4 20 144 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/7b1c84739c22e1c37ca763396ee394af.pdf 2304fe555b3c35b58cc702e12a63a8a7 PDF Text Text MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV? Begond moraL extens ion isms. Some find us of mereig not ourseives at with odds mainstream environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg disastrous, not ontg for mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg, a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes. the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons Rgain wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne. extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL MoraL apparatus conventLonaL Lts begond (but certaLnLg subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed, certaLn confLnes to unwarranted) or eLse, more LLkeLg, has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend wag the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the assumptions vatue, (equaL appLLed to a wider cLass equat of rLghts, of adjustment, consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg equaL a (Rs subjects. moraL egaLLtarLan wLth tgpe, generaL moraL ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff., under and the tgpicaL and usefuL weapon movements of Liberation with proceed couLd Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a MoraLisms Nature LabLe more rLghts and accurate movements Less but equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL to moraLitg bend to iLLegitimate certain interests, etc), are equaLitg, standing, but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least on the boundaries, as it ex tens Lon isms endeavour not onLg do the since (rights, such impressive pubLLcLg extensLonLsms purposes, extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved (though is! from Seen a wider perspective, environmentaL not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go, in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted, it remains. The zones of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai as forests, species, ecosgstems, continue mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE, things be to p.llf.1). Nor can such substantiaL to open the sorts of invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite which extensions, extensions operate, such as sentience, LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe, the verg characteristics pain-receptivitg, idea of an on interests, environmentaL ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite respect for naturat sgstems and communities, founders on the moraL rights position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff). �Mang a Ls MoraLLtg weapon, purpose depLoged bg pressure and often interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to and justLfg wLde a actLvLtg of range and hostLLe practices ground naturaL to envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr needs generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met there though even are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu and PLgden - have a poLnt MoraLLtLes Lt when MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew and to coMes The MoraLLtg. such HLnckfuss through daMage of seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the often benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and work often the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts. Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk, conduct to LMpossLbLe concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the response to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg, tougher dLstLnctLon, (practLcaL hard j^s (whLch axLoLogg to to avoLd) MaLntaLn, between there Ls a further deontLc expressLons Rnd deontLes. and practLcat between expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth and such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a soLLd case agaLnst objectLve or absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks. Hagbe the net a carefuL practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?, LMpact soMe of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can doesn t MoraLLtg coLLect a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg constraLn that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest appear to be turned around through abuses, of an Ls Lnput on chauvLnLstLc, as such froM sLaverg, huMan MoraLLtg. huMan Even so the persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg posLtLveLg Ln thLngs contrLbute couLd that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar, MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the prospect of More, More protectLon, Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through verg channeLLed MoraL ftowLng, through aLL too LegaL often, rather to the than wrong dLfferent LnstLtutLons; wLth fraMeworks, part Les, such as the Lt Ls the benefLts strong and estabLLshed. HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls, Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for peace (MoraLLtg beLng a MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be. -2- �Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide an assauit on the environMent instead of other creatures, subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones, or a prettg easg feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern technoLogicaL LLke was that course, of is; Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom guns another or (huMan, Ls now deeptg natLonat, state or race), LLkeLg, More entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part supportLng of scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg socLaL can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg not and appLLed, successfuttg Must awaLt Ls Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on. There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars antL-MoraLLsts) equated) nottons: MoraL status, rLghts, sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs But the tern can scarceLg escape attogether MoraL def Ln Lt tons Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg reveaL) that tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe such MoraL group: narrower the ang Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the use ttght of as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL. Lssue coMMon cLuster consLderatLon, retevance, a on foLLowLng These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to . ... the standing, consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates perMissions, to are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns (often (guaLnt ethicai ) (hunan) actors, as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces Ln the Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM objects MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends to be shunned Ln The notion of deeper environMentaL theorg. SiMoraL RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies. standing, introduced notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag environMentaL heavg, but ethics. It is anaiogg questionabte bg a Major, with the RngLo-RMerLcan but d3Maging, danaging because, verg briefLg, rote it wouLd paint a rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that have not froM those territorg. that have MoraL standing - across Much conpLex More Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence criterion in of MoraL standing is probieM soLving; absoiuteLg basic reasonabLg addressing of a in environMentaL thinking and the Lssue of MoraL standLng Must be vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of thLs Ls so evLdent, especLaLLg gLven the MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL �standing. In the sane vein, an a necessarg condition ... for Lt is stated that ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing adequate Such statements are suretg overstatements. For, Ln pLace, fLrst the