroeconomic
steady-state
objective
or
will
level,
for
economy,
something
economists have so far sketched.
which
Daly
for
At
the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a
sustainable
be
goals.
example
though
the
alternative
environmental
much less inflexible and nationalistic than
In fact the ''emerging steady-state
advocates,
paradigm",
affords only a shallow alternative to the
dominant paradigm, differing only as to
growth
and
reserves
But
themes.
a
fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate
capitalism
the
higher-dimensional
steady
position;
state
it
would
involve
However, the higher dimensional
how a better argued transition can be made;
diagram
essentially by combining
steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions
the
Left-socialist
combination, which
framework
would
a
diagram, and remove the convenient oversimplification of the
two dimensional left-right transition.
indicates
so
case
does
not
against microeconomic themes.
touch
human
relations,
a
with
Even so, even with the
narrower
anthropocentric
have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would
have only began to enter.
Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying
social
model takes us towards the following familiar picture:
society consists
of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g.
they are not
genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort
of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have
(e.g.
a
certain
ability
to
calculate).
but
few
of
these
At bottom, these individuals have
utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize;
and
so
they
are
competitive (by virtue of scarcity).
that they are possessive, and possess
capital.
The
distinctive
the
feature
means
of
Their other feature is
production,
e.g.
land,
of the American model is of course is that
individuals can separately accumulate the means of production.
7
To ensure
their
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X
: X·➔Y
I
I X ➔Y
X<R)
X ➔Y
I
I Y<Q)
y
Y
Y
V
IHUMAN RELATIONS
jPRIMARY
IY(Q)
X
X·->Y
y
y
I
y
ITRADITIONAL MARKETS
WITH IN PUBLIC INTEREST
I FRAMEWORK
LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF
IPRODUCTIVE MEANS
!DECENTRAL ISED:
I
COMMUNAL i
0
1REGIONALINEIGHBOURHOOD
FOCUS; SOCIAL (NONIV IOLENT) DEFENCE
I
PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES
J(c ITIZEN-WORKER
I
INVOLVEMENT)
1LIBERAT!O
N; SOCIAL
I
IREGULATION
I
I
X
1X<Rl I
y
JEARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED
X
I X
y
NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL
NoNHUMANS ESSENTIALLY
ME CHAN l ST IC
X
X
I X
I X
FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
SEPARATION OF REASON/
EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, , , ,
ScIENTIF!C/UT!L!TARIAN
RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC
REDUCTIONISTIC
X
:x(R)
iNATURE DELICATELY
BALANCED
1NATURE BENIGN
!OTHER ANIMALS ALSO
INTENTIONAL
y
X
IX
y
X
IX
I
IRATIONALITY
I REJECTED
y
X➔ Y
!
1SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE
NoN-(POWER)H!ERARCHJC,\L
IHUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN
IECO - COMMUN I TY
1
?
I
o . ,:, ,u <r 4l1 n 1
lx<Rl
AMPLE RESERV~S (OR
(SUBSTITUTES)
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE I
I '''
'
I
Y/NON OWNERSHIP
I
!COLLECTIVE ETHOS/
!SOCIAL PROVISION
EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED
IRELATED
l(AREFUL USE/RECYCLING , 1Y(ESSENTIAL)
LOCAL/SELF-MANAGEMENT
!PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS!
X
x<R>
IDEEP ECOLOGY
, orsT[NGU[SIIED
1LE SS MATERIAL GOALS
' (E.G. SE LF-REALISATION)
! lir.RMONY WI TH NATURE
,NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
IGREATER VALUE
' VALUED FOR ITSELF
ASSUMPTIOrj
!REJECTED
(FOR
I
BIOSPEC I ES
I IMPARTIALITY)
X--"Y
I
I
iALTERN/\TlVE (Y)
!ENVIRONMENTAL P/\R.l\D!GM
y
x<RR)
I
STATE
!OWNERSHIP
"
I
LIMITS TO SCIENCE:
!APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
JINTEGRATION OF REASON/
EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , ,
!HIDER RATIONALITY (OR
REJECTION OF NARROWER);
IHOLISTIC
IV/NATURAL AS
TELEOLOGICAL
I
I
�entitlement
to
this
is
the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive
apparatus of the (minimal) state.
natural,
this
about
self-interested
Features
There is nothing compulsory, or
picture.
competing
Individuals
individuals
are
matter
of
these
nurture,
abstract
not
nature.
of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of
training, not human nature, as a comparison
where
approximating
particularly
individuals
are
not
like
this,
individuals embody rationality either:
with
helps
other
traditional
cultures,
Nor do these archtypal
show.
only a question-begging
argument
leads
to the American model as something naturally required.
The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model.
introduces
certain
relations.
human
chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they
The
do
left
not
models
omit
are
social
The left
still
human
relations:
the
further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to
full community relations,
independent
value.
recognising
That
is
a
creatures
and
nonhuman
things
as
of
bigger step, a step that no Western political
institutions make requisite allowance
for,
and
that
mainstream
underpinning
Western value theories do not accommodate.
The arguments from traditional cultures can also be
illustrated
paradigms
cultures such as those
and
of
the
models
Melanesia
that
and
directed
underlie
Polynesia,
them.
many
against
the
In traditional
of
the
operative
assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted.
Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there
is
good
prospect
of
thwarting
more
environmentally
destructive practices.
Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed.
But much of the
inhabited
and
there are
already
New
governed
and
by
environmentally
less
unscathed
World
peoples of predominantly European stock.
distinctive
features
8
observable
in
New
World
is
now
Although
cultures,
�assumptions
of
the
dominant
Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently
questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial
other,
or
even
lesser,
features
of
surprisingly
leave
There are
out
cultures
significant
as
artistic
and
intellectual
usually
cultural
industrial culture, though economically dominated
accompanying
other
conspicuous
The incomplete social paradigms outlined do
not exhaust features of the accompanying
rather
to
be
sure,
does
affords
European
culture.
This
alternatives.
a
discrepancies.
established
have
an
somewhat
as
that
in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian
gives
*l
but
Northern
features.
This
icing.
discerned,
precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such
evidenced
So
the cultures will have to be invoked if
change in approach is to be hastened in this way.
cultural features to be considered.
classes.
But
the
basis
there
of
the
as
are
aesthetic
well
more
route
to
important
environmental
omissions
and
In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to
religion;
also
neglected
are
many
of
the connected older and
formerly more prominent values of American culture.
The
American
search
for
environmentally
acceptable
alternatives
has
regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or
spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 •
establish
"the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken
a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way.
and
Indeed the primary attempts to
representative
(For example, Nash provides a
sample
list of the books he considers important in the rise of the
new environmentalis m:
virtually all that proceed beyond ecology
depend
on
an
appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.)
In the context of American culture the appeal
something
to
be
said for it.
to
religious
features
has
For, firstly, a high proportion of the American
population profess some active religious commitment;
9
and, unlike
Australia,
a
�substantial
proportion
do
act
in
accordance
with
that
response.
And, secondly, religious values do clash with
dominant
Northern
paradigm.
This
sort
of
conflict
socially
the
precepts
was
approved
of
perceived,
considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the
case
the
with
of
Melanesian society (p.9):
The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was
torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which
carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of
enlightened self-int-erest.
Both aspects were a direct contradiction
of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of
Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the
minds of the people.
While the Christian religion was widely
compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism,
with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another,
it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow.
It ran also contrary to the
religion
of
individualism
and
self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was
followed by the majority of Europeans •••
It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant
Northern
paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved
it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans.
a
partial answer:
compartmentalisation.
Religion for most is a separate thing
fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not
upset
the
standard
penetrate deep.
business
week.
escape
to
Thus for most believers religion does not
Only for a minority does it directly
such as human poverty:
There is
touch
immediate
matters
why should we expect it to work for the Environment?
Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious
perceptions
within
the
American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter
things.
But even if some of the effects of a religious return would
beneficial,
and
to
nature
domination
highly
be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a
narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable.
of
be
were
Unless moreover the position
abandoned in favour of one of the lesser relig ious
traditions the environmental effects would
10
be
negative
(as
Watt
testifies).
�Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset.
with any depth to it appears most unlikely.
"the
scientific
world
view".
In any case such a reversal
Religion in America has lost out to
In part it failed deservedly:
world view was seriously deficient and it did not account
more
scientific
view could explain.
the case for its
for
much
the
Consider, for instance, the matter of the
existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc.
no
virtue
in
front-end-in.
shape.
It
trying
return
to
the
is
world
view
in
such
great
is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or
social
it is that this perspective, a paradigm,
paradigm.
So
incorporates
it is far from uniquely determined.
more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g.
view).
There
view with these sorts of weaknesses
But nor is the so-called scientific
cannot account for;
dominant
to
rival
a richer
intensional
the
There are
scientific
These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking
a theological way.
There is a
second
quasi-religious
set
character
of
of
reasons
some
sort,
for
not
endeavouring
Christian,
Jewish,
whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia.
strongly
impose
a
Pantheistic or
These
turn
on
the
irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion
is unlikely to have much
understood
as
a
(the
success.
first)
Australia,
post-Christian
it
has
been
irreligious
character
of
the
understanding much else about the culture,
society
e.g.
said,
is
'best
society, in which religion (is)
barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an
generally
to
exaggeration
the
is a fact and is the key to
the
curious
extent
of
the
state's protrusion into Australian social life.
If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach
to
hastened
paradigm
transition - and a related approach through mysticism or
transcendentali sm excluded for analogous reasons and because of
11
the
earthiness
�of
the
culture
what
alternative s
are
open?
There are other significant
features of the culture running against major elements of the
dominant
paradigm,
effectively
which
can
perhaps
be
much
applied
quasi-relig ious approaches to turn matters around.
more
Western
than
To indicate the prospects of
applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how
Australian culture contrasts with American.
Australian mainstream culture
transition
from
the
dominant
is
already
American
political left has much stronger support in
difficult
to
some
culture.
Australia
way
It
along
the
leftward
is not merely that the
than
USA.
It
is
not
indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show
its left-displac ement from the dominant Western paradigm.
some elements of the contrast:-
12
The next table
lists
�TABLE 2.
CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE
SCALE OF INCREASE
*2
individualistic ethos
inacceptability of socialist institutions
inegalitarian attitudes
POSITIVE
inegalitarian practices
ITEMS (PER
level of consumerism
CAPITA
maximization quest
WHERE
imperialist drive
RELEVANT)
extent of violence
police and military commitment
high technology involvement
functional rationality
environmental inactivism
AUSTRALIA
USA
SCALE OF
INCREASE
level of urbanisation
legal obstacles to environmental action
NEGATIVE
official opposition to environmental
practices, such as dedication of
ITEMS
wilderness
administrative delays in implementing
environmental practices, such as
pollution requirements, recycling, etc.
13
�Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items
in
the
in
the
contrast.
Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on
first
diagram
of
rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as
opposed to American, it appears that prospects
indeed better.
themes
for
applying
the
culture
are
This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation.
The
task can profitably be combined with others:
there is much work here
both
for
environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists.
A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires
and
what
ought to be done (ideologically ).
and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly
theses:
A
weak
confirmation,
Let us focus on transition theses,
factual
and
normative
transition
factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is
undergoing a transition
away
from
the
dominant
confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g.
better results could be obtained in Australia;
social
Marsh).
paradigm,
has
been
Presumably similar or
but appropriate samplings of the
community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being
a
neglected
undoubtedly
field
also
in
Australia.
Another
weak
factual
transition
thesis
holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the
each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia
have
come
to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm.
But again comparative-fig ures
sociological
work
are
entirely
of
data
to
Though
impressionistic
tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia
than USA - indeed more intensive than
piece
lacking.
anywhere
else,
an
immensely
build upon - we lack solid confirmation.
sociogeographer s to do.
14
important
There is much for
�Throughout, · as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been
taken
largely
for
granted,
that
Australian
culture, indeed Western culture
generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm
Western
paradigms
and
their
away
from
dominant
variations (such as those of advocated corporate
capitalism and of the post-indus trial society),
transiting
shift,
and
towards an environmen tal alternative .
furthermore
ought
the
arguments.
It
is
also
be
That complex normative thesis
is argued for in environmen tal philosophy, and fortunately there isn't
repeat
to
time
to
argued against there, but, to sum up the
opposition case cavalierly, unconvincin gly.
Given then that the transition is going on,
indeed
emerging
are
are
clear
doing
environmen tal
encourage
enough.
for
it
in
Australia?
example,
directing
action
going
be
aiming
swing
major
Preliminary
against
the
to
organisatio ns.
on,
answers
sources
of
They
should
increase their support bases, but not merely by membership
They should be
endeavourin g
to
influence
the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there
for a considerabl y greater change than has thus far been
two
be
despoilatio n and the like, primarily industrial organisatio ns and
drives and environmen tal education.
and
to
Not only should activists be continuing with what
those supposed to regulate them, further (public)
also
ought
ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how
do environmen tal activists
they
and
parts
to
this
further
practice
which
achieved.
There
are
can run in tandem, a more
negative and a more positive part:
•
More negatively, it involves
cutting
down
and
countering
the
flow
of
propaganda
in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from
the North.
That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option.
includes
gently
a
range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as
lopping
anti-Americ an
It
off
the
tall
poppies
pedalling
and anti-Northe rn activities.
15
the
stuff,
and
careful
The latter practices (which should
�.
.
not of course reduce merely to personall y directed antagonism ) fit in well
other
regional
environm ental
with
aims, such as independe nt and nonaligne d defence
policies.
•
More positivel y, it consists in promoting and adapting other also
despised
features
of
alternati ve paradigms .
ambassado rs,
Australia n
It
is
culture that work directly towards themes of
commonly
Northern
intellect uals
Lawrence ).
adapted
like
are,
of
course,
those
nonmaxim izing making-do socialist ic ones,
of
local
natural
the
The features to be
egalitari an,
along
environm ents.
with
the
combines
enough:
cultural
with
promoted
or
anti-auth oritarian ,
rapidly
increasin g
Nonmaxim izing, for example, is
reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often
and
and
note, that are responsib le for the low repute in which some of the
cultural character s are held (e.g.
appreciat ion
commonly
taken
to
things,
egalitari an methods as encapsula ted in Fair go and Enough's
consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics , in local
markets.
As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its
restrictio n in practice to
extension
male
relations hips:
to communit ies (includin g nonhuman s).
is there for deep cultural transform ation:
but
why
not
encourage
its
So, to conclude, the potential
we must help to realise it.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The term 'approach es' is intended to include both theory and
both espoused ideology and behaviour .
2.
They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellect ual
positions .
At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no
more ridiculou s than those of Christian ity. Typically they were much
weakened by new diseases, and overwhelm ed by new technolog y often
applied in violent fashion.
3.
By integrity is meant much more than retaining represent ative samples
of this and that system or species;
not represent ative southern
sassafras , parma wallabies
and
Torres
Strait
Islanders ,
but
sufficien tly many.
16
practice,
�4.
Another past philosophic al basis for environmen tal philosophy, American
naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise
some have seen in it.
*1
The aesthetic route
Highwater.
*2
Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is
egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less
inegalitari an than American. The hard data underlying the claim--rs
assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence '.
*3
For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which
included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best
source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in
Birrell, p.178;
the second is from Griffin's article in Australian
Wild Life.
*4
P.
is
well-illust rated
by
the
main
approach
in
O'Farrell.
REFERENCES
J.
Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision
Harper & Row, New York, 1981.
J.
Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964.
W.B.
Griffin,
-.
)
,
'\
and
,•
Reality
in
Indian
America,
Australian Wild Life
W.
Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings
a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982.
P.
O'Farrell,
'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in
Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1
(1982) Canberra.
R.
Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the
new environmen talism', typescript, University of California at Santa
Barbara, 1982.
A.
Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousne ss, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977.
s.
Cotgrove, Catastrophe and Cornucopia, Wiley, ,\,'. ~· , ,,
R.
Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms
action', in Elliot and Gare, 260-293.
R.
Elliot and A.
Ga:re, Environmen tal Philosophy.
Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983.
of
c- r-
17
, 1982.
in environmen tal
A
thought
Collection
and
of
�
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WORKING DRAFT 1'l}l' T1 1,,i··)
CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
Many of you know that Canberra was originally designed by Walter Burley
'lO
Griffin.
This talk is dedicated to him. You may not know that Griffin, an
c111,d l,ee,tJ>,, I! a ,~cJ/2...ru/.1t-l/ '";~1/n,-,l,c1...
American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was
not
simply
an
architect
and
A
lantlscape
designer_, but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists.
key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially
on
making
nature
the
servant
of
man',
'land
to
be
accorded
the
'concentration
and discerned instead elements of a
different 'consciousness' (the word is his).
took
the
He rejected
His approach was holistic, and
respect
he
due to a highly developed and
perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or
as
a
mere
section of a map'.
Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still,
for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere
.eco~osic-.w,
city;
but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception
but far from deep ecological ideals.
*
*
*3
*
*
*
*
The objective of the larger investigation, of which this
part,
is
to
gauge
the
extent
to
which
Australian
contrasted with American culture, contains developable
will
underpin
a
under which many
suffers.
talk
sketches
a
culture, especially as
elements
(seeds)
which
different political framework from the bastardised capitalism
people
presently
labour
and
local
environment
frequently
It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the
political course
interested
to
in
charted
as
environmentally
alternative structures:
socially
disastrous
to
be
it is enough, for example, to view them
r ,i,v~c~ntL..:f- [.<-ol"l,-"
hd<--t r7' <-.~ .::..
P,r~t- f tl. /~J
1
or
J
I
C-IJll·A-r~u... )
~ tn "S.
those
as far from satisfactory, or very far from
the
of
best
to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to
worlds,
increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against
vandalism
and
like, and ecological construction [direct positive action].
the
grounds
give
remarkable level of environmental activism that has
the
especially
hope,
damage,
environment
There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that
for
attainable
of
somehow emerged among the people.
It is worth trying to pull together
some
of
these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts,
and increasing the level of concern and activism.
the
towards
practices,
and
attitudes
different approaches, different
1
Indeed appreciation of,
environment.
have
cultures
different
Without doubt
practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally
dependent:
and where they still survive uncorrupted still have -
nonimperial cultures had
much
exploitative
less
whose
North,
industrial
exploitation
approaches
to
practices
not
vandalism
and
the
environment
merely
environmental
but to a marked extent depend upon such practices.
control"
their
of
local
typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination.
in
But occasionally, notably
retained
the
of
those
than
gross
permit
Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost
environments,
Most
American Jews and American Indians.
instance,
for
compare,
sufficient
autonomy
the
to
adjacent
Pacific,
regional
cultures
2
have
slow or even halt environmental destruction.
Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked
in
Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land.
One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially
in
the
South,
is
to
foster
certain
both
sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy;
socialism
and
indigenous
for
cultural
instance
land rights movements.
2
differences
to
support
and, more
Melanesian
For, where the cultures have
not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is
rapid
way
of
paradigms.
in
the
a
cultural
differences
can
also
serve
Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in
transition to different
Such
comparatively
activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social
The question arises whether
elsewhere
a
less
environmentally
exploitative
social
paradigms.
transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture.
Can
features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite
differences?
In the case of Australia, a basis
culture,
is
there
both
in
the
land
and
the
and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of
the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation.
the
need
for
change,
at
least
if the natural environment is to retain some
It
semblance of integrity, there is little doubt.
that
there
is,
in
is
becoming
platitudinous
the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many
local natural environments and ecosystems
loose
Of
3
unless
we
in
the
Antipodes
break
from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised
North and
work
destructive
towards
establishment
of
a
less
in
some
parts,
rising
tide
war.
of
For despite
environmental
the industrialised North still appears in the grip of
established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of
nuclear
environmentally
culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy.
elements of regionalism in the North, despite a
concern
different
disaster,
such
Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority
movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go
largely
alone.
Nor
is
the
Australia because as well as the
location,
the
advantage
of
the
ground
and
its
southern
seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing.
cultivation.
Such
a
it
task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in
like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and
speedy
as
careful
But
if
task is rendered urgent also by other matters of
3
environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs
but
colossal
biological
losses
through
of
nuclear
rapid destruction of, e.g.
war,
tropical
rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere
humans now establish.
How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to
alter approaches to the environment?
As in the title of the talk it operates in
the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like
and
design
culture.
principles
A working
picture
that
the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like
most images of the more abstract distorts across
organising
of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the
environmental way on the ropes of regional
links
the
is
that
of
a
suspension
the gap often separating people from the natural environment.
bridge
There are
people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment,
like
so:-
approach
➔
Natural
Environment
People
(Of course people may be part of the natural environment:
the
picture
doesn't
exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different
sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot
traffic,
through
the
monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able
to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans.
of
But it is the structure
all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly.
The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if
4
you
will.
~
{dC"' CULTURE
l
(--.__ APPROACH ~
____,___.- ·'---
So
with
approaches.
different
------- ----- -
cultures,
different
carrying
bridges
different
It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy,
but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and
rivets
of
the
structures.
types,
bridges,
but
rather
It has its analytical
computing
the
loads
and
as
parts,
the
design
looking
stresses
at
on them;
and
engineering of the
the
components,
and it also has its more
holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and
of
them
their
- the social paradigms embedded in the cultures.
select
substructures
Philosophy, the link
subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business.
Less
figuratively,
assumptions
of
a
philosophy
replacement,
or marxist philosophies.
deep ecology, asks deeper
assumptions
of
all
and
and
assumptions
paradigms.
the
operative
for
example
of
free
Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not
deeper
questions,
extracting
the
fundamental
other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions
embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e.
social
assembles
culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions,
that is, to be considered for
enterprise
isolates
In
what are sometimes called the
this respect philosophy - which includes much more than
conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects,
as
logic,
the
science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of
arguments and methodology of all other sciences.
philosophical
investigation
extracts,
5
The
deeper
assumptions
such
when put together yield a philosophy in
the more popular sense (as e.g.
enterprise
philosophy):
in
philosophy
of
life
or
again
the
free
in any case the result will be a philosophical theory
or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done.
By largely philosophical investigation then,
assumptions
of
the
techniques we try
contrasted
base.
with
operative
to
test
apparent
we
trace
and
Northern social paradigms;
the
adequacy
social
of
the
organise
the
and by sociological
assemblage,
especially
as
alternatives with some environmental support
So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some
results are illustrated in diagram 1.
Details of other positions, the old
culture
(as
positions
typically
offer
environmental
a
projected),
transition
alternative.
are
from
And
and
new
left
and
the
counter
included in the diagram because these
the
while
the
dominant
it
may
Western
appear
paradigm
to
indeed is - a long
political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative,
of
the
intermediate
taken one at a time.
details
steps is not so great;
To illustrate the way transitions can
of the first line (row) in macro-economic form.
construed
as
representing
package typically includes
environment,
so
the
in
components
each
and the steps can, and have, been
be
made,
consider
The dominant objective
is to maximize some economic package of goods and services
being
such
as
GDP,
a rough way standard of living.
minimal
to
quality
of
life
this
But the
and
and
pollution,
and
perhaps
with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness.
this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective
to considerable reservations, X(RR).
of
material
goes
back
to
Greek
philosophy;
6
In
growth
The real break however comes with
members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example,
idea
the
objective function to be maximized gets much complicated,
with subtractions for externalities such as noise
subject
the
though
the
namely, the abandonment of growth and
maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing
the
macroeconomic
steady-state
objective
or
will
level,
for
economy,
something
economists have so far sketched.
which
Daly
for
At
the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a
sustainable
be
goals.
example
though
the
alternative
environmental
much less inflexible and nationalistic than
In fact the "emerging steady-state
advocates,
paradigm",
affords only a shallow alternative to the
dominant paradigm, differing only as to
growth
and
reserves
themes.
But
a
fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate
capitalism
the
higher-dimensional
steady
state
position;
involve
would
However, the higher dimensional
how a better argued transition can be made;
diagram
essentially by combining
steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions
the
Left-socialist
combination, which
framework
would
a
diagram, and remove the convenient ~simplification of the
two dimensional left-right transition.
indicates
it
so
case
does
not
against microeconomic themes.
touch
human
relations,
a
with
Even so, even with the
narrower
anthropocentric
have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would
have only began to enter.
Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying
social
model takes us towards the following familiar picture:
society consists
of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g.
they are not
genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort
of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have
(e.g.
a
certain
ability
to
calculate).
but
few
of
these
At bottom, these individuals have
utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize;
and
so
they
are
competitive (by virtue of scarcity).
that they are possessive, and possess
capital.
The
distinctive
the
feature
means
of
Their other feature is
production,
e.g.
land,
of the American model is of course is that
individuals can separately accumulate the means of production.
7
To ensure
their
rABLI J.
COMPLll NG SOC IAL l'ARAD IGMS
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DOMINANT (XJ
WESTERN PARADIGM
CORE
THEMES
ECONOMIC
ORGANISATIONAL
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MATERIAL (ECONOMIC)
GROWTH
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NATURAL ENVIRONMENT A
RESOURCE
MARKET FORCES (MINIMALLY
REGULATED, PRODUCTIVITY
AND PROFIT MAXIMIZING)
PREDOMINANTLY PRIVATE
OWNERSHIP OF PRODUCTIVE
MEANS
I ND IV I DUALI ST I c/
COMPETITIVE ETHOS
ELITIST/REWARDS FOR
APPROVED ACHIEVEMENT
CONSUMERISM ENCOURAGED
URBAN-INDUSTRIAL
COMMODITY/CULTURAL
PACKAGING
CENTRALISED : URBAN
CENTRED
LARGE-SCALE: ORDERED
(POWER-) HIERARCHICAL
HUMAN RELATIONS
SECONDARY
/OLD
1LEFT
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1
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I
entitlement
to
this
is
the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive
apparatus of the (minimal) state.
natural,
this
about
self-interested
Features
There is nothing compulsory, or
Individuals
picture.
competing
individuals
are
matter
of
these
nurture,
abstract
not
nature.
of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of
training, not human nature, as a comparison
where
approximating
particularly
individuals
are
not
like
this,
individuals embody rationality either:
with
helps
other
traditional
show.
cultures,
Nor do these archtypal
only a question-begging
argument
leads
to the American model as something naturally required.
The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model.
certain
introduces
human
The
relations.
chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they
do
left
not
models
omit
are
social
The left
still
human
relations:
the
further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to
full community relations,
independent
value.
recognising
That
is
a
creatures
and
nonhuman
things
as
of
bigger step, a step that no Western political
institutions make requisite allowance
for,
and
that
mainstream
underpinning
Western value theories do not accommodate.
The arguments from traditional cultures can also be
illustrated
paradigms
and
cultures such as those
the
of
models
Melanesia
that
and
directed
underlie
Polynesia,
them.
many
of
against
the
In traditional
the
operative
assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted.
Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there
is
good
prospect
of
thwarting
more
environmentally
destructive practices.
Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed.
But much of the
inhabited
and
there are
already
New
governed
and
by
environmentally
less
unscathed
World
peoples of predominantly European stock.
distinctive
features
8
observable
in
New
World
is
now
Although
cultures,
assumptions
of
the
dominant
Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently
questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the manag~rial
other,
or
even
lesser,
features
of
surprisingly
leave
out
There are
cultures
significant
as
artistic
and
intellectual
usually
cultural
industrial culture, though economically dominated
accompanying
other
conspicuous
The incomplete social paradigms outlined do
not exhaust features of the accompanying
rather
to
be
icing.
discerned,
features.
sure,
This
does
affords
European
culture.
This
alternatives.
a
discrepancies.
established
have
an
somewhat
as
that
in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian
gives
*l
but
Northern
precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such
evidenced
So
the cultures will have to be invoked if
change in approach is to be hastened in this way.
cultural features to be considered.
classes.
But
the
basis
there
of
are
the
as
aesthetic
well
more
route
to
important
environmental
omissions
and
In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to
religion;
also
neglected
are
many
of
the connected older and
formerly more prominent values of American culture.
The
American
search
for
environmentally
acceptable
alternatives
has
regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or
spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 •
establish
"the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken
a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way.
and
Indeed the primary attempts to
representative
new environmentalism:
(For example, Nash provides a
sample
list of the books he considers important in the rise of the
virtually all that proceed beyond ecology
depend
on
an
appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.)
In the context of American culture the appeal
something
to
be
said for it.
to
religious
features
has
For, firstly, a high proportion of the American
population profess some active religious commitment;
•
9
and, unlike
Australia,
a
substantial
do
proportion
act
response.
And, secondly, religious values do clash with
dominant
Northern
paradigm.
This
sort
of
socially
that
with
accordance
in
conflict
precepts
the
was
approved
of
perceived,
considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the
case
the
with
of
Melanesian society (p.9):
The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was
torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which
•••
carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of
Both aspects were a direct contradiction
enlightened self-interest.
of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of
Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the
While the Christian religion was widely
minds of the people.
compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism,
with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another,
it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow.
and
individualism
of
religion
It ran also contrary to the
self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was
followed by the majority of Europeans •••
It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant
paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved
Northern
There is
it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans.
a
compartmentalisation.
partial answer:
Religion for most is a separate thing
fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not
the
upset
standard
penetrate deep.
business
to
Thus for most believers religion does not
week.
Only for a minority does it directly
such as human poverty:
escape
touch
immediate
matters
why should we expect it to work for the Environment?
Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious
perceptions
within
the
American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter
things.
But even if some of the effects of a religious return would
beneficial,
and
to
nature
domination
highly
be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a
narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable.
of
be
were
Unless moreover the position
abandoned in favour of one of the lesser religious
traditions the environmental effects would
10
be
negative
(as
Watt
testifies).
Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset.
Religion in America has lost out to
with any depth to it appears most unlikely.
the
There
existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc.
no
But nor is the so-called scientific
front-end-in.
cannot account for;
it is that this perspective, a paradigm,
a richer
more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g.
view).
such
great
the
incorporates
There are
it is far from uniquely determined.
So
paradigm.
social
dominant
in
view
world
is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or
It
shape.
is
view with these sorts of weaknesses
the
to
return
to
trying
in
virtue
rival
Consider, for instance, the matter of the
view could explain.
scientific
much
for
world view was seriously deficient and it did not account
more
the case for its
In part it failed deservedly:
view".
world
scientific
"the
In any case such a reversal
intensional
scientific
These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking
a theological way.
character
quasi-religious
reasons
of
set
second
There is a
of
some
sort,
for
not
endeavouring
Christian,
strongly
These
on
turn
the
irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion
is unlikely to have much
as
understood
a
(the
Australia,
success.
first)
post-Christian
it
has
been
irreligious
character
the
of
understanding much else about the culture,
society
e.g.
'best
is
said,
society, in which religion (is)
barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an
generally
a
Pantheistic or
Jewish,
whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia.
impose
to
exaggeration
the
is a fact and is the key to
the
curious
extent
of
the
state's protrusion into Australian social life.
If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach
to
hastened
paradigm
transition - and a related approach through mysticism or
transcendentalism excluded for analogous reasons and because of
11
the
earthiness
of
the
culture
-
what
alternatives
are
open?
There are other significant
features of the culture running against major elements of the
dominant
paradigm,
effectively
which
can
perhaps
applied
be
much
quasi-religious approaches to turn matters around.
more
Western
than
To indicate the prospects of
applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how
Australian culture contrasts with American.
Australian mainstream culture
transition
from
the
dominant
is
already
American
political left has much stronger support in
difficult
to
some
culture.
Australia
way
It
along
the
leftward
is not merely that the
than
USA.
It
is
not
indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show
its left-displacement from the dominant Western paradigm.
some elements of the contrast:-
12
The next table
lists
TABLE 2.
CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE
SCALE OF INCREASE
*2
individualistic ethos
inacceptability of socialist institutions
inegalitarian attitudes
POSITIVE
inegalitarian practices
ITEMS (PER
level of consumerism
CAPITA
maximization quest
WHERE
imperialist drive
RELEVANT)
extent of violence
police and military commitment
high technology involvement
functional rationality
environmental inactivism
USA
AUSTRALIA
SCALE OF
INCREASE
level of urbanisation
legal obstacles to environmental action
NEGATIVE
official opposition to environmental
practices, such as dedication of
ITEMS
wilderness
administrative delays in implementing
environmental practices, such as
pollution requirements, recycling, etc.
13
Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items
in
the
in
the
contrast.
Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on
first
diagram
of
rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as
opposed to American, it appears that prospects
indeed better.
themes
for
applying
the
culture
are
This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation.
The
task can profitably be combined with others:
there is much work here
both
for
environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists.
A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires
and
what
ought to be done (ideologically).
and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly
theses:
A weak
confirmation,
Let us focus on transition theses,
factual
and
normative
transition
factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is
undergoing a transition
away
from
the
dominant
confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g.
better results could be obtained in Australia;
social
Marsh).
paradigm,
has
been
Presumably similar or
but appropriate samplings of the
community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being
a
neglected
undoubtedly
field
also
in
Another
Australia.
weak
factual
transition
thesis
holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the
each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia
have
come
to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm.
But again comparative-figures
sociological
work
are
entirely
of
data
to
Though
impressionistic
tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia
than USA - indeed more intensive than
piece
lacking.
anywhere
else,
an
immensely
build upon - we lack solid confirmation.
sociogeographers to do.
14
important
There is much for
Throughout, as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been
taken
largely
for
granted,
that
Australian
culture, indeed Western culture
generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm
Western
paradigms
and
their
away
from
dominant
variations (such as those of advocated corporate
capitalism and of the post-industrial society),
transiting
shift,
and
towards an environmental alternative.
furthermore
ought
the
arguments.
It
is
also
be
That complex normative thesis
is argued for in environmental philosophy, and fortunately there isn't
repeat
to
time
to
argued against there, but, to sum up the
opposition case cavalierly, unconvincingly.
Given then that the transition is going on,
indeed
emerging
are
are
clear
doing
environmental
encourage
enough.
for
it
in
Australia?
example,
directing
action
going
be
aiming
swing
major
Preliminary
against
the
to
organisations.
on,
answers
sources
of
They
should
increase their support bases, but not merely by membership
They should be
endeavouring
to
influence
the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there
for a considerably greater change than has thus far been
two
be
despoilation and the like, primarily industrial organisations and
drives and environmental education.
and
to
Not only should activists be continuing with what
those supposed to regulate them, further (public)
also
ought
ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how
do environmental activists
they
and
parts
to
this
further
practice
which
achieved.
There
are
can run in tandem, a more
negative and a more positive part:
•
More negatively, it involves
cutting
down
and
countering
the
flow
of
propaganda
in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from
the North.
That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option.
includes
gently
a
range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as
lopping
anti-American
It
off
the
tall
poppies
pedalling
and anti-Northern activities.
15
the
stuff,
and
careful
The latter practices (which should
not of course reduce merely to personally directed antagonism) fit in well
other
regional
environmental
with
aims, such as independent and nonaligned defence
policies.
•
More positively, it consists in promoting and adapting other also
despised
features
of
alternative paradigms.
ambassadors,
Australian
It
is
culture that work directly towards themes of
commonly
are,
of
course,
those
Lawrence).
like
nonmaximizing making-do socialistic ones,
appreciation
Northern
intellectuals
of
local
natural
the
The features to be
egalitarian,
along
environments.
with
the
combines
enough:
cultural
with
promoted
or
anti-authoritarian,
rapidly
increasing
Nonmaximizing, for example, is
reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often
and
and
note, that are responsible for the low repute in which some of the
cultural characters are held (e.g.
adapted
commonly
taken
to
things,
egalitarian methods as encapsulated in Fair go and Enough's
consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics, in local
markets.
As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its
restriction in practice to
extension
male
relationships:
to communities (including nonhumans).
is there for deep cultural transformation:
but
why
not
encourage
its
So, to conclude, the potential
we must help to realise it.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The term 'approaches' is intended to include both theory and
both espoused ideology and behaviour.
2.
They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellectual
positions.
At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no
more ridiculous than those of Christianity. Typically they were much
weakened by new diseases, and overwhelmed by new technology often
applied in violent fashion.
3.
By integrity is meant much more than retaining representative samples
of this and that system or species;
not representative southern
sassafras, parma wallabies
and
Torres
Strait
Islanders,
but
sufficiently many.
16
practice,
4.
Another past philosophical basis for environmental philosophy, American
naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise
some have seen in it.
*1
The aesthetic route
Highwater.
is
well-illustrated
by
the
main
approach
in
*2
Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is
egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less
inegalitarian than American. The hard data underlying the claim---ri
assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence'.
*3
For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which
included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best
source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in
Birrell, p.178;
the second is from Griffin's article in Australian
Wild Life.
*4
P.
O'Farrell.
REFERENCES
J.
Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision
Harper & Row, New York, 1981.
J.
Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964.
W.B.
Griffin,
(,0· cc,,/' «.,PL'0"1 d I
(on
and
Reality
in
Indian
America,
· __ ,.,.,,
ja,n;~, Australian Wild Life J_
(f9Jt-f/), ty ·-J,
W.
Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings
a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982.
P.
O'Farrell, 'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in
Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1
(1982) Canberra.
R.
Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the
new environmentalism', typescript, University of California at Santa
Barbara, 1982.
A.
Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousness, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977.
s.
Cotgrove, Catastrophe
R.
Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms
action', in Elliot and Qlre, 260-293.
R.
Elliot and A.
Gare, Environmental Philosophy.
Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983.
or-
aae
Cornucopia, Wiley,
17
~~J~rh ,
of
1982.
in environmental
thought
A Collection
and
of
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r
r"
WORKING DRAFT
·. , ' I
·
CULTURE, PHILOSOPHY, AND APPROACHES TO THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT - AN
AUSTRALIAN PERSPECTIVE
Many of you know tha~ Canberra was originally
Griffin.
This
talk
is
(, ,~ ,/ h (: (tJ m,
, .
designed
by
Walter
Burley
'i.C
to him. You may not know that Griffin, an
dedicated
/ 1,• <, , ' ' ! I ·,/ .• r : , J,,--.T~- l, c :....
American who migrated to Australia in 1913, was
not
simply
an
architect
and
,1
lantlscape
designe ~ but one of Australia's early deeper ecologists.
key elements of the Western industrial paradigm, especially
on
making
nature
the
servant
of
man',
'land
to
be
accorded
the
'concentration
and discerned instead elements of a
different 'consciousness' (the word is his).
took
the
He rejected
His approach was holistic, and
respect
he
due to a highly developed and
perfected living organism not to be exterminated or treated as dead material, or
as
a
mere
section of a map'.
Canberra, now no mere section of map, is still,
,.,i/f . ,:i:.
for all its deficiencies, perhaps the best approximation anywhere
~~l-0gical
city;
*
to
*
*
*
*
*
gauge
the
extent
to
which
Australian
contrasted with American culture, contains developable
will
underpin
a
under which many
suffers.
-,/
/h ,1 ;1 ~11._r
talk
sketches
a
culture, especially as
elements
(seeds)
which
different political framework from the bastardised capitalism
people
presently
labour
and
local
environment
frequently
It is not necessary to see the present political arrangements and the
political course
interested
aeeper
*3
The objective of the larger investigation, of which this
is
a
but it is not only removed from Griffin's original conception
but far from deep ecological ideals.
part,
to
in
charted
as
environmentally
alternative structures:
f) '
r ,nt
1
or
socially
disastrous
to
be
it is enough, for example, to view them
t__
ri __f. _________
---1
n__
{- ,-; ,:_... --1 (.
"'I n,l ._
1
,.
(•✓ L / ~• • }
'
<: l7' 1 •-rt,,,_
c, ,
/---5-0-J. i +- I~.,, )•
I
as far from satisfactory, or very far from
worlds,
those
of
the
best
attainable
to be interested in the prospects of turning things around somewhat, to
increasing ecological resistance [negative action] against
vandalism
and
the
environment
hope,
damage,
like, and ecological construction [direct positive action].
There are several distinctive features of Australian culture that
for
of
especially
the
give
grounds
remarkable level of environmental activism that has
somehow emerged among the people.
It is worth trying to pull together
some
of
these features of the culture, to look at ways of furthering the valuable parts,
and increasing the level of concern and activism.
Without doubt
attitudes
and
different
practices,
cultures
towards
have
the
different
environment.
approaches,
1
different
Indeed appreciation of,
practices towards, and respect for the natural environment are highly culturally
dependent:
compare,
for
nonimperial cultures had
much
less
North,
exploitation
and
American Jews and American Indians.
whose
approaches
to
practices
not
vandalism
the
environment
merely
permit
those
of
the
environmental
gross
control"
of
their
local
typically under the missionary, colonial or imperial domination.
But occasionally, notably
retained
than
but to a marked extent depend upon such practices.
Mostly these more benign cultures have however "lost
environments,
Most
and where they still survive uncorrupted still have -
exploitative
industrial
instance,
sufficient
in
autonomy
the
to
adjacent
Pacific,
regional
cultures
2
have
slow or even halt environmental destruction.
Thus, for example, rainforest damaging projects have been delayed or blocked
in
Melanesia largely through Melanesian attitudes to the land.
One important way then to try to slow environmental degradation, especially
in
the
South,
is
to
foster
both
certain
sweepingly, regional cultural autonomy;
socialism
and
indigenous
for
cultural
instance
land rights movements.
2
differences
to
support
and, more
Melanesian
For, where the cultures have
not been excessively corrupted by Northern influences, this is
rapid
way
of
paradigms.
in
the
a
cultural
differences
can
also
serve
Antipodes, in particular in Australia, to at least assist in
transition to different
Such
comparatively
activating alternative paradigms to the dominant Northern social
The question arises whether
elsewhere
a
less
environmentally
exploitative
social
paradigms.
transition is unlikely to occur unless it is based on the culture.
Can
features of the culture and the social life be used to foster and make requisite
differences?
In the case of Australia, a basis
culture,
is
there
both
in
the
land
and
and things appear sufficiently different from those in the cultures of
the industrialised North to allow (some hope) for cultural differentiation .
the
need
for
change,
at
least
there
is,
in
It
is
becoming
platitudinous
the longer run not much prospect for the integrity of many
local natural environments and ecosystems
loose
Of
if the natural environment is to retain some
semblance of integrity, there is little doubt.
that
3
unless
we
in
the
Antipodes
break
from the damaging cultural assumptions and practice of the industrialised
North and
work
destructive
towards
establishment
of
a
concern
in
different
less
some
parts,
rising
tide
war.
of
For despite
environmental
the industrialised North still appears in the grip of
established forces and unlikely to budge in time - short of
nuclear
environmentally
culture, towards a certain regional cultural autonomy.
elements of regionalism in the North, despite a
disaster,
such
largely
alone.
Nor
is
the
Australia because as well as the
location,
the
as
Though we who seek change can count on some support from minority
movements in the North, nonetheless if we are to achieve changes, we must go
advantage
of
the
ground
and
its
southern
seeds of cultural difference are already there and growing.
cultivation.
Such
a
it
task of paradigm transition entirely hopeless in
like most new and more fragile developments they need attention and
speedy
the
careful
But
if
task is rendered urgent also by other matters of
3
environmental and human concern, not just the gathering signs
but
colossal
biological
losses
through
of
nuclear
rapid destruction of, e.g.
war,
tropical
rainforests, indeed mounting evidence of environmental decline almost everywhere
humans now establish.
How does philosophy fit into the strategy of harnessing regional culture to
alter approaches to the environment?
As in the title of the talk it operates in
the middle, not as an idle middleman, but more like
and
design
culture.
principles
A
working
picture
that
the main components of the discussion together - a picture that also like
most images of the more abstract distorts across
organising
of the dynamic linkage in a good suspension bridge, which lifts the
environmental way on the ropes of regional
links
the
is
that
of
a
suspension
the gap often separating people from the natural environment.
bridge
There are
people, and the environment, and approaches by bridges to the environment,
like
so:-
approach
➔
People
Natural
Environment
(Of course people may be part of the natural environment:
the
picture
doesn't
exclude that important overlap.) The connecting bridges may be of very different
sorts, ranging from rustic bridges good for careful foot
traffic,
through
the
monumental suspension bridge at Middle Harbour, to modern high-tech bridges able
to carry nuclear tanks and bulldozers over large spans.
of
But it is the structure
all these types of bridges carrying the approaches that matter particularly.
The spans are carried by the ropes of culture, and the pylons of culture if
4
you
will.
\
\
\
\
)
(......._ APPROACH
_ .,__ _.
So
with
approaches.
different
'--
--------- ---~
cultures,
__,.;::;f
---
different
carrying
bridges
different
It is better to see the link component in the middle - philosophy,
but it might almost as well be sociology - not as part of the nuts and bolts and
rivets
of
the
structures.
types,
bridges,
but
rather
It has its analytical
computing
the
loads
and
as
parts,
the
design
looking
stresses
at
on them;
and
engineering of the
the
components,
and it also has its more
holistic elements, considering the bridges themselves and
of
them
their
- the social paradigms embedded in the cultures.
select
substructures
Philosophy, the link
subject, is then the architecture and engineering of the business.
Less
figuratively,
assumptions
of
a
philosophy
replacement,
or marxist philosophies.
deep ecology, asks deeper
assumptions
of
all
and
and
assumptions
paradigms.
the
operative
for
example
of
free
Philosophy, especially metaphysics and not
deeper
questions,
extracting
the
fundamental
other subjects and assembling the intellectual assumptions
embodied in a culture or social way of life, i.e.
social
assembles
culture applied in environmental practices, the assumptions,
that is, to be considered for
enterprise
isolates
In
what are sometimes called the
this respect philosophy - which includes much more than
conceptual analysis - is first among the intellectual subjects,
as
logic,
the
science of reasoning, is the first among the sciences, investigating the form of
arguments and methodology of all other sciences.
philosophical
investigation
extracts,
5
The
deeper
assumptions
such
when put together yield a philosophy in
the more popular sense (as e.g.
enterprise
philosophy):
in
philosophy
of
life
or
again
the
free
in any case the result will be a philosophical theory
or the rudiments of a philosophical paradigm, depending on how it is done.
By largely philosophical investigation then,
assumptions
of
the
techniques we try
contrasted
base.
with
operative
to
test
apparent
we
trace
and
Northern social paradigms;
the
adequacy
social
of
the
organise
the
and by sociological
assemblage,
especially
as
alternatives with some environmental support
So much has already been accomplished, in a rough and ready way, and some
results are illustrated in diagram 1.
Details of other positions, the old
culture
(as
positions
typically
offer
environmental
a
projected),
transition
alternative.
are
from
And
and
new
left
and
the
counter
included in the diagram because these
the
while
the
dominant
it
may
Western
appear
paradigm
to
indeed is - a long
political way from the dominant paradigm to the environmental alternative,
of
the
intermediate
taken one at a time.
details
steps is not so great;
To illustrate the way transitions can
of the first line (row) in macro-economic form.
construed
as
representing
package typically includes
environment,
so
the
in
components
be
made,
consider
The dominant objective
such
as
GDP,
a rough way standard of living.
minimal
to
quality
of
life
this
But the
and
and
pollution,
and
perhaps
with additions for non-material features excluded in dominant consciousness.
this way we arrive at New Left thinking with the objective
to considerable reservations, X(RR).
of
material
goes
back
to
Greek
philosophy;
6
In
growth
The real break however comes with
members of the counterculture, the Hippies and Yippies for example,
idea
the
objective function to be maximized gets much complicated,
with subtractions for externalities such as noise
subject
each
and the steps can, and have, been
is to maximize some economic package of goods and services
being
the
though
the
namely, the abandonment of growth and
maximization objectives altogether, for less material nonmaximizing
the
macroeconomic
steady-state
objective
or
will
level,
for
economy,
something
economists have so far sketched.
which
Daly
for
At
the idea gets partially represented by the goal of a
sustainable
be
goals.
example
though
the
alternative
environmental
much less inflexible and nationalistic than
In fact the ''emerging steady-state
advocates,
paradigm",
affords only a shallow alternative to the
dominant paradigm, differing only as to
growth
and
reserves
But
themes.
a
fuller diagram of paradigms would include - among others such advanced corporate
capitalism
the
higher-dimensional
steady
position;
state
it
would
involve
However, the higher dimensional
how a better argued transition can be made;
diagram
essentially by combining
steady-state arguments against macroeconomic growth and stocks assumptions
the
Left-socialist
combination, which
framework
would
a
diagram, and remove the convenient oversimplification of the
two dimensional left-right transition.
indicates
so
case
does
not
against microeconomic themes.
touch
human
relations,
a
with
Even so, even with the
narrower
anthropocentric
have been left behind, deeper environmental concern would
have only began to enter.
Reaching behind the dominant Western paradigm so outlined to the underlying
social
model takes us towards the following familiar picture:
society consists
of a set of individual humans of decidedly impoverished type, e.g.
they are not
genuinely interrelated, so they are isolated, and, though they are the only sort
of items that have intensional (mental) features, they have
(e.g.
a
certain
ability
to
calculate).
but
few
of
these
At bottom, these individuals have
utilities, reflecting preferences or self-interests, which they aim to maximize;
and
so
they
are
competitive (by virtue of scarcity).
that they are possessive, and possess
capital.
The
distinctive
the
feature
means
of
Their other feature is
production,
e.g.
land,
of the American model is of course is that
individuals can separately accumulate the means of production.
7
To ensure
their
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(POWER-BROKERS ANO
EXPERTS PROMINENT)
LAW AND ORDER; LEGAL
REGULATION, POLICE BACKED
X
: X·➔Y
I
I X ➔Y
X<R)
X ➔Y
I
I Y<Q)
y
Y
Y
V
IHUMAN RELATIONS
jPRIMARY
IY(Q)
X
X·->Y
y
y
I
y
ITRADITIONAL MARKETS
WITH IN PUBLIC INTEREST
I FRAMEWORK
LIMITED OWNERSHIP OF
IPRODUCTIVE MEANS
!DECENTRAL ISED:
I
COMMUNAL i
0
1REGIONALINEIGHBOURHOOD
FOCUS; SOCIAL (NONIV IOLENT) DEFENCE
I
PARTICIPATIVE STRUCTURES
J(c ITIZEN-WORKER
I
INVOLVEMENT)
1LIBERAT!O
N; SOCIAL
I
IREGULATION
I
I
X
1X<Rl I
y
JEARTH SUPPLIES LIMITED
X
I X
y
NATURE HOSTILE/NEUTRAL
NoNHUMANS ESSENTIALLY
ME CHAN l ST IC
X
X
I X
I X
FAITH IN SCIENCE: HIGH
TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS
SEPARATION OF REASON/
EMOTION, FACT/VALUE, , , ,
ScIENTIF!C/UT!L!TARIAN
RATIONALITY; ANALYTIC
REDUCTIONISTIC
X
:x(R)
iNATURE DELICATELY
BALANCED
1NATURE BENIGN
!OTHER ANIMALS ALSO
INTENTIONAL
y
X
IX
y
X
IX
I
IRATIONALITY
I REJECTED
y
X➔ Y
!
1SMALL-SCALE; FLEXIBLE
NoN-(POWER)H!ERARCHJC,\L
IHUMAN RELATIONS WITHIN
IECO - COMMUN I TY
1
?
I
o . ,:, ,u <r 4l1 n 1
lx<Rl
AMPLE RESERV~S (OR
(SUBSTITUTES)
ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLLABLE I
I '''
'
I
Y/NON OWNERSHIP
I
!COLLECTIVE ETHOS/
!SOCIAL PROVISION
EGALITARIAN/INCOME NEED
IRELATED
l(AREFUL USE/RECYCLING , 1Y(ESSENTIAL)
LOCAL/SELF-MANAGEMENT
!PRODUCT/CULTURE EMPHASIS!
X
x<R>
IDEEP ECOLOGY
, orsT[NGU[SIIED
1LE SS MATERIAL GOALS
' (E.G. SE LF-REALISATION)
! lir.RMONY WI TH NATURE
,NATURAL ENVIRONMENT
IGREATER VALUE
' VALUED FOR ITSELF
ASSUMPTIOrj
!REJECTED
(FOR
I
BIOSPEC I ES
I IMPARTIALITY)
X--"Y
I
I
iALTERN/\TlVE (Y)
!ENVIRONMENTAL P/\R.l\D!GM
y
x<RR)
I
STATE
!OWNERSHIP
"
I
LIMITS TO SCIENCE:
!APPROPRIATE TECHNOLOGY
JINTEGRATION OF REASON/
EMOTION, FACT/VALUE , , ,
!HIDER RATIONALITY (OR
REJECTION OF NARROWER);
IHOLISTIC
IV/NATURAL AS
TELEOLOGICAL
I
I
entitlement
to
this
is
the initial argument, on this model, for the coercive
apparatus of the (minimal) state.
natural,
this
about
self-interested
Features
There is nothing compulsory, or
picture.
competing
Individuals
individuals
are
matter
of
these
nurture,
abstract
not
nature.
of the American economic archtype are a matter of culture, a result of
training, not human nature, as a comparison
where
approximating
particularly
individuals
are
not
like
this,
individuals embody rationality either:
with
helps
other
traditional
cultures,
Nor do these archtypal
show.
only a question-begging
argument
leads
to the American model as something naturally required.
The transitions to the left already go beyond the American model.
introduces
certain
relations.
human
chauvinistic (anthropocentric) but they
The
do
left
not
models
omit
are
social
The left
still
human
relations:
the
further big step to the environmental alternative is to widen these relations to
full community relations,
independent
value.
recognising
That
is
a
creatures
and
nonhuman
things
as
of
bigger step, a step that no Western political
institutions make requisite allowance
for,
and
that
mainstream
underpinning
Western value theories do not accommodate.
The arguments from traditional cultures can also be
illustrated
paradigms
cultures such as those
and
of
the
models
Melanesia
that
and
directed
underlie
Polynesia,
them.
many
against
the
In traditional
of
the
operative
assumptions of the Northern social paradigms are, very reasonably, not accepted.
Where these cultures still prevail with some measure of regional autonomy, there
is
good
prospect
of
thwarting
more
environmentally
destructive practices.
Features of the local culture can be immediately harnessed.
But much of the
inhabited
and
there are
already
New
governed
and
by
environmentally
less
unscathed
World
peoples of predominantly European stock.
distinctive
features
8
observable
in
New
World
is
now
Although
cultures,
assumptions
of
the
dominant
Northern paradigms have hardly been sufficiently
questioned, let alone overthrown, especially among the managerial
other,
or
even
lesser,
features
of
surprisingly
leave
There are
out
cultures
significant
as
artistic
and
intellectual
usually
cultural
industrial culture, though economically dominated
accompanying
other
conspicuous
The incomplete social paradigms outlined do
not exhaust features of the accompanying
rather
to
be
sure,
does
affords
European
culture.
This
alternatives.
a
discrepancies.
established
have
an
somewhat
as
that
in romanticism and a significant feature of American Indian
gives
*l
but
Northern
features.
This
icing.
discerned,
precarious foothold for an aesthetic approach to the environment, such
evidenced
So
the cultures will have to be invoked if
change in approach is to be hastened in this way.
cultural features to be considered.
classes.
But
the
basis
there
of
the
as
are
aesthetic
well
more
route
to
important
environmental
omissions
and
In particular, the dominant American paradigm omits reference to
religion;
also
neglected
are
many
of
the connected older and
formerly more prominent values of American culture.
The
American
search
for
environmentally
acceptable
alternatives
has
regularly turned to these omitted features of American culture, and religious or
spiritual elements, and associated past values 4 •
establish
"the gospel of ecology" and displace the dominant paradigm have taken
a spiritual route, a quasi-religious way.
and
Indeed the primary attempts to
representative
(For example, Nash provides a
sample
list of the books he considers important in the rise of the
new environmentalis m:
virtually all that proceed beyond ecology
depend
on
an
appeal to religious elements, to divine or sacred features of natural things.)
In the context of American culture the appeal
something
to
be
said for it.
to
religious
features
has
For, firstly, a high proportion of the American
population profess some active religious commitment;
9
and, unlike
Australia,
a
substantial
proportion
do
act
in
accordance
with
that
response.
And, secondly, religious values do clash with
dominant
Northern
paradigm.
This
sort
of
conflict
socially
the
precepts
was
approved
of
perceived,
considerable puzzlement, by colonised cultures, as Lini reports in the
case
the
with
of
Melanesian society (p.9):
The fabric of this society, with its inherent communal discipline was
torn by the arrival of European commercial practices which
carried with it the message of materialism, together with the creed of
enlightened self-int-erest.
Both aspects were a direct contradiction
of Melanesian values and priorities. The introduction to Melanesia of
Christianity added a further element of division and confusion in the
minds of the people.
While the Christian religion was widely
compatible with the ethics and principles of Melanesian communalism,
with its emphasis on mutuality, compassion and caring for one another,
it was a practice that very few of the Europeans appeared to follow.
It ran also contrary to the
religion
of
individualism
and
self-interest, which not just (had) more important exponents, but was
followed by the majority of Europeans •••
It is something a a puzzle how the assimilation of elements of the dominant
Northern
paradigm with prospects of Christianity is pulled off, though achieved
it certainly is in a great many Northerners, and too many Antipodeans.
a
partial answer:
compartmentalisation.
Religion for most is a separate thing
fitted into a Sunday morning box, important elements of which do not
upset
the
standard
penetrate deep.
business
week.
escape
to
Thus for most believers religion does not
Only for a minority does it directly
such as human poverty:
There is
touch
immediate
matters
why should we expect it to work for the Environment?
Nonetheless widespread real adoption of religious
perceptions
within
the
American population, and reflected in the Administration, would presumably alter
things.
But even if some of the effects of a religious return would
beneficial,
and
to
nature
domination
highly
be welcomed, it is also true that some of the effects of a
narrow fundamentalism would be highly undesirable.
of
be
were
Unless moreover the position
abandoned in favour of one of the lesser relig ious
traditions the environmental effects would
10
be
negative
(as
Watt
testifies).
Religion could be more of a drawback than an asset.
with any depth to it appears most unlikely.
"the
scientific
world
view".
In any case such a reversal
Religion in America has lost out to
In part it failed deservedly:
world view was seriously deficient and it did not account
more
scientific
view could explain.
the case for its
for
much
the
Consider, for instance, the matter of the
existence of God, the fallaciousness of the arguments involved, etc.
no
virtue
in
front-end-in.
shape.
It
trying
return
to
the
is
world
view
in
such
great
is not just that there is much that this sort of view leaves out or
social
it is that this perspective, a paradigm,
paradigm.
So
incorporates
it is far from uniquely determined.
more intellectually satisfactory rivals (e.g.
view).
There
view with these sorts of weaknesses
But nor is the so-called scientific
cannot account for;
dominant
to
rival
a richer
intensional
the
There are
scientific
These rivals allow for value and wonder in natural things without taking
a theological way.
There is a
second
quasi-religious
set
character
of
of
reasons
some
sort,
for
not
endeavouring
Christian,
Jewish,
whatever, on deeper environmental approaches in Australia.
strongly
impose
a
Pantheistic or
These
turn
on
the
irreligious character of the culture, where an appeal through religion
is unlikely to have much
understood
as
a
(the
success.
first)
Australia,
post-Christian
it
has
been
irreligious
character
of
the
understanding much else about the culture,
society
e.g.
said,
is
'best
society, in which religion (is)
barely relevant culturally'. *4 Even if that formulation is an
generally
to
exaggeration
the
is a fact and is the key to
the
curious
extent
of
the
state's protrusion into Australian social life.
If an approach through religion is accordingly ruled out as a main approach
to
hastened
paradigm
transition - and a related approach through mysticism or
transcendentali sm excluded for analogous reasons and because of
11
the
earthiness
of
the
culture
what
alternative s
are
open?
There are other significant
features of the culture running against major elements of the
dominant
paradigm,
effectively
which
can
perhaps
be
much
applied
quasi-relig ious approaches to turn matters around.
more
Western
than
To indicate the prospects of
applying features of the culture to detach from dominant paradigms, consider how
Australian culture contrasts with American.
Australian mainstream culture
transition
from
the
dominant
is
already
American
political left has much stronger support in
difficult
to
some
culture.
Australia
way
It
along
the
leftward
is not merely that the
than
USA.
It
is
not
indicate features of the Australian cultural situation which show
its left-displac ement from the dominant Western paradigm.
some elements of the contrast:-
12
The next table
lists
TABLE 2.
CONTRASTING ELEMENTS IN AUSTRALIAN AND AMERICAN CULTURE
SCALE OF INCREASE
*2
individualistic ethos
inacceptability of socialist institutions
inegalitarian attitudes
POSITIVE
inegalitarian practices
ITEMS (PER
level of consumerism
CAPITA
maximization quest
WHERE
imperialist drive
RELEVANT)
extent of violence
police and military commitment
high technology involvement
functional rationality
environmental inactivism
AUSTRALIA
USA
SCALE OF
INCREASE
level of urbanisation
legal obstacles to environmental action
NEGATIVE
official opposition to environmental
practices, such as dedication of
ITEMS
wilderness
administrative delays in implementing
environmental practices, such as
pollution requirements, recycling, etc.
13
Thus there are some offsetting negative items as well as positive items
in
the
in
the
contrast.
Since, however, most of these contrasting elements bear on
first
diagram
of
rival paradigms in a way favourable to Australian culture as
opposed to American, it appears that prospects
indeed better.
themes
for
applying
the
culture
are
This important theme requires elaboration and confirmation.
The
task can profitably be combined with others:
there is much work here
both
for
environmental spectators with an empirical bent and for environmental activists.
A first task is to separate out what is known, what requires
and
what
ought to be done (ideologically ).
and their surrounds, distinguishing firstly
theses:
A
weak
confirmation,
Let us focus on transition theses,
factual
and
normative
transition
factual transition thesis, that Western (European) culture is
undergoing a transition
away
from
the
dominant
confirmed by several Northern sociologists (e.g.
better results could be obtained in Australia;
social
Marsh).
paradigm,
has
been
Presumably similar or
but appropriate samplings of the
community have not been done, analysed and so on - environmental sociology being
a
neglected
undoubtedly
field
also
in
Australia.
Another
weak
factual
transition
thesis
holds, namely that since 1960 a significant percentage of the
each human community in specifiable advanced Western countries such as Australia
have
come
to adopt main assumptions of the alternative environmental paradigm.
But again comparative-fig ures
sociological
work
are
entirely
of
data
to
Though
impressionistic
tells us that environmental activism is greater in Australia
than USA - indeed more intensive than
piece
lacking.
anywhere
else,
an
immensely
build upon - we lack solid confirmation.
sociogeographer s to do.
14
important
There is much for
Throughout, · as you may have noticed, a normative transition thesis has been
taken
largely
for
granted,
that
Australian
culture, indeed Western culture
generally, ought to be undergoing a major paradigm
Western
paradigms
and
their
away
from
dominant
variations (such as those of advocated corporate
capitalism and of the post-indus trial society),
transiting
shift,
and
towards an environmen tal alternative .
furthermore
ought
the
arguments.
It
is
also
be
That complex normative thesis
is argued for in environmen tal philosophy, and fortunately there isn't
repeat
to
time
to
argued against there, but, to sum up the
opposition case cavalierly, unconvincin gly.
Given then that the transition is going on,
indeed
emerging
are
are
clear
doing
environmen tal
encourage
enough.
for
it
in
Australia?
example,
directing
action
going
be
aiming
swing
major
Preliminary
against
the
to
organisatio ns.
on,
answers
sources
of
They
should
increase their support bases, but not merely by membership
They should be
endeavourin g
to
influence
the dominant regional culture, for the potential appears to be there
for a considerabl y greater change than has thus far been
two
be
despoilatio n and the like, primarily industrial organisatio ns and
drives and environmen tal education.
and
to
Not only should activists be continuing with what
those supposed to regulate them, further (public)
also
ought
ought then to be going on with greater rapidity, how is it hastened, how
do environmen tal activists
they
and
parts
to
this
further
practice
which
achieved.
There
are
can run in tandem, a more
negative and a more positive part:
•
More negatively, it involves
cutting
down
and
countering
the
flow
of
propaganda
in favour of the dominant paradigms both locally but especially from
the North.
That is important in reversing the extent of Northern co-option.
includes
gently
a
range of activities some with solid bases in local culture, such as
lopping
anti-Americ an
It
off
the
tall
poppies
pedalling
and anti-Northe rn activities.
15
the
stuff,
and
careful
The latter practices (which should
.
.
not of course reduce merely to personall y directed antagonism ) fit in well
other
regional
environm ental
with
aims, such as independe nt and nonaligne d defence
policies.
•
More positivel y, it consists in promoting and adapting other also
despised
features
of
alternati ve paradigms .
ambassado rs,
Australia n
It
is
culture that work directly towards themes of
commonly
Northern
intellect uals
Lawrence ).
adapted
like
are,
of
course,
those
nonmaxim izing making-do socialist ic ones,
of
local
natural
the
The features to be
egalitari an,
along
environm ents.
with
the
combines
enough:
cultural
with
promoted
or
anti-auth oritarian ,
rapidly
increasin g
Nonmaxim izing, for example, is
reflected in the She'll be right and It'll do approach often
and
and
note, that are responsib le for the low repute in which some of the
cultural character s are held (e.g.
appreciat ion
commonly
taken
to
things,
egalitari an methods as encapsula ted in Fair go and Enough's
consider the effects of these, decently applied, in economics , in local
markets.
As for mateship, sure it could use widening, a main problem being its
restrictio n in practice to
extension
male
relations hips:
to communit ies (includin g nonhuman s).
is there for deep cultural transform ation:
but
why
not
encourage
its
So, to conclude, the potential
we must help to realise it.
FOOTNOTES
1.
The term 'approach es' is intended to include both theory and
both espoused ideology and behaviour .
2.
They did not go under because of the weakness of their intellect ual
positions .
At bottom their religious beliefs, for example, were no
more ridiculou s than those of Christian ity. Typically they were much
weakened by new diseases, and overwhelm ed by new technolog y often
applied in violent fashion.
3.
By integrity is meant much more than retaining represent ative samples
of this and that system or species;
not represent ative southern
sassafras , parma wallabies
and
Torres
Strait
Islanders ,
but
sufficien tly many.
16
practice,
4.
Another past philosophic al basis for environmen tal philosophy, American
naturalism, seems to have been little developed, despite the promise
some have seen in it.
*1
The aesthetic route
Highwater.
*2
Note well that it is not being claimed that Australian culture is
egalitarian (in conformity with a popular myth); only that it is less
inegalitari an than American. The hard data underlying the claim--rs
assembled in 'Culture and the roots of political divergence '.
*3
For Griffin's conception of Canberra - a much smaller Canberra, which
included a rail loop - see, to start with, Birrell (still the best
source on Griffin). The first quotation from Griffin is quoted in
Birrell, p.178;
the second is from Griffin's article in Australian
Wild Life.
*4
P.
is
well-illust rated
by
the
main
approach
in
O'Farrell.
REFERENCES
J.
Highwater, The Primal Mind. Vision
Harper & Row, New York, 1981.
J.
Birrell, Walter Burley Griffin, Queensland U.P., 1964.
W.B.
Griffin,
-.
)
,
'\
and
,•
Reality
in
Indian
America,
Australian Wild Life
W.
Lini, Keynote Address, Australia and the South Pacific, Proceedings
a Conference held at the Australian National University, 1982.
P.
O'Farrell,
'The cultural ambivalence of Australian religion', in
Culture and the State in Australia, Australian Cultural History 1
(1982) Canberra.
R.
Nash, 'Rounding out the American revolution: ethical extension and the
new environmen talism', typescript, University of California at Santa
Barbara, 1982.
A.
Marsh, Protect and Political Consciousne ss, Sage Beverley Hills, 1977.
s.
Cotgrove, Catastrophe and Cornucopia, Wiley, ,\,'. ~· , ,,
R.
Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms
action', in Elliot and Gare, 260-293.
R.
Elliot and A.
Ga:re, Environmen tal Philosophy.
Readings, University of Queensland Press, 1983.
of
c- r-
17
, 1982.
in environmen tal
A
thought
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and
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Text
�DEEP ECOLOOY AHO OREEH POLITICS
Deep Ecology ts an envtronMentaL theory or pLatforM wtth poLtttcaL
stgntftcant
wtth
pLatforM
LMpLtcattons. Green PoLtttcs ts a poLtttcaL
envtronMentaL LMpLtcattons. Both arose tn Large part tn reactton to prevatLtng
envtronMentaL practtces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theorettcaL
refLectton, Green PoLtttcs on practtcaL actton. Deep
and
tnvesttgatton
questtontng of the underLytng doMtnant attttudes, seen as the Major source of
ecoLogtcaL and other probLeMs, Led to arttcuLatton of the Deep Ecology pLatforM,
partly outLtned tn "slogan" forM tn the foLLowtng table.
TABLE 1.
DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED ~ITH OOMIHAHT ATTITUDES
OOMrnAtn ATT HUDES (OOMrnAtH PARADIGM]
DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EttV IROHMEHTAL PARADIGM]
Hature a Resource; Intrtnstc
Value conftned to HuMans
Natural EnvtronMent Valued for
ltseLt; Btocentrtc E9aLttartantsM
MatertaL EconoMtc Growth
a predoMtnant goaL
Hon-MatertaL Goals, espectaLLy
ConsuMertsM
Dotng wtth Enough/RecycLtng
CoMpettttve LtfestyLe
Cooperattve Ltfeway
CentraLtzed/ Urban Centred/
DecentraLtzed/ Btoregtonat/ ·
Hetghbourhood focus
tia t Lona L focus
SeLf-ReaLtzatton
Power structure HterarchtcaL
Hon-hterarchtcaL/ Grassroots
DeMocracy
Htgh Technology
Approprtate Technology
~htLe Deep Ecology grew froM the work of one envtronMentaL phtLosopher
(Haess tn 1972), Green PoLtttcs arose (tn ~est GerMany stnce 1976) froM the
synthests of several MoveMents - ecology, ctttzens, aLternattve, peace and other
MoveMents. The platforM of Green PoLtttcs, whtch ts butlt around four ptllars
soctaL responstbtltty, grassroots deMocracy, and non-vtoLence
ecology,
reflects these ortgtns.
The ftrst of these ptLLars, ecology, ts based on the stMpLe theMe that
LtMtted ecoLogtcaL systeMs cannot sustatn unltMtted econoMtc growth, or such
questtonabLe types of growth as nuclear power, wtthout sertous rtsk of daMage
and degeneratton. The Green atM ts to Move to systeMs of productlon and
consuMptton whtch Matntatn and restore natural processes and cycles rather than
doMtnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wtth nature. The second ptllar
of Green Poltttcs, soctal responstbtltty, tMpLtes opposttton to the tnequaltttes
tn power and doMtnatton relattonshtps of present soctety, and reMovaL of
dtscrtMtnatton, econoMtc hardshtp and explottatton, both regtonaLly and as
regards the Thtrd ~orld. The Green atM - to be achteved prtMartly froM below,
ts to butLd stable and just soctaL
through those adversely affected
arrangeMents, wtth coMprehenstve deMocrattc rtghts and freedoMs (both tn GerMany
-1-
�and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd ~orLd). These changes are to be
brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased
reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and
coordLnatLon .of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (LocaL, coMMunLty and dLstrLct) whLch
are 9Lven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of
referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and
fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpLLes the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve
practLces, not MereLy by More powerfuL peopLe, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups
and states, and aLso, More posLtLveLy, actLve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of
socLaL protest, resLstance and defence. The coMpatLbLLLty of Means wLth ends
serves here as an LMportant underLyLng prLncLpLe: that a just, non-vLoLent,
huMane• end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vLoLent, LnhuMane
Means. 1
Green PoLLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLaL change, whLch
LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecoLogLcaLLy focussed Deep EcoLogy pLatforM as a
quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of
MoveMents of whLch Deep EcoLogy represents one
LMportant
strand.
The
Lnter-reLatLons are shown pLctorLaLLy at the second LeveL of the foLLowLng
12
dLagraM:
DIAGRAM l.
DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IN PLACE
B
p
1. Deep EcoLogy fundaMentaLs;
e.g. BuddhLst (B), ChrLstLan
(C) and (Eco)-Phi.LosophLc
(P) uLtLMate bases
C
I
2
Exp Lana.t Lon
DLrecti.on
2. Deep Ecology platforM
2C . ReforMi.st envLronMental
posi.ti.on
2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of
Green platforM
Der Lvat Lon
Di.recti.on
j
3 . . General norMs and theMes,
substantLaLLy derLved
froM pLatforM
~- PartLcular norMs and
concrete decLsLons,
applyi.ng to relevant
practLcaL sLtuatLons .
The ecoLogLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not 90 very deep; Lt May
onLy be based upon reforM envLronMentaLLsM (or shaLLow ecoLogy as Lt used to be
• Starred notes LndLcate poLnts at whLch readLngs wLth the correspondLng nuMbers
May be Lnserted or undertaken.
-2-
�catted), whLch aLMs to reforM soMe of the worst abuses and excesses of the
doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross pottutLon, extensLve despotLatLo n of land and
takes and oceans, tLttte thought for the future, MLstreatMen t of anLMals, etc.
On shallow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltsetf, but as a resource,
that Ls LnstruMent atty, for what Lt can be used for by huMans. By contrast, Deep
Ecology argues (e.g. froM preMLsses of level I) that the envLronMent Ls
LntrLnsLcat ty valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that,
LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted . ThLs projectLon of
furtherr,ore ,
egatLtarLan or Lr,partLatLt y prLncLptes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the
whole of tLfe Ln the natural world, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtte, BLocentrLc
EgalLtarLanL sM. The prLncLple, not part of Green PolLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most
controversL al of the central prLncLptes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe
substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value
beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to explaLn how value Ls
dLstrLbuted . Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLo n through what Ls
' •3
.
presented as a ' core der,ocracy Ln the b~osphere .
Deep Ecology grew out of a phLtosophL cal dP~penLng of the new features of
the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run
of reductLonLs t scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes;
systeMs whLch are More than the sur, of theLr ator,LstLc parts; eMergent eler,ents,
tLke lLfe, organLsatLo n, etc.). Deep Ecology quLckly allLed Ltself wLth the
subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcutar, the eMphasLs on the
lLMLts, and ultLMate faLture of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and
phLlosophy. ~Lth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surpr~s~ng that there Ls lLttle
dLrectty about such r,aLn pLllars of Green PotLtLcs as socLal responsLbLl Lty and
non-vLotenc e Ln the platforM of Deep Ecology. However Deep Ecology Ls cor,patLble
wLth these Green pLllar prLncLptes, and Lndeed perr,Lts theLr derLvatLon. ~hat Ls
supposed to result are general norMs, lLke Ho exploLtatLo n, Ho subjectLon, Ho
vLolence, at level 3. (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLolenc e prLncLple froM the
Deep Ecology prLncLple of r,axLMLzLng Self-realLs atLon Ls atter,pted by Haess Ln
the frar,ework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLloso phy).•~
A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan relatLons wLth the
natural envLronMen t, away froM doMLnant exploLtatLv e practLces. The natural
envLronr,ent coMprLses Lter,s of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng hur,ans (who are not
above or separate fror, Lt), and accordLngty Ls to be treated wLth the care and
respect valuable Lter,s warrant, and not LrresponsLb ly. Thus Lt would be contrary
whLch
to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued Lter,s vLolently
such
(consLder
however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do
wLdespread phenor,ena as "rape of the envLronMen t", ·of the land", •of the
forests"). SLnce hur,ans are not apart fror, or superLor to nature, Lt follows
froM the Deep Ecology platforr, that natural and proper relatLons also exclude
vLolence towards other hur,ans or classes of huMans.
Because Lt covers a pluralLty of posLtLons, LncludLng shallow ecologLcal
posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More ar,elLoratLv e and reforMLst Ln character
than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further rer,oved froM dor,Lnant attLtudes, More
hardLLne, and r,ore radLcat. ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMenta ts, and
focusses on Ldeats and theory, Green PotLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal
poLLtLcat probler,s of an envLronr,en tat or socLat kLnd, such as acLd raLn or
rLver pottutLon or MLssLte deptoyMent, and (LLke the Peace Mover,ent Ln
AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLples or
workLng out an envLronMen tat (or peace) phLtosophy. Because of Lts envLronMen tal
depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural
-3-
�radLcaL
the
envLronMent Lssues, such as wLLderness, rare specLes, and
transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL
MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach.
Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous
Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMagLng LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLoLence
and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of
the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcaL actLon,
LncLudLng typLcaL protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLoLence aLso
LMpLLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary practLces, socLaL defence.
WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLoLent Methods and socLaL
defence, other Lesser factLons hoLd that force Ls necessary to brLng about
varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes.
The Deep EcoLogy pLatforM LncLudes severaL prLncLpLes that wouLd be
recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLpLes
(whLch however, unLLke BLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM, wouLd not be wLdeLy opposed by
reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of
MaxLML2Ln9 SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of seLf-reaLLsatLon of varLous reLLgLous
posLtLons, of the fuLL unfoLdLng and deveLopMent of the person, Ls vastLy
expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to LncLude brLngLng to fuLL fruLtLon not MereLy one's
own person, but aLL that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded SeLf, whLch
Ls taken to be not MereLy one's faMLLy or feLLows or feLLow natLonaLs, nor
MereLy ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whoLe huMan race, but the whoLe naturaL
1
systeM.
The SeLf-reaLLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened
personaL seLf-Lnterest prLncLpLe, has an exceLLent phLLosophLcaL pedLgree (at
Least as appLLed to huMans or neLghbourLng cLasses of huMans). Thus rather than
beLng argued for, a dLffLcuLt Matter Ln the case of uLtLMate prLncLpLes, SeLfreaLLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLLosophLcaL or reLLgLous posLtLons at
LeveL I of the doubLe pyraMLd, froM those that heLp sustaLn Deep EcoLogy.
However the expansLon LnvoLved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow seLf to
coMprehensLve SeLf, severs the usuaL justLfLcatory LLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy
one's seLf-Lnterests wLth · those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed
LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder
reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan
SeLf, Nature personLfLed
prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc.
Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcaL and
spLrLtuaL ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the
16
AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the sLogan
sLogan, "SLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends".
one uses and where one LLves
technoLogy
of
are those concernLng what kLnd
(the Matter of dweLLLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent vaLue and the LLke), what and
how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around
of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have
MaxLML2atLon
eMphasLsed both MaterLaL goaLs and MaterLaL Means, partLcuLarLy personaL
consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for
envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyLes are approprLate? Deep EcoLogy,
LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLaL and spLrLtuaL ends and
eMphasL2es the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLLabLe. The resuLt, of course,
Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, doLng wLth enough, and,
More generaLLy, practLces whLch LLe LLght on the Land and the naturaL worLd. In
a properLy ecoLogLcaL way of doLng thLngs, these wLLL be Lntegrated (Ln
syMbLotLc and other naturaL styLes) wLth the naturaL systeMs LnvoLved, workLng
wLth rather than agaLnst the naturaL fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL
approprLate to regLonaL
wLLL accordLngLy be ecoregLonaL
arrangeMents,
-4-
�ecologtcal grouptngs - or btoregtonal, as they have coNe to be called. • 7
Approprtate Means tnclude, tn turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce
and theory .of Deep Ecology. HLgh technologLes such as nuclear power are not
approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLal socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of
the envLronMental and socLal costs and rLsks such technologLcal forMs LMpose. On
both deep and green perceptLons, what Ls requLred are relLable careful
technologLes whLch are not ecologLcally daMagLng or socLally rLsky or otherwLse
undesLrable; but the technologLes adMLtted wLll dLffer accordLng to the
prLncLples of the posLtLons they answer back to (e.g . farMLng technLques wLlt
need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLtLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such
prLncLptes as bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM). In each case the practLcat use of
approprLate technology falls at the bottoM, actLon level, of the double
. •a
pyraN~d.
WhLle Deep Ecology supplLes an appeatLng blueprLnt for dLfferent socLal and
lLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed land reached? A MaLn part
of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLal feature of Deep
Ecology: EcologLcal ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of
other older LdeologLes (e.g. of relLgLous, or of revolutLonary, conscLousness).
What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtual or LdeologLcal conversLon Ls agaLn broadened
froM the personal and socLat to coMprehend the full envLronMental predLcaMent.
In thLs explanatLon, of how people get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and
Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper
explanatory prLncLples. A thorough conversLon process Lnvolves elevatLon to the
top livet, spLrLtuat transcendence of the daLly econoMLc and polLtLcat actLon
level. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology
wLlt be put Ln place, lLke Green PolLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures.
LLke the fundaMental sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes
practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at
EcologLcal ConscLousness. SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and
conteMptatLon, are derLved froM the fundaMental sources. But other Methods whLch
extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecologLcat experLence, Lnclude value
reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon
seeLng thLngs dLfferently, and
coMLng to apprecLate the worth and well-beLng of other thLngs. Connected wLth
these wLdened experLentLal bases, and LnforMLng theM, goes a holLstLc shLft Ln
values and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon, affordLng dLrect lLnkage
wLth parts and wholes of the natural world. •IO By these Methods, a person May
coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the real world, a convert to Deep
Ecology , a fellow and advocate of Lts Messages and lLfe-ways .
ESSAY QUESTIOHS
I. To what extent do Green PolLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and
address the saMe probleMs? CrLtLcally coMpare and contrast theLr proposa l s,
especLally as regards the natural and the buLlt envLronMent.
2. Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four, levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to
explaLn carefully the LnterrelatLons aMong these levels. Uhere does Green
PolLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probleMatLc scheMe?
3 . "BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM - Ln prLncLple appears as a key theMe of Deep
Ecology. CrLtLcally assess Lts adequacy. Shouldn't Green PolLtLcs Lnctude such a
prLncLpte?
4. Is Non-vLolence an unstated prLncLple of Deep Ecology? ExplaLn why Deep
Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLolence to the degree Lt Ls? In your answers . take
-5-
\
�account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLctLons between the use of
vLoLence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vloLence Ln
nature; ttt. the need for coerclve Methods to preserve the natural envtronMent.
5. Uhat justlfLes expandLng _seLf-reallsatLon to SeLf-reaLlsatlon? ExpLaLn the
Meanlng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLlsatLon for Deep Ecology and dLscuss Lts
adequacy. Uhy does lt not feature ln Green PolLtlcs?
6. ExpLaLn the MeanLng of the deLLberateLy vague slogan ·slMple ln Means, rlch
ln ends·, or of soMe other hlgh-lMpact slogan of Deep Ecology. Indlcate how the
vagueness Mlght work for and agalnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be
alternatLve LnterpretatLons, and lndlcate soMe of the
suggest
applled,
alternattves.
these
of
raMLflcatlons
7. OutLlne btoregtonaLL3M, lndlcatlng what practlcaL envlronMental probleMs bloreglonallsM lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bloreglonallsM derlved froM Deep Ecology?
Conslder to what extent bloregLonallsM fLts wLth the slogan, •Thlnk globally,
act LocaLly".
deeper, or to any,
envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vlews of Deep Ecology and Green
PolLtLcs on the role of varlous types of technology.
8~ Is More hLgh technology an unprobleMatLc
soLutLon
to
9. Uhat Ls EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for
Deep Ecology? If Lt ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green
PoLltlcs?
10. A reLatlonaL, total-fLeLd LMage of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been
quletLy oMLtted froM the orLglnal pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt
pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated?
READINGS
1:
DEEP ECOLOGY AND GREEN POLITICS
The Greens consLder theMseLves the poLltLcal voLce of the cLtLzens' MoveMents, that Ls, ecology, antl-nuclear-power, peace, feMLnLst, and others. Most
MeMbers of the Green party are also actLvLsts Ln one or More of those MoveMents,
and thLs dLverse orLentatLon Ls reflected Ln the wLngs, or factLons, of the
party: the vLslonary/hollstlc Greens, the Eco-Greens, the peace-MoveMent Greens,
and the radlcal-Left Greens. A great deaL of overlapplng occurs wlth any categor~z~ng of Green LdentltLes and soMe people say there are no actual factlons,
but clearly there are dtfferent prtorltLes aMong the four clusters.
The More that people perceLved the LnterconnectLons aMong prLncLpLes of
ecologLcaL wlsdoM, a truly secure peace, an econoMy wLth a future, and a
partLcLpatory deMocracy wLth power channeled dLrectly froM the grassroots Level,
the More they notLces the absence of such LdeaLs aMong the exLsttng poLLtlcaL
partles.
[Green] pollcLes are gutded by long-terM v~s~ons for the future and are
founded on four basLc prLncLples: ecology, socLal responsLbLLLty, grassroots
deMocracy, and nonvLoLence.
The fLrst of the ·four pLLlars, • ecology, has several MeanLngs Ln Green
poLLtLcs. Green poLLtLcs, Ls Lnherently hoLLstLc Ln theory and practLce. It Ls
based on ecoLogLcal, or ·network·, thLnkLng, a terM used frequently by the
Greens. EcoLogLcaL thLnkLng also Lncludes the realLzatLon that the seeMLngLy
-6-
�rtgtd structures we percetve Ln our envLronMent are actually ManLfestatLons of
underlytng processes, of nature's contLnual dynaMLc flux. Interrelatedness and
ongoLng process are the lessons the Greens take froM and apply to the ecosysteMs
surroundLng us. They support •soft" energy productLon (such as solar power) that
works wLth the cycles of the sun, the water, and the wLnd, and the flow of the
rLvers. They call for the developMent of approprLate technology that reflects
our Lnterdependence wLth the Earth. They advocate regeneratLve agrLculture that
replenLshes the soLl and Lncorporates natural Means of pest control. Above all,
the Greens deMand a halt to our ravagLng of natural "resources" and our poLsonLng of the bLosphere through the duMpLng of toxLc wastes, the accuMulatLon of
so-called acceptable levels of radLatLon exposure, and the pollutLon of the aLr.
The broader applLcatLons of ecologLcal thLnkLng lead to ·socLal ecology,
the perceptton of soctetal structures and huMan Lnteracttons as an Lntrtcate web
of dynaMLc systeMs that are sLMultaneously Lnterrelated parts and coMplete Ln
theMselves. That eMphasLs on relatLonshLps and Lnterconnecttons Ls the basts of
the
Greens'
ecologtcal work that focuses specLfLcally on envLronMental
protectLon. TheLr prograMs Ln thts area call for huMans to ftnd our place Ln the
ecosysteMs:
~e defLne ecologLcal polLtLcs as those Measures that understand huMan betngs
and our envLronMent as beLng part of nature. HuMan lLfe, too, Ls eMbedded Ln
the lLfe cycles of the ecosysteMs; we Lnterfere wLth our actLons and thLs,
Ln turn, acts back on us. ~e Must not destroy the stabLlLty of the ecosysteMs. In partLcular, ecologtcal polLtLcs presents an all-encoMpassLng rejectLon of an econoMy of exploLtatLon and plunderLng of natural resources
and raw MaterLals, as well as the destructLve LnterventLon Lnto the cycles
of nature's household.
The second of the four pLllars, ·soctal responsLbLlLty, • Ls understood by
Most Greens to Mean socLal justLce and assurance that the poor and the workLng
class wLll not get hurt by prograMs to restructure the econoMy and our consuMer
socLety ecologtcally.
The radLcal-left Greens, however, read sozLal as a codeword for socLalLsM,
that Ls, deMocratLc MarxLsM~ SLnce that polLtLcal Model Ls specLfLcally not what
the vLsLonary, lLberal and conservatLve Greens have Ln MLnd, a battle developed
over establLshLng the basLc prLncLples. The MajorLty wanted the new party to
stand for possLbLlLtLes other than etther socLalLsM or the capLtalLst status
quo. The radLcal-left contLngent, on the other hand, LnsLsted on not only
Lncludtng socLalLsM but also on excludLng nonvLolence as a guLdLng prLncLple.
So one of the four pLllars, lLke so Much else Ln the Green party, has a
paradoxLcal character: Lt Means soMethLng dLfferent Ln dLfferent parts of the
party. All factLons of the party concur that socLal, econoMLc and ecologLcal
Lssues are Lnherently lLnked. The ecologLcal and socLal spheres belong Lnseparably together: the econoMy of nature Ls ltnked to the econoMy of huMans for
better or worse .
The thLrd pLllar, grassroots deMocracy, was LnspLred by the ~est GerMan
cLtLzens' MoveMents throughout the 1970s, whLch Ln turn were Lnfluenced by the
cLvLl rLghts, ecology, consuMer, and other MoveMents ~n the Un~ted States.
OLrect, or partLcLpatory, deMocracy locates a greater aMount of power and
control wLth the local groups, the grassroots. ThLs orLentatLon ~nforMs the
structure of the Green party. An organLzatLon structured wtth partLcLpatory
deMocracy sets Lts basLc polLcy accordLng to the votLng at large asseMblLes. It
allows LndLvLduals access to all party offLcLals, and Lt eschews hLerarchLcal
structure. Instead of allowtng power to be concentrated Ln a few people who
-7-
�reMaLn at the top of a hLerarchy for years, such groups generally elect steerLng
coMMLttees.
The fourth pLllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both
personal vLolence and •structural vLolence, • that Ls, vLolence and oppress Lon
LMposed by the state and by LnstLtutLons. (See ReadLng 4; Green PolLtLcs,
pp.3-4, 29-43)
The tenets of [the Deep Ecology] MoveMent Nay perhaps be roughly forNulated
as follows: (1) The well-beLng of nonhuMan lLfe on Earth has value Ln Ltself.
ThLs value Ls Lndependent of any LnstruNental usefulness for LLMLted huNan
purposes. (2) RLchness and dLversLty Ln lLfe forMs contrLbute to thLs value and
Lnterfere
Ls a further value Ln Ltself. (3) HuMans have no rLght to
destructLvely wLth nonhuMan lLfe except for purposes of satLsfyLng vLtal needs.
(4) Present Lnterference Ls excessLve and detrLMental. (5) Present polLcLes Must
therefore be changed. (6) The necessary polLcy changes affect basLc econoMLc and
LdeologLcal structures and wLll be the More drastLc the longer Lt takes before
sLgnLfLcant change Ls started. (7) The LdeologLcal change Ls MaLnly that of
apprecLatLng lLfe qualLty (focusLng on sLtuatLons LnvolvLng Lnherent. value). (8)
Those who subscrLbe to the foregoLng poLnts have an oblLgatLon dLrectly or
LndLrectly to try to LMpleMent the necessary changes. (Defence, p.266)
It should be fully apprecLated that the sLgnLfLcant tenets of the Deep
Ecology MoveMent are clearly and forcefully norMatLve. They express a value
prLorLty systeM only Ln part based on results (or lack of results) of scLentLfLc
research. Today, ecologLsts try to Lnfluence polLcy-MakLng bodLes largely
resource
and
through threats, through predLctLons concernLng pollutants
depletLon, knowLng that polLcy-Makers accept at least certaLn MLnLMUM norMs
concernLng health and just dLstrLbutLon. There are polLtLcal potentLals Ln thLs
MoveNent whLch should not be overlooked and whLch have lLttle to do wLth
pollutLon and resource depletLon. In plottLng possLble futures, the norMs should
be freely used and elaborated. (Shallow and Oeep 1
p.99)
A Major dLfference between the theorLes lLes Ln the dLstrLbutLon of values.
Deep ecology, lLke sLMpler utLlLtarLanLsM, offers a unLque LnLtLal dLstrLbutLon:
each lLvLng thLng Ls assLgned equal value and nothLng else has LntrLnsLc value.
Value Ls assessed through soMe MLx of value-NakLng characterLstLcs, LncludLng
such defeasLble ecologLcal unLversals as stabLlLty, resLlLence, naturalness,
rLchness, scarcLty and so forth . But there are consLderable
dLversLty,
constraLnts on how thLs Ls done . . . . One constraLnt, that of LMpartLalLty whLch
excludes certaLn types of class chauvLnLsM, a thLng cannot be ranked as valuable
or ahead or another sLMply by vLrtue of belongLng to soNe specLes (e.g. beLng
huNan) or favoured bLologLcal class; such class features are not Ln theMselves
value-MakLng characterLstLcs. Such an account of how value Ls assessed reNaLn
however far froM specLfLc, and soMetLMes of lLttle use Ln practLce. (CrLtLque,
pp.59- 60)
POINTS OF UNITY
1. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. Ue base our phLlosophy on a proper understandLng of the
purposes and workLngs of nature and do not try to LNpose an Ldeology upon Lt . Ue
seek to transforM socLety based upon thLs understandLng.
2. CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY. Ue conduct all our MeetLngs accordLng to the prLncLples
of consensus deNocracy, eNphasLzLng unanLMous or near-unanLMous agreeMent on all
decLsLons. No representatLve May Make decLsLons on behalf of the Greens wLthout
the approval of the entLre NeMbershLp. Ue encourage the use of consensus
deMocracy Ln all socLal, econoMLc and polLtLcal LnstLtutLons.
-8-
�3. NONVIOLENCE AND FREEDOM. ~e oppose the threat or use of phystcal vtolence to
resolve tnternatlonat, clvll, polltlcal and personal confllcts. ~e encourage the
nonvlolent enforceMent of all prlvate and publlc rules and Laws. ~e recognlEe
that a nonvlolent soclety would be a very free soclety and encourage tolerance
of others' vlews and actlons.
~- SOCIAL ECOLOGY. ~e eMphaslze the connectton of doMlnatlon and vlolence toward
the envlronMent and toward our fellow huMans. ~e seek a nonvlolent soclety ln
whlch the needs of lndlvlduals, coMMunltles and bloreglons are balanced and
lntegrated and ln whlch econoMtc resources are used consclousty, deMocratlcaLLy
and approprlatety to further thls end.
5. STRATEGY. ~e wlLL oppose ecologlcatty and soclatty destructlve pollcles and
dlsobedlence
clvll
and
protest
practlces through nonvlolent polltlcal
actlvltles. ~e wlLL proMote alternatlve projects and lnstltutlons conslstent
wlth our Green phllosophy. ~e wlLL cooperate ln solldarlty wlth all groups ln
substantlal agreeMent wlth these polnts of unlty as partlclpants ln the
lnternatlonal Green MoveMent. (Deep Ecology, pp.36-7).
2:
DEEP ECOLOGY LEVELS
In dlscusslng the relatlonshlp between deep ecology and Major tradltlons
such as BuddhlsM and Chrlstlanlty, Naess stresses that people can agree broadly
on a set of prlnctptes and dlsagree greatly on other aspects of ldeology and
other tradttlons thusly:
In order to factlttate dlscusslon lt May be helpful to dlsttngutsh a coMMon
platforM (baste prlnclples) of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of
phllosophles and rellglons froM whlch that platforM (baste prlnctples) ls
derlved, lf the platforM ls forMulated as a set of norMs and hypotheses
lf . verballEed, are Buddhlst,
(factual assuMptlons). The fundaMentals,
or phllosophlc wlth
persuaslons,
rettgtous
other
Taolst, Chrtsttan or of
afftnltles to the baste vlews of Splnoza, Uhltehead, Hetdegger, or others.
The fundaMentals are Mutually More or Less lncoMpattble or at Least
dtfflcult to coMpare l~ terMs of cognltlve contents. The tncoMpattblltty
does not affect the deep ecology prlnclples adversely.
The baste prlnclples wlthln the deep ecology MoveMent are grounded ln
retlglon or phllosophy. In a Loose sense, tt May be sald to be dertved froM
the fundaMentals. Because these are dtfferent, the sltuatlon only reMlnds us
that very slMllar or even tdenttcal conclustons May be drawn froM dlvergent
preMlses. The prlnclples (or platforM) are the . saMe, the fundaMentaL
preMlses dtffer.
In order to clartfy the dtscusston one Must avold Looktng for one deftntte
phllosophy or rellgton aMong the supporters of the deep ecologlcal MoveMent.
Fortunately there ls a rlch Manlfold of klnds of consequences dertved froM
the prlnclples.
The dtscusston has four Levels to take lnto account: verballzed fundaMentaL
phllosophlcal and rellglous ldeas and lntultlons, the deep ecology baste
prlnclples, the More or Less general consequences dertved froM the platforM
Llfestytes and general pollcles of every klnd - and Lastly, descrlpttons
of concrete sltuatlons and declstons Made ln theM. (See DlagraM 1)
Arne Naess has atteMpted to provlde a Loglcal dlagraM or systeMatlzatlon of
hls own verslon of deep ecology or ecosophy whtch he calls •Ecosophy r·. He
-9-
�caLLs thts a norMattve systeM whtch tncLudes both norMs (or baste values) and
factual hypotheses_ The Lower norMs or actton stateMents are dertved froM the
top norMs tn a Loosely LogtcaL sense_ The top or Most baste norMs are arrtved at
by the deep questtontng Lntutttve process_
Naess stresses that Ecosophy T Ls onLy hts verston of deep ecology, and
that Many versLons need to be worked out_ SoMe people NLght be crLtLcaL that
Many of the norMs of deep ecology are heLd on an tntutttve basts, but Naess
potnts out aLL theortes begtn soMewhere beyond LogtcaL constructtons_ (DEEP
ECOLOGY, pp-225-7)
In order to factLttate dtscusston about deep ecology aMong phtLosophers tt
May be heLpfuL to dtsttngutsh a coMMon pLatforM of deep ecology froM the
fundaMentaL features of phtLosophtes and reLtgtons froM whtch that pLatforM Ls
derLved, tf tt ts forMuLated as a set of norMs and hypotheses (factual
assuMpttons)_ The terM 'pLatforM' ts preferred to 'prtncLpLe' because the Latter
May be NLsunderstood to refer to the uLtLMate fundaMentaLs_ FurtherMore, the
forMuLatton of a pLatforM should be short and conctse (as a synopsts), whereas
the fundaMentaLs, tf verbaLtzed, are Buddhtst, Taotst, ChrLstLan or of other
reLtgtous ktnds, or they are phtLosophLc wtth afftntttes to the baste vtews of
SpLnoza, ~hLtehead, HeLdegger, or others_ The fundaMentaLs are MutuaLLy More or
Less LncoMpatLbLe or at Least dtffLcuLt to coMpare tn terMs of cognLttve
contents_ Supporters of deep ecology May have great dLfftcuLttes understandtng
each other's uLtLMate vLews_
The pLatforM of the deep ecology MoveMent Ls grounded tn reLtgLon or
phLLosophy tncLudtng ethLcs_ It May be saLd to be derLved froM
these
fundaMentaLs_ As used here the terM 'dertved' ts open to a vartety of LnterpretatLons_ If the vaLLdLty of a norM or a hypothesLs Ls justLfLed by reference
to one defLnLte set of assuMptLons of a phtLosophtcaL or reLLgtous ktnd, the
norM or hypothests ts Ln a sense dertved froM those assuMpttons_ The set
acquLres a character of preMLses for parttcuLar concLusLons_ But cLoseLy · sLMLLar
or even tdenttcaL concLustons May be drawn froM sets of LncoMpatLbLe preMLses_
ThLs expLaLns the coMbLnatLon of 'bewLLderLng' dLverstty of vLews at the deepest
LeveL wtth agreeMent of vtews at the next LeveL_
In assesstng constructLve crttLctsM of deep ecology Lt Ls useful to try to
ftnd out whLch LeveL Ls LnvoLved_ An exaMpLe: In the tntroductLon to hLs The
EthLcs of EnvtronMentaL Concern, (Oxford: BLackweLL 1983), Robtn AttfLeLd says:
Yet I do not accept, wLth the so-caLLed 'deep, Long-range ecology MoveMent',
the vtew that our prLncLpaL Loyalty should be focussed not on feLLow-huMans
or feLLow creatures but on the bLosphere as an organtc whole, __ _
I suppose there are soMe supporters of the deep ecology MOVeMent who
propose focusstng Loyalty on the bLosphere as an organLc whole Ln the sense
suggested by AttfteLd_ The conceptLon of the bLosphere as an organLc whole and
of such a kLnd of Loyalty belongs to the reaLM of fundaMentaLs, that Ls LeveL
one, rather than to the other Levels_ Therefore that AttfLeLd does not accept
the vtew he descrtbes ts not relevant tn arguMentatton for or agatnst deep
ecology- One Matn potnt tn deep ecology ts tts deep arguMentatton, that ts,
arguMentatton froM uLttMate (phLLosophLcaL, reLtgtous) preMtsses, but there Ls
rooM for very dLfferent sets of such preMLsses_ A supporter of deep ecology May
or May not have any conceptton of a prLMary Loyalty focussed on the bLosphere as
an organtc whole_
[The] dtsttnctLon of Levels Ls useful when tryLng to ptn down exactly what
a crttLcLsM Ls focusstng on_ The dLagraM furnLshes onLy a ktnd of stattc ModeL_
-10-
�A supporter of deep ecology wLLL norMaLLy ModLfy the sentences at the dLfferent
Levels froM tLMe to tLMe. Hew LnforMatLon May change any hypotheses and
therefore also change norMs whLch Ln part have been justLfLed on the basLs of
the hypotheses beLng changed.
Renewed ethLcaL consLderatLon or new LnforMatLon May Make the supporter
change a norM. If a norM Ls changed norMally new sets of hypotheses are
Lnvolved, and old ones are dLscarded. ThLs agaLn wLLl cause reverberatLons Ln a
sMaLLer or greater part of the fLeld.
F roM a po Ln t of v Lew of no rMa t Lve sys teMa t t·~a t Lons what goes on when
changes are Made at one or More Levels Ls rather coMpLLcated. But part of Lt Ls
processes of derLvatLon. OLagraM l pretends only to Lllustrate LMportant
dLfferences of the Levels of derLvatLon and the specLfLc character of Level 2.
It represents a condensed forMulatLon of the deepest-Level norMs and hypotheses
whLch supporters of the deep ecology MoveMent can agree upon. ThLs Level Ls
LLLustrated as the penultLMate (next to ultLMate) Level of arguMentatLon
characterLstLc of those supporters of deep ecology who try to artLculate theLr
baste vLews. At the thLrd and fourth Level dLsagreeMents May arLse. At the fLrst
Level supporters May dLsagree, or fLnd each others vLews' LncoMprehensLb le, or
LncoMparable as to valLdLty.
Ls not a Measure of value prLorLtLes or of
A 'dLrectLon of derLvatLon
ethLcaL prLorLtLes. And Lt does not LMply that what Ls derLved Ls a Means Ln
relatLon to what Lt Ls derLved froM. A sLMple exaMple Ls enough to clarLfy thLs.
FroM 'do not kLlL huMans! ·, follows, Lf you concede 'all Mothers are huMans' the
conclusLon 'do not kLLL your Mother!'. ThLs rather concrete norM Ls here derLved
froM the More general and abstract one. But thLs does not LMply that huMans Ln
general have a hLgher value or a kLnd of prLorLty Ln relatLon to Mothers. It
does not say that Ln a norM confLLct you should be More careful not to kLLL
huMans than not to kLLL your Mother. An absurd posLtLon! And Lastly, Lt Ls
rather strange to refraLn froM kLllLng your Mother as a Means to a goal, · naMely
not to kLLL huMans.
The forMulatLons of Level 2 have the character of proposals. It May turn
out that proposals wLLL dLffer substantLaLLy or show a natural dLversLty of
terMLnologLcal and conceptual LdLosyncracLes . UnhappLLy Lt Ls quLte coMMon to
MLx the, Ln a broad sense, LogLcal relatLon of derLvatLon wLth other relatLons.
These are at Least as LMportant, but nevertheless are dLfferent. (BASIC, pp.1-5)
ScheMatLcally we May represent the total vLews LMpLLed Ln the MoveMent by
and
norMs
streaMs of derLvatLon f roM 'h Lghest', L.e. Most fundaMentaL
sLtuatLons.
lLfe
partLcular
Ln
descrLptLve assuMptLon, to partLcular decLsLons
Answers to the deepest questLon, L.e. hLghest norMatLve prLncLples and
basLc assuMptLons about the world MLddle range answers. Lower derLvatLonaL Level
derLvatLons towards decLsLons Ln partLcular LLfe sLtuatLons. Level of actLon Ln
concrete partLcular sLtuatLons.
The LLLustratLon reseMbles those of hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeMs. One
MaLn dLfference Ls that soMe sentences at the top Level are norMatLve,
expressed by LMperatLves. ThLs Makes Lt possLble to furnLsh
preferably
LMperatLves at the Lowest derLvatLonaL Level, sentences such as ·Turn to the
Left!" ·voteforN.N. !.
Just as Ln hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeM, Let us say Ln physLcs, only the
two upper Levels of the pyraMLd Ls thought of as part of physLcs as a systeM,
only those parts are Ln norMatLve systeMs characterLstLc of the total systeM.
-11-
�The sentences
change.
Ln
the
Lowest
part
change froM day to day as LLfe sLtuatLons
The above kLnd of presentLng the derLvatLonaL structure of a totaL vLew
Must not be taken too serLousLy. SoMe wLLL absoLuteLy refuse even to consLder
such a way of exposLtLon. And Lt does not Ln any Manner characterLze thLnkLng
wLthLn the deep ecoLogLcaL MoveMents. SoMe of us wLth a professLonaL background
of scLence and anaLytLcaL phLLosophy fLnd Lt heLpfuL, however.
Arne Naess's systeMatLEatLon LLLustrates the reLatLonshLp of deep ecoLogy's
basLc prLncLpLes or Lts "platforM" (LeveL 2), to varLous · possLbLe and relLgLous
"fundaMentaL preMLsses
on the one hand (LeveL 1) and varLous possLbLe
theoretLcaL and practLcaL "consequences" on the other (LeveLs 3 and~). Althou~h
thLs systeMatLzatLon Ls presented Ln terMs of
"fundaMentaL
preMLsses,
consequences", and a dLrectLon of "derLvatLon• froM LeveLs (1) to(~), thLs
should not be taken to Mean that a sentence at one Level Ls held to follow by
vLrtue of necessLty or probabLLLty froN sentences at a prevLous Level L.e~,
Naess Ls not proposLng a deductLve or an LnductLve systeM. As he coMMents
hLMself, Lt Ls only Ln a "Loose sense• that the deep ecology pLatforM "May be
saLd to be derLved froM fundaMentaLs·.
In other words, derLvatLon or precLseness Ls a Matter of deLLMLtLng a
range of possLble LnterpretatLons. For exaNpLe, we MLght proceed froN a
fundaMentaL (L.e. Level 1) reLLgLous or phLLosophLcal preMLss such as "ALL Ls
One" or the SpLnozLst Ldea that "there Ls onLy one 'substance• • and, Ln the
sense descrLbed, "derLve" the (More precLse) central "plank" Ln the deep ecology
"pLatforM" that "there are no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcaL fLeld", or that
"aLl entLtLes are constLtuted by theLr relatLonshLps" (LeveL 2). Further
precLsatLon MLght express the realLsatLon that "the sense of oneself as a skLn
encapsulated ego Ls not Ln accord wLth thLs ' seaMLess web' ontoLogy• (Level 3).
None of the steps Ln the above exaMpLe Ls held to foLLow by necessLty
(deductLve Lnference) or probabLLLty (LnductLve Lnference) froM sentences at a
prevLous LeveL. ALL we have (Ln logLcaL terMs) Ls a chaLn of precLsatLons
fLowLng Ln one or Many possLble dLrectLons of LnterpretatLon. Ue could have
easLLy started froM the saMe vague, general fundaMentaL preMLss and proceeded to
deveLop a chaLn of precLsatLons Ln a very dLfferent dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon.
Thus, the "dLrectLon of derLvatLon· shown Ln the dLagraMMatLc LLlustratLon of
Naess's systeMatLsatLon shouLd be understood as referrLng to both the leveL of
precLsatLon and the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. The greater the Level of
precLsatLon the More evLdent the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon (or what Naess has
prevLousLy referred to as the "defLnLteness of LntentLon")_
Uhat Ls the vaLue of tryLng to provLde a systeMatLsatLon of deep ecology
(or any other faLrLy coMprehensLve vLew) when the connectLve LLnks between
fundaMentaL preMLsses (LeveL I) and practLcaL consequences (Level~) are as weak
as that of "possLbLe LnterpretatLon"? An LMportant answer Must be that such a
systeNatLsatLon eMphasLses the contLnuaLLy-beLng-forgotten fact that our Most
sophLstLcated and precLse, non-trLvLaL (L ~e. nontautoLogLcaL) reasonLngs are
aLways eMbedded or grounded Ln a very generaL "underLyLng perceptLon of the way
thLngs are." ThLs eMphasLs, thLs contLnual reMLndLng, constLtutes the Most
sLgnLfLcant and dLstLnctLve structural feature of deep ecologLcaL thought.
(GUIDING STARS, pp.203-4)
OnLy LeveL one contaLns phLLosophLes (LncLudLng MetaphysLcs, of course) and expLLcLt reLLgLous foundations. There Ls, and hopefuLLy wLLL never be, Many
sLgnLfLcant COMMon characterLstLcs on Level 1. The cLeanLng of 'rubbLsh' on thLs
Level Ls a hazardous undertakLng froN MY poLnt of vLew.
-12-
�In a coMprehensLve phLLosophy of Level l, for lnstance ln an 'ecosophy' ln
MY terMlnoLogy, every key terM of the pLatforM forMuLatlon, (Level 2), would
have to be .coM"ented upon and elucLdated. ThLs "ay be seen as a clearLng up
operatlon. A hlgher level of preclseness Ls achLeved and eLLMLnatlon of
ph~Losoph~caLLy unsuLtable rhetorLcs. (HOTES ON SYLVAN, pp.8-9)
3:
ON BIOCENTRIC EGALITARIANISM
The Lntultlon of blocentrlc equaLlty ls that aLL thlngs Ln the blosphere
have an equal rlght to Llve and bLossoM and to reach thelr own LndLvlduaL forMs
of unfoLdLng and self-reaLlzatlon wlthln the Larger SeLf-reallzatlon. Thls basLc
Lntultlon Ls that aLL organLsMs and entltles Ln the ecosphere, as parts of the
lnterreLated whole, are equal Ln LntrlnsLc worth. Naess suggests that bLocentrlc
equaLLty as an LntuLtlon Ls true ln prLncLpLe, although ln the process of
LLvLng, aLL specLes use each other as food, shelter, etc. Mutual predatlon ls a
b~ologLcal fact of lLfe, and "any of the world's relLgLons have struggled wLth
the spLrltuaL lMpllcatlons of thts. SoMe anlMaL llberatlonLsts who atteMpted to
sLde-step thLs probLeM by advocatlng vegetarLanlsM are forced to say that the
entLre plant ktngdo" LncLudLng raLn forests have no rLght to thelr own
exlstence. ThLs evaslon fLles ln the face of the basLc LntuLtlon of equalLty.
Aldo Leopold expressed thLs Lntultlon when sald huMans are •pLaLn cLtlzens• of
the btotlc coMMunlty, not Lord and Master over all other specLes.
BlocentrLc equaLlty ls lntlMateLy related to the aLL-LnclusLve SeLfreaLlzatLon ln the sense that Lf we harM the rest of Nature then we are harMLng
ourselves. There are no boundarles and everythlng ls lnterreLated. But Lnsofar
as we percelve thlngs as LndLvLduaL organlsMs or entLtLes, the LnsLght draws us
to respect aLL huMan and nonhuMan lndLvLduals ln theLr own rLght as parts of the
whole wLthout feeLLng the need to set up hlerarchLes of specles wlth huMans at
the top.
The practlcaL LMpLlcatlons of thLs lntultlon or norM suggest that we should
LLve wlthLn MlnLMuM rather than MaxlMUM lMpact on other specLes and on the Earth
ln general. Thus we see another aspect of our guldlng prLnclpLe: ·slMpLe ln
Means, rLch ln ends.• (Deep EcoLog~, pp.167-9)
blospherLcaL egaLltarlanlsM Ln prlnclpLe' and certaln
The abstract terM
slMlLar terMs whlch I have used, do perhaps More harM than good. They suggest a
posLtLve doctrLne, and that ls too Much. The LMportance of the LntultLon ls
but
MOMentary,
only
perhaps
the
rather lts capaclty to counteract,
Less
seeMs
what
towards
attltude
Lordly
and
consequentlaL, self-congratulatory
developed, Less coMplex, Less MlracuLous.
A rlch varLety of acceptable Motlves can be forMuLated for belng More
reluctant to Lnjure of klLL a LLvLng beLng of klnd A than a beLng of klnd B. The
cultural settlng ls dLfferent for each belng Ln each culture, furtherMore there
are few general norMs, only vague guLdeLLnes. One factor: felt nearness,
deterMlnes Largely our capactty to ldentLfy ourselves wlth a sort of beLng, to
suffer when they suffer. One cannot put forth ethLcaL rules of conduct wlthout
takLng such feeltngs and our lLMlted capacLtLes serLously. If Lt Ls dLffLcuLt to
avotd klLLLng A because of Lts sMalLness, whereas klLLlng B ls easlLy avolded,
we tend to protect B rather than A. Indeed we Llve wLth an obvLous dLversLty of
obLlgatlons. Ue have speclaL oblLgatlons towards our own chLldren: Ln Most
cultures any anlMaL May be kLLLed ln order to feed one's starvLng chlLd.
ObLlgatLons toward specLes that have been MeMbers of our llfe coMMunLty for Long
perLods are greater than toward accldentaL vlsltors. FurtherMore, we have the
-13-
�relevance of sufferLng:
capacLty of sufferLng?
Is
the sufferLng of A less than that of B? Has A the
The sLMpLe thLng I try to convey here L3 that an ethLcs concernLng
dLfferences between non-huMan LLvLng beLngs Ls of a coMparable level of
coMpLexLty to ethLcs concernLng dLfferent people and groups wLth whoM we have to
do. (lntuLtLon, p.202)
Those of us who procLaLM the rLght of all LLfe forMs to LLve and bLossoM
thLnk of thLs rLght as an aspect of the 'value Ln LtseLf' whLch we attrLbute to
the bLosphere wLth Lts closely Lnterconnected LLfe forMs. The procLaMatLon seeMs
to steM froM an LntuLtLon for whLch a graduatLon Ls soMethLng foreLgn. If there
Ls such a basLc rLght, Lf Lt can be gLven a faLrly precLse MeanLng, Lt Ls the
naMe for all lLfe forMs. It Ls LMportant enough to be terMed bLospherLcaL
egaLLtarLanLsM. But Lt Ls perhaps the best to abstaLn froM such Labels. They
LnvLte a varLety of LnterpretatLons Most of whLch May be MLsLeadLng.
As to the consequences of a posLtLve answer, I thLnk we can learn froM
certaLn cultures of hunters and gatherers where bLg anLMaLs are only kLLled
after elaborate cereMonLes and excuses'. There Ls acknowLedgeMent of equal
rLght, but also of a rLght to kLlL Ln order to Meet vLtaL needs. There Ls a
'norM conflLct' whLch Ls solved through addLtLonal norMs: the perforMance of
certaLn rLtes and behavLors of other kLnds. What I thLnk we need not proclaLM Ls
that we as huMans are Most or More valuable, or have a hLgher rLght. ~e need not
say '1 have a hLgher rLght to LLve and bLossoM than you have, obnoxLus MosquLto,
so I kLLL you!' or 'BeLng Much More valuable than you are, I kLlL you and your
offsprLng, dLrty rat!' In so far as we have vLtal needs to kLlL, and Ln so far
as Lt Ls LnevLtabLe Ln practLce, we May justLfy thLs through varLous norMs whLch
are Ln harMony wLth general ecoLogLcal thLnkLng.
Do these words solve the relevant probLeMs? Of course not. ~hat I aM
drLvLng at Ls the prLorLty of MaLntaLnLng a sort of egalLtarLanLsM Ln p~LncLple.
How we can LLve thLs that prLncLpLe Ls a questLon of ethLcs Ln a very general
sense, proceedLng froM Many prLncLples whLch LnevLtably Lead to norM confLLcts
requLrLng adjustMents froM day to day. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, pp.27-9)
AccordLng to Naess, a bLospherLc egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe, of equal value of
to the
all LLfe, Ls an LntuLtLveLy clear and obvLous value axLoM', at least
aLMost
ecoLogLcaL fLeLd-worker' (73, p96)!. But eMpLrLcaL surveys would
certaLnLy not sustaLn Haess's claLMs. The prLncLpLe seeMs generally neLther
LntuLtLve nor obvLous, and Ln several ways Lt appears LncoMpatLbLe wLth the
wLder deep ecology pLatforM. It Ls not even obvLous that soMethLng has value by
vLrtue of havLng LLfe. On the contrary, value seeMs, lLke yellowness, to be Much
More patchLLy dLstrLbuted across the unLverse. SpecLal places, for Lnstance, are
especLaLLy valuable. Hor Ls value always dLstrLbuted on LLvLng thLngs, but
colours toMbs of the dead; and soMetLMes Lt flakes off consteLlatLons of LLvLng
thLngs, for exaMpLe thLngs Ln excess, such as Locusts or rats Ln a plague.
But even Lf every LLvLng thLng were assLgned value, Lt would not follow (Ln
the way soMetLMes LnvaLLdLy argued) that every thLng has Lt equally. ~hLLe Lt
could be saLd that thLngs are equal Ln havLng Lt, thLs Ls rather LLke pretendLng
that people are equal Ln an LnegaLLtarLan socLety where all have soMe Money - a
subterfuge. Indeed proposed prLncLpLes of deep ecology LnforM us, correctly,
that soMe ecoLogLcaL LteMS are More valuable than others. For Lnstance, a
certaLn sort of coMpLexLty Ls a vLrtue (Naess 73, prLncLpLe (6)), so presuMabLy
an LteM wLth that coMpLexLty Ls More valuable than a sLMple bLoLogLcal LteM.
SLMLLarLy, dLversLty of systeM Ls a vLrtue, a prLMe ground of value (prLncLpLe
(2)). The upshot appears to be that a hLghly dLverse ecosysteM Ls More valuable
-14-
�than a sLMpLLfLed and LMpoverLshed one_
FurtherMore, bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM Ls LnconsLstent wLth the hoLLstLc,
antL-reducLLonL3tLc, antL-LndLvLduaLL3tLc ethos whLch deep ecoLogy LMports froM
hoLLstLc ecotogy.
AnaLogous concLu3Lons can be reached for •equaL rLghts• forMuLatLons_ For
one thLng, equaL rLghts are characterLstLcally based on equal MerLt or equal
worth_ For another, arguMents lLke those gLven can be rerun wLth rLghts suppLantLng values_ As a theoretLcaL prLncLpLe, bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM has to
be scrapped_ The LMMense dLffLcuLtLes of such a prLncLpLe Ln practLce Naess had
already partLally recognLsed, qualLfyLng egalLtarLanLsM to equalLty Ln prLncLple 'because any realLstLc praxLs necessLtates soMe kLllLng, exploLtatLon, and
suppressLon' (p_95). The extent of erosLon Ln equalLty thLs affords reMaLns
obscure; but Lt couLd be close to total, wLth theoretLcaL equaLLty LapsLng whenever confLLct of rLghts or values LooMed_ Such egaLLtarLanLsM would be LLke a
MaxLM of honesty Ln prLncLpLe, whLch appLLed Ln practLce only when Lt was not
LnconvenLent; that Ls, but an eMpty MaxLM_
~hatever Naess's Lntended qualLfLcatLon, Lt stLLL seeMs to people wLth
Much practLcaL experLence on the Land or Ln gardenLng, especLaLLy Ln places
where the surroundLng natural envLronMent has not been totally transforMed, that
he has consLderabLy underestLMated the extent of quaLLfLcatLon needed, and that
the prLncLpLe. BLospherLc
strangle
to
begLn
does
quaLLfLcatLon
due
theLr own shelter or
supply
not
do
who
egaLLtarLanLsM Ln practLce Ls for people
sustenance, but pass the busLness of ecosysteM Lnterference and ModLfLcatLon on
to others (as they typLcaLLy pass the butchery of theLr Meat and the LLke on to
others)_ Even were Lt desLrabLe, unLversaL hunter-gatherLng Ls no Longer
possLbLe or feasLbLe, wLth so Many Mostly unsuLted and LLL-adapted huMans; and
a substantLaL
even hunter-gatherers terMLnate the LLves of Many creatures
Lnterference wLth theLr rLghts to LLve and bLossoM - and, More LMportant,
and
dLrectty
LnterferLng
substantLaLLy ModLfy theLr envLronMents, thus
LndLrectly wLth enorMous nuMbers of LLvLng thLngs_
~hatever rLghts sLMpLer LLvLng organLsMs, especLaLLy ones such as bacterLa
and vLruses, have to LLve and bLossoM, they have decLdedLy quaLLfLed and Much
attentuated ones. ULth bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM (Ln prLncLpLe) the deep ecology
MoveMent has Latched onto a prLncLple whLch Ls both too powerful, and yet, Lf
the ·Ln prLncLpLe" quaLLfLcatLon Ls appLLed so as to cover typLcaL LLfestyLes of
deep ecoLogLsts, a prLncLpLe so rLddLed wLth exceptLons as to barely hang
together. But wLthout soMe of the Lntended force of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM,
deep ecology Ls Ln danger of coLLapsLng (LLke Many of Lts followers) Lnto an
LnterMedLate posLtLon, as no other part of the pLatforM adequately sustaLns Lts
LLMLted
separatLon_ Part of what Ls sought wLth the egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe
Lnterference, huMan Lnterference to an extent and on a scale far below that
of
theMe
the
Ls already afforded a basLs Ln
presently prevaLLLng
Ls
what
wLth
values-Ln-nature and outsLde the huMan sphere, sLnce Lnterference
of value Ls (Lpso facto) LLMLted. Such a prLncLpLe of LLMLted Interference
deserves, Ln any case, separate forMuLatLon (whLch Lt usually gaLns Ln deep
ecology pLatforMs)_ But even so Lt hardly achLeves the requLsLte separatLon,
sLnce LnterMedLate posLtLons can, and do, grant or MaLntaLn soMe such prLncLpLe
of lLMLted or reduced Lnterference (thus e-g- BLrch, AttfLeLd, SLnger)_
~hat Ls requLred Ls a posLtLve equLvaLent of the separatLng feature, of the
rejectLon of the greater vaLue assuMptLon, and therewLth of the rejectLon of
huMan supreMacy, of the value pLcture of huMans as always nuMber one_ What Ls
needed, More generaLLy, Ls a prLncLpLe teLLLng agaLnst the favourLng of one
over others sLMpLy on the basLs of specLes, a
specLes - huMans Ln partLcuLar
-15-
�prLncLple of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty, to gLve Lt a sLMLlar grandLose tLtle.
There Ls soMe reason to suspect that, as elsewhere, a requLreMent of LMparttalLty has been hardened Lnto one of egalLtarLanLsM, that faLrness, because often
dLfftcult to assess, has been MLstakenly taken to Lnvolve equaltty. BLospecLes
LMpartLalLty LMplLes the avoLdance of specLes chauvLnLsM, that Ls the avotdance
of unfaLr treatMent of LteMs outstde the gLven specLes. Because unfaLr, the
treatMent concerned lacks any sufftctent justLfLcatLon. Hence, the avotdance of
spectes chauvtnLsM Lnvolved Ls effectLvely that prevLously explaLned as a
specLal case of class chauvLnLsM. SLMLlarly, the requLreMent of bLospecLes
LMpartLalLty Ls a specLal case of the requlreMent of class (or natural group)
LMpartlallty, for whlch the arguMents are the saMe as those for the avoldance of
class chauvLnLsM.
The danger of specLes partLalLty, of favourLng soMe specLes, Ls Much
encouraged by a specles fallacy, whLch Ls coMMonly lnvoked ln favourlng huMans.
ThLs Ls the error of concludLng that because a few MeMbers of the specles have
accoMplLshed soMethtng of (LMMense) value, all MeMbers of the spectes therefore
are (hlghly) valuable; all MeMbers of the specles Manage to free-load for the
rtde, obtatned by a few MeMbers, so to say. The arguMent, once challenged,
usually falls back on an arguMent that goes by way of capacltLes: the reMaLnLng
MeMbers of the specles have the capactty to achleve these sorts of thlngs
also. But, fLrstly, that Ls not true: LntellLgence, skLlls, and the lLke, vary
soMewhat wtthLn specLes, and froM our narrow perspectLve, vary consLderably
aMong huMans, soMe of whoM have no capacLty for advanced MatheMatLcs or MusLc.
a
Secondly, Lt requLres More than capacLty: Lt requLres cLrcuMstances,
favourable envlronMent to exercLse theM (hence, ln part, the folly of More
huMans ln conspLcuously suboptLMal cLtLes), together wLth a wlll and drlve
actually to follow through approprLately on capacLtLes. (CrLtLque, pp.12-16)
4.
NON-VIOLENCE
The fourth plllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both
personal vLolence and -structural vlolence·, that Ls, vLolence and oppresslon
LMposed by the state and by Lnstltutlons. For these reasons the Greens support
the concept of self-deterMlnatLon for lndLvLduals and groups. They also advocate
peace educatLon Ln the schools, whLch would teach nonvLolent Means of conflLct
resolutLon and show chLldren that the cult of the soldLer Ls a cultural, not a
natural condltLon. The Greens also call for an end to the vLolence and
oppressLon toward woMen, chLldren, and MLnorLty groups so coMMon Ln patrLarchal
socLetLes. They want to develop a nonexploLtatlve econoMlc systeM Ln whLch
eMployee-owned and -controlled busLnesses replace huge operatlons dLctated by
or corporate lnterests. They want to transforM our vlolent
state
the
relatLonshLp wlth nature lnto one of balance and respect. Petra Kelly expresses
the centralLty of thLs prLncLple when she says, ·NonvLolence Ls the essentLal
Lngredtent ln an ecologLcal socLety. •
Most of the Greens eMphatLcally eMbrace the prLncLple of
Although
nonvLolence, they also realLze that Lts appllcatLon Ls often probleMatLc. Roland
Vogt polnted out one of the areas of confll~tlng values:
What we have not yet accoMplLshed Ls to say how we show ourselves to be
nonvLolent at the MOMent when we partLcLpate Ln governMental functLons,
because the state Ls Ltself an LnstLtutLon of vLolence. For exaMple, how
wlll a Green cLty counctl act agalnst people who don't pay thelr rent,
although they really could because they recelve welfare or because they earn
enough. The norMal course Ls warnLng, warnLng, evLctLon notLce, and then
evLctLon by force and by polLce. We haven't solved thLs. That Ls, there are
stLll no thought-out concepts of how we can reconcLle the deMands of socLal
-16-
�responsLbLL Lty wLth the deMands of non vLoLence.
The Greens extend theLr prLncLpLe of nonvLoLence to theLr actLve resLstance
agaLnst the Most MassLve and potentLaLLy deadly "anLfestatL on of structural
vLoLence: the nuclear arMs race proMoted by the MLLLtary-L ndustrLaL coMpLex and
the governMent. In theLr natLonaL headquarter s Ln Bonn the Greens have a poster
of OandhL s adage "there Ls no way to peace; peace Ls the way• and one of
Thoreau
0
Those who eMbrace nonvLoLent cLvLL dLsobedLenc e, coMMLttLng breaches of Law
on the grounds of conscLence, are prepared to suffer · vLoLence or punLshMent
theMseLves rather than LnfLLct vLoLence or LnjustLce on others or share
responsLbLL Lty for such acts by reMaLnLng passLve. •1,, however, the Law Ls
so proMuLgated that Lt of necessLty Makes you an agent of LnjustLce agaLnst
another, then I say to you: Break the Law."
The MajorLty of Greens strongly endorse - and lLve - the concept of actLve,
nonvLoLence resLstance. However, the MarxLst-orL ented MeMbers of the party have
never been fully supportLve of that prLncLpLe. They vLew Lt "ereLy as a
·MoralLstLc " tactLc that should be abandoned Ln favor of escaLatLng resLstance
Lf Lt does not prove suffLcLentL y effectLve. Petra Kelly's account of the
LeftLsts' attLtude on thLs Lssue was sLMLlar to what we had heard froM Many
other Greens:
They do not understand that nonvLolent actLon Ls an extre"ely subversLve
force. They thLnk Lt's harMLess, Ls a for" of obedLence, and changes
nothLng, that Lt's LLke beggLng froM the state. ·1t's just a tactLc, a
toot," they say. To theM everythLng Ls to be used. But there are soMe thLngs
you should never "Lsuse - or even use. They are sLMpLy LntegraL. NonvLoLence
cannot be coMproMLsed.
Although Many of the advocates of nonvLoLent . resLstance argued that ·such a
course cannot be dLsMLssed as "Merely MoraLLstLc" sLnce Lt Ls also absolutely
ratLonaL (that Ls, hLstory shows that vLoLence breeds vLolence - structural as
welt as personal - so we "ust fLnd another way to effect change, especLaLLy Ln
the nuclear age). For Most MeMbers of the greens the choLce was clear, as
expressed wLth a cLtatLon froM MartLn Luther KLng: •~e no Longer have a choLce
or
nonvLoLence
between vLoLence and nonvLoLence . The choLce Ls eLther
nonexLsten ce." (Green PoLLtLcs, pp.~3-7)
Deeply coMMLtted persons Ln the ecology Move"ent sense the vuLnerabLLL ty of
natural processes to huMan LnterventLo n, and the fundaMentaL necessLty of
MaLntaLnLng bLologLcal dLversLty. AffLrMatLon of the LntegrLty of ecosysteMs
frequently LnvoLves a caMpaLgn to save froM developMent soMe rLver of canyon or
wLLderness area.
In a real sense, ecologLcaL resLstance LnvoLves beco"Lng frLends wLth
another specLes or a rLver or a MountaLn, for exaMpLe. In general, the resLster
takes up the burden of responsLbLl Lty, the burden of wLtnessLng for the other as
Self. ThLs process of befrLendLng "ay be based on ArLstotle's crLterLa for
frLendshLp: the proMotLon of the other's good for the other's own sake. Or
frLendshLp can be the extensLon of self. When OandhL was asked Lf hLs good deeds
Ln a vLLLage expressed hLs huManLtarLa nLsM, he repLLed he worked "to serve no
• GandhL s stateMent defLned MaturLty. ALtruLsM was
one else but Myself
unnecessary because hLs self eMbraced the whole vLLLage.
0
There are Many dLfferent tactLcs of LndLvLduaLs and organL2atLo ns Ln
save the Earth•, but
or
poLLtLcaL caMpaLgns whLch seek to ·save the rLver
-17-
�there Ls one overrLdLng or baste norM of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng: non-vLoLence.
Ecology teaches us that MankLnd Ls not the center of LLfe on the planet.
Ecology has taught us that the whole earth Ls part of our "body" and that we
Must Learn to respect Lt as we respect ourselves. As we feel for ourselves, we
Must feel for aLL forMs of LLfe - the whales, the seals, the forests, the seas.
The treMendous beauty of ecoLogLcaL thought Ls that Lt shows us a pathway back
to an understandLng and an apprecLatLon of LLfe LtseLf - an understandLng and
apprecLatLon that Lt Ls LMperatLve to that very way or LLfe.
As wLth the whales and the seals, LLfe Must be saved by nonvLoLent
confrontatLons, by what the Quakers caLL "bearLng wLtness•. A person bearLng
wLtness Must accept responsLbLLLty for beLng aware of an LnjustLce. The person
May then choose to do soMethLng or stand by, but he May not turn away Ln
Lgnorance. The Greenpeace ethLc Ls not onty to personally bear wLtness to
atrocLtLes agaLnst lLfe; Lt Ls to take dLrect actLon to prevent theM. ~hLLe
actLon Must be dLrect, Lt Must also be non-vLoLent. Ue Must obstruct a wrong
wLthout offerLng personal vLoLence to Lts perpetrators. Ue Must know that our
greatest strength Ls LLfe LtseLf, and the coMMLtMent to dLrect our lLves to
prbtect others.
EcoLogLcaL resLstLng could be defLned as keepLng the peace of the neLghborhood. Rarely are vandals or vLolent neLghbors welcoMe Ln the neLghborhood. Uhen
the neLghbors Lnclude rLvers and MountaLns, seashores and prarLes, then the
LntegrLty of the ecosysteM Ls MaLntaLned.
In hLs explLcatLon of GandhL's theory of nonvLoLence, Arne
several norMs of nonvLoLent potLtLcat caMpaLgns. These Lnctude:
Naess
lLsts
l. Announce your case and the goal of your caMpaLgn explLcLtty and clearly,
dLstLnguLshLng essentLaLs froM nonessentLats.
2. Seek personal contact wLth your opponent and be avaLLable to hLM. · BrLng
confLLctLng groups Lnto personal contact.
3. Turn your opponent Lnto a beLLever Ln and supporter of your case, but do
not coerce or expLoLt hLM.
~- You provoke your opponent Lf you deLLberateLy or carelessly destroy hLs
property.
of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng denounce
theorLsts
LeadLng
nonvLoLence as tactLcs. But as Rober ALtken RoshL wrote:
vLoLence
versus
Non-vLoLence Ls not just a tactLc for people who Make Lt a practLce ... The
end Ls the Means, Ln other words. Look at poLLtLcaL hLstory or at the
hLstory of any MoveMents. Uhen we work for certaLn goals, those goals tend
to betray us. Ue defeated L.B. Johnson only to get RLchard NLxon. Ue got rLd
of the B-1 BoMber (teMporarLLy) and the CruLse MLssLle appeared. Ue have to
Make our actLon the goal. Our actLon Must LtseLf be the truth. Our actLon
Must be Lts own defense, Lts own procLaMatLon, Lts own purpose. (Letter to
the author, June 1982)
Both on practLcaL and ethLcaL grounds, vLoLence Ls rejected as a Mode of
ecotogLcal resLstance. TerrorLst attacks on nuclear plants or MLssLle sLtes
could cause ·red" alerts and vLolent responses froM governMent agencLes.
PLacLng one's own LLfe at rLsk, such as sLttLng Ln front of bulldozers or
polLce cars at a deMonstratLon to protest destructLon of the raLn forest, May be
LLLegaL but not vLoLent. And spontaneous acts such as the decoMMLssLonLng of a
power generator or bulldozer May draMatLze the contLnuLng destructLon of a
-18-
�spectal ecosysteM.
Ecologtcal reststance also Means defendtng natural dtverstty through
educatLon, publLc speakLng, and use of lawsuLts; tryLng to convert publtc
opLnton to the cause; and tnforMLng poltttctans and dectsLon Makers. ResLstance
Ls another naMe for afftrMatLon - joyful affLrMatton of the tntegrLty of Nature,
natural dLversLty, and MLnLMuM huMan LMpact on place. (Deep Ecolo9H, pp.16-17)
The Deep Ecology MOVeMent and peace MoveMent.
Ftfteen years ago close cooperatton between supporters of deep ecology and
actLvtsts Ln the peace MoveMent was out of reach. Rather suddenly thts sttuatton
Ls totally changed. SoMe of us, ltke Myself, favour unLlateral dtsarMaMent and
establtshMent of MtlLtant, but unherotc, non-vtolent defence.
At thts potnt Lt ts tMportant for actLvtsts to stress the dtstLnctLon
between actLon, caMpaLgn and MOVeMent. They May be tllustrated by three
concentrLc cLrcles. The LnnerMost coMprLse the dLrect actLons wLthLn a caMpatgn,
for Lnstance, a dated deMonstratLon at a parttcular locatLon agatnst the
butldtng of a daM, or the non-vtolent obstructton of the transport of the
MachLnery on the way to the daM sLte. ThLs May be part of a ten year old
caMpaLgn to save a rtver (LncludLng of course tts ecosysteM) froM developMent of
soMe sort. Ten dLrect acttons May be fatlure, but nevertheless theLr LMpact May
conflLct,
contrtbute to vLctory of the caMpaLgn. (Or May polarLze the
antt-actLvtsts
Many
what
Ls
That
contrLbutLng to the faLlure of the caMpatgn?
MaLntaLn.) The rLver caMpaLgn together wLth other analogous caMpaLgns May be
seen as part of a MoveMent of greater or lesser generaltty. A MoveMent to save
rtvers, or More generally a conservatton MoveMent. Many caMpatgns May be
fatlures, but the MOVeMent goes on. (Hates on Poltttcs, pp.l~-JS)
Gandhtan and other forMs of non-vtolence are wtdely found wLthtn the deep
ecologLcal MoVeMent. There Ls a reluctance to accept destructLon of MachLnery Ln
efforts to stop destructton even of holy places. There Ls soMe dtsagreeMent on
thts and related subjects. I do not thtnk that the coMpletely general norMs of
care and consLderatLon should be looked upon as part of the specLftc platforM of
the deep ecology MoveMent . . (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, p.31)
In suM, the paradtgM of deep ecology Ls revolutLonary tn tts MetaphysLcs,
epLsteMology, and cosMology, but deep ecologLsts do not seek to overthrow
governMents by force of arMs or to Lssue anythLng lLke a coMprehensLve, alleMbracLng polLtLcal prograM for brLngLng about the new order. The conteMporary
deep ecology MoveMent seeMs to be what Robert NLsbet has called a "wLthdrawal
and renewal" MoveMent such as has perLodLcally arLsen .Ln ~estern socLety sLnce
the fall of the RoMan EMpLre.
There ts no poltttcal party of "deep ecology,· no cadre of poltttcal
revoluttonarte s. Thts ts not an approprtate approach for deep ecologtsts. No
frontal confrontatLons wLth reforMLst envLronMental tsts or wLth the doMLnant
socLal/polttLc al order Ls destred. It would be counter-product Lve by Maktng
people More defensLve of thetr LdeologLcal posLtLon. Deep ecology Ls not an
atteMpt to add one More tdeology Ln the crowded fLeld of Modern LdeologLes. Deep
ecologLsts are questLng for ways to lLberate and cultLvate the ecologLcal
conscLousness. FroM ecologtcal conscLousness wtll naturally flow an ecologtcal
reststance. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.316-17)
5:
ON SELF-REALIZATION
Naess: Self-realtzatLo n ts
the
realtzatLon
of
-19-
the
potentLaltttes
of
ltfe.
�OrganLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln three ways gLve us Less dLversLty than
organLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln one hundred ways. Therefore, the selfreaLLzatLon we experLence when we LdentLfy wLth the unLverse Ls heLghtened by an
Lncrease Ln the nuMber of ways Ln whLch LndLvLduals, socLetLes, and even specLes
and lLfe forMs realLze theMselves. The greater the dLversLty, the, the greater
the self-realLzatLon. ThLs seeMLng duaLLty between LndLvLduaLs and the totalLty
Ls encoMpassed by what I call the Self and the ChLnese call the Tao. Most people
Ln deep ecology have had the feelLng - usually, but not always, Ln nature - that
they are connected wLth soMethLng greater than theLr ego, greater than theLr
naMe, theLr faMLLy, theLr specLaL attrLbutes as an LndLvLdual - a feelLng that
Ls often called oceanLc because Many have Lt on the ocean. ULthout that
LdentLfLcatLon, one Ls not easLLy drawn to becoMe LnvoLved Ln deep ecology.
Many people have thLs feeLLng when they see a death struggle - for Lnstance
tLny anLMaLs LLke fLtes or Mosquttoes fLghtLng for thetr ltves. Uhen they see
anLMals sufferLng, they May LdentLfy wLth LLfe forMs they usually don't LdentLfy
wLth. Such sLtuatLons offer us an opportunLty to develop a More Mature poLnt of
vLew. Insofar as thLs conversLon, these deep feelLngs are reLLgLous, deep
ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, and those people who have done the Most to
Make socLetLes aware of the destructLve way Ln whLch we LLve Ln reLatLon to
natural settLngs have had such relLgLous feeLLngs. Rachel Carson, for exaMpLe,
says that we cannot do what we do, we have no reLLgLous or ethLcaL justLfLcatLon
for behavLng as we do toward nature. Her arguMent Ls not calculated or
reasonable Ln the usual sense, sayLng that, Lf we contLnue poLsonLng nature, we
wLLl be Less healthy, or wLLL have fewer resources, and so on. She Ls sayLng
that we are sLMply not perMLtted to behave Ln that way. SoMe wLll say that
nature Ls not Man's property, Lt's the property of God; others wLLL say Lt Ln
other ways. The MaLn poLnt Ls that deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent,
fundaMental LntuLtLons that everyone Must cuLtLvate Lf he or she Ls to have a
LLfe based on values and not functLon LLke a coMputer. Uhereas shallow ecology,
Lf taken to Lts logLcaL extreMe, Ls lLke a coMputerLzed, cost-benefLt anaLysLs
for huMans. (SLMpLe tn Means, p.11)
If the terM seLf-reaLLzatLon Ls applLed, Lt should be kept Ln MLnd that
Me", "ego , and self have shLftLng denotatLons. NothLng Ls evLdent and
•1·,
LndLsputabLe. Even that we are Ls debatable Lf we Make the questLon dependent
upon answertng what we are.
Self-realLzatLon Ln Lts absolute MaxLMUM Ls, as I see Lt, the Mature
experLence of oneness Ln dLversLty as depLcted Ln the above verse. The MLnLMUM
Ls the seLf-reaLL2atLon by More of Less consLstent egotLsM - by the narrowest
experLence of what constLtutes one's self and a MaxLMUM of alLentatLon. As
eMpLrLcaL beLngs we dweLL soMewhere Ln between, but Lncreased MaturLty LnvoLves
tncrease of the wLdeness of the self.
The seLf-reaLtzatton MaxLMuM should not necessarLLy be conceLved as a
MystLcal or MedLtattonaL state. ·ey MedLtatLon soMe perceLve the Self tn the
self by the self; others by the path of knowledge and stLLl others by the path
of work (karMa-yoga) [Gtta: Chapter 13,, verse 2~]. GandhL was a karMa-yoga,
reaLLzLng hLMseLf through socLaL and poLLtLcaL actLon.
The terMs MystLcal unLon and MystLcLsM are avoLded here for three reasons:
Ftrst, strong Mysttcal tradLtLons stress the dtssolutLon of Lndtvtdual selves
Lnto a nondLversLfLed supreMe whole. Both froM cultural and ecoLogLcaL poLnt of
vtew dLversLty and LndLvtdualLty are essentLaL. Second, there Ls a strong
terMLnoLogtcaL trend wtthtn sctenttftc coMMuntttes to assoctate MysttcLsM wtth
MystLcs tend to agree that MysttcaL
ThLrd,
confuston.
and
vagueness
conscLousness Ls rarely sustatned under norMal, everyday condLttons. But strong,
-20-
�w~de LdentLfLcatLon can color experLence under such condLtLons.
GandhL was only MargLnally concerned wLth 'nature'. In hLs ashraM poLsonous
snakes were perMLtted to tLve LnsLde and outsLde huMan dwettLngs. AntL-poLson
MedLcLnes were frowned upon~ GandhL LnsLsted that trust awakens trust, and that
snakes have the saMe rLght to tLve land btossoM as the huMans. (IdentLfLcatLon,
pp.259-6)
In keepLng wLth the spLrLtual tradLtLons of Many of the worlds s retLgLons,
the deep ecology norM of setf-reatL2atLon goes beyond the Modern western self
hedonLstLc
whLch Ls defLned as an Lsotated ego strLvLng prLMarLly for
gratLfLcatLon or for a narrow sense of LndLvLduat satvatLon Ln thLs tLfe or the
next. ThLs socLatty prograMMed sense of the narrow self or socLat self
dLslocates us, and leaves us prey to whatever fad or fashLon Ls prevalent Ln our
socLety or socLat reference group. Ue are thus robbed of be9LnnLn9 the search
for our unLque spLrLtuat/b.LologLcal personhood. SpLrLtual growth, or unfotdLng,
begLns when we cease to understand or see ourselves as Lsolated and narrow
coMpetLng egos and begLn to LdentLfy wLth other huMans forM our faMLly and
frLends to, eventually, our specLes. But the deep ecology sense of self requLres
a further MaturLty and growth, an LdentLfLcatLon whLch goes beyond huManLty to
Lnclude the nonhuMan world. Ue Must see beyond our narrow conteMporary cultural
assuMptLons and values, and the conventLonat wLsdoM of our tLMe and place, and
thLs Ls best achLeved by the MedLtatLve deep questLonLng process. Only Ln thLs
way can we hope to attaLn full Mature personhood and unLqueness.
A nurturLng nondoMLnatLng socLety can help Ln the "real work" of becoMLng a
whole person. The ·real work• can be suMMarLzed syMbolLcally as the realLzatLon
of "self-Ln-Self- where ·setf· stands for organLc wholeness. ThLs process of the
full unfoldLng of the self can also be SUMMarLzed by the phrase, •No one Ls
saved untLt we are all saved,· where the phrase •one• Lncludes not only Me, an
LndLvLduat huMan, but all huMans, whales, grLzzly bears, whole raLn forest
ecosysteMs, MountaLns and rLvers, the tLnLest MLcrobes Ln the soLt, and so on.
(Deep Ecology, pp.66-7)
of
norM
SubscrLbLng to these prLncLples, Naess asserts, coMes froM the
self-realLzatLon, that ·.~. wLth MaturLty, huMan beLngs wLtl experLence joy and
sorrow when other tLfe forMs experLence sorrow. Not only wLll we feet sad when
our brother or the dog or cat feels sad, but we wLll grLeve when lLvLng beLngs,
LncludLng landscapes, are destroyed. In our cLvLlLzatLon, we have vast Means' of
destructLon at our dLsposal but extreMely lLttle MaturLty Ln our feelLngs. Only
a very narrow range of feetLngs have Lnterested Most huMan beLngs untLt now.•
ThLs deepenLng of feetLngs seeMs to run counter . to the trend Ln Modern
socLety toward superfLcLat relatLonshLps . . . . Arne Naess asserts that ·setfrealLzatLon cannot develop far wLthout sharLng joys and sorrows wLth others, or
More fundaMentalty, wLthout the developMent of the narrow ego of the sMall chLld
Lnto the coMprehensLve structure of a Self that coMprLses all huMan beLngs. The
ecologLcal MoveMent -- as Many earlLer phLlosophLcat MoveMents -- takes a step
further and asks for developMent such that, there Ls a deep LdentLfLcatLon of
LndLvLduals wLth all lLfe."
I suggest that the leaders of the ecology MoveMent devetopMent theLr ethLcs
after they had Moved along thLs path of Self-reatLzatLon. (Stone/Sky, pp.6-7)
But what Ls wrong wLth the wLdely applauded atteMpt, runnLng through Much
LdeatLstLc and Eastern thLnkLng, to explLcate value through self-realLsatLon?
FLrstly, lLke utLlLtarLan explLcatLons, such as those through happLness and
satLsfactLon, Lt Ls Much too experLentLal. It renders value a feature of those
-21-
�who exper~ence value - roughly of valuers - rather than of what ~s valued, and
bears value. It Ls lLke sayLng that colour Ls a Matter of those (huMans) who
perceLve colour, not of the (coMposLtLon of) thLngs that are coloured. And
reMove the experLences, those undertakLng self-realLsatLon, as Ln the days
before lLfe appears and value dLsappears. And that too Ls wrong.
Secondly, even Lf self-realLsatLon were always worthwhLle and never tLed to
by contrast wLth lLfe - there are exaMpLes of value whLch fall beyond
evLl
(Ln
presented
often
seLf-reaLLsatLon. A certaLn sort of dLrectLon Ls
bLocheMLstry texts Lnterested Ln explaLnLng lLfe) as a MLnLMal condLtLon of lLfe
of an organLsr1 or syster1: caLL that dLrectLon, s·eLf-dLrecti.on. Thus, deep
ecology, Lnsofar as Lt values (just) LLfe, values (just) self-dLrectLon. In
these terMs, the contractLon froM seLf-dLrectLon to self-realLsatLon, as Ln
Ecosophy T, Looks LLke a M~stake. A s~r1LLar M~stake appears to underLLe
contractLons to ecologLcal conscLousness (as Ln Devall); for self-realLsatLon
Looks rer1arkabLy L~ke consc~ous seLf-d~rectLon, roughly an LntersectLon of
seLf-dLrectLon wLth conscLousness.
The argur1ents asser1bLed thus underMLne both of what Devall presents as the
uLtLMate norMs of deep ecology', nar1eL~eLf-reaLLsatLon and bLocentrLsM.
'These are not proved but "felt"' (83, p.5). But they are not felt, at least by
those who perceLve value beyond what lLves; rather they are dLsproved, by a
serLes of counterexar1ples to each as uLtLr1ate norr1s. (CrLtLque, pp.2~-5)
In partLcular presentatLons of a partLcular phLLosophy froM whLch the
Naess-SessLon platforM Ls derLved, naMely Ecosophy r' I use a Model where
'Self-realLzaHon!' and sLr1LLar short forr1uLatLons are taken to express a top
norr1 of a norr1atLve systeM.
~e r1ay artLcuLate 'r1odeLs' of a very cor1prehensLve norr1atLve syster1, and
use Lt to explore the LnterrelatLons of our own vLews and those of others. I
have extensLvely used a Model of a cor1prehensLve yLew I call 'Ecosophy r ·' and I
use only one top norM whLch on the Most crude ser1antLcaL Level Ls expressed by a
one word sentence 'seLf-realLzatLon! '.
A r1aLn LnspLratLon for - the choLce cor1es froM the use of the terN by
GandhL. Another MaLn LnspLratLon Ls the strong trend Ln Uestern LndustrLaL
states towards an LndLvLdualLsM favourLng lLfe as a Long ego-trLp full of
'happenLngs' . In France there Ls a group of 'egologLsts' , the nar1e beLng chosen
as a contrast to 'ecologLsts ' : ~hatever the reLatLons between LndLvLdual beLngs,
huMan nature Ls such that the egocentred Lnterests of each of us Ls stronger
than any other. To foster the kLnds of soLLdar~ty the pol~t~cal left ~s taLkLng
about, or the soLLdarLty wLth other lLfe forMs wh~ch . ecologLsts (the greens)
preach, w~ll therefore never succeed and ~s apt to hurt the LndLvLduaL .
' seLf-reaL~zatLon!' Ls a norM that LnLtLaLLy arLses vLvLd Lnterest aMong
those who are LnfLuenced by the ego-trLp trend, but are then astonLshed and
bewLLdered by the d~stLnctLons between ego, self and Self. Th~s ~s new to Most
of theM and they are often Led to recons~der theLr LndLvLduaL~st posLtLon. ThLs
reconsLderLng Ls for Me a confLrMatLon of the SocratLc value of the choLce of
forr1ulatLon.
The r1aLn poLnt Ln thLs connectLon Ls that huMans undergo a r1aturLn9
process, and only Lf thLs process coMes to a 'prer1ature' halt, LndentLfLcatLon
wLth others and solLdarLty faLL to develop. If we, as I do, add the SpLnozLst
(courageous) hypothes~s that the joy and equLMLndedness you exper~ence as a
Mature person ~s deeper and rLcher than that you exper~ence as an ~r1r1ature grown
'reaLLzaHon of the (wLde) Self!' gets to be an ~nstructi.ve and ~nsp~rLng
up,
-22-
�forMu l,a.
The Self-realLzatLo n norM proposed by Me has been taken too serLously as Lf
one, two or three world expressLons were adequate phLLosophLcaL expressLons
of a hL9hest' norM. An adequate expressLon LMplLes that the LntrLcate subject
ego, se Lf, Se Lf ', that Ls, b Lo Log Lea L, soe La L and Hetaphys Lea L se Lf ar·e
dLstLnguLshed. Only Ln relatLon to a faLrly Large body of phLlosophLcaL analysLs
we can forMulate adequate phLlosophLcal prLncLples. It has always been that way.
(Notes on Sylvan, pp.17-19)
HY
0
6:
OH LIFESTYLE
The deep ecologLcal MoveMent Ls recruLted froM people who do not look upon
natural surroundLngs as a Means for recreatLon and repaLr. LLfe and work Ln
natural surroundLngs Ls a vLtal concern. The rLchness of that LLfe Ls so vast,
and the Means are so sLMple, that they have dLffLculty understandLng why others
seeM to need Means on a level of coMplLcatLon and sophLstLcatLon that Ls unLque
Ln the hLstory of [huMan]kLnd. They cannot but fLght agaLnst the acceleratLng
destructLon of nature due to the MaLntaLnLng and expandLng the productLon of
such Means. They do not thLnk people who serLousLy reflect upon the reLatLon
between Means and ultLMate LntrLnsLc values can justLfy the present polLcLes.