there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones, which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL ecoLogLcat Rodman s deep Naess s (e.g. ecotogg, sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg warranted make standing rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing. For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's moraL of notLon attempt (Ln NP) to a make standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic, part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii as ahistoricai, a piece of footnoted Regan s retrospective account of Legisiation). as But, it happens, standing, according to which a being has moraL morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the exposed (thus biconditionaL invoLved in the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the conditions tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest bg sgstem about be to buiidozed, or the Moon about to be bg tourized an Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags that wiii at Low we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be that affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps in a modified wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so, such a deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic; for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings, which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition standLng, something his footnoted for moraL account does not guarantee. The LegaListic notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL. Rn initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is for ang sufficientLg comprehensive notion of a sometimes entering into moraL consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason, some decidedtg restrictive assumptions, concerning interests and whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter assessment on modeL dubious it imports rights into ethicaL occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates terms of having of thing in certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests, sort of that couLd or be the have interests, even as derived (as in the case of LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often -4- indeed, �Legat have to standing to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc., is begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts. room Of course there ts constderabte standtng not ton the widen to Legat of tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and (which "cLaimants to admit, through representatton, other to the PresentLg, courts. for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag and persons of broadentng the standtng not ton objects, agatn because to encompass Limitations the the mang requisite environmentaL nottons of tnterests and rtghts impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs, the MonuMents, and bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of Ontg constderabtg. do, Like naturat these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the wodet Legat be overcome. coutd be recogntsed, account of the Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg anaLogg behtnd, Left unimpeded fresh a and now standtng woraL rather propose free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to an expLLcatton of Recordtng to them, can be construed atong these LLnes. whtch For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X fISl. tnterests Lts theg sag Ln that weLL-betng have postttve moraL weight stLpuLattng theg re the but this; theg re or (PP. p.3). RctuaLLg, not free simpig to given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg sttputate, recogntze Ln proceeding at once to consider various to their standard answers basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore in LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg a than effect substitute a tortuous Less nameLg account, generaLLtg (in interpretation) MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG: pureLg since future items mag have ancestors). Either wag the account is weight and having moraL continued some moraL circutar, or shouLd however be significance, since having X of wetfare has deLeted, as mag dead positive moraL standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster. p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg circutar, H33. But has X then as moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight. a expLication, the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg. Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do? -5- The troubie �Ls except that theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL partLcuLar on standing, the notion Ln fact does verg because hoMe Ma Ln whose eth Les, chauvLnLstLc base does whLch LLes wLthLn the not extend or traveL unsatLsfactorg; wLth as coMpetence, or m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL The personhood). are (such cLassLfLcatLons bLoLogLcaL socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or potentLaL standLng MoraL Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth spec Les the of the wLder to onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to not ctassLfLcatLons ethLcaL MeMbershLp are theg trad Lt LonaL of weLL for ethLcs, It Ls one of those confLnes envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed confuse envLronmentaL Ln work Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt. there not Lons, LLttLe enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE) DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then, no satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP - or Lt eLsewhere It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe, seens. non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng. Rather the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The for reason the needs what cost-benefLt LMperatLves be to Looked at presuppose a Morat Ln appLLcatLons assessments, (whLch thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present Lt wouLd decLsLvetg Ls evLdent enough: usefuL work, space, about enthusLasM and deLLMLt of the categorLcaL of deLLMLtatLons behLnd proposed some notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc foLd (partLg moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg bg use of the term achLeved Ls search unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so Morat search space towards the confLnes of the thLs MoraL confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes appLLcatLons the neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of Lts LLmLtatLons. ConsLder standLng moraL Lnstead of work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL standLng (m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X, e.g. Let to Lt theg otherwLse not atone, do not to confLne Lt or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but (cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around, thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of whereas Lf Lacks m-s, Lt Lt does not have thLs protectLon, 3 Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt . def Ln Lt Lon of moraL standLng ... Lf somethLng weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count Lts Lf a Lnterests, Lt does not count, .... Indeed, so Lt Ls Lacks (p.t+). The moraL saLd, standLng, defLnLtLon Bg Lts however deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng moraL wLthout pLcture of assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems m-s are dLscounted, and trade-offs contempLated, p.16). -6- of Ltems wLth m-s are soon �Such appLication an if division; accordingtg LmpLies an unfortunate aLL-or-nothing item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng Lf be and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd standing contrasted with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat such tgpoLogg, that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The as tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant such as having vaiue, weLL-being, appropriate p.!2).