As an LllustratLon of dLfferent Means/end ratLos, coMpare the dLrect and
LndLrect technologLcal requLreMent of a faMLly wLth MeMbers froM 8 to 80 years
old lLvLng Ln a natural surroundLng and goLng cross-country skLLng together,
wLth that of a faMLly doLng slaloM at a bLg fashLonable skL
resort.
(PhLlosophLcal. Aspects, pp.35-6)
0
RLch Ln ends, sLMple Ln Means!.' HuMan Lnterference Ln the ecosphere can
only be reduced to tolerable levels Lf people, and especLally the average (or
econoMLcally above average) people of the LndustrLal states adopt lLfe styles
requLrLng sLMple MaterLal Means. ThLs Ls coMpatLble wLth or even favourable
towards rLchness of goals.
'Increase the sensLtLvLty to and apprecLatLon of what there Ls suffLcLent
of for all!' The educatLonal slogan fLghts agaLnst the confusLon of value wLth
Market value and prLce. A way to MaxLMLze our abLlLty to derLve deep
satLsfactLon froM the goods of whLch there stLll, Ls, or coul.d be, enough. The
present lLfe style of average people Ln LndustrLal socLetLes cannot be a global
lLfe style wLthout LrreversLble, colossal destructLon of condLtLons of LLfe on
Earth. (Hotes on PolLtLcs, p.2)
It ' s a shLft froM beLng doMLnated by Means, LnstruMents, gadgets, all the
Many thLngs we thLnk wLLl gLve us pleasure or Make us happy or perfect. The
shLft coMes about when we serLously ask ourselves, In what sLtuatLons do I
experLence the MaxLMUM satLsfactLon of MY whole beLng? and fLnd that we need
practLcally nothLng of what we are supposed to need for a rLght and fuLfLlLLng
LLfe. And Lf we Make that shLft toward a LLfe sLMple Ln Means but rLch Ln goals,
we are not threatened by the plans elaborated by envLronMentalL sts. For
Lnstance, we can see that, Lnstead of an ene~gy cr~s~s, we have a crLsLs of
consuMptLon - we have More than enough energy. There Ls no reason to contLnue
LncreasLng our consuMptLon of energy or of any of the other MaterLaL aspects of
lLfe. In countrLes lLke the UnLted States the crLsLs Ls rather one of LLfestyle,
of our tradLtLons of thoughtlessness and confusLon, or our LnabLLLty to questLon
what Ls and Ls not worthwhLLe Ln l,Lfe. ULthLn fLfty years, eLther we wLl,l, need a
dLctatorshLp to save what Ls Left of the dLversLty of LLfe forMs, or we wLLl
have a shLft of values, a shLft of our total vLew such that no dLctatorshLp wLLL
-23-
�be . needed. It Ls thoroughly natural to stop doMLnatLng and expLoLtLng and
destroyLng the planet. A "sMooth" ~ay, LnvoLvLng harMonLous LLvLng wLth nature,
or a "rough" way, LnvoLvLng dLctatorshLp and coercion - those are the optLdns.
I tell people that, Lf they Make clear theLr fundaMentaL assuMptLons about
what Ls needed for a LLfe sLMpLe Ln Means and rLch Ln ends, they wLLL
necessarLLy coMe to the conctusLon that Lt Ls not tack of energy consuMptLon
that Makes theM unhappy. They can then oppose nuclear power wLthout havLng read
thLck books and wLthout knowLng the MyrLad facts that are used Ln newspapers and
perLodLcaLs. And they Must also fLnd others who feel the saMe and forM cLrcLes
of frLends who gLve one another confidence and support Ln lLvLng Ln a way that
the MajorLty fLnds rLdLcuLous, naLve, stupLd, and sLMpt~stLc. But Ln order to do
that, one Must already have enough seLf-confLdenc e to follow one's LntuLtLon - a
quaLLty very Much LackLng Ln broad sectLons of the populace. Most people follow
the trends and advertLseMents and becoMe phLLosophLcaL and ethLcaL crLpples.
I thLnk that, Ln the long run, Ln order to joyfully and wholeheartedly
partLcLpate Ln the deep ecology MoveMent you have to take your own LLfe very
seriously. People who successfully MaLntaLn a Low MaterLaL standard of lLvLng
and successfully cultLvate a deep, Lntense Lnner lLfe are Much better able to
consLstentLy MaLntaLn a deep ecoLogLcat vLew and to act on behalf of Lt. As 1·
sLt down and breathe deeply and just feel where I aM, I can ask Myself where and
when I really enjoy MY LLfe and what would be the MLnLMuM Means necessary to
MaLntaLn those enjoyable feelLngs and sLtuatLons. For exaMpLe, I Myself have
too eager to go cLLMbLng Ln the HLMaLayas, whereas the pecutLar
been
satLsfactLon I have as a MountaLneer could be had Ln Norway . If you concentrate
on what gLves you satLsfactLon, you wLLL fLnd that Lt can be obtaLned Much More
easLly and sLMply than we are educated to belLeve Ln our socLety, where bL99er,
More elaborate and More expensLve are always consLdered better.
The deveLopMent of sensLtLvLty toward the good thLngs whLch we already have
Ln suffLcLent quantLty Ls the true goal of educatLon. Not that we need to LLMLt
our desLres. I'M not for the sLMple lLfe, except Ln the sense of a tLfe sLMpLe
Ln Means but rLch Ln goals and values. I have treMendous aMbLtLon. Only the best
Ls good enough for Me. I LLke rLchness, and I feel rLcher than the rLchest
person when I'M Ln MY cottage Ln the country wLth water I've carrLed froM a
certaLn well and wood I've gathered froM the forest. Uhen you take a heLLcopter
to the SUMMLt of a MountaLn,° the vLew Looks LLke a postcard, and, Lf there ' s a
restaurant on the top, you wLll coMplaLn that the food Ls not properly Made.
~hereas Lf you struggle up froM the bottoM, you have thLs deep feeLLng of
satLsfactLon, and even sandwLches MLxed wLth skL wax and sand taste fantastLc.
(SLMple Ln Means, pp . 11-12)
(1) Use of s LMple Means, avoidance of unnecessary coMplLcated LnstruMents and
other sorts of Means.
(2) ChoLce of actLvLtLes Most dLrectLy servLng values Ln theMselves and havLng
LntrLnsLc value. AvoLdance of actLvLtLes whLch are Merely auxLlLary, havLng no
LntrLnsLc value , or beLng Many stages away froM fundaMentaL goals.
(3) AntL-consuMerLs M . ThLs negatLve attLtude follows froM (1) and (2).
(~) Endeavour to MaLntaLn and Lncrease the sensLtLvLty and apprecLatLon of goods
of whLch there Ls enough for all to enjoy. '
(5) Absence or low degree of novophLLL - the love of what Ls new Merely because
Lt Ls new.
(6) Effort to dwell Ln sLtuatLons of LntrLnsLc value and to act rather than
beLng busy .
(7) ApprecLatLon of ethnLc and cultural differences aMon9 people, not feelLn9
theM as threats .
(8) Concern about the sLtuatLon of the thLrd and fourth world and atteMpt to
-24-
�avoLd a standard of LLvLng too Much dLfferent froM and hLgher than the needy.
(Global soLLdarLt y of LLfe style).
(9) ApprecLat Lon of LLfe styles whLch are unLversaL LzabLe, whLch are not
blatantly LMpossLbLe to sustaLn wLthout LnjustLce toward fellow huMans or other
specLes.
(10) To go for depth and rLchness of experLenc e rather than LntensLty .
(11) To apprecLat e and choose, when possLbLe, MeanLngfuL work rather than just
MakLng a LLvLng.
(12) To Lead a coMpLex, not a coMpLLca ted LLfe, tryLn9 to reaLLze as Many
aspects of posLtLve experLenc es as possLbLe wLthLn each tLMe-Lnte rvaL.
(13) CuLtLvatL ng LLfe Ln coMMunLty (GeMeLns chaft) rather than Ln socLety
(OeseLLs chaft}.
sMaLL scale
Ln prLMary productLo n
(14) ApprecLat Lon of or partLcLpa tLon
agrLcuLtu re, forestry, fLshLng.
(15) Effort to satLsfy vLtaL needs rather than desLres. (Paradox, pp.57-8)
In soMe Eastern tradLtLon s, the student Ls presented wLth a koan, a sLMpLe
story or stateMent whLch May sound paradoxLc aL or nonsensLc aL on the surface but
as the student turns and turns Lt Ln hLs or her MLnd, authentLc understan dLng
eMerges. ThLs dLrect actLon · of turnLng and turnLn9, seeLn9 froM dLfferent
perspectL ves and froM dLfferent depths, Ls requLred for the cuLtLvatL on of
conscLou sness. The koan-LLke phrase for deep ecology, suggested by proMLnen t
NorwegLan phLLosoph er Arne Naess Ls: ·sLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends.· (Deep
Ecology, p.10)
The LdeoLogLcaL change Ls MaLnLy that of apprecLat Lng LLfe quaLLty
Ln sLtuatLon s of Lnherent value) rather than adherLng to an
(dweLLLng
LncreasLn gLy hLgher standard of LLvLng. There wLLL be a profound awareness of
the dLfferenc e between bLg and great.
SoMe econoMLs ts crLtLcLze the terM "quaLLty of LLfe" because Lt Ls supposed
to be vague. But on closer LnspectLo n, what they consLder to be vague Ls
actuaLLy the non-quan tLtatLve nature of the terM. One cannot quantLfy adequatel y
what Ls LMportant for the quaLLty of LLfe as dLscussed here, and there Ls no
need to do so.
There Ls aMple rooM for dLfferent op~n~ons about prLorLtLe s: what should be
done fLrst, what next? What Cs Most urgent? What Ls necessary as opposed to what
Ls hL9hLy desLrabLe ? But the dLfferenc es do not exclude vLgorous cooperatL on.
~hat Ls gaLned froM tentatLve Ly forMuLatL ng basLc vLews shared today by
Most or all supporter s of the deep ecology MoveMent? Hopefully Lt Makes Lt a
LLttLe easLer to LocaLLze the MoveMent aMong the Many 'aLternat Lve' MoveMents.
Hopefully thLs does not Lead to LsoLatLon but rather to even better cooperatL on
wLth Many other aLternatL ve MoveMents. It MLght also Make soMe of us More clear
about where we stand, and More clear about whLch dLsagreeM ents MLght profLtabL y
be reduced and whLch ones MLght profLtabL y be sharpened . After aLL dLversLt y!'
Ls a hLgh Level norM! (BasLc, p.6,9)
0
A set of platforM forMulatL on should be vague and aMbLguous enough to be
capable or rather dLfferen t phLLosoph LcalLy relevant Lnterpret atLons. The
prLncLpLe s of Lnterpret atLon of pLatforMs of MoveMents reseMbLe those of
Lnterpret atLon of Laws. Vagueness Ls here essentLaL prLMarLLy because those
appLyLng the Laws Must have soMe freedoM Ln adaptLng theM to ever changLng
cLrcuMst ances, but also because the forMuLatL on Must slur over, or abstract froM
MLnor dLfferenc es of relevant opLnLon aMon9 those who have supported the Lssue
of the Law. On the other hand, the Lnterpret atLon of the text of a phLLosop her
reseMbLes that of a testaMent ( 'wLLL' ). Exactly what the testator Lntends Ls the
-25-
�sole crLterLon of correctness of the LnterpretatLon . Uhether hLs or her
terMLnology Ls abhorent or crazy Ls Lrrelevant. (Hates on Sylvan, pp.10-11)
7:
ON BIOREGIOHALISM
The central eleMent of bLoregLon Ls the LMportance gLven to natural systeMs
"both as the source of physLcal nutrLtLon and as the body of Metaphors froM
whLch our spLrLts draw sustenance. To understand natural systeMs Ls to begLn an
understandLng of the self."
A second eleMent of bLoregLon Ls setf-regulatLo n: •anarchy doesn't Mean out
Lt Means out of theLr control.• Local coMMunLtLes LnspLred by a
control;
of
shared concern for the bLoregLon, for "tettLng be• the plants and natLve anLMals
of that place, ~an Make decLsLons concernLng LndLvLduat and coMMunat actLons
whLc respect the LntegrLty of natural processes Ln that place. CarLng for a
place Means avoLdLng exptoLtatLon.
thLrd eleMent coMposLng the bLoregLonal notLon Ls spLrLt. • There Ls no
sLngle relLgLous practLce for thLs sense of bLoregLonat spLrLt. It can be
ChrLstLan, BuddhLst, NatLve AMerLcan or others; based on deep ecologLcal
LnsLghts, Lt can be expressed Ln nuMerous ways. (Deep Ecology, pp.21-22)
·A
UhLte the bLoregLonal, MLnorLty tradLtLon seeMs approprLate to us for
cuttLvatLng ecotogLcal conscLousness, atlowLng for bLologLcat dLversLty wLth
sLMplLcLty of Means, there are tough, practLcat decLsLons to Make. ConsLstent
wLth our uttLMate norMs, Lt seeMs that one prLncLple Ls protectLon of endangered
specLes of plants and anLMals as part of the general norM of unLty Ln dLversLty.
Another norM Ls bLoregLonal responsLbLlLty . The local coMMunLty Ls the place for
decLsLons. However, what happens when a local COMMunLty's needs conflLct wLth
the norM of protectLng specLes dLversLty?
Such a sLtuatLon occurred on the north slope of Alaska where natLve EskLMos
were huntLng bowhead whales Ln the 1970s. The InternatLonat UhatLng Co~MLssLon
ruled that thLs was an endangered specLes of whale and consLdered a total ban on
the kLttLng of bowhead. However, the natLve EskLMos pleaded that Lt was part of
theLr tradLtLon to kLtt whales. TheLr Myths and tLfestyle were dependent on Lt.
It they dLdn't kLll whales they would be More dependent on canned Meat froM the
"tower forty-eLght": gLven theM by welfare departMents. ThLs soMewhat sptLt the
envLronMentalL sts . Many groups supported a total ban on the kLllLng of bowheads
untLl ecologLsts deterMLned that theLr poputatLon had "suffLcLently Lncreased, •
but FrLends of the Earth took the posLtLon that EskLMos be allowed to take a
regulated nuMber of bowheads usLng theLr tradLtLonal Methods (no advanced
technology for kLtlLng theM was allowed).
Arne Haess provLdes an exaMple froM the bLoregLon ·of northern Horway where
farMers and herders, through expansLon of farMs and nuMber of sheep , were
rapLdty encroachLng on habLtat of wolves and bears. SoMe suggested kLllLng all
bears sLnce a few bears seeMed to be eatLng soMe sheep. But others suggested
LdentLfyLng the probleM More carefully. Uas a specLfLc bear becoMLng More and
More Lnterested Ln sheep? Could that bear be entLced to refraLn froM eatLng
sheep? Could Lt be reMoved to another tocat(on? Could the farMers agree to keep
theLr sheep out of areas where bears were known to have dens or graze? Only as a
last resort would the coMMunLty consLder the optLon of kLllLng that bear.
ThLs approach Ls Ln great contrast wLth that favoured by soMe ranchers and
such as wolves,
farMers Ln the AMerLcan Uest . Uhen a •predator" Ls defLned
to elLMLnate Lt,
undertaken
are
efforts
systeMLc
then
etc.
coyotes, eagles,
poLson •1oso",
of
spreadLng
LncludLng aerLal huntLng of wolves (Ln Alaska),
-26-
�shootLn g eagles wLth hLgh-po wered rLfles and destroyL ng habLtat (dennLng areas,
rLparLan habLtat of rats, etc.). (Deep Ecology , pp.148- 9)
DasMann wrLtes about "bLoregL onalLsM " and •ecodeve lopMent " for the peoples
of
of AfrLca and the South PacLfLc , and refers approvL ngly to the concept
Ln
are
("~e
House
Lynn
and
e
6orslLn
"future prLMLtL ve• develop ed by Jerry
another
to
ve
prLMLtL
transLtL on froM one condLtL on of syMbLot Lc balance - the
a
whLch we wLll call future prLMLtLve ... a condLtL on havLng the attrLbu tes of
Mature ecosyste M: stable, dLverse , Ln syMbLot Lc balance agaLn") . OasMann
dLstLng uLshes between what he calls ecosyste M people and bLosphe re people:
"Ecosyst eM people lLve wLthLn a sLngle ecosyste M, or at Most two or three
M
adjacen t and closely related ecosyste Ms. They are depende nt upon that ecosyste
BLosphe re people draw theLr support , not froM the
for theLr survLva l
resource s of any one ecosyste M, but froM the entLre bLosphe re. BLosphe re people
can exert LncredL ble pressure upon an ecosyste M they wLsh to exploLt , and create
great devastat Lon - soMethL ng that would be LMpossLble or unthLnk able for people
who were depende nt upon that partLcu lar ecosyste M ... BLosphe re people create
a
natLona l parks. Ecosyste M people have always lLved Ln the equLval ent of
at
natLona l park ... I propose that the future belongs to those who can regaLn,
a hLgher level, the old sense of balance and belon9Ln 9 between Man and nature
(ecosyst eM people) .· (SessLo ns, pp-~18- 19)
A bLoregL on Ls a part of earth's surface whose rough boundar Les are
deterML ned by natural rather than huMan dLctate s, dLstLng uLshable froM other
and
areas by attrLbu tes of flora, fauna, water, clLMate , soLls, and land-for Ms,
The
to.
rLse
the huMan settleM ents and culture s those attrLbu tes have gLven
borders between such areas are usually not rLgLd - Nature works wLth More
flexLbL lLty and fluLdLty than that - but the general contour s of the regLons
theMselv es are not hard to LdentLfy , and Lndeed wLll probabl y be felt,
and
understo od, sensed, or Ln soMe way known to Many of the LnhabLt ants,
,
partLcu larly those rooted Ln the land, farMers , rancher s, hunters and fLshers
n,
AMerlca
of
face
the
across
foreste rs and botanLs ts, and Most especLa lly,
the
trlbal Indlans, those stLll Ln touch wLth a culture that for centurl es knew
earth as sacred and Lts well-beL ng as LMperat Lve.
The wLdest regLon, takLng Lts charact er froM the broades t Measure s of
natLve vegetatL on and soLl contour s, May be called the ecore9Lo n and wLll
general ly cover several hundred thousand s of square Mlles. But wlthln these
ecoregL ons Lt Ls easy to dLstLngu Lsh other coheren t terrLtor Les that defLne
a
theMselv es prLMarL ly by theLr surface feature s - a watersh ed, or rLver basLn,
the
valley, a desert, a plateau , a MountaLn range - and whLch we May all call
stLll
locate
often
can
one
turn,
Ln
9eore9L on. And wLthLn these 9eore9L ons,
sMaller areas, of perhaps several thousand square MLles dLscret e and Ldentof
LfLable wLth theLr own topograp hLes and LnhabLt ants, theLr own varLatLo ns
huMan culture and agrLcul ture, to whLch we May gLve the · naMe vLtaregL on. Uhether
we speak of ecoregL on or 9eore9Lo n or vLtaregL on, after all, we speak of bLoregLons , and Lt Ls that essentL al archetyp e that Ls Most LMporta nt to coMprehend. For once that Ls done on any sLgnLfL cant scale then the Matter of MakLng
to
dLstLnc tLons and creatLn g huMan LnstLtut Lons to Match theM can be safely left
best.
theM
the LnhabLt ants, the dweller s on the land, who wLll always know
The econoMy that coMes lnto belng wlthln a
charact er froM the condLtL ons, the laws of Nature.
what we can be sald to know wLth soMe surety
llvlng on the soLl has been cogently SUMMarLsed as
be dLstLng uLshed, froM the laws of TherMod ynaMLcs .
The
flrst
law
ls
that
conserv atlon,
bloreglo n also derlves lts
Our Lgnoranc e Ls LMMense, but
after these Many centurL es of
the laws of EcodynaMLcs - to
preserv atlon,
-27-
sustena nce, ls the
�central goat of the natural world, hence Lts fundaMentat resLstance to largescale structural change; the second law Ls that, far froM beLng entropLc Nature
Ls Lnherently stable, workLng Ln all tLMes and places toward that ecology calls
a ctLMax, that Ls, a balanced, harMonLous, LntegratLve state of MaturLty whLch,
once reached, Ls MaLntaLned for prolonged perLods. FroM thLs Lt follows that a
bLoregLonal econoMy would seek to MaLntaLn rather than exploLt the natural
world, accoMModate to the envLronMent, rather than resLst Lt; Lt would atteMpt
to create condLtLons for a clLMax, a balance, for what soMe econoMLsts have
recently taken to callLng a "steady state," rather than for perpetual change and
contLnuat growth, Ln servLce to "progress", a false and delusory goddess Lf ever
there was one. It would, Ln practLcat terMs, MLnLMLse resource use, eMphasLse
conservatLon and recyclLng, avoLd poltutLon and waste. It would adopt Lts
systeMs to the gLven bLoregLonal resources - energy based on wLnd, for exaMple,
where Nature catted for that, or wood where that was approprLate, and food based
on what the regLon Ltself - partLcularly Ln Lts natLve, pre-agrLcutturat state could grow.
And thus Lt would be based, above all, on the Most eleMentat and Most
elegant prLncLpte of the natural world, that of setf-suffLcLency. Just as Nature
does not depend on trade, does not create elaborate networks of contLnentat
for the
dependency, so the bLoregLon would fLnd all Lts needed resources
Lts own
wLthLn
luxury
Manufacture,
craft,
energy, food, shelter, clothLng,
thus
beLng
envLronMent. And far froM Lt beLng deprLved, far froM Lt
LMpoverLshed, Lt would gaLn Ln every Measure of econoMLc health. It would be
More stable, free froM booM-and-bust cycles and dLstant potLtLcat crLses; Lt
would be able to plan, to allocate at the safest pace, Ln the Most ecotogLcal
Manner_ It would not be at the Mercy of dLstant and uncontrollable natLonal
bureaucracLes and transnatLonal governMents, and thus More self regardLng, More
cohesLve, developLng a sense of place, of COMMunLty of coMradeshLp, and the
prLde that coMes froM stabLlLty, control, coMpetence, and Lndependence.
In one of hLs More prescLent perceptLons FrLtz SchuMacher reatLsed that the
Market econoMy of twentLeth century capLtatLsM erred fundaMentatty, because Lt
erred repeatedly, agaLnst Nature. "It Ls Lnherent Ln the Methodology of
econoMLcs to Lgnore Man's dependence on the natural world," he wrote. "The
Market represents only the surface of socLety and Lts sLgnLfLcance relates to
the MOMentary sLtuatLon as Lt exLsts there and then. There Ls no probLng Lnto
the depths of thLngs, Lnlo the natural or socLat facts that lLe behLnd theM. •
And thLs Ls why, as he poLnts out, conventLonal econoMLcs Makes no dLstLnctLons
at all between prLMary goods, "whLch Man has to wLn froM nature," and secondary
goods Manufactured froM theM, or between renewable or nonrenewable resources, or
the envLronMental and socLal costs of developLng one agaLnst the other. A bLothese
regLonal econoMy, Ln sharpest contrast, Makes - Ln fact Ls grounded Ln
vLtal dLstLnctLons.
PolLtLcal prLncLples on a bLoregLonal scale are also grounded Ln the
dLctates presented by Nature, Ln whLch what Ls forever valued are not the
LMperatLves of gLgantLsM, centralLzatLon, hLerarchy, and MonolLthLcLty, but
rather, Ln starkest contraposLtLon, those of scale, decentralLsatLon, dLvLsLon,
and dLversLty.
The lessons are obvLous, and suggest LMMedLately the desLgn for a bLoregLon as for a contLnent of bLoregLons. Each unLt, of the sL2e that the natural
settLngs proMote, May be unLfLed and cohesLve - startLng froM the base up wLth a
neLghbourhood, a coMMUnLty, a sMatl town, att tLvLng sLde-by-sLde wLth others Ln
settled and Mutual pattern, together wLth coMprLsLng a vLtare9Lon; and that
a
vLtaregLon May have Lts own unLfLcatLon and cohesLveness, Lts own Method of
governance, and yet lLve sLde-by-sLde wLth other regLons, organLsed as they May
-28-
�see fLt; and so on, outward, Ln selfsuffLcLent collaboratLon, unLt upon unLt,
for so long as the natural boundarLes May perMLt and the natural affLnLtLes be
kept Lntact.
SLMLlar lessons May be derLved froM the patterns of huHan nature. Thus
throughout all huMan hLstory people have tended to lLve Ln separate and
Lndependent groups, a "fragMentatLon of huMan socLety· that Harold Isaccs has
descrLbed as soMethLng akLn to •a pervasLve force Ln huMan affaLrs and always
has been.• Even when natLons and eMpLres have arLsen, he notes, they have no
stayLng power agaLnst the Lnnate huMan drLve to fragMentatLon.
In a bLoregLonal socLety, the dLvLsLon between urban and rural, LndustrLal
and agrLcuttural, populatLon and resources, would be replaced by an equLLLbrLuM,
a syMbLosLs. On the one hand, the cLty would be necessary as a producer of
certaLn kLnds of goods, as a centre of artLstLc culture, as a source of the
asseMbled cLvLc vLrtues, though the cLty need not be of LMMense sLze - Lndeed,
no larger than 50,000 or 100,000 people - and Ln fact Ldeally would replLcate
rather than grow so that Lnstead of a sLngle MetropolLs there would be a
MultLplLcLty of cLtLes of Modest sLzes scattered throughout the bLoregLon. On
the other hand, the country would be necessary as the prLMe source of food and
water and the HaterLals of shelter and clothLng and artLsanshLp and trade, and
especLatty as the eMbodLHent of the bLoregLonal spLrLt of Gaea, whose presence
should be felt daLly by the LnhabLtants of every settleMent, of whatever sLze.
BLoregLonalLsM Ls no More than the Modern versLon of a very old perceptLon of
the world held not Merely by the Greeks but by vLrtually every prelLterate
socLety of whLch we have knowledge. (Sate, 167-72)
8:
TECHNOLOGY
The qualLty of huMan exLstence and huMan welfare should not be Measured
of products. Technology Ls returned to Lts ancLent place as an
quantLty
by
only
approprLate tool for huMan welfare, not an end Ln Ltself. There should be a
rapLd MoveMent toward "soft• energy paths and "approprLate technology~ and toward lLfestytes whLch wLll result Ln drastLc decrease Ln per capLta energy consuMptLon Ln advanced LnductrLal socLetLes whLcl LncreasLng approprLate energy Ln
decentralLzed vLllages Ln so-called "thLrd world" natLons. Deep ecologLst5 are
coMMLtted to rapLd MOVeMent to a •steady-state• or •conservor socLety· both froH
ethLcal prLncLples of har~onLous LntegratLon of huMans wLth nature and froM apprecLatLon of ecologLcal realLtLes. IntegratLon of sophLstLcated, elegant, unobtrusLve, ecologLcalty sound, approprLate technology wLth greatly scaled down,
dLversLfLed, organLc, labor-LntensLve agrLculture, huntLng, and gatherLng Ls
another goal. (Deep Ecology pp.311-12)
QuestLonLng technology Ls a process of dLrect actLon that anyone can develop. It Ls one of the Host serLous act Lons that can ·be taken Ln a technocratLc
socLety where the assuMptLon that •technology wLll solve all probleMs• Ls so
deeply held.
as a systeM or as a specLfLc devLce such as a
To questLon technology
coMputer - can often arouse hostLlLty, defena
certaLn type of vehLcle or
sLveness, LrrLtatLon, and resentMent Ln lLsteners. Anyone who questLons technology can be branded a "LuddLte" or antLModernLst. A person who says ·no to
any technologLcal devLce Ls often charged as beLng antLprogressLve. Yet Ls
crucLat to questLon technology, Ln spLte of these crLtLcLsMs.
~e need technology whLch Ls coMpatLble wLth the growth of autonoMous, selfdeterMLnLng LndLvLduats Ln nonhLerarchLcal coMHunLtLes. ~e need prLncLples that
wLll help us escape the trap of technocratLc socLety, where technology Ls the
-29-
�central LnstLtutLon.
Technology can be crLtLcLzed and evaluated based on general prLncLples,
scale or structure. The followLng questLons can be asked of any technologLcal
devLce or systeM:
I. Does thLs technologLcal devLce serve vLtal needs?
2. ls thLs devLce or systeM of the sort that can be LMMedLately understood by
nonexperts?
3. Does Lt have a hLgh degree of flexLbLlLty and MutabLlLty or does Lt LMpose a
perManent, rLgLd, LrreversLble LMprLnt on the lLves of cLtLzens?
local
~- Does thLs technologLcal devLce or systeM foster greater autonoMy of
coMMunLtLes or greater dependency on soMe centralLzed "authorLty"?
5. ls thLs devLce or systeM ecologLcally destructLve or conducLve to a deep
ecology way of lLfe?
6. Does thLs devLce or systeM enhance the LndLvLdualLty of persons or does Lt
lead to bureaucratLc hLerarchLes?
7. Does thLs devLce or systeM encourage people to behave and thLnk lLke
MachLnes?
A fully LnforMed, approprLate technology Ls a MeetLng ground of ethLcs ,
polLtLcs, MechanLcal understandLng and deep ecologLcal conscLousness. As Langdon
WLnner concludes Ln AutonoMous Technology, "If one lacks a clear and knowledgeable sense of what Means are approprLate lo the cLrcuMstances at hand, one's
These Means do not
choLce of Means can easLly lead to excesses and danger.
Lnvolve just narrow utLlLty or effLcLency of productLon or profLt Ln soMe
short-terM calculatLon. Indeed, the narrow eMphasLs upon effLcLency of Means
drLves us away froM the larger Lssues of envLronMental ethLcs asnd LndLvLdual
responsLbLlLty for the consequences of our actLons. (Deep Ecology, pp.35-6)
Shallow approach: AcceptLng LndustrLalLzatLon of the kLnd ManLfested Ln the
West as the natural goal for developLng countrLes. Low estLNatLon of deep
cultural dLfferences wLth sLgnLfLcant devLatLons froM Western standards. Deep
approach: SocLal and cultural dLversLty of dLfferent specLes Ls an essentLal
IntensLfLed Measures to
part of general rLchness and varLatLon of lLfe forMs.
exLstLng non-LndustrLal
stLll
lLMLt the LMpact of Western technology upon
cultures . Defence of the fourth world agaLnst cultural foreLgn doMLnatLon.
PolLtLcal and econoMLc polLcLes Ln favour of subcultures and MLnorLtLes Ln
LndustrLalLzed socLetLes. Support of local and soft technologLes as a Means to
MaLntaLn baste cultural assessMent of technLcal LnnovatLon. Due regard to anLMal
socLetLes and cultures. SurvLval of populatLons does not ensure survLval of
socLal LnstLtutLons . QuestLonLng whether so-called advanced, Modern technologLes
are approprLate relatLve to levels of pollutLon, resources, populatLon and as
subordLnate part of general culture. (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, pp.12-13)
Technology Ls More helpless than ever because the technology beLng produced
doesn ' t fulfLll baste huNan needs, such as MeanLngful work Ln a MeanLngful
envLronMent . TechnLcal progress Ls shaM progress because the terM technLcal
progress Ls a cultural, not a technLcal, terM . Our culture Ls the only one Ln
the hLstory of MankLnd Ln whLch the culture has adjusted Ltself to the
technology, rather than vLce versa. (SLMple ' Ln Means, p.11)
Once the scLentLfLc probleMs have been solved, once Lt Ls understood how a
partLcular forM of pollutLon arLses and Ln what Lts danger consLsts, the next
probleM Ls technologLcal : to dLscover a Method of reducLng thLs LncLdence. That
Lnvolves decLdLng, Ln the fLrst place, whLch of the causatLve factors Lt wLll be
easLest to control . KnowLng, for exaMple, that the Los Angeles sMog Ls a joLnt
product of the sLtLng of Los Angeles, Lts hours of sunlLght and the exhaust
-30-
�fuMes froM the LnternaL coMbustLon engLne, Lt Ls at once apparent that onLy the
thLrd of these Lf controLLabLe at a toLerabLe cost. So what has to be Lnvented
Ls a devLce whLch wLLL reduce the output of hydrocarbons Ln exhaust fuMes. ThLs
constLtutes a technoLogLcaL probLeM, the soLutLon to whLch LLes Ln the LnventLon
of a devLce whLch wouLd satLsfy partLcuLar technLcaL specLfLcatLons . (The word
devLce' Ls h~re beLng used Ln a very broad sense; an LnsectLcLde Ls a devLce
and so Ls the sterLLLsLng of Lnsects as a Means of bLoLogLcaL control.)
0
The Ldea of a 'technoLogLcaL soLutLon' Ls, however, a good deaL Less
straLghtforward than Lt at fLrst appears to be, as the phrase I used above 'at a
toLerabLe cost' aLready hLnts. It Ls very easy to thLnk up technLcaL soLutLons
of ecoLogLcaL probLeMs Lf we consLder theM Ln LsoLatLon~ and Lf we defLne a
technLcaL soLutLon, wLthout any reference to costs, as one whLch descrLbes a way
of freeLng ourselves froM the ecoLogLcaL condLtLon whLch concerns us. Such a
soLutLon Ls soMetLMes saLd to be 'practLcaL' but not 'operatLonal'. So Los
AngeLes sMog could be reduced Ln LntensLty by roofLng over the entLre cLty, or
by MakLng everybody use pubLLc transport, or by substLtutLng fuel-ceLls, Ln
theLr present state of developMent, for Lnternal coHbustLon engLnes. But few
wouLd serLousLy advance these proposals as 'solutLons', as satLsfactory ways of
deaLLng wLth the sMog probleM. ~hy not? SLMply because the costs, or so Lt Ls
w~deLy beLLeved, wouLd be too great, costs of varLous sorts, socLal, ecologLcal,
econoMLc and poLLtLcaL.
In so far as ecologLcaL probleMs can be solved only wLth the help of
scLentLfLc dLscovery and technoLogLcaL LnventLon, they can be soLved only wLthLn
the ~estern ratLonal tradLtLons. That Much Ls obvLous. MystLcaL conteMplatLon
wLlL not reveal to the cheMLst the orLgLns of the Los Angeles sMog or enabLe the
engLneer to desLgn an effectLve devLce for reducLng Lts LntensLty. But Lt Ls a
enthusLasM
proper crLtLcLsM of ~estern socLety that, Ln Lts - often chLldLsh
for technoLogLcaL 'advance', Lt has faLled adequateLy to consLder the costs of
LntroducLng new devLces and has defLned 'costs' far too narrowly.
ThLs objectLon can be dLrected, even, agaLnst antL-pollutLon devLces. The
Manufacture of such devLces wLLL norMaLLy create · More polLutLon. It May, by
ModLfyLng the character of the poLlutant, Lntroduce new dangers - reducLng the
percentage of carbon MonoxLde Ln exhaust fuMes whLle LncreasLng the percentage
of the no Less dangerous nLtrogen dLoxLde. Or Lt May shLft the LncLdence of the
poLLutLon froM a weaLthLer to a poorer coMMunLty - ManufacturLng sMokeless fueLs
Ln an LndustrLaL town to Make the London aLr cLeaner - wLthout reducLng Lts
total voLuMe. Any technoLogLcal LnnovatLon, furtherMore, LnvoLves an eleMent of
ecoLoe LcaL rLsk; Lt Ls LMpossLbLe to calculate all Lts consequences Ln every
possLbLe cLrcuMstance. The best the technologLst can do Ls to exclude effects
whLch are already known to be dangerous and to LnvestLgate further effects whLch
are suspect . That Ls why, as I saLd earLLer, caLlLng upon the technologLst to
save us Ls so often equated wLth caLLLng Ln the devLL as an exorcLst.
But Lt wouLd be quLte wrong to conclude that for the reasons just advanced
the technologLcaL Method of overcoMLng ecoLogLcaL probleMs would be abandoned,
that what ~estern socLetLes should do Ls to shut down factorLes, Let us say,
rather than LnsLst on theLr reducLng, by technoLogLcal Means, theLr eMLssLon of
pollutants. For econoMLc and socLaL rLsks ~ and, Ln the end, greater ecoLogLcal
rLsks Lf the socLaL resentMent engendered by the closure Ls dLrected agaLnst the
whoLe systeM of ecoLogLcaL controls. It, too, May do no More than shLft the
LncLdence of poLLutLon froM rLcher to poorer regLons, as the factory-owner takes
hLs capLtal elsewhere. To gLve up takLng any rLsks would be to gLve up actLng .
Every actLon costs soMethLng, rLsks soMethLng. Uhat can properLy be deManded Ls
not that Men should cease to act Ln ways whLch LnvoLve ecologLcal rLsks - there
are no such ways, as Matters now stand, whatever the sLtuatLon Ln the Garden of
-31-
�Eden - but rather that they shouLd take More account of the ecoLogLcaL costs and
benefLts of theLr actLon. And thLs Means, once agaLn, that they wLLL hav~ to
Make fuLLer use of ratLonaL Western-type Methods, cost benefLt anaLyses or
decLsLon-procedures. (PassMore, pp.~8-50)
EcoLogLcaL resLsters do not accept that there are onLy narrow technLcaL
soLutLons to narrowLy defLned socLal probLeMs (such as aLr poLLutLon). These
probLeMs are seen onLy as syMptoMs of the Larger Lssues.
There are three MaLn dangers to technocratLc soLutLons. FLrst Ls the danger
Ln beLLevLng there Ls a coMpLete or acceptabLe soLutLon usLng Modern doMLnant
LdeoLogLes and technoLogy. The second danger Ls the presentatLon of an
LMpressLon that soMethLng Ls beLng done when Ln fact the reaL probLeM contLnues.
reaL work". FLnaLLy, there Ls the danger of
TLnkerLng dLstracts froM the
assuMLng there wLLL be new experts - such as professLonaL ecoLogLsts - who wLLL
provLde the soLutLon but who May Ln fact be constraLned to be pubLLc reLatLons
spokespersons for the agenda of profLt or power of soMe corporatLon or agency.
EcoLogLcaL resLstance Ls actLon froM centraL prLncLpLes of doLng what Ls
necessary, of wLtnessLng nonvLoLentLy. It arLses froM a shLft Ln conscLouness.
EcoLogLcaL resLstLng Ls deeper, soMe wouLd say More radLcaL,. than just
reforMLsM. SoMe of the reforMLst actLons to MLtLgate soMe of the worse forMs of
aLr and water poLLutLon (due to auto exhaust, for exaMpLe) are MotLvated by
concern onLy for huMan heaLth and safety and not by the LntrLnsLc vaLues of the
bLosphere. But th LLMLts of reforMLSM are by now weLL known. (Deep EcoLog~,
pp.195-6)
In tryLng to exaMLne technoLogy and productLon, we encounter a curLous
paradox. ~e are deepLy rLven by a great sense of proMLse about technLcaL
LnnovatLon, on the one hand, and by a thorough sense of dLsenchantMent wLth Lts
resuLts, on the other. ThLs duaL attLtude not onLy refLects a confLLct Ln the
popuLar LdeologLes concernLng technoLogy but aLso expresses strong doubts about
the nature of the Modern technologLcaL LMagLnatLon LtseLf. We are puzzLed that
the very LnstruMents our MLnds have conceLved and our hands have created can be
so easLly turned agaLnst us, wLth dLsastrous resuLts for our weLL-beLng
Lndeed, for our very survLval as a specLes.
Techne, Moreover, covered a wLder scope of experLence than the Modern word
technLcs. The goaL of techne Ls not restrLcted to MereLy "LLvLng weLL. or lLvLng
wLthLn the lLMLt. Techne LncLudes LLvLng an ethLcaL LLfe accordLng to an
orLgLnatLve and orderLng prLncLple conceLved as "potency". VLewed even Ln an
LnstruMental sense, techne thus encoMpasses not MereLy raw MaterLaLs, tooLs,
MachLnes, and products but aLso the producer - Ln short, a hLghly sophLstLcated
subject froM whLch aLL eLse orLgLnates. To ArLstotle, the "Master-craftsMan" Ls
dLstLnguLshed subjectLveLy froM hLs apprentLces or assLstants by vLrtue of
honor, a sense of "why" products are created, and generaLLy a wLsdoM of thLngs
ArLstotLe
subject,
and phenoMena. By startLng wLth the ratLonaLLty of
productLon
the
to
estabLLshes a poLnt of departure for brLngLng ratLonaLLzatLon
of the object.
Modern LndustrLaL productLon functLons Ln precLseLy the opposLte way. Not
only Ls the Modern LMage of techne LLMLted to Mere technLcs Ln the LnstruMentaL
sense of the terM, but aLso Lts goaLs are LnextrLcabLy tLed to unLLMLted
Ls conceLved as LLMLtLess consuMptLon wLthLn the
productLon. "LLvLng weLL
fraMework of a totaLLy unethLcaL, prLvatLzed LeveL of seLf-Lnterest. TechnLcs,
not the producer and hLs or her ethLcaL standards
LncLudes
Moreover,
(proLetarLans, after aLL, servLce the Modern LndustrLal apparatus Ln totaL
anonyMLty) but the product and Lts constLtuLnts. The technLcaL focus shLfts froM
-32-
�the subject to the object, froM the producer to the product, froM the creator to
the created. Honor, a sense of •why," and any generaL wLsdoM of thLngs and
phenoMena have no pLace Ln the worLd requLred by Modern Lndustry. ~hat reaLLy
counts Ln technLcs Ls effLcLency, quantLty, and an LntensLfLcatLon of the Labor
process. The specLous ratLonaLLty LnvoLved Ln producLng the object Ls foLsted on
the ratLonaLLzatLon of the subject to a poLnt where producer's subjectLvLty Ls
totally atrophLed and reduced to an object aMong objects. (BookchLn, pp.219-22)
9:
ON ECOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Deep ecoLogy Ls eMergLng as a way of developLng a new balance and harMony
between LndLvLduaLs, coMMunLtLes and aLl of Nature. It can potentLaLLy satsLfy
our deepest yearnLngs: faLth and trust Ln our Most basLc LntuLtLons; courage to
take dLrect actLon; joyous confLdence to dance wLth the sensuous harMonLes
dLscovered through spontaneous, playfuL Lntercourse wLth the rhythMs of our
bodLes, the rhythMs of fLowLng water, changes Ln the weather and seasons, and
the overaLL processes of LLfe on Earth.
The deep ecology MoveMent Lnvolves workLng on ourselves, what poetphLLosopher Gary Snyder caLls "the reaL work,• the work of reaLLy LookLng at
ourselves, of becoMLng More real. ThLs Ls the work we call cultLvatLng
ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. ThLs process LnvoLves becoMLng More aware of the
actuaLLty of rocks, wolves, trees, and rLvers - the cultLvatLon of the LnsLght
that everythLng Ls connected. CultLvatLng ecologLcal conscLousness Ls a process
of learnLng apprecLate sLLence and solLtude and redLscoverLng how to lLsten. It
Ls learnLng how to be More receptLve, trustLng, holLstLc Ln perceptLon, and Ls
grounded Ln a vLsLon of nonexploLtLve scLence and technology.
ThLs process Lnvolves beLng honest wLth ourselves and seekLng clarLty Ln
our LntuLtLons, then actLng froM cLear prLncLpLes, practLcLng seLf-dLscLpLLne
and workLng honestLy wLthLn our coMMunLty. It Ls sLMpLe but not easy work. Henry
DavLd Thoreau, nLneteenth-century naturalLst and wrLter, adMonLshes us, ·Let
your lLfe be a frLctLon agaLnst the MachLne. •
CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcal conscLousness Ls correlated wLth the cultLvatLon of
conscLence. CuLtural hLstorLan Theordore Roszak suggests Ln Person/PLanet
conscLousness, how LnstructLve the overLappLng
and
"conscLence
(1978),
sLMLLarLty of those two words Ls. FroM the new conscLousness we are gaLnLng of
ourseLves as persons perhaps we wLLL yet create a new conscLence, one whose
ethLcaL sensLtLvLty Ls at Least tuned to a sLgnLfLcant good, a sLgnLfLcant
evLL.
We beLLeve that huMans have a vLtaL need to cuLtLvate ecologLcaL conscLousness and that thLs need Ls related to the needs of the planet. At the saMe tLMe,
huMans need dLrect contact wLth untraMMeLed wLLderness, places undoMestLcated
for narrow huMan purposes.
Many people sense the needs of the pLanet and the need for wLLderness
preservatLon. But we need not be technLcal experts Ln order to cultLvate
ecotogLcal conscLousness, as Thoreau saLd, cuLtLvatLng ecotogLcaL conscLousness
requLres that "we front up to the facts and deterMLne to lLve our lLves
delLberately, or not at all." We belLeve that people can clarLfy theLr own
LntuLtLons, and act froM deep prLncLpLes.
Deep ecology Ls a process of even-deeper questLonLng of ourselves, the
assuMptLons of the doMLnant worLdvLew Ln our culture, and the MeanLng and truth
Ln our realLty. We cannot change conscLousness by only lLstenLng to others, we
Must Lnvolve ourselves. We Mu~t take dLrect actLon.
-33-
�One hopeful poLLtLcaL MoveMent wLth deep ecology as a base Ls the Uest
GerMan Green poLLtLcaL party. They have as theLr slogan, "ue are neLther Left
nor rLght, we are Ln front.· Green poLLtLcs Ln Uest GerMany, and to soMe extent
Ln Great BrLtaLn, BeLgLuM and AustraLLa Ln the 1980s, goes beyond the
conventLonaL, tLberaL defLnLtLon of a party, coMbLnLng personal work (that Ls,
work on cLarLfyLng one's own character) and polLtLcal actLvLsM.
The Greens present a proMLsLng poLLtLcaL strategy because they encourage
the cultLvatLon of personal ecoLogLcaL conscLousness as well as address Lssues
of pubLLc polLcy. If the Greens propogate the bLocentrLc perspectLve - the
Lnherent worth of other specLes besLdes huMans - then they can help change the
current vLew whLch says we should use Nature only to serve narrow huMan
Lnterests.
CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Ln conteMporary socLetLes, however, Ls
a two-edged sword. Ue Must not be MLsLed by our zeaL for change so that we are
concerned only wLth the narrow self or ego. If we seek only personal redeMptLon
we could becoMe soLLtary ecologLcal saLnts aMong the Masses of those we MLght
cLassLfy as "sLnners" who contLnue to pollute. Change Ln persons requLres a
change Ln culture and vLce versa. We cannot Lgnore the personal arena nor the
socLaL, for our project Ls to enhance harMony wLth each other, the planet and
ourselves. (Deep Ecology, pp.7-1~)
~e began by suggestLng a varLety of specLfLc actLons whLch people can take
dLrected at reforMLng publLc polLcy, developLng bLoregLonal coMMunLtLes, and
cuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. Ue return to the theMe of dLrect actLon.
~e have deMonstrated that deep ecology Ls not just a gaMe of ~bstract
theorLzLng. As a perspectLve Lt Ls lLved, danced, celebrated. It has resonance.
Ln part, cuLtLvatLng what
CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Means,
Ls engaged Ln the
LnteLLect
RhapsodLc
Theodore Roszak caLLs rhapsodLc LntelLect.
process of LntegratLng LntelLect, body, and joyous eMotLon.
Based on the LnsLghts, uLtLMate norMs, prLncLples and theorLes of deep
ecology, the central practLcaL questLon Ls how do we becoMe More Mature persons,
gLven the constraLnts of th~s culture?
Ue suggest there Ls an LnterpLay between outward dLrect actLon and Lnward
dLrect actLon, between actLng on one's self and actLng Ln the world, wLth the
result of further and deeper MaturLty Ln the deep ecologLcaL sense of
LdentLfLcatLon wLth alL LLfe. There Ls no sharp break between Lnward and
outward. People take dLrectLon actLon froM dLrect ecoLogLcal prLncLpLes and they
becoMe More Mature through dLrect actLon. The Label we use for the type of
dLrect actLon Ln Lts outward forM Ls ecoLogLcaL resLstLng. (Deep Ecology, p.19~)
'Deep ecology', an envLronMental scLence broadsheet tells us, Ls Naess's
expressLon for an ecologLcaL awareness or conscLousness' . SpeLLLng deep ecology
out then becoMes a Matter of settLng down the types of conscLousness and
awareness and recognLtLon LnvoLved, SOMethLns that Ls done Ln a thoroughly
anthropocentrL c way, begLnnLng as foLLows: 'a conscLousness of the LMplLcatLons
of ecology for huMan beLng'. It Ls all Ln fact done Ln terMs of huMan responses,
fundaMentaLLy
Ls
approach
the
AccordLn9Ly
capacLtLes and psychology.
MLsconceLved. For deep ecology Ls not so anthropocentrL c, and Ls no More a
Matter of envLronMentaL psychology than Ls the value theory or MetaphysLcs whLch
are part of Lt. The psychoL09LcaL conversLon Ls LLke cLaLMLng that 'MarxLsM' Ls
an expressLon for socLaLLst conscLousness, or 'MusLc' for MusLco-LogLcal
awareness.
-34-
�The conversLon of deep ecology Lnto awareness psychology, Lnto a certaLn
sort of exercLse Ln self-realLsatLon or 'lLberatLng ecologLcal conscLousness, or
conscLousness raLsLng', Ls open to sLMLlar objectLons. Ecology, deep or shallow
or systeMatLc, Ls not ego-trLppLng or a personal thLng. Granted those who do
have and share certaLn attLtudes and feelLngs to natural envLronMents are "uch
More lLkely to becoMe actLve supporters or followers of deep ecology or to adopt
a deeper ecologLcal stance. Even so such states as self-realLsatLon or
ecologLcal conscLousness are neLther necessary nor suffLcLent for thLs.
Such subjectLve states are not necessary because soMeone can beco"e a
supporter of deep ecology wLthout havLng attaLned, or Made any effort to attaLn,
these states. Thus consLder soMeone, a dedLcated naturalLst for Lnstance, who
has no deep Lnterest Ln or understandLng of huMan psychology or socLology so far
as these bear on the envLronMent. Such a person Ls a deep ecologLst, but lacks
ecologLcal conscLousness as Lt Ls explaLned. The case of Peter SLnger Ln the
anLMal lLberatLon "oveMent Ls LnstructLve; for SLnger goes out of hLs way to
explaLn hLs dLsLnterest, hLs coMparatLve lack of zoologLcal conscLousness, that
he does not LdentLfy wLth anLMals and so on, yet hLs LMpact for anLMal
lLberatLon has been Most sLgnLfLcant. Analogously, a Deeper SLnger need not be
Ln love wLth the Earth but feel rather Lsolated froM Lt and feel rLghtly that
Most of Lts LnhabLtants dLslLke hLM or are frLghtened by hLM. He May have lLttle
Ldea what Lt Ls lLke to be one of theM or a MountaLn, ... ; but he "ay have the
rLght values, adhere to the rLght phLlosophy and undertake the rLght sorts of
actLon and lLfestyle.
GenuLnely and specLfLcally deep ecologLcal conscLousness has not been well
descrLbed and Ls not partLcularly well defLned. And soMe of the requLreMents
LMposed upon Lt, whatever Lt aMounts to, render Lt LMpossLble. Thus Fox, echoLng
others, claLMs that 'to the extent that we perceLve boundarLes, we fall short of
a deep ecologLcal conscLousness'. Then we all fall short, sLnce we are regularly
confronted by, and perceLve, terrLtorLal boundarLes and a wLde range of other
deMarcatLon lLnes and contrasts. Indeed fallLng short Ls LnevLtable; for
hence
and
perceptLon necessarLly Lnvolves selectLon and dLscrLMLnatLon,
separatLon and boundarLes. Deep conscLousness Ls also rendered LMpossLble by
soMe of the LdentLfLcatLon requLreMents, drawn froM nature MystLcLsM, whLch are
LMposed upon Lt. It Ls one thLng to be Ln tune wLth the unLverse (a Metaphor
that can be spelled out), quLte another, and LMpossLble, feat to be LdentLcal
wLth Lt, sLnce then a proper part would be LdentLcal wLth a whole contaLnLng Lt.
SoMe explLcatLon of LdentLfLcatLon (trans-specLes and other) Ls LMportant for
the elaboratLon of deep ecology, but the relatLon Lnvolved (though Lt concerns
shared features, such as perhaps experLences) Ls not one of LdentLty or MakLng
LdentLcal, as sLMplLstLc etyMology May suggest. Other requLreMents coMMonly
placed on deep conscLousness, whLle they do not exclude Lt, render Lt unduly
anthropocentrLc. (CrLtLque, pp.30-2)
Deep ecologLsts agree wLth BLrch and Cobb's LnsLght that "huMan beLngs are
More deeply Moved by the way they experLence theLr ~orld than by the claLMs
ethLcs Makes on theM." Thus, where conteMporary envLronMental phLlosophy Ls
doMLna~ed by the questLon "How do we construct an adequate envLron"ental
ethLc? , deep ecology asks the questLon "How do we cultLvate a deep ecologLcal
conscLousness?" The forMer questLon looks to conceptual answers, the latter to
experLentLal answers. In seekLng to change the way Ln whLch we experLence the
world, deep ecologLsts place theLr prLMary eMphasLs upon changLng our ·underlyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are" (L.e. changLng our ontology) rather than
upon what we MLght terM the "conceptual fLx• approach of "bL99er and better"
ethLcs. ThLs atteMpt to shLft the prLMary focus of envLronMental phLlosophLcal
concern froM ethLcs to ontology clearly constLtutes a fundaMental or revolutLon-
-35-
�ary chaLLenge to norMaL envLronMentaL phLLosophy. It Ls (and should be) deep
ecology's guLdLng star. (GuLdLng Stars, p.204)
10:
ON HOLISM
AccordLng to deep ecology: A new cosMLc/ecoLogLcaL MetaphysLcs whLch stresses the LdentLty (I/thou) of huMans wLth non-huMan nature Ls a necessary condLLons for a vLabLe approach to buLLdLng an eco-phLLosophy. In deep ecology, the
wholeness and LntegrLty of a person/planet together wLth the prLncLpLe of what
Arne Naess caLLs "bLoLogLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM" are the Most LMportant Ldeas. Man
Ls an LntegraL part of nature, not over or apart froM nature. Man Ls a "pLaLn
cLtLzen· of the bLosphere, not Lts conqueror or Manager .. There should be a
"deMocracy of aLL God's creatures" accordLng to St. FrancLs; or as SpLnoza saLd,
Man Ls a "teMporary and dependent Mode of the whole of God/Nature.· Man flows
wLth the systeM of nature rather than atteMptLng to control aLL of the rest of
nature. The hand of Man LLes LLghtLy on the Land. Man does not perfect nature,
nor Ls Man's prLMary duty to Make nature More effLcLent.
A new psychology Ls needed to Lntegrate the MetaphysLcs Ln the MLnd fLeLd
of post-LndurtrLaL socLety. A Major paradLgM shLft results froM psychoLogLcaL
changes of perceptLon. The new paradLgM requLres rejectLon of subject/object,
Man/nature duaLLsMs and wLLL requLre a pervasLve awareness of total LnterMLngLLng of the planet earth. Psychotherapy seen as adjustMent to eco-orLented
socLety Ls replaced by a new LdeaL of psychotherapy as spLrLtuaL deveLopMent.
The new MetaphysLcs and psychology Leads LogLcaLLy to a posture of bLospherLc
egaLLtarLanLsM and LLberatLon Ln the sense of autonoMy, physoLogLcaL/eMotLona L
freedoM of the LndLvLduaL, spLrLtuaL deveLopMent of HoMo sapLens, and the rLght
of other specLes to pursue theLr own evoLutLonary destLnLes. (Deep Ecology
MoveMent, pp.310-11)
RejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favour of the reLatLonaL,
totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs as knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of
LntrLnsLc reLatLons. As LntrLnsLc reLatLon between two thLngs ~ and B Ls such
that the reLatLon belongs to the defLnLtLons or basLc constLtutLons of A and ~•
so that wLthout a reLatLon, ~and~ are no Longer the saMe thLngs. The totaLfLeLd Model dLssoLves not only the Man-Ln-envLronMent concept, but every coMpact
thLng-Ln-MLLLeu concept - except when taLkLng at a superfLcLaL or preLLMLnary
Level of coMMunLcatLon. (Shallow and Deep, p.95)
Shallow envLronMentaLLsM atteMpts to curb soMe of the Most gLarLng envLronMentaL abuse such as poLLutLon and resource depLetLon whLLe caLLLng for no basLc
change Ln the anthropocentrLc urban-LndustrLaL socLaL paradLgM. Naess descrLbes
Lts central objectLve as "the health and affluence of people Ln the developed
countrLes." The Deep Ecology MoveMent, on the other hand, gathers LnspLratLon
froM the fLeLd ecoLogLst and Ls a rejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln
favor of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs are knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. w (SessLons, p . 398)
0
Because they cannot conceLve Man apart' they experLence no dLffLcuLty Ln
attrLbutLng LntrLnsLc value to nature. In so far as they conceLve theMseLves as
havLng such value, the LnabLLLty to separate theLr selves froM nature, LnescapabLy Leads to thLnkLng of "Man" and ·envLronMent' as a whole. (Gestalt thLnkLng.) In thLs century the reactLon agaLnst conceLvLng the LndLvLduaL self as
soMethLng separable froM the socLaL settLng has been Largely successful, but not
the paraLLeL reactLon agaLnst the separabLLLty froM the natural settLng.
(PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, p.35)
By subtractLng your own self-centred and
seLf-servLng
-36-
thoughts
froM
the
�world you coMe to reaLLze that "the other Ls none other than yourself: that the
fundaMentaL deLusLon of huManlty ls to suppose I aM here and you are out there_·
ThLs understandLng perMeates the MystLcaL tradLtLons and Ls exeMpLLfLed Ln the
TaoLst advLce to "LdentLfy yourself wLth non-dLstLnctLon_ •
It ls now becoMlng coMMonpLace to polnt to the fundaMentaLLy slMlLar
cosMoLogLes eMobdLed Ln the MystLcaL tradLtLons on the one hand and the 'new
physlcs' on the other_ What Ls structurally sLMllar about these cosMoLogLes Ls
that they reveal a 'seaMLess web' vLew of the unLverse_
Both the MystLcaL tradLtLons and the new physLcs' serve to generate Lnter
aLLa, what we MLght now caLL 'ecoLoglcaL awareness', .that Ls, awareness of the
fundaMentaL LnterreLatedne~s of aLL thLngs or, More accurately, aLL events_ The
theoretlcaL physLclst Frltjof Capra has been quLte expLlcLt about thls: "1 thLnk
what physLcs can do Ls help to generate ecoLogLcaL awareness_ You see, Ln MY
vLew now Ln the Western versLon of MystLcaL awareness, our versLon of BuddhLsM
or TaoLsM, wLLl be ecologLcal awareness_" Where the physLcLst, the Mystlc, and
the deep ecologLst (as phLlosopher) dLffer Ls Ln theLr Means of arrLvLng at
'ecologLcal awareness ' ___ _
The deep ecologLst's conceptLon of unLty Ln process' need not LMpLy that,
at any gLven MOMent, all 'knots' (L_e_ organLsMs) Ln the 'bLospherLcal net' are
constLtuted of equally coMpLex reLatLons_ To the extent that value Lnheres Ln
coMplexLty of relatLons, and to the extent that coMplexLty of reLatLons Ls
evLdenced Ln the degree of an organLsM's central organLzatLon (and therefore
capacLty for rLchness of experLence), then organLsMs are entLtLed to Moral
consLderatLon coMMensurate wLth theLr degree of central organLzatLon (or
capaclty for rlchness of experlence) for the duratlon of thelr exlstence - as
transLent as that May be Ln terMs of evolutLonary tLMe_
In pursulng theLr central LntuLtLon of 'unLty' (L_e_ of no boundarLes Ln
the bLospherLcal fLeLd), deep ecoLogLsts have possLbly Lost sLght of the sLgnLfaspect of theLr 'unLty Ln process' MetaphysLcs_
Lcance of the 'Ln process
AttentLon to thLs Latter aspect suggests that any process contLnuousLy produces
LMperManent, uneven dLstrLbutLons (L_e_, dLfferent values) of varLous attrLbutes
(and Ln the process of the world these attrLbutes May be Money, LnforMatLon,
coMplexLty of relatLons, and so on)_ If thLs were not so then we would have no
process but a perfectly unLforM, hoMogenous and, therefore, LLfeless fLeld_ The
only unLverse where value Ls spread evenly across the fLeLd Ls a dead unLverse _
RecognLsLng thLs, we should be clear that the central LntuLtLon of deep ecology
does not entaLl the vLew that LntrLnsLc value Ls spread evenly across the
MeMbershLp of the bLotLc coMMunLty_ Moreover, Ln sLtuatLons of genuLne value
conflLct, justLce Ls better served by not subscrLbLng to the vLew of ecoLogLcal
-egaLLtarLanLsM_ (Fox, pp-196-200)
An arctLc Landscape May superfLcLaLly Look rather dead Ln wLnter. In sprLng
Lt May Look overwheLMLngLy aLLve_ It would take a Long traLnLng to force
perceptLon to dLstLnguLsh organLsM froM non-organLsMs Ln such a LLve Landscape_
Even Ln wLnter the Lover of the Landscape sees abundance of LndLvLduaL LLfe
forMs and also hLgher order gestaLts_
Why Ls the gestalt ontology not MentLoned Ln the platforN forMulatLon_ A
Landscape wLth organLsMs - and aLL Landscapes have organLsMs Ln MLcro-organLsMs
are counted - Ls a hLgh order, natural gestalt_ The separatLon of organLsMs and
non-organLsMs Ls very unnatural Ln gestalt thLnkLng and apperceptLon. But the
concepts of 9estaLt-thlnkln9 are too specLaL for pLatforM forMuLatLons- Only a
MLnorLty of supporters of deed ecology are acadeMLcs_ (Notes on Sylvan, p-7)
-37-
�BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sources used
0
S. BodLan, S LMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends: A conversatLon wLth Arne Naess', Ten
DLrectLons, SuMMer/Fall, 1982, 7,10-12; referred to as SLMple Ln Means.
M. BookchLn, The Ecology of FreedoM, CheshLre, Londong,
1982;
referred
to
as
F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green PolLtLcs, HutchLnson, London, 198~; referred
as Green PolLtLcs.
to
Bookch i,n.
B. Devall,
'The Deep Ecology MoveMent', Natural Resources Journal 20, 1980,
299-322; referred to as Deep Ecology MoveMent.
B. Devall, 'stone/Sky: ReflectLons on the 'Real ~ork' of Deep Ecology', paper
delLvered at EnvLronMent, EthLcs and Ecology Conference, Canberra, August
1983, 20ff.; referred to as Stone/Sky .
8. Devall and G. SessLons, Deep Ecology, PeregrLne SMLth, Layton, Utah, 1985;
referred to as Deep Ecology.
U. Fox,
Deep Ecology: A new phLlosophy
194-200; referred to as Fox.
of
our tLMe', EcologLst 1~, 1984,
U. Fox, 'on guLdLng stars to Deep Ecology', EcologLst 14, 1984, 203-4;
to as GuLdLng Stars.
A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology MoveMent.
InquLry 18, 1973, 95-100; referred to as Shallow and Deep.
A. Naess, 'PhLlosophLcal Aspects of Deep Ecology ' , unpublLshed
1983, 35ff.; referred to as PhLlosophLcal Aspects.
A. N.3 ess, • IntuLtLon, LntrLnsLc value and Deep
201-3; referred to as IntuLtLon.
Ecology',
referred
A SUMMary.
paper,
EcologLst
14,
Oslo,
1984,
A. Naess, Notes on the PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent ' , unpublLshed
paper, Canberra, 1984, 17ff.; referred to as PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology
MoveMent.
A. Naess, 'What Ls basLc to Deep Ecology?', unpublLshed paper,
12ff . ; referred to as BasLc.
A. Naess, A defence of the Deep Ecology
1984, 265-70; referred to as Defence.
MoveMent',
Canberra,
1984,
EnvLronMental EthLcs
A. Naess, 'The paradox of envLronMentalLsM' SyMposLuM ProceedLngs,
(ed.), York UnLversLty, 1984, 57-60; referred to as Paradox.
N.
S,
Everden
A. Naess,
'IdentLfLcatLon as a source of Deep EcologLcal attLtudes', Deep
Ecology, M. TobLas (ed.), Avant Books, San DLego, 1985, s256-70; referred
to as ldentLfLcatLon.
A. Naess,
Notes on Professor Sylvan's crLtLque of the Deep Ecology MoveMent,
unpublLshed paper, Olso, 1985, 19ff.; referred to as Notes on Sylvan.
J. PassMore,
Man's ResponsLb~lLty For Nature, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London, 1980;
-38-
�referred to as PassMore.
A new way to treat the Land', EcoLogLst 14, 1984,
BLoregLonaLLsM
K. Sale,
167-73; referred to as Sale.
the ph~Losoph~cal
and Deep Ecology: A rev~ew of
'shallow
G. Sess~ons,
EcoLogLcaL
(eds.),
Hughes
J.D.
and
Ln R.C. Schultz
unfortune',
UnLvers~ty Press of AMer~ca, ~ash~ngton, D.C., 1981,
Consc~ousness,
391- 4 62; referred to as Sess~ons.
R. Sylvan, A Cr~t~que of Deep Ecology, Research School of SocLaL
AustraLLan Hat~onaL Un~vers~ty, 1985; referred to as Cr~t~que.
ScLences,
Further Read~ngs
R.F. OasMann, Env~ronMentaL Conservat~on, 5th ed., ~LLey, New York, 1984.
A. Leopold, A Sand Country ALManac, CheshLre, New York, 1966.
E. PapadukLs, The Green MoveMent Ln ~est GerMany, Croon HeLM, London, 1984.
-39-
�DEEP ECOLOGY AHO GREEN POLITICS
Deep Ecology Ls an envLronMe~tal theory or platforM wLth polLtLcal
sLgnLfLcant
wLth
pLatforM
i..MplLcatLons. Breen PoLLtLcs Ls a poLi..tLcaL
envLronMentaL LMpLLcatLons. Both arose Ln Large part Ln reactLon to prevaLLLng
envi..ronMentaL practLces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theoretLcal
reflectLon, Green PolLtLcs on practLcaL actLon . Deep
and
LnvestLgatLon
questLoni..ng of the underlyLng doMi,nant attLtudes, seen as the Major source of
ecoL09Lcal and other probLeMs, Led to artLcuLatLon of the Deep EcoLogy pLatforM,
partLy outLi..ned Ln ·slogan" forM Ln the foLLowi..ng tabLe.
).
TABLE 1.
DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH DOMINANT ATT ITIJOES
DOMINANT ATTITUDES [OOMIHAHT PARADIGM]
DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EHVIRONMEHTAL PARADIGM]
OoMi..nati..on over Nature
Nature a Resource; IntrLnsLc
VaLue confi..ned to HuMans
NaturaL EnvLronMent VaLued for
Itself; Bi..ocentri..c EgaLi..tari..ani..sM
AMp Le Reso1J rces/Subs t i.. tu tes
Earth SuppLLes Li..MLted
MaterLaL EconoMLc Growth
a predoMLnant goaL
Non-MaterLaL GoaLs, especLaLLy
SeLf-ReaLi..zati..on
ConsuMer i,sM
DoLng wLth Enough/RecycLLng
CoMpetLti..ve Li..festyLe
Cooperati..ve Li..feway
CentraLLzed/ Urban Centred/
Hati..onaL focus
Decentral.i..zed/ Bi..oregi..onaL/
Nei..ghbourhood focus
Power structure Hi..erarchLcaL
Non-h i,erarch Lea L/ Grass roots
DeMocrac!::I
HLgh TechnoL09y
Appropri..ate Technology
Whi..Le Deep Ecol.og!::j grew froM the work of one envLronMentaL phi..Losopher
(Naess Ln 1872), Green PolLtLcs arose (Ln West GerMany sLnce 1876) froM the
synthesLs of several. MoveMents - ecol.09!::j, cLtLzens, aLternatLve, peace and other
MoveMents. The pLatforM of Green PoLLtLcs, whLch Ls buLLt around four pLLLars
socLaL responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy , and non-vLoLence
ecology,
refLects these orLgLns.
The fLrst of these pLLLars, ecoLog!::j, Ls based on the sLMpLe theMe that
LLMLted ecoLogi..caL systeMs cannot sustai..n unLi..MLted econoMi..c growth, or such
questi..onabLe types of growth as nucLear power, wi..thout serLous rLsk of daMage
and degeneratLon. The Green aLM Ls to Move to S!::jsteMs of producti..on and
consuMptLon whLch MaLntai..n and restore natural processes and C!::fCLes rather than
doMLnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wLth nature. The second pi..LLar
of Green PoLLtLcs, socLaL responsLbLLLt!::j, LMpLLes opposi..tLon to the LnequaLLti..es
i..n power and doMLnati..on reLati..onshi..ps of present soci..ety, and reMovaL of
di..scri..Mi..nati..on, econoMLc hardshi..p and exploi..tati..on, both regi..onally and as
regards the ThLrd ~orLd. The Green aLM - to be achi..eved pri..Mari..Ly froM below,
Ls to bui..ld stable and just soci..al
through those adversely affected
arrangeMents, wLth coMprehensLve deMocrati..c rLghts and freedoMs (both i..n 6erMan~
-1-
�and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd WorLd). These changes are to be
brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased
reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and
coordLnatLon of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (Local, COMMunLty and dLstrLct) whi..ch
are gLven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of :
referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and
fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpli..es the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve
practLces, not Merely by More powerful people, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups
and states, and also, More posLtLveLy, acti..ve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of
socLal protest, resLstance and defence . The coMpatLbLlLty of Means wLth ends
serves here as an LMportant underlyLng prLncLple: that a just, non-vLolent,
huMane end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vi..oLent, LnhuMane
Means . • l
Gr een PolLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLal change, whLch
LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecologLcalLy focussed Deep Ecology platforM as a
quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of
The
strand.
LMportant
MoveMents of whLch Deep Ecology represents one
Lnter-relatLons are shown pLctorLaLly at the second level of the foLlowLng
12
dLagraM:
DIAGRAM 1.
DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IM PLACE
p
B
\ '\
I
2C ]
~
Oer Lva ti..on
Di,recti,on
2+
ExpLanatLon
Oi,recti..on
2. Deep Ecology pLatforM
2C. ReforMLst envLronMentaL
2
p1Jsi.. t i.,Qn
2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of
Green pLatforM
-/
//'
;/
e.g. Buddhi..st (B), ChrLstLan
(C) and (Eco)-PhLLosophLc
(P) ultLMate bases
j
/
-\,r -
[
1. Deep Ecology fundaMentaLs;
C
\
\
\
3.
s
\
General norMs and theMes ,
substanti,ally derLved
froM pl,atforM
PartLcuLar norMs and
concrete decLsLons ,
appLyLng to reLevant
practLcal sLtuatLons.
The ecologLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not go very deep; Lt May
on l y be based upon reforM envLronMentalLsM (or shallow ecology as i,t used to be
I
Starred notes LndLcate poi..nts at wh i..ch readLngs wi..th the correspondLng nuMbers
May be Lnserted or undertaken .
-2-
�caLLed), whLch aLM3 to reforM 30Me of the wor3t abuse3 and exces3e3 of the
doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross poLLutLon, extensLve despoLLatLon of Land and
Lakes and oceans, LLttLe thought for the future, MLstreatMent of anLMals, etc_
On shaLlow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltself, but as a resource,
that Ls LnstruMentalLy, for what Lt can be used for by huMans_ By contrast, Deep
Ecology argues (e_g_ froM preMLsses of Level I) that the envLronMent Ls
LntrLnsLcaLLy valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that,
furtherMore,
LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted_ ThLs projectLon of
egsLLtarLan or LMpartLalLty prLncLpLes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the
whole of lLfe Ln the natural worLd, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtle, BLocentrLc
EgalLtarLanLsM_ The prLncLple, not part of Green PoLLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most
controversLal of the central prLncLpLes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe
substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value
beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to expLaLn how value Ls
dLstrLbuted_ Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLon through what Ls
.
.
presented as a core deMocracy ~n the bLosphere . _•3
Deep Ecology grew out of a phLlosophLcal deepenLng of the new features of
the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run
of reductLonLst scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes;
systeMs whLch are More than the suM of theLr atoMLstLc parts; eMergent eleMents,
lLke lLfe, organLsatLon, etc_ )_ Deep Ecology quLckLy aLLLed Ltself wLth the
subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcuLar, the eMphasLs on the
lLMLts, and ultLMate faLlure of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and
phLlosophy_ WLth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surprLsLng that there Ls lLttle
dLrectLy about such MaLn pLllars of Green PolLtLcs as socLaL responsLbLLLty and
non-vLoLence Ln the pLatforM of Deep Ecology- However Deep Ecology Ls coMpatLbLe
wLth these Green pLlLar prLncLpLes, and Lndeed perMLts theLr derLvatLon_ ~hat Ls
supposed to resuLt are generaL norMs, LLke No exploLtatLon, No subjectLon, No
vLoLence, at leveL 3_ (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLoLence prLncLpLe froM tne
Deep Ecology prLncLpLe of MaxLMLzLng Self-reaLLsatLon Ls atteMpted by Naess Ln
the fraMework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLLosophy)_•l
A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan reLatLons wLth the
natural envLronMent, away froM doMLnant expLoLtatLve practLces_ The naturaL
envLronMent coMprLses LteMs of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng huMans (who are not
above or separate froM Lt), and accordLn9ly Ls to be treated wLth the care and
respect valuable LteMs warrant, and not LrresponsLbLy_ Thus Lt would be contrary
to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued LteMs vLolently
whLch
however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do (consLder such
wLdespread phenoMena as "rape of the envLronMent", "of the Land", "of the
forestsu)_ SLnce huMans are not apart froM or superLor to nature, Lt follows
froM the Deep Ecology pLatforM that natural and proper relatLons also exclude
vLoLence towards other huMans or classes of huMans_
Because Lt covers a pluraLLty of posLt~ons, LncludLng shaLLow ecoLogLcaL
posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More aMelLoratLve and reforMLst Ln character
than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further reMoved froM doMLnant attLtudes, More
hardLLne, and More radLcaL_ ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMentaLs, and
focusses on Ldeals and theory, Green PolLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal
polLtLcal probleMs of an envLronMental or socLal kLnd, such as acLd raLn or
rLver pollutLon or MLssLle deplo8Ment, and (lLke the Peace MoveMent Ln
AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLpLes or
wor~Lng out an env~ronMentaL (or peace) ph~Losophy_ Because of Lts envLronMentaL
depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural
envLronMent Lssues, such as wLlderness, rare specLes, and
the
radLcal
-3-
�transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL
MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach.
Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous
Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMa9Ln9 LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLolence
and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of
the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcal actLon,
LncLudLn9 typLcal protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLolence also
LMplLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary pra~tLces, socLal defence.
WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLolent Methods and socLal
defence, other Lesser factLons hold that force Ls necessary to brLn9 about
varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes.
The Deep EcoLogy platforM Lncludes severaL prLncLpLes that would be
recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLples
(whLch however, unlLke BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM, would not be wLdeLy opposed by
reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of
MaxLMLzLng SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of self-realLsatLon of varLous relLgLous
posLtLons, of the full unfoldLng and developMent of the person, Ls vastly
expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to Lnclude brLngLng to fuLl fruLtLon not MereLy one's
own person, but all that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded Self, whLch
Ls taken to be not Merely one's faMLLy or feLlows or fellow natLonals, nor
Merely ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whole huMan race, but the whole naturaL
1
systeM.