^ the character aLL-or-nothing from at Least Modified becomes evident of various (e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties capacities, so and and forth; to moraL standing distinctions soon duties) (direct to needs be introduced as opposed to (indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg regarding duties autonomg, and postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP ethicaL That preferences, features adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent boundarg consists in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing is assumed to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg PSI. floraL agents iff But have a presumptive dutg to X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.). presumptive are duties even more prone to be bg upset circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion the notion overriding expands); standing, p.S), the forged connections things than without much too simpLe, as wiLL are for appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required purposes so operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding moraL decentLg] X [to treat it moraLLg moraL a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties, which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue, and extent of vaLue (see SM). Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing account, and counted, perhaps (if sometimes that wouLd be taken into in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL attributes are evidentLg a subcLass commonpLace vaLue of surprising, vaLue as attributes, e.g. in the confiation CaLLicott). is Possessing intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant. Indeed PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to intrinsic vaLue with their being evident, and considerabLe, (p.S) and before Long has identified moraL standing of things vaLuabte prove in damaging. Goodpaster themseLves Towards Lapses (p.I6). Such equations are not the end of his essag, on being moraLLg from -7- moraL considerabiLitg into �that Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte, Ln vatue-for-itsetf, psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities sophLstLcated unnecessaritg seen Lt Ls true when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be Lts for vatued own (p.320); sake Lt not so obvious that theg are too but sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon at work Ln Goodpaster s hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of and vatue ontg — consLderabLLLtg to appears obtaLn where vatue Ls unreduced (LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter; for exanpte tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when as where, of conceptLon Lts (p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and noraL consLderabLLLtg vatue Ls no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter, characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion). The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is point even norat the obvioustg Less stopping vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has for estate no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat vatue verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg (a accessibte nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose (for further, what is not at att untiketg, that sgstens natch that Moon the has fornations sone shoutd be the that thensetves, into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of taken projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But insist or naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a the defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in which is considerabititg Lt woutd be LnptausLbte to Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes. It is just not the feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the circte have suggests different sone exanpte, For connotations. notions beLng Ln noraL the consLderabLe norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account, suitabte not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg requires the iten in question has interests or at Least a such tetos), an that agent discussion-setting can phrase be deserves norat weLL-being towards considerate notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31 does norat retevance, R different get nere artifacts are norattg etc., dependent, quarrg that (a Goodpaster s Rnd nornattg the notion do presunabtg nornattg woutd not. Nor, not it erroneoustg, reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains context Like that another different notion sonetines equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though since does nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3 inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect, appear, (as or consideration ). certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.) woutd norat an etusive, has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of -8- �high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto other chase. the however, Since these are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like notLons MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or - scrapped we qutetLg can bgpass the vaiue the nuances and differences. CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect, wider notion and Moraiitg, if wag theg inportant in which not at derivative, Least with R dependent. Most connect is through LiMitat ions on interference. MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue. LittLe R More preciseLg, a actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as MoraL to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a sensitive Matter MainLg because deontic principLes do not excLude soMe vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we of reduction - shaLL be obLiged to return. Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg, and standing Like, the vaLue notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists, in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it triviaL is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte vaLue circuMstances); the (in Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes soMething Morai. It this notion too that has induced the unwarranted narrow ing of focus, to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer, certainig wrong, to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather, etc. what is MoraL has to do with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with justice and goodness), features refLected fornaLLg in suitabLe universaLizabiiitg of principie.^ So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate at narrower certain ethicaL tgpes, which excLude the wider environnent. The width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing ethicaL*. equivaLent ethics a of (For coMparison, rec Lass ification as consider "environMentat bg MoraL its originaL the effect in environMentat MoraLs" environMentat or Moratitg"). $2. Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages. EthicaL standing does not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM door for hearing. a hearing; in an ethicaL it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even, if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse for identifging standing and rights (short assuMption that of the astonishing but prevaLent aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences are giossed over, having MoraL rights is equated with having MoraL standing �The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8) CaLLicott). (e.g. Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions (expioitation consideration free not exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie for Underneath consideration). MoraL these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions; triviaL MoraL deserving since wh3t is piausibie for costs, of for just not the More that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in one but the ethicaL door, consideration are assuMption the rendered that equivaLent having and rights standing or a coMMon Middie terM, such as through having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has iff it has (or even have) rights. (or can have) interests, i.e. iMpiicit appear but (with Minor Such equations quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things; but Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted of (huManoid) interest. notion If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights. But theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation. contrast Bg with anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk and institutions aitogether, and with Mang utiLitarians, who view notion of considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in g passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be (MoraL) rights with certain unduLg narrow theories rights, of which wouLd have, if theg stood, decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie view, Regan's particuLar the rights view (as if an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the attention, worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL it has score heaviLg been proMoted since in environMentat ethics Literature and it does exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs, in certain areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats. R theorg of rights a coMprises representation (in the fashion of other package, which can be given fornaL theories) genetic as containing the foLLowing coMponents: D. a definition of a right, and P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights. Rs MatheMaticaL exaMpLes (such as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL there is a good deat of stippage between D ord inarg usage controts and P. But because of the More on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg includes as weLL 0. a set of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C) R. a set of reduction scheMes for eiiMinating transLation, reduction ruLes, etc. -10- rights Locutions, e.g. bg �The of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends theory partLcuLar LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng genetLc such breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL, accordLng to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd It guarantee. Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of and treatment. respectfuL to patLents canonLcat RLthough expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form to [not] , where - onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt X[s] of The rLght as for Lnstance not Ln to permtts (the pLuraLLsatLon partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted the rLghts vLew features onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln back dLstrLbutLng context not are The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the harm . LncLuded forms Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of to actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated, unduLg agents moraL has a LLttLe more thLs LrreducLbLe the Ls Lt poLnt, (Ln rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the' sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.) be UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL crLtLcLsed, Ln sLgnLfLeant rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge. respects Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend theg and heavLLg upon - though do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of thLs defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs, to anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the certaLn Lssue of defLnLtLon. To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz. 11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag. of gLven rLghts sLmLLar core: hLm the Ln bg MLLL (whLch of ... account Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg possessLon The moraL somethLng socLetg to protect ought to defend...', MLLL provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does whLch Regan after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls, rLght not LncLude, and quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s Lnsurance cover Ls supposed to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out, Regan, now features of rLghts LmLtatLng FeLnberg s Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag. trLcks, trLes to puLL substantLve out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for -11- such acts �than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset: is entitied to treatment of a certain kind is to assert that someone... ... To wake a ciaim and that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To a make individuais, ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against... (p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a ciaim imports much the that ordinarg notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a transaction between individuais^, thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making directig to the ciaimant, such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend, at tea one sunset, doing ang of those things in ang straightforward not is sense. There is nothing significant due or owed, directed at other took individuais in the the demanding assertions wag, or at need not be aii; and no entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it as requires weii as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items tgpicaiig introduced bg or 'to . Someone who makes a that ciaims ciaim that something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements. Rnd if is it ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg). Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification of the definitions OED integration and it with Miii's definition. Upon of separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg much the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits: M2. Vaiid entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg). The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig, or have obtain or something, characteristic fiii to to in act a certain "justifiabie justifiabie to (to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each something entaiis and mag to be entitiement ciaims sufficient, ent ireig warrant vaiid. from Thirdig, and ang case entitiing ones, and that in are i.e. dubious ciaims-against preconceptions, without be regarded appears most need not ciaim restrict to on but aiso the ciaim because make or the sheds unduig and expected ciass of rights havers or haver of a it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing potentiaiig?) important entitiement hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the right as grounds morai ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that improves upon invoived an sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig some adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation has converseig an entitiement to have something. Secondig, is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement if (To) phrase wag , which gives the of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something, entitiement the stake that ciaims. Thus use of the term -12- can ciaim (at ieast makes it an �even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on behatf of wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade through indirectLg, representatives; the tern but representatives" suggests verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg wake the to interests" shouid not be afforded rights" to dubious inference from bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance. R Lot hangs on choice of basic (as then terms other in chaiienging phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to right' newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that entitLement cLaim' and