The SeLf-realLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened
personal self-Lnterest prLncLple, has an excellent phLlosophLcaL pedLgree (at
Least as applLed to huMans or neL9hbourLn9 classes of huMans). Thus rather than
beLng argued for, a dLffLcult Matter Ln the case of ultLMate prLncLples, SeLfrealLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLlosophLcal or reLLgLous posLtLons at
Level 1 of the double pyraMLd, froM those that help sustaLn Deep Ecology.
However the expansLon Lnvolved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow self to
coMprehensLve Self, severs the usual justLfLcatory lLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy
one's self-Lnterests wLth those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed
LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder
reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan
Self, Nature personLfLed
prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc.
Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcal and
spLrLtual ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the
16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the slogan
slogan, USLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln endsn.
are those concernLng what kLnd of technology one uses and where one lLves
(the Matter of dwellLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent value and the lLke), what and
how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around
of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have
MaxLMLzatLon
eMphasLsed both MaterLal goals and MaterLal Means, partLcuLarly personal
consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for
envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyles are approprLate? Deep Ecology,
LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLal and spLrLtuaL ends and
eMphasLzes the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLlabLe. The result, of course,
Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, do~ng wLth enough, and,
More 9enerall8, practLces whLch lLe lLght on the Land and the naturaL world. In
way of d0Ln9 thLngs, these wLLL be Lnte9rated (Ln
~ properly ecoLogLcaL
syMbLotLc and other naturaL styles) wLth the natural systeMs LnvoLved, workLng
wLth rather than agaLnst the natural fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL
approprLate to regLonaL
wLLl accordLngly be ecoregLonaL
arrangeMents,
17
to be caLLed.
coMe
have
they
as
bLore9LonaL,
ecoL09LcaL 9roupLn9s - or
-4-
�ApproprLate Means LncLude, Ln turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce
and theory of Deep Ecology- HLgh technoL09Les such as nuclear power are not
approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLaL socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of
the envLronMentaL and socLaL costs and rLsks such technoLogLcaL forMs LMpose_ On
both deep and green percept i,ons, wh-3 t Ls requ Lred a re re LLab Le c-:1 ref u L
technoLogLes whLch are not ecoLogLcaLLy daMa9Ln9 or socLaLLy rLsky or otherwLse
undesLrabLe; but the technoLogi,es adl"li,tted wLLl dLffer accordLng to the
prLncLpLes of the posLtLons they answer back to (e_g_ farMLng technLques wLLL
need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLLLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such
prLncLpLes as bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM )_ In each case the practLcaL use of
approprLate technoLogy faLLs at the bottoM, actLon Level, of the doubLe
pyral"I ,,"d _•8
WhLLe Deep Ecology suppLLes an appeaLLng bLueprLnt for dLfferent socLaL and
LLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed Land reached? A MaLn part
of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLaL feature of Deep
Ecology: EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of
other oLder LdeoLogLes (e_g_ of reLL9Lous, or of revoLutLonary, conscLousness)_
What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtuaL or LdeoLogLcaL conversLon Ls agaLn broadened
froM the personaL and socLaL to coMprehend the fuLL envLronMentaL predLcaMent_
In thLs expLanatLon, of how peopLe get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and
Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper
explanatory prLncLpLes_ A thorough conversLon process LnvoLves eLevatLon to the
top LiveL, spLrLtuaL transcendence of the daLLy econoMLc and poLLtLcaL actLon
LeveL. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology
wLLL be put Ln place, LLke Green PoLLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures_
LLke the fundaMentaL sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes
practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at
EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness_ SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and
conteMpLatLon, are derLved frol"I the fundaMentaL sources_ But other Methods whLch
extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecoLogLcaL experLence, LncLude value
seeLng thLngs dLfferentLy, and
reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon
of other thLngs - Connected wLth
weLL-beLng
and
worth
the
coMLng to apprecLate
goes a hoLLstLc shLft Ln
theM,
these wLdened experLentLaL bases, and LnforMLng
vaLues and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon , affordLng dLrect LLnkage
wLth parts and whoLes of the natural worLd_•IO By these Methods, a person May
coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the reaL world, a convert to Deep
Ecology, a feLLow and advocate of Lts Messages and LLfe-ways.
ESSAY QUESTIONS
}_ To what extent do Green PoLLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and
address the sal"le probLel"ls? CrLtLcaLLy coMpare and contrast theLr proposals,
especLaLLy as regards the naturaL and the buLLt envLronMent_
2_ Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four Levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to
expLaLn carefuLLy the LnterreLatLons aMong
PoLLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probLeMatLc scheMe?
these
Levels.
Where
does
Green
Ln prLncLpLe" appears as a key theMe of Deep
Eco~ogy. Cri.tLcaLLy assess Lts adequacy_ Shouldn't Green PoLLtLcs LncLude such a
pri.nci.pLe?
3_ ·sLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM -
Non-vLo~ence an unstated pr~nc~p~e of Deep Ecoiog~? Expia~n why Deep
Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLoLence to the degree i.t Ls? In your answers take
account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLcti.ons between the use of
I+-
1:5
-5-
�vLolence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vLolence Ln
nature; LLL. the need for coercLve Methods to preserve the natural envLronMent.
5. What justLfLes expandLng self-realLsatLo n to Self-realLsatLo n? ExpLaLn the
MeanLng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLLsatL on for Deep EcoLogy and dLscuss Lts
adequacy. Why does Lt not feature Ln Green PolLtLcs?
6. ExplaLn the MeanLng of the delLberateLy vague slogan °SLMple Ln Means, rLch
Ln ends", or of soMe other hLgh-LMpact sLogan of Deep EcoLogy. IndLcate how the
vagueness MLght work for and a9aLnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be
alternatLve LnterpretatLon s, and LndLcate soMe of the
suggest
applLed,
aLternatLves.
these
of
raMLfLcatLons
7. OutLLne bLoregLonalLsM , LndLcatLng what practLcaL envLronMentaL probLeMs bLoregLonalLsM Lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bLoregLonalLsM derLved froM Deep EcoLogy?
ConsLder to what extent bLoregLonalLsM fLts wLth the sLogan, ·rhLnk globally,
act locally·.
8. Is More hLgh technology an unprobLeMatLc solutLon to deeper, or to any,
envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vLews of Deep Ecology and Green
PoLLtLcs on the role of varLous types of technoLogy.
9. What Ls Ecolo9Lcal ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for
Deep Ec0Lo9y? If Lt Ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green
PoLLtLcs?
A reLatLonaL, total-fLeLd LMa9e of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been
quLetLy oMLtted froM the orLgLnaL pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt
pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated?
10.
-6-
�
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DEEP ECOLOOY AHO OREEH POLITICS
Deep Ecology ts an envtronMentaL theory or pLatforM wtth poLtttcaL
stgntftcant
wtth
pLatforM
LMpLtcattons. Green PoLtttcs ts a poLtttcaL
envtronMentaL LMpLtcattons. Both arose tn Large part tn reactton to prevatLtng
envtronMentaL practtces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theorettcaL
refLectton, Green PoLtttcs on practtcaL actton. Deep
and
tnvesttgatton
questtontng of the underLytng doMtnant attttudes, seen as the Major source of
ecoLogtcaL and other probLeMs, Led to arttcuLatton of the Deep Ecology pLatforM,
partly outLtned tn "slogan" forM tn the foLLowtng table.
TABLE 1.
DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED ~ITH OOMIHAHT ATTITUDES
OOMrnAtn ATT HUDES (OOMrnAtH PARADIGM]
DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EttV IROHMEHTAL PARADIGM]
Hature a Resource; Intrtnstc
Value conftned to HuMans
Natural EnvtronMent Valued for
ltseLt; Btocentrtc E9aLttartantsM
MatertaL EconoMtc Growth
a predoMtnant goaL
Hon-MatertaL Goals, espectaLLy
ConsuMertsM
Dotng wtth Enough/RecycLtng
CoMpettttve LtfestyLe
Cooperattve Ltfeway
CentraLtzed/ Urban Centred/
DecentraLtzed/ Btoregtonat/ ·
Hetghbourhood focus
tia t Lona L focus
SeLf-ReaLtzatton
Power structure HterarchtcaL
Hon-hterarchtcaL/ Grassroots
DeMocracy
Htgh Technology
Approprtate Technology
~htLe Deep Ecology grew froM the work of one envtronMentaL phtLosopher
(Haess tn 1972), Green PoLtttcs arose (tn ~est GerMany stnce 1976) froM the
synthests of several MoveMents - ecology, ctttzens, aLternattve, peace and other
MoveMents. The platforM of Green PoLtttcs, whtch ts butlt around four ptllars
soctaL responstbtltty, grassroots deMocracy, and non-vtoLence
ecology,
reflects these ortgtns.
The ftrst of these ptLLars, ecology, ts based on the stMpLe theMe that
LtMtted ecoLogtcaL systeMs cannot sustatn unltMtted econoMtc growth, or such
questtonabLe types of growth as nuclear power, wtthout sertous rtsk of daMage
and degeneratton. The Green atM ts to Move to systeMs of productlon and
consuMptton whtch Matntatn and restore natural processes and cycles rather than
doMtnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wtth nature. The second ptllar
of Green Poltttcs, soctal responstbtltty, tMpLtes opposttton to the tnequaltttes
tn power and doMtnatton relattonshtps of present soctety, and reMovaL of
dtscrtMtnatton, econoMtc hardshtp and explottatton, both regtonaLly and as
regards the Thtrd ~orld. The Green atM - to be achteved prtMartly froM below,
ts to butLd stable and just soctaL
through those adversely affected
arrangeMents, wtth coMprehenstve deMocrattc rtghts and freedoMs (both tn GerMany
-1-
and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd ~orLd). These changes are to be
brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased
reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and
coordLnatLon .of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (LocaL, coMMunLty and dLstrLct) whLch
are 9Lven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of
referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and
fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpLLes the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve
practLces, not MereLy by More powerfuL peopLe, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups
and states, and aLso, More posLtLveLy, actLve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of
socLaL protest, resLstance and defence. The coMpatLbLLLty of Means wLth ends
serves here as an LMportant underLyLng prLncLpLe: that a just, non-vLoLent,
huMane• end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vLoLent, LnhuMane
Means. 1
Green PoLLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLaL change, whLch
LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecoLogLcaLLy focussed Deep EcoLogy pLatforM as a
quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of
MoveMents of whLch Deep EcoLogy represents one
LMportant
strand.
The
Lnter-reLatLons are shown pLctorLaLLy at the second LeveL of the foLLowLng
12
dLagraM:
DIAGRAM l.
DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IN PLACE
B
p
1. Deep EcoLogy fundaMentaLs;
e.g. BuddhLst (B), ChrLstLan
(C) and (Eco)-Phi.LosophLc
(P) uLtLMate bases
C
I
2
Exp Lana.t Lon
DLrecti.on
2. Deep Ecology platforM
2C . ReforMi.st envLronMental
posi.ti.on
2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of
Green platforM
Der Lvat Lon
Di.recti.on
j
3 . . General norMs and theMes,
substantLaLLy derLved
froM pLatforM
~- PartLcular norMs and
concrete decLsLons,
applyi.ng to relevant
practLcaL sLtuatLons .
The ecoLogLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not 90 very deep; Lt May
onLy be based upon reforM envLronMentaLLsM (or shaLLow ecoLogy as Lt used to be
• Starred notes LndLcate poLnts at whLch readLngs wLth the correspondLng nuMbers
May be Lnserted or undertaken.
-2-
catted), whLch aLMs to reforM soMe of the worst abuses and excesses of the
doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross pottutLon, extensLve despotLatLo n of land and
takes and oceans, tLttte thought for the future, MLstreatMen t of anLMals, etc.
On shallow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltsetf, but as a resource,
that Ls LnstruMent atty, for what Lt can be used for by huMans. By contrast, Deep
Ecology argues (e.g. froM preMLsses of level I) that the envLronMent Ls
LntrLnsLcat ty valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that,
LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted . ThLs projectLon of
furtherr,ore ,
egatLtarLan or Lr,partLatLt y prLncLptes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the
whole of tLfe Ln the natural world, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtte, BLocentrLc
EgalLtarLanL sM. The prLncLple, not part of Green PolLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most
controversL al of the central prLncLptes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe
substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value
beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to explaLn how value Ls
dLstrLbuted . Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLo n through what Ls
' •3
.
presented as a ' core der,ocracy Ln the b~osphere .
Deep Ecology grew out of a phLtosophL cal dP~penLng of the new features of
the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run
of reductLonLs t scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes;
systeMs whLch are More than the sur, of theLr ator,LstLc parts; eMergent eler,ents,
tLke lLfe, organLsatLo n, etc.). Deep Ecology quLckly allLed Ltself wLth the
subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcutar, the eMphasLs on the
lLMLts, and ultLMate faLture of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and
phLlosophy. ~Lth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surpr~s~ng that there Ls lLttle
dLrectty about such r,aLn pLllars of Green PotLtLcs as socLal responsLbLl Lty and
non-vLotenc e Ln the platforM of Deep Ecology. However Deep Ecology Ls cor,patLble
wLth these Green pLllar prLncLptes, and Lndeed perr,Lts theLr derLvatLon. ~hat Ls
supposed to result are general norMs, lLke Ho exploLtatLo n, Ho subjectLon, Ho
vLolence, at level 3. (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLolenc e prLncLple froM the
Deep Ecology prLncLple of r,axLMLzLng Self-realLs atLon Ls atter,pted by Haess Ln
the frar,ework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLloso phy).•~
A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan relatLons wLth the
natural envLronMen t, away froM doMLnant exploLtatLv e practLces. The natural
envLronr,ent coMprLses Lter,s of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng hur,ans (who are not
above or separate fror, Lt), and accordLngty Ls to be treated wLth the care and
respect valuable Lter,s warrant, and not LrresponsLb ly. Thus Lt would be contrary
whLch
to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued Lter,s vLolently
such
(consLder
however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do
wLdespread phenor,ena as "rape of the envLronMen t", ·of the land", •of the
forests"). SLnce hur,ans are not apart fror, or superLor to nature, Lt follows
froM the Deep Ecology platforr, that natural and proper relatLons also exclude
vLolence towards other hur,ans or classes of huMans.
Because Lt covers a pluralLty of posLtLons, LncludLng shallow ecologLcal
posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More ar,elLoratLv e and reforMLst Ln character
than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further rer,oved froM dor,Lnant attLtudes, More
hardLLne, and r,ore radLcat. ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMenta ts, and
focusses on Ldeats and theory, Green PotLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal
poLLtLcat probler,s of an envLronr,en tat or socLat kLnd, such as acLd raLn or
rLver pottutLon or MLssLte deptoyMent, and (LLke the Peace Mover,ent Ln
AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLples or
workLng out an envLronMen tat (or peace) phLtosophy. Because of Lts envLronMen tal
depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural
-3-
radLcaL
the
envLronMent Lssues, such as wLLderness, rare specLes, and
transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL
MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach.
Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous
Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMagLng LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLoLence
and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of
the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcaL actLon,
LncLudLng typLcaL protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLoLence aLso
LMpLLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary practLces, socLaL defence.
WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLoLent Methods and socLaL
defence, other Lesser factLons hoLd that force Ls necessary to brLng about
varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes.
The Deep EcoLogy pLatforM LncLudes severaL prLncLpLes that wouLd be
recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLpLes
(whLch however, unLLke BLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM, wouLd not be wLdeLy opposed by
reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of
MaxLML2Ln9 SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of seLf-reaLLsatLon of varLous reLLgLous
posLtLons, of the fuLL unfoLdLng and deveLopMent of the person, Ls vastLy
expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to LncLude brLngLng to fuLL fruLtLon not MereLy one's
own person, but aLL that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded SeLf, whLch
Ls taken to be not MereLy one's faMLLy or feLLows or feLLow natLonaLs, nor
MereLy ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whoLe huMan race, but the whoLe naturaL
1
systeM.
The SeLf-reaLLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened
personaL seLf-Lnterest prLncLpLe, has an exceLLent phLLosophLcaL pedLgree (at
Least as appLLed to huMans or neLghbourLng cLasses of huMans). Thus rather than
beLng argued for, a dLffLcuLt Matter Ln the case of uLtLMate prLncLpLes, SeLfreaLLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLLosophLcaL or reLLgLous posLtLons at
LeveL I of the doubLe pyraMLd, froM those that heLp sustaLn Deep EcoLogy.
However the expansLon LnvoLved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow seLf to
coMprehensLve SeLf, severs the usuaL justLfLcatory LLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy
one's seLf-Lnterests wLth · those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed
LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder
reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan
SeLf, Nature personLfLed
prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc.
Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcaL and
spLrLtuaL ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the
16
AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the sLogan
sLogan, "SLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends".
one uses and where one LLves
technoLogy
of
are those concernLng what kLnd
(the Matter of dweLLLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent vaLue and the LLke), what and
how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around
of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have
MaxLML2atLon
eMphasLsed both MaterLaL goaLs and MaterLaL Means, partLcuLarLy personaL
consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for
envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyLes are approprLate? Deep EcoLogy,
LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLaL and spLrLtuaL ends and
eMphasL2es the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLLabLe. The resuLt, of course,
Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, doLng wLth enough, and,
More generaLLy, practLces whLch LLe LLght on the Land and the naturaL worLd. In
a properLy ecoLogLcaL way of doLng thLngs, these wLLL be Lntegrated (Ln
syMbLotLc and other naturaL styLes) wLth the naturaL systeMs LnvoLved, workLng
wLth rather than agaLnst the naturaL fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL
approprLate to regLonaL
wLLL accordLngLy be ecoregLonaL
arrangeMents,
-4-
ecologtcal grouptngs - or btoregtonal, as they have coNe to be called. • 7
Approprtate Means tnclude, tn turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce
and theory .of Deep Ecology. HLgh technologLes such as nuclear power are not
approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLal socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of
the envLronMental and socLal costs and rLsks such technologLcal forMs LMpose. On
both deep and green perceptLons, what Ls requLred are relLable careful
technologLes whLch are not ecologLcally daMagLng or socLally rLsky or otherwLse
undesLrable; but the technologLes adMLtted wLll dLffer accordLng to the
prLncLples of the posLtLons they answer back to (e.g . farMLng technLques wLlt
need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLtLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such
prLncLptes as bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM). In each case the practLcat use of
approprLate technology falls at the bottoM, actLon level, of the double
. •a
pyraN~d.
WhLle Deep Ecology supplLes an appeatLng blueprLnt for dLfferent socLal and
lLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed land reached? A MaLn part
of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLal feature of Deep
Ecology: EcologLcal ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of
other older LdeologLes (e.g. of relLgLous, or of revolutLonary, conscLousness).
What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtual or LdeologLcal conversLon Ls agaLn broadened
froM the personal and socLat to coMprehend the full envLronMental predLcaMent.
In thLs explanatLon, of how people get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and
Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper
explanatory prLncLples. A thorough conversLon process Lnvolves elevatLon to the
top livet, spLrLtuat transcendence of the daLly econoMLc and polLtLcat actLon
level. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology
wLlt be put Ln place, lLke Green PolLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures.
LLke the fundaMental sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes
practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at
EcologLcal ConscLousness. SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and
conteMptatLon, are derLved froM the fundaMental sources. But other Methods whLch
extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecologLcat experLence, Lnclude value
reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon
seeLng thLngs dLfferently, and
coMLng to apprecLate the worth and well-beLng of other thLngs. Connected wLth
these wLdened experLentLal bases, and LnforMLng theM, goes a holLstLc shLft Ln
values and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon, affordLng dLrect lLnkage
wLth parts and wholes of the natural world. •IO By these Methods, a person May
coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the real world, a convert to Deep
Ecology , a fellow and advocate of Lts Messages and lLfe-ways .
ESSAY QUESTIOHS
I. To what extent do Green PolLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and
address the saMe probleMs? CrLtLcally coMpare and contrast theLr proposa l s,
especLally as regards the natural and the buLlt envLronMent.
2. Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four, levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to
explaLn carefully the LnterrelatLons aMong these levels. Uhere does Green
PolLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probleMatLc scheMe?
3 . "BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM - Ln prLncLple appears as a key theMe of Deep
Ecology. CrLtLcally assess Lts adequacy. Shouldn't Green PolLtLcs Lnctude such a
prLncLpte?
4. Is Non-vLolence an unstated prLncLple of Deep Ecology? ExplaLn why Deep
Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLolence to the degree Lt Ls? In your answers . take
-5-
\
account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLctLons between the use of
vLoLence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vloLence Ln
nature; ttt. the need for coerclve Methods to preserve the natural envtronMent.
5. Uhat justlfLes expandLng _seLf-reallsatLon to SeLf-reaLlsatlon? ExpLaLn the
Meanlng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLlsatLon for Deep Ecology and dLscuss Lts
adequacy. Uhy does lt not feature ln Green PolLtlcs?
6. ExpLaLn the MeanLng of the deLLberateLy vague slogan ·slMple ln Means, rlch
ln ends·, or of soMe other hlgh-lMpact slogan of Deep Ecology. Indlcate how the
vagueness Mlght work for and agalnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be
alternatLve LnterpretatLons, and lndlcate soMe of the
suggest
applled,
alternattves.
these
of
raMLflcatlons
7. OutLlne btoregtonaLL3M, lndlcatlng what practlcaL envlronMental probleMs bloreglonallsM lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bloreglonallsM derlved froM Deep Ecology?
Conslder to what extent bloregLonallsM fLts wLth the slogan, •Thlnk globally,
act LocaLly".
deeper, or to any,
envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vlews of Deep Ecology and Green
PolLtLcs on the role of varlous types of technology.
8~ Is More hLgh technology an unprobleMatLc
soLutLon
to
9. Uhat Ls EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for
Deep Ecology? If Lt ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green
PoLltlcs?
10. A reLatlonaL, total-fLeLd LMage of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been
quletLy oMLtted froM the orLglnal pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt
pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated?
READINGS
1:
DEEP ECOLOGY AND GREEN POLITICS
The Greens consLder theMseLves the poLltLcal voLce of the cLtLzens' MoveMents, that Ls, ecology, antl-nuclear-power, peace, feMLnLst, and others. Most
MeMbers of the Green party are also actLvLsts Ln one or More of those MoveMents,
and thLs dLverse orLentatLon Ls reflected Ln the wLngs, or factLons, of the
party: the vLslonary/hollstlc Greens, the Eco-Greens, the peace-MoveMent Greens,
and the radlcal-Left Greens. A great deaL of overlapplng occurs wlth any categor~z~ng of Green LdentltLes and soMe people say there are no actual factlons,
but clearly there are dtfferent prtorltLes aMong the four clusters.
The More that people perceLved the LnterconnectLons aMong prLncLpLes of
ecologLcaL wlsdoM, a truly secure peace, an econoMy wLth a future, and a
partLcLpatory deMocracy wLth power channeled dLrectly froM the grassroots Level,
the More they notLces the absence of such LdeaLs aMong the exLsttng poLLtlcaL
partles.
[Green] pollcLes are gutded by long-terM v~s~ons for the future and are
founded on four basLc prLncLples: ecology, socLal responsLbLLLty, grassroots
deMocracy, and nonvLoLence.
The fLrst of the ·four pLLlars, • ecology, has several MeanLngs Ln Green
poLLtLcs. Green poLLtLcs, Ls Lnherently hoLLstLc Ln theory and practLce. It Ls
based on ecoLogLcal, or ·network·, thLnkLng, a terM used frequently by the
Greens. EcoLogLcaL thLnkLng also Lncludes the realLzatLon that the seeMLngLy
-6-
rtgtd structures we percetve Ln our envLronMent are actually ManLfestatLons of
underlytng processes, of nature's contLnual dynaMLc flux. Interrelatedness and
ongoLng process are the lessons the Greens take froM and apply to the ecosysteMs
surroundLng us. They support •soft" energy productLon (such as solar power) that
works wLth the cycles of the sun, the water, and the wLnd, and the flow of the
rLvers. They call for the developMent of approprLate technology that reflects
our Lnterdependence wLth the Earth. They advocate regeneratLve agrLculture that
replenLshes the soLl and Lncorporates natural Means of pest control. Above all,
the Greens deMand a halt to our ravagLng of natural "resources" and our poLsonLng of the bLosphere through the duMpLng of toxLc wastes, the accuMulatLon of
so-called acceptable levels of radLatLon exposure, and the pollutLon of the aLr.
The broader applLcatLons of ecologLcal thLnkLng lead to ·socLal ecology,
the perceptton of soctetal structures and huMan Lnteracttons as an Lntrtcate web
of dynaMLc systeMs that are sLMultaneously Lnterrelated parts and coMplete Ln
theMselves. That eMphasLs on relatLonshLps and Lnterconnecttons Ls the basts of
the
Greens'
ecologtcal work that focuses specLfLcally on envLronMental
protectLon. TheLr prograMs Ln thts area call for huMans to ftnd our place Ln the
ecosysteMs:
~e defLne ecologLcal polLtLcs as those Measures that understand huMan betngs
and our envLronMent as beLng part of nature. HuMan lLfe, too, Ls eMbedded Ln
the lLfe cycles of the ecosysteMs; we Lnterfere wLth our actLons and thLs,
Ln turn, acts back on us. ~e Must not destroy the stabLlLty of the ecosysteMs. In partLcular, ecologtcal polLtLcs presents an all-encoMpassLng rejectLon of an econoMy of exploLtatLon and plunderLng of natural resources
and raw MaterLals, as well as the destructLve LnterventLon Lnto the cycles
of nature's household.
The second of the four pLllars, ·soctal responsLbLlLty, • Ls understood by
Most Greens to Mean socLal justLce and assurance that the poor and the workLng
class wLll not get hurt by prograMs to restructure the econoMy and our consuMer
socLety ecologtcally.
The radLcal-left Greens, however, read sozLal as a codeword for socLalLsM,
that Ls, deMocratLc MarxLsM~ SLnce that polLtLcal Model Ls specLfLcally not what
the vLsLonary, lLberal and conservatLve Greens have Ln MLnd, a battle developed
over establLshLng the basLc prLncLples. The MajorLty wanted the new party to
stand for possLbLlLtLes other than etther socLalLsM or the capLtalLst status
quo. The radLcal-left contLngent, on the other hand, LnsLsted on not only
Lncludtng socLalLsM but also on excludLng nonvLolence as a guLdLng prLncLple.
So one of the four pLllars, lLke so Much else Ln the Green party, has a
paradoxLcal character: Lt Means soMethLng dLfferent Ln dLfferent parts of the
party. All factLons of the party concur that socLal, econoMLc and ecologLcal
Lssues are Lnherently lLnked. The ecologLcal and socLal spheres belong Lnseparably together: the econoMy of nature Ls ltnked to the econoMy of huMans for
better or worse .
The thLrd pLllar, grassroots deMocracy, was LnspLred by the ~est GerMan
cLtLzens' MoveMents throughout the 1970s, whLch Ln turn were Lnfluenced by the
cLvLl rLghts, ecology, consuMer, and other MoveMents ~n the Un~ted States.
OLrect, or partLcLpatory, deMocracy locates a greater aMount of power and
control wLth the local groups, the grassroots. ThLs orLentatLon ~nforMs the
structure of the Green party. An organLzatLon structured wtth partLcLpatory
deMocracy sets Lts basLc polLcy accordLng to the votLng at large asseMblLes. It
allows LndLvLduals access to all party offLcLals, and Lt eschews hLerarchLcal
structure. Instead of allowtng power to be concentrated Ln a few people who
-7-
reMaLn at the top of a hLerarchy for years, such groups generally elect steerLng
coMMLttees.
The fourth pLllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both
personal vLolence and •structural vLolence, • that Ls, vLolence and oppress Lon
LMposed by the state and by LnstLtutLons. (See ReadLng 4; Green PolLtLcs,
pp.3-4, 29-43)
The tenets of [the Deep Ecology] MoveMent Nay perhaps be roughly forNulated
as follows: (1) The well-beLng of nonhuMan lLfe on Earth has value Ln Ltself.
ThLs value Ls Lndependent of any LnstruNental usefulness for LLMLted huNan
purposes. (2) RLchness and dLversLty Ln lLfe forMs contrLbute to thLs value and
Lnterfere
Ls a further value Ln Ltself. (3) HuMans have no rLght to
destructLvely wLth nonhuMan lLfe except for purposes of satLsfyLng vLtal needs.
(4) Present Lnterference Ls excessLve and detrLMental. (5) Present polLcLes Must
therefore be changed. (6) The necessary polLcy changes affect basLc econoMLc and
LdeologLcal structures and wLll be the More drastLc the longer Lt takes before
sLgnLfLcant change Ls started. (7) The LdeologLcal change Ls MaLnly that of
apprecLatLng lLfe qualLty (focusLng on sLtuatLons LnvolvLng Lnherent. value). (8)
Those who subscrLbe to the foregoLng poLnts have an oblLgatLon dLrectly or
LndLrectly to try to LMpleMent the necessary changes. (Defence, p.266)
It should be fully apprecLated that the sLgnLfLcant tenets of the Deep
Ecology MoveMent are clearly and forcefully norMatLve. They express a value
prLorLty systeM only Ln part based on results (or lack of results) of scLentLfLc
research. Today, ecologLsts try to Lnfluence polLcy-MakLng bodLes largely
resource
and
through threats, through predLctLons concernLng pollutants
depletLon, knowLng that polLcy-Makers accept at least certaLn MLnLMUM norMs
concernLng health and just dLstrLbutLon. There are polLtLcal potentLals Ln thLs
MoveNent whLch should not be overlooked and whLch have lLttle to do wLth
pollutLon and resource depletLon. In plottLng possLble futures, the norMs should
be freely used and elaborated. (Shallow and Oeep 1
p.99)
A Major dLfference between the theorLes lLes Ln the dLstrLbutLon of values.
Deep ecology, lLke sLMpler utLlLtarLanLsM, offers a unLque LnLtLal dLstrLbutLon:
each lLvLng thLng Ls assLgned equal value and nothLng else has LntrLnsLc value.
Value Ls assessed through soMe MLx of value-NakLng characterLstLcs, LncludLng
such defeasLble ecologLcal unLversals as stabLlLty, resLlLence, naturalness,
rLchness, scarcLty and so forth . But there are consLderable
dLversLty,
constraLnts on how thLs Ls done . . . . One constraLnt, that of LMpartLalLty whLch
excludes certaLn types of class chauvLnLsM, a thLng cannot be ranked as valuable
or ahead or another sLMply by vLrtue of belongLng to soNe specLes (e.g. beLng
huNan) or favoured bLologLcal class; such class features are not Ln theMselves
value-MakLng characterLstLcs. Such an account of how value Ls assessed reNaLn
however far froM specLfLc, and soMetLMes of lLttle use Ln practLce. (CrLtLque,
pp.59- 60)
POINTS OF UNITY
1. NATURAL PHILOSOPHY. Ue base our phLlosophy on a proper understandLng of the
purposes and workLngs of nature and do not try to LNpose an Ldeology upon Lt . Ue
seek to transforM socLety based upon thLs understandLng.
2. CONSENSUS DEMOCRACY. Ue conduct all our MeetLngs accordLng to the prLncLples
of consensus deNocracy, eNphasLzLng unanLMous or near-unanLMous agreeMent on all
decLsLons. No representatLve May Make decLsLons on behalf of the Greens wLthout
the approval of the entLre NeMbershLp. Ue encourage the use of consensus
deMocracy Ln all socLal, econoMLc and polLtLcal LnstLtutLons.
-8-
3. NONVIOLENCE AND FREEDOM. ~e oppose the threat or use of phystcal vtolence to
resolve tnternatlonat, clvll, polltlcal and personal confllcts. ~e encourage the
nonvlolent enforceMent of all prlvate and publlc rules and Laws. ~e recognlEe
that a nonvlolent soclety would be a very free soclety and encourage tolerance
of others' vlews and actlons.
~- SOCIAL ECOLOGY. ~e eMphaslze the connectton of doMlnatlon and vlolence toward
the envlronMent and toward our fellow huMans. ~e seek a nonvlolent soclety ln
whlch the needs of lndlvlduals, coMMunltles and bloreglons are balanced and
lntegrated and ln whlch econoMtc resources are used consclousty, deMocratlcaLLy
and approprlatety to further thls end.
5. STRATEGY. ~e wlLL oppose ecologlcatty and soclatty destructlve pollcles and
dlsobedlence
clvll
and
protest
practlces through nonvlolent polltlcal
actlvltles. ~e wlLL proMote alternatlve projects and lnstltutlons conslstent
wlth our Green phllosophy. ~e wlLL cooperate ln solldarlty wlth all groups ln
substantlal agreeMent wlth these polnts of unlty as partlclpants ln the
lnternatlonal Green MoveMent. (Deep Ecology, pp.36-7).
2:
DEEP ECOLOGY LEVELS
In dlscusslng the relatlonshlp between deep ecology and Major tradltlons
such as BuddhlsM and Chrlstlanlty, Naess stresses that people can agree broadly
on a set of prlnctptes and dlsagree greatly on other aspects of ldeology and
other tradttlons thusly:
In order to factlttate dlscusslon lt May be helpful to dlsttngutsh a coMMon
platforM (baste prlnclples) of deep ecology froM the fundaMentaL features of
phllosophles and rellglons froM whlch that platforM (baste prlnctples) ls
derlved, lf the platforM ls forMulated as a set of norMs and hypotheses
lf . verballEed, are Buddhlst,
(factual assuMptlons). The fundaMentals,
or phllosophlc wlth
persuaslons,
rettgtous
other
Taolst, Chrtsttan or of
afftnltles to the baste vlews of Splnoza, Uhltehead, Hetdegger, or others.
The fundaMentals are Mutually More or Less lncoMpattble or at Least
dtfflcult to coMpare l~ terMs of cognltlve contents. The tncoMpattblltty
does not affect the deep ecology prlnclples adversely.
The baste prlnclples wlthln the deep ecology MoveMent are grounded ln
retlglon or phllosophy. In a Loose sense, tt May be sald to be dertved froM
the fundaMentals. Because these are dtfferent, the sltuatlon only reMlnds us
that very slMllar or even tdenttcal conclustons May be drawn froM dlvergent
preMlses. The prlnclples (or platforM) are the . saMe, the fundaMentaL
preMlses dtffer.
In order to clartfy the dtscusston one Must avold Looktng for one deftntte
phllosophy or rellgton aMong the supporters of the deep ecologlcal MoveMent.
Fortunately there ls a rlch Manlfold of klnds of consequences dertved froM
the prlnclples.
The dtscusston has four Levels to take lnto account: verballzed fundaMentaL
phllosophlcal and rellglous ldeas and lntultlons, the deep ecology baste
prlnclples, the More or Less general consequences dertved froM the platforM
Llfestytes and general pollcles of every klnd - and Lastly, descrlpttons
of concrete sltuatlons and declstons Made ln theM. (See DlagraM 1)
Arne Naess has atteMpted to provlde a Loglcal dlagraM or systeMatlzatlon of
hls own verslon of deep ecology or ecosophy whtch he calls •Ecosophy r·. He
-9-
caLLs thts a norMattve systeM whtch tncLudes both norMs (or baste values) and
factual hypotheses_ The Lower norMs or actton stateMents are dertved froM the
top norMs tn a Loosely LogtcaL sense_ The top or Most baste norMs are arrtved at
by the deep questtontng Lntutttve process_
Naess stresses that Ecosophy T Ls onLy hts verston of deep ecology, and
that Many versLons need to be worked out_ SoMe people NLght be crLtLcaL that
Many of the norMs of deep ecology are heLd on an tntutttve basts, but Naess
potnts out aLL theortes begtn soMewhere beyond LogtcaL constructtons_ (DEEP
ECOLOGY, pp-225-7)
In order to factLttate dtscusston about deep ecology aMong phtLosophers tt
May be heLpfuL to dtsttngutsh a coMMon pLatforM of deep ecology froM the
fundaMentaL features of phtLosophtes and reLtgtons froM whtch that pLatforM Ls
derLved, tf tt ts forMuLated as a set of norMs and hypotheses (factual
assuMpttons)_ The terM 'pLatforM' ts preferred to 'prtncLpLe' because the Latter
May be NLsunderstood to refer to the uLtLMate fundaMentaLs_ FurtherMore, the
forMuLatton of a pLatforM should be short and conctse (as a synopsts), whereas
the fundaMentaLs, tf verbaLtzed, are Buddhtst, Taotst, ChrLstLan or of other
reLtgtous ktnds, or they are phtLosophLc wtth afftntttes to the baste vtews of
SpLnoza, ~hLtehead, HeLdegger, or others_ The fundaMentaLs are MutuaLLy More or
Less LncoMpatLbLe or at Least dtffLcuLt to coMpare tn terMs of cognLttve
contents_ Supporters of deep ecology May have great dLfftcuLttes understandtng
each other's uLtLMate vLews_
The pLatforM of the deep ecology MoveMent Ls grounded tn reLtgLon or
phLLosophy tncLudtng ethLcs_ It May be saLd to be derLved froM
these
fundaMentaLs_ As used here the terM 'dertved' ts open to a vartety of LnterpretatLons_ If the vaLLdLty of a norM or a hypothesLs Ls justLfLed by reference
to one defLnLte set of assuMptLons of a phtLosophtcaL or reLLgtous ktnd, the
norM or hypothests ts Ln a sense dertved froM those assuMpttons_ The set
acquLres a character of preMLses for parttcuLar concLusLons_ But cLoseLy · sLMLLar
or even tdenttcaL concLustons May be drawn froM sets of LncoMpatLbLe preMLses_
ThLs expLaLns the coMbLnatLon of 'bewLLderLng' dLverstty of vLews at the deepest
LeveL wtth agreeMent of vtews at the next LeveL_
In assesstng constructLve crttLctsM of deep ecology Lt Ls useful to try to
ftnd out whLch LeveL Ls LnvoLved_ An exaMpLe: In the tntroductLon to hLs The
EthLcs of EnvtronMentaL Concern, (Oxford: BLackweLL 1983), Robtn AttfLeLd says:
Yet I do not accept, wLth the so-caLLed 'deep, Long-range ecology MoveMent',
the vtew that our prLncLpaL Loyalty should be focussed not on feLLow-huMans
or feLLow creatures but on the bLosphere as an organtc whole, __ _
I suppose there are soMe supporters of the deep ecology MOVeMent who
propose focusstng Loyalty on the bLosphere as an organLc whole Ln the sense
suggested by AttfteLd_ The conceptLon of the bLosphere as an organLc whole and
of such a kLnd of Loyalty belongs to the reaLM of fundaMentaLs, that Ls LeveL
one, rather than to the other Levels_ Therefore that AttfLeLd does not accept
the vtew he descrtbes ts not relevant tn arguMentatton for or agatnst deep
ecology- One Matn potnt tn deep ecology ts tts deep arguMentatton, that ts,
arguMentatton froM uLttMate (phLLosophLcaL, reLtgtous) preMtsses, but there Ls
rooM for very dLfferent sets of such preMLsses_ A supporter of deep ecology May
or May not have any conceptton of a prLMary Loyalty focussed on the bLosphere as
an organtc whole_
[The] dtsttnctLon of Levels Ls useful when tryLng to ptn down exactly what
a crttLcLsM Ls focusstng on_ The dLagraM furnLshes onLy a ktnd of stattc ModeL_
-10-
A supporter of deep ecology wLLL norMaLLy ModLfy the sentences at the dLfferent
Levels froM tLMe to tLMe. Hew LnforMatLon May change any hypotheses and
therefore also change norMs whLch Ln part have been justLfLed on the basLs of
the hypotheses beLng changed.
Renewed ethLcaL consLderatLon or new LnforMatLon May Make the supporter
change a norM. If a norM Ls changed norMally new sets of hypotheses are
Lnvolved, and old ones are dLscarded. ThLs agaLn wLLl cause reverberatLons Ln a
sMaLLer or greater part of the fLeld.
F roM a po Ln t of v Lew of no rMa t Lve sys teMa t t·~a t Lons what goes on when
changes are Made at one or More Levels Ls rather coMpLLcated. But part of Lt Ls
processes of derLvatLon. OLagraM l pretends only to Lllustrate LMportant
dLfferences of the Levels of derLvatLon and the specLfLc character of Level 2.
It represents a condensed forMulatLon of the deepest-Level norMs and hypotheses
whLch supporters of the deep ecology MoveMent can agree upon. ThLs Level Ls
LLLustrated as the penultLMate (next to ultLMate) Level of arguMentatLon
characterLstLc of those supporters of deep ecology who try to artLculate theLr
baste vLews. At the thLrd and fourth Level dLsagreeMents May arLse. At the fLrst
Level supporters May dLsagree, or fLnd each others vLews' LncoMprehensLb le, or
LncoMparable as to valLdLty.
Ls not a Measure of value prLorLtLes or of
A 'dLrectLon of derLvatLon
ethLcaL prLorLtLes. And Lt does not LMply that what Ls derLved Ls a Means Ln
relatLon to what Lt Ls derLved froM. A sLMple exaMple Ls enough to clarLfy thLs.
FroM 'do not kLlL huMans! ·, follows, Lf you concede 'all Mothers are huMans' the
conclusLon 'do not kLLL your Mother!'. ThLs rather concrete norM Ls here derLved
froM the More general and abstract one. But thLs does not LMply that huMans Ln
general have a hLgher value or a kLnd of prLorLty Ln relatLon to Mothers. It
does not say that Ln a norM confLLct you should be More careful not to kLLL
huMans than not to kLLL your Mother. An absurd posLtLon! And Lastly, Lt Ls
rather strange to refraLn froM kLllLng your Mother as a Means to a goal, · naMely
not to kLLL huMans.
The forMulatLons of Level 2 have the character of proposals. It May turn
out that proposals wLLL dLffer substantLaLLy or show a natural dLversLty of
terMLnologLcal and conceptual LdLosyncracLes . UnhappLLy Lt Ls quLte coMMon to
MLx the, Ln a broad sense, LogLcal relatLon of derLvatLon wLth other relatLons.
These are at Least as LMportant, but nevertheless are dLfferent. (BASIC, pp.1-5)
ScheMatLcally we May represent the total vLews LMpLLed Ln the MoveMent by
and
norMs
streaMs of derLvatLon f roM 'h Lghest', L.e. Most fundaMentaL
sLtuatLons.
lLfe
partLcular
Ln
descrLptLve assuMptLon, to partLcular decLsLons
Answers to the deepest questLon, L.e. hLghest norMatLve prLncLples and
basLc assuMptLons about the world MLddle range answers. Lower derLvatLonaL Level
derLvatLons towards decLsLons Ln partLcular LLfe sLtuatLons. Level of actLon Ln
concrete partLcular sLtuatLons.
The LLLustratLon reseMbles those of hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeMs. One
MaLn dLfference Ls that soMe sentences at the top Level are norMatLve,
expressed by LMperatLves. ThLs Makes Lt possLble to furnLsh
preferably
LMperatLves at the Lowest derLvatLonaL Level, sentences such as ·Turn to the
Left!" ·voteforN.N. !.
Just as Ln hypothetLco-ded uctLve systeM, Let us say Ln physLcs, only the
two upper Levels of the pyraMLd Ls thought of as part of physLcs as a systeM,
only those parts are Ln norMatLve systeMs characterLstLc of the total systeM.
-11-
The sentences
change.
Ln
the
Lowest
part
change froM day to day as LLfe sLtuatLons
The above kLnd of presentLng the derLvatLonaL structure of a totaL vLew
Must not be taken too serLousLy. SoMe wLLL absoLuteLy refuse even to consLder
such a way of exposLtLon. And Lt does not Ln any Manner characterLze thLnkLng
wLthLn the deep ecoLogLcaL MoveMents. SoMe of us wLth a professLonaL background
of scLence and anaLytLcaL phLLosophy fLnd Lt heLpfuL, however.
Arne Naess's systeMatLEatLon LLLustrates the reLatLonshLp of deep ecoLogy's
basLc prLncLpLes or Lts "platforM" (LeveL 2), to varLous · possLbLe and relLgLous
"fundaMentaL preMLsses
on the one hand (LeveL 1) and varLous possLbLe
theoretLcaL and practLcaL "consequences" on the other (LeveLs 3 and~). Althou~h
thLs systeMatLzatLon Ls presented Ln terMs of
"fundaMentaL
preMLsses,
consequences", and a dLrectLon of "derLvatLon• froM LeveLs (1) to(~), thLs
should not be taken to Mean that a sentence at one Level Ls held to follow by
vLrtue of necessLty or probabLLLty froN sentences at a prevLous Level L.e~,
Naess Ls not proposLng a deductLve or an LnductLve systeM. As he coMMents
hLMself, Lt Ls only Ln a "Loose sense• that the deep ecology pLatforM "May be
saLd to be derLved froM fundaMentaLs·.
In other words, derLvatLon or precLseness Ls a Matter of deLLMLtLng a
range of possLble LnterpretatLons. For exaNpLe, we MLght proceed froN a
fundaMentaL (L.e. Level 1) reLLgLous or phLLosophLcal preMLss such as "ALL Ls
One" or the SpLnozLst Ldea that "there Ls onLy one 'substance• • and, Ln the
sense descrLbed, "derLve" the (More precLse) central "plank" Ln the deep ecology
"pLatforM" that "there are no boundarLes Ln the bLospherLcaL fLeld", or that
"aLl entLtLes are constLtuted by theLr relatLonshLps" (LeveL 2). Further
precLsatLon MLght express the realLsatLon that "the sense of oneself as a skLn
encapsulated ego Ls not Ln accord wLth thLs ' seaMLess web' ontoLogy• (Level 3).
None of the steps Ln the above exaMpLe Ls held to foLLow by necessLty
(deductLve Lnference) or probabLLLty (LnductLve Lnference) froM sentences at a
prevLous LeveL. ALL we have (Ln logLcaL terMs) Ls a chaLn of precLsatLons
fLowLng Ln one or Many possLble dLrectLons of LnterpretatLon. Ue could have
easLLy started froM the saMe vague, general fundaMentaL preMLss and proceeded to
deveLop a chaLn of precLsatLons Ln a very dLfferent dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon.
Thus, the "dLrectLon of derLvatLon· shown Ln the dLagraMMatLc LLlustratLon of
Naess's systeMatLsatLon shouLd be understood as referrLng to both the leveL of
precLsatLon and the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon. The greater the Level of
precLsatLon the More evLdent the dLrectLon of LnterpretatLon (or what Naess has
prevLousLy referred to as the "defLnLteness of LntentLon")_
Uhat Ls the vaLue of tryLng to provLde a systeMatLsatLon of deep ecology
(or any other faLrLy coMprehensLve vLew) when the connectLve LLnks between
fundaMentaL preMLsses (LeveL I) and practLcaL consequences (Level~) are as weak
as that of "possLbLe LnterpretatLon"? An LMportant answer Must be that such a
systeNatLsatLon eMphasLses the contLnuaLLy-beLng-forgotten fact that our Most
sophLstLcated and precLse, non-trLvLaL (L ~e. nontautoLogLcaL) reasonLngs are
aLways eMbedded or grounded Ln a very generaL "underLyLng perceptLon of the way
thLngs are." ThLs eMphasLs, thLs contLnual reMLndLng, constLtutes the Most
sLgnLfLcant and dLstLnctLve structural feature of deep ecologLcaL thought.
(GUIDING STARS, pp.203-4)
OnLy LeveL one contaLns phLLosophLes (LncLudLng MetaphysLcs, of course) and expLLcLt reLLgLous foundations. There Ls, and hopefuLLy wLLL never be, Many
sLgnLfLcant COMMon characterLstLcs on Level 1. The cLeanLng of 'rubbLsh' on thLs
Level Ls a hazardous undertakLng froN MY poLnt of vLew.
-12-
In a coMprehensLve phLLosophy of Level l, for lnstance ln an 'ecosophy' ln
MY terMlnoLogy, every key terM of the pLatforM forMuLatlon, (Level 2), would
have to be .coM"ented upon and elucLdated. ThLs "ay be seen as a clearLng up
operatlon. A hlgher level of preclseness Ls achLeved and eLLMLnatlon of
ph~Losoph~caLLy unsuLtable rhetorLcs. (HOTES ON SYLVAN, pp.8-9)
3:
ON BIOCENTRIC EGALITARIANISM
The Lntultlon of blocentrlc equaLlty ls that aLL thlngs Ln the blosphere
have an equal rlght to Llve and bLossoM and to reach thelr own LndLvlduaL forMs
of unfoLdLng and self-reaLlzatlon wlthln the Larger SeLf-reallzatlon. Thls basLc
Lntultlon Ls that aLL organLsMs and entltles Ln the ecosphere, as parts of the
lnterreLated whole, are equal Ln LntrlnsLc worth. Naess suggests that bLocentrlc
equaLLty as an LntuLtlon Ls true ln prLncLpLe, although ln the process of
LLvLng, aLL specLes use each other as food, shelter, etc. Mutual predatlon ls a
b~ologLcal fact of lLfe, and "any of the world's relLgLons have struggled wLth
the spLrltuaL lMpllcatlons of thts. SoMe anlMaL llberatlonLsts who atteMpted to
sLde-step thLs probLeM by advocatlng vegetarLanlsM are forced to say that the
entLre plant ktngdo" LncLudLng raLn forests have no rLght to thelr own
exlstence. ThLs evaslon fLles ln the face of the basLc LntuLtlon of equalLty.
Aldo Leopold expressed thLs Lntultlon when sald huMans are •pLaLn cLtlzens• of
the btotlc coMMunlty, not Lord and Master over all other specLes.
BlocentrLc equaLlty ls lntlMateLy related to the aLL-LnclusLve SeLfreaLlzatLon ln the sense that Lf we harM the rest of Nature then we are harMLng
ourselves. There are no boundarles and everythlng ls lnterreLated. But Lnsofar
as we percelve thlngs as LndLvLduaL organlsMs or entLtLes, the LnsLght draws us
to respect aLL huMan and nonhuMan lndLvLduals ln theLr own rLght as parts of the
whole wLthout feeLLng the need to set up hlerarchLes of specles wlth huMans at
the top.
The practlcaL LMpLlcatlons of thLs lntultlon or norM suggest that we should
LLve wlthLn MlnLMuM rather than MaxlMUM lMpact on other specLes and on the Earth
ln general. Thus we see another aspect of our guldlng prLnclpLe: ·slMpLe ln
Means, rLch ln ends.• (Deep EcoLog~, pp.167-9)
blospherLcaL egaLltarlanlsM Ln prlnclpLe' and certaln
The abstract terM
slMlLar terMs whlch I have used, do perhaps More harM than good. They suggest a
posLtLve doctrLne, and that ls too Much. The LMportance of the LntultLon ls
but
MOMentary,
only
perhaps
the
rather lts capaclty to counteract,
Less
seeMs
what
towards
attltude
Lordly
and
consequentlaL, self-congratulatory
developed, Less coMplex, Less MlracuLous.
A rlch varLety of acceptable Motlves can be forMuLated for belng More
reluctant to Lnjure of klLL a LLvLng beLng of klnd A than a beLng of klnd B. The
cultural settlng ls dLfferent for each belng Ln each culture, furtherMore there
are few general norMs, only vague guLdeLLnes. One factor: felt nearness,
deterMlnes Largely our capactty to ldentLfy ourselves wlth a sort of beLng, to
suffer when they suffer. One cannot put forth ethLcaL rules of conduct wlthout
takLng such feeltngs and our lLMlted capacLtLes serLously. If Lt Ls dLffLcuLt to
avotd klLLLng A because of Lts sMalLness, whereas klLLlng B ls easlLy avolded,
we tend to protect B rather than A. Indeed we Llve wLth an obvLous dLversLty of
obLlgatlons. Ue have speclaL oblLgatlons towards our own chLldren: Ln Most
cultures any anlMaL May be kLLLed ln order to feed one's starvLng chlLd.
ObLlgatLons toward specLes that have been MeMbers of our llfe coMMunLty for Long
perLods are greater than toward accldentaL vlsltors. FurtherMore, we have the
-13-
relevance of sufferLng:
capacLty of sufferLng?
Is
the sufferLng of A less than that of B? Has A the
The sLMpLe thLng I try to convey here L3 that an ethLcs concernLng
dLfferences between non-huMan LLvLng beLngs Ls of a coMparable level of
coMpLexLty to ethLcs concernLng dLfferent people and groups wLth whoM we have to
do. (lntuLtLon, p.202)
Those of us who procLaLM the rLght of all LLfe forMs to LLve and bLossoM
thLnk of thLs rLght as an aspect of the 'value Ln LtseLf' whLch we attrLbute to
the bLosphere wLth Lts closely Lnterconnected LLfe forMs. The procLaMatLon seeMs
to steM froM an LntuLtLon for whLch a graduatLon Ls soMethLng foreLgn. If there
Ls such a basLc rLght, Lf Lt can be gLven a faLrly precLse MeanLng, Lt Ls the
naMe for all lLfe forMs. It Ls LMportant enough to be terMed bLospherLcaL
egaLLtarLanLsM. But Lt Ls perhaps the best to abstaLn froM such Labels. They
LnvLte a varLety of LnterpretatLons Most of whLch May be MLsLeadLng.
As to the consequences of a posLtLve answer, I thLnk we can learn froM
certaLn cultures of hunters and gatherers where bLg anLMaLs are only kLLled
after elaborate cereMonLes and excuses'. There Ls acknowLedgeMent of equal
rLght, but also of a rLght to kLlL Ln order to Meet vLtaL needs. There Ls a
'norM conflLct' whLch Ls solved through addLtLonal norMs: the perforMance of
certaLn rLtes and behavLors of other kLnds. What I thLnk we need not proclaLM Ls
that we as huMans are Most or More valuable, or have a hLgher rLght. ~e need not
say '1 have a hLgher rLght to LLve and bLossoM than you have, obnoxLus MosquLto,
so I kLLL you!' or 'BeLng Much More valuable than you are, I kLlL you and your
offsprLng, dLrty rat!' In so far as we have vLtal needs to kLlL, and Ln so far
as Lt Ls LnevLtabLe Ln practLce, we May justLfy thLs through varLous norMs whLch
are Ln harMony wLth general ecoLogLcal thLnkLng.
Do these words solve the relevant probLeMs? Of course not. ~hat I aM
drLvLng at Ls the prLorLty of MaLntaLnLng a sort of egalLtarLanLsM Ln p~LncLple.
How we can LLve thLs that prLncLpLe Ls a questLon of ethLcs Ln a very general
sense, proceedLng froM Many prLncLples whLch LnevLtably Lead to norM confLLcts
requLrLng adjustMents froM day to day. (PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, pp.27-9)
AccordLng to Naess, a bLospherLc egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe, of equal value of
to the
all LLfe, Ls an LntuLtLveLy clear and obvLous value axLoM', at least
aLMost
ecoLogLcaL fLeLd-worker' (73, p96)!. But eMpLrLcaL surveys would
certaLnLy not sustaLn Haess's claLMs. The prLncLpLe seeMs generally neLther
LntuLtLve nor obvLous, and Ln several ways Lt appears LncoMpatLbLe wLth the
wLder deep ecology pLatforM. It Ls not even obvLous that soMethLng has value by
vLrtue of havLng LLfe. On the contrary, value seeMs, lLke yellowness, to be Much
More patchLLy dLstrLbuted across the unLverse. SpecLal places, for Lnstance, are
especLaLLy valuable. Hor Ls value always dLstrLbuted on LLvLng thLngs, but
colours toMbs of the dead; and soMetLMes Lt flakes off consteLlatLons of LLvLng
thLngs, for exaMpLe thLngs Ln excess, such as Locusts or rats Ln a plague.
But even Lf every LLvLng thLng were assLgned value, Lt would not follow (Ln
the way soMetLMes LnvaLLdLy argued) that every thLng has Lt equally. ~hLLe Lt
could be saLd that thLngs are equal Ln havLng Lt, thLs Ls rather LLke pretendLng
that people are equal Ln an LnegaLLtarLan socLety where all have soMe Money - a
subterfuge. Indeed proposed prLncLpLes of deep ecology LnforM us, correctly,
that soMe ecoLogLcaL LteMS are More valuable than others. For Lnstance, a
certaLn sort of coMpLexLty Ls a vLrtue (Naess 73, prLncLpLe (6)), so presuMabLy
an LteM wLth that coMpLexLty Ls More valuable than a sLMple bLoLogLcal LteM.
SLMLLarLy, dLversLty of systeM Ls a vLrtue, a prLMe ground of value (prLncLpLe
(2)). The upshot appears to be that a hLghly dLverse ecosysteM Ls More valuable
-14-
than a sLMpLLfLed and LMpoverLshed one_
FurtherMore, bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM Ls LnconsLstent wLth the hoLLstLc,
antL-reducLLonL3tLc, antL-LndLvLduaLL3tLc ethos whLch deep ecoLogy LMports froM
hoLLstLc ecotogy.
AnaLogous concLu3Lons can be reached for •equaL rLghts• forMuLatLons_ For
one thLng, equaL rLghts are characterLstLcally based on equal MerLt or equal
worth_ For another, arguMents lLke those gLven can be rerun wLth rLghts suppLantLng values_ As a theoretLcaL prLncLpLe, bLospherLc egalLtarLanLsM has to
be scrapped_ The LMMense dLffLcuLtLes of such a prLncLpLe Ln practLce Naess had
already partLally recognLsed, qualLfyLng egalLtarLanLsM to equalLty Ln prLncLple 'because any realLstLc praxLs necessLtates soMe kLllLng, exploLtatLon, and
suppressLon' (p_95). The extent of erosLon Ln equalLty thLs affords reMaLns
obscure; but Lt couLd be close to total, wLth theoretLcaL equaLLty LapsLng whenever confLLct of rLghts or values LooMed_ Such egaLLtarLanLsM would be LLke a
MaxLM of honesty Ln prLncLpLe, whLch appLLed Ln practLce only when Lt was not
LnconvenLent; that Ls, but an eMpty MaxLM_
~hatever Naess's Lntended qualLfLcatLon, Lt stLLL seeMs to people wLth
Much practLcaL experLence on the Land or Ln gardenLng, especLaLLy Ln places
where the surroundLng natural envLronMent has not been totally transforMed, that
he has consLderabLy underestLMated the extent of quaLLfLcatLon needed, and that
the prLncLpLe. BLospherLc
strangle
to
begLn
does
quaLLfLcatLon
due
theLr own shelter or
supply
not
do
who
egaLLtarLanLsM Ln practLce Ls for people
sustenance, but pass the busLness of ecosysteM Lnterference and ModLfLcatLon on
to others (as they typLcaLLy pass the butchery of theLr Meat and the LLke on to
others)_ Even were Lt desLrabLe, unLversaL hunter-gatherLng Ls no Longer
possLbLe or feasLbLe, wLth so Many Mostly unsuLted and LLL-adapted huMans; and
a substantLaL
even hunter-gatherers terMLnate the LLves of Many creatures
Lnterference wLth theLr rLghts to LLve and bLossoM - and, More LMportant,
and
dLrectty
LnterferLng
substantLaLLy ModLfy theLr envLronMents, thus
LndLrectly wLth enorMous nuMbers of LLvLng thLngs_
~hatever rLghts sLMpLer LLvLng organLsMs, especLaLLy ones such as bacterLa
and vLruses, have to LLve and bLossoM, they have decLdedLy quaLLfLed and Much
attentuated ones. ULth bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM (Ln prLncLpLe) the deep ecology
MoveMent has Latched onto a prLncLple whLch Ls both too powerful, and yet, Lf
the ·Ln prLncLpLe" quaLLfLcatLon Ls appLLed so as to cover typLcaL LLfestyLes of
deep ecoLogLsts, a prLncLpLe so rLddLed wLth exceptLons as to barely hang
together. But wLthout soMe of the Lntended force of bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM,
deep ecology Ls Ln danger of coLLapsLng (LLke Many of Lts followers) Lnto an
LnterMedLate posLtLon, as no other part of the pLatforM adequately sustaLns Lts
LLMLted
separatLon_ Part of what Ls sought wLth the egaLLtarLan prLncLpLe
Lnterference, huMan Lnterference to an extent and on a scale far below that
of
theMe
the
Ls already afforded a basLs Ln
presently prevaLLLng
Ls
what
wLth
values-Ln-nature and outsLde the huMan sphere, sLnce Lnterference
of value Ls (Lpso facto) LLMLted. Such a prLncLpLe of LLMLted Interference
deserves, Ln any case, separate forMuLatLon (whLch Lt usually gaLns Ln deep
ecology pLatforMs)_ But even so Lt hardly achLeves the requLsLte separatLon,
sLnce LnterMedLate posLtLons can, and do, grant or MaLntaLn soMe such prLncLpLe
of lLMLted or reduced Lnterference (thus e-g- BLrch, AttfLeLd, SLnger)_
~hat Ls requLred Ls a posLtLve equLvaLent of the separatLng feature, of the
rejectLon of the greater vaLue assuMptLon, and therewLth of the rejectLon of
huMan supreMacy, of the value pLcture of huMans as always nuMber one_ What Ls
needed, More generaLLy, Ls a prLncLpLe teLLLng agaLnst the favourLng of one
over others sLMpLy on the basLs of specLes, a
specLes - huMans Ln partLcuLar
-15-
prLncLple of bLospecLes LMpartLalLty, to gLve Lt a sLMLlar grandLose tLtle.
There Ls soMe reason to suspect that, as elsewhere, a requLreMent of LMparttalLty has been hardened Lnto one of egalLtarLanLsM, that faLrness, because often
dLfftcult to assess, has been MLstakenly taken to Lnvolve equaltty. BLospecLes
LMpartLalLty LMplLes the avoLdance of specLes chauvLnLsM, that Ls the avotdance
of unfaLr treatMent of LteMs outstde the gLven specLes. Because unfaLr, the
treatMent concerned lacks any sufftctent justLfLcatLon. Hence, the avotdance of
spectes chauvtnLsM Lnvolved Ls effectLvely that prevLously explaLned as a
specLal case of class chauvLnLsM. SLMLlarly, the requLreMent of bLospecLes
LMpartLalLty Ls a specLal case of the requlreMent of class (or natural group)
LMpartlallty, for whlch the arguMents are the saMe as those for the avoldance of
class chauvLnLsM.
The danger of specLes partLalLty, of favourLng soMe specLes, Ls Much
encouraged by a specles fallacy, whLch Ls coMMonly lnvoked ln favourlng huMans.
ThLs Ls the error of concludLng that because a few MeMbers of the specles have
accoMplLshed soMethtng of (LMMense) value, all MeMbers of the spectes therefore
are (hlghly) valuable; all MeMbers of the specles Manage to free-load for the
rtde, obtatned by a few MeMbers, so to say. The arguMent, once challenged,
usually falls back on an arguMent that goes by way of capacltLes: the reMaLnLng
MeMbers of the specles have the capactty to achleve these sorts of thlngs
also. But, fLrstly, that Ls not true: LntellLgence, skLlls, and the lLke, vary
soMewhat wtthLn specLes, and froM our narrow perspectLve, vary consLderably
aMong huMans, soMe of whoM have no capacLty for advanced MatheMatLcs or MusLc.
a
Secondly, Lt requLres More than capacLty: Lt requLres cLrcuMstances,
favourable envlronMent to exercLse theM (hence, ln part, the folly of More
huMans ln conspLcuously suboptLMal cLtLes), together wLth a wlll and drlve
actually to follow through approprLately on capacLtLes. (CrLtLque, pp.12-16)
4.
NON-VIOLENCE
The fourth plllar, nonvLolence, Means to the Greens the cessatLon of both
personal vLolence and -structural vlolence·, that Ls, vLolence and oppresslon
LMposed by the state and by Lnstltutlons. For these reasons the Greens support
the concept of self-deterMlnatLon for lndLvLduals and groups. They also advocate
peace educatLon Ln the schools, whLch would teach nonvLolent Means of conflLct
resolutLon and show chLldren that the cult of the soldLer Ls a cultural, not a
natural condltLon. The Greens also call for an end to the vLolence and
oppressLon toward woMen, chLldren, and MLnorLty groups so coMMon Ln patrLarchal
socLetLes. They want to develop a nonexploLtatlve econoMlc systeM Ln whLch
eMployee-owned and -controlled busLnesses replace huge operatlons dLctated by
or corporate lnterests. They want to transforM our vlolent
state
the
relatLonshLp wlth nature lnto one of balance and respect. Petra Kelly expresses
the centralLty of thLs prLncLple when she says, ·NonvLolence Ls the essentLal
Lngredtent ln an ecologLcal socLety. •
Most of the Greens eMphatLcally eMbrace the prLncLple of
Although
nonvLolence, they also realLze that Lts appllcatLon Ls often probleMatLc. Roland
Vogt polnted out one of the areas of confll~tlng values:
What we have not yet accoMplLshed Ls to say how we show ourselves to be
nonvLolent at the MOMent when we partLcLpate Ln governMental functLons,
because the state Ls Ltself an LnstLtutLon of vLolence. For exaMple, how
wlll a Green cLty counctl act agalnst people who don't pay thelr rent,
although they really could because they recelve welfare or because they earn
enough. The norMal course Ls warnLng, warnLng, evLctLon notLce, and then
evLctLon by force and by polLce. We haven't solved thLs. That Ls, there are
stLll no thought-out concepts of how we can reconcLle the deMands of socLal
-16-
responsLbLL Lty wLth the deMands of non vLoLence.
The Greens extend theLr prLncLpLe of nonvLoLence to theLr actLve resLstance
agaLnst the Most MassLve and potentLaLLy deadly "anLfestatL on of structural
vLoLence: the nuclear arMs race proMoted by the MLLLtary-L ndustrLaL coMpLex and
the governMent. In theLr natLonaL headquarter s Ln Bonn the Greens have a poster
of OandhL s adage "there Ls no way to peace; peace Ls the way• and one of
Thoreau
0
Those who eMbrace nonvLoLent cLvLL dLsobedLenc e, coMMLttLng breaches of Law
on the grounds of conscLence, are prepared to suffer · vLoLence or punLshMent
theMseLves rather than LnfLLct vLoLence or LnjustLce on others or share
responsLbLL Lty for such acts by reMaLnLng passLve. •1,, however, the Law Ls
so proMuLgated that Lt of necessLty Makes you an agent of LnjustLce agaLnst
another, then I say to you: Break the Law."
The MajorLty of Greens strongly endorse - and lLve - the concept of actLve,
nonvLoLence resLstance. However, the MarxLst-orL ented MeMbers of the party have
never been fully supportLve of that prLncLpLe. They vLew Lt "ereLy as a
·MoralLstLc " tactLc that should be abandoned Ln favor of escaLatLng resLstance
Lf Lt does not prove suffLcLentL y effectLve. Petra Kelly's account of the
LeftLsts' attLtude on thLs Lssue was sLMLlar to what we had heard froM Many
other Greens:
They do not understand that nonvLolent actLon Ls an extre"ely subversLve
force. They thLnk Lt's harMLess, Ls a for" of obedLence, and changes
nothLng, that Lt's LLke beggLng froM the state. ·1t's just a tactLc, a
toot," they say. To theM everythLng Ls to be used. But there are soMe thLngs
you should never "Lsuse - or even use. They are sLMpLy LntegraL. NonvLoLence
cannot be coMproMLsed.
Although Many of the advocates of nonvLoLent . resLstance argued that ·such a
course cannot be dLsMLssed as "Merely MoraLLstLc" sLnce Lt Ls also absolutely
ratLonaL (that Ls, hLstory shows that vLoLence breeds vLolence - structural as
welt as personal - so we "ust fLnd another way to effect change, especLaLLy Ln
the nuclear age). For Most MeMbers of the greens the choLce was clear, as
expressed wLth a cLtatLon froM MartLn Luther KLng: •~e no Longer have a choLce
or
nonvLoLence
between vLoLence and nonvLoLence . The choLce Ls eLther
nonexLsten ce." (Green PoLLtLcs, pp.~3-7)
Deeply coMMLtted persons Ln the ecology Move"ent sense the vuLnerabLLL ty of
natural processes to huMan LnterventLo n, and the fundaMentaL necessLty of
MaLntaLnLng bLologLcal dLversLty. AffLrMatLon of the LntegrLty of ecosysteMs
frequently LnvoLves a caMpaLgn to save froM developMent soMe rLver of canyon or
wLLderness area.
In a real sense, ecologLcaL resLstance LnvoLves beco"Lng frLends wLth
another specLes or a rLver or a MountaLn, for exaMpLe. In general, the resLster
takes up the burden of responsLbLl Lty, the burden of wLtnessLng for the other as
Self. ThLs process of befrLendLng "ay be based on ArLstotle's crLterLa for
frLendshLp: the proMotLon of the other's good for the other's own sake. Or
frLendshLp can be the extensLon of self. When OandhL was asked Lf hLs good deeds
Ln a vLLLage expressed hLs huManLtarLa nLsM, he repLLed he worked "to serve no
• GandhL s stateMent defLned MaturLty. ALtruLsM was
one else but Myself
unnecessary because hLs self eMbraced the whole vLLLage.
0
There are Many dLfferent tactLcs of LndLvLduaLs and organL2atLo ns Ln
save the Earth•, but
or
poLLtLcaL caMpaLgns whLch seek to ·save the rLver
-17-
there Ls one overrLdLng or baste norM of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng: non-vLoLence.
Ecology teaches us that MankLnd Ls not the center of LLfe on the planet.
Ecology has taught us that the whole earth Ls part of our "body" and that we
Must Learn to respect Lt as we respect ourselves. As we feel for ourselves, we
Must feel for aLL forMs of LLfe - the whales, the seals, the forests, the seas.
The treMendous beauty of ecoLogLcaL thought Ls that Lt shows us a pathway back
to an understandLng and an apprecLatLon of LLfe LtseLf - an understandLng and
apprecLatLon that Lt Ls LMperatLve to that very way or LLfe.
As wLth the whales and the seals, LLfe Must be saved by nonvLoLent
confrontatLons, by what the Quakers caLL "bearLng wLtness•. A person bearLng
wLtness Must accept responsLbLLLty for beLng aware of an LnjustLce. The person
May then choose to do soMethLng or stand by, but he May not turn away Ln
Lgnorance. The Greenpeace ethLc Ls not onty to personally bear wLtness to
atrocLtLes agaLnst lLfe; Lt Ls to take dLrect actLon to prevent theM. ~hLLe
actLon Must be dLrect, Lt Must also be non-vLoLent. Ue Must obstruct a wrong
wLthout offerLng personal vLoLence to Lts perpetrators. Ue Must know that our
greatest strength Ls LLfe LtseLf, and the coMMLtMent to dLrect our lLves to
prbtect others.
EcoLogLcaL resLstLng could be defLned as keepLng the peace of the neLghborhood. Rarely are vandals or vLolent neLghbors welcoMe Ln the neLghborhood. Uhen
the neLghbors Lnclude rLvers and MountaLns, seashores and prarLes, then the
LntegrLty of the ecosysteM Ls MaLntaLned.
In hLs explLcatLon of GandhL's theory of nonvLoLence, Arne
several norMs of nonvLoLent potLtLcat caMpaLgns. These Lnctude:
Naess
lLsts
l. Announce your case and the goal of your caMpaLgn explLcLtty and clearly,
dLstLnguLshLng essentLaLs froM nonessentLats.
2. Seek personal contact wLth your opponent and be avaLLable to hLM. · BrLng
confLLctLng groups Lnto personal contact.
3. Turn your opponent Lnto a beLLever Ln and supporter of your case, but do
not coerce or expLoLt hLM.
~- You provoke your opponent Lf you deLLberateLy or carelessly destroy hLs
property.
of ecoLogLcaL resLstLng denounce
theorLsts
LeadLng
nonvLoLence as tactLcs. But as Rober ALtken RoshL wrote:
vLoLence
versus
Non-vLoLence Ls not just a tactLc for people who Make Lt a practLce ... The
end Ls the Means, Ln other words. Look at poLLtLcaL hLstory or at the
hLstory of any MoveMents. Uhen we work for certaLn goals, those goals tend
to betray us. Ue defeated L.B. Johnson only to get RLchard NLxon. Ue got rLd
of the B-1 BoMber (teMporarLLy) and the CruLse MLssLle appeared. Ue have to
Make our actLon the goal. Our actLon Must LtseLf be the truth. Our actLon
Must be Lts own defense, Lts own procLaMatLon, Lts own purpose. (Letter to
the author, June 1982)
Both on practLcaL and ethLcaL grounds, vLoLence Ls rejected as a Mode of
ecotogLcal resLstance. TerrorLst attacks on nuclear plants or MLssLle sLtes
could cause ·red" alerts and vLolent responses froM governMent agencLes.
PLacLng one's own LLfe at rLsk, such as sLttLng Ln front of bulldozers or
polLce cars at a deMonstratLon to protest destructLon of the raLn forest, May be
LLLegaL but not vLoLent. And spontaneous acts such as the decoMMLssLonLng of a
power generator or bulldozer May draMatLze the contLnuLng destructLon of a
-18-
spectal ecosysteM.
Ecologtcal reststance also Means defendtng natural dtverstty through
educatLon, publLc speakLng, and use of lawsuLts; tryLng to convert publtc
opLnton to the cause; and tnforMLng poltttctans and dectsLon Makers. ResLstance
Ls another naMe for afftrMatLon - joyful affLrMatton of the tntegrLty of Nature,
natural dLversLty, and MLnLMuM huMan LMpact on place. (Deep Ecolo9H, pp.16-17)
The Deep Ecology MOVeMent and peace MoveMent.
Ftfteen years ago close cooperatton between supporters of deep ecology and
actLvtsts Ln the peace MoveMent was out of reach. Rather suddenly thts sttuatton
Ls totally changed. SoMe of us, ltke Myself, favour unLlateral dtsarMaMent and
establtshMent of MtlLtant, but unherotc, non-vtolent defence.
At thts potnt Lt ts tMportant for actLvtsts to stress the dtstLnctLon
between actLon, caMpaLgn and MOVeMent. They May be tllustrated by three
concentrLc cLrcles. The LnnerMost coMprLse the dLrect actLons wLthLn a caMpatgn,
for Lnstance, a dated deMonstratLon at a parttcular locatLon agatnst the
butldtng of a daM, or the non-vtolent obstructton of the transport of the
MachLnery on the way to the daM sLte. ThLs May be part of a ten year old
caMpaLgn to save a rtver (LncludLng of course tts ecosysteM) froM developMent of
soMe sort. Ten dLrect acttons May be fatlure, but nevertheless theLr LMpact May
conflLct,
contrtbute to vLctory of the caMpaLgn. (Or May polarLze the
antt-actLvtsts
Many
what
Ls
That
contrLbutLng to the faLlure of the caMpatgn?
MaLntaLn.) The rLver caMpaLgn together wLth other analogous caMpaLgns May be
seen as part of a MoveMent of greater or lesser generaltty. A MoveMent to save
rtvers, or More generally a conservatton MoveMent. Many caMpatgns May be
fatlures, but the MOVeMent goes on. (Hates on Poltttcs, pp.l~-JS)
Gandhtan and other forMs of non-vtolence are wtdely found wLthtn the deep
ecologLcal MoVeMent. There Ls a reluctance to accept destructLon of MachLnery Ln
efforts to stop destructton even of holy places. There Ls soMe dtsagreeMent on
thts and related subjects. I do not thtnk that the coMpletely general norMs of
care and consLderatLon should be looked upon as part of the specLftc platforM of
the deep ecology MoveMent . . (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, p.31)
In suM, the paradtgM of deep ecology Ls revolutLonary tn tts MetaphysLcs,
epLsteMology, and cosMology, but deep ecologLsts do not seek to overthrow
governMents by force of arMs or to Lssue anythLng lLke a coMprehensLve, alleMbracLng polLtLcal prograM for brLngLng about the new order. The conteMporary
deep ecology MoveMent seeMs to be what Robert NLsbet has called a "wLthdrawal
and renewal" MoveMent such as has perLodLcally arLsen .Ln ~estern socLety sLnce
the fall of the RoMan EMpLre.
There ts no poltttcal party of "deep ecology,· no cadre of poltttcal
revoluttonarte s. Thts ts not an approprtate approach for deep ecologtsts. No
frontal confrontatLons wLth reforMLst envLronMental tsts or wLth the doMLnant
socLal/polttLc al order Ls destred. It would be counter-product Lve by Maktng
people More defensLve of thetr LdeologLcal posLtLon. Deep ecology Ls not an
atteMpt to add one More tdeology Ln the crowded fLeld of Modern LdeologLes. Deep
ecologLsts are questLng for ways to lLberate and cultLvate the ecologLcal
conscLousness. FroM ecologtcal conscLousness wtll naturally flow an ecologtcal
reststance. (Deep Ecology MoveMent, pp.316-17)
5:
ON SELF-REALIZATION
Naess: Self-realtzatLo n ts
the
realtzatLon
of
-19-
the
potentLaltttes
of
ltfe.
OrganLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln three ways gLve us Less dLversLty than
organLsMs that dLffer froM each other Ln one hundred ways. Therefore, the selfreaLLzatLon we experLence when we LdentLfy wLth the unLverse Ls heLghtened by an
Lncrease Ln the nuMber of ways Ln whLch LndLvLduals, socLetLes, and even specLes
and lLfe forMs realLze theMselves. The greater the dLversLty, the, the greater
the self-realLzatLon. ThLs seeMLng duaLLty between LndLvLduaLs and the totalLty
Ls encoMpassed by what I call the Self and the ChLnese call the Tao. Most people
Ln deep ecology have had the feelLng - usually, but not always, Ln nature - that
they are connected wLth soMethLng greater than theLr ego, greater than theLr
naMe, theLr faMLLy, theLr specLaL attrLbutes as an LndLvLdual - a feelLng that
Ls often called oceanLc because Many have Lt on the ocean. ULthout that
LdentLfLcatLon, one Ls not easLLy drawn to becoMe LnvoLved Ln deep ecology.
Many people have thLs feeLLng when they see a death struggle - for Lnstance
tLny anLMaLs LLke fLtes or Mosquttoes fLghtLng for thetr ltves. Uhen they see
anLMals sufferLng, they May LdentLfy wLth LLfe forMs they usually don't LdentLfy
wLth. Such sLtuatLons offer us an opportunLty to develop a More Mature poLnt of
vLew. Insofar as thLs conversLon, these deep feelLngs are reLLgLous, deep
ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent, and those people who have done the Most to
Make socLetLes aware of the destructLve way Ln whLch we LLve Ln reLatLon to
natural settLngs have had such relLgLous feeLLngs. Rachel Carson, for exaMpLe,
says that we cannot do what we do, we have no reLLgLous or ethLcaL justLfLcatLon
for behavLng as we do toward nature. Her arguMent Ls not calculated or
reasonable Ln the usual sense, sayLng that, Lf we contLnue poLsonLng nature, we
wLLl be Less healthy, or wLLL have fewer resources, and so on. She Ls sayLng
that we are sLMply not perMLtted to behave Ln that way. SoMe wLll say that
nature Ls not Man's property, Lt's the property of God; others wLLL say Lt Ln
other ways. The MaLn poLnt Ls that deep ecology has a reLLgLous coMponent,
fundaMental LntuLtLons that everyone Must cuLtLvate Lf he or she Ls to have a
LLfe based on values and not functLon LLke a coMputer. Uhereas shallow ecology,
Lf taken to Lts logLcaL extreMe, Ls lLke a coMputerLzed, cost-benefLt anaLysLs
for huMans. (SLMpLe tn Means, p.11)
If the terM seLf-reaLLzatLon Ls applLed, Lt should be kept Ln MLnd that
Me", "ego , and self have shLftLng denotatLons. NothLng Ls evLdent and
•1·,
LndLsputabLe. Even that we are Ls debatable Lf we Make the questLon dependent
upon answertng what we are.
Self-realLzatLon Ln Lts absolute MaxLMUM Ls, as I see Lt, the Mature
experLence of oneness Ln dLversLty as depLcted Ln the above verse. The MLnLMUM
Ls the seLf-reaLL2atLon by More of Less consLstent egotLsM - by the narrowest
experLence of what constLtutes one's self and a MaxLMUM of alLentatLon. As
eMpLrLcaL beLngs we dweLL soMewhere Ln between, but Lncreased MaturLty LnvoLves
tncrease of the wLdeness of the self.
The seLf-reaLtzatton MaxLMuM should not necessarLLy be conceLved as a
MystLcal or MedLtattonaL state. ·ey MedLtatLon soMe perceLve the Self tn the
self by the self; others by the path of knowledge and stLLl others by the path
of work (karMa-yoga) [Gtta: Chapter 13,, verse 2~]. GandhL was a karMa-yoga,
reaLLzLng hLMseLf through socLaL and poLLtLcaL actLon.
The terMs MystLcal unLon and MystLcLsM are avoLded here for three reasons:
Ftrst, strong Mysttcal tradLtLons stress the dtssolutLon of Lndtvtdual selves
Lnto a nondLversLfLed supreMe whole. Both froM cultural and ecoLogLcaL poLnt of
vtew dLversLty and LndLvtdualLty are essentLaL. Second, there Ls a strong
terMLnoLogtcaL trend wtthtn sctenttftc coMMuntttes to assoctate MysttcLsM wtth
MystLcs tend to agree that MysttcaL
ThLrd,
confuston.
and
vagueness
conscLousness Ls rarely sustatned under norMal, everyday condLttons. But strong,
-20-
w~de LdentLfLcatLon can color experLence under such condLtLons.
GandhL was only MargLnally concerned wLth 'nature'. In hLs ashraM poLsonous
snakes were perMLtted to tLve LnsLde and outsLde huMan dwettLngs. AntL-poLson
MedLcLnes were frowned upon~ GandhL LnsLsted that trust awakens trust, and that
snakes have the saMe rLght to tLve land btossoM as the huMans. (IdentLfLcatLon,
pp.259-6)
In keepLng wLth the spLrLtual tradLtLons of Many of the worlds s retLgLons,
the deep ecology norM of setf-reatL2atLon goes beyond the Modern western self
hedonLstLc
whLch Ls defLned as an Lsotated ego strLvLng prLMarLly for
gratLfLcatLon or for a narrow sense of LndLvLduat satvatLon Ln thLs tLfe or the
next. ThLs socLatty prograMMed sense of the narrow self or socLat self
dLslocates us, and leaves us prey to whatever fad or fashLon Ls prevalent Ln our
socLety or socLat reference group. Ue are thus robbed of be9LnnLn9 the search
for our unLque spLrLtuat/b.LologLcal personhood. SpLrLtual growth, or unfotdLng,
begLns when we cease to understand or see ourselves as Lsolated and narrow
coMpetLng egos and begLn to LdentLfy wLth other huMans forM our faMLly and
frLends to, eventually, our specLes. But the deep ecology sense of self requLres
a further MaturLty and growth, an LdentLfLcatLon whLch goes beyond huManLty to
Lnclude the nonhuMan world. Ue Must see beyond our narrow conteMporary cultural
assuMptLons and values, and the conventLonat wLsdoM of our tLMe and place, and
thLs Ls best achLeved by the MedLtatLve deep questLonLng process. Only Ln thLs
way can we hope to attaLn full Mature personhood and unLqueness.
A nurturLng nondoMLnatLng socLety can help Ln the "real work" of becoMLng a
whole person. The ·real work• can be suMMarLzed syMbolLcally as the realLzatLon
of "self-Ln-Self- where ·setf· stands for organLc wholeness. ThLs process of the
full unfoldLng of the self can also be SUMMarLzed by the phrase, •No one Ls
saved untLt we are all saved,· where the phrase •one• Lncludes not only Me, an
LndLvLduat huMan, but all huMans, whales, grLzzly bears, whole raLn forest
ecosysteMs, MountaLns and rLvers, the tLnLest MLcrobes Ln the soLt, and so on.
(Deep Ecology, pp.66-7)
of
norM
SubscrLbLng to these prLncLples, Naess asserts, coMes froM the
self-realLzatLon, that ·.~. wLth MaturLty, huMan beLngs wLtl experLence joy and
sorrow when other tLfe forMs experLence sorrow. Not only wLll we feet sad when
our brother or the dog or cat feels sad, but we wLll grLeve when lLvLng beLngs,
LncludLng landscapes, are destroyed. In our cLvLlLzatLon, we have vast Means' of
destructLon at our dLsposal but extreMely lLttle MaturLty Ln our feelLngs. Only
a very narrow range of feetLngs have Lnterested Most huMan beLngs untLt now.•
ThLs deepenLng of feetLngs seeMs to run counter . to the trend Ln Modern
socLety toward superfLcLat relatLonshLps . . . . Arne Naess asserts that ·setfrealLzatLon cannot develop far wLthout sharLng joys and sorrows wLth others, or
More fundaMentalty, wLthout the developMent of the narrow ego of the sMall chLld
Lnto the coMprehensLve structure of a Self that coMprLses all huMan beLngs. The
ecologLcal MoveMent -- as Many earlLer phLlosophLcat MoveMents -- takes a step
further and asks for developMent such that, there Ls a deep LdentLfLcatLon of
LndLvLduals wLth all lLfe."
I suggest that the leaders of the ecology MoveMent devetopMent theLr ethLcs
after they had Moved along thLs path of Self-reatLzatLon. (Stone/Sky, pp.6-7)
But what Ls wrong wLth the wLdely applauded atteMpt, runnLng through Much
LdeatLstLc and Eastern thLnkLng, to explLcate value through self-realLsatLon?
FLrstly, lLke utLlLtarLan explLcatLons, such as those through happLness and
satLsfactLon, Lt Ls Much too experLentLal. It renders value a feature of those
-21-
who exper~ence value - roughly of valuers - rather than of what ~s valued, and
bears value. It Ls lLke sayLng that colour Ls a Matter of those (huMans) who
perceLve colour, not of the (coMposLtLon of) thLngs that are coloured. And
reMove the experLences, those undertakLng self-realLsatLon, as Ln the days
before lLfe appears and value dLsappears. And that too Ls wrong.
Secondly, even Lf self-realLsatLon were always worthwhLle and never tLed to
by contrast wLth lLfe - there are exaMpLes of value whLch fall beyond
evLl
(Ln
presented
often
seLf-reaLLsatLon. A certaLn sort of dLrectLon Ls
bLocheMLstry texts Lnterested Ln explaLnLng lLfe) as a MLnLMal condLtLon of lLfe
of an organLsr1 or syster1: caLL that dLrectLon, s·eLf-dLrecti.on. Thus, deep
ecology, Lnsofar as Lt values (just) LLfe, values (just) self-dLrectLon. In
these terMs, the contractLon froM seLf-dLrectLon to self-realLsatLon, as Ln
Ecosophy T, Looks LLke a M~stake. A s~r1LLar M~stake appears to underLLe
contractLons to ecologLcal conscLousness (as Ln Devall); for self-realLsatLon
Looks rer1arkabLy L~ke consc~ous seLf-d~rectLon, roughly an LntersectLon of
seLf-dLrectLon wLth conscLousness.
The argur1ents asser1bLed thus underMLne both of what Devall presents as the
uLtLMate norMs of deep ecology', nar1eL~eLf-reaLLsatLon and bLocentrLsM.
'These are not proved but "felt"' (83, p.5). But they are not felt, at least by
those who perceLve value beyond what lLves; rather they are dLsproved, by a
serLes of counterexar1ples to each as uLtLr1ate norr1s. (CrLtLque, pp.2~-5)
In partLcular presentatLons of a partLcular phLLosophy froM whLch the
Naess-SessLon platforM Ls derLved, naMely Ecosophy r' I use a Model where
'Self-realLzaHon!' and sLr1LLar short forr1uLatLons are taken to express a top
norr1 of a norr1atLve systeM.
~e r1ay artLcuLate 'r1odeLs' of a very cor1prehensLve norr1atLve syster1, and
use Lt to explore the LnterrelatLons of our own vLews and those of others. I
have extensLvely used a Model of a cor1prehensLve yLew I call 'Ecosophy r ·' and I
use only one top norM whLch on the Most crude ser1antLcaL Level Ls expressed by a
one word sentence 'seLf-realLzatLon! '.
A r1aLn LnspLratLon for - the choLce cor1es froM the use of the terN by
GandhL. Another MaLn LnspLratLon Ls the strong trend Ln Uestern LndustrLaL
states towards an LndLvLdualLsM favourLng lLfe as a Long ego-trLp full of
'happenLngs' . In France there Ls a group of 'egologLsts' , the nar1e beLng chosen
as a contrast to 'ecologLsts ' : ~hatever the reLatLons between LndLvLdual beLngs,
huMan nature Ls such that the egocentred Lnterests of each of us Ls stronger
than any other. To foster the kLnds of soLLdar~ty the pol~t~cal left ~s taLkLng
about, or the soLLdarLty wLth other lLfe forMs wh~ch . ecologLsts (the greens)
preach, w~ll therefore never succeed and ~s apt to hurt the LndLvLduaL .
' seLf-reaL~zatLon!' Ls a norM that LnLtLaLLy arLses vLvLd Lnterest aMong
those who are LnfLuenced by the ego-trLp trend, but are then astonLshed and
bewLLdered by the d~stLnctLons between ego, self and Self. Th~s ~s new to Most
of theM and they are often Led to recons~der theLr LndLvLduaL~st posLtLon. ThLs
reconsLderLng Ls for Me a confLrMatLon of the SocratLc value of the choLce of
forr1ulatLon.
The r1aLn poLnt Ln thLs connectLon Ls that huMans undergo a r1aturLn9
process, and only Lf thLs process coMes to a 'prer1ature' halt, LndentLfLcatLon
wLth others and solLdarLty faLL to develop. If we, as I do, add the SpLnozLst
(courageous) hypothes~s that the joy and equLMLndedness you exper~ence as a
Mature person ~s deeper and rLcher than that you exper~ence as an ~r1r1ature grown
'reaLLzaHon of the (wLde) Self!' gets to be an ~nstructi.ve and ~nsp~rLng
up,
-22-
forMu l,a.
The Self-realLzatLo n norM proposed by Me has been taken too serLously as Lf
one, two or three world expressLons were adequate phLLosophLcaL expressLons
of a hL9hest' norM. An adequate expressLon LMplLes that the LntrLcate subject
ego, se Lf, Se Lf ', that Ls, b Lo Log Lea L, soe La L and Hetaphys Lea L se Lf ar·e
dLstLnguLshed. Only Ln relatLon to a faLrly Large body of phLlosophLcaL analysLs
we can forMulate adequate phLlosophLcal prLncLples. It has always been that way.
(Notes on Sylvan, pp.17-19)
HY
0
6:
OH LIFESTYLE
The deep ecologLcal MoveMent Ls recruLted froM people who do not look upon
natural surroundLngs as a Means for recreatLon and repaLr. LLfe and work Ln
natural surroundLngs Ls a vLtal concern. The rLchness of that LLfe Ls so vast,
and the Means are so sLMple, that they have dLffLculty understandLng why others
seeM to need Means on a level of coMplLcatLon and sophLstLcatLon that Ls unLque
Ln the hLstory of [huMan]kLnd. They cannot but fLght agaLnst the acceleratLng
destructLon of nature due to the MaLntaLnLng and expandLng the productLon of
such Means. They do not thLnk people who serLousLy reflect upon the reLatLon
between Means and ultLMate LntrLnsLc values can justLfy the present polLcLes.
As an LllustratLon of dLfferent Means/end ratLos, coMpare the dLrect and
LndLrect technologLcal requLreMent of a faMLly wLth MeMbers froM 8 to 80 years
old lLvLng Ln a natural surroundLng and goLng cross-country skLLng together,
wLth that of a faMLly doLng slaloM at a bLg fashLonable skL
resort.
(PhLlosophLcal. Aspects, pp.35-6)
0
RLch Ln ends, sLMple Ln Means!.' HuMan Lnterference Ln the ecosphere can
only be reduced to tolerable levels Lf people, and especLally the average (or
econoMLcally above average) people of the LndustrLal states adopt lLfe styles
requLrLng sLMple MaterLal Means. ThLs Ls coMpatLble wLth or even favourable
towards rLchness of goals.
'Increase the sensLtLvLty to and apprecLatLon of what there Ls suffLcLent
of for all!' The educatLonal slogan fLghts agaLnst the confusLon of value wLth
Market value and prLce. A way to MaxLMLze our abLlLty to derLve deep
satLsfactLon froM the goods of whLch there stLll, Ls, or coul.d be, enough. The
present lLfe style of average people Ln LndustrLal socLetLes cannot be a global
lLfe style wLthout LrreversLble, colossal destructLon of condLtLons of LLfe on
Earth. (Hotes on PolLtLcs, p.2)
It ' s a shLft froM beLng doMLnated by Means, LnstruMents, gadgets, all the
Many thLngs we thLnk wLLl gLve us pleasure or Make us happy or perfect. The
shLft coMes about when we serLously ask ourselves, In what sLtuatLons do I
experLence the MaxLMUM satLsfactLon of MY whole beLng? and fLnd that we need
practLcally nothLng of what we are supposed to need for a rLght and fuLfLlLLng
LLfe. And Lf we Make that shLft toward a LLfe sLMple Ln Means but rLch Ln goals,
we are not threatened by the plans elaborated by envLronMentalL sts. For
Lnstance, we can see that, Lnstead of an ene~gy cr~s~s, we have a crLsLs of
consuMptLon - we have More than enough energy. There Ls no reason to contLnue
LncreasLng our consuMptLon of energy or of any of the other MaterLaL aspects of
lLfe. In countrLes lLke the UnLted States the crLsLs Ls rather one of LLfestyle,
of our tradLtLons of thoughtlessness and confusLon, or our LnabLLLty to questLon
what Ls and Ls not worthwhLLe Ln l,Lfe. ULthLn fLfty years, eLther we wLl,l, need a
dLctatorshLp to save what Ls Left of the dLversLty of LLfe forMs, or we wLLl
have a shLft of values, a shLft of our total vLew such that no dLctatorshLp wLLL
-23-
be . needed. It Ls thoroughly natural to stop doMLnatLng and expLoLtLng and
destroyLng the planet. A "sMooth" ~ay, LnvoLvLng harMonLous LLvLng wLth nature,
or a "rough" way, LnvoLvLng dLctatorshLp and coercion - those are the optLdns.
I tell people that, Lf they Make clear theLr fundaMentaL assuMptLons about
what Ls needed for a LLfe sLMpLe Ln Means and rLch Ln ends, they wLLL
necessarLLy coMe to the conctusLon that Lt Ls not tack of energy consuMptLon
that Makes theM unhappy. They can then oppose nuclear power wLthout havLng read
thLck books and wLthout knowLng the MyrLad facts that are used Ln newspapers and
perLodLcaLs. And they Must also fLnd others who feel the saMe and forM cLrcLes
of frLends who gLve one another confidence and support Ln lLvLng Ln a way that
the MajorLty fLnds rLdLcuLous, naLve, stupLd, and sLMpt~stLc. But Ln order to do
that, one Must already have enough seLf-confLdenc e to follow one's LntuLtLon - a
quaLLty very Much LackLng Ln broad sectLons of the populace. Most people follow
the trends and advertLseMents and becoMe phLLosophLcaL and ethLcaL crLpples.
I thLnk that, Ln the long run, Ln order to joyfully and wholeheartedly
partLcLpate Ln the deep ecology MoveMent you have to take your own LLfe very
seriously. People who successfully MaLntaLn a Low MaterLaL standard of lLvLng
and successfully cultLvate a deep, Lntense Lnner lLfe are Much better able to
consLstentLy MaLntaLn a deep ecoLogLcat vLew and to act on behalf of Lt. As 1·
sLt down and breathe deeply and just feel where I aM, I can ask Myself where and
when I really enjoy MY LLfe and what would be the MLnLMuM Means necessary to
MaLntaLn those enjoyable feelLngs and sLtuatLons. For exaMpLe, I Myself have
too eager to go cLLMbLng Ln the HLMaLayas, whereas the pecutLar
been
satLsfactLon I have as a MountaLneer could be had Ln Norway . If you concentrate
on what gLves you satLsfactLon, you wLLL fLnd that Lt can be obtaLned Much More
easLly and sLMply than we are educated to belLeve Ln our socLety, where bL99er,
More elaborate and More expensLve are always consLdered better.
The deveLopMent of sensLtLvLty toward the good thLngs whLch we already have
Ln suffLcLent quantLty Ls the true goal of educatLon. Not that we need to LLMLt
our desLres. I'M not for the sLMple lLfe, except Ln the sense of a tLfe sLMpLe
Ln Means but rLch Ln goals and values. I have treMendous aMbLtLon. Only the best
Ls good enough for Me. I LLke rLchness, and I feel rLcher than the rLchest
person when I'M Ln MY cottage Ln the country wLth water I've carrLed froM a
certaLn well and wood I've gathered froM the forest. Uhen you take a heLLcopter
to the SUMMLt of a MountaLn,° the vLew Looks LLke a postcard, and, Lf there ' s a
restaurant on the top, you wLll coMplaLn that the food Ls not properly Made.
~hereas Lf you struggle up froM the bottoM, you have thLs deep feeLLng of
satLsfactLon, and even sandwLches MLxed wLth skL wax and sand taste fantastLc.
(SLMple Ln Means, pp . 11-12)
(1) Use of s LMple Means, avoidance of unnecessary coMplLcated LnstruMents and
other sorts of Means.
(2) ChoLce of actLvLtLes Most dLrectLy servLng values Ln theMselves and havLng
LntrLnsLc value. AvoLdance of actLvLtLes whLch are Merely auxLlLary, havLng no
LntrLnsLc value , or beLng Many stages away froM fundaMentaL goals.
(3) AntL-consuMerLs M . ThLs negatLve attLtude follows froM (1) and (2).
(~) Endeavour to MaLntaLn and Lncrease the sensLtLvLty and apprecLatLon of goods
of whLch there Ls enough for all to enjoy. '
(5) Absence or low degree of novophLLL - the love of what Ls new Merely because
Lt Ls new.
(6) Effort to dwell Ln sLtuatLons of LntrLnsLc value and to act rather than
beLng busy .
(7) ApprecLatLon of ethnLc and cultural differences aMon9 people, not feelLn9
theM as threats .
(8) Concern about the sLtuatLon of the thLrd and fourth world and atteMpt to
-24-
avoLd a standard of LLvLng too Much dLfferent froM and hLgher than the needy.
(Global soLLdarLt y of LLfe style).
(9) ApprecLat Lon of LLfe styles whLch are unLversaL LzabLe, whLch are not
blatantly LMpossLbLe to sustaLn wLthout LnjustLce toward fellow huMans or other
specLes.
(10) To go for depth and rLchness of experLenc e rather than LntensLty .
(11) To apprecLat e and choose, when possLbLe, MeanLngfuL work rather than just
MakLng a LLvLng.
(12) To Lead a coMpLex, not a coMpLLca ted LLfe, tryLn9 to reaLLze as Many
aspects of posLtLve experLenc es as possLbLe wLthLn each tLMe-Lnte rvaL.
(13) CuLtLvatL ng LLfe Ln coMMunLty (GeMeLns chaft) rather than Ln socLety
(OeseLLs chaft}.
sMaLL scale
Ln prLMary productLo n
(14) ApprecLat Lon of or partLcLpa tLon
agrLcuLtu re, forestry, fLshLng.
(15) Effort to satLsfy vLtaL needs rather than desLres. (Paradox, pp.57-8)
In soMe Eastern tradLtLon s, the student Ls presented wLth a koan, a sLMpLe
story or stateMent whLch May sound paradoxLc aL or nonsensLc aL on the surface but
as the student turns and turns Lt Ln hLs or her MLnd, authentLc understan dLng
eMerges. ThLs dLrect actLon · of turnLng and turnLn9, seeLn9 froM dLfferent
perspectL ves and froM dLfferent depths, Ls requLred for the cuLtLvatL on of
conscLou sness. The koan-LLke phrase for deep ecology, suggested by proMLnen t
NorwegLan phLLosoph er Arne Naess Ls: ·sLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln ends.· (Deep
Ecology, p.10)
The LdeoLogLcaL change Ls MaLnLy that of apprecLat Lng LLfe quaLLty
Ln sLtuatLon s of Lnherent value) rather than adherLng to an
(dweLLLng
LncreasLn gLy hLgher standard of LLvLng. There wLLL be a profound awareness of
the dLfferenc e between bLg and great.
SoMe econoMLs ts crLtLcLze the terM "quaLLty of LLfe" because Lt Ls supposed
to be vague. But on closer LnspectLo n, what they consLder to be vague Ls
actuaLLy the non-quan tLtatLve nature of the terM. One cannot quantLfy adequatel y
what Ls LMportant for the quaLLty of LLfe as dLscussed here, and there Ls no
need to do so.
There Ls aMple rooM for dLfferent op~n~ons about prLorLtLe s: what should be
done fLrst, what next? What Cs Most urgent? What Ls necessary as opposed to what
Ls hL9hLy desLrabLe ? But the dLfferenc es do not exclude vLgorous cooperatL on.
~hat Ls gaLned froM tentatLve Ly forMuLatL ng basLc vLews shared today by
Most or all supporter s of the deep ecology MoveMent? Hopefully Lt Makes Lt a
LLttLe easLer to LocaLLze the MoveMent aMong the Many 'aLternat Lve' MoveMents.
Hopefully thLs does not Lead to LsoLatLon but rather to even better cooperatL on
wLth Many other aLternatL ve MoveMents. It MLght also Make soMe of us More clear
about where we stand, and More clear about whLch dLsagreeM ents MLght profLtabL y
be reduced and whLch ones MLght profLtabL y be sharpened . After aLL dLversLt y!'
Ls a hLgh Level norM! (BasLc, p.6,9)
0
A set of platforM forMulatL on should be vague and aMbLguous enough to be
capable or rather dLfferen t phLLosoph LcalLy relevant Lnterpret atLons. The
prLncLpLe s of Lnterpret atLon of pLatforMs of MoveMents reseMbLe those of
Lnterpret atLon of Laws. Vagueness Ls here essentLaL prLMarLLy because those
appLyLng the Laws Must have soMe freedoM Ln adaptLng theM to ever changLng
cLrcuMst ances, but also because the forMuLatL on Must slur over, or abstract froM
MLnor dLfferenc es of relevant opLnLon aMon9 those who have supported the Lssue
of the Law. On the other hand, the Lnterpret atLon of the text of a phLLosop her
reseMbLes that of a testaMent ( 'wLLL' ). Exactly what the testator Lntends Ls the
-25-
sole crLterLon of correctness of the LnterpretatLon . Uhether hLs or her
terMLnology Ls abhorent or crazy Ls Lrrelevant. (Hates on Sylvan, pp.10-11)
7:
ON BIOREGIOHALISM
The central eleMent of bLoregLon Ls the LMportance gLven to natural systeMs
"both as the source of physLcal nutrLtLon and as the body of Metaphors froM
whLch our spLrLts draw sustenance. To understand natural systeMs Ls to begLn an
understandLng of the self."
A second eleMent of bLoregLon Ls setf-regulatLo n: •anarchy doesn't Mean out
Lt Means out of theLr control.• Local coMMunLtLes LnspLred by a
control;
of
shared concern for the bLoregLon, for "tettLng be• the plants and natLve anLMals
of that place, ~an Make decLsLons concernLng LndLvLduat and coMMunat actLons
whLc respect the LntegrLty of natural processes Ln that place. CarLng for a
place Means avoLdLng exptoLtatLon.
thLrd eleMent coMposLng the bLoregLonal notLon Ls spLrLt. • There Ls no
sLngle relLgLous practLce for thLs sense of bLoregLonat spLrLt. It can be
ChrLstLan, BuddhLst, NatLve AMerLcan or others; based on deep ecologLcal
LnsLghts, Lt can be expressed Ln nuMerous ways. (Deep Ecology, pp.21-22)
·A
UhLte the bLoregLonal, MLnorLty tradLtLon seeMs approprLate to us for
cuttLvatLng ecotogLcal conscLousness, atlowLng for bLologLcat dLversLty wLth
sLMplLcLty of Means, there are tough, practLcat decLsLons to Make. ConsLstent
wLth our uttLMate norMs, Lt seeMs that one prLncLple Ls protectLon of endangered
specLes of plants and anLMals as part of the general norM of unLty Ln dLversLty.
Another norM Ls bLoregLonal responsLbLlLty . The local coMMunLty Ls the place for
decLsLons. However, what happens when a local COMMunLty's needs conflLct wLth
the norM of protectLng specLes dLversLty?
Such a sLtuatLon occurred on the north slope of Alaska where natLve EskLMos
were huntLng bowhead whales Ln the 1970s. The InternatLonat UhatLng Co~MLssLon
ruled that thLs was an endangered specLes of whale and consLdered a total ban on
the kLttLng of bowhead. However, the natLve EskLMos pleaded that Lt was part of
theLr tradLtLon to kLtt whales. TheLr Myths and tLfestyle were dependent on Lt.
It they dLdn't kLll whales they would be More dependent on canned Meat froM the
"tower forty-eLght": gLven theM by welfare departMents. ThLs soMewhat sptLt the
envLronMentalL sts . Many groups supported a total ban on the kLllLng of bowheads
untLl ecologLsts deterMLned that theLr poputatLon had "suffLcLently Lncreased, •
but FrLends of the Earth took the posLtLon that EskLMos be allowed to take a
regulated nuMber of bowheads usLng theLr tradLtLonal Methods (no advanced
technology for kLtlLng theM was allowed).
Arne Haess provLdes an exaMple froM the bLoregLon ·of northern Horway where
farMers and herders, through expansLon of farMs and nuMber of sheep , were
rapLdty encroachLng on habLtat of wolves and bears. SoMe suggested kLllLng all
bears sLnce a few bears seeMed to be eatLng soMe sheep. But others suggested
LdentLfyLng the probleM More carefully. Uas a specLfLc bear becoMLng More and
More Lnterested Ln sheep? Could that bear be entLced to refraLn froM eatLng
sheep? Could Lt be reMoved to another tocat(on? Could the farMers agree to keep
theLr sheep out of areas where bears were known to have dens or graze? Only as a
last resort would the coMMunLty consLder the optLon of kLllLng that bear.
ThLs approach Ls Ln great contrast wLth that favoured by soMe ranchers and
such as wolves,
farMers Ln the AMerLcan Uest . Uhen a •predator" Ls defLned
to elLMLnate Lt,
undertaken
are
efforts
systeMLc
then
etc.
coyotes, eagles,
poLson •1oso",
of
spreadLng
LncludLng aerLal huntLng of wolves (Ln Alaska),
-26-
shootLn g eagles wLth hLgh-po wered rLfles and destroyL ng habLtat (dennLng areas,
rLparLan habLtat of rats, etc.). (Deep Ecology , pp.148- 9)
DasMann wrLtes about "bLoregL onalLsM " and •ecodeve lopMent " for the peoples
of
of AfrLca and the South PacLfLc , and refers approvL ngly to the concept
Ln
are
("~e
House
Lynn
and
e
6orslLn
"future prLMLtL ve• develop ed by Jerry
another
to
ve
prLMLtL
transLtL on froM one condLtL on of syMbLot Lc balance - the
a
whLch we wLll call future prLMLtLve ... a condLtL on havLng the attrLbu tes of
Mature ecosyste M: stable, dLverse , Ln syMbLot Lc balance agaLn") . OasMann
dLstLng uLshes between what he calls ecosyste M people and bLosphe re people:
"Ecosyst eM people lLve wLthLn a sLngle ecosyste M, or at Most two or three
M
adjacen t and closely related ecosyste Ms. They are depende nt upon that ecosyste
BLosphe re people draw theLr support , not froM the
for theLr survLva l
resource s of any one ecosyste M, but froM the entLre bLosphe re. BLosphe re people
can exert LncredL ble pressure upon an ecosyste M they wLsh to exploLt , and create
great devastat Lon - soMethL ng that would be LMpossLble or unthLnk able for people
who were depende nt upon that partLcu lar ecosyste M ... BLosphe re people create
a
natLona l parks. Ecosyste M people have always lLved Ln the equLval ent of
at
natLona l park ... I propose that the future belongs to those who can regaLn,
a hLgher level, the old sense of balance and belon9Ln 9 between Man and nature
(ecosyst eM people) .· (SessLo ns, pp-~18- 19)
A bLoregL on Ls a part of earth's surface whose rough boundar Les are
deterML ned by natural rather than huMan dLctate s, dLstLng uLshable froM other
and
areas by attrLbu tes of flora, fauna, water, clLMate , soLls, and land-for Ms,
The
to.
rLse
the huMan settleM ents and culture s those attrLbu tes have gLven
borders between such areas are usually not rLgLd - Nature works wLth More
flexLbL lLty and fluLdLty than that - but the general contour s of the regLons
theMselv es are not hard to LdentLfy , and Lndeed wLll probabl y be felt,
and
understo od, sensed, or Ln soMe way known to Many of the LnhabLt ants,
,
partLcu larly those rooted Ln the land, farMers , rancher s, hunters and fLshers
n,
AMerlca
of
face
the
across
foreste rs and botanLs ts, and Most especLa lly,
the
trlbal Indlans, those stLll Ln touch wLth a culture that for centurl es knew
earth as sacred and Lts well-beL ng as LMperat Lve.
The wLdest regLon, takLng Lts charact er froM the broades t Measure s of
natLve vegetatL on and soLl contour s, May be called the ecore9Lo n and wLll
general ly cover several hundred thousand s of square Mlles. But wlthln these
ecoregL ons Lt Ls easy to dLstLngu Lsh other coheren t terrLtor Les that defLne
a
theMselv es prLMarL ly by theLr surface feature s - a watersh ed, or rLver basLn,
the
valley, a desert, a plateau , a MountaLn range - and whLch we May all call
stLll
locate
often
can
one
turn,
Ln
9eore9L on. And wLthLn these 9eore9L ons,
sMaller areas, of perhaps several thousand square MLles dLscret e and Ldentof
LfLable wLth theLr own topograp hLes and LnhabLt ants, theLr own varLatLo ns
huMan culture and agrLcul ture, to whLch we May gLve the · naMe vLtaregL on. Uhether
we speak of ecoregL on or 9eore9Lo n or vLtaregL on, after all, we speak of bLoregLons , and Lt Ls that essentL al archetyp e that Ls Most LMporta nt to coMprehend. For once that Ls done on any sLgnLfL cant scale then the Matter of MakLng
to
dLstLnc tLons and creatLn g huMan LnstLtut Lons to Match theM can be safely left
best.
theM
the LnhabLt ants, the dweller s on the land, who wLll always know
The econoMy that coMes lnto belng wlthln a
charact er froM the condLtL ons, the laws of Nature.
what we can be sald to know wLth soMe surety
llvlng on the soLl has been cogently SUMMarLsed as
be dLstLng uLshed, froM the laws of TherMod ynaMLcs .
The
flrst
law
ls
that
conserv atlon,
bloreglo n also derlves lts
Our Lgnoranc e Ls LMMense, but
after these Many centurL es of
the laws of EcodynaMLcs - to
preserv atlon,
-27-
sustena nce, ls the
central goat of the natural world, hence Lts fundaMentat resLstance to largescale structural change; the second law Ls that, far froM beLng entropLc Nature
Ls Lnherently stable, workLng Ln all tLMes and places toward that ecology calls
a ctLMax, that Ls, a balanced, harMonLous, LntegratLve state of MaturLty whLch,
once reached, Ls MaLntaLned for prolonged perLods. FroM thLs Lt follows that a
bLoregLonal econoMy would seek to MaLntaLn rather than exploLt the natural
world, accoMModate to the envLronMent, rather than resLst Lt; Lt would atteMpt
to create condLtLons for a clLMax, a balance, for what soMe econoMLsts have
recently taken to callLng a "steady state," rather than for perpetual change and
contLnuat growth, Ln servLce to "progress", a false and delusory goddess Lf ever
there was one. It would, Ln practLcat terMs, MLnLMLse resource use, eMphasLse
conservatLon and recyclLng, avoLd poltutLon and waste. It would adopt Lts
systeMs to the gLven bLoregLonal resources - energy based on wLnd, for exaMple,
where Nature catted for that, or wood where that was approprLate, and food based
on what the regLon Ltself - partLcularly Ln Lts natLve, pre-agrLcutturat state could grow.
And thus Lt would be based, above all, on the Most eleMentat and Most
elegant prLncLpte of the natural world, that of setf-suffLcLency. Just as Nature
does not depend on trade, does not create elaborate networks of contLnentat
for the
dependency, so the bLoregLon would fLnd all Lts needed resources
Lts own
wLthLn
luxury
Manufacture,
craft,
energy, food, shelter, clothLng,
thus
beLng
envLronMent. And far froM Lt beLng deprLved, far froM Lt
LMpoverLshed, Lt would gaLn Ln every Measure of econoMLc health. It would be
More stable, free froM booM-and-bust cycles and dLstant potLtLcat crLses; Lt
would be able to plan, to allocate at the safest pace, Ln the Most ecotogLcal
Manner_ It would not be at the Mercy of dLstant and uncontrollable natLonal
bureaucracLes and transnatLonal governMents, and thus More self regardLng, More
cohesLve, developLng a sense of place, of COMMunLty of coMradeshLp, and the
prLde that coMes froM stabLlLty, control, coMpetence, and Lndependence.
In one of hLs More prescLent perceptLons FrLtz SchuMacher reatLsed that the
Market econoMy of twentLeth century capLtatLsM erred fundaMentatty, because Lt
erred repeatedly, agaLnst Nature. "It Ls Lnherent Ln the Methodology of
econoMLcs to Lgnore Man's dependence on the natural world," he wrote. "The
Market represents only the surface of socLety and Lts sLgnLfLcance relates to
the MOMentary sLtuatLon as Lt exLsts there and then. There Ls no probLng Lnto
the depths of thLngs, Lnlo the natural or socLat facts that lLe behLnd theM. •
And thLs Ls why, as he poLnts out, conventLonal econoMLcs Makes no dLstLnctLons
at all between prLMary goods, "whLch Man has to wLn froM nature," and secondary
goods Manufactured froM theM, or between renewable or nonrenewable resources, or
the envLronMental and socLal costs of developLng one agaLnst the other. A bLothese
regLonal econoMy, Ln sharpest contrast, Makes - Ln fact Ls grounded Ln
vLtal dLstLnctLons.
PolLtLcal prLncLples on a bLoregLonal scale are also grounded Ln the
dLctates presented by Nature, Ln whLch what Ls forever valued are not the
LMperatLves of gLgantLsM, centralLzatLon, hLerarchy, and MonolLthLcLty, but
rather, Ln starkest contraposLtLon, those of scale, decentralLsatLon, dLvLsLon,
and dLversLty.
The lessons are obvLous, and suggest LMMedLately the desLgn for a bLoregLon as for a contLnent of bLoregLons. Each unLt, of the sL2e that the natural
settLngs proMote, May be unLfLed and cohesLve - startLng froM the base up wLth a
neLghbourhood, a coMMUnLty, a sMatl town, att tLvLng sLde-by-sLde wLth others Ln
settled and Mutual pattern, together wLth coMprLsLng a vLtare9Lon; and that
a
vLtaregLon May have Lts own unLfLcatLon and cohesLveness, Lts own Method of
governance, and yet lLve sLde-by-sLde wLth other regLons, organLsed as they May
-28-
see fLt; and so on, outward, Ln selfsuffLcLent collaboratLon, unLt upon unLt,
for so long as the natural boundarLes May perMLt and the natural affLnLtLes be
kept Lntact.
SLMLlar lessons May be derLved froM the patterns of huHan nature. Thus
throughout all huMan hLstory people have tended to lLve Ln separate and
Lndependent groups, a "fragMentatLon of huMan socLety· that Harold Isaccs has
descrLbed as soMethLng akLn to •a pervasLve force Ln huMan affaLrs and always
has been.• Even when natLons and eMpLres have arLsen, he notes, they have no
stayLng power agaLnst the Lnnate huMan drLve to fragMentatLon.
In a bLoregLonal socLety, the dLvLsLon between urban and rural, LndustrLal
and agrLcuttural, populatLon and resources, would be replaced by an equLLLbrLuM,
a syMbLosLs. On the one hand, the cLty would be necessary as a producer of
certaLn kLnds of goods, as a centre of artLstLc culture, as a source of the
asseMbled cLvLc vLrtues, though the cLty need not be of LMMense sLze - Lndeed,
no larger than 50,000 or 100,000 people - and Ln fact Ldeally would replLcate
rather than grow so that Lnstead of a sLngle MetropolLs there would be a
MultLplLcLty of cLtLes of Modest sLzes scattered throughout the bLoregLon. On
the other hand, the country would be necessary as the prLMe source of food and
water and the HaterLals of shelter and clothLng and artLsanshLp and trade, and
especLatty as the eMbodLHent of the bLoregLonal spLrLt of Gaea, whose presence
should be felt daLly by the LnhabLtants of every settleMent, of whatever sLze.
BLoregLonalLsM Ls no More than the Modern versLon of a very old perceptLon of
the world held not Merely by the Greeks but by vLrtually every prelLterate
socLety of whLch we have knowledge. (Sate, 167-72)
8:
TECHNOLOGY
The qualLty of huMan exLstence and huMan welfare should not be Measured
of products. Technology Ls returned to Lts ancLent place as an
quantLty
by
only
approprLate tool for huMan welfare, not an end Ln Ltself. There should be a
rapLd MoveMent toward "soft• energy paths and "approprLate technology~ and toward lLfestytes whLch wLll result Ln drastLc decrease Ln per capLta energy consuMptLon Ln advanced LnductrLal socLetLes whLcl LncreasLng approprLate energy Ln
decentralLzed vLllages Ln so-called "thLrd world" natLons. Deep ecologLst5 are
coMMLtted to rapLd MOVeMent to a •steady-state• or •conservor socLety· both froH
ethLcal prLncLples of har~onLous LntegratLon of huMans wLth nature and froM apprecLatLon of ecologLcal realLtLes. IntegratLon of sophLstLcated, elegant, unobtrusLve, ecologLcalty sound, approprLate technology wLth greatly scaled down,
dLversLfLed, organLc, labor-LntensLve agrLculture, huntLng, and gatherLng Ls
another goal. (Deep Ecology pp.311-12)
QuestLonLng technology Ls a process of dLrect actLon that anyone can develop. It Ls one of the Host serLous act Lons that can ·be taken Ln a technocratLc
socLety where the assuMptLon that •technology wLll solve all probleMs• Ls so
deeply held.
as a systeM or as a specLfLc devLce such as a
To questLon technology
coMputer - can often arouse hostLlLty, defena
certaLn type of vehLcle or
sLveness, LrrLtatLon, and resentMent Ln lLsteners. Anyone who questLons technology can be branded a "LuddLte" or antLModernLst. A person who says ·no to
any technologLcal devLce Ls often charged as beLng antLprogressLve. Yet Ls
crucLat to questLon technology, Ln spLte of these crLtLcLsMs.
~e need technology whLch Ls coMpatLble wLth the growth of autonoMous, selfdeterMLnLng LndLvLduats Ln nonhLerarchLcal coMHunLtLes. ~e need prLncLples that
wLll help us escape the trap of technocratLc socLety, where technology Ls the
-29-
central LnstLtutLon.
Technology can be crLtLcLzed and evaluated based on general prLncLples,
scale or structure. The followLng questLons can be asked of any technologLcal
devLce or systeM:
I. Does thLs technologLcal devLce serve vLtal needs?
2. ls thLs devLce or systeM of the sort that can be LMMedLately understood by
nonexperts?
3. Does Lt have a hLgh degree of flexLbLlLty and MutabLlLty or does Lt LMpose a
perManent, rLgLd, LrreversLble LMprLnt on the lLves of cLtLzens?
local
~- Does thLs technologLcal devLce or systeM foster greater autonoMy of
coMMunLtLes or greater dependency on soMe centralLzed "authorLty"?
5. ls thLs devLce or systeM ecologLcally destructLve or conducLve to a deep
ecology way of lLfe?
6. Does thLs devLce or systeM enhance the LndLvLdualLty of persons or does Lt
lead to bureaucratLc hLerarchLes?
7. Does thLs devLce or systeM encourage people to behave and thLnk lLke
MachLnes?
A fully LnforMed, approprLate technology Ls a MeetLng ground of ethLcs ,
polLtLcs, MechanLcal understandLng and deep ecologLcal conscLousness. As Langdon
WLnner concludes Ln AutonoMous Technology, "If one lacks a clear and knowledgeable sense of what Means are approprLate lo the cLrcuMstances at hand, one's
These Means do not
choLce of Means can easLly lead to excesses and danger.
Lnvolve just narrow utLlLty or effLcLency of productLon or profLt Ln soMe
short-terM calculatLon. Indeed, the narrow eMphasLs upon effLcLency of Means
drLves us away froM the larger Lssues of envLronMental ethLcs asnd LndLvLdual
responsLbLlLty for the consequences of our actLons. (Deep Ecology, pp.35-6)
Shallow approach: AcceptLng LndustrLalLzatLon of the kLnd ManLfested Ln the
West as the natural goal for developLng countrLes. Low estLNatLon of deep
cultural dLfferences wLth sLgnLfLcant devLatLons froM Western standards. Deep
approach: SocLal and cultural dLversLty of dLfferent specLes Ls an essentLal
IntensLfLed Measures to
part of general rLchness and varLatLon of lLfe forMs.
exLstLng non-LndustrLal
stLll
lLMLt the LMpact of Western technology upon
cultures . Defence of the fourth world agaLnst cultural foreLgn doMLnatLon.
PolLtLcal and econoMLc polLcLes Ln favour of subcultures and MLnorLtLes Ln
LndustrLalLzed socLetLes. Support of local and soft technologLes as a Means to
MaLntaLn baste cultural assessMent of technLcal LnnovatLon. Due regard to anLMal
socLetLes and cultures. SurvLval of populatLons does not ensure survLval of
socLal LnstLtutLons . QuestLonLng whether so-called advanced, Modern technologLes
are approprLate relatLve to levels of pollutLon, resources, populatLon and as
subordLnate part of general culture. (PhLlosophLcal Aspects, pp.12-13)
Technology Ls More helpless than ever because the technology beLng produced
doesn ' t fulfLll baste huNan needs, such as MeanLngful work Ln a MeanLngful
envLronMent . TechnLcal progress Ls shaM progress because the terM technLcal
progress Ls a cultural, not a technLcal, terM . Our culture Ls the only one Ln
the hLstory of MankLnd Ln whLch the culture has adjusted Ltself to the
technology, rather than vLce versa. (SLMple ' Ln Means, p.11)
Once the scLentLfLc probleMs have been solved, once Lt Ls understood how a
partLcular forM of pollutLon arLses and Ln what Lts danger consLsts, the next
probleM Ls technologLcal : to dLscover a Method of reducLng thLs LncLdence. That
Lnvolves decLdLng, Ln the fLrst place, whLch of the causatLve factors Lt wLll be
easLest to control . KnowLng, for exaMple, that the Los Angeles sMog Ls a joLnt
product of the sLtLng of Los Angeles, Lts hours of sunlLght and the exhaust
-30-
fuMes froM the LnternaL coMbustLon engLne, Lt Ls at once apparent that onLy the
thLrd of these Lf controLLabLe at a toLerabLe cost. So what has to be Lnvented
Ls a devLce whLch wLLL reduce the output of hydrocarbons Ln exhaust fuMes. ThLs
constLtutes a technoLogLcaL probLeM, the soLutLon to whLch LLes Ln the LnventLon
of a devLce whLch wouLd satLsfy partLcuLar technLcaL specLfLcatLons . (The word
devLce' Ls h~re beLng used Ln a very broad sense; an LnsectLcLde Ls a devLce
and so Ls the sterLLLsLng of Lnsects as a Means of bLoLogLcaL control.)
0
The Ldea of a 'technoLogLcaL soLutLon' Ls, however, a good deaL Less
straLghtforward than Lt at fLrst appears to be, as the phrase I used above 'at a
toLerabLe cost' aLready hLnts. It Ls very easy to thLnk up technLcaL soLutLons
of ecoLogLcaL probLeMs Lf we consLder theM Ln LsoLatLon~ and Lf we defLne a
technLcaL soLutLon, wLthout any reference to costs, as one whLch descrLbes a way
of freeLng ourselves froM the ecoLogLcaL condLtLon whLch concerns us. Such a
soLutLon Ls soMetLMes saLd to be 'practLcaL' but not 'operatLonal'. So Los
AngeLes sMog could be reduced Ln LntensLty by roofLng over the entLre cLty, or
by MakLng everybody use pubLLc transport, or by substLtutLng fuel-ceLls, Ln
theLr present state of developMent, for Lnternal coHbustLon engLnes. But few
wouLd serLousLy advance these proposals as 'solutLons', as satLsfactory ways of
deaLLng wLth the sMog probleM. ~hy not? SLMply because the costs, or so Lt Ls
w~deLy beLLeved, wouLd be too great, costs of varLous sorts, socLal, ecologLcal,
econoMLc and poLLtLcaL.
In so far as ecologLcaL probleMs can be solved only wLth the help of
scLentLfLc dLscovery and technoLogLcaL LnventLon, they can be soLved only wLthLn
the ~estern ratLonal tradLtLons. That Much Ls obvLous. MystLcaL conteMplatLon
wLlL not reveal to the cheMLst the orLgLns of the Los Angeles sMog or enabLe the
engLneer to desLgn an effectLve devLce for reducLng Lts LntensLty. But Lt Ls a
enthusLasM
proper crLtLcLsM of ~estern socLety that, Ln Lts - often chLldLsh
for technoLogLcaL 'advance', Lt has faLled adequateLy to consLder the costs of
LntroducLng new devLces and has defLned 'costs' far too narrowly.
ThLs objectLon can be dLrected, even, agaLnst antL-pollutLon devLces. The
Manufacture of such devLces wLLL norMaLLy create · More polLutLon. It May, by
ModLfyLng the character of the poLlutant, Lntroduce new dangers - reducLng the
percentage of carbon MonoxLde Ln exhaust fuMes whLle LncreasLng the percentage
of the no Less dangerous nLtrogen dLoxLde. Or Lt May shLft the LncLdence of the
poLLutLon froM a weaLthLer to a poorer coMMunLty - ManufacturLng sMokeless fueLs
Ln an LndustrLaL town to Make the London aLr cLeaner - wLthout reducLng Lts
total voLuMe. Any technoLogLcal LnnovatLon, furtherMore, LnvoLves an eleMent of
ecoLoe LcaL rLsk; Lt Ls LMpossLbLe to calculate all Lts consequences Ln every
possLbLe cLrcuMstance. The best the technologLst can do Ls to exclude effects
whLch are already known to be dangerous and to LnvestLgate further effects whLch
are suspect . That Ls why, as I saLd earLLer, caLlLng upon the technologLst to
save us Ls so often equated wLth caLLLng Ln the devLL as an exorcLst.
But Lt wouLd be quLte wrong to conclude that for the reasons just advanced
the technologLcaL Method of overcoMLng ecoLogLcaL probleMs would be abandoned,
that what ~estern socLetLes should do Ls to shut down factorLes, Let us say,
rather than LnsLst on theLr reducLng, by technoLogLcal Means, theLr eMLssLon of
pollutants. For econoMLc and socLaL rLsks ~ and, Ln the end, greater ecoLogLcal
rLsks Lf the socLaL resentMent engendered by the closure Ls dLrected agaLnst the
whoLe systeM of ecoLogLcaL controls. It, too, May do no More than shLft the
LncLdence of poLLutLon froM rLcher to poorer regLons, as the factory-owner takes
hLs capLtal elsewhere. To gLve up takLng any rLsks would be to gLve up actLng .
Every actLon costs soMethLng, rLsks soMethLng. Uhat can properLy be deManded Ls
not that Men should cease to act Ln ways whLch LnvoLve ecologLcal rLsks - there
are no such ways, as Matters now stand, whatever the sLtuatLon Ln the Garden of
-31-
Eden - but rather that they shouLd take More account of the ecoLogLcaL costs and
benefLts of theLr actLon. And thLs Means, once agaLn, that they wLLL hav~ to
Make fuLLer use of ratLonaL Western-type Methods, cost benefLt anaLyses or
decLsLon-procedures. (PassMore, pp.~8-50)
EcoLogLcaL resLsters do not accept that there are onLy narrow technLcaL
soLutLons to narrowLy defLned socLal probLeMs (such as aLr poLLutLon). These
probLeMs are seen onLy as syMptoMs of the Larger Lssues.
There are three MaLn dangers to technocratLc soLutLons. FLrst Ls the danger
Ln beLLevLng there Ls a coMpLete or acceptabLe soLutLon usLng Modern doMLnant
LdeoLogLes and technoLogy. The second danger Ls the presentatLon of an
LMpressLon that soMethLng Ls beLng done when Ln fact the reaL probLeM contLnues.
reaL work". FLnaLLy, there Ls the danger of
TLnkerLng dLstracts froM the
assuMLng there wLLL be new experts - such as professLonaL ecoLogLsts - who wLLL
provLde the soLutLon but who May Ln fact be constraLned to be pubLLc reLatLons
spokespersons for the agenda of profLt or power of soMe corporatLon or agency.
EcoLogLcaL resLstance Ls actLon froM centraL prLncLpLes of doLng what Ls
necessary, of wLtnessLng nonvLoLentLy. It arLses froM a shLft Ln conscLouness.
EcoLogLcaL resLstLng Ls deeper, soMe wouLd say More radLcaL,. than just
reforMLsM. SoMe of the reforMLst actLons to MLtLgate soMe of the worse forMs of
aLr and water poLLutLon (due to auto exhaust, for exaMpLe) are MotLvated by
concern onLy for huMan heaLth and safety and not by the LntrLnsLc vaLues of the
bLosphere. But th LLMLts of reforMLSM are by now weLL known. (Deep EcoLog~,
pp.195-6)
In tryLng to exaMLne technoLogy and productLon, we encounter a curLous
paradox. ~e are deepLy rLven by a great sense of proMLse about technLcaL
LnnovatLon, on the one hand, and by a thorough sense of dLsenchantMent wLth Lts
resuLts, on the other. ThLs duaL attLtude not onLy refLects a confLLct Ln the
popuLar LdeologLes concernLng technoLogy but aLso expresses strong doubts about
the nature of the Modern technologLcaL LMagLnatLon LtseLf. We are puzzLed that
the very LnstruMents our MLnds have conceLved and our hands have created can be
so easLly turned agaLnst us, wLth dLsastrous resuLts for our weLL-beLng
Lndeed, for our very survLval as a specLes.
Techne, Moreover, covered a wLder scope of experLence than the Modern word
technLcs. The goaL of techne Ls not restrLcted to MereLy "LLvLng weLL. or lLvLng
wLthLn the lLMLt. Techne LncLudes LLvLng an ethLcaL LLfe accordLng to an
orLgLnatLve and orderLng prLncLple conceLved as "potency". VLewed even Ln an
LnstruMental sense, techne thus encoMpasses not MereLy raw MaterLaLs, tooLs,
MachLnes, and products but aLso the producer - Ln short, a hLghly sophLstLcated
subject froM whLch aLL eLse orLgLnates. To ArLstotle, the "Master-craftsMan" Ls
dLstLnguLshed subjectLveLy froM hLs apprentLces or assLstants by vLrtue of
honor, a sense of "why" products are created, and generaLLy a wLsdoM of thLngs
ArLstotLe
subject,
and phenoMena. By startLng wLth the ratLonaLLty of
productLon
the
to
estabLLshes a poLnt of departure for brLngLng ratLonaLLzatLon
of the object.
Modern LndustrLaL productLon functLons Ln precLseLy the opposLte way. Not
only Ls the Modern LMage of techne LLMLted to Mere technLcs Ln the LnstruMentaL
sense of the terM, but aLso Lts goaLs are LnextrLcabLy tLed to unLLMLted
Ls conceLved as LLMLtLess consuMptLon wLthLn the
productLon. "LLvLng weLL
fraMework of a totaLLy unethLcaL, prLvatLzed LeveL of seLf-Lnterest. TechnLcs,
not the producer and hLs or her ethLcaL standards
LncLudes
Moreover,
(proLetarLans, after aLL, servLce the Modern LndustrLal apparatus Ln totaL
anonyMLty) but the product and Lts constLtuLnts. The technLcaL focus shLfts froM
-32-
the subject to the object, froM the producer to the product, froM the creator to
the created. Honor, a sense of •why," and any generaL wLsdoM of thLngs and
phenoMena have no pLace Ln the worLd requLred by Modern Lndustry. ~hat reaLLy
counts Ln technLcs Ls effLcLency, quantLty, and an LntensLfLcatLon of the Labor
process. The specLous ratLonaLLty LnvoLved Ln producLng the object Ls foLsted on
the ratLonaLLzatLon of the subject to a poLnt where producer's subjectLvLty Ls
totally atrophLed and reduced to an object aMong objects. (BookchLn, pp.219-22)
9:
ON ECOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS
Deep ecoLogy Ls eMergLng as a way of developLng a new balance and harMony
between LndLvLduaLs, coMMunLtLes and aLl of Nature. It can potentLaLLy satsLfy
our deepest yearnLngs: faLth and trust Ln our Most basLc LntuLtLons; courage to
take dLrect actLon; joyous confLdence to dance wLth the sensuous harMonLes
dLscovered through spontaneous, playfuL Lntercourse wLth the rhythMs of our
bodLes, the rhythMs of fLowLng water, changes Ln the weather and seasons, and
the overaLL processes of LLfe on Earth.
The deep ecology MoveMent Lnvolves workLng on ourselves, what poetphLLosopher Gary Snyder caLls "the reaL work,• the work of reaLLy LookLng at
ourselves, of becoMLng More real. ThLs Ls the work we call cultLvatLng
ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. ThLs process LnvoLves becoMLng More aware of the
actuaLLty of rocks, wolves, trees, and rLvers - the cultLvatLon of the LnsLght
that everythLng Ls connected. CultLvatLng ecologLcal conscLousness Ls a process
of learnLng apprecLate sLLence and solLtude and redLscoverLng how to lLsten. It
Ls learnLng how to be More receptLve, trustLng, holLstLc Ln perceptLon, and Ls
grounded Ln a vLsLon of nonexploLtLve scLence and technology.
ThLs process Lnvolves beLng honest wLth ourselves and seekLng clarLty Ln
our LntuLtLons, then actLng froM cLear prLncLpLes, practLcLng seLf-dLscLpLLne
and workLng honestLy wLthLn our coMMunLty. It Ls sLMpLe but not easy work. Henry
DavLd Thoreau, nLneteenth-century naturalLst and wrLter, adMonLshes us, ·Let
your lLfe be a frLctLon agaLnst the MachLne. •
CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcal conscLousness Ls correlated wLth the cultLvatLon of
conscLence. CuLtural hLstorLan Theordore Roszak suggests Ln Person/PLanet
conscLousness, how LnstructLve the overLappLng
and
"conscLence
(1978),
sLMLLarLty of those two words Ls. FroM the new conscLousness we are gaLnLng of
ourseLves as persons perhaps we wLLL yet create a new conscLence, one whose
ethLcaL sensLtLvLty Ls at Least tuned to a sLgnLfLcant good, a sLgnLfLcant
evLL.
We beLLeve that huMans have a vLtaL need to cuLtLvate ecologLcaL conscLousness and that thLs need Ls related to the needs of the planet. At the saMe tLMe,
huMans need dLrect contact wLth untraMMeLed wLLderness, places undoMestLcated
for narrow huMan purposes.
Many people sense the needs of the pLanet and the need for wLLderness
preservatLon. But we need not be technLcal experts Ln order to cultLvate
ecotogLcal conscLousness, as Thoreau saLd, cuLtLvatLng ecotogLcaL conscLousness
requLres that "we front up to the facts and deterMLne to lLve our lLves
delLberately, or not at all." We belLeve that people can clarLfy theLr own
LntuLtLons, and act froM deep prLncLpLes.
Deep ecology Ls a process of even-deeper questLonLng of ourselves, the
assuMptLons of the doMLnant worLdvLew Ln our culture, and the MeanLng and truth
Ln our realLty. We cannot change conscLousness by only lLstenLng to others, we
Must Lnvolve ourselves. We Mu~t take dLrect actLon.
-33-
One hopeful poLLtLcaL MoveMent wLth deep ecology as a base Ls the Uest
GerMan Green poLLtLcaL party. They have as theLr slogan, "ue are neLther Left
nor rLght, we are Ln front.· Green poLLtLcs Ln Uest GerMany, and to soMe extent
Ln Great BrLtaLn, BeLgLuM and AustraLLa Ln the 1980s, goes beyond the
conventLonaL, tLberaL defLnLtLon of a party, coMbLnLng personal work (that Ls,
work on cLarLfyLng one's own character) and polLtLcal actLvLsM.
The Greens present a proMLsLng poLLtLcaL strategy because they encourage
the cultLvatLon of personal ecoLogLcaL conscLousness as well as address Lssues
of pubLLc polLcy. If the Greens propogate the bLocentrLc perspectLve - the
Lnherent worth of other specLes besLdes huMans - then they can help change the
current vLew whLch says we should use Nature only to serve narrow huMan
Lnterests.
CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Ln conteMporary socLetLes, however, Ls
a two-edged sword. Ue Must not be MLsLed by our zeaL for change so that we are
concerned only wLth the narrow self or ego. If we seek only personal redeMptLon
we could becoMe soLLtary ecologLcal saLnts aMong the Masses of those we MLght
cLassLfy as "sLnners" who contLnue to pollute. Change Ln persons requLres a
change Ln culture and vLce versa. We cannot Lgnore the personal arena nor the
socLaL, for our project Ls to enhance harMony wLth each other, the planet and
ourselves. (Deep Ecology, pp.7-1~)
~e began by suggestLng a varLety of specLfLc actLons whLch people can take
dLrected at reforMLng publLc polLcy, developLng bLoregLonal coMMunLtLes, and
cuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness. Ue return to the theMe of dLrect actLon.
~e have deMonstrated that deep ecology Ls not just a gaMe of ~bstract
theorLzLng. As a perspectLve Lt Ls lLved, danced, celebrated. It has resonance.
Ln part, cuLtLvatLng what
CuLtLvatLng ecoLogLcaL conscLousness Means,
Ls engaged Ln the
LnteLLect
RhapsodLc
Theodore Roszak caLLs rhapsodLc LntelLect.
process of LntegratLng LntelLect, body, and joyous eMotLon.
Based on the LnsLghts, uLtLMate norMs, prLncLples and theorLes of deep
ecology, the central practLcaL questLon Ls how do we becoMe More Mature persons,
gLven the constraLnts of th~s culture?
Ue suggest there Ls an LnterpLay between outward dLrect actLon and Lnward
dLrect actLon, between actLng on one's self and actLng Ln the world, wLth the
result of further and deeper MaturLty Ln the deep ecologLcaL sense of
LdentLfLcatLon wLth alL LLfe. There Ls no sharp break between Lnward and
outward. People take dLrectLon actLon froM dLrect ecoLogLcal prLncLpLes and they
becoMe More Mature through dLrect actLon. The Label we use for the type of
dLrect actLon Ln Lts outward forM Ls ecoLogLcaL resLstLng. (Deep Ecology, p.19~)
'Deep ecology', an envLronMental scLence broadsheet tells us, Ls Naess's
expressLon for an ecologLcaL awareness or conscLousness' . SpeLLLng deep ecology
out then becoMes a Matter of settLng down the types of conscLousness and
awareness and recognLtLon LnvoLved, SOMethLns that Ls done Ln a thoroughly
anthropocentrL c way, begLnnLng as foLLows: 'a conscLousness of the LMplLcatLons
of ecology for huMan beLng'. It Ls all Ln fact done Ln terMs of huMan responses,
fundaMentaLLy
Ls
approach
the
AccordLn9Ly
capacLtLes and psychology.
MLsconceLved. For deep ecology Ls not so anthropocentrL c, and Ls no More a
Matter of envLronMentaL psychology than Ls the value theory or MetaphysLcs whLch
are part of Lt. The psychoL09LcaL conversLon Ls LLke cLaLMLng that 'MarxLsM' Ls
an expressLon for socLaLLst conscLousness, or 'MusLc' for MusLco-LogLcal
awareness.
-34-
The conversLon of deep ecology Lnto awareness psychology, Lnto a certaLn
sort of exercLse Ln self-realLsatLon or 'lLberatLng ecologLcal conscLousness, or
conscLousness raLsLng', Ls open to sLMLlar objectLons. Ecology, deep or shallow
or systeMatLc, Ls not ego-trLppLng or a personal thLng. Granted those who do
have and share certaLn attLtudes and feelLngs to natural envLronMents are "uch
More lLkely to becoMe actLve supporters or followers of deep ecology or to adopt
a deeper ecologLcal stance. Even so such states as self-realLsatLon or
ecologLcal conscLousness are neLther necessary nor suffLcLent for thLs.
Such subjectLve states are not necessary because soMeone can beco"e a
supporter of deep ecology wLthout havLng attaLned, or Made any effort to attaLn,
these states. Thus consLder soMeone, a dedLcated naturalLst for Lnstance, who
has no deep Lnterest Ln or understandLng of huMan psychology or socLology so far
as these bear on the envLronMent. Such a person Ls a deep ecologLst, but lacks
ecologLcal conscLousness as Lt Ls explaLned. The case of Peter SLnger Ln the
anLMal lLberatLon "oveMent Ls LnstructLve; for SLnger goes out of hLs way to
explaLn hLs dLsLnterest, hLs coMparatLve lack of zoologLcal conscLousness, that
he does not LdentLfy wLth anLMals and so on, yet hLs LMpact for anLMal
lLberatLon has been Most sLgnLfLcant. Analogously, a Deeper SLnger need not be
Ln love wLth the Earth but feel rather Lsolated froM Lt and feel rLghtly that
Most of Lts LnhabLtants dLslLke hLM or are frLghtened by hLM. He May have lLttle
Ldea what Lt Ls lLke to be one of theM or a MountaLn, ... ; but he "ay have the
rLght values, adhere to the rLght phLlosophy and undertake the rLght sorts of
actLon and lLfestyle.
GenuLnely and specLfLcally deep ecologLcal conscLousness has not been well
descrLbed and Ls not partLcularly well defLned. And soMe of the requLreMents
LMposed upon Lt, whatever Lt aMounts to, render Lt LMpossLble. Thus Fox, echoLng
others, claLMs that 'to the extent that we perceLve boundarLes, we fall short of
a deep ecologLcal conscLousness'. Then we all fall short, sLnce we are regularly
confronted by, and perceLve, terrLtorLal boundarLes and a wLde range of other
deMarcatLon lLnes and contrasts. Indeed fallLng short Ls LnevLtable; for
hence
and
perceptLon necessarLly Lnvolves selectLon and dLscrLMLnatLon,
separatLon and boundarLes. Deep conscLousness Ls also rendered LMpossLble by
soMe of the LdentLfLcatLon requLreMents, drawn froM nature MystLcLsM, whLch are
LMposed upon Lt. It Ls one thLng to be Ln tune wLth the unLverse (a Metaphor
that can be spelled out), quLte another, and LMpossLble, feat to be LdentLcal
wLth Lt, sLnce then a proper part would be LdentLcal wLth a whole contaLnLng Lt.
SoMe explLcatLon of LdentLfLcatLon (trans-specLes and other) Ls LMportant for
the elaboratLon of deep ecology, but the relatLon Lnvolved (though Lt concerns
shared features, such as perhaps experLences) Ls not one of LdentLty or MakLng
LdentLcal, as sLMplLstLc etyMology May suggest. Other requLreMents coMMonly
placed on deep conscLousness, whLle they do not exclude Lt, render Lt unduly
anthropocentrLc. (CrLtLque, pp.30-2)
Deep ecologLsts agree wLth BLrch and Cobb's LnsLght that "huMan beLngs are
More deeply Moved by the way they experLence theLr ~orld than by the claLMs
ethLcs Makes on theM." Thus, where conteMporary envLronMental phLlosophy Ls
doMLna~ed by the questLon "How do we construct an adequate envLron"ental
ethLc? , deep ecology asks the questLon "How do we cultLvate a deep ecologLcal
conscLousness?" The forMer questLon looks to conceptual answers, the latter to
experLentLal answers. In seekLng to change the way Ln whLch we experLence the
world, deep ecologLsts place theLr prLMary eMphasLs upon changLng our ·underlyLng perceptLon of the way thLngs are" (L.e. changLng our ontology) rather than
upon what we MLght terM the "conceptual fLx• approach of "bL99er and better"
ethLcs. ThLs atteMpt to shLft the prLMary focus of envLronMental phLlosophLcal
concern froM ethLcs to ontology clearly constLtutes a fundaMental or revolutLon-
-35-
ary chaLLenge to norMaL envLronMentaL phLLosophy. It Ls (and should be) deep
ecology's guLdLng star. (GuLdLng Stars, p.204)
10:
ON HOLISM
AccordLng to deep ecology: A new cosMLc/ecoLogLcaL MetaphysLcs whLch stresses the LdentLty (I/thou) of huMans wLth non-huMan nature Ls a necessary condLLons for a vLabLe approach to buLLdLng an eco-phLLosophy. In deep ecology, the
wholeness and LntegrLty of a person/planet together wLth the prLncLpLe of what
Arne Naess caLLs "bLoLogLcaL egaLLtarLanLsM" are the Most LMportant Ldeas. Man
Ls an LntegraL part of nature, not over or apart froM nature. Man Ls a "pLaLn
cLtLzen· of the bLosphere, not Lts conqueror or Manager .. There should be a
"deMocracy of aLL God's creatures" accordLng to St. FrancLs; or as SpLnoza saLd,
Man Ls a "teMporary and dependent Mode of the whole of God/Nature.· Man flows
wLth the systeM of nature rather than atteMptLng to control aLL of the rest of
nature. The hand of Man LLes LLghtLy on the Land. Man does not perfect nature,
nor Ls Man's prLMary duty to Make nature More effLcLent.
A new psychology Ls needed to Lntegrate the MetaphysLcs Ln the MLnd fLeLd
of post-LndurtrLaL socLety. A Major paradLgM shLft results froM psychoLogLcaL
changes of perceptLon. The new paradLgM requLres rejectLon of subject/object,
Man/nature duaLLsMs and wLLL requLre a pervasLve awareness of total LnterMLngLLng of the planet earth. Psychotherapy seen as adjustMent to eco-orLented
socLety Ls replaced by a new LdeaL of psychotherapy as spLrLtuaL deveLopMent.
The new MetaphysLcs and psychology Leads LogLcaLLy to a posture of bLospherLc
egaLLtarLanLsM and LLberatLon Ln the sense of autonoMy, physoLogLcaL/eMotLona L
freedoM of the LndLvLduaL, spLrLtuaL deveLopMent of HoMo sapLens, and the rLght
of other specLes to pursue theLr own evoLutLonary destLnLes. (Deep Ecology
MoveMent, pp.310-11)
RejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln favour of the reLatLonaL,
totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs as knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of
LntrLnsLc reLatLons. As LntrLnsLc reLatLon between two thLngs ~ and B Ls such
that the reLatLon belongs to the defLnLtLons or basLc constLtutLons of A and ~•
so that wLthout a reLatLon, ~and~ are no Longer the saMe thLngs. The totaLfLeLd Model dLssoLves not only the Man-Ln-envLronMent concept, but every coMpact
thLng-Ln-MLLLeu concept - except when taLkLng at a superfLcLaL or preLLMLnary
Level of coMMunLcatLon. (Shallow and Deep, p.95)
Shallow envLronMentaLLsM atteMpts to curb soMe of the Most gLarLng envLronMentaL abuse such as poLLutLon and resource depLetLon whLLe caLLLng for no basLc
change Ln the anthropocentrLc urban-LndustrLaL socLaL paradLgM. Naess descrLbes
Lts central objectLve as "the health and affluence of people Ln the developed
countrLes." The Deep Ecology MoveMent, on the other hand, gathers LnspLratLon
froM the fLeLd ecoLogLst and Ls a rejectLon of the Man-Ln-envLronMent LMage Ln
favor of the reLatLonaL, totaL-fLeLd LMage. OrganLsMs are knots Ln the bLospherLcaL net or fLeLd of LntrLnsLc reLatLons. w (SessLons, p . 398)
0
Because they cannot conceLve Man apart' they experLence no dLffLcuLty Ln
attrLbutLng LntrLnsLc value to nature. In so far as they conceLve theMseLves as
havLng such value, the LnabLLLty to separate theLr selves froM nature, LnescapabLy Leads to thLnkLng of "Man" and ·envLronMent' as a whole. (Gestalt thLnkLng.) In thLs century the reactLon agaLnst conceLvLng the LndLvLduaL self as
soMethLng separable froM the socLaL settLng has been Largely successful, but not
the paraLLeL reactLon agaLnst the separabLLLty froM the natural settLng.
(PhLLosophLcaL Aspects, p.35)
By subtractLng your own self-centred and
seLf-servLng
-36-
thoughts
froM
the
world you coMe to reaLLze that "the other Ls none other than yourself: that the
fundaMentaL deLusLon of huManlty ls to suppose I aM here and you are out there_·
ThLs understandLng perMeates the MystLcaL tradLtLons and Ls exeMpLLfLed Ln the
TaoLst advLce to "LdentLfy yourself wLth non-dLstLnctLon_ •
It ls now becoMlng coMMonpLace to polnt to the fundaMentaLLy slMlLar
cosMoLogLes eMobdLed Ln the MystLcaL tradLtLons on the one hand and the 'new
physlcs' on the other_ What Ls structurally sLMllar about these cosMoLogLes Ls
that they reveal a 'seaMLess web' vLew of the unLverse_
Both the MystLcaL tradLtLons and the new physLcs' serve to generate Lnter
aLLa, what we MLght now caLL 'ecoLoglcaL awareness', .that Ls, awareness of the
fundaMentaL LnterreLatedne~s of aLL thLngs or, More accurately, aLL events_ The
theoretlcaL physLclst Frltjof Capra has been quLte expLlcLt about thls: "1 thLnk
what physLcs can do Ls help to generate ecoLogLcaL awareness_ You see, Ln MY
vLew now Ln the Western versLon of MystLcaL awareness, our versLon of BuddhLsM
or TaoLsM, wLLl be ecologLcal awareness_" Where the physLcLst, the Mystlc, and
the deep ecologLst (as phLlosopher) dLffer Ls Ln theLr Means of arrLvLng at
'ecologLcal awareness ' ___ _
The deep ecologLst's conceptLon of unLty Ln process' need not LMpLy that,
at any gLven MOMent, all 'knots' (L_e_ organLsMs) Ln the 'bLospherLcal net' are
constLtuted of equally coMpLex reLatLons_ To the extent that value Lnheres Ln
coMplexLty of relatLons, and to the extent that coMplexLty of reLatLons Ls
evLdenced Ln the degree of an organLsM's central organLzatLon (and therefore
capacLty for rLchness of experLence), then organLsMs are entLtLed to Moral
consLderatLon coMMensurate wLth theLr degree of central organLzatLon (or
capaclty for rlchness of experlence) for the duratlon of thelr exlstence - as
transLent as that May be Ln terMs of evolutLonary tLMe_
In pursulng theLr central LntuLtLon of 'unLty' (L_e_ of no boundarLes Ln
the bLospherLcal fLeLd), deep ecoLogLsts have possLbly Lost sLght of the sLgnLfaspect of theLr 'unLty Ln process' MetaphysLcs_
Lcance of the 'Ln process
AttentLon to thLs Latter aspect suggests that any process contLnuousLy produces
LMperManent, uneven dLstrLbutLons (L_e_, dLfferent values) of varLous attrLbutes
(and Ln the process of the world these attrLbutes May be Money, LnforMatLon,
coMplexLty of relatLons, and so on)_ If thLs were not so then we would have no
process but a perfectly unLforM, hoMogenous and, therefore, LLfeless fLeld_ The
only unLverse where value Ls spread evenly across the fLeLd Ls a dead unLverse _
RecognLsLng thLs, we should be clear that the central LntuLtLon of deep ecology
does not entaLl the vLew that LntrLnsLc value Ls spread evenly across the
MeMbershLp of the bLotLc coMMunLty_ Moreover, Ln sLtuatLons of genuLne value
conflLct, justLce Ls better served by not subscrLbLng to the vLew of ecoLogLcal
-egaLLtarLanLsM_ (Fox, pp-196-200)
An arctLc Landscape May superfLcLaLly Look rather dead Ln wLnter. In sprLng
Lt May Look overwheLMLngLy aLLve_ It would take a Long traLnLng to force
perceptLon to dLstLnguLsh organLsM froM non-organLsMs Ln such a LLve Landscape_
Even Ln wLnter the Lover of the Landscape sees abundance of LndLvLduaL LLfe
forMs and also hLgher order gestaLts_
Why Ls the gestalt ontology not MentLoned Ln the platforN forMulatLon_ A
Landscape wLth organLsMs - and aLL Landscapes have organLsMs Ln MLcro-organLsMs
are counted - Ls a hLgh order, natural gestalt_ The separatLon of organLsMs and
non-organLsMs Ls very unnatural Ln gestalt thLnkLng and apperceptLon. But the
concepts of 9estaLt-thlnkln9 are too specLaL for pLatforM forMuLatLons- Only a
MLnorLty of supporters of deed ecology are acadeMLcs_ (Notes on Sylvan, p-7)
-37-
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Sources used
0
S. BodLan, S LMple Ln Means, rLch Ln ends: A conversatLon wLth Arne Naess', Ten
DLrectLons, SuMMer/Fall, 1982, 7,10-12; referred to as SLMple Ln Means.