are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries partLg in terms of the others) tautoLogous. and expticative satisfactorg UeLL, Like definitions that M2 definitions virtuaLLg are are but anaLgtic, preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of entitLement, putative entitLement' expression, right , i.e. it a since doesn t a becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is that appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe, better something, is write in To vaLiditg. avoid a is sLightLg a reaL or supposed to amounts sometimes cLaim cLaim' these probLems with avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression basic definition something, R vaLid in that something (after fiLL to into in M2) and avoid disappearance of the VaLid something, on to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights). term suitabie entitLement, titiement ; is which a or a is titiement aLLeged or putative mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6. That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a aLLeged (e.g. vacuitg quant ificationaL recognised right', Const, with cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation ground inf. of a or right; of to, suitabie hence, an of the thing in, deontic principLe, cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie [for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement [for X] R . Requirements for what conditions objects (Rs) and suitabiLitg, subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows. Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to), MiLL, as interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL titiements are to be vaLidated: depend on compLiance its independentLg estabLished' the vaLiditg of with (p.270), derivation from these correct moraL stack, the vaguer a right (to) moraL principLes us return a right, whose correct that he beiieves, takes up, must have been vaLiditg principLes. to as to how provides...guidance princ ip Les i.e. Let It is the removing the "moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version, is a M3. VaLid titiement, from correct moraL principLes, appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate: -13- to some (categoriaLLg �H3S. premLsses correct worst prtncLpLes SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as to R vaLLd dertvatton cone Lus con There Ls a tttLement to R RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R Ls then LmmedLate, bg f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff X has a tttLement, vaLLd Trow correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon wag estabLLsh. candLdates The fLLL to R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g. out freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg sound LLfe, needs, support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least severaL basLc restrLct the quaLLftcatLon, consLderabLe and categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that can have the purported tttLement. Such a scheme, as f13S not (whLLe entLretg wLthout adequate eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of and revests much about rtghts. derLved important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of ought to protect can hoLders, be regards as correct moraL rLght , of a requLrement and therefore rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon, dLffuse correLatLve dutLes 3pptg prtncLpLes, to Ls no doubt Ls thus a consequentLaL over vaLLd characterLstLc poLnt of R tLtLements. as socLetLes Lt transmLt uphoLd, feature. SLmLLarLg such obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not feature from thetr character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of that soctetg that that reLevant soctettes ought to part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent dertvatLve be separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to derLvatLons; to rtghts In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For true duLg 3 rLght, but somethtng foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance, Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve others, free from unnecessarg suffering then moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng; -14- �and prohLbLtLon the functor Ls transnLtted the down cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents R derLvatLon.^ Ls consequentLaL a feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe. (ThLs Ls whg Regan can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231). SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that seLf-evLdent puretg or rLghts. axLonatLc a aLwags defence It foLLows, then, that ang theorg rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons. cLaLns are no For ang rLght that stands up, that connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls Lags there of that seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts to (such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such as that RnerLcan) the announces seLf-evLdent rLghts, Ls nLstaken. RLghts are aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten. ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts, and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes, as there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds, are rLghts and generated fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns, etc. - but Ln the derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes. Because of theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg envLronnentaL ethLcaL enterprLses. not are But Ln essentLaL absoLuteLg a strongLg for LndLvLduaLLstLc rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg, Lt Ls a snart strategg to nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents. RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance, of the force theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of others (hence the Lnportance Ln a noraL consLderatLons, whLch noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and rotes, of Ln persuasLve so Lnsurance sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts prLncLpLes, and truno on. argunentatLve reasons too, Lnputed rLghts are Lnportant Ln reLnforcLng gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg, Ln The socLaL advantages LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon of rLghts accordLngLg offers not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest: -15- he �aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang is woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back Lt ts not a consequence that Me prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL, the can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there potnt no ts advantage or Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get theM. to to aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can get aLong wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us. R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having senttence, tnterest, as such etc. (a rather now rtghts, of faniLiar test). Constder tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive. Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln Ln the Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL theg coutd be incorporated, Ln defLntttons McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though (OED, vLctnttg other preMtss the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg RI is observes, not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has had Mang with notabtg rivaLs, interests repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing (rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^ How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide accreditation and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings out), 1) inc Lud ing: we Usage; speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as don't possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg). and non-usage to has be backed In fact we do, bg other consideration if arbitrariness and prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp. 160-1). 