M. BookchLn, The Ecology of FreedoM, CheshLre, Londong,
1982;
referred
to
as
F. Capra and C. Spretnak, Green PolLtLcs, HutchLnson, London, 198~; referred
as Green PolLtLcs.
to
Bookch i,n.
B. Devall,
'The Deep Ecology MoveMent', Natural Resources Journal 20, 1980,
299-322; referred to as Deep Ecology MoveMent.
B. Devall, 'stone/Sky: ReflectLons on the 'Real ~ork' of Deep Ecology', paper
delLvered at EnvLronMent, EthLcs and Ecology Conference, Canberra, August
1983, 20ff.; referred to as Stone/Sky .
8. Devall and G. SessLons, Deep Ecology, PeregrLne SMLth, Layton, Utah, 1985;
referred to as Deep Ecology.
U. Fox,
Deep Ecology: A new phLlosophy
194-200; referred to as Fox.
of
our tLMe', EcologLst 1~, 1984,
U. Fox, 'on guLdLng stars to Deep Ecology', EcologLst 14, 1984, 203-4;
to as GuLdLng Stars.
A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology MoveMent.
InquLry 18, 1973, 95-100; referred to as Shallow and Deep.
A. Naess, 'PhLlosophLcal Aspects of Deep Ecology ' , unpublLshed
1983, 35ff.; referred to as PhLlosophLcal Aspects.
A. N.3 ess, • IntuLtLon, LntrLnsLc value and Deep
201-3; referred to as IntuLtLon.
Ecology',
referred
A SUMMary.
paper,
EcologLst
14,
Oslo,
1984,
A. Naess, Notes on the PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology MoveMent ' , unpublLshed
paper, Canberra, 1984, 17ff.; referred to as PolLtLcs of the Deep Ecology
MoveMent.
A. Naess, 'What Ls basLc to Deep Ecology?', unpublLshed paper,
12ff . ; referred to as BasLc.
A. Naess, A defence of the Deep Ecology
1984, 265-70; referred to as Defence.
MoveMent',
Canberra,
1984,
EnvLronMental EthLcs
A. Naess, 'The paradox of envLronMentalLsM' SyMposLuM ProceedLngs,
(ed.), York UnLversLty, 1984, 57-60; referred to as Paradox.
N.
S,
Everden
A. Naess,
'IdentLfLcatLon as a source of Deep EcologLcal attLtudes', Deep
Ecology, M. TobLas (ed.), Avant Books, San DLego, 1985, s256-70; referred
to as ldentLfLcatLon.
A. Naess,
Notes on Professor Sylvan's crLtLque of the Deep Ecology MoveMent,
unpublLshed paper, Olso, 1985, 19ff.; referred to as Notes on Sylvan.
J. PassMore,
Man's ResponsLb~lLty For Nature, 2nd ed., Duckworth, London, 1980;
-38-
referred to as PassMore.
A new way to treat the Land', EcoLogLst 14, 1984,
BLoregLonaLLsM
K. Sale,
167-73; referred to as Sale.
the ph~Losoph~cal
and Deep Ecology: A rev~ew of
'shallow
G. Sess~ons,
EcoLogLcaL
(eds.),
Hughes
J.D.
and
Ln R.C. Schultz
unfortune',
UnLvers~ty Press of AMer~ca, ~ash~ngton, D.C., 1981,
Consc~ousness,
391- 4 62; referred to as Sess~ons.
R. Sylvan, A Cr~t~que of Deep Ecology, Research School of SocLaL
AustraLLan Hat~onaL Un~vers~ty, 1985; referred to as Cr~t~que.
ScLences,
Further Read~ngs
R.F. OasMann, Env~ronMentaL Conservat~on, 5th ed., ~LLey, New York, 1984.
A. Leopold, A Sand Country ALManac, CheshLre, New York, 1966.
E. PapadukLs, The Green MoveMent Ln ~est GerMany, Croon HeLM, London, 1984.
-39-
DEEP ECOLOGY AHO GREEN POLITICS
Deep Ecology Ls an envLronMe~tal theory or platforM wLth polLtLcal
sLgnLfLcant
wLth
pLatforM
i..MplLcatLons. Breen PoLLtLcs Ls a poLi..tLcaL
envLronMentaL LMpLLcatLons. Both arose Ln Large part Ln reactLon to prevaLLLng
envi..ronMentaL practLces; but Deep Ecology concentrates rather on theoretLcal
reflectLon, Green PolLtLcs on practLcaL actLon . Deep
and
LnvestLgatLon
questLoni..ng of the underlyLng doMi,nant attLtudes, seen as the Major source of
ecoL09Lcal and other probLeMs, Led to artLcuLatLon of the Deep EcoLogy pLatforM,
partLy outLi..ned Ln ·slogan" forM Ln the foLLowi..ng tabLe.
).
TABLE 1.
DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH DOMINANT ATT ITIJOES
DOMINANT ATTITUDES [OOMIHAHT PARADIGM]
DEEP ECOLOGY [RIVAL EHVIRONMEHTAL PARADIGM]
OoMi..nati..on over Nature
Nature a Resource; IntrLnsLc
VaLue confi..ned to HuMans
NaturaL EnvLronMent VaLued for
Itself; Bi..ocentri..c EgaLi..tari..ani..sM
AMp Le Reso1J rces/Subs t i.. tu tes
Earth SuppLLes Li..MLted
MaterLaL EconoMLc Growth
a predoMLnant goaL
Non-MaterLaL GoaLs, especLaLLy
SeLf-ReaLi..zati..on
ConsuMer i,sM
DoLng wLth Enough/RecycLLng
CoMpetLti..ve Li..festyLe
Cooperati..ve Li..feway
CentraLLzed/ Urban Centred/
Hati..onaL focus
Decentral.i..zed/ Bi..oregi..onaL/
Nei..ghbourhood focus
Power structure Hi..erarchLcaL
Non-h i,erarch Lea L/ Grass roots
DeMocrac!::I
HLgh TechnoL09y
Appropri..ate Technology
Whi..Le Deep Ecol.og!::j grew froM the work of one envLronMentaL phi..Losopher
(Naess Ln 1872), Green PolLtLcs arose (Ln West GerMany sLnce 1876) froM the
synthesLs of several. MoveMents - ecol.09!::j, cLtLzens, aLternatLve, peace and other
MoveMents. The pLatforM of Green PoLLtLcs, whLch Ls buLLt around four pLLLars
socLaL responsLbLLLty, grassroots deMocracy , and non-vLoLence
ecology,
refLects these orLgLns.
The fLrst of these pLLLars, ecoLog!::j, Ls based on the sLMpLe theMe that
LLMLted ecoLogi..caL systeMs cannot sustai..n unLi..MLted econoMi..c growth, or such
questi..onabLe types of growth as nucLear power, wi..thout serLous rLsk of daMage
and degeneratLon. The Green aLM Ls to Move to S!::jsteMs of producti..on and
consuMptLon whLch MaLntai..n and restore natural processes and C!::fCLes rather than
doMLnate or destroy theM - a Move towards harMony wLth nature. The second pi..LLar
of Green PoLLtLcs, socLaL responsLbLLLt!::j, LMpLLes opposi..tLon to the LnequaLLti..es
i..n power and doMLnati..on reLati..onshi..ps of present soci..ety, and reMovaL of
di..scri..Mi..nati..on, econoMLc hardshi..p and exploi..tati..on, both regi..onally and as
regards the ThLrd ~orLd. The Green aLM - to be achi..eved pri..Mari..Ly froM below,
Ls to bui..ld stable and just soci..al
through those adversely affected
arrangeMents, wLth coMprehensLve deMocrati..c rLghts and freedoMs (both i..n 6erMan~
-1-
and where GerMan operatLons LMpLnge Ln the ThLrd WorLd). These changes are to be
brought about by grassroots deMocracy, the thLrd pLLLar, through Lncreased
reaLLsatLon of dLrect decentraLLsed deMocracy. ThLs LnvoLves organLsatLon and
coordLnatLon of decentraLLsed basLc unLts (Local, COMMunLty and dLstrLct) whi..ch
are gLven extensLve, but not coMpLete, autonoMy, as weLL as wLde use of :
referenda, deLegatLon practLces, and rotatLon of offLce-hoLders. The fourth and
fLnaL pLLLar, non-vLoLence, LMpli..es the reMovaL of coercLve and aLso oppressLve
practLces, not Merely by More powerful people, but especLaLLy by socLaL groups
and states, and also, More posLtLveLy, acti..ve depoLyMent of varLous Methods of
socLal protest, resLstance and defence . The coMpatLbLlLty of Means wLth ends
serves here as an LMportant underlyLng prLncLple: that a just, non-vLolent,
huMane end-state cannot be satLsfactorLLy achLeved by unjust, vi..oLent, LnhuMane
Means . • l
Gr een PolLtLcs offers then a broad prograM for socLal change, whLch
LncLudes the More specLfLc and ecologLcalLy focussed Deep Ecology platforM as a
quLte proper part. Put dLfferentLy, Green PoLLtLcs coMbLnes a wLder pLuraLLty of
The
strand.
LMportant
MoveMents of whLch Deep Ecology represents one
Lnter-relatLons are shown pLctorLaLly at the second level of the foLlowLng
12
dLagraM:
DIAGRAM 1.
DOUBLE PYRAMID, SETTING DEEP ECOLOGY IM PLACE
p
B
\ '\
I
2C ]
~
Oer Lva ti..on
Di,recti,on
2+
ExpLanatLon
Oi,recti..on
2. Deep Ecology pLatforM
2C. ReforMLst envLronMentaL
2
p1Jsi.. t i.,Qn
2+. Vague fundaMentaLs of
Green pLatforM
-/
//'
;/
e.g. Buddhi..st (B), ChrLstLan
(C) and (Eco)-PhLLosophLc
(P) ultLMate bases
j
/
-\,r -
[
1. Deep Ecology fundaMentaLs;
C
\
\
\
3.
s
\
General norMs and theMes ,
substanti,ally derLved
froM pl,atforM
PartLcuLar norMs and
concrete decLsLons ,
appLyLng to reLevant
practLcal sLtuatLons.
The ecologLcaL coMponent of Green PolLtLcs May not go very deep; Lt May
on l y be based upon reforM envLronMentalLsM (or shallow ecology as i,t used to be
I
Starred notes LndLcate poi..nts at wh i..ch readLngs wi..th the correspondLng nuMbers
May be Lnserted or undertaken .
-2-
caLLed), whLch aLM3 to reforM 30Me of the wor3t abuse3 and exces3e3 of the
doMLnant posLtLon, such as gross poLLutLon, extensLve despoLLatLon of Land and
Lakes and oceans, LLttLe thought for the future, MLstreatMent of anLMals, etc_
On shaLlow ecology, nature Ls not valued for Ltself, but as a resource,
that Ls LnstruMentalLy, for what Lt can be used for by huMans_ By contrast, Deep
Ecology argues (e_g_ froM preMLsses of Level I) that the envLronMent Ls
LntrLnsLcaLLy valuable, that nature Ls valuable Ln and for Ltself; and that,
furtherMore,
LntrLnsLc value Ls equally dLstrLbuted_ ThLs projectLon of
egsLLtarLan or LMpartLalLty prLncLpLes, usually restrLcted to huMans, to the
whole of lLfe Ln the natural worLd, gets dLgnLfLed by the tLtle, BLocentrLc
EgalLtarLanLsM_ The prLncLple, not part of Green PoLLtLcs, Ls perhaps the Most
controversLal of the central prLncLpLes of Deep Ecology; but Lt or soMe
substLtute for Lt Ls requLred, granted that the natural world contaLns value
beyond that accruLng to huMans and theLr features, to expLaLn how value Ls
dLstrLbuted_ Deep Ecology accounts for the dLstrLbutLon through what Ls
.
.
presented as a core deMocracy ~n the bLosphere . _•3
Deep Ecology grew out of a phLlosophLcal deepenLng of the new features of
the scLence of ecology, whLch served to dLstance ecology froM the standard run
of reductLonLst scLences (through such features as holLsM; gestalt propertLes;
systeMs whLch are More than the suM of theLr atoMLstLc parts; eMergent eleMents,
lLke lLfe, organLsatLon, etc_ )_ Deep Ecology quLckLy aLLLed Ltself wLth the
subversLve features of unco-opted ecology, Ln partLcuLar, the eMphasLs on the
lLMLts, and ultLMate faLlure of (atoMLstLc) reductLonLsM Ln scLence and
phLlosophy_ WLth such an orLgLn, Lt Ls not surprLsLng that there Ls lLttle
dLrectLy about such MaLn pLllars of Green PolLtLcs as socLaL responsLbLLLty and
non-vLoLence Ln the pLatforM of Deep Ecology- However Deep Ecology Ls coMpatLbLe
wLth these Green pLlLar prLncLpLes, and Lndeed perMLts theLr derLvatLon_ ~hat Ls
supposed to resuLt are generaL norMs, LLke No exploLtatLon, No subjectLon, No
vLoLence, at leveL 3_ (Such a derLvatLon of a non-vLoLence prLncLpLe froM tne
Deep Ecology prLncLpLe of MaxLMLzLng Self-reaLLsatLon Ls atteMpted by Naess Ln
the fraMework of hLs systeM of Eco-phLLosophy)_•l
A MaLn focus of Deep Ecology Ls on changLng huMan reLatLons wLth the
natural envLronMent, away froM doMLnant expLoLtatLve practLces_ The naturaL
envLronMent coMprLses LteMs of LntrLnsLc value, LncludLng huMans (who are not
above or separate froM Lt), and accordLn9ly Ls to be treated wLth the care and
respect valuable LteMs warrant, and not LrresponsLbLy_ Thus Lt would be contrary
to Deep Ecology to treat the envLronMent or Lts valued LteMs vLolently
whLch
however Ls what Deep Ecology contends doMLnant practLces do (consLder such
wLdespread phenoMena as "rape of the envLronMent", "of the Land", "of the
forestsu)_ SLnce huMans are not apart froM or superLor to nature, Lt follows
froM the Deep Ecology pLatforM that natural and proper relatLons also exclude
vLoLence towards other huMans or classes of huMans_
Because Lt covers a pluraLLty of posLt~ons, LncludLng shaLLow ecoLogLcaL
posLtLons, Green PolLtLcs Ls Much More aMelLoratLve and reforMLst Ln character
than Deep Ecology, whLch Ls further reMoved froM doMLnant attLtudes, More
hardLLne, and More radLcaL_ ~hereas Deep Ecology goes to fundaMentaLs, and
focusses on Ldeals and theory, Green PolLtLcs tends to concentrate on practLcal
polLtLcal probleMs of an envLronMental or socLal kLnd, such as acLd raLn or
rLver pollutLon or MLssLle deplo8Ment, and (lLke the Peace MoveMent Ln
AustralLa) Ls not so Much concerned wLth refLnLng Lts rather vague prLncLpLes or
wor~Lng out an env~ronMentaL (or peace) ph~Losophy_ Because of Lts envLronMentaL
depth and natural world focus, Deep Ecology Ls concerned wLth a range of natural
envLronMent Lssues, such as wLlderness, rare specLes, and
the
radLcal
-3-
transforMatLon of agrLcuLture, whLch are onLy of passLng Lnterest to a sMaLL
MLnorLty Ln Green PoLLtLcs or are beyond Lts poLLtLcaL reach.
Jn Lts reforMLst styLe Green PoLLtLcs does not venture far beyond prevLous
Left-LeanLng poLLtLcaL MoveMents, except, fLrstLy, Ln Lts opposLtLon to envLronMent and aMenLty daMa9Ln9 LndustrLaLLsM and, secondLy, as regards non-vLolence
and Lts coMMLtMent to attaLnLng peace. Non-vLoLence Ls the Most controversLaL of
the four pLLLars. For non-vLoLence ruLes out a range of poLLtLcal actLon,
LncLudLn9 typLcal protests, confrontatLon and revoLutLons. Non-vLolence also
LMplLes, what Ls very dLfferent froM current MLLLtary pra~tLces, socLal defence.
WhLLe MaLn factLons Ln the Green MoveMent support non-vLolent Methods and socLal
defence, other Lesser factLons hold that force Ls necessary to brLn9 about
varLous necessary changes and for defence purposes.
The Deep EcoLogy platforM Lncludes severaL prLncLpLes that would be
recognLsed by onLy a MLnorLty of the Green MoveMent. One of these prLncLples
(whLch however, unlLke BLocentrLc EgalLtarLanLsM, would not be wLdeLy opposed by
reforMLst Greens) Ls the core prLncLpLe of SeLf-reaLLsatLon, or More exactLy of
MaxLMLzLng SeLf-reaLLsatLon. The notLon of self-realLsatLon of varLous relLgLous
posLtLons, of the full unfoldLng and developMent of the person, Ls vastly
expanded Ln Deep EcoLogy to Lnclude brLngLng to fuLl fruLtLon not MereLy one's
own person, but all that one LdentLfLes wLth, that Ls the expanded Self, whLch
Ls taken to be not Merely one's faMLLy or feLlows or fellow natLonals, nor
Merely ~as on huManLstLc ethLcs) the whole huMan race, but the whole naturaL
1
systeM.
The SeLf-realLsatLon prLncLpLe, sprLngLng as Lt appears froM an enLLghtened
personal self-Lnterest prLncLple, has an excellent phLlosophLcaL pedLgree (at
Least as applLed to huMans or neL9hbourLn9 classes of huMans). Thus rather than
beLng argued for, a dLffLcult Matter Ln the case of ultLMate prLncLples, SeLfrealLsatLon Ls LMported froM syMpathetLc phLlosophLcal or reLLgLous posLtLons at
Level 1 of the double pyraMLd, froM those that help sustaLn Deep Ecology.
However the expansLon Lnvolved, the derLvatLon process froM narrow self to
coMprehensLve Self, severs the usual justLfLcatory lLnks. It Ls hard to LdentLfy
one's self-Lnterests wLth those of a rock or an acorn. So the supposed
LdentLfLcatLon - wLth soMe or aLL MountaLns, rLvers and raLnforests Ln the wLder
reMaLns, LLke the assocLated extended EgaLLtarLan
Self, Nature personLfLed
prLncLpLe, decLdedLy probLeMatLc.
Because Lt Ls assuMed that SeLf-reaLLsatLon Ls dLrected to ecoLogLcal and
spLrLtual ends, not at MaterLaL goods or Means, SeLf-reaLLsatLon Leads to the
16 AMong the raMLfLcatLons of the slogan
slogan, USLMpLe Ln Means, rLch Ln endsn.
are those concernLng what kLnd of technology one uses and where one lLves
(the Matter of dwellLng Ln sLtuatLons of Lnherent value and the lLke), what and
how Much one consuMes, and so on. The doMLnant attLtudes, forMed around
of econoMLc growth and econoMLc routes to happLness, have
MaxLMLzatLon
eMphasLsed both MaterLal goals and MaterLal Means, partLcuLarly personal
consuMerLsM. But Lf MaterLaL use and pure consuMptLon are to be reduced for
envLronMentaL and other reasons, what LLfestyles are approprLate? Deep Ecology,
LLke Lts fundaMentaL sources, poLnts to experLentLal and spLrLtuaL ends and
eMphasLzes the rLchness of non-MaterLaL ends avaLlabLe. The result, of course,
Ls practLces whLch are sLMpLe, voluntary sLMpLLcLty, do~ng wLth enough, and,
More 9enerall8, practLces whLch lLe lLght on the Land and the naturaL world. In
way of d0Ln9 thLngs, these wLLL be Lnte9rated (Ln
~ properly ecoLogLcaL
syMbLotLc and other naturaL styles) wLth the natural systeMs LnvoLved, workLng
wLth rather than agaLnst the natural fLow. The practLces, and organLsatLonaL
approprLate to regLonaL
wLLl accordLngly be ecoregLonaL
arrangeMents,
17
to be caLLed.
coMe
have
they
as
bLore9LonaL,
ecoL09LcaL 9roupLn9s - or
-4-
ApproprLate Means LncLude, Ln turn, technLques approprLate to the practLce
and theory of Deep Ecology- HLgh technoL09Les such as nuclear power are not
approprLate, even Ln advanced LndustrLaL socLetLes, but LnapproprLate because of
the envLronMentaL and socLaL costs and rLsks such technoLogLcaL forMs LMpose_ On
both deep and green percept i,ons, wh-3 t Ls requ Lred a re re LLab Le c-:1 ref u L
technoLogLes whLch are not ecoLogLcaLLy daMa9Ln9 or socLaLLy rLsky or otherwLse
undesLrabLe; but the technoLogi,es adl"li,tted wLLl dLffer accordLng to the
prLncLpLes of the posLtLons they answer back to (e_g_ farMLng technLques wLLL
need to be very dLfferent froM those prevaLLLng Ln rural GerMany to Meet such
prLncLpLes as bLospherLc egaLLtarLanLsM )_ In each case the practLcaL use of
approprLate technoLogy faLLs at the bottoM, actLon Level, of the doubLe
pyral"I ,,"d _•8
WhLLe Deep Ecology suppLLes an appeaLLng bLueprLnt for dLfferent socLaL and
LLfe-ways, the questLon reMaLns: how Ls the proMLsed Land reached? A MaLn part
of the answer Ls taken to be gLven through a further crucLaL feature of Deep
Ecology: EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness, a notLon agaLn expandLng upon conceptLons of
other oLder LdeoLogLes (e_g_ of reLL9Lous, or of revoLutLonary, conscLousness)_
What Ls dLfferent Ls that spLrLtuaL or LdeoLogLcaL conversLon Ls agaLn broadened
froM the personaL and socLaL to coMprehend the fuLL envLronMentaL predLcaMent_
In thLs expLanatLon, of how peopLe get, and are got, to grasp Deep Ecology and
Lts practLces, the pyraMLd Ls ascended, froM actLon to Ldeas, to deeper
explanatory prLncLpLes_ A thorough conversLon process LnvoLves eLevatLon to the
top LiveL, spLrLtuaL transcendence of the daLLy econoMLc and poLLtLcaL actLon
LeveL. 9 It Ls assuMed that, wLth enough converts and supporters, Deep Ecology
wLLL be put Ln place, LLke Green PoLLtLcs, by grassroots deMocratLc procedures_
LLke the fundaMentaL sources upon whLch Lt draws, Deep Ecology prescrLbes
practLces by whLch to achLeve such a conversLon and through whLch to arrLve at
EcoLogLcaL ConscLousness_ SoMe of the MaLn practLces, such as MedLtatLon and
conteMpLatLon, are derLved frol"I the fundaMentaL sources_ But other Methods whLch
extend these, soMe of theM expandLng upon ecoLogLcaL experLence, LncLude value
seeLng thLngs dLfferentLy, and
reorLentatLon and wLdened value perceptLon
of other thLngs - Connected wLth
weLL-beLng
and
worth
the
coMLng to apprecLate
goes a hoLLstLc shLft Ln
theM,
these wLdened experLentLaL bases, and LnforMLng
vaLues and perceptLon, and an expanded LdentLfLcatLon , affordLng dLrect LLnkage
wLth parts and whoLes of the natural worLd_•IO By these Methods, a person May
coMe to a deep and joyous apprecLatLon of the reaL world, a convert to Deep
Ecology, a feLLow and advocate of Lts Messages and LLfe-ways.
ESSAY QUESTIONS
}_ To what extent do Green PoLLtLcs and Deep Ecology share the saMe values and
address the sal"le probLel"ls? CrLtLcaLLy coMpare and contrast theLr proposals,
especLaLLy as regards the naturaL and the buLLt envLronMent_
2_ Deep Ecology Ls soMetLMes assLgned four Levels. Try to descrLbe these, and to
expLaLn carefuLLy the LnterreLatLons aMong
PoLLtLcs fLt Lnto thLs probLeMatLc scheMe?
these
Levels.
Where
does
Green
Ln prLncLpLe" appears as a key theMe of Deep
Eco~ogy. Cri.tLcaLLy assess Lts adequacy_ Shouldn't Green PoLLtLcs LncLude such a
pri.nci.pLe?
3_ ·sLocentrLc EgaLLtarLanLsM -
Non-vLo~ence an unstated pr~nc~p~e of Deep Ecoiog~? Expia~n why Deep
Ecology Ls coMMLtted to non-vLoLence to the degree i.t Ls? In your answers take
account of the foLLowLng dLffLcuLtLes: L. the contradLcti.ons between the use of
I+-
1:5
-5-
vLolence and the defence of the envLronMent; LL. the occurrence of vLolence Ln
nature; LLL. the need for coercLve Methods to preserve the natural envLronMent.
5. What justLfLes expandLng self-realLsatLo n to Self-realLsatLo n? ExpLaLn the
MeanLng and LMportance of SeLf-ReaLLsatL on for Deep EcoLogy and dLscuss Lts
adequacy. Why does Lt not feature Ln Green PolLtLcs?
6. ExplaLn the MeanLng of the delLberateLy vague slogan °SLMple Ln Means, rLch
Ln ends", or of soMe other hLgh-LMpact sLogan of Deep EcoLogy. IndLcate how the
vagueness MLght work for and a9aLnst the slogan, suggest how the slogan MLght be
alternatLve LnterpretatLon s, and LndLcate soMe of the
suggest
applLed,
aLternatLves.
these
of
raMLfLcatLons
7. OutLLne bLoregLonalLsM , LndLcatLng what practLcaL envLronMentaL probLeMs bLoregLonalLsM Lnduces. How Ln fact Ls bLoregLonalLsM derLved froM Deep EcoLogy?
ConsLder to what extent bLoregLonalLsM fLts wLth the sLogan, ·rhLnk globally,
act locally·.
8. Is More hLgh technology an unprobLeMatLc solutLon to deeper, or to any,
envLronMental probLeMs? CoMpare and contrast the vLews of Deep Ecology and Green
PoLLtLcs on the role of varLous types of technoLogy.
9. What Ls Ecolo9Lcal ConscLousness? And what Ls Lt supposed to do Ln and for
Deep Ec0Lo9y? If Lt Ls so LMportant, why Ls Lt not a MaLn concern for Green
PoLLtLcs?
A reLatLonaL, total-fLeLd LMa9e of huMan reLatLonshLps wLth nature has been
quLetLy oMLtted froM the orLgLnaL pLatforM of Deep Ecology. Is thLs gestalt
pLcture needed? Is Lt defensLbLe? Should Lt be reLnstated?
10.
-6-
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Text
ON EXTIRPATING WAR:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, whilp acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
FeaZi/res o/ a Tacts/
o/ war antZ wn#tarfs?n.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius itnposed very demanding conditions:
for example, "when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,' Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war — on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); "he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; "none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the L<3<9 TzM
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
/
But, after that splendid
the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
id build-up,
bu
assert outright that war is ann abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military teclhhology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does/not
s/n< recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
teqhi
to suggest military techniques
and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works ^f Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tza because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as The most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, To life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
�WAR AND PEACE IV:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7.
o/ a Taofsf endive o/
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzz/
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
ewA.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lap Tztv because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
�2
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
dispensation? Why should what is
tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves /nare explaining to be done.
There are rwo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are
paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter
attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can
take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A? taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
They are hated by creatures
Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ...
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of
clever weapons. Instead the points are made by
what the possesser of Tao
�3
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by a/M/ogy, of victory in war with death.
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is
&<2<7, because evil,
also
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element' in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17).
'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is
missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism
sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic
dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
�4
Digrams .
r/zg
q/^zzrzc 6Zz7gw/?z^ r/z^zr ^zrg "r&wZvg^".
Z)gg/?-grggzz c/^rr;
Arguments to
dilemmii
' incompatible
input/^^ prescriptions
-*
Processing of dilemma,
situational procedures
directive
output
C(?rrgjpgzz<7z7zg TzzcAr c/z^rr:
Black
directive
Box
output
It is evident that Taoism can be gxfgn^M; information can be put into the Black BoR
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is /i<9 resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may
incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always arg generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:-
�Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders a// actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even (/"that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b^
unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
"unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important
of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders End convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?! In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to 'just war /hr party d'.)
�6
unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then i/*it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar").
2
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
confirm ity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
�7
2.
On //ze Jtrergence o/
yrow T^o/yw.
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, <2 roMgA and preliminary %?<9/<9gy
is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a
- in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) para&y. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as ana/agma/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, yfafgy. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably
abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or,
perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang
wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and
virtually all the worst wars.
While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much
larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us
distinguish such wars as
wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
�20
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wTongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow
rot?
violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however ^VHrion rather than
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents" (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is
to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped" (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified" violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape" (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with 'the basic principle of self-defence" which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
'appropriate, in response is 0/7/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat" (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his 'basic principle", his appeal to 'lesser evil" generates some instances. The
'basic principle", itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle", since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
�8
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
this effort).
and
wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading"
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
Among wars, an important distinction is that between
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggr&yxor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LTp.l52).3
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market
3
There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely 'For
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can cow/?a.y.yz'<9/i be
appropriate unless this attack is wn/u'/i a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
�23
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war': a 'new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a 'rule of law', not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A
referred to as ST.
Paa/: on C7zzm?yg P/zz7a.ya/?/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77za Way a/Lao 7za(Taa-m C/zzrzg), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, U/zraarz'/zg War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Eca/agy, cam/Mmzz'zy a/zb /z/byzy/g, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pzgy/ar z7z^ Anc^yrary : rima/ zn r/zg eca/agy a/* a
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
Gamoa P^a/z/e, Yale
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', Dz'yczzyyzan /za/z^ry zzz g/zvzrazzm^zzra/ jz/zz/aya/z/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Ezz/zzzzy ); referred to as AL
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Dzycayyza/z
^a/z^ry z/z oma'ronmoma/ p/zz/aya/z/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paracazzyz'y^mLagz'c); referred to as AID.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', Dz'yczzyyz'a/z pa/z^ry z/z e/zvzra/z/?z^/zfa/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, Sacz'a/ Pavt^r am/ Pa/z'aca/ Priborn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 77zg War/?zy af zTzg H^arf a/T/zz'/zgy , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', Sacz'a/ P/zz7aya/z/zy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dz'yczzyyza/z /za/z^ry z/z
a/zvz'ra/z/?z^/zra/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
�9
capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...}.
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but
for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
(the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a
favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite
targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
* conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
* social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society A
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
�10
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state w;7/
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised
defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to ^<7 war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
* elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
* force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
* contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in
* elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /a// distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp
curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
�11
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast
in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that
available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
�12
Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an gco/og/c^Z/y
war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information
accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars
both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. PMzzZes
sfrafegy and /Zs
o/ fec/tno/ogy an;? woZence
Tt is surprising how much of the E<2<? TzM is devoted to military strategy". Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists"
strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
*
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222)
�13
*
and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, 'smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people" (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fpeT
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: 'The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be"
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194).
* advance from
flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
* coolness and
(LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
/
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT p.164), is cited as involving
'an element of deceit" 'undeniably", and 'worse" it is 'morally questionable" (Chan p.17). But
in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give
my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of
benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary
first to expand" (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to
bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured
natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly
illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and
weakness turned hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, 'smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state" would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: 'Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
�paradox).5
The powerful critique of militarism in the
CA&ig is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p. 197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere
technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size,
such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive
technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small
technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria
for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off:
reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of
operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair
inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
�15
right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as vzo/^zzc^, which is more generally
w/zz'c/z
i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
* War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
* Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
° But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^
This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
6
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist"
action
the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
�second premiss.
4.
anJ nioraZ jz^cf/zy/T!.
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
* It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed zVz /?rzzzcz/?/g to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, z^ own use, of destructive force, and
continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire
consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and
important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery
can be thwarted in this way.
/^cz/zym, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
is, in Amauld's word,
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), .... In brief ^a/z^ar^ /zacz/Aw is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
�17
to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various! they can certainly be
as with nonviolent
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
Plainly the
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the
Eng/fy/? definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The
Eng/7y/z tends to force pacifism into what the
Eng/fy/i Efcfforza/y lists as its final item:
'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any
circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds,
p<2c(/Ts7??.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive",
"fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as
might have been better.
pacifism:
�18
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p.10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, wifAi/r the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of <2// that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes
pacifism' (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of acfzvz.S7?z which holds that while violence is a/wayy wrong
one is
justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet -- pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^
of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism'' is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is /?r?/?zz/d:rz\y^(/, deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
�19
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: "what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS
p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of modves), to design situations where
modves, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
"second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can
enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
�19
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa3
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), /tor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS
p.152). Situationally ofAer procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
"second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that on/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can
enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
�20
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow
r<9<9 mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however <7;7Mh<9H rather than
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
'appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The
'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
�21
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
"natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
�22
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
modified
P2
results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
(as modified) is
While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just fa/Aing a&oMf
and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace,/tg Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will
prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be
done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
9
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
vandolence.
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
�followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever hanaged (o glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come^ 'out of ihe horror of war': a new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a; 'rule
law', not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the bther, & not explained (Medlin's paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the'mosLpart, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A -Source Poo/: on Chines P/zi/osop/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/* Tao Tza(Tao-re C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Eco/ogy, commtziry and /i/esfy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pigs/or r/ze Anchors : rita/ in r/ze eco/ogy o/*a New Guinea Pcop/e, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', Di-srn.y.s'ion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /notary ); referred to as Al.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discussion
papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsz'srenr Logic); referred to as MD.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, Socia/ Power and Po/irica/ Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J W. Smith, 77ze Worms ar r/ze /Vearr o/T/zings , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', -Socia/ P/zi/osop/zy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discussion papers in
environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
�
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ON EXTIRPATING WAR:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, whilp acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
FeaZi/res o/ a Tacts/
o/ war antZ wn#tarfs?n.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius itnposed very demanding conditions:
for example, "when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,' Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war — on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); "he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; "none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the L<3<9 TzM
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
/
But, after that splendid
the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
id build-up,
bu
assert outright that war is ann abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military teclhhology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does/not
s/n< recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
teqhi
to suggest military techniques
and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works ^f Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tza because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as The most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, To life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
WAR AND PEACE IV:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7.
o/ a Taofsf endive o/
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzz/
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
ewA.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lap Tztv because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
2
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
dispensation? Why should what is
tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves /nare explaining to be done.
There are rwo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are
paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter
attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can
take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A? taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
They are hated by creatures
Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ...
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of
clever weapons. Instead the points are made by
what the possesser of Tao
3
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by a/M/ogy, of victory in war with death.
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is
&<2<7, because evil,
also
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element' in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17).
'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is
missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism
sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic
dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
4
Digrams .
r/zg
q/^zzrzc 6Zz7gw/?z^ r/z^zr ^zrg "r&wZvg^".
Z)gg/?-grggzz c/^rr;
Arguments to
dilemmii
' incompatible
input/^^ prescriptions
-*
Processing of dilemma,
situational procedures
directive
output
C(?rrgjpgzz<7z7zg TzzcAr c/z^rr:
Black
directive
Box
output
It is evident that Taoism can be gxfgn^M; information can be put into the Black BoR
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is /i<9 resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may
incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always arg generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:-
Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders a// actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even (/"that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b^
unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
"unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important
of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders End convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?! In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to 'just war /hr party d'.)
6
unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then i/*it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar").
2
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
confirm ity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
7
2.
On //ze Jtrergence o/
yrow T^o/yw.
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, <2 roMgA and preliminary %?<9/<9gy
is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a
- in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) para&y. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as ana/agma/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, yfafgy. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably
abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or,
perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang
wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and
virtually all the worst wars.
While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much
larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us
distinguish such wars as
wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
20
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wTongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow
rot?
violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however ^VHrion rather than
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents" (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is
to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped" (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified" violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape" (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with 'the basic principle of self-defence" which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
'appropriate, in response is 0/7/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat" (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his 'basic principle", his appeal to 'lesser evil" generates some instances. The
'basic principle", itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle", since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
8
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
this effort).
and
wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading"
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
Among wars, an important distinction is that between
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggr&yxor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LTp.l52).3
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market
3
There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely 'For
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can cow/?a.y.yz'<9/i be
appropriate unless this attack is wn/u'/i a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
23
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war': a 'new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a 'rule of law', not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A
referred to as ST.
Paa/: on C7zzm?yg P/zz7a.ya/?/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77za Way a/Lao 7za(Taa-m C/zzrzg), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, U/zraarz'/zg War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Eca/agy, cam/Mmzz'zy a/zb /z/byzy/g, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pzgy/ar z7z^ Anc^yrary : rima/ zn r/zg eca/agy a/* a
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
Gamoa P^a/z/e, Yale
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', Dz'yczzyyzan /za/z^ry zzz g/zvzrazzm^zzra/ jz/zz/aya/z/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Ezz/zzzzy ); referred to as AL
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Dzycayyza/z
^a/z^ry z/z oma'ronmoma/ p/zz/aya/z/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paracazzyz'y^mLagz'c); referred to as AID.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', Dz'yczzyyz'a/z pa/z^ry z/z e/zvzra/z/?z^/zfa/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, Sacz'a/ Pavt^r am/ Pa/z'aca/ Priborn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 77zg War/?zy af zTzg H^arf a/T/zz'/zgy , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', Sacz'a/ P/zz7aya/z/zy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dz'yczzyyza/z /za/z^ry z/z
a/zvz'ra/z/?z^/zra/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
9
capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...}.
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but
for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
(the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a
favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite
targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
* conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
* social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society A
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
10
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state w;7/
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised
defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to ^<7 war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
* elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
* force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
* contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in
* elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /a// distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp
curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
11
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast
in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that
available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
12
Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an gco/og/c^Z/y
war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information
accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars
both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. PMzzZes
sfrafegy and /Zs
o/ fec/tno/ogy an;? woZence
Tt is surprising how much of the E<2<? TzM is devoted to military strategy". Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists"
strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
*
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222)
13
*
and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, 'smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people" (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fpeT
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: 'The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be"
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194).
* advance from
flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
* coolness and
(LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
/
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT p.164), is cited as involving
'an element of deceit" 'undeniably", and 'worse" it is 'morally questionable" (Chan p.17). But
in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give
my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of
benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary
first to expand" (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to
bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured
natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly
illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and
weakness turned hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, 'smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state" would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: 'Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
paradox).5
The powerful critique of militarism in the
CA&ig is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p. 197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere
technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size,
such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive
technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small
technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria
for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off:
reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of
operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair
inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
15
right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as vzo/^zzc^, which is more generally
w/zz'c/z
i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
* War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
* Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
° But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^
This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
6
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist"
action
the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
second premiss.
4.
anJ nioraZ jz^cf/zy/T!.
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
* It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed zVz /?rzzzcz/?/g to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, z^ own use, of destructive force, and
continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire
consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and
important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery
can be thwarted in this way.
/^cz/zym, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
is, in Amauld's word,
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), .... In brief ^a/z^ar^ /zacz/Aw is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
17
to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various! they can certainly be
as with nonviolent
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
Plainly the
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the
Eng/fy/? definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The
Eng/7y/z tends to force pacifism into what the
Eng/fy/i Efcfforza/y lists as its final item:
'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any
circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds,
p<2c(/Ts7??.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive",
"fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as
might have been better.
pacifism:
18
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p.10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, wifAi/r the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of <2// that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes
pacifism' (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of acfzvz.S7?z which holds that while violence is a/wayy wrong
one is
justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet -- pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^
of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism'' is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is /?r?/?zz/d:rz\y^(/, deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
19
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: "what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS
p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of modves), to design situations where
modves, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
"second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can
enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
19
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa3
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), /tor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS
p.152). Situationally ofAer procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
"second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that on/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can
enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
20
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow
r<9<9 mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however <7;7Mh<9H rather than
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
'appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The
'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
21
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
"natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
22
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
modified
P2
results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
(as modified) is
While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just fa/Aing a&oMf
and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace,/tg Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will
prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be
done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
9
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
vandolence.
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever hanaged (o glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come^ 'out of ihe horror of war': a new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a; 'rule
law', not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the bther, & not explained (Medlin's paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the'mosLpart, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A -Source Poo/: on Chines P/zi/osop/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/* Tao Tza(Tao-re C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Eco/ogy, commtziry and /i/esfy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pigs/or r/ze Anchors : rita/ in r/ze eco/ogy o/*a New Guinea Pcop/e, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', Di-srn.y.s'ion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /notary ); referred to as Al.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discussion
papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsz'srenr Logic); referred to as MD.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, Socia/ Power and Po/irica/ Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J W. Smith, 77ze Worms ar r/ze /Vearr o/T/zings , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', -Socia/ P/zi/osop/zy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discussion papers in
environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
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WAR AND PEACE IV:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7. Fca/ar^y o/ % Tao/s/
q/ war an<?
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za'
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoi<7a&/e gvfAy.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
�2
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
dispensation? Why should what is no? tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves
* PMzz/ay/br
explaining to be done.
and wars as M/tavafda&Ze evf/s
There are fwa puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the zm/ffary-pracac^s
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /Z/g-prac^c^s paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter
attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all tight - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the 7%oLyf-ZZ/&y?y/e
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coA^nfZy take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or
cleaver weapons. Instead the points are made by
what the possesser of Tao
�3
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by awa/ogy, of victory in war with death.
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is bof/i
because evil,
also no?
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element* in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain irom killing (p. 17).
'Just as*? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT bn examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing,
most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees
them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas
that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
�4
Diagrams . C/%zr%Kg
"r&w/v^".
procawmg
Dggp-grgg/Y c/Mrr
Arguments to
incompatible
prescriptions
Processing of dilemma,
directive
situational procedures
output
CorrasppMJing 7%<9i\f c/M!rr:
Black
directive
Box
output
input
It is evident that Taoism can be
information can be put into the Black Box
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensi^s of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:-
�5
Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders aZZ actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be
unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
"unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important (ype of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But",to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to 'just warybr party d'.)
�6
unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then i/* it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of Wept-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military illness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
-
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar").
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
;
�7
2.
On
divergence of deej?-green fron: Taoisn!.
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, a roMg/t and preliminary ryp<?/<9gy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a gawc - in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) parfzay. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as a/za/ogfca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, -yfafe.y. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not so readily or desirably abolished),
between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by
extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But
undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the
worst wars.
While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contents. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been
much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let
us distinguish such wars as
wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
�8
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
this effort).
Among wars, an important distinction is that between
and
wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading"
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggray-yor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LT p. 152)3,
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining "defensive* to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include ""defence** of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is ""defensive**). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; Marxist and market capitalism, for
3
There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can c<?wpa.y.Hon be
appropriate unless this attack is wif/un a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
�9
example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...).
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but
for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
-the
(pulf war liquidated some ^1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured
method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
* conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
* social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wz'Z/
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
�10
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised
defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to
war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
* elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
* force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
* contraction to defensive capacities only, and the Anal stage consists in
* elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /%// distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the
sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the nation in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
�11
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in assendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably
forecast in advance. A modem war is of course a war that deploys modem technology, at least
that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
thlaess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
�12
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, environments were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an eco/ogica/Zy son/M? war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the
information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and
Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. PuzzZes
Tao/sf s/ra/egy anJ f/s endues o/ fec/tnoZogy an*/ woZence
Tt is surprising how much of the Lao Tza is devoted to military strategy'. Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists'
strong opposition to the use of force' (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
*
*
not 'making light of the enemy' (p.222)
and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
�13
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people* (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be*
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194).
* advance from weaATt&M, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
* coolness and noncompetition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give* (LT p.164), is cited as invoking "an
element of deceit* "undeniably*, and "worse* it is "morally questionable* (Chan p.17). But in
order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my
hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign
construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to
expand* (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it
first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural
items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the
Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned
hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, "smart weapons* as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state* would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them* (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
�14
paradox)^
The powerful critique of militarism in the
C/wng is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p. 197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMwef, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere
technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice oLtechnology that appropr^/zg^,
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion^ 3ize, such as smallness, or
intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technology are likely
to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of
course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good
these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in
maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions
(which may be difficult^ ease of repair, capital cgeapness and repair inexpensiveness,
environmental^ benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
/-C
^7^^7*//
/
�right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as
which is more generally /orcg w/zzc/z vzo/af&y, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally
nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much
sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
* War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs and enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is
an anachronism.
* Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
° But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^
This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
6
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist"
action
the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
;
/1
�16
second premiss.
and worn/ /zacz/zszn.
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: * It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
* It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2,
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed zn prznczp/e to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, zr^ own use, of destructive force, and.
inveighed against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in
conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important
early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be
thwarted in this way.
Pacz/z^nz, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
is, in Amauld's word, a/zzz-IVar-z^nz, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief ^Zazzdard ^acz/z^nz is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
/,
�17
Plainly the oppojzfzon to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be acfzve, as with nonviolent
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concz'-ye
Ezzg/z^/z definition of the negative component: "the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Cozzcz^
E/zg/zj/z tends to force pacifism into what the
Eng/zs/z Dzcfz'onafy lists as its final item:
'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any
circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds, .yfrefc/z^ /?acz/z.M?z.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called mora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive",
"fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times sketched pacifism
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as cowigrghgn.yzvg pacifism:
ovcrcomprgAe/MAe might have been better.
�18
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p. 10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, wif/nn the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of a// that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes
pacifism" (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of acf/vw?! which holds that while violence is
wrong
one is -yowefwtay justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^
Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism"" is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is
deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movement:and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
�accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nof 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS
p.152). Situationally
procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
"second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can
enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
�20
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the "strategy will allow
foe
violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however
rather than
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can "justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist "is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is
to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially "justified' violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains "a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with "the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
"appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his "basic principle', his appeal to "lesser evil' generates some instances. The
"basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the "basic principle', since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
�21
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent ^depiction, the
"natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which bschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady
indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical
framework, designed for the usual human round, the convendonal setting for ethical theories, it
stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification
envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that
o
supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive
�22
agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
To recover what amounts, in the prevous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious cjuic^ to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope
for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what
is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan
Append?*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just fa/Amg aAoaf peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace,/ig Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will
prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be
done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox
9
The generalization^ P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental
vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes^MP2°. It is
morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence.
�23
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
"peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A 5*oarce 2?oo% on C/zz'ae^e P/zZZo^op/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), T/ze Way a/* Lao Tza(Tao-re C/zZag), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, UproorZag War, Freedom press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, EcoZogy, coazazaaZry aa<% ZZ/e.yfy^, Cambridge University press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, PZg.y /or r/ze Anc&yfory : rituaLin the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, "War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', DZjca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzeafaZ p/zZZojop/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /apaZry); referred to as Al.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, "Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca&yZoa
papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/aZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paracoa^z\yrearLogZc); referred to as MD.
R. Routley, "War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, 6*acZaZ Power aad PoZZrZcaZ Free&wi, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 77ze Woraz^ ar r/ze 7/earr o/T/zZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, "War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZaZ P/zZZo^op/zy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, "Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za
eavZroaazearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
�22
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
paci/Ly/H (as modified) is
While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The 3ptly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even — in what was effectively a declaration of war — reiteration of the
modem quest for "a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. "War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just
peace,
and thinking about peace; we must work for
for it - through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will
prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be
done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin s paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
vandolence.
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
�23
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A
on C%Zn^.y^ P/zZZo-yopZEy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 7%^ Way 0/L00 7za (7ao-z^ C/nng), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, EcoZogy, co/wmonZy an%Z ZZ/f^ZyZ^, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, PZg^ybr z/^^ Anc^^ror^ : rZzaaZ Zn Z/^^ ^coZogy o/ a ZV^w GnZn^a P^opZ^, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', DZ^cn^Zon papery Zn ^nvZronm^nfaZ p/zZZo-yop/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /npaZry); referred to as Al.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca-MZoK
papery Zn ^nvZronw^HZaZ p/nZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paraco/MZ-yZ^/iZ LfgZc); referred to as MD.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', DZ-ycas-yZon papers Zn ^nvZron/M^nZaZp/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, &?cZ%Z Potter aA!^Z PoZZzZcaZ Fr^fJow, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 7%^ Wor^ty %Z z/z^ 7/^arZ p/77iZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZ#Z P%ZZo.yopZ!y, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^-yZan papers Zn
^HvZronm^nZaZ p/uZo-yop^y #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
�23
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A 6*az/rce Z3aa& on C/zinese P/ziZasap/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/Eaa 7za (7aa-te C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Eco/ogy, canznznnify aneZ Zi/esfyZe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pigs^ar r/ze Ancesfars : rifzzaZ in f/ze ecaZagy a/a Aew Gzzinea PeapZe, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', Discassian papery in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /n^aizy); referred to as Al.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discassian
papers in enviranzzzenfaZ p/tiZo.yop/ty #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paracon.yi.y^nf Lagic); referred to as MD.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZp/ziZasap/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, .SaciaZ Patter anJ PaZificaZ FreeJazn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 77ze Warzzzs af f/ze Pfearf a/77zings, Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989,
h 7^)5,
R. Sylvan, War and Peace IIL Australian defence philosophy',
P/ziZasap/zy 3 Zw)
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discassian papers in
enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
/-//TirZcVf
Z^9/
�
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WAR AND PEACE IV:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7. Fca/ar^y o/ % Tao/s/
q/ war an<?
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za'
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoi<7a&/e gvfAy.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
2
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
dispensation? Why should what is no? tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves
* PMzz/ay/br
explaining to be done.
and wars as M/tavafda&Ze evf/s
There are fwa puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the zm/ffary-pracac^s
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /Z/g-prac^c^s paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter
attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all tight - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the 7%oLyf-ZZ/&y?y/e
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coA^nfZy take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or
cleaver weapons. Instead the points are made by
what the possesser of Tao
3
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by awa/ogy, of victory in war with death.
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is bof/i
because evil,
also no?
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element* in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain irom killing (p. 17).
'Just as*? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT bn examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing,
most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees
them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas
that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
4
Diagrams . C/%zr%Kg
"r&w/v^".
procawmg
Dggp-grgg/Y c/Mrr
Arguments to
incompatible
prescriptions
Processing of dilemma,
directive
situational procedures
output
CorrasppMJing 7%<9i\f c/M!rr:
Black
directive
Box
output
input
It is evident that Taoism can be
information can be put into the Black Box
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensi^s of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:-
5
Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders aZZ actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be
unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
"unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important (ype of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But",to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to 'just warybr party d'.)
6
unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then i/* it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of Wept-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military illness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
-
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar").
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
;
7
2.
On
divergence of deej?-green fron: Taoisn!.
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, a roMg/t and preliminary ryp<?/<9gy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a gawc - in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) parfzay. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as a/za/ogfca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, -yfafe.y. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not so readily or desirably abolished),
between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by
extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But
undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the
worst wars.
While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contents. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been
much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let
us distinguish such wars as
wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
8
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
this effort).
Among wars, an important distinction is that between
and
wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading"
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggray-yor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LT p. 152)3,
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining "defensive* to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include ""defence** of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is ""defensive**). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; Marxist and market capitalism, for
3
There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can c<?wpa.y.Hon be
appropriate unless this attack is wif/un a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
9
example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...).
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but
for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
-the
(pulf war liquidated some ^1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured
method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
* conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
* social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wz'Z/
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
10
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised
defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to
war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
* elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
* force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
* contraction to defensive capacities only, and the Anal stage consists in
* elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /%// distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the
sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the nation in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
11
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in assendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably
forecast in advance. A modem war is of course a war that deploys modem technology, at least
that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
thlaess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
12
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, environments were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an eco/ogica/Zy son/M? war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modern wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the
information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and
Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. PuzzZes
Tao/sf s/ra/egy anJ f/s endues o/ fec/tnoZogy an*/ woZence
Tt is surprising how much of the Lao Tza is devoted to military strategy'. Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists'
strong opposition to the use of force' (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
*
*
not 'making light of the enemy' (p.222)
and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
13
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people* (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be*
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194).
* advance from weaATt&M, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
* coolness and noncompetition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give* (LT p.164), is cited as invoking "an
element of deceit* "undeniably*, and "worse* it is "morally questionable* (Chan p.17). But in
order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my
hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign
construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to
expand* (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it
first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural
items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the
Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned
hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, "smart weapons* as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state* would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them* (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
14
paradox)^
The powerful critique of militarism in the
C/wng is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p. 197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMwef, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere
technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice oLtechnology that appropr^/zg^,
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion^ 3ize, such as smallness, or
intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technology are likely
to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of
course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good
these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in
maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions
(which may be difficult^ ease of repair, capital cgeapness and repair inexpensiveness,
environmental^ benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
/-C
^7^^7*//
/
right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as
which is more generally /orcg w/zzc/z vzo/af&y, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally
nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much
sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
* War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs and enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is
an anachronism.
* Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
° But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^
This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
6
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist"
action
the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
;
/1
16
second premiss.
and worn/ /zacz/zszn.
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: * It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
* It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2,
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed zn prznczp/e to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, zr^ own use, of destructive force, and.
inveighed against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in
conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important
early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be
thwarted in this way.
Pacz/z^nz, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
is, in Amauld's word, a/zzz-IVar-z^nz, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief ^Zazzdard ^acz/z^nz is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
/,
17
Plainly the oppojzfzon to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be acfzve, as with nonviolent
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concz'-ye
Ezzg/z^/z definition of the negative component: "the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Cozzcz^
E/zg/zj/z tends to force pacifism into what the
Eng/zs/z Dzcfz'onafy lists as its final item:
'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any
circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds, .yfrefc/z^ /?acz/z.M?z.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called mora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive",
"fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times sketched pacifism
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as cowigrghgn.yzvg pacifism:
ovcrcomprgAe/MAe might have been better.
18
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p. 10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, wif/nn the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of a// that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes
pacifism" (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of acf/vw?! which holds that while violence is
wrong
one is -yowefwtay justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^
Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism"" is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is
deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movement:and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nof 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS
p.152). Situationally
procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
"second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can
enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
20
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the "strategy will allow
foe
violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however
rather than
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can "justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist "is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is
to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially "justified' violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains "a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with "the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
"appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his "basic principle', his appeal to "lesser evil' generates some instances. The
"basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the "basic principle', since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
21
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent ^depiction, the
"natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which bschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady
indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical
framework, designed for the usual human round, the convendonal setting for ethical theories, it
stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification
envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that
o
supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive
22
agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
To recover what amounts, in the prevous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious cjuic^ to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope
for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what
is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan
Append?*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just fa/Amg aAoaf peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace,/ig Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will
prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be
done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox
9
The generalization^ P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental
vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes^MP2°. It is
morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence.
23
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
"peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A 5*oarce 2?oo% on C/zz'ae^e P/zZZo^op/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), T/ze Way a/* Lao Tza(Tao-re C/zZag), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, UproorZag War, Freedom press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, EcoZogy, coazazaaZry aa<% ZZ/e.yfy^, Cambridge University press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, PZg.y /or r/ze Anc&yfory : rituaLin the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, "War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', DZjca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzeafaZ p/zZZojop/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /apaZry); referred to as Al.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, "Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca&yZoa
papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/aZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paracoa^z\yrearLogZc); referred to as MD.
R. Routley, "War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, 6*acZaZ Power aad PoZZrZcaZ Free&wi, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 77ze Woraz^ ar r/ze 7/earr o/T/zZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, "War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZaZ P/zZZo^op/zy, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, "Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za
eavZroaazearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
22
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
paci/Ly/H (as modified) is
While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The 3ptly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even — in what was effectively a declaration of war — reiteration of the
modem quest for "a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. "War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just
peace,
and thinking about peace; we must work for
for it - through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will
prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be
done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now
supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world
order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one,
enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin s paradox
hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that
vandolence.
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
23
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A
on C%Zn^.y^ P/zZZo-yopZEy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 7%^ Way 0/L00 7za (7ao-z^ C/nng), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, EcoZogy, co/wmonZy an%Z ZZ/f^ZyZ^, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, PZg^ybr z/^^ Anc^^ror^ : rZzaaZ Zn Z/^^ ^coZogy o/ a ZV^w GnZn^a P^opZ^, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', DZ^cn^Zon papery Zn ^nvZronm^nfaZ p/zZZo-yop/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /npaZry); referred to as Al.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca-MZoK
papery Zn ^nvZronw^HZaZ p/nZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paraco/MZ-yZ^/iZ LfgZc); referred to as MD.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', DZ-ycas-yZon papers Zn ^nvZron/M^nZaZp/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, &?cZ%Z Potter aA!^Z PoZZzZcaZ Fr^fJow, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 7%^ Wor^ty %Z z/z^ 7/^arZ p/77iZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989.
R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZ#Z P%ZZo.yopZ!y, for Nuclear
Conference, University of Queensland, 1985.
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^-yZan papers Zn
^HvZronm^nZaZ p/uZo-yop^y #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
23
'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted;
practice has scarcely changed at all.
REFERENCES
W.-T. Chan, A 6*az/rce Z3aa& on C/zinese P/ziZasap/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963;
referred to as ST.
W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/Eaa 7za (7aa-te C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963;
referred to as LT.
B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984.
A. Naess, Eco/ogy, canznznnify aneZ Zi/esfyZe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK,
1989.
R.A. Rapaport, Pigs^ar r/ze Ancesfars : rifzzaZ in f/ze ecaZagy a/a Aew Gzzinea PeapZe, Yale
University Press, New Haven, 1967.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism
of pacifism', Discassian papery in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #9, Research School of
Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /n^aizy); referred to as Al.
R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discassian
papers in enviranzzzenfaZ p/tiZo.yop/ty #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian
National University, 1984 (also in Paracon.yi.y^nf Lagic); referred to as MD.
R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence
and the political fall-out', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZp/ziZasap/zy, #5, Research
School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984.
G. Sharp, .SaciaZ Patter anJ PaZificaZ FreeJazn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980.
J.W. Smith, 77ze Warzzzs af f/ze Pfearf a/77zings, Public Relations Unit, Flinders University,
1989,
h 7^)5,
R. Sylvan, War and Peace IIL Australian defence philosophy',
P/ziZasap/zy 3 Zw)
R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discassian papers in
enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National
University, 1990; referred to as UT.
/-//TirZcVf
Z^9/
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* WAR AND
TAO AND DEE
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory
nanism, is not a pacific
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast foi
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7.
o/ a
o/ war
wnZz/arMw.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Zzzo
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
^vz'Ay.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the
because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
�/
/
46""WAR AND PEACE )V:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
\
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
J.
of a Tao:s;
of war anJ wn/%ar:syn.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ 'If a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed" (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war" (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu". '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za"
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoMfa&Zt? evz'A.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element" in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, 'to life in general" (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
��2
dispensation? Why should what is no/ tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done.
* Pnzz^/br 7hofym, on J wary a.y nnavo^^/e evi/.y
There are /wo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the miP/ary-prac/fce^
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /{/e-^racOce^ paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, The most bitter
attack on militarism", the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coZ^r^n/Zy take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position Ay taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
They are hated by creatures
Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them....
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of
clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circMw/ocM/Zon, what the possesser of Tao
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by ana/ogy, of victory in war with death.
�3
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is
because evil,
J also no/
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that 'most troublesome element' in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17).
'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is
missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism
sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic
dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
DMgrawy . C/tar/ing
�4
It is evident that Taoism can be
information can be put into the Black Box
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may .yfonJ, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always
generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
�5
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders %/Z actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even i/that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be
unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
"unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important fype of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?*
In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
unavoidable.
Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to Just war Jbr party d'.)
�6
excessive ethical costs such as extermination.
Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then /fit can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar").
2.
On
q/
/row
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
2
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
continuity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
�7
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, a roMg/t and preliminary %?<?Zogy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a "contest earned on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a game - in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) /?ar%&?. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as aaa/a^/ca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, graf^. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably
abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or,
perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang
wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and
virtually all the worst wars.
While ""nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of "force of arms', token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much
larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us
distinguish such wars as
wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
�8
this effort).
Among wars, an important distinction is that between
and
wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading"
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LT p.l52).3
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market
capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
3
There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can compa^fo/i be
appropriate unless this attack is
a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
1 dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
�9
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...).
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but
for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
(the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a
favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite
targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
* conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
* social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society/
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wi//
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
�10
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised socia/ defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to
war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
* elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
* force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
* contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in
* elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /aZZ distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp
curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
�11
facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war — finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modem wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast
in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that
available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
�12
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an ^co/og/ca/Zy goMnJ war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modem wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modem wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information
accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars
both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. Fuzzes
Tao/s/ sZra/fgy
of Z^cAnoZogy an<Z woZ^ncF
Tt is surprising how much of the Loo 7zM is devoted to military strategy". Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? "Do they not contradict the Taoists
strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
* -yenoMyn&M, not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222)
*
and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
�13
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people' (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be'
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194).
* advance from
flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
* coolness and
(LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give' (LT p.164), is cited as involving
"an element of deceit' "undeniably', and "worse' it is "morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But
in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give
my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of
benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary
first to expand' (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to
bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured
natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly
illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and
weakness turned hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, "smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state' would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them' (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
paradox).^
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
�14
The powerful critique of militarism in the 7ho-^ CTnng is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p.197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
right. 'Vital force without restraint", intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as vZoZence, which is more generally
w/tZc/t vZo/aZ^^, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere
technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that approprZaf^n^&f,
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size,
such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive
technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small
technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria
for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off:
reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of
operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair
inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
�15
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
* War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
* Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
° But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6
This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the "therefore" is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
second premiss.
4.
6
am/
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist"
action
the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
�16
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially /xzcf/ic position — it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
* It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed m
to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war.
The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, /A? own use, of destructive force, and
continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire
consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and
important early task commits in unscrambling senses of pacifism". Semantical skulduggery
can be thwarted in this way.
Paci/Mwi, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
is, in Amauld's word, a/ifi-War-M/M, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief .yfa/iJarJ paci/Mwi is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
Plainly the
to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be
as with nonviolent
�17
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the
Eng/fy/t definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare". Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The
Eng/is/t tends to force pacifism into what the Ox/brd
Dictionary lists as its final item:
'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price", 'in any
circumstance". Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds, -yfrefcM
While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wior#/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent ", "inconsistent"", "insensitive ,
"fanatical"". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as
<9v^rc<9m/?r^H.S7Vg might have been better.
pacifism:
�18
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives z/* the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p.10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, wzf/zzzz the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of
that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a "failure because it trivializes
pacifism" (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of acfzvLf/M which holds that while violence is a/wayj wrong
one is
justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^
Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS ""activism"" is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is
deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
�19
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as %
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS
p.152). Situationally or%er procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
"second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that onZy consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can
enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow
?<%) mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however J/ZMfzon rather than
�20
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
'appropriate, in response is <?n/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The
'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
�21
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
"natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral -
in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
modified P2 results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
9
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
�
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* WAR AND
TAO AND DEE
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory
nanism, is not a pacific
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast foi
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
7.
o/ a
o/ war
wnZz/arMw.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Zzzo
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as
^vz'Ay.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the
because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
/
/
46""WAR AND PEACE )V:
TAO AND DEEP-GREEN
\
Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many
issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific
doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress
mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific
purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the
role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to
military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through
Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and
towards deep-green theory.
J.
of a Tao:s;
of war anJ wn/%ar:syn.
War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally
aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions:
for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military
tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ 'If a ruler ... does not set himself
right, even his commands will not be obeyed" (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much
further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no
net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation
practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate
to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war" (SB
p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao
Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu". '[T]he opposition of Taoism to
the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za"
(Chan, p.154, p.17.)
But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not
assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war,
militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced
from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who
possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoMfa&Zt? evz'A.
Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed
to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among
the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works,
a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism.
The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has
been seen as 'the most troublesome element" in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much
however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much
more widely, 'to life in general" (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special
2
dispensation? Why should what is no/ tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given
that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of
universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done.
* Pnzz^/br 7hofym, on J wary a.y nnavo^^/e evi/.y
There are /wo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the miP/ary-prac/fce^
paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /{/e-^racOce^ paradoxes. The special
paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, The most bitter
attack on militarism", the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the
possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from
all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful)
conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward
generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some
practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas
assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the
conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a
Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious
and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the
paradox.
Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coZ^r^n/Zy take the
positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable
preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position Ay taken, especially on war
and militarism. One key pasage runs:
Fine weapons are instruments of evil
They are hated by creatures
Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them....
Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler.
When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best
principle
Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy,
For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men.
He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ...
For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies
(LT p.154).
Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil.
They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes
unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse,
obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of
dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse
which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of
clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circMw/ocM/Zon, what the possesser of Tao
does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by ana/ogy, of victory in war with death.
3
Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories,
underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where
something is unavoidably evil, it is
because evil,
J also no/
doing it is
excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses),
an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars
have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects.
Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that 'most troublesome element' in Taoism, the
military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking:
It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of
taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic
and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the
chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma
whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or
should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17).
'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in
contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible
duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of
one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties.
These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding
war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling
reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps
overlapping, set of reasons).
A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate
treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable
strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or
develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account
of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is
the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic
discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear
inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism
of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements
and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious
feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is
missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism
sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic
dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show:
DMgrawy . C/tar/ing
4
It is evident that Taoism can be
information can be put into the Black Box
rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory,
i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is
indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to
deep ecological theory (see UT).
We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes
deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of
Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The
principles delineating the fix may .yfonJ, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality
(or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved
parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account,
see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists
will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued.
So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other
dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior
substantive issue is whether dilemmas always
generated: not whether wars are evil
(typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of
wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided,
through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained,
through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that
conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs.
Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an
occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other
types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor
could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore,
5
every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable.
Setting aside determinism (which renders %/Z actual wars along with all other events
unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor,
an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such
examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for
instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions.
The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided
perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely
averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even i/that should be so sometimes, when
there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is
unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant
features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive
action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be
unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided.
Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For
whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur
before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is
"unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like
survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important fype of
unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within
range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes.
State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably
high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example,
be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose
that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith
which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday
machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine
be unavoidable?*
In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate.
Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But
deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the
human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically
unavoidable.
Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves
illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e.
1
Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that
such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of
war. For, according to received
doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter;
coherence requires relativization to Just war Jbr party d'.)
6
excessive ethical costs such as extermination.
Let us explain deontic unavoidability
analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical
costs. Then /fit can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of
war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then
that is deontically unavoidable. It is also
for those committed to, or inclined
towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is
also justifiable, on pacific grounds.
Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable
require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of
standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken
to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition.
The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized:
Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow.
Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152).
And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition
of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very
early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not
however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And
only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a
military objective, with environmental security.
The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and
roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should
exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing
of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and
similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing
kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What
the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters.
But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that
should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than
being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar").
2.
On
q/
/row
Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though
2
But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in
continuity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for
what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT.
7
generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about
how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the
damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature
of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep
green theory begins to diverge from Taoism.
In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections
to them, a roMg/t and preliminary %?<?Zogy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in
its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a "contest earned on by
force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a game - in the
generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the
contestants, (warring) /?ar%&?. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set
up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several
analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object,
construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These
we can set aside as aaa/a^/ca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities.
Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include
surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life
style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently
military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns.
An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as
reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, graf^. Unfortunately it is not
quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures,
races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably
abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or,
perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang
wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and
virtually all the worst wars.
While ""nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of "force of arms', token
wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams
representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are
hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should
not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial
contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much
larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us
distinguish such wars as
wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the
technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure
(indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to
8
this effort).
Among wars, an important distinction is that between
and
wars. An
offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading"
that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded.
Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not
strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can
easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless
they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor,
which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars
between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory,
e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were
defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken
(LT p.l52).3
The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the
subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If
they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.)
Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as
redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or
allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place
(whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is
engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part
of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy)
democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive.
Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to
resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is
represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones,
such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and
so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market
capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion.
The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the
3
There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor
deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can compa^fo/i be
appropriate unless this attack is
a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability
or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation:
I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive:
1 dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222).
These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting.
9
advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for
economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without
war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without
expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars
were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy
meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of
political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit
repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons
economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed
economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in
effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu:
When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to
fertilize (the fields ...).
When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs.
There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181).
But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but
for
cessation of such practices.
The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is
reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the
Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15
years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth,
the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years
(the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a
favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite
targets.
Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and
abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military
practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism.
A main distinction is between
* conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals,
and
* social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is
carried out through social networks of a significant part of society/
It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wi//
have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No
4
Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin.
10
doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in
secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised socia/ defence; people will be kept in the dark
about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies
of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons
of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should
retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more
generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether.
Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily
acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism.
For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations
frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and
authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep
green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important
preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of
state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has
no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an
elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference.
A recommended route to
war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the
means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include
* elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and
* force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed
very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in
* contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in
* elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social
defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation.
Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /aZZ distance are readily grasped by
considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp
curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been
primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social
fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a
matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars
should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline
and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon
endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize
war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust
facts.
Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive
perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also
11
facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long
and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into
long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all
this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and
glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war — finally
shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities)
and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means
vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the
practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components
into the industrial engine.
With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the
dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength.
Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly
worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The
opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women
in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs;
likewise conquest.
Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further
strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be
strengthened, through the following syllogism:
All wars should be fully just wars.
Modem wars cannot be fully just wars.
Therefore, there should be no modem wars.
A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast
in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that
available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much
information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is
always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial
requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation
or chemical or biological weapons around.
From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just
war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features
introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant
cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the
chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or
environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf
Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow
a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of
12
value, of what counts.
The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension,
neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars
are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply
backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama.
Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental
ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no
similarly developed doctrine of an ^co/og/ca/Zy goMnJ war, a deep ecological war. Unless any
such war were literally different from modem wars, that is from contemporary technological
wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological
disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even
less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species
than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity.
Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism:
All wars should be environmentally sound wars.
Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound.
Therefore, there should be no modem wars.
The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information
accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars
both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them.
The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There
are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the
technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As
well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that
make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity
and cruelty.
3. Fuzzes
Tao/s/ sZra/fgy
of Z^cAnoZogy an<Z woZ^ncF
Tt is surprising how much of the Loo 7zM is devoted to military strategy". Which
strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? "Do they not contradict the Taoists
strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism?
Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does
not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the
emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling.
The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include
* -yenoMyn&M, not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222)
*
and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics:
marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting
13
enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of
the state should not be displayed to the people' (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel
the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing
smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be'
(p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous
consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194).
* advance from
flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will
overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233).
* coolness and
(LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies
are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices
the charge of deviousness looks feeble.
The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For
the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and
elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general,
unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to
meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the
legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give' (LT p.164), is cited as involving
"an element of deceit' "undeniably', and "worse' it is "morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But
in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give
my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of
benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary
first to expand' (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to
bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured
natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly
illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and
weakness turned hardness and strength.
The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp
weapons, "smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we
have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted
(p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state' would not be retained
unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons
deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there
are arrows and weapons, none will display them' (LT p.238). Much technology, military and
other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices
paradox).^
5
Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of
quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and
14
The powerful critique of militarism in the 7ho-^ CTnng is coupled with strong opposition
to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an
ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an
unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may
occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence.
To force the growth of life means ill omen.
For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence
(LT p.197).
One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing
requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony.
To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and
violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is
condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice
violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non
interference that are excluded.
However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite
right. 'Vital force without restraint", intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts
as vZoZence, which is more generally
w/tZc/t vZo/aZ^^, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible.
A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things
that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An
important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of
war, above all from irresponsible state power.
As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so
difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is
technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent
or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has
to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out;
there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere
technique. It is
because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that approprZaf^n^&f,
itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size,
such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive
technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small
technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria
for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off:
reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of
operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair
inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs.
15
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
* War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
* Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
° But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6
This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the "therefore" is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
second premiss.
4.
6
am/
Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
- designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative,
thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism,
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist"
action
the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
capitalism.
16
Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and
accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially /xzcf/ic position — it is not (nowhere in the
central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart
defensive wars.
* It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance
through the watershed thesis
P2.
It is morally wrong to use violence.
By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is
committed m
to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles.
Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism,
notably European forms. Is deep green?
There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the
warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of
contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war.
The most prominent
contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they
claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use.
As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly.
They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to
wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and
cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix).
Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily
in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, /A? own use, of destructive force, and
continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire
consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and
important early task commits in unscrambling senses of pacifism". Semantical skulduggery
can be thwarted in this way.
Paci/Mwi, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and
contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component
is, in Amauld's word, a/ifi-War-M/M, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of
warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what
it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation,
arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g.
of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief .yfa/iJarJ paci/Mwi is
opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means.
Plainly the
to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be
as with nonviolent
17
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g.
turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident,
then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the
Eng/fy/t definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and
of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare". Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism
which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The
Eng/is/t tends to force pacifism into what the Ox/brd
Dictionary lists as its final item:
'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price", 'in any
circumstance". Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has
many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non
violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries,
of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions.
They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is
very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which
P2 holds, -yfrefcM
While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
(unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being
the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more
problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wior#/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent ", "inconsistent"", "insensitive ,
"fanatical"". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and
treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism
was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant
violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects
envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and
many ordinary women, but much more extensively.
7
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as
<9v^rc<9m/?r^H.S7Vg might have been better.
pacifism:
18
The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of
moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands
the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to
WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances
develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable
wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the
literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives z/* the pacifist
shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the
literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details
of both see MD p.10).
Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent
decides in the situation, wzf/zzzz the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such
decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad
faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see
MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of
that should be included will not however
be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation.
This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by
Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a "failure because it trivializes
pacifism" (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation
trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ
from a form of acfzvLf/M which holds that while violence is a/wayj wrong
one is
justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent
acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the
commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was
supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^
Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS ""activism"" is
hardly trivial - as that pacifism is
deflated from a radical position to the
commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced
that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace
movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most
people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
8
JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his
criticism, I don't know.
19
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was
deployed as %
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS
p.152). Situationally or%er procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
"second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that onZy consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can
enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has
wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes.
There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow
?<%) mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153).
This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however J/ZMfzon rather than
20
populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed
on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts,
providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153).
Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never
part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly
erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle
free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to
prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is
no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence.
What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially
justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it
remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby
inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent
with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is
'appropriate, in response is <?n/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the
threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence
which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The
'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons
are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would
enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense
stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper
bound on level of force.
As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing
objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far
hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced,
to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally
compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed.
To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non
violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious
difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of
which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world.
Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to
meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
21
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
"natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral -
in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
modified P2 results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
9
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
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TAOISM AND DEEP (ECOLOGICAL) THEORY:
a preliminary object-theoretic investigation.
There is a remarkable, and remarked, convergence of themes of deeper ecological
positions, such-as Deep Ecology, with those ot Taoism, i Given that Deep Theory has not
received adequate elaboration in important directions, particularly metaphysical and political
directions, the older wisdom of Tao can be profitably drawn upon to elaborate and enrich
deeper positions. Where Taoism does diverge from Deep Ecology (our working example
since it is presently the best known deep environmental theory) concerns some of the weakest
and most controversial parts of the Deep Ecology platform, such as the theme of Biospheric
Egalitarianism, the equality of all (living) beings.2 Thus Taoism can also provide a base for
1
The connections are remarked in some of the prime texts for Deep Ecology, for which see
Devall and Sessions (and therein p.100), and also CD. Not all the connections assumed in
Deep Ecology sources are correct however; in parucular Taoism does not deductively deliver
the platform of Deep Ecology. At most it informs the platform, which it would, if taken
seriously, after.
2
A critical exposition of Deep Ecology, which surveys the main themes, is ventured in Sylvan
CD. In several significant respects, Taoism offers a (retrospective) improvement on Deep
Ecology, being free of the excessive junk Deep Ecology has quickly accumulated. Fortunately
for those averse to intellectual junk such as environmental thought tends to collect (though
no doubt for later building or recycling), Deep Ecology is but one deep ecological position.
Another, presently being worked out in some detail, is Deep Green Theory, the ecological
part of a more comprehensive Deep Theory, which is intended to cover a much broader region
of philosophical ideas. Deep Theory includes, for instance, what adds to the depth, depth
relevant logic, intenzional object theory, and deep pluralism. As will begin to become
evident, Taoism proves to be a very congenial position for Deep Theory, and for Deep Green
Theory in particular. Thus it can most usefully be applied to illuminate Deep Theory, as well
as adding to its historical depth. But in this preliminary investigation, we become ^o caught
up in interpreting and explaining authentic Taoism, that we do not get to much explicit
elaboration of Deep Green Theory.
A corollary we want to draw from our investigations (preliminary though they are) bears
upon, and when developed may help to eradicate, a commonplace Western complacency and
smug superiority. A widespread, though usually subterranean, view in philosophy is that the
East really has little or nothing to offer. This view even extends far into environmental
philosophy (cf. Rolston's put-down). It is often part of cultural chauvinism; Western
scientific industrial culture doesn't have much to learn from other, generally more backward or
primitive or scientifically crude, cultures. The West is the cultural pace-setter, with the
information, resources, etc. Observe however that a nothing-new-to-offer position need not
reject old theories as worthless and not worth bothering with; in less brash form it can allow
�51
correction and adjustment of Deep Ecology, and an impressionistic guide to a more
satisfactory and richer deep theory. Taoism is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a
high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow
Mxmrg as the basis of practice. It is also, so it transpires, a very congenial philosophic way
station for ecologically-concerned intellectual travellers weary of mainstream Anglo-American
and Continental philosophies which inform and reinforce the dominant Western social
paradigm.
Both for background, and in order to arrive immediately in the thick of the comparison,
we outline a main part of the Deep Ecology platform in (typical) slogan form and contrast it on
the one side with predominant Western attitudes and platitudes and on the other side with
Taoism.
TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH THE DOMINANT
PARADIGM AND WITH TAOISM
DOMINANT (WESTERN)
PARADIGM
DEEP ECOLOGY (DE)
TAOISM
Domination over nature
Harmony with nature
Elaboration of DE
Nature a resource;
intrinsic value confined
to humans
Natural environment
valued for itself
Much for DE;
"humanism" rejected
Humane supremacy
Biocentric egalitarianism
Differs from DE;
wide impartiality
Ample resources/substitutes
Earth supplies limited
Supplies ample
Material economic growth
a predominant goal
Non-material goals,
especially self-realization
Following Tao-te
that there is interest and merit in historical and reconstruction exercises. What it cannot allow
is news, such as News from Tao. Thus it does clash with what we argue, that such deep
theories as Deep Ecology can benefit and learn from Taoism. Taoism offers a striking timetested theory upon which Deep Theory can draw, an ongoing source of inspiration and
wisdom. Taoism texts may lack the detail of prime Western (non-industrial) sources such as
the texts of Aristotle or Plato; but they offer a much more congenial source for Deep Theory.
�52
Consumerism
Doing with enough/
recycling
Doing with enough
(recycling inappropriate)
Competitive lifestyle
Cooperative lifeway
Much as for DE:
voluntary simplicity
Centralized/urban centred/
national focus
Decentralized/bioregional
/neighbourhood focus
As for DE
Power structure
hierarchical
Non-hierarchical/
grassroots democracy
Hierarchy without
power structure
High technology
Appropriate technology
Limited technology
The contrasts tabulated are of limited accuracy, because condensed to slogans, and also
limited because much of importance is omitted, especially from Taoism (which as so far
portrayed only reflects themes of Deep Ecology). In what follows several of the contrasts
will be expanded, and main omissions rectified. The richness of Taoism, the philosophical
topics traversed to which nothing corresponds in Deep Ecology, will mean that Deep Ecology
is often left far behind?
Deep Ecology offers however a different perspective on Taoism than has been arrived at
before. Not only can Taoism further Deep Ecology, then, but the compliment can be
returned. A comparison of Taoism with deep ecological theory can hardly be our only
objective; as an essential preliminary, much effort is directed at systematising Taoism. In the
course of this outside endeavour, we succumbed to a rather too familiar taunting challenge: to
draw something philosophically solid, of contemporary relevance, from the ancient Taoist
tests. A key element in our attempt to pull off something mind-expanding has been an object-
theoretic interpretation of perhaps the most vexing part of elusive Taoist theory, the
"metaphysics". Taoism lends itself to natural systematisation in terms of noneism (the brand
3
We have not attempted anything approaching a fuii coverage of features of Taoism of
contemporary philosophical interest; but a
coverage is an eventual eco-theoretic
objective. The main works repay repeated fossicking.
There is, for instance, a significant doctrine of opposites in Taoism, iikely /tot the same as
that in the main Chinese tradition, which needs fathoming, and linking with common ancient
themes of balance and dynamic equilibrium of healthy systems. Every sort of thing, every
category has an opposite, which furthermore interacts with its dual. In theory, the opposition
appears to be tied to a (questionable) contrast theory of meaning. In practice, the opposites
tend to be reconciled or harmonized, but /tor in a Hegelian fashion by ascent, but through
taking a middle way (natural compromise rather than dialectic confrontation).
�53
of object-theory developed in JB). For not only is the theory woven around certain striking
objects - Tao, Te, Tzu-jan, and others - not only does the theory cleverly exploit an objecttheoretic cosmology; but also important, the theory, though remarkedly free of the type of
religious trappings and claptrap that ontologically weigh down most older or traditional
ideologies, is opposed to and is highly resistant to reductionistic practices. That is, like
noneism, Taoism takes a no-rubbish non-reductionist stance. It is in part for such reasons especially that most everything in what it is and neither some other (approved) item nor
reducible to such other item - that Taoism avoids the common-sense implausibility and
scientific naivety of many a position, old and new: that for instance everything reduces to
water or air or fire or matter or energy or superstrings
Evidently, in advancing such noneist claims and other claims about what Taoists say or
imply, an interpretation is adopted, when often enough other rival interpretations of the central
texts are supportable. Indeed such a small body of theoretical work as the basic Taoist tests
comprise is far from categorical and is bound to admit of a plurality of non-isomorphic
interpretations.^ The main arguments we should offer for the selection we make from the
basket of admissible interpretations are these: the interpretation we offer is very
straightforward and is mostly an "obvious reading"; for the most part such an interpretation
has already been offered, in other connections, by others much better informed than we are
about the Chinese texts; and that it is a relevant and important one for deep ecological
purposes.
Finally we should remark that we are essentially concerned with the
systematisation of only the Erst two Taoist texts (LT and CT) and focus upon LT. In brasher
moments we are inclined to think that the framework supplied (brushstrokes behind the old
master's impressionistic brushstrokes) will enable us to take philosophical account of almost
everything in the compact LT; we are not nearly so confident as regards CT.
1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao.
Taoism sketches a cosmology
while Deep Ecology does not. The cosmology is interestingly at variance with dominant
- Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance
with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate
(according to Chang Tzu) and comes first.
4
There are significant pluralistic lessons for hermeneutics to be drawn from the logical
investigations of categoricalness of postulate systems and the typical /a/Zare of
categoricalness.
�54
All things in the world come from being
And being comes from nonbeing (LT 40).
The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing (SB p.202).
DIAGRAM 1. TAOIST CYCLE OF RETURN (cf. Chan p.173 fn 2).
flourishing
growth
cycle of generated
entity
reversion
NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or
ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal
(FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal
Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness
all that comes to pass, that is. "All things flourish, but each one returns to its root' (LT 16).
The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the
emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is
5
For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan CS. In
Neo-Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see
e.g. Chan SB, p.335)
A serious complication is induced in the Taoist cosmological story by variations on the
traditional interpretation of the later verses of LT 1. (On the variations, see Chan p.99 note
5; the linkage of Nonbeing with "no desires" is not however so remote as Chan tries to make
out; see LT 37.) The variations (which replace having desires and having no desires by Being
and Nonbeing) lead to dialethic complications of a Hegelian cast. For they make Being and
Nonbeing ultimately the
no doubt because of the becoming and reversion of each
generated being to nonbeing. (Becoming is seen by the modem translators Hegelian-style, as
the product of Being and Nonbeing.) Of course there is bound to be some dialethic elaboration
of Taoism in any case; e.g. Tao itself is both nameless (LT 1) and named (LT 14), though in
a slack sense. Thus Tao is both nameless because nonexistent and not fully conceptualisable
or describable; and also named, because called "Tao', "the Subtle', etc., and theorisable about.
�55
much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon
stability, constancy and equilibrium (cf. Chan p.20, also SB p.177). Overall, it is correct to
say, if not highly informative, that Tao is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense
both of
and of
The novel cosmology — the emergence of what exists from nothing — is made feasible
through adoption of rudiments of a theory of objects (in the style much later elaborated by
Reid, Meinong and others). Nonbeing, what does not exist, is not formless or empty, an
indescribable nullity, as previous Chinese schools had apparently invariably thought (Chan,
p.8). On the contrary, it is not devoid of characteristics, but has definite features. Perhaps
wisely (if unfortunately from an analytic angle) authentic Taoism is largely silent on such
questions as to exactly which features nonexistent items have. But enough is said to reveal
how what does not exist — above all Tao — may yet have very distinctive features, while yet
lacking other properties (such as existence). Main examples, some repeatedly alluded to, are
those of gaps, lacunae, vacant spaces, as with a hollow bowl (LT 4), or empty utensil or
window space or lightweight wheel (LT 11), or valley. The unoccupied space of a room for
example has definite dimensions, location, and so forth; and its function and utility depends
upon its not being occupied (LT 11).
Rudiments of object-theory are however coupled with a curiously narrow doctrine of
names, perhaps as a concession to rival Chinese schools and with a view to making its
nonstandard position devastatingly clear. (This would parallel then the contemporary
concession of
to mainstream schools, in virtue of which nonexistent objects are not
referents; there are no referring terms, "referential names", which signify them.) According
to this doctrine of names, only what is a concrete individual and partly at least describable in
quite particular ostensive terms is nameable (nor at least
nameable). As Wang Pi, an
early commentator, indicated, names have a restricted role, naming requiring circumscription,
'the name that can be named point[s] to a particular affair' (p.l). Thus, for example, the main
-
transcendental notions are not nameable, Tao in particular. Tao, though-a great form ,
though at least apparently "named" honorifically in several ways, is not named thereby, but is
nameless, because not suitably circumscribed, because not a particular (affair). Similarly for
the other central notions of Taoism, such as Te; though they can be described, in approximate
fashion, they cannot be named. 'Tao', Te' and the like are not (ptimary) 77#/%?.?, but rather
(like 'God' and 'Vulcan' on contemporary theories) condensed descriptions. They could be
said to be
'Name' has been contracted, perhaps unduly, to 'primary name'.
There is another very important reason for eschewing names, or at least treating them -
�56
and descriptions - with due caution. Names come with classification, with conceptualisation,
with carving the whole block, with imposition of a theoretical grid on the seamless Whole.6
Usual metaphysical theories presuppose one or another of standard, narrow and limiting,
conceptualisations and classifications, some perspective already carving up the Whole.
Names, basic to the linguistics of such carving operations, have a major role in the
worldification, in breaking up the One, which is simple and undifferentated, and typically a
major role in imposing a single impoverishing theoretical grid (e.g. recent empiricist
perspectives eliminate intensional and evaluative richness from the presented stuff). Part of
the point of the "uncarved block" image - which symbolises the One (among other things, it
is also a symbol for simplicity, and naturalness, for things not spoiled by artifice), the One
simple and undifferentiated, the unity behind all multiplicity - is to get at the purity and unity
of Tao before conceptualisation, before naming, before the differentiating and perhaps
distorting conferring of names.
Though Tao is so nameless, that is, it is not an existent concrete thing (e.g. a
particular), nonetheless a lot can be said a&oM? the Tao, by way of description (see the
excellent summary of Taoist descriptions in Chan pp.6-7). Though Tao is a single item, One,
unity behind multiplicity, under conceptualisations it is "complex', many things: source of
everything, great form regulating both nature and conduct, Way of satisfactory conduct and
proper lives, and derivatively it is "invisible', "inaudible', "vague and elusive'. Nothing
important conceptualised in Taoism comes in neat single form. All the main features and
notions of Taoism - principles, models, examples, etc. - appear in such multiple form:
metaphysical, ethical, etc. The artificial boundaries between these areas are broken down.
Tao itself exhibits this plural conceptual character: it combines both a complex of natural
principles and methods and of guiding ethical forms, with no imposed separation of fact and
value; but it is also an inexhaustible source, and so on. But the Tao is not beyond the reach of
reason (necessarily), even though it is inexpressible (adequately). Other things, such as
infinity, are also of this sort. (If Tao were Nothing, which in a sense it Ay, many of the
puzzling descriptions would be entirely apt.)
Tao is perhaps best explained by going going back to fundamentals. "The word fao
6
This appropriate image was popularised by James. Under deep pluralism, different
determinations of the Whole, different grids, yield different worlds, a pZuraf/ry of worlds, with
different domains of objects named or different classes of designated propositions (and so
derivatively perhaps widi different logics).
�57
consists of one element meaning a head and another meaning to run. It means that on which
something or someone goes [that by which a thing becomes what it is], a path or road, later
extended to mean "method", "principle"../ (Chan p.6, insert from p.7).
DIAGRAM 2.
FUNDAMENTALS OF TAO
head
running
stvlised
source
course
program
path
§
source
directed
path
To the apt Taoist images of Tao as "storehouse", "mother" and "ancestor", may be added
others, such as that of a programmed or guided projectile. Each image helps peel off
unwanted associations of others; thus Tao is a great mother without male input; an ancestor
without predecessor, a missile without maker, an outputing program without input. Like a
program projectile or delivering storehouse, it integrates a complex source, an initial operating
program, with a planned course, a natural (and ideal) path.
The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it
encapsulates a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both
metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving ""laws"") of nature
<37%/ axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with
Plato's structure of Forms, appropriately neutralised (in the object-theory fashion Reid urged:
see JB), or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the
pre-Socratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern
of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao
is a ""great form"", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other
t (unhypostatized) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not
feature large in the
CTn/ig. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the
final chapter (LT 81). Other less Platonically emphasized (or available) forms are more
important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the
supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is
coupled with a dynamic path component.
Tao as form is part of Tao as in/bT*???//?^ source, which comprehends the class of
characterisations of objects e.g. subjectized and individualized forms, taos (these no doubt
�58
relate to forms, ideals or principles, rather as particular essences relate to Platonic forms).
Tao as informing source is summed up in such phrases as "The original of everything and out
of which all arises." Tao as combined governing principle and source is summed up in such
phrases as "the ancestor and mother of all things". The Mother-image provides both a source,
and for the form of an object without being that object? Under the ancestral-image, Tao
supplies both the material source and the form, the genetic coding, for existence.
It is evident that Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and
indeed linked with and not above the everyday. But what is the relationship between nature
and Tao? Is Tao supra- or super-natural? Tao is certainly not supernatural, and it does not
transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both
orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations
(i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this sense is a process and the container and origin of
process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and
Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe.
(Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao,
the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, allembracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so
simple.
The persistent Mother image in Lao Tzu has suggested several tancifui interpretations, such
as that of a mother-goddess, which are not textualiy supported. The latest in this fanciful line
is a Gaia story.
�59
DIAGRAM 3. SUPER-TAO, OR GREAT TAO, WITH COMPONENTS
INTEGRATED
SUPER-TAO
Overarching forms, principles, Way of Nature
'§
'§
Nature, with taos in world
unrealised
objectified
forms
natural
system
'§
'§
'§
'§
§
'§
'§
Deviation line
Defective (or fallen)
fl'
from Natural
taos
As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again
exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to
say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self-
governing. Nor is it quite accurate to say that "the Tao is immanent and expressed through the
�60
fe = r^Zoj, ideal direction) of things'.s The transcendent/immanent dichotomy fails (as on
object-theory), because it presupposes that principles and the Tao exist, either externally or
internally; but they do not exist. What is nearer right is that "Everything has its own nature
and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce
themselves, that is all' (Kuo Hsiang, p.328). But ZJooZZy they proceed according to the Tao-
te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously.
DIAGRAM 4. TAO-TE PATHS, AND GOING WITH THE NATURAL FLOW
(cf. LT 53).
Tao (source)
Te(los)
Flow
Ideal Way: Way of Virtue
§
Deviations
from Flow
Deviant
Ways
tao '§.....................>-Ote
Laws persist, and perhaps evolve, under the guidance of overarching Tao, while the
universe in its rich diversity comes into and goes out of being. Tao thus offers a kind of unity
in, or above, diversity. In this regard too, Taoism can be applied to clarify the value scheme
of Deep Ecology. For Deep Ecology also values diversity and organic unity in diversity, but
lacks the cosmology from which the features derive. The unity lies in a unified tier of
principle (matched in part at an upper level of the Deep Ecology pyramid) above the diversity
of life processes. The Taoist metaphor of a single block, variously composed of many
things, can likewise be applied to fill out Deep Ecology's picture of the ecosphere. However,
8
As Hall claims.
a fundamental notion in Taoism, is often translated as wrfa%, sometimes
power; but often reZo^y gets the intended item and objective better, as the subsequent text tries
to explain. Te is not the same as Tao. And it is a mistake to t?Ze?uZ/y tao, or individualised
Tao, with te (as sometimes suggested; e.g. Chan SB p.178), though they are evidendy closely
connected, and to a restricted extent (as e.g. in a missile example) one can be derived from the
other. While tao gives the source and route ' §, te supplies die virtuous direction and focus or
goal (telos) §-O.
�61
the block metaphor has some drawbacks; it tends to suggest a static picture, which is
unwarranted.
For both Tao and Deep Ecology, universes and ecospheres are, when
appropriately stable, in dynamic equilibrium.
Tao is a natural order. Though the phrase "natural order'* may seem strange, even
contradictory, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perception of the world is the
reverse of the modern Hobbes-Locke perception of the world. In contrast to European
political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of
chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of
Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-
nature, is thus undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is
rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and should, follow nature. Science and politics
can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to
exclude value. Nature presumes value.
Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a
normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they
are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things.
By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment
and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription
of how to act in accord with the way they are.
According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the
world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), the world is
both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to
components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or
ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system
programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts, computer
substitutes for the lost "universal men**).
The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe or Form or whole
genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos - within it. Such a
lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what is properly, a
coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced
directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair
comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an
individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with
a
which comprises a normative directive. For both Aristotle and Tao there is, in effect,
�62
an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namraZ order come about? That
is Tao; another, old and compatible answer is: It evolved.) When things are running
properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord
under the overarching program (cf. diagram 3). If each individual runs according to the
program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual
does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a less ideal result. If each
person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to
impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand
guides, but the hand cannot be forced.
This picture of order invites comparison with the modem market theory, which claims
that maximum effect or benefit is obtained without regulation (other than extensive framework
legislation!), and that once regulation is imposed the result is inferior. In principle, the market
operates on a set of understood (partly conventional) rules. The rules are known and it is
merely a matter of following them. But the market enables dominance by the rich and
powerful, and thereby discrimination and the like. Tao, however, is opposed to such
dominance; those who follow Tao attempt to refrain from dominating others. But like the
market, the rules of conduct are built into the system and any attempt to impose them is
counterproductive.
As a result, spontaneity and order are not opposites, but result from the same thing. A
strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in the good sense) enters.
Like Buddhism, Tao assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater
order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met
without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying
organization. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of
some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutioning sort or of a supernatural sort,
as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism
undermines such latter alternates, and points (in CT) towards an evolutionary explanation.
2. The extend of Tao as agency: non-religion and (non-)moraiity. God does not
occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe
happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur,
He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an
example. "But there is no indication of his existence" (CT 2). As in the socio-political sphere,
direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only examplary. In paiticular, God is not
required to start or wind the universe up. "Everything in the world creates itself without the
�63
direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the
norm of the universe.'9
The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not
personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". It the Tao includes all-encompassing
natural order — a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the
whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the
whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on
the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from
the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic
features are brought in only at disequilibrium — an interesting, but tricky, position. Then too,
in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged.
In politics, as in morals, it is deviation from the natural state that represents the
problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought of the Hobbes-Locke strain,
where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state; by contrast with mainstream thought, nineteenth
century European anarchism adopts a position very similar to Taoism. 10
It is revealing to compare the Taoist picture of deviation from a natural state with
Aristotelian model of deviation from the mean, which provides the norm (cf. diagram 4). On
the Aristotelian model, the end of all things is seeking well-being, to be achieved by following
the Mean. This involves adhering to the Mean in an active rational fashion. Rationality is tied
to seeking, to the means. Tao does not require rationality. Tao is sought passively, by letting
happen, not actively, by forced efficiency, whereas on the Aristotelian account, the search and
aim for the good is active.
9
Kao Hsiang,
on
Tyu, 330-7. When Hall and others try to argue (like
Neo-Taoists) that the Taoist totality is without a beginning - contrary to Hall's other material
about Being coming from Nonbeing - what they actually present, and mean, is. without a
creative beginning. And that is right: there is no Creano
m/h/o as per Genesis. But it is
false that there is no cosmogony. There is; and while there is no creation, a making by
someone, there is a beginning; see e.g. SB, p.202.
10
In this respect, Hall is right off track (in the last sentence of his paragraph 1). The Taoist
point is that naturalness is not such a prominent feature of human affairs, because of the
imposition of excess laws, regulation, etc. Taoist sensibility is only bizarre from an
erroneous dominant paradigm perspective.
�64
DIAGRAM 5. TAOIST MIDDLE/CENTRAL/LITTLE-ACTION WAYS
1.
2.
Aristotelian/Confucian/Taoist
Taoist contrasting ways
mean path, in fuzzy sufficiency cone
hard or extreme
mountain ways
a middle
way
valley, ravine or
river way;
easy, natural way
Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in
Lao 7h/ (e.g. 77, also 29), that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist
route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a path of weakness and little resistance, in line
with the general account of following Tao and living and faring well.
Tao supplies a set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well, as well as a
parallel (and controlling) set of propositions about how things happen and proceed ideally.
Of course there is a moral purpose in Lao Tzu; the moral purpose is a central one alongside,
and inseparable from, the metaphysical purpose, the acquiring of an account of ultimate
reality". To what extent then is Taoism open to the accusation of amorality? Since axiology
is a crucial part of the world view — evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively
offered in the texts — it is not amoral in a generous sense. But the treatment of deontic
principles, and of rules of conduct generally is very different. Deontics get into the picture
only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a
t
course),
'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose' (LT 18). It
depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and
implicitly recommended life-styles, though there are few "oughts' and no (ConfucianKantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless the preferred Taoist lifestyle
merely
recommended, not required, Taoism would tall down as insufficiently pluralistic.
3. On the Taoist styie of iife; an environmental hfestyie. According to Lao Tzu,
there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures' (LT 67; but different
overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19).
�65
1. Deep love - which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care,
respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating
empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however
capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical for Taoism, as it is for Deep
Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness"
or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects).
2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met
adequately without deprivation or excess.
3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism
there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather,
one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society
there are no conspicuous tall poppies.
Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, it is assumed, from these three
virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership
from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps
one to aim in the case of attack/And to be firm in the case of defence" (LT 67). Earlier (LT
19) it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the
ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of
frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious
sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are,
astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly
read out of the "treasures"", are adduced: 'Manifest plainness/ embrace simplicity/ reduce
selfishness/have few desires" (LT 19). Another element, beyond the three of relatedness,
frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is adaptability or sponanteity. This complements the
further desiderata.
Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound life-style are highly
commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing an introduction for Callenbach's
environmental handbook, Living Poor wifL
or even for Pausacker and Andrews'
Living Rener wifL L^^. In Chang Tzu, the pure person is a deep environmentalist:- She is a
'companion' of Nature and 'does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man
upon it". Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace" and derivatively freedom; and her
route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to
the universal process of transformation" and thus to the environment (Chan SB p.177).
�66
In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental life-styles
are condemmed. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess
commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs").
Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as
well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces
ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion
and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes
aspersions on both, thus fitting neatly with Deep Ecology's prescription for environmental
lifestyle and (supposedly derived) policy of non-violence . In place of the Enlightenment and
mainstream economic virtue of competition appears the 'virtue of non-competition' (LT 68).
Arguments against competition can be developed from other doctrines of Taoism. For
example, competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of
(non-action), competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from one's tao. The
penality for such deviation from the path is not spelled out in Deep Ecology, but it is in
Taoism. Another way of putting it (suggested by Clark) is that in competition external rival
standards are imposed on Tao, presumably with electrifying results. In any case, according
to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place oneself above another. So there is no value in
competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the
world cannot compete with him.
A way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned
to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought,
and excess avoided. This includes, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. In Deep
Ecology the same idea appears, partly sloganised as "simple in means; rich in ends".
Simplicity is not the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further
in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not
value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they
are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not.
It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that
Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.^
11
As Elgin's very profuse account reveals. Strictly much further detail is called for here:
namely, a set of conditions is needed, and also elaboration of the Taoist form of frugality, and
then connection of the conditions with die three basic elements of Tao - frugality, deep
relatedness, and not daring to be ahead in die world.
�67
Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity
and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as
elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist
virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its
metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central
Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by
artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and
ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free
from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical
humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity' (Chan
p.14). As to voluntariness, people have a
of selecting the way of Tao rather than one
of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. nonrelatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's
way onto the correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. It is deontic
to speak of a
to find the correct path.
4. Following Tao, non-action, Te and Self-realization. Part of the Taoist route to
an environmental lifestyle and to "self-realization" consists in acquiring the practice of non
action, in terms of non-assertion, non-aggression, non-destruction, etc.
commonly
translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action
and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, wzz-w^z is sometimes rendered
'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as
'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'.^ Construed in this fashion, wM-wez is
not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from
other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non
action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so
arrows in diagram 3 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances,
pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action
(e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other *No-nos; the "no
12
An illuminating philological comparison of
activity with anarc/zz.wi is developed by
Ames, pp.342-3. The sympathy between [them] lies in their common reference to activity
performed in the absence of coercively determined constraints ...'. As Ames observes, the
comparison operates not only at the political and ethical levels, but bears upon cosmology
also, negating a coercive boss or planner in the beginning of things. For an integrated
treatment of wzz-principles, which generally reject forms of imposition and control, see Hall
pp.59-60.
�68
desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorthand for 'no impure desires' (Chan p.13),
i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally
no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to
undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and
intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can
there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be
unspontaneous actions, or any violation of
/yoznAy in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not
Tao, however, is a source which only
all individual paths, which can
deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and
ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature
destroying activities are all too common.^
Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been
damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be,
as Deep Ecologists would say, with basically "hands off' practice and management.
Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow (cf. diagram
4). One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter
bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete does things
effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of
activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in
sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not
striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and
adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities.
Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley
way. In Tao these qualities are associated with life; the inflexible and the rigid are associated
with the dead. This can be visualized as a range of activities associated with the process of
coming into being and passing out of being, in which the pre-life and the post-life are dead.
The central time, like the centre, is flexible and supple; not hard, stiff and inflexible. All this
carries a social message as well as an individual one.
After things reach their prime they grow old, which means they become contrary to
Tao. What is contrary to Tao soon perishes. After prime a thing moves towards rigidity.
13
When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature' (SB p.202); deviation from
Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As
for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature' (SB p.207).
�69
But Taoism does not accept Western cultural notions of primeness. Primeness is not a matter
of a certain juvenile physical or sporting prowess or peak. It takes a long time to reach a
practice approximating Tao. Socrates died in his prime, although by Western standards he
was an old man. An important, but retrograde, cultural shift has occurred in modern Western
culture. The doyens of Deep Ecology are old(er) men by Western standards.
A supreme goal in Deep Ecology, both for individuals and systems, societies and such
like, is self-realisation (again capitalised in the overall case). Self-realisation is a modem
European idea, not found in Taoism, and indeed incompatible with it and all older non
maximizing wisdoms which incorporate theories of adhering to the Mean. For Self
realisation, as understood and explained (of course the account could ahistorically be amended
to a satisizing one), is a maximizing prescription applied to the aggregated interests of separate
self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although Deep
Ecology's ideal of Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there is a group of
associated goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility,
following Tao, cultivation of
parallels that between
cultivation of virtue or
and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation
and %, great
Since The main objective of the
(Chan p.ll), it is
is the
that displaces self-realisation on the Taoist
scheme.
Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a
thing, te is the matching
or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and
(in principle favourably) developing, perfecting; hence the standard translation of
as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power'
has some currency; it is a directed force ybr good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the
direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating
te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for
a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te
(rather than Tao) that generally appears individualised.
As self-realisation in Deep Ecology is not restricted to individuals, so te and tao are not.
The society as well as the individual has a tao and a matching te. Taoism is neither
individualistic nor atomistic, but systemic and holistic. Thus groups or societies have their
own taos and the collection is related to the overall Tao. Social insects perhaps provide a
conspicuous example of the social tao. The example transfers to overly rigid social forms,
such as bureaucracies, and also to military societies which are obsessed with security.
(Taoism is fairly lateralist in its thinking, with much inferential movement by association.)
�70
But security is not obtained by being secure as in military security, which is characteristically
a fortified security. In peace people are open to danger but secure in another sense. The
materialist world, excessively propped up by possessions, Taoism treats with disdain; it does
not equate security with material security.
Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self
development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal-directed
virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature.
Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self-development. How
does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter-organisation, my proper self
development cannot impede your proper self-development. Taoism is decidedly short on
details of such mutual adjustment and harmonious integration, but certain it happens naturally
- as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.^ So there is, or need be, no
vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of
others, between individualistic and relational paths. Perhaps in Taoism the modem problems
are skirted rather than solved. But the Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination
of plans, without domination, whereas the pattern of Western relations operates (as in Hegel)
through hierarchical ordering and domination.
5. Anti-patriarchal aspects: feminism, powerlessness, peace.
Taoism advances
other models, than those concerning age, which are strange by entrenched Western standards
- such as demotion of strength and power, and the place and importance ascribed to
characteristically feminine and child-like elements in living well and achieving Taoist self
realisation, te. It was prepared for ecofeminism in a way that Deep Ecology was not. Taoism
is highly critical of patriarchy, accepting in effect main anti-chauvinistic themes of
ecofeminism. By contrast, there has been continuing conflict between Deep Ecology and
ecofeminism. In its formative programmatic days Deep Ecology did not recognise legitimate
feminine aspirations or sexual domination, and it took no due account of the organising theme
14
resolution of this problem can now make a good start with Axelrod's investigations of
evolving cooperation.
Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice,
provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population,
individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from
invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other
words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod
p.177).
�71
of ecofeminism, the striking parallel between the domination of women and the domination of
nature. But Taoism even incorporates an interesting early form of affirmative action. In
Taoism, the traditional Chinese balance between ya/rg and ym swings, when in disequilibrium
it does, towards the y/n. Quite in contrast with the Western paradigm, one properly aims at
yzn (which represents the complex of supposedly feminine features) rather than at yang
(symbolising, among other things, the masculine complex).
There is an emphasis on female and child-like, features, and, as in ym-yang dovetailing,
integration of gender features. There is, nonetheless, some stereotyping of male and female
features in Tao (as there is generally in feminism itself), with males allegedly active and
female weaker and more passive. It is in this way that the emphasis on yin is reached, from
desiderata such as humility and weakness. Still, though historic Taoism hardly admits of
degendering, rigidly defined sex roles are alien to Tao sensibilities. People develop according
to their own tao. They can develop typically male, or female, features or features of both.
One who rigidly accounts these masculine and feminine features, speaks from without the
framework of Tao. Historically, where it began to be put into practice, Taoism worked for
sexual freedom and liberation of women.
The Child also serves as a model (LT 55), and there are certain components of
Childhood liberation in Taoism: in the emphasis on freedom, in the attack on learning and
schooling, and so on. The reason the child is a model is because it has spontaneity, it is direct
and natural, and lacks power or strength. Tao rejects institutions and societies based on
power. Infants are not ruled by a longing for power, instead all actions are spontaneous.
Active force, like power, is in general castigated.
To force growth is deviant,
destroying harmony. To stop growth is deviant. "For the mind to employ the vital force
without restraint means violence" (replacing "mind" with intentionality would give a better
picture of what is meant). There is a significant difference between force and violence. To
employ intentionally destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To
remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a
non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are
excluded.
Not only is the Taoist opposition to violence well-known, but there is a blistering attack
on militarism and warfare in
7zM (e.g. LT 31, 30, 46); "war is a symptom of the decline
of man' (Chan p.5). Given the hostility to war, it has been regarded as passing strange, not
to say puzzling, that Lao Tzu sketches military tactics and other allegedly devious political
strategies. The strategies are however but application of Taoist principles and techniques to
�72
warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are
accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be
countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor
is it. The legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT 36), is said to
involve 'an element of deceit' 'undeniably', and 'worse' is 'morally questionable' (Chan
p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for
me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics
permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it
is necessary first to expand' (LT 36). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it
is better to bend it first further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both
favoured natural items for symbolic purposes) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is
however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength.
6. Environmental theory and practice, and environmental problems and
difficulties, such as quietism and security.
As on deeper ecological theories,
traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected.
The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other
inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and
the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also
the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models are also undercut There is
no greater boss or purpose for humans to serve or act as steward to; besides stewardship,
which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active
interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active
interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no
"perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist views fall along with domination and
dominion.
Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be
approach, with "hands off' management and associated lifestyles, several features of which
we have already glimpsed. A most stoking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its
strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism.
Heaven and earth are not humane
They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects].
The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist].
He regards all people as straw dogs (LT.5).
Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu (e.g. CT. 2),
Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing
�73
philosophy", it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not
confined to humans or their affairs, but
include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion
of what is good or true. The traditional idea that a supreme supernatural being
... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe
exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are
not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are imparm?/, but in a
broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to
g&m&izTZy
... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards ot
things and replaces them with Nature (Chan p.10, italics added; also p.107).
What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism.
For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society
and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no
unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to
manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose,
that is man" (SB p.207). In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality.
'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way" (SB p.206). He who is
enlightened 'is impartial" (LT 6); 'he has no partial love for anyone" (SB p.201) he does not
bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature.
Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the
CTxmg
'the equality of all things" (the literal 'levelling all things" is nearer the mark), and
the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of
equal value of all things is ventured - nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass
thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the
same stress on /i/i? in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life"
to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking natural objects.) What is offered, instead
of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like deeper ecological theory) a
doctrine of identification. Wide identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality
,
and counter chauvinism. Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself,
humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider
identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's
interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification
reveals that interests, desires, values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted.
Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are
developed, e.g. with a butterfly, by dream access (SB p.190), with rivers and seas, and wider
again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty
world/ This is called profound identification" (LT 56, also 4) - and perhaps wider yet, and
�74
ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao (e.g. LT 16).
No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on
traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional
education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and
prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would
be no regular learning or habituation processor, such as those encouraged traditional
indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in
part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of a power group.
But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not rarified into a
commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Knowledge
is power; such power is removed from the hands of a few by making it a community good.
This goes beyond Deep Ecology, in that it questions and rejects experts. Indeed in its
criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the
position taken by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The move against informational
power also points to the difference between wisdom (not unequivocally approved) and
knowledge, a difference recorded in Taoism as in most older wisdom. However one of the
indicated Taoist arguments against mere knowledge illustrates an a//-to-any fallacy. We can't
reasonably (or possibly) aim for all knowledge - by the unlimited objective or limited beings
argument (see CT 2) - so we can't reasonably aim for any, and shouldn't, so it appears to be
suggested. Another line of argument looks more promising. Life has a limit, but knowledge
is without limit. For the limited to pursue the unlimited is futile. However the argument only
reveals limits to the accumulation of knowledge, not its pointlessness or undesirability. In
any case, in the end the superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism shifts ground; it is
directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against slickness and cleverness, against
devious and crafty uses of knowledge (LT 3), against counter-productive acquiring of
knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The messy situation is tidied up a bit in the CTnxng
where an apposite distinction is made between
knowledge, the castigated sorts,
which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and
knowledge, which is
"leisurely and at ease", comprehensive, extensive, and synthetic (cf. Chan p.20). Even so,
original Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of
(perhaps debilitating) igornance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging
practices, choices and alternatives.
The critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique
of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. (Hence, png
of the complex reasons for the delayed development of technology in China.) Certain forms
�75
of technology were, if not rejected outright (as Clark contends), at least strongly discouraged.
Thus, 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows
and weapons, none will display them" (LT 80).15 More generally, while high and dangerous
technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically.
Lao Tzu recognized clearly that even low impact technology may destroy human practices and
conventions constructive to a community. Nor was the connection of technology with
population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a laboursaving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of
technology.
There is enjoined an avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and
correspondingly a shunning of replacing labour with nothing at all. Taoism exhibits a firmer
grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving
technology, than recent positions like Deep Ecology.^ The Taoist approach also demolishes
the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress,
whatever the merits of the "Law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such
social laws are highly paradigm-dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant
Western paradigm everywhere else.
Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in
Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly
that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends and not a resource, but
something of great value in and for itself. Nature is something to be cherished, allowed to
take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant
view is reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by
15
Some verses of LT, of which this one example, support a rival, sinister, interpretation.
According to this sinister interpretation (pointed out to us by David Garrett, a student at the
University of Auckland), the LT represents not what it has been taken to be, but a work
addressed, like Machiavelli's 77%? Prince, to a Prince, on how to pacify and control the people.
Thus weapons, though held and sharpened, will not be displayed; wealth, though inequitably
distributed, will not be shown; the people will be kept ignorant, through lack of information
and education; and so on. Fortunately many other verses tell decisively enough against this
interpretation. In particular, Taoism denies the need for a Ruler. While under satisfactory
arrangements there will be those who are much better attuned to Tao, even sages, they are in
position to rule as to impose upon others. Moreover should they endeavour to do so, thay
would jeopardise or negate their own accord with Tao. Authoritarian rule Machiavelli-style is
decidedly politically counterproductive.
16
The claim promoted recently that Taoism is an evident home for alternative technology, and
prescribes as much, is rather naive in the light of Taoist texts.
�76
following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western
aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct
aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non
intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when
assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such concepts as bioregionalism is not
to be encountered in explicit forms in Taoism, their bases and many other recently fashionable
environmental ideas are: living in place is certainly present (LT 80); doing things locally and
remaining local, while being attuned to the universe and retaining global connections, is
certainly advocated, underwriting the Deep Ecology maxim of "think globally, act locally .
While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper
environmental theories, Taoism also leaves puzzles or points to residual problems. Not all the
supposed problems are however genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to
contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the
issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action.
How would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment go, and
fare, given its strong (alleged) emphasis on "don't bother'? In-built harmony and quietism do
not allow sufficiently for conflict.
In part there is only a problem because of
misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a don t bother attitude to
environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy
nature. Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to
overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental
destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is
accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer.
How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply,
Taoism holds that there is no genuine problem of plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an
abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the
t
requirements of Tao (rather as some claim there is food scarcity even now, with present
gigantic human populations, only because of politico-economic mismanagement). Tao will
serve to restore plentitude (LT 77). Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is
represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth.
17
Use of the power of water affords a prime exampie; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old
Chinese martiai arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and
resistance.
�77
Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao
keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if those individual
requirements are in line with the greater Tao?is No doubt in those times, and most historical
times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still
operated on human species, there wasn't more than a hypothetical or remote future problem.
It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of
too many people and incremental resource degradation. The texts say little about soil
degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China. By contrast, in
the West, Plato was properly concerned about deforestation of Greece. Nor does Taoism
have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss,
urban disgustification, and so forth, though some of the problems are hardly new. Historic
Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems.
7. The extent of political anarchism: hierarchy, domination, and rulers in
Taoism. In looking to Taoism for political illumination, an early query is likely to be: To
what (damaging) extent is Taoism, and the work of Lao Tzu in particular, anarchistic? It
explicitly addresses a ruler, and takes for granted the existence of a state. But the format of
the Lao 7zM may have been obligatory; for Taoism also hopes for "the absence of princes".
Nonetheless, overtly, Taoism is not anarchistic. But although literally archist, almost
everything in the work corresponds to anarchist sentiments, and it has struck responsive
chords in anarchists. Not surprisingly then, some have argued that, despite appearances, the
work is anarchistic, and disposes of the state and the ruler "when taken in a political sense
(thus Clark). What has happened here is that anarchism is confused with an important
Taoism sketches
an early version of monarchically organised anakyrism; Clark (in his book) a late version of
variant,
meaning practice, policy and so on
ecological anakyrism.
If Taoism assumes a ruler then it is open to the charge of not being a suitably natural
-
way - unless there is a no-hands ruler. But a satisfactory ruler does not coerce, and in fact
does no regulation. It seems clear that Lao Tzu assumes a monarchical style of society
without coercion. The basic idea is that it is alright (if maybe costly) to have or inherit a
perhaps superfluous ruler, so long as there is no coercion. The "ruler" is merely a planner, a
18
It is tempting to speculate that the greater Tao would serve to limit the number of actual
individual taos, as certainly happened in most historic times. On a market model, supply and
demand would be on a natural parity.
�78
guide, an example. "Laws" are not backed up with coercion. Carving the block coercively is
seen as counterproductively breaking up the community.
Control or domination breaks the natural order of society, coercion removes the basic
elements of voluntary simplicity; they are appropriately met with resistance. Government is
said to be a sort of disorder. Government is indeed a main source of disorder, where
government means coercive government. People are difficult to keep in order because those
above interfere. Indeed this is the only reason they are difficult to keep in order (LT 57 and
58). The more laws there are, the more disorder is possible, the more disorder there is. The
more ways order is attempted, and more ways there are to have disorder.
Natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive.
There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if
social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray.
Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is given on social and political
organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural
social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian
ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning
well. Even so, rather more needs to be said about how society accommodates "deviants" of
various sorts, as to how unsocial and unenvironmental activities are curtailed, what support
structures natural arrangements afford, and so on. Of course these things are attended to
locally by society, not by a remote and mostly indifferent state. As in modem anarchism, an
important distinction is taken for granted between (local) society and the state or empire. (By
contrast, in contemporary texts, especially those of economic orientation, the state is often
conflated with society, social roles are transferred to the state, and it is even claimed that what
society wants is what the state does!) In Taoism, as in nineteenth century social anarchism,
society functions along natural lines; the state is essentially otiose. Society is self-regulating.
No doubt small markets that do not yield excess profits flourish, no doubt craftspeople
-
abound and live well but not extravagantly, no doubt local people make inputs to the
arrangements of their social affairs. Most of these sorts of background details go largely
unstated. But some significant features of social practice are revealed; for example (LT 3), the
worthy are not exalted or rewarded, competition is not promoted, there is no unnecessary
accumulation of possessions, consumerism and the manufacturing ot wants is discouraged.
In short, all the main approved features of modern economic behaviour - the sources of
greed, discrimination and strife according to Taoism (Chan p. 103) - are gently set aside, they
do not represent natural, or satisfactory, ways.
�79
Just as nature can operate by itself without a director or boss, so a confederation can run
itself without an emperor or president. True, there may be one or more rulers. However a
Taoist ruler/sage "exercises" non-dominating authority. But obviously, since he exercises no
authority, some of the stuffing has been removed from notion of authority. The ruler/sage
has no personal power. He imposes nothing on others. He transmits worthwhile tradition
but does not impose it. He is said to transmit it through eternal edicts, but these are principles
proferred or advice at best. He does not attempt to legislate or require the good. Society is
like the individual, it cannot be coerced into doing right things. And it should not be! At
work is a teleological model of "transcendent" good, a bit like a natural law theory, but even
more like recent deep environmental theory. No more than co-operating individuals in a
social matrix are required for the good. A ruler, or organiser, does not attempt to require it
for society. He takes no action and the people are transformed by an exemplar ruler. He is a
ruler on a rather more Gandhian model, but even so not a visible charismatic leader. Unlike
contemporary models, the ruler is not a jet-setter or super-consumer; he is not usually seen on
television, and perhaps not seen at all, but only known about, or his or her existence merely
rumoured.
As with "authority", but even more so, other social and political terms thus get
drastically turned around, and even subverted. The "empire ceases to be coercive power, but
turns into a natural super-regional order under general guidance of the Tao. Possessing the
empire" even comes to mean something like attunement to Te. The "power" of a ruler is not
coercive. It is exemplary. The best rulers are those whose existence is merely known by the
people. Thus they are not rulers or leaders, but models for personal development. (For Deep
Ecology the corresponding roles would be those oi eco-saints.) They are not apart from
society, but central to society's ideals. Society could have a lot of "rulers" (kingly people) or
could consist entirely of "kingly people". Like Christ, a taoist ruler leads from within or
behind. The people seeing the life of the sage choose to do likewise.
An ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler. The people bec&me, if you like,
ruler-groupies. The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly.
So Taoism reinterprets the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as
the sage. The meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler is one
who deviates little from the Tao. This is his "power"". Someone who deviates little from the
Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an allembracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of an ideal
life. A more general model is also sketched (notably in LT 8) ot the best type of person — a
person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth", but also loves humanity, and order, and
�80
competence, and profundity.
While Taoism is decidedly short on structural details for organising large human
populations, which are no longer self-regulating (by contrast with large dense populations of
modem penguins), it nonetheless transmits significant political messages, which deep theory
needs to assimilate. Taoism has been attacked, like other similar alternative political forms
(e.g. Morris's social anarchism and Illich's convivial society), as being conservative, as
seeking anachronistically to turn the clock back to some ancient village communal life-style,
better left far behind. Such attacks do not cohere. Such considerable changes, as Taoism
envisages, from the status quo, can hardly be represented as conservative. To be sure, there
are conservative elements in Taoism, as in the most radical environmental movements, for
instance the desire to conserve elements of the natural environment that the "conservatives"
wish to exploit or destroy. ('Conservative', like many a political terms in heavy popular use,
breaks down under conceptual overload.)
While backward-looking glances at an idealised past is a conservative tendency,
anathema to forward-looking progressives who prefer to leave the past obscured in a heavy
cloud of dust, nonetheless, the past, with its actual features, its blocked possibilities, and its
paths not taken, remains important to all main political persuasions. Against anarchistic
positions, progressives like to lodge the charges
that the past never was ideal, that
virtually everything that matters (not, surely, forests inhabited by wild creatures) was far
worse than the enlightened present, #776? that anarchism has never really been achieved in the
past. Again the charges do not cohere. (Proof is left as an exercise; but for hints, see EE).
It should be evident that Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a
severe attack on mainstream civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm. It
discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and
doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and
offers a very mean path, simple and modest, between insufficiency and excess-
APPENDIX. Doctrines of Four: the four great things and the fourfold way.
Running in a striking way through the history of thought are certain related doctrines of four —
of four great, important or valuable, things, whose basic interrelations are fundamental to the
whole doctrine involved. Consider first three, plainly related, fourfolds, of much interest in
deeper ecological thinking:-
theWay/Tao
I
God(s)
I
Whole/Gaia
�
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TAOISM AND DEEP (ECOLOGICAL) THEORY:
a preliminary object-theoretic investigation.
There is a remarkable, and remarked, convergence of themes of deeper ecological
positions, such-as Deep Ecology, with those ot Taoism, i Given that Deep Theory has not
received adequate elaboration in important directions, particularly metaphysical and political
directions, the older wisdom of Tao can be profitably drawn upon to elaborate and enrich
deeper positions. Where Taoism does diverge from Deep Ecology (our working example
since it is presently the best known deep environmental theory) concerns some of the weakest
and most controversial parts of the Deep Ecology platform, such as the theme of Biospheric
Egalitarianism, the equality of all (living) beings.2 Thus Taoism can also provide a base for
1
The connections are remarked in some of the prime texts for Deep Ecology, for which see
Devall and Sessions (and therein p.100), and also CD. Not all the connections assumed in
Deep Ecology sources are correct however; in parucular Taoism does not deductively deliver
the platform of Deep Ecology. At most it informs the platform, which it would, if taken
seriously, after.
2
A critical exposition of Deep Ecology, which surveys the main themes, is ventured in Sylvan
CD. In several significant respects, Taoism offers a (retrospective) improvement on Deep
Ecology, being free of the excessive junk Deep Ecology has quickly accumulated. Fortunately
for those averse to intellectual junk such as environmental thought tends to collect (though
no doubt for later building or recycling), Deep Ecology is but one deep ecological position.
Another, presently being worked out in some detail, is Deep Green Theory, the ecological
part of a more comprehensive Deep Theory, which is intended to cover a much broader region
of philosophical ideas. Deep Theory includes, for instance, what adds to the depth, depth
relevant logic, intenzional object theory, and deep pluralism. As will begin to become
evident, Taoism proves to be a very congenial position for Deep Theory, and for Deep Green
Theory in particular. Thus it can most usefully be applied to illuminate Deep Theory, as well
as adding to its historical depth. But in this preliminary investigation, we become ^o caught
up in interpreting and explaining authentic Taoism, that we do not get to much explicit
elaboration of Deep Green Theory.
A corollary we want to draw from our investigations (preliminary though they are) bears
upon, and when developed may help to eradicate, a commonplace Western complacency and
smug superiority. A widespread, though usually subterranean, view in philosophy is that the
East really has little or nothing to offer. This view even extends far into environmental
philosophy (cf. Rolston's put-down). It is often part of cultural chauvinism; Western
scientific industrial culture doesn't have much to learn from other, generally more backward or
primitive or scientifically crude, cultures. The West is the cultural pace-setter, with the
information, resources, etc. Observe however that a nothing-new-to-offer position need not
reject old theories as worthless and not worth bothering with; in less brash form it can allow
51
correction and adjustment of Deep Ecology, and an impressionistic guide to a more
satisfactory and richer deep theory. Taoism is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a
high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow
Mxmrg as the basis of practice. It is also, so it transpires, a very congenial philosophic way
station for ecologically-concerned intellectual travellers weary of mainstream Anglo-American
and Continental philosophies which inform and reinforce the dominant Western social
paradigm.
Both for background, and in order to arrive immediately in the thick of the comparison,
we outline a main part of the Deep Ecology platform in (typical) slogan form and contrast it on
the one side with predominant Western attitudes and platitudes and on the other side with
Taoism.
TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH THE DOMINANT
PARADIGM AND WITH TAOISM
DOMINANT (WESTERN)
PARADIGM
DEEP ECOLOGY (DE)
TAOISM
Domination over nature
Harmony with nature
Elaboration of DE
Nature a resource;
intrinsic value confined
to humans
Natural environment
valued for itself
Much for DE;
"humanism" rejected
Humane supremacy
Biocentric egalitarianism
Differs from DE;
wide impartiality
Ample resources/substitutes
Earth supplies limited
Supplies ample
Material economic growth
a predominant goal
Non-material goals,
especially self-realization
Following Tao-te
that there is interest and merit in historical and reconstruction exercises. What it cannot allow
is news, such as News from Tao. Thus it does clash with what we argue, that such deep
theories as Deep Ecology can benefit and learn from Taoism. Taoism offers a striking timetested theory upon which Deep Theory can draw, an ongoing source of inspiration and
wisdom. Taoism texts may lack the detail of prime Western (non-industrial) sources such as
the texts of Aristotle or Plato; but they offer a much more congenial source for Deep Theory.
52
Consumerism
Doing with enough/
recycling
Doing with enough
(recycling inappropriate)
Competitive lifestyle
Cooperative lifeway
Much as for DE:
voluntary simplicity
Centralized/urban centred/
national focus
Decentralized/bioregional
/neighbourhood focus
As for DE
Power structure
hierarchical
Non-hierarchical/
grassroots democracy
Hierarchy without
power structure
High technology
Appropriate technology
Limited technology
The contrasts tabulated are of limited accuracy, because condensed to slogans, and also
limited because much of importance is omitted, especially from Taoism (which as so far
portrayed only reflects themes of Deep Ecology). In what follows several of the contrasts
will be expanded, and main omissions rectified. The richness of Taoism, the philosophical
topics traversed to which nothing corresponds in Deep Ecology, will mean that Deep Ecology
is often left far behind?
Deep Ecology offers however a different perspective on Taoism than has been arrived at
before. Not only can Taoism further Deep Ecology, then, but the compliment can be
returned. A comparison of Taoism with deep ecological theory can hardly be our only
objective; as an essential preliminary, much effort is directed at systematising Taoism. In the
course of this outside endeavour, we succumbed to a rather too familiar taunting challenge: to
draw something philosophically solid, of contemporary relevance, from the ancient Taoist
tests. A key element in our attempt to pull off something mind-expanding has been an object-
theoretic interpretation of perhaps the most vexing part of elusive Taoist theory, the
"metaphysics". Taoism lends itself to natural systematisation in terms of noneism (the brand
3
We have not attempted anything approaching a fuii coverage of features of Taoism of
contemporary philosophical interest; but a
coverage is an eventual eco-theoretic
objective. The main works repay repeated fossicking.
There is, for instance, a significant doctrine of opposites in Taoism, iikely /tot the same as
that in the main Chinese tradition, which needs fathoming, and linking with common ancient
themes of balance and dynamic equilibrium of healthy systems. Every sort of thing, every
category has an opposite, which furthermore interacts with its dual. In theory, the opposition
appears to be tied to a (questionable) contrast theory of meaning. In practice, the opposites
tend to be reconciled or harmonized, but /tor in a Hegelian fashion by ascent, but through
taking a middle way (natural compromise rather than dialectic confrontation).
53
of object-theory developed in JB). For not only is the theory woven around certain striking
objects - Tao, Te, Tzu-jan, and others - not only does the theory cleverly exploit an objecttheoretic cosmology; but also important, the theory, though remarkedly free of the type of
religious trappings and claptrap that ontologically weigh down most older or traditional
ideologies, is opposed to and is highly resistant to reductionistic practices. That is, like
noneism, Taoism takes a no-rubbish non-reductionist stance. It is in part for such reasons especially that most everything in what it is and neither some other (approved) item nor
reducible to such other item - that Taoism avoids the common-sense implausibility and
scientific naivety of many a position, old and new: that for instance everything reduces to
water or air or fire or matter or energy or superstrings
Evidently, in advancing such noneist claims and other claims about what Taoists say or
imply, an interpretation is adopted, when often enough other rival interpretations of the central
texts are supportable. Indeed such a small body of theoretical work as the basic Taoist tests
comprise is far from categorical and is bound to admit of a plurality of non-isomorphic
interpretations.^ The main arguments we should offer for the selection we make from the
basket of admissible interpretations are these: the interpretation we offer is very
straightforward and is mostly an "obvious reading"; for the most part such an interpretation
has already been offered, in other connections, by others much better informed than we are
about the Chinese texts; and that it is a relevant and important one for deep ecological
purposes.
Finally we should remark that we are essentially concerned with the
systematisation of only the Erst two Taoist texts (LT and CT) and focus upon LT. In brasher
moments we are inclined to think that the framework supplied (brushstrokes behind the old
master's impressionistic brushstrokes) will enable us to take philosophical account of almost
everything in the compact LT; we are not nearly so confident as regards CT.
1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao.
Taoism sketches a cosmology
while Deep Ecology does not. The cosmology is interestingly at variance with dominant
- Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance
with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate
(according to Chang Tzu) and comes first.
4
There are significant pluralistic lessons for hermeneutics to be drawn from the logical
investigations of categoricalness of postulate systems and the typical /a/Zare of
categoricalness.
54
All things in the world come from being
And being comes from nonbeing (LT 40).
The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing (SB p.202).
DIAGRAM 1. TAOIST CYCLE OF RETURN (cf. Chan p.173 fn 2).
flourishing
growth
cycle of generated
entity
reversion
NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or
ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal
(FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal
Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness
all that comes to pass, that is. "All things flourish, but each one returns to its root' (LT 16).
The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the
emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is
5
For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan CS. In
Neo-Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see
e.g. Chan SB, p.335)
A serious complication is induced in the Taoist cosmological story by variations on the
traditional interpretation of the later verses of LT 1. (On the variations, see Chan p.99 note
5; the linkage of Nonbeing with "no desires" is not however so remote as Chan tries to make
out; see LT 37.) The variations (which replace having desires and having no desires by Being
and Nonbeing) lead to dialethic complications of a Hegelian cast. For they make Being and
Nonbeing ultimately the
no doubt because of the becoming and reversion of each
generated being to nonbeing. (Becoming is seen by the modem translators Hegelian-style, as
the product of Being and Nonbeing.) Of course there is bound to be some dialethic elaboration
of Taoism in any case; e.g. Tao itself is both nameless (LT 1) and named (LT 14), though in
a slack sense. Thus Tao is both nameless because nonexistent and not fully conceptualisable
or describable; and also named, because called "Tao', "the Subtle', etc., and theorisable about.
55
much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon
stability, constancy and equilibrium (cf. Chan p.20, also SB p.177). Overall, it is correct to
say, if not highly informative, that Tao is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense
both of
and of
The novel cosmology — the emergence of what exists from nothing — is made feasible
through adoption of rudiments of a theory of objects (in the style much later elaborated by
Reid, Meinong and others). Nonbeing, what does not exist, is not formless or empty, an
indescribable nullity, as previous Chinese schools had apparently invariably thought (Chan,
p.8). On the contrary, it is not devoid of characteristics, but has definite features. Perhaps
wisely (if unfortunately from an analytic angle) authentic Taoism is largely silent on such
questions as to exactly which features nonexistent items have. But enough is said to reveal
how what does not exist — above all Tao — may yet have very distinctive features, while yet
lacking other properties (such as existence). Main examples, some repeatedly alluded to, are
those of gaps, lacunae, vacant spaces, as with a hollow bowl (LT 4), or empty utensil or
window space or lightweight wheel (LT 11), or valley. The unoccupied space of a room for
example has definite dimensions, location, and so forth; and its function and utility depends
upon its not being occupied (LT 11).
Rudiments of object-theory are however coupled with a curiously narrow doctrine of
names, perhaps as a concession to rival Chinese schools and with a view to making its
nonstandard position devastatingly clear. (This would parallel then the contemporary
concession of
to mainstream schools, in virtue of which nonexistent objects are not
referents; there are no referring terms, "referential names", which signify them.) According
to this doctrine of names, only what is a concrete individual and partly at least describable in
quite particular ostensive terms is nameable (nor at least
nameable). As Wang Pi, an
early commentator, indicated, names have a restricted role, naming requiring circumscription,
'the name that can be named point[s] to a particular affair' (p.l). Thus, for example, the main
-
transcendental notions are not nameable, Tao in particular. Tao, though-a great form ,
though at least apparently "named" honorifically in several ways, is not named thereby, but is
nameless, because not suitably circumscribed, because not a particular (affair). Similarly for
the other central notions of Taoism, such as Te; though they can be described, in approximate
fashion, they cannot be named. 'Tao', Te' and the like are not (ptimary) 77#/%?.?, but rather
(like 'God' and 'Vulcan' on contemporary theories) condensed descriptions. They could be
said to be
'Name' has been contracted, perhaps unduly, to 'primary name'.
There is another very important reason for eschewing names, or at least treating them -
56
and descriptions - with due caution. Names come with classification, with conceptualisation,
with carving the whole block, with imposition of a theoretical grid on the seamless Whole.6
Usual metaphysical theories presuppose one or another of standard, narrow and limiting,
conceptualisations and classifications, some perspective already carving up the Whole.
Names, basic to the linguistics of such carving operations, have a major role in the
worldification, in breaking up the One, which is simple and undifferentated, and typically a
major role in imposing a single impoverishing theoretical grid (e.g. recent empiricist
perspectives eliminate intensional and evaluative richness from the presented stuff). Part of
the point of the "uncarved block" image - which symbolises the One (among other things, it
is also a symbol for simplicity, and naturalness, for things not spoiled by artifice), the One
simple and undifferentiated, the unity behind all multiplicity - is to get at the purity and unity
of Tao before conceptualisation, before naming, before the differentiating and perhaps
distorting conferring of names.
Though Tao is so nameless, that is, it is not an existent concrete thing (e.g. a
particular), nonetheless a lot can be said a&oM? the Tao, by way of description (see the
excellent summary of Taoist descriptions in Chan pp.6-7). Though Tao is a single item, One,
unity behind multiplicity, under conceptualisations it is "complex', many things: source of
everything, great form regulating both nature and conduct, Way of satisfactory conduct and
proper lives, and derivatively it is "invisible', "inaudible', "vague and elusive'. Nothing
important conceptualised in Taoism comes in neat single form. All the main features and
notions of Taoism - principles, models, examples, etc. - appear in such multiple form:
metaphysical, ethical, etc. The artificial boundaries between these areas are broken down.
Tao itself exhibits this plural conceptual character: it combines both a complex of natural
principles and methods and of guiding ethical forms, with no imposed separation of fact and
value; but it is also an inexhaustible source, and so on. But the Tao is not beyond the reach of
reason (necessarily), even though it is inexpressible (adequately). Other things, such as
infinity, are also of this sort. (If Tao were Nothing, which in a sense it Ay, many of the
puzzling descriptions would be entirely apt.)
Tao is perhaps best explained by going going back to fundamentals. "The word fao
6
This appropriate image was popularised by James. Under deep pluralism, different
determinations of the Whole, different grids, yield different worlds, a pZuraf/ry of worlds, with
different domains of objects named or different classes of designated propositions (and so
derivatively perhaps widi different logics).
57
consists of one element meaning a head and another meaning to run. It means that on which
something or someone goes [that by which a thing becomes what it is], a path or road, later
extended to mean "method", "principle"../ (Chan p.6, insert from p.7).
DIAGRAM 2.
FUNDAMENTALS OF TAO
head
running
stvlised
source
course
program
path
§
source
directed
path
To the apt Taoist images of Tao as "storehouse", "mother" and "ancestor", may be added
others, such as that of a programmed or guided projectile. Each image helps peel off
unwanted associations of others; thus Tao is a great mother without male input; an ancestor
without predecessor, a missile without maker, an outputing program without input. Like a
program projectile or delivering storehouse, it integrates a complex source, an initial operating
program, with a planned course, a natural (and ideal) path.
The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it
encapsulates a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both
metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving ""laws"") of nature
<37%/ axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with
Plato's structure of Forms, appropriately neutralised (in the object-theory fashion Reid urged:
see JB), or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the
pre-Socratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern
of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao
is a ""great form"", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other
t (unhypostatized) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not
feature large in the
CTn/ig. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the
final chapter (LT 81). Other less Platonically emphasized (or available) forms are more
important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the
supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is
coupled with a dynamic path component.
Tao as form is part of Tao as in/bT*???//?^ source, which comprehends the class of
characterisations of objects e.g. subjectized and individualized forms, taos (these no doubt
58
relate to forms, ideals or principles, rather as particular essences relate to Platonic forms).
Tao as informing source is summed up in such phrases as "The original of everything and out
of which all arises." Tao as combined governing principle and source is summed up in such
phrases as "the ancestor and mother of all things". The Mother-image provides both a source,
and for the form of an object without being that object? Under the ancestral-image, Tao
supplies both the material source and the form, the genetic coding, for existence.
It is evident that Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and
indeed linked with and not above the everyday. But what is the relationship between nature
and Tao? Is Tao supra- or super-natural? Tao is certainly not supernatural, and it does not
transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both
orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations
(i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this sense is a process and the container and origin of
process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and
Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe.
(Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao,
the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, allembracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so
simple.
The persistent Mother image in Lao Tzu has suggested several tancifui interpretations, such
as that of a mother-goddess, which are not textualiy supported. The latest in this fanciful line
is a Gaia story.
59
DIAGRAM 3. SUPER-TAO, OR GREAT TAO, WITH COMPONENTS
INTEGRATED
SUPER-TAO
Overarching forms, principles, Way of Nature
'§
'§
Nature, with taos in world
unrealised
objectified
forms
natural
system
'§
'§
'§
'§
§
'§
'§
Deviation line
Defective (or fallen)
fl'
from Natural
taos
As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again
exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to
say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self-
governing. Nor is it quite accurate to say that "the Tao is immanent and expressed through the
60
fe = r^Zoj, ideal direction) of things'.s The transcendent/immanent dichotomy fails (as on
object-theory), because it presupposes that principles and the Tao exist, either externally or
internally; but they do not exist. What is nearer right is that "Everything has its own nature
and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce
themselves, that is all' (Kuo Hsiang, p.328). But ZJooZZy they proceed according to the Tao-
te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously.
DIAGRAM 4. TAO-TE PATHS, AND GOING WITH THE NATURAL FLOW
(cf. LT 53).
Tao (source)
Te(los)
Flow
Ideal Way: Way of Virtue
§
Deviations
from Flow
Deviant
Ways
tao '§.....................>-Ote
Laws persist, and perhaps evolve, under the guidance of overarching Tao, while the
universe in its rich diversity comes into and goes out of being. Tao thus offers a kind of unity
in, or above, diversity. In this regard too, Taoism can be applied to clarify the value scheme
of Deep Ecology. For Deep Ecology also values diversity and organic unity in diversity, but
lacks the cosmology from which the features derive. The unity lies in a unified tier of
principle (matched in part at an upper level of the Deep Ecology pyramid) above the diversity
of life processes. The Taoist metaphor of a single block, variously composed of many
things, can likewise be applied to fill out Deep Ecology's picture of the ecosphere. However,
8
As Hall claims.
a fundamental notion in Taoism, is often translated as wrfa%, sometimes
power; but often reZo^y gets the intended item and objective better, as the subsequent text tries
to explain. Te is not the same as Tao. And it is a mistake to t?Ze?uZ/y tao, or individualised
Tao, with te (as sometimes suggested; e.g. Chan SB p.178), though they are evidendy closely
connected, and to a restricted extent (as e.g. in a missile example) one can be derived from the
other. While tao gives the source and route ' §, te supplies die virtuous direction and focus or
goal (telos) §-O.
61
the block metaphor has some drawbacks; it tends to suggest a static picture, which is
unwarranted.
For both Tao and Deep Ecology, universes and ecospheres are, when
appropriately stable, in dynamic equilibrium.
Tao is a natural order. Though the phrase "natural order'* may seem strange, even
contradictory, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perception of the world is the
reverse of the modern Hobbes-Locke perception of the world. In contrast to European
political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of
chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of
Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-
nature, is thus undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is
rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and should, follow nature. Science and politics
can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to
exclude value. Nature presumes value.
Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a
normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they
are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things.
By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment
and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription
of how to act in accord with the way they are.
According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the
world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), the world is
both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to
components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or
ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system
programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts, computer
substitutes for the lost "universal men**).
The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe or Form or whole
genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos - within it. Such a
lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what is properly, a
coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced
directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair
comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an
individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with
a
which comprises a normative directive. For both Aristotle and Tao there is, in effect,
62
an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namraZ order come about? That
is Tao; another, old and compatible answer is: It evolved.) When things are running
properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord
under the overarching program (cf. diagram 3). If each individual runs according to the
program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual
does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a less ideal result. If each
person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to
impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand
guides, but the hand cannot be forced.
This picture of order invites comparison with the modem market theory, which claims
that maximum effect or benefit is obtained without regulation (other than extensive framework
legislation!), and that once regulation is imposed the result is inferior. In principle, the market
operates on a set of understood (partly conventional) rules. The rules are known and it is
merely a matter of following them. But the market enables dominance by the rich and
powerful, and thereby discrimination and the like. Tao, however, is opposed to such
dominance; those who follow Tao attempt to refrain from dominating others. But like the
market, the rules of conduct are built into the system and any attempt to impose them is
counterproductive.
As a result, spontaneity and order are not opposites, but result from the same thing. A
strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in the good sense) enters.
Like Buddhism, Tao assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater
order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met
without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying
organization. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of
some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutioning sort or of a supernatural sort,
as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism
undermines such latter alternates, and points (in CT) towards an evolutionary explanation.
2. The extend of Tao as agency: non-religion and (non-)moraiity. God does not
occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe
happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur,
He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an
example. "But there is no indication of his existence" (CT 2). As in the socio-political sphere,
direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only examplary. In paiticular, God is not
required to start or wind the universe up. "Everything in the world creates itself without the
63
direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the
norm of the universe.'9
The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not
personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". It the Tao includes all-encompassing
natural order — a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the
whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the
whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on
the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from
the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic
features are brought in only at disequilibrium — an interesting, but tricky, position. Then too,
in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged.
In politics, as in morals, it is deviation from the natural state that represents the
problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought of the Hobbes-Locke strain,
where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state; by contrast with mainstream thought, nineteenth
century European anarchism adopts a position very similar to Taoism. 10
It is revealing to compare the Taoist picture of deviation from a natural state with
Aristotelian model of deviation from the mean, which provides the norm (cf. diagram 4). On
the Aristotelian model, the end of all things is seeking well-being, to be achieved by following
the Mean. This involves adhering to the Mean in an active rational fashion. Rationality is tied
to seeking, to the means. Tao does not require rationality. Tao is sought passively, by letting
happen, not actively, by forced efficiency, whereas on the Aristotelian account, the search and
aim for the good is active.
9
Kao Hsiang,
on
Tyu, 330-7. When Hall and others try to argue (like
Neo-Taoists) that the Taoist totality is without a beginning - contrary to Hall's other material
about Being coming from Nonbeing - what they actually present, and mean, is. without a
creative beginning. And that is right: there is no Creano
m/h/o as per Genesis. But it is
false that there is no cosmogony. There is; and while there is no creation, a making by
someone, there is a beginning; see e.g. SB, p.202.
10
In this respect, Hall is right off track (in the last sentence of his paragraph 1). The Taoist
point is that naturalness is not such a prominent feature of human affairs, because of the
imposition of excess laws, regulation, etc. Taoist sensibility is only bizarre from an
erroneous dominant paradigm perspective.
64
DIAGRAM 5. TAOIST MIDDLE/CENTRAL/LITTLE-ACTION WAYS
1.
2.
Aristotelian/Confucian/Taoist
Taoist contrasting ways
mean path, in fuzzy sufficiency cone
hard or extreme
mountain ways
a middle
way
valley, ravine or
river way;
easy, natural way
Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in
Lao 7h/ (e.g. 77, also 29), that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist
route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a path of weakness and little resistance, in line
with the general account of following Tao and living and faring well.
Tao supplies a set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well, as well as a
parallel (and controlling) set of propositions about how things happen and proceed ideally.
Of course there is a moral purpose in Lao Tzu; the moral purpose is a central one alongside,
and inseparable from, the metaphysical purpose, the acquiring of an account of ultimate
reality". To what extent then is Taoism open to the accusation of amorality? Since axiology
is a crucial part of the world view — evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively
offered in the texts — it is not amoral in a generous sense. But the treatment of deontic
principles, and of rules of conduct generally is very different. Deontics get into the picture
only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a
t
course),
'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose' (LT 18). It
depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and
implicitly recommended life-styles, though there are few "oughts' and no (ConfucianKantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless the preferred Taoist lifestyle
merely
recommended, not required, Taoism would tall down as insufficiently pluralistic.
3. On the Taoist styie of iife; an environmental hfestyie. According to Lao Tzu,
there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures' (LT 67; but different
overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19).
65
1. Deep love - which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care,
respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating
empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however
capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical for Taoism, as it is for Deep
Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness"
or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects).
2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met
adequately without deprivation or excess.
3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism
there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather,
one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society
there are no conspicuous tall poppies.
Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, it is assumed, from these three
virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership
from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps
one to aim in the case of attack/And to be firm in the case of defence" (LT 67). Earlier (LT
19) it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the
ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of
frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious
sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are,
astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly
read out of the "treasures"", are adduced: 'Manifest plainness/ embrace simplicity/ reduce
selfishness/have few desires" (LT 19). Another element, beyond the three of relatedness,
frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is adaptability or sponanteity. This complements the
further desiderata.
Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound life-style are highly
commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing an introduction for Callenbach's
environmental handbook, Living Poor wifL
or even for Pausacker and Andrews'
Living Rener wifL L^^. In Chang Tzu, the pure person is a deep environmentalist:- She is a
'companion' of Nature and 'does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man
upon it". Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace" and derivatively freedom; and her
route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to
the universal process of transformation" and thus to the environment (Chan SB p.177).
66
In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental life-styles
are condemmed. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess
commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs").
Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as
well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces
ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion
and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes
aspersions on both, thus fitting neatly with Deep Ecology's prescription for environmental
lifestyle and (supposedly derived) policy of non-violence . In place of the Enlightenment and
mainstream economic virtue of competition appears the 'virtue of non-competition' (LT 68).
Arguments against competition can be developed from other doctrines of Taoism. For
example, competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of
(non-action), competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from one's tao. The
penality for such deviation from the path is not spelled out in Deep Ecology, but it is in
Taoism. Another way of putting it (suggested by Clark) is that in competition external rival
standards are imposed on Tao, presumably with electrifying results. In any case, according
to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place oneself above another. So there is no value in
competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the
world cannot compete with him.
A way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned
to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought,
and excess avoided. This includes, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. In Deep
Ecology the same idea appears, partly sloganised as "simple in means; rich in ends".
Simplicity is not the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further
in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not
value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they
are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not.
It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that
Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.^
11
As Elgin's very profuse account reveals. Strictly much further detail is called for here:
namely, a set of conditions is needed, and also elaboration of the Taoist form of frugality, and
then connection of the conditions with die three basic elements of Tao - frugality, deep
relatedness, and not daring to be ahead in die world.
67
Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity
and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as
elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist
virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its
metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central
Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by
artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and
ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free
from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical
humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity' (Chan
p.14). As to voluntariness, people have a
of selecting the way of Tao rather than one
of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. nonrelatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's
way onto the correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. It is deontic
to speak of a
to find the correct path.
4. Following Tao, non-action, Te and Self-realization. Part of the Taoist route to
an environmental lifestyle and to "self-realization" consists in acquiring the practice of non
action, in terms of non-assertion, non-aggression, non-destruction, etc.
commonly
translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action
and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, wzz-w^z is sometimes rendered
'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as
'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'.^ Construed in this fashion, wM-wez is
not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from
other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non
action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so
arrows in diagram 3 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances,
pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action
(e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other *No-nos; the "no
12
An illuminating philological comparison of
activity with anarc/zz.wi is developed by
Ames, pp.342-3. The sympathy between [them] lies in their common reference to activity
performed in the absence of coercively determined constraints ...'. As Ames observes, the
comparison operates not only at the political and ethical levels, but bears upon cosmology
also, negating a coercive boss or planner in the beginning of things. For an integrated
treatment of wzz-principles, which generally reject forms of imposition and control, see Hall
pp.59-60.
68
desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorthand for 'no impure desires' (Chan p.13),
i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally
no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to
undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and
intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can
there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be
unspontaneous actions, or any violation of
/yoznAy in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not
Tao, however, is a source which only
all individual paths, which can
deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and
ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature
destroying activities are all too common.^
Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been
damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be,
as Deep Ecologists would say, with basically "hands off' practice and management.
Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow (cf. diagram
4). One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter
bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete does things
effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of
activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in
sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not
striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and
adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities.
Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley
way. In Tao these qualities are associated with life; the inflexible and the rigid are associated
with the dead. This can be visualized as a range of activities associated with the process of
coming into being and passing out of being, in which the pre-life and the post-life are dead.
The central time, like the centre, is flexible and supple; not hard, stiff and inflexible. All this
carries a social message as well as an individual one.
After things reach their prime they grow old, which means they become contrary to
Tao. What is contrary to Tao soon perishes. After prime a thing moves towards rigidity.
13
When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature' (SB p.202); deviation from
Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As
for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature' (SB p.207).
69
But Taoism does not accept Western cultural notions of primeness. Primeness is not a matter
of a certain juvenile physical or sporting prowess or peak. It takes a long time to reach a
practice approximating Tao. Socrates died in his prime, although by Western standards he
was an old man. An important, but retrograde, cultural shift has occurred in modern Western
culture. The doyens of Deep Ecology are old(er) men by Western standards.
A supreme goal in Deep Ecology, both for individuals and systems, societies and such
like, is self-realisation (again capitalised in the overall case). Self-realisation is a modem
European idea, not found in Taoism, and indeed incompatible with it and all older non
maximizing wisdoms which incorporate theories of adhering to the Mean. For Self
realisation, as understood and explained (of course the account could ahistorically be amended
to a satisizing one), is a maximizing prescription applied to the aggregated interests of separate
self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although Deep
Ecology's ideal of Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there is a group of
associated goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility,
following Tao, cultivation of
parallels that between
cultivation of virtue or
and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation
and %, great
Since The main objective of the
(Chan p.ll), it is
is the
that displaces self-realisation on the Taoist
scheme.
Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a
thing, te is the matching
or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and
(in principle favourably) developing, perfecting; hence the standard translation of
as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power'
has some currency; it is a directed force ybr good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the
direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating
te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for
a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te
(rather than Tao) that generally appears individualised.
As self-realisation in Deep Ecology is not restricted to individuals, so te and tao are not.
The society as well as the individual has a tao and a matching te. Taoism is neither
individualistic nor atomistic, but systemic and holistic. Thus groups or societies have their
own taos and the collection is related to the overall Tao. Social insects perhaps provide a
conspicuous example of the social tao. The example transfers to overly rigid social forms,
such as bureaucracies, and also to military societies which are obsessed with security.
(Taoism is fairly lateralist in its thinking, with much inferential movement by association.)
70
But security is not obtained by being secure as in military security, which is characteristically
a fortified security. In peace people are open to danger but secure in another sense. The
materialist world, excessively propped up by possessions, Taoism treats with disdain; it does
not equate security with material security.
Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self
development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal-directed
virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature.
Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self-development. How
does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter-organisation, my proper self
development cannot impede your proper self-development. Taoism is decidedly short on
details of such mutual adjustment and harmonious integration, but certain it happens naturally
- as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.^ So there is, or need be, no
vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of
others, between individualistic and relational paths. Perhaps in Taoism the modem problems
are skirted rather than solved. But the Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination
of plans, without domination, whereas the pattern of Western relations operates (as in Hegel)
through hierarchical ordering and domination.
5. Anti-patriarchal aspects: feminism, powerlessness, peace.
Taoism advances
other models, than those concerning age, which are strange by entrenched Western standards
- such as demotion of strength and power, and the place and importance ascribed to
characteristically feminine and child-like elements in living well and achieving Taoist self
realisation, te. It was prepared for ecofeminism in a way that Deep Ecology was not. Taoism
is highly critical of patriarchy, accepting in effect main anti-chauvinistic themes of
ecofeminism. By contrast, there has been continuing conflict between Deep Ecology and
ecofeminism. In its formative programmatic days Deep Ecology did not recognise legitimate
feminine aspirations or sexual domination, and it took no due account of the organising theme
14
resolution of this problem can now make a good start with Axelrod's investigations of
evolving cooperation.
Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice,
provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population,
individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from
invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other
words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod
p.177).
71
of ecofeminism, the striking parallel between the domination of women and the domination of
nature. But Taoism even incorporates an interesting early form of affirmative action. In
Taoism, the traditional Chinese balance between ya/rg and ym swings, when in disequilibrium
it does, towards the y/n. Quite in contrast with the Western paradigm, one properly aims at
yzn (which represents the complex of supposedly feminine features) rather than at yang
(symbolising, among other things, the masculine complex).
There is an emphasis on female and child-like, features, and, as in ym-yang dovetailing,
integration of gender features. There is, nonetheless, some stereotyping of male and female
features in Tao (as there is generally in feminism itself), with males allegedly active and
female weaker and more passive. It is in this way that the emphasis on yin is reached, from
desiderata such as humility and weakness. Still, though historic Taoism hardly admits of
degendering, rigidly defined sex roles are alien to Tao sensibilities. People develop according
to their own tao. They can develop typically male, or female, features or features of both.
One who rigidly accounts these masculine and feminine features, speaks from without the
framework of Tao. Historically, where it began to be put into practice, Taoism worked for
sexual freedom and liberation of women.
The Child also serves as a model (LT 55), and there are certain components of
Childhood liberation in Taoism: in the emphasis on freedom, in the attack on learning and
schooling, and so on. The reason the child is a model is because it has spontaneity, it is direct
and natural, and lacks power or strength. Tao rejects institutions and societies based on
power. Infants are not ruled by a longing for power, instead all actions are spontaneous.
Active force, like power, is in general castigated.
To force growth is deviant,
destroying harmony. To stop growth is deviant. "For the mind to employ the vital force
without restraint means violence" (replacing "mind" with intentionality would give a better
picture of what is meant). There is a significant difference between force and violence. To
employ intentionally destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To
remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a
non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are
excluded.
Not only is the Taoist opposition to violence well-known, but there is a blistering attack
on militarism and warfare in
7zM (e.g. LT 31, 30, 46); "war is a symptom of the decline
of man' (Chan p.5). Given the hostility to war, it has been regarded as passing strange, not
to say puzzling, that Lao Tzu sketches military tactics and other allegedly devious political
strategies. The strategies are however but application of Taoist principles and techniques to
72
warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are
accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be
countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor
is it. The legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT 36), is said to
involve 'an element of deceit' 'undeniably', and 'worse' is 'morally questionable' (Chan
p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for
me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics
permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it
is necessary first to expand' (LT 36). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it
is better to bend it first further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both
favoured natural items for symbolic purposes) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is
however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength.
6. Environmental theory and practice, and environmental problems and
difficulties, such as quietism and security.
As on deeper ecological theories,
traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected.
The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other
inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and
the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also
the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models are also undercut There is
no greater boss or purpose for humans to serve or act as steward to; besides stewardship,
which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active
interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active
interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no
"perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist views fall along with domination and
dominion.
Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be
approach, with "hands off' management and associated lifestyles, several features of which
we have already glimpsed. A most stoking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its
strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism.
Heaven and earth are not humane
They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects].
The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist].
He regards all people as straw dogs (LT.5).
Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu (e.g. CT. 2),
Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing
73
philosophy", it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not
confined to humans or their affairs, but
include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion
of what is good or true. The traditional idea that a supreme supernatural being
... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe
exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are
not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are imparm?/, but in a
broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to
g&m&izTZy
... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards ot
things and replaces them with Nature (Chan p.10, italics added; also p.107).
What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism.
For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society
and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no
unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to
manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose,
that is man" (SB p.207). In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality.
'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way" (SB p.206). He who is
enlightened 'is impartial" (LT 6); 'he has no partial love for anyone" (SB p.201) he does not
bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature.
Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the
CTxmg
'the equality of all things" (the literal 'levelling all things" is nearer the mark), and
the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of
equal value of all things is ventured - nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass
thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the
same stress on /i/i? in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life"
to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking natural objects.) What is offered, instead
of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like deeper ecological theory) a
doctrine of identification. Wide identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality
,
and counter chauvinism. Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself,
humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider
identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's
interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification
reveals that interests, desires, values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted.
Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are
developed, e.g. with a butterfly, by dream access (SB p.190), with rivers and seas, and wider
again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty
world/ This is called profound identification" (LT 56, also 4) - and perhaps wider yet, and
74
ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao (e.g. LT 16).
No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on
traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional
education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and
prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would
be no regular learning or habituation processor, such as those encouraged traditional
indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in
part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of a power group.
But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not rarified into a
commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Knowledge
is power; such power is removed from the hands of a few by making it a community good.
This goes beyond Deep Ecology, in that it questions and rejects experts. Indeed in its
criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the
position taken by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The move against informational
power also points to the difference between wisdom (not unequivocally approved) and
knowledge, a difference recorded in Taoism as in most older wisdom. However one of the
indicated Taoist arguments against mere knowledge illustrates an a//-to-any fallacy. We can't
reasonably (or possibly) aim for all knowledge - by the unlimited objective or limited beings
argument (see CT 2) - so we can't reasonably aim for any, and shouldn't, so it appears to be
suggested. Another line of argument looks more promising. Life has a limit, but knowledge
is without limit. For the limited to pursue the unlimited is futile. However the argument only
reveals limits to the accumulation of knowledge, not its pointlessness or undesirability. In
any case, in the end the superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism shifts ground; it is
directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against slickness and cleverness, against
devious and crafty uses of knowledge (LT 3), against counter-productive acquiring of
knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The messy situation is tidied up a bit in the CTnxng
where an apposite distinction is made between
knowledge, the castigated sorts,
which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and
knowledge, which is
"leisurely and at ease", comprehensive, extensive, and synthetic (cf. Chan p.20). Even so,
original Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of
(perhaps debilitating) igornance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging
practices, choices and alternatives.
The critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique
of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. (Hence, png
of the complex reasons for the delayed development of technology in China.) Certain forms
75
of technology were, if not rejected outright (as Clark contends), at least strongly discouraged.
Thus, 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows
and weapons, none will display them" (LT 80).15 More generally, while high and dangerous
technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically.
Lao Tzu recognized clearly that even low impact technology may destroy human practices and
conventions constructive to a community. Nor was the connection of technology with
population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a laboursaving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of
technology.
There is enjoined an avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and
correspondingly a shunning of replacing labour with nothing at all. Taoism exhibits a firmer
grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving
technology, than recent positions like Deep Ecology.^ The Taoist approach also demolishes
the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress,
whatever the merits of the "Law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such
social laws are highly paradigm-dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant
Western paradigm everywhere else.
Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in
Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly
that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends and not a resource, but
something of great value in and for itself. Nature is something to be cherished, allowed to
take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant
view is reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by
15
Some verses of LT, of which this one example, support a rival, sinister, interpretation.
According to this sinister interpretation (pointed out to us by David Garrett, a student at the
University of Auckland), the LT represents not what it has been taken to be, but a work
addressed, like Machiavelli's 77%? Prince, to a Prince, on how to pacify and control the people.
Thus weapons, though held and sharpened, will not be displayed; wealth, though inequitably
distributed, will not be shown; the people will be kept ignorant, through lack of information
and education; and so on. Fortunately many other verses tell decisively enough against this
interpretation. In particular, Taoism denies the need for a Ruler. While under satisfactory
arrangements there will be those who are much better attuned to Tao, even sages, they are in
position to rule as to impose upon others. Moreover should they endeavour to do so, thay
would jeopardise or negate their own accord with Tao. Authoritarian rule Machiavelli-style is
decidedly politically counterproductive.
16
The claim promoted recently that Taoism is an evident home for alternative technology, and
prescribes as much, is rather naive in the light of Taoist texts.
76
following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western
aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct
aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non
intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when
assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such concepts as bioregionalism is not
to be encountered in explicit forms in Taoism, their bases and many other recently fashionable
environmental ideas are: living in place is certainly present (LT 80); doing things locally and
remaining local, while being attuned to the universe and retaining global connections, is
certainly advocated, underwriting the Deep Ecology maxim of "think globally, act locally .
While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper
environmental theories, Taoism also leaves puzzles or points to residual problems. Not all the
supposed problems are however genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to
contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the
issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action.
How would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment go, and
fare, given its strong (alleged) emphasis on "don't bother'? In-built harmony and quietism do
not allow sufficiently for conflict.
In part there is only a problem because of
misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a don t bother attitude to
environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy
nature. Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to
overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental
destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is
accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer.
How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply,
Taoism holds that there is no genuine problem of plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an
abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the
t
requirements of Tao (rather as some claim there is food scarcity even now, with present
gigantic human populations, only because of politico-economic mismanagement). Tao will
serve to restore plentitude (LT 77). Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is
represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth.
17
Use of the power of water affords a prime exampie; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old
Chinese martiai arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and
resistance.
77
Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao
keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if those individual
requirements are in line with the greater Tao?is No doubt in those times, and most historical
times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still
operated on human species, there wasn't more than a hypothetical or remote future problem.
It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of
too many people and incremental resource degradation. The texts say little about soil
degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China. By contrast, in
the West, Plato was properly concerned about deforestation of Greece. Nor does Taoism
have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss,
urban disgustification, and so forth, though some of the problems are hardly new. Historic
Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems.
7. The extent of political anarchism: hierarchy, domination, and rulers in
Taoism. In looking to Taoism for political illumination, an early query is likely to be: To
what (damaging) extent is Taoism, and the work of Lao Tzu in particular, anarchistic? It
explicitly addresses a ruler, and takes for granted the existence of a state. But the format of
the Lao 7zM may have been obligatory; for Taoism also hopes for "the absence of princes".
Nonetheless, overtly, Taoism is not anarchistic. But although literally archist, almost
everything in the work corresponds to anarchist sentiments, and it has struck responsive
chords in anarchists. Not surprisingly then, some have argued that, despite appearances, the
work is anarchistic, and disposes of the state and the ruler "when taken in a political sense
(thus Clark). What has happened here is that anarchism is confused with an important
Taoism sketches
an early version of monarchically organised anakyrism; Clark (in his book) a late version of
variant,
meaning practice, policy and so on
ecological anakyrism.
If Taoism assumes a ruler then it is open to the charge of not being a suitably natural
-
way - unless there is a no-hands ruler. But a satisfactory ruler does not coerce, and in fact
does no regulation. It seems clear that Lao Tzu assumes a monarchical style of society
without coercion. The basic idea is that it is alright (if maybe costly) to have or inherit a
perhaps superfluous ruler, so long as there is no coercion. The "ruler" is merely a planner, a
18
It is tempting to speculate that the greater Tao would serve to limit the number of actual
individual taos, as certainly happened in most historic times. On a market model, supply and
demand would be on a natural parity.
78
guide, an example. "Laws" are not backed up with coercion. Carving the block coercively is
seen as counterproductively breaking up the community.
Control or domination breaks the natural order of society, coercion removes the basic
elements of voluntary simplicity; they are appropriately met with resistance. Government is
said to be a sort of disorder. Government is indeed a main source of disorder, where
government means coercive government. People are difficult to keep in order because those
above interfere. Indeed this is the only reason they are difficult to keep in order (LT 57 and
58). The more laws there are, the more disorder is possible, the more disorder there is. The
more ways order is attempted, and more ways there are to have disorder.
Natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive.
There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if
social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray.
Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is given on social and political
organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural
social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian
ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning
well. Even so, rather more needs to be said about how society accommodates "deviants" of
various sorts, as to how unsocial and unenvironmental activities are curtailed, what support
structures natural arrangements afford, and so on. Of course these things are attended to
locally by society, not by a remote and mostly indifferent state. As in modem anarchism, an
important distinction is taken for granted between (local) society and the state or empire. (By
contrast, in contemporary texts, especially those of economic orientation, the state is often
conflated with society, social roles are transferred to the state, and it is even claimed that what
society wants is what the state does!) In Taoism, as in nineteenth century social anarchism,
society functions along natural lines; the state is essentially otiose. Society is self-regulating.
No doubt small markets that do not yield excess profits flourish, no doubt craftspeople
-
abound and live well but not extravagantly, no doubt local people make inputs to the
arrangements of their social affairs. Most of these sorts of background details go largely
unstated. But some significant features of social practice are revealed; for example (LT 3), the
worthy are not exalted or rewarded, competition is not promoted, there is no unnecessary
accumulation of possessions, consumerism and the manufacturing ot wants is discouraged.
In short, all the main approved features of modern economic behaviour - the sources of
greed, discrimination and strife according to Taoism (Chan p. 103) - are gently set aside, they
do not represent natural, or satisfactory, ways.
79
Just as nature can operate by itself without a director or boss, so a confederation can run
itself without an emperor or president. True, there may be one or more rulers. However a
Taoist ruler/sage "exercises" non-dominating authority. But obviously, since he exercises no
authority, some of the stuffing has been removed from notion of authority. The ruler/sage
has no personal power. He imposes nothing on others. He transmits worthwhile tradition
but does not impose it. He is said to transmit it through eternal edicts, but these are principles
proferred or advice at best. He does not attempt to legislate or require the good. Society is
like the individual, it cannot be coerced into doing right things. And it should not be! At
work is a teleological model of "transcendent" good, a bit like a natural law theory, but even
more like recent deep environmental theory. No more than co-operating individuals in a
social matrix are required for the good. A ruler, or organiser, does not attempt to require it
for society. He takes no action and the people are transformed by an exemplar ruler. He is a
ruler on a rather more Gandhian model, but even so not a visible charismatic leader. Unlike
contemporary models, the ruler is not a jet-setter or super-consumer; he is not usually seen on
television, and perhaps not seen at all, but only known about, or his or her existence merely
rumoured.
As with "authority", but even more so, other social and political terms thus get
drastically turned around, and even subverted. The "empire ceases to be coercive power, but
turns into a natural super-regional order under general guidance of the Tao. Possessing the
empire" even comes to mean something like attunement to Te. The "power" of a ruler is not
coercive. It is exemplary. The best rulers are those whose existence is merely known by the
people. Thus they are not rulers or leaders, but models for personal development. (For Deep
Ecology the corresponding roles would be those oi eco-saints.) They are not apart from
society, but central to society's ideals. Society could have a lot of "rulers" (kingly people) or
could consist entirely of "kingly people". Like Christ, a taoist ruler leads from within or
behind. The people seeing the life of the sage choose to do likewise.
An ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler. The people bec&me, if you like,
ruler-groupies. The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly.
So Taoism reinterprets the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as
the sage. The meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler is one
who deviates little from the Tao. This is his "power"". Someone who deviates little from the
Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an allembracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of an ideal
life. A more general model is also sketched (notably in LT 8) ot the best type of person — a
person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth", but also loves humanity, and order, and
80
competence, and profundity.
While Taoism is decidedly short on structural details for organising large human
populations, which are no longer self-regulating (by contrast with large dense populations of
modem penguins), it nonetheless transmits significant political messages, which deep theory
needs to assimilate. Taoism has been attacked, like other similar alternative political forms
(e.g. Morris's social anarchism and Illich's convivial society), as being conservative, as
seeking anachronistically to turn the clock back to some ancient village communal life-style,
better left far behind. Such attacks do not cohere. Such considerable changes, as Taoism
envisages, from the status quo, can hardly be represented as conservative. To be sure, there
are conservative elements in Taoism, as in the most radical environmental movements, for
instance the desire to conserve elements of the natural environment that the "conservatives"
wish to exploit or destroy. ('Conservative', like many a political terms in heavy popular use,
breaks down under conceptual overload.)
While backward-looking glances at an idealised past is a conservative tendency,
anathema to forward-looking progressives who prefer to leave the past obscured in a heavy
cloud of dust, nonetheless, the past, with its actual features, its blocked possibilities, and its
paths not taken, remains important to all main political persuasions. Against anarchistic
positions, progressives like to lodge the charges
that the past never was ideal, that
virtually everything that matters (not, surely, forests inhabited by wild creatures) was far
worse than the enlightened present, #776? that anarchism has never really been achieved in the
past. Again the charges do not cohere. (Proof is left as an exercise; but for hints, see EE).
It should be evident that Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a
severe attack on mainstream civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm. It
discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and
doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and
offers a very mean path, simple and modest, between insufficiency and excess-
APPENDIX. Doctrines of Four: the four great things and the fourfold way.
Running in a striking way through the history of thought are certain related doctrines of four —
of four great, important or valuable, things, whose basic interrelations are fundamental to the
whole doctrine involved. Consider first three, plainly related, fourfolds, of much interest in
deeper ecological thinking:-
theWay/Tao
I
God(s)
I
Whole/Gaia
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�The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 re feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett’s
paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Letter is signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. (1 leaf)
�/V
/
7 7
.
�TAOISM and DEEPER ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Let concern spread to aH the myriad things^
Among accredited religions, Taoism appears exceptionally environmentally friendly.
Whereas the main terrestial religions, particularly those that have gained significant
political influence, are heavily anthropocentric (indeed human chauvinistic), Taoism,
certainly as propounded in the classical texts, is not.2 It is genuinely ecocentric; in it
nature has a preeminent and fundamental place. It is throughout decidedly ecologically
oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe
amounting to FoZZow TVamre as the basis of practice. Thus it can provide sources for,
and inspiration for, genuine environmentalism in a way that no Western religion can
(outside some deviant minority sects), and in a way that few other Eastern religions can.
It can assume just such a source and inspirational role for contemporary deeper
environmental positions, a place it has been assigned for the most prominent of these,
Deep Ecology.
Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on
mainstream materialist civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm (as the
following table shows). Like Deep Ecology, it discards or upsets many mainstream
values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead
examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers an environmental
path, simple and modest, a middle way between insufficiency and excess.
1 The tenth thesis of Hui Shih, cited in CT.
2 Classical Taoism, or philosophical Taoism as it is sometimes distinguished, consists essentially of two
primary texts, LT and CT, and early creative commentaries upon them. The primary texts were probably
both assembled in the intellectually prolific period of the Warring States (from 403 to 221 BC), before the
deadening cover of an empire descended. The classic works were only subsequently brought together as
texts for a loosely associated religion, Daoism, that then proceeded to diverge from them, especially as
regards natural world emphases and concerns. Very many details of the cultural and physical contexts in
which the texts were written, and of those who wrote them, have vanished with passage of time. For an
outline of what is known or reasonably conjectured, see e.g. Graham. Of course in such respects Taoism
resembles other religions with shrouded origins.
Daoism radically transformed philosophical Taoism, for the worse environmentally (and
intellectually). %<? became the means to happiness, wealth, and long life, human life; and (neo-)Daoism
became mired in human chauvinism. Coupled to it under Daoism were - what were no part of classical
Taoism - belief in spirit survival, use of magical charms for the cure of illness, confession of sin and
absolution on the basis of good work, a priestly caste, and the trappings of ritual, ceremonies, and so on.
For an account of these features of Daoism, see Lagcrwey.
The present essay considers only classical Taoism, and that under a certain straightforward
interpretation.
�3
1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology,
which is interestingly at variance with Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out
of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing
precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first.
All things in the world come from being
And being comes from nonbeing^
The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing?
Diagram 1: Taoist cycie of return^
flourishing
growth
reversion
cycle of generated
entity
NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or\
ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal
(FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal
7
Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into
nothingness; all that comes to pass, that is. All things flourish, but each one returns to
its root'? The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay.
But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and
transformation, is much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more
stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium? Overall, it is correct to say, if
not so far highly informative, that Taoism is a natural process philosophy, with a keen
sense both of c/ta/ige and of Zz'mi'Ay.
4 LT 40.
5 SB p.202.
6 Cf. Chan, p.173, fn.2.
7 LT 16. For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan cs. In Neo
Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB,
p.335).
8 Cf. Chan, p.20, also SB p.177.
�4
Tao itself is a complex item, comprising both an initial source, or program, and a
coupled direction; a planned course, with a natural (and ideal) path. (So it is
appropriately symbolised O—*-) The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive
source of natural activity; it encapsulates, in its program, a framework of forms or
principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both
dynamic principles (or evolving "laws") of nature an<% axiological principles guiding
conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms,9 or
still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the preSocratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern
of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though
Tao is a "great form", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for
other (unhypostatised) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness,
do not feature large in the
CTi/ng. They are distinguished, and set rather to the
side, in the final chapter. 10 Other less Platonically emphasised (or available)
environmentally friendly forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and
Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants
the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component.
Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked
with and not above the everyday. It is certainly not supernatural, and it does not
transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao
both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical
idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this is a process and the container
and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of
Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and
the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is
also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it
is certainly simple, all-embracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their
connections is not quite so simple.
The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe of Form or
whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing
what it is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed
output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item,
which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction
or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of
9 Though appropriately neutralised, in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: for details see JB.
10 LT 81.
�5
Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a
which comprises a normative
directive. For both Artistotle and Tao there is, in effect, an "invisible hand" at work.
(How did this, such convenient namra/ order come about? That is Tao. But another,
old, compatible, and more satisfactory answer is: It evolved.) When things are running
properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in
accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 2).
If each individual runs
according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works
even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a
Diagram 2: Super-Tao, or Great Tao, with components integrated
SUPER-TAO
O->
D->
unrealised
Nature, with taos in world
objectified
natural
forms
system
/
E->
a->
—Deviation line—
Defective (or fallen)
taos
from Natural Ways
�6
less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order
result.
Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is
counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced.
As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are
again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but
are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are
naturally self-governing. 'Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own
ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all'.n
But
they proceed according to the Tao-te, the goal directed way of virtue,
autonomously.
Diagram 3: Tao-te paths, and going with the natura! fiow^
Te(los)
Tao (source)
EH----------- ?-----------
+
*
Ideal Way: Way of Virtue
2. Natural order, and the extent of Tao as agency. Tao supplies a spontaneous
natural order. Though the phrase "natural order" may seem strange, even perverse, it is
not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perspective is the reverse of the modern
perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream
Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the
Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that
political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-nature, is
accordingly undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it
is rests on mistaken assumptions.
Politics can, and ideally should, follow nature.
Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western
fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value.
11 Kao Hsiang, p.328.
12 Cf. LT 53.
�7
According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees
the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo),
nature is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the
whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their
programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but
artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs
representing super-experts).
Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which
involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as
well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part
of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact
with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description
of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are.
Since it is normally regulated by Tao, natural order is decidedly benign, and
definitely worth emulating. As a result, natural order is the way, the recommended
way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the
imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose
Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain
why little satisfactory detail is offered as to social and political organisation. For the
requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures
(whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics)
largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well.
It is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast
again to European political thought, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder
(lives are nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state-of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural
state, which is one of satisfactory order. A strong sense of natural order, of self
organisation, of anarchy (in a positive sense), flows from classical Taoism. Like
Buddhism, Taoism assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater
order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be
met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying
organisation. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need
of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutionary sort or of a
supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the
organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternatives, and points^ towards
an evolutionary explanation.
13 In CT.
�8
Order occurs naturally, spontaneously (as the inertial state), without agency.
Super-agents do not feature, and would be otoise. God does not occur, and is not
needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or
as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He
would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an
example. 'But there is no indication of his existence'.^ As in the socio-political sphere,
direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only exemplary. In particular, God is not
required to start or wind the universe up. 'Everything in the world creates itself without
the direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned.
This is the norm of the universe.'15
The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly
not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". If the Tao includes all-
encompassing natural order - a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in
harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being
follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority,
exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only
when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a
community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at
disequilibrium - an interesting, if awkward, position. Then too, in formulating norms,
appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged.
There is a concealed moral purpose in Lao Tzu; a moral purpose that is central,
alongside, and inseparable from, the evident metaphysical purpose. Since axiology is a
crucial part of it - evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in
the texts - Taoism is not amoral. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of
conduct generally, is very different. Deontics enter only when there is a lapse or
deviation from an ideal natural state (from a proper course). 'When the Great Tao
declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose'. 16 Much depends then, on
what counts as "moral" and "amoral".
Certainly there are approved and implicitly
recommended lifestyles, though there are few "oughts", and no (Confucian-Kantian)
lists of duties. Moreover, unless preferred Taoist lifestyles
merely recommended,
not required, Taoism would fall down as insufficiently pluralistic.
3. On Taoist styles of life: an environmental lifestyle. As well as a set of regulative
propositions about how things happen, and proceed ideally, Taoism supplies a parallel
14 CT 2.
15 Kao Hsiang, CTwwze/i/ary
16 LT 18.
pp.330-331.
�set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well. According to Lao Tzu, there
are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures'.^
1.
Deep love — which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration,
care, concern, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy,
deep-penetrating empathy.
Sympathy, a main linkage of the European
"Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone
would be too egoistical and too circumscribed for Taoism, as it is for Deep
Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided
"relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). It is certainly not confined
to fellow humans, but reaches through, around and beyond them to the myriad
things;
2.
Frugality - a renunciation of excess. That implies a renunciation of consumerism.
But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation
or excess. As in Deep Ecology too, richness in ends is compatible with modesty of
material means;
3.
Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In
Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western
desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being
in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies.
Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, so it is assumed, from these
three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of
leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this:
'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack / And to be firm in the case of
defence'. 18 Earlier^ it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean
a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational
relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility
an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional)
wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate;
so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures" are adduced: 'Manifest
plainness / embrace simplicity / reduce selfishness / have few desires'. 20 Another
element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is
17 LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19.
18 LT 67.
19 LT 19.
20 LT 19.
�10
adaptability or spontaneity. This "fourth treasure" (which can be read off natural order)
complements the further desiderata.
Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound lifestyle are highly
commended.
Lao Tzu might almost have been writing another introduction for
Callenbach's environmental handbook, LM/ig Poor
or even for Pausacker
and Andrews' Lfwzg Po^r wft/z
In Chang Tzu, the /?Mr^ person is a deep
environmentalist:— She is a companion' of Nature and does not attempt to interfere
with it by imposing the way of man upon it'. Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and
peace' and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and
limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of
transformation' and thus to the environmental
In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental
lifestyles are condemned.
The Western drives to power, fame, competition,
possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism
(along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in
professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly
discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids
competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action.
Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both. In
place of the mainstream economic virtue of competition, inherited from the
Enlightenment and reinforced by Darwinianism, appears the 'virtue of non
competition'.^ Competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the
doctrine of wM-wef (non-action). In competition external rival standards are imposed on
Tao. Competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from tao, and from te, virtue. In any
event, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place onself above another. So
there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person
does not compete then the world cannot compete with him.
A broad way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all
things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and
frugality are sought, and excess and competition avoided. This involves, in a nutshell,
voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. Simplicity is not however the impoverished life of
one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means.
Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that
people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and
vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not.
21 Chan SB p.177.
22 LT 68.
�11
It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion
that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy
notion.23
Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious
components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is
often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is
obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the
theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised
Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises
unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness
and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome
straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and
cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity
and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity'.24 As to
voluntariness, people have a c/iozce of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the
deviant ways.
It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. non-
relatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force
one's way onto a correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself.
Within the broad way of life depicted fall a plurality of particular lifestyles,
appropriate to various different social roles. Among more specialised lifeways on
which Taoist attention is lavished are those of the sage and the ideal ruler. A sage is
naturally one who follows Tao, who has acquired great knowledge, and so on (ideality
is built into the notion of
The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and
practices accordingly.
Likewise an ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler, who observes voluntary
Ideally the people become emulators of this ruler. Effectively Taoism
redefines the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage,
whereupon the meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler
simplicity.
is one who deviates little from the Tao; this is his "power". Someone who deviates little
from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows
an all-embracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples
of kinds of ideal lifes. Another kind is also sketched,2$ that of the best type of person
(effectively an ideal Deep Ecologist), a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth', but
also loves humanity, and order, and competence, and profundity.
23 As its fullest elaboration, Elgin's very profuse account, reveals.
24 Chan, p.14.
25 Notably in LT 8.
�12
4. Following Tao: non-action, cultivating Te and seeking Enlightenment. Part of
the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and towards enlightenment consists in
acquiring the practice of non-action, exemplified through non-assertion, non
aggression, non-destruction, and the like.
commonly translated as 'non-action',
is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is
action. To avoid such dialectical overtones,
is sometimes rendered 'not acting
wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without
forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'. Construed in this fashion,
is not an
extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other
features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non-
action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so
arrows in Diagram 2 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances,
pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted
action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other No-nos;
the "no desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorhand for 'no impure desires',26
i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require
literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions
contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt
Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is
natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from
Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of
Tao,
however, is a source which only
in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not
all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus
deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals
is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature-destroying activities are all too
common. When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature';27 deviation
from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their
principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature'.28
Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not
been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course;
letting Being be, as Deep Ecology has it, with basically "hands off practice and
management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with
the flow. One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not
encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete
26 Chan, p.13.
27 SB p.202.
28 SB p.207.
�13
does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however
involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the
waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies
in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in
simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of
normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness,
belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. Though the ancient transcultural
doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in La<9 TzM,29 that middle path
is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley
way, a non-maximising path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the broad
account of living and faring well.
Taoism, like other older non-maximising wisdoms enjoining adherence to the
Mean, is incompatible with modem maximising ideologies.
Taoism is thus
incompatible with Deep Ecology, whose supreme directive is self-realisation (again
capitalised for wider "selves"). Such Self-realisation is a European idea, a maximising
prescription applied to the aggregated interests of a separate self, inflation of a typically
egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although such directives to Self-realisation
would be rightly queried in Taoism, there are parallel non-maximising goals to be found
in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, and
cultivation of
and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation parallels
that between
and %, great re. Since a 'main objective of the [Lao Tza] is the
cultivation of virtue or fe',3O can be seen as displacing self-realisation on the Taoist
scheme. As it works out then, Self-realisation is nicely displaced by Enlightenment.
Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of
a thing, te is the matching goaZ-bZfrc^Z
or unfolding of a thing. It is a
directed and
standard translation of
(in principle favourably) developing, value-adding; hence the
as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a
rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force/br good (or evil).
The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao
(and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a
lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly
commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally
appears invididualised.
Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self
development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal29 E.g. 77, also 29.
39 Chan, p.ll.
�14
directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all
follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self
development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter
organisation, my proper self-development cannot impede your proper self-development.
While Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mututal adjustment and harmonious
integration, it is certain that it happens naturally — as it may, for instance, through the
evolution of co-operation.3i So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following
one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between
individualistic and relational paths. The Taoist result is integration, a harmonious
combination of plans, without domination, by contrast with the dominant pattern of
Western relations, operating through hierarchical ordering and domination.
5. Environmental theory and practice; environmental problems and difficulties,
such as quietism and security. As on deeper environmental theories, traditional
Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The
dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other
inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist
base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed.
Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models, such
as stewardship and perfectionism, are also undercut. There is no superior or greater
purpose for humans to serve, or lord to supplicate as steward. Besides stewardship, a
kind of servant-master relationship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly
patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The
idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more
or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist
alternatives fall along with domination and dominion.
Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be
approach, with "hands off" environmental management and associated lifestyles. A
most striking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then
prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism.
31 Ong resolution of this problem can now make a useful start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving
cooperation.
Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable,
and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such
discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of
cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of
cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177).
�15
Heaven and earth are not humane
They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects].
The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist].
He regards all people as straw dogs.32
Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu,33
Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a
dehumanizing philosophy', it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern
and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but
include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion
of what is good or true. The traditonal idea that a supreme supernatural being
... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe
exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are
not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are
but in a
broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to
... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards of
things and replaces them with Nature.34
What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human
chauvinism.
For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of
conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human
species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as
Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put
a string through the cow's nose, that is man'.35 In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a
doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way'. 36
He who is enlightened 'is impartial';37 'he has no partial love for anyone'38 he does not
bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature.
Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of
the
TzM, 'the equality of all things' (the literal 'levelling all things' is nearer the
mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and
difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured — nor any theme of parity for
some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on
prime life, there is not the same stress on
in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology,
nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking
What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of
impartiality, is (again like Deeper Ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide
natural objects.)
identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality and counter chauvinism.
32 LT 5.
33 E.g. CT 2.
34 Chan, p.10, italics added; also p.107.
35 SB p.207.
36 SB p.206.
37 LT 6.
38 SB p.201.
�16
Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans,
and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop
to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting
value) and to such class-restricted solidarity.
For wider identification reveals that
interests and desires, concerns and values and so forth, are not so individual or class
restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it
may be achieved, are developed, for example with a butterfly, by dream access,39 with
rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world
- 'Become one with the dusty world / This is called profound identification'40 - and
perhaps wider yet, and ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with
Tao .41
No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of
attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against
traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces
entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of
course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processes, in place
of those excessively encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is
the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an
entrenched knowledge in the hands of power and professional groups. But, in an
organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not ratified into a
commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati.
Insofar as knowledge is power, such power is removed from the control of a few by
making it a community good. In these respects Taoism goes beyond Deep Ecology, for
instance in questioning and rejecting experts.
Indeed in its criticism of schooling,
narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the stance adopted by
Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The superficially anti-intellectual trend of
Taoism is really directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against power
through knowledge and control of knowledge, against slickness and cleverness, against
devious and crafty uses of knowledge ,42 against counter-productive acquiring of
knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The puzzling situation is tidied up somewhat
in the C%<2Kg TzM, where an apposite distinction is made between
knowledge, the
castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and
greaf knowledge, which is 'leisurely and at ease', comprehensive, extensive, and
39 SB p.190.
40 LT 56, also 4.
41 E.g. LT 16.
4^ LT 3.
�17
synthetic .43 Even so, classical Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of
information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) ignorance, concerning health and
welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives.
What is environmentally significant is that the critique of small knowledge and
narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology
was assigned a very limited role at best. Certain forms of technology were, if not
rejected outright, at least strongly discouraged. 'Even if there are ships and carriages,
none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display
them'.44 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more
appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognised clearly that
even low impact technology may destroy conventions and practices constitutive of a
community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a
small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a labour-saving device he would not
use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. What is
enjoined is avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and therewith of unnecessary
consumption, and correspondingly on the production side, shunning of a work void, of
efficiently replacing labour with nothing at all.
In these sorts of respects Taoism
exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate
labour-saving technology, than a spread of recent positions. Likewise a Taoist approach
demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or
its progress. Whatever the merits of the "law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism
reveals that such social laws are culture and community dependent, and do not
withstand transfer from the dominant social paradigm everywhere else.
Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in
classical Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it
emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends, and not
merely a resource, but something of great value in itself. Nature is something to be
cherished in its own right, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or
destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant instrumental perspective is interestingly
reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by
following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated
Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are,
not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature
is required; non-intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is
gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such
43 CfChan, p.20.
44 LT 80.
�18
recently fashionable ideas as bioregionalism are not encountered in explicit form in
Taoism, their bases are, as are other associated environmental ideas: living in place is
certainly present;^ doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the
universe, is certainly advocated, giving some sustenance to the maxim Deep Ecology
happily borrowed, "think globally, act locally".
While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with
deeper environmental theories, Taoism also induces puzzles or generates residual
problems. While some of the problems are genuine enough, that of material scarcity for
example, not all the supposed problems are genuine; and not all the puzzles are
bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which
is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social
improvement and action. How, for instance, would a Taoist resistance against
depredation, a Taoist defence of environment proceed, and fare, given its apparent
emphasis on not bothering, "don't bother"? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow
sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of
Taoism, which is not committed to a "don't bother" attitude to environmental
destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature.^
Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome
strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction,
and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is
accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer (an
oppositional, not a Taoist tag).
How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very
simply, Taoism optimistically holds that there is no genuine problem concerning
plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is
scarcity only because of violations of the requirements of Tao (with excessive desires,
excessive consumer demand, excessive hoarding, political mismanagement, and so on).
Tao will serve to restore plentitude/s Rather than a collection of scarce resources,
Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. Nor was
there a looming problem of limits to growth, because growth (in key parameters, such
as populations) would not proceed exponentially.
Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people?
Can the
greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if
45 LT 80.
46 See CT.
47 Use of the power of water affords a prime example; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese
martial arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance.
48 LT 77.
�19
those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao? No doubt in those times,
and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as
droughts, when evolution still operated overtly on human species, there was little more
than a hypothetical or remote future problem concerning population. It seems plain
however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too
many people and incremental resource and ecosystem degradation. While the texts do
address, forcefully, two of the three main components of the standard environmental
impact equation, namely consumption and technology, the important third, human
population, is not considered at all, still less statisfactorily therefore. It is much the
same for other significant environmental issues. The prime texts say little about soil
degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China, as in other
centres of civilisation. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main
contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so
forth, though several of the problems are hardly new (and some are recognised in early
commentaries). Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were
seen as problems.
There is no reason at all, however, why classical Taoism should not be updated,
more than two millenia, to take account of contemporary environmental problems.
Because of its compatibility with deeper environmentalism, Taoism admits such an
extension in a way that main modem religions do not.49
49 Such an extension of Taoism, entitled Neo-Daoism, is brashly sketched in UTD, from which much of
the present exercise is adapted. Such Neo-Daoism diverges sharply from contemporary Daoism. But it is
very congenial to contemporary deep environmental theory.
�20
REFERENCES
Ames, R.T. (1986), 'Taoism and the nature of nature', E/zvzronm^nfaZ P/zz7o^op/zy 8:317350.
Axelrod, R. (1984), T/ze Evo/zmon of Cooperarzo/z, Basic Books, New York.
Chan, W.T. (1963), A .Source BooZr zTz C/zzzz^ E/zzZosop/zy, Princeton University Press,
Princeton [referred to as SB].
Chan, W.T. (1963), 77ze 1Toy of Loo Tza (Too-re c/zzzzg), Bobbs-Merill, New York
[introduction referred to as Chan, translation referred to as LT].
Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985), Deep EcoZogy: Lzvzng os y zzomre Moffered, Gibbs
M. Smith, Layton, Utah.
Elgin, D. (1981), VoZa/zfary .SzmpZzczzy, Murrow, New York [for a better briefer account,
see D. Elgin and A. Mitchell, 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZafz'on gzzorrerZy 14
(Summer 1977)].
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Fox, W. (1990), Toward o TroHspersoKo/ EcoZogy, Shambhala, Boston.
Graham, A.C. (1989), Dz'sporers ofr/ze Too, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois.
Illicit, I. (1974), 7oo/sfor CozzvzvzaZzzy, Calder and Boyars, London.
Lagerwey, J. (1987), 7oozsrEz'rooZ z'/z C/zz/zese ^ocze/y, Macmillan, New York.
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environmental problems', in D. Mannison cf aZ. (eds), Ezzvz'rozzmc/zro/ E^/zzc^, The
Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as EE].
Sylvan, R. (1985-86), 'Towards an improved cosmological synthesis', Grazer
P/zzZo^op/zz'jc/zg 57a<7z^/z 25/26:135-178 [referred to as CS].
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No. 19, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University,
Canberra [referred to as UTD].
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University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
Watson, B. (1964), T/zc Co/zzpZcrc WorE? of C/za/zg Tza, Columbia University Press,
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�
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Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 re feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett’s
paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Letter is signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. (1 leaf)
/V
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7 7
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TAOISM and DEEPER ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS
Let concern spread to aH the myriad things^
Among accredited religions, Taoism appears exceptionally environmentally friendly.
Whereas the main terrestial religions, particularly those that have gained significant
political influence, are heavily anthropocentric (indeed human chauvinistic), Taoism,
certainly as propounded in the classical texts, is not.2 It is genuinely ecocentric; in it
nature has a preeminent and fundamental place. It is throughout decidedly ecologically
oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe
amounting to FoZZow TVamre as the basis of practice. Thus it can provide sources for,
and inspiration for, genuine environmentalism in a way that no Western religion can
(outside some deviant minority sects), and in a way that few other Eastern religions can.
It can assume just such a source and inspirational role for contemporary deeper
environmental positions, a place it has been assigned for the most prominent of these,
Deep Ecology.
Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on
mainstream materialist civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm (as the
following table shows). Like Deep Ecology, it discards or upsets many mainstream
values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead
examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers an environmental
path, simple and modest, a middle way between insufficiency and excess.
1 The tenth thesis of Hui Shih, cited in CT.
2 Classical Taoism, or philosophical Taoism as it is sometimes distinguished, consists essentially of two
primary texts, LT and CT, and early creative commentaries upon them. The primary texts were probably
both assembled in the intellectually prolific period of the Warring States (from 403 to 221 BC), before the
deadening cover of an empire descended. The classic works were only subsequently brought together as
texts for a loosely associated religion, Daoism, that then proceeded to diverge from them, especially as
regards natural world emphases and concerns. Very many details of the cultural and physical contexts in
which the texts were written, and of those who wrote them, have vanished with passage of time. For an
outline of what is known or reasonably conjectured, see e.g. Graham. Of course in such respects Taoism
resembles other religions with shrouded origins.
Daoism radically transformed philosophical Taoism, for the worse environmentally (and
intellectually). %<? became the means to happiness, wealth, and long life, human life; and (neo-)Daoism
became mired in human chauvinism. Coupled to it under Daoism were - what were no part of classical
Taoism - belief in spirit survival, use of magical charms for the cure of illness, confession of sin and
absolution on the basis of good work, a priestly caste, and the trappings of ritual, ceremonies, and so on.
For an account of these features of Daoism, see Lagcrwey.
The present essay considers only classical Taoism, and that under a certain straightforward
interpretation.
3
1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology,
which is interestingly at variance with Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out
of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing
precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first.
All things in the world come from being
And being comes from nonbeing^
The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing?
Diagram 1: Taoist cycie of return^
flourishing
growth
reversion
cycle of generated
entity
NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or\
ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal
(FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal
7
Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into
nothingness; all that comes to pass, that is. All things flourish, but each one returns to
its root'? The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay.
But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and
transformation, is much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more
stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium? Overall, it is correct to say, if
not so far highly informative, that Taoism is a natural process philosophy, with a keen
sense both of c/ta/ige and of Zz'mi'Ay.
4 LT 40.
5 SB p.202.
6 Cf. Chan, p.173, fn.2.
7 LT 16. For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan cs. In Neo
Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB,
p.335).
8 Cf. Chan, p.20, also SB p.177.
4
Tao itself is a complex item, comprising both an initial source, or program, and a
coupled direction; a planned course, with a natural (and ideal) path. (So it is
appropriately symbolised O—*-) The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive
source of natural activity; it encapsulates, in its program, a framework of forms or
principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both
dynamic principles (or evolving "laws") of nature an<% axiological principles guiding
conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms,9 or
still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the preSocratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern
of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though
Tao is a "great form", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for
other (unhypostatised) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness,
do not feature large in the
CTi/ng. They are distinguished, and set rather to the
side, in the final chapter. 10 Other less Platonically emphasised (or available)
environmentally friendly forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and
Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants
the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component.
Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked
with and not above the everyday. It is certainly not supernatural, and it does not
transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao
both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical
idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this is a process and the container
and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of
Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and
the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is
also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it
is certainly simple, all-embracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their
connections is not quite so simple.
The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe of Form or
whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing
what it is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed
output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item,
which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction
or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of
9 Though appropriately neutralised, in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: for details see JB.
10 LT 81.
5
Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a
which comprises a normative
directive. For both Artistotle and Tao there is, in effect, an "invisible hand" at work.
(How did this, such convenient namra/ order come about? That is Tao. But another,
old, compatible, and more satisfactory answer is: It evolved.) When things are running
properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in
accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 2).
If each individual runs
according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works
even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a
Diagram 2: Super-Tao, or Great Tao, with components integrated
SUPER-TAO
O->
D->
unrealised
Nature, with taos in world
objectified
natural
forms
system
/
E->
a->
—Deviation line—
Defective (or fallen)
taos
from Natural Ways
6
less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order
result.
Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is
counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced.
As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are
again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but
are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are
naturally self-governing. 'Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own
ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all'.n
But
they proceed according to the Tao-te, the goal directed way of virtue,
autonomously.
Diagram 3: Tao-te paths, and going with the natura! fiow^
Te(los)
Tao (source)
EH----------- ?-----------
+
*
Ideal Way: Way of Virtue
2. Natural order, and the extent of Tao as agency. Tao supplies a spontaneous
natural order. Though the phrase "natural order" may seem strange, even perverse, it is
not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perspective is the reverse of the modern
perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream
Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the
Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that
political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-nature, is
accordingly undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it
is rests on mistaken assumptions.
Politics can, and ideally should, follow nature.
Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western
fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value.
11 Kao Hsiang, p.328.
12 Cf. LT 53.
7
According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees
the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo),
nature is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the
whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their
programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but
artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs
representing super-experts).
Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which
involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as
well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part
of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact
with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description
of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are.
Since it is normally regulated by Tao, natural order is decidedly benign, and
definitely worth emulating. As a result, natural order is the way, the recommended
way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the
imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose
Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain
why little satisfactory detail is offered as to social and political organisation. For the
requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures
(whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics)
largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well.
It is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast
again to European political thought, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder
(lives are nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state-of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural
state, which is one of satisfactory order. A strong sense of natural order, of self
organisation, of anarchy (in a positive sense), flows from classical Taoism. Like
Buddhism, Taoism assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater
order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be
met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying
organisation. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need
of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutionary sort or of a
supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the
organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternatives, and points^ towards
an evolutionary explanation.
13 In CT.
8
Order occurs naturally, spontaneously (as the inertial state), without agency.
Super-agents do not feature, and would be otoise. God does not occur, and is not
needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or
as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He
would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an
example. 'But there is no indication of his existence'.^ As in the socio-political sphere,
direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only exemplary. In particular, God is not
required to start or wind the universe up. 'Everything in the world creates itself without
the direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned.
This is the norm of the universe.'15
The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly
not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". If the Tao includes all-
encompassing natural order - a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in
harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being
follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority,
exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only
when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a
community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at
disequilibrium - an interesting, if awkward, position. Then too, in formulating norms,
appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged.
There is a concealed moral purpose in Lao Tzu; a moral purpose that is central,
alongside, and inseparable from, the evident metaphysical purpose. Since axiology is a
crucial part of it - evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in
the texts - Taoism is not amoral. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of
conduct generally, is very different. Deontics enter only when there is a lapse or
deviation from an ideal natural state (from a proper course). 'When the Great Tao
declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose'. 16 Much depends then, on
what counts as "moral" and "amoral".
Certainly there are approved and implicitly
recommended lifestyles, though there are few "oughts", and no (Confucian-Kantian)
lists of duties. Moreover, unless preferred Taoist lifestyles
merely recommended,
not required, Taoism would fall down as insufficiently pluralistic.
3. On Taoist styles of life: an environmental lifestyle. As well as a set of regulative
propositions about how things happen, and proceed ideally, Taoism supplies a parallel
14 CT 2.
15 Kao Hsiang, CTwwze/i/ary
16 LT 18.
pp.330-331.
set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well. According to Lao Tzu, there
are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures'.^
1.
Deep love — which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration,
care, concern, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy,
deep-penetrating empathy.
Sympathy, a main linkage of the European
"Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone
would be too egoistical and too circumscribed for Taoism, as it is for Deep
Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided
"relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). It is certainly not confined
to fellow humans, but reaches through, around and beyond them to the myriad
things;
2.
Frugality - a renunciation of excess. That implies a renunciation of consumerism.
But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation
or excess. As in Deep Ecology too, richness in ends is compatible with modesty of
material means;
3.
Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In
Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western
desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being
in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies.
Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, so it is assumed, from these
three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of
leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this:
'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack / And to be firm in the case of
defence'. 18 Earlier^ it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean
a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational
relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility
an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional)
wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate;
so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures" are adduced: 'Manifest
plainness / embrace simplicity / reduce selfishness / have few desires'. 20 Another
element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is
17 LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19.
18 LT 67.
19 LT 19.
20 LT 19.
10
adaptability or spontaneity. This "fourth treasure" (which can be read off natural order)
complements the further desiderata.
Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound lifestyle are highly
commended.
Lao Tzu might almost have been writing another introduction for
Callenbach's environmental handbook, LM/ig Poor
or even for Pausacker
and Andrews' Lfwzg Po^r wft/z
In Chang Tzu, the /?Mr^ person is a deep
environmentalist:— She is a companion' of Nature and does not attempt to interfere
with it by imposing the way of man upon it'. Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and
peace' and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and
limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of
transformation' and thus to the environmental
In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental
lifestyles are condemned.
The Western drives to power, fame, competition,
possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism
(along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in
professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly
discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids
competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action.
Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both. In
place of the mainstream economic virtue of competition, inherited from the
Enlightenment and reinforced by Darwinianism, appears the 'virtue of non
competition'.^ Competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the
doctrine of wM-wef (non-action). In competition external rival standards are imposed on
Tao. Competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from tao, and from te, virtue. In any
event, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place onself above another. So
there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person
does not compete then the world cannot compete with him.
A broad way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all
things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and
frugality are sought, and excess and competition avoided. This involves, in a nutshell,
voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. Simplicity is not however the impoverished life of
one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means.
Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that
people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and
vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not.
21 Chan SB p.177.
22 LT 68.
11
It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion
that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy
notion.23
Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious
components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is
often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is
obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the
theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised
Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises
unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness
and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome
straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and
cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity
and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity'.24 As to
voluntariness, people have a c/iozce of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the
deviant ways.
It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. non-
relatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force
one's way onto a correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself.
Within the broad way of life depicted fall a plurality of particular lifestyles,
appropriate to various different social roles. Among more specialised lifeways on
which Taoist attention is lavished are those of the sage and the ideal ruler. A sage is
naturally one who follows Tao, who has acquired great knowledge, and so on (ideality
is built into the notion of
The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and
practices accordingly.
Likewise an ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler, who observes voluntary
Ideally the people become emulators of this ruler. Effectively Taoism
redefines the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage,
whereupon the meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler
simplicity.
is one who deviates little from the Tao; this is his "power". Someone who deviates little
from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows
an all-embracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples
of kinds of ideal lifes. Another kind is also sketched,2$ that of the best type of person
(effectively an ideal Deep Ecologist), a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth', but
also loves humanity, and order, and competence, and profundity.
23 As its fullest elaboration, Elgin's very profuse account, reveals.
24 Chan, p.14.
25 Notably in LT 8.
12
4. Following Tao: non-action, cultivating Te and seeking Enlightenment. Part of
the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and towards enlightenment consists in
acquiring the practice of non-action, exemplified through non-assertion, non
aggression, non-destruction, and the like.
commonly translated as 'non-action',
is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is
action. To avoid such dialectical overtones,
is sometimes rendered 'not acting
wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without
forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'. Construed in this fashion,
is not an
extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other
features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non-
action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so
arrows in Diagram 2 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances,
pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted
action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other No-nos;
the "no desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorhand for 'no impure desires',26
i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require
literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions
contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt
Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is
natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from
Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of
Tao,
however, is a source which only
in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not
all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus
deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals
is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature-destroying activities are all too
common. When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature';27 deviation
from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their
principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature'.28
Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not
been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course;
letting Being be, as Deep Ecology has it, with basically "hands off practice and
management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with
the flow. One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not
encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete
26 Chan, p.13.
27 SB p.202.
28 SB p.207.
13
does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however
involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the
waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies
in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in
simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of
normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness,
belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. Though the ancient transcultural
doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in La<9 TzM,29 that middle path
is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley
way, a non-maximising path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the broad
account of living and faring well.
Taoism, like other older non-maximising wisdoms enjoining adherence to the
Mean, is incompatible with modem maximising ideologies.
Taoism is thus
incompatible with Deep Ecology, whose supreme directive is self-realisation (again
capitalised for wider "selves"). Such Self-realisation is a European idea, a maximising
prescription applied to the aggregated interests of a separate self, inflation of a typically
egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although such directives to Self-realisation
would be rightly queried in Taoism, there are parallel non-maximising goals to be found
in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, and
cultivation of
and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation parallels
that between
and %, great re. Since a 'main objective of the [Lao Tza] is the
cultivation of virtue or fe',3O can be seen as displacing self-realisation on the Taoist
scheme. As it works out then, Self-realisation is nicely displaced by Enlightenment.
Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of
a thing, te is the matching goaZ-bZfrc^Z
or unfolding of a thing. It is a
directed and
standard translation of
(in principle favourably) developing, value-adding; hence the
as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a
rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force/br good (or evil).
The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao
(and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a
lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly
commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally
appears invididualised.
Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self
development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal29 E.g. 77, also 29.
39 Chan, p.ll.
14
directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all
follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self
development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter
organisation, my proper self-development cannot impede your proper self-development.
While Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mututal adjustment and harmonious
integration, it is certain that it happens naturally — as it may, for instance, through the
evolution of co-operation.3i So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following
one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between
individualistic and relational paths. The Taoist result is integration, a harmonious
combination of plans, without domination, by contrast with the dominant pattern of
Western relations, operating through hierarchical ordering and domination.
5. Environmental theory and practice; environmental problems and difficulties,
such as quietism and security. As on deeper environmental theories, traditional
Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The
dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other
inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist
base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed.
Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models, such
as stewardship and perfectionism, are also undercut. There is no superior or greater
purpose for humans to serve, or lord to supplicate as steward. Besides stewardship, a
kind of servant-master relationship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly
patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The
idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more
or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist
alternatives fall along with domination and dominion.
Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be
approach, with "hands off" environmental management and associated lifestyles. A
most striking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then
prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism.
31 Ong resolution of this problem can now make a useful start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving
cooperation.
Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable,
and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such
discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of
cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of
cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177).
15
Heaven and earth are not humane
They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects].
The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist].
He regards all people as straw dogs.32
Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu,33
Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a
dehumanizing philosophy', it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern
and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but
include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion
of what is good or true. The traditonal idea that a supreme supernatural being
... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe
exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are
not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are
but in a
broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to
... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards of
things and replaces them with Nature.34
What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human
chauvinism.
For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of
conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human
species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as
Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put
a string through the cow's nose, that is man'.35 In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a
doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way'. 36
He who is enlightened 'is impartial';37 'he has no partial love for anyone'38 he does not
bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature.
Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of
the
TzM, 'the equality of all things' (the literal 'levelling all things' is nearer the
mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and
difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured — nor any theme of parity for
some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on
prime life, there is not the same stress on
in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology,
nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking
What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of
impartiality, is (again like Deeper Ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide
natural objects.)
identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality and counter chauvinism.
32 LT 5.
33 E.g. CT 2.
34 Chan, p.10, italics added; also p.107.
35 SB p.207.
36 SB p.206.
37 LT 6.
38 SB p.201.
16
Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans,
and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop
to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting
value) and to such class-restricted solidarity.
For wider identification reveals that
interests and desires, concerns and values and so forth, are not so individual or class
restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it
may be achieved, are developed, for example with a butterfly, by dream access,39 with
rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world
- 'Become one with the dusty world / This is called profound identification'40 - and
perhaps wider yet, and ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with
Tao .41
No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of
attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against
traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces
entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of
course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processes, in place
of those excessively encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is
the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an
entrenched knowledge in the hands of power and professional groups. But, in an
organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not ratified into a
commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati.
Insofar as knowledge is power, such power is removed from the control of a few by
making it a community good. In these respects Taoism goes beyond Deep Ecology, for
instance in questioning and rejecting experts.
Indeed in its criticism of schooling,
narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the stance adopted by
Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The superficially anti-intellectual trend of
Taoism is really directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against power
through knowledge and control of knowledge, against slickness and cleverness, against
devious and crafty uses of knowledge ,42 against counter-productive acquiring of
knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The puzzling situation is tidied up somewhat
in the C%<2Kg TzM, where an apposite distinction is made between
knowledge, the
castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and
greaf knowledge, which is 'leisurely and at ease', comprehensive, extensive, and
39 SB p.190.
40 LT 56, also 4.
41 E.g. LT 16.
4^ LT 3.
17
synthetic .43 Even so, classical Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of
information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) ignorance, concerning health and
welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives.
What is environmentally significant is that the critique of small knowledge and
narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology
was assigned a very limited role at best. Certain forms of technology were, if not
rejected outright, at least strongly discouraged. 'Even if there are ships and carriages,
none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display
them'.44 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more
appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognised clearly that
even low impact technology may destroy conventions and practices constitutive of a
community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a
small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a labour-saving device he would not
use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. What is
enjoined is avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and therewith of unnecessary
consumption, and correspondingly on the production side, shunning of a work void, of
efficiently replacing labour with nothing at all.
In these sorts of respects Taoism
exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate
labour-saving technology, than a spread of recent positions. Likewise a Taoist approach
demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or
its progress. Whatever the merits of the "law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism
reveals that such social laws are culture and community dependent, and do not
withstand transfer from the dominant social paradigm everywhere else.
Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in
classical Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it
emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends, and not
merely a resource, but something of great value in itself. Nature is something to be
cherished in its own right, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or
destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant instrumental perspective is interestingly
reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by
following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated
Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are,
not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature
is required; non-intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is
gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such
43 CfChan, p.20.
44 LT 80.
18
recently fashionable ideas as bioregionalism are not encountered in explicit form in
Taoism, their bases are, as are other associated environmental ideas: living in place is
certainly present;^ doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the
universe, is certainly advocated, giving some sustenance to the maxim Deep Ecology
happily borrowed, "think globally, act locally".
While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with
deeper environmental theories, Taoism also induces puzzles or generates residual
problems. While some of the problems are genuine enough, that of material scarcity for
example, not all the supposed problems are genuine; and not all the puzzles are
bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which
is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social
improvement and action. How, for instance, would a Taoist resistance against
depredation, a Taoist defence of environment proceed, and fare, given its apparent
emphasis on not bothering, "don't bother"? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow
sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of
Taoism, which is not committed to a "don't bother" attitude to environmental
destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature.^
Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome
strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction,
and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is
accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer (an
oppositional, not a Taoist tag).
How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very
simply, Taoism optimistically holds that there is no genuine problem concerning
plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is
scarcity only because of violations of the requirements of Tao (with excessive desires,
excessive consumer demand, excessive hoarding, political mismanagement, and so on).
Tao will serve to restore plentitude/s Rather than a collection of scarce resources,
Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. Nor was
there a looming problem of limits to growth, because growth (in key parameters, such
as populations) would not proceed exponentially.
Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people?
Can the
greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if
45 LT 80.
46 See CT.
47 Use of the power of water affords a prime example; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese
martial arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance.
48 LT 77.
19
those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao? No doubt in those times,
and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as
droughts, when evolution still operated overtly on human species, there was little more
than a hypothetical or remote future problem concerning population. It seems plain
however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too
many people and incremental resource and ecosystem degradation. While the texts do
address, forcefully, two of the three main components of the standard environmental
impact equation, namely consumption and technology, the important third, human
population, is not considered at all, still less statisfactorily therefore. It is much the
same for other significant environmental issues. The prime texts say little about soil
degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China, as in other
centres of civilisation. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main
contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so
forth, though several of the problems are hardly new (and some are recognised in early
commentaries). Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were
seen as problems.
There is no reason at all, however, why classical Taoism should not be updated,
more than two millenia, to take account of contemporary environmental problems.
Because of its compatibility with deeper environmentalism, Taoism admits such an
extension in a way that main modem religions do not.49
49 Such an extension of Taoism, entitled Neo-Daoism, is brashly sketched in UTD, from which much of
the present exercise is adapted. Such Neo-Daoism diverges sharply from contemporary Daoism. But it is
very congenial to contemporary deep environmental theory.
20
REFERENCES
Ames, R.T. (1986), 'Taoism and the nature of nature', E/zvzronm^nfaZ P/zz7o^op/zy 8:317350.
Axelrod, R. (1984), T/ze Evo/zmon of Cooperarzo/z, Basic Books, New York.
Chan, W.T. (1963), A .Source BooZr zTz C/zzzz^ E/zzZosop/zy, Princeton University Press,
Princeton [referred to as SB].
Chan, W.T. (1963), 77ze 1Toy of Loo Tza (Too-re c/zzzzg), Bobbs-Merill, New York
[introduction referred to as Chan, translation referred to as LT].
Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985), Deep EcoZogy: Lzvzng os y zzomre Moffered, Gibbs
M. Smith, Layton, Utah.
Elgin, D. (1981), VoZa/zfary .SzmpZzczzy, Murrow, New York [for a better briefer account,
see D. Elgin and A. Mitchell, 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZafz'on gzzorrerZy 14
(Summer 1977)].
Elgin, D. and Mitchell, A. (1977), 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZaaozz QaarferZy 14
(Summer 1977).
Fox, W. (1990), Toward o TroHspersoKo/ EcoZogy, Shambhala, Boston.
Graham, A.C. (1989), Dz'sporers ofr/ze Too, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois.
Illicit, I. (1974), 7oo/sfor CozzvzvzaZzzy, Calder and Boyars, London.
Lagerwey, J. (1987), 7oozsrEz'rooZ z'/z C/zz/zese ^ocze/y, Macmillan, New York.
Naess, A. (with D. Rothenberg) (1989), EcoZogy, Co/w/za/zzZy ozzzZLz/esZy/e, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge.
Routley, R. (1980), ExpZorzzzg Mez/zozzg's Jzz/zgZe a/z^Z BeyornZ, Research School of
Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as JB].
Routley, V. and Routley, R. (1980), 'Social theories, self management and
environmental problems', in D. Mannison cf aZ. (eds), Ezzvz'rozzmc/zro/ E^/zzc^, The
Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as EE].
Sylvan, R. (1985-86), 'Towards an improved cosmological synthesis', Grazer
P/zzZo^op/zz'jc/zg 57a<7z^/z 25/26:135-178 [referred to as CS].
Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D. (1990), Df Ufopza.?, Tao azzefDeep EcoZogy, Green Series
No. 19, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University,
Canberra [referred to as UTD].
Wang Pi (1979), 'Commentary on the Lao Tzu', transl. A. Rump and W.J. Chan,
University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu.
Watson, B. (1964), T/zc Co/zzpZcrc WorE? of C/za/zg Tza, Columbia University Press,
New York [referred to as CT].
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15
nght. 'Vital force without restraint', mtentionaily excessive force, is only part of what counts
as
which is more generally/^ w/tm/i
i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
- Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^
This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
Brian Medhn, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
designed to reveal deep difficulties m contemporary political, and especially alternative,
t oug t Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist"
action be/bre the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
�17
Plainly the
to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise"
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be ucrive, as with nonviolent
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e .
ummg th. forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident
hen, that some of th. dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restating the negaZ
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider th.
of . al on-c-operadon with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded ar. forms of pacifism
o er active an plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise
often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any
circumstance . Pacifism can easily resist being forced into thes. sorts of circumstances: it has
y resources, as an extensive senes of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non
ent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
of rendennZ
semantical strategy of som. dictmnan.s',
Th f h
""nT Z"
""
biassed definitions.
y ave stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
ve" Z
of violence, from state and interstate to, what ,s
noL oZZ^"""' "t^
^'nce. Caii the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to us. violence, according to which
stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
'h' inverse is very far from being
(uniMs Znof
hf c e f
T
diff^mml" f
"""""
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
n
several, substantially
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called "mra/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
al arg.t to moral philosophers. Many th. effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
"fana icaP- H
"inconsistent", "insensitive",
treZ
'
Z"' "
accommodating and
reat ng moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
stretched pacifism
"-ent
wZt oT 7
Zen Zs S 7 "Z Z"
ways. So far from bemg stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism
might have been better.
as
pacifism:
�19
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa
*s
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS
p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
second best' consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <9t/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can nouVigrg enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
�21
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
"natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral -
in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
�22
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
modified
P2
results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
^tr^rc/z^ /?<2cz/z.wz (as modified) is
While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for 'a new world order of peace'. Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace' (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just taking aZzoMf
and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace,/zg/zt for it-through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war'. But now 'only force will
prevail', as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted'. 'What must be
done' must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
9
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
vandolence.
*
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
�
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
A name given to the resource
Draft Papers
Description
An account of the resource
Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed.
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
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15
nght. 'Vital force without restraint', mtentionaily excessive force, is only part of what counts
as
which is more generally/^ w/tm/i
i.e. transgresses, descrecrates,
profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some
specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to
regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather
intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a
range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the
machines of war industry stop.
Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and
ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with
much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent
paradox concerning war and nonviolence:
War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and
the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an
anachronism.
- Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence
involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the
process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it
could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war.
But then war cannot be abolished without war.
Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^
This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far.
For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let
the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that
the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need
be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the
conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the
argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the
Brian Medhn, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it
designed to reveal deep difficulties m contemporary political, and especially alternative,
t oug t Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism
revolved around the following inconsistent triad:
* capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained.
* capitalism cannot be removed without repression.
* repression is antithetical to liberty.
The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist"
action be/bre the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing
17
Plainly the
to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military
(using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise"
ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be ucrive, as with nonviolent
demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e .
ummg th. forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident
hen, that some of th. dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restating the negaZ
components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider th.
of . al on-c-operadon with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded ar. forms of pacifism
o er active an plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise
often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any
circumstance . Pacifism can easily resist being forced into thes. sorts of circumstances: it has
y resources, as an extensive senes of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non
ent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest.
of rendennZ
semantical strategy of som. dictmnan.s',
Th f h
""nT Z"
""
biassed definitions.
y ave stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and
ve" Z
of violence, from state and interstate to, what ,s
noL oZZ^"""' "t^
^'nce. Caii the resulting considerably stretched
notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to us. violence, according to which
stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism
'h' inverse is very far from being
(uniMs Znof
hf c e f
T
diff^mml" f
"""""
different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim.
n
several, substantially
Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called "mra/ pacifism, has looked a very easy
al arg.t to moral philosophers. Many th. effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a
"fana icaP- H
"inconsistent", "insensitive",
treZ
'
Z"' "
accommodating and
reat ng moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous
stretched pacifism
"-ent
wZt oT 7
Zen Zs S 7 "Z Z"
ways. So far from bemg stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism
In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism
might have been better.
as
pacifism:
19
accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle,
pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a
radical doctrine.
As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism
is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter
pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level
of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism
pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is
said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not
generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such
principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A
small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a
principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it.
A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma
situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa
*s
deployed as a
only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic
procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective
vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts
in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS
p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision
making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38).
Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to
reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in
principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where
motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential
calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism,
sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed.
A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to
second best' consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What
was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <9t/y consequentialist
considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic
principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that
consequentialist considerations can nouVigrg enter into deliberation and decision making. The
conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray.
After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon
consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find
... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised
by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152)
21
routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that
the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to
vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog
biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and
beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be
somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be
converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of
hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their
own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the
practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable
improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as
alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is
it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in
order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly.
More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended,
be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent
depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and
predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus,
for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of
orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the
"natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral
dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not
separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route:
The natural order is not an immoral order
The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence.
Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral -
in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly
occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory
carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral
(neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far).
The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was
alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable,
ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical
theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of
modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to
carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to
22
peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably
modified
P2
results:
MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^
To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the
proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has
to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a
moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for
something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace
sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively:
^tr^rc/z^ /?<2cz/z.wz (as modified) is
While it is perhaps too late to hope for
much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is
supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced.
Richard Sylvan*
*
I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the
American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just
made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much
talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the
modem quest for 'a new world order of peace'. Peace through war; so it rings out again and
again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace' (Aristotle p.220). More than
two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke
solemely pronounced, just taking aZzoMf
and thinking about peace; we must work for
peace,/zg/zt for it-through war. Impeccable logic?
President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with
many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war'. But now 'only force will
prevail', as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted'. 'What must be
done' must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as
on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little
that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to
9
The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of
environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes
MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use
vandolence.
*
Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in
JWS)
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Box 21, Item 708: Partial draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green
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Printout (photocopy) of draft, undated. Pages also numbered 15, 17, 19, 21, 22. Later title of paper: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism.
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708
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Box 21: More Green
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Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3
-
https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6b4b577a786501afaafd82e859e98104.pdf
44ba4cefb5aacc03ad709d0007755408
PDF Text
Text
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 21, Item 708: Notes on utopia
Subject
The topic of the resource
Handwritten notes, undated.
Description
An account of the resource
One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Utopia: Outopia or Eutopia Ms.
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708
Publisher
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
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Box 21: More Green
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f130a216eb4a497358aaa800dc744fc4
PDF Text
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Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
Description
An account of the resource
In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
Text
A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text.
Text
Any textual data included in the document
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A most interesting 4-some is the Aum, comprising the symbols
AU
MA
the last for silence, before and after each Aum.
Thus each full sequence is
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An Aum represents the zoom of life, or, what takes the same pattern, the hum of this
universe. Part of that hum has now been identified, in the back-ground radiation of this
universe.
The pattern the process of this universe follows is in grand outline as follows:
Nothing
Aris^l
U
Big Bang,
achieved by
massive
borrowing of energy
in vacuum state
Maturity
Decline and
Decay,
perhaps through
heat death, and
through return of
borrowed energy
Nothing
The hum emanates from the Big Ban , and terminates with return of borrowings.
The zoom of life follows a similar simple pattern, into which much detail again needs to
be inserted. But for each life the borrowing is from outside material in the environment, not
from nothing. The broad pattern of a life (with several sub-patterns of the same form not
represented) looks like this:
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The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of two pages (pp, 510-511) from publication or chapter Strengths and weakness of
physico-theology. (1 leaf)
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of six pages from unidentified publications. (3 leaves)
HIL050PHY
COOMBS BUILDING
The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf)
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Dublin Core
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Title
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Box 21, Item 708: Notes and cuttings on investigations in numerology
Subject
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Handwritten notes, undated, and cuttings from unidentified publications.
Description
An account of the resource
One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Investigations in Numerology I - clipped bundle of notes + some strays on same topic. Published works redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions.
Creator
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
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<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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[21] leaves. 26.77 MB.
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Manuscript
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ced267e">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ced267e</a>
Coverage
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Como - Shelves - Top - Pile 3
Box 21: More Green
Como House
Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3
-
https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/7bef76c19973550743e6a466433569dd.pdf
aa9aa1d56900cd8d26174d6c9d500b3e
PDF Text
Text
/^<?a^r
Ct/
f<y^c^'^
e
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/ 9*.
�
Dublin Core
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Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia
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In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid".
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/^<?a^r
Ct/
f<y^c^'^
e
c
c^-V^
/ 9*.
Dublin Core
The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/.
Title
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Box 21, Item 705: Notes on Collected essays on environmental philosophy
Subject
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Handwritten notes, dated 1992. Title top of page: Collected essays on environmental philosophy.
Description
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One of ten papers digitised from item 705.
Creator
An entity primarily responsible for making the resource
<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a>
Source
A related resource from which the described resource is derived
<span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705
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<a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a>
Date
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1992
Contributor
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This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>.
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For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library.
Format
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[1] leaf. 1.36 MB.
Type
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Manuscript
Identifier
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<a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:770c422">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:770c422</a>