2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM (again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^ it of and coupied 3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for right it cLaiM). Must have Nothing characteristicaLLg an interest however requires afford (FreedMan, is that reasoning a right is a sonething to a have p.16^., who upsets the inferred the protection rights that of an interest; as far as the Meaning of goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*) exercising roughig if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation with sgnongnous have; others and Confusion of having right with right a a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising or to cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted transition, such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate -16- to do with the �Mak Lng bg c La LMS of a hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns). R creature or LteM wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such as exercLsabLe rLghts, Lndeed Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe but reLevant actLvLtg), requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the such notLon of rLght. of For Lnstance, the Lnterest-protectLng aspect of tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not froM the notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests (especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of Lnterests). R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to rLghts restrLct to persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton that what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts to persons, or to LndLvLduaLs, or persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to LndLvLduaLs and "persons". RLL these restr Let Lons on rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon. or �§3. and rebuiLding environMentaLLg. the rLghts vLew Deconstructing Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts LndLvLduaL to Consider, a subjects, LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to cope decentLg spec Les, concernLng rare 3nd endangered (e.g. Regan s pp.395-6). prob Lens of our tines, such as those envLronnentaL Major wLth forest does restrLctLon ecosgsteMs, wLLderness, foLLow froM not even etc. hLs own defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg LnfLLtrated, as postuLates the concerning are eLaborated. It is not rights uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in p.39S) RR, a arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins, brief because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs (In sgLLogistic extended IndividuaLs forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs. not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species. do Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So the rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare endangered or species right-hoLders needn t be individuaLs, aniMais.) of so The restricted beginning after aLL, onLg the species (with a if are paradigMs MoraL the about or MeMbers species e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then treated, individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan view as Look undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone further non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species theiisetves. it Makes of announces, rights The Species are not individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of species to is view 3ngthing rights individuaLs. (p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation is actuaLLg offered), are not MereLg the right-hoLders; paradigMatic theg right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the exhaust iron-fisted thene of (p.361), according the to aLLeged individuaListic nature of MoraL rights which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL and LegaL usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction. Uhg trg to iMpose such an iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view? EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg. a rebuiit rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group, in virtue of princ ip Les such as that significant endangered species ought to be protected. creatures wouLd hoLd different But then different rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid, this, On but as a Matter of definition) in and basis (the of inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions. -18- of rights, �restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s The package, that can simpig be pee Led off. rLghts appt LeatLons of super-imposed theorg, the but Ls essentLaL wLth for the given coherence a super-individuaL, such as a specLes, If postuLates. equaLLtg hetd rLghts on an equaL basts It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major Lt, composLng LndLvLduaLs the then the wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL super-individuaL Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE on bLocentrLc egaLitarianism; DC, Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing p.3S). through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg. IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts view, theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and deconstructLon on of the rLghts exactLg view thLs Ls EquaLLtg done. assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to from dLrectLg dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg features absoLute are quaLLt Les, theg do Ls aspect ref Leets and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg rLghts foLLow that (p.368). It does not come Ln degrees not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of Ltems the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL bund Les equaL that have have rLghts of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a certain Ln LmpartLaLLtg treatment (often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm). equaLLtg NeLther nor assumptLons LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts To them fend we have to foLLow gLven. the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the rLght respectfuL to treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag, both beLng imported parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated as justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls rLght those of who have argued Ls basic the Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment (p.277), where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng aLL suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg. ConsLder subjects' vaLue as - what we LL caLL Lnherent LndLvLduaLs vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg p.23S ff.). (pp p.37; Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming sLmLLarLg to HR various postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent vaLue can be varied, pLace of Lnherent vaLue, LndLvLduaL as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then, Ln LnLtLaL or connate vaLue, X, or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X, defined, for ang Ltem if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt assumed that, for Ls ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came -17- �connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised, Ls Lt as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load. showing Before that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing (certain affairs individual tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or tgpes aLL positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd negative vaLue connate disboLicainess, if (their ontoLogicaL no nonexistence proofs objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate doubt have decidedLg to adding their the existence of top connate vaLue of are vaLues somewhat thus initiaL Like LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood, at an best initiaL assignment. The assignments Like those of initiaL are probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg vaLue; connate out themseLves presumptive those of inherent vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort their bg initiaL Life-stgLes, can which vaLue, then intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a be theg states worLd-Lines, posteriori a diminished as or increased receive probabiLLtg assignments. Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting prtncLpLes, features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant. 0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to carrg enough (not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect principLe. appears Examination to show that it can, at Least to this extent: insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on respectfuL fact, Ln individuat bg to item substitute connate made is principLe, principLe as aLso to repLace required, nameig resuLts defence of the modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the bg shows, where the the same substitutions as before. The modified principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items which have connate that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect wags in and presupposed argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon vaLue right throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the modified the features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg concerning respect to inherent for work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg those vaLue succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It treatment suffices, inherent principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for individuaLs, and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment. Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted, but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a fuLLer de- and re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded environmentaL rights theorg offered. But it which repLaces the moraL rights view wiLL be is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of -20- �the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts theorg (e.g. can PP,p.32), perhaps (minus remain totaLitg the cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence. But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact, most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of rLghts movement. Nonethe Less? animat the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe supererogatorg; Lt (p.351,p.3^.6) to thLs permLssLbLe Ls vegetarianism Ls (p.39!+); But (p.3^6). obLLgatorg' cone Lus Lon the appear to most the arguments the not Ls Lt that Ls estab LLsh not to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages). vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons Ls Lt given, wrong to purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a vegetarLan beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and, '16 ----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc ), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no proper of focus Regan's sLnce attach, such practLces tgpLcaLLg dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les of practLces huntLng-gatherLng LLfestgLes, of doubt Lead LncLude to the the gardenLng cuLtures of the Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes. Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page 3nd 351 with eatLng dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of (as these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes weLL as mtnor ones), newfangLed Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and so R chLef reason gLven Ls that on. end theLr LLves are brought to an untLmeLg antmaLs' (e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct tLme has come, vegetarLanLsm, that or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead. Mhat precLudes respectfuL use? Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more connected theorLes, such as aLL that consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as restrLctLons, wLthout further Large sent Lent utLLLtarLanLsm, are Longer no sentient or entaLL moraL deserve such dLetarg assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to which beLngs than eat dead creatures, things which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is aLreadg dead, but of causing prematureLg, Ln order death (or, to a Lesser extent, Letting die) to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product. For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate moraL standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg. Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to -21- �anLmaLs bauLk anLmaLs. Rnd at for sone patLents, Papuans the rLghts extensive to LLfe and LLveLhood to own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between Regan's noraL agents and moraL treatment, such admLttLng ground of treatment dLfferentLaL further and pLgs, a peopLe dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed. Regan s dLfferentLaL justLfgLng for So how tLght Ls Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst arguMent, tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk of the crucLaL argument ff.) dLd not treat resources. Nor dLd theg (p.3{+^); receptacLes does sLmpLg cuLtures tradLtLonaL renewabLe (p.3t*3 appLg. not anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as as anLmaLs treat Lnstruments mere excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that of tradLtLonaL unLLke peopLes, provLsLon (p.3t*3), are prLncLpLe dubLous admLtted commercLaL under derLved supposedLg who farmers Regan's from prLncLpLe LLbertg respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R the LncLudLng fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng requLres whLch that treatment creatures of vaLue Lnherent are however Some excLuded. Ls not of for prLncLpLe, the countervaLLLng respectfuL No excLuded. LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue persLst, come what mag. There use Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have (p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not wLth a (p.331, stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more the Ln practLces the vLoLate the respect crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs, food, Papua, pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not exchanged often or consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln who Large and Bg does rLghts are therebg a acquLre not Ln LndLctLons Lnterference rLght text Regan s to (and eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng tradLtLonaL the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons that Lt Ls LLfestgLes LnadmLssLbLe. Such are aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that LLfe anLmaLs brLnqtrg to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe use or harmfuL destructLve wLth LncompatLbLe bLoconatLvLst the vLoLence "LLbertg" assumptLons, no (p.287); prLncLpLes matter as Lnterpreted. dLffLcuLt how wouLd maxLMLae never to bLoconatLvLsm appears Lndeed to NonetheLess, LLve bg, are hLghLg appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg who an to mang vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or MorLd magbe a Ls not verg rendered LnadmLssLbLe. ilagbe The RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL; dLfferent predator-free sLn-eradLcated RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed? -22- post-naturaL worLd Ls �$4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts and substantiaL prob tews. tivehood: and predation, territoriatitg other the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers Despite have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that * Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the human as those of instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see for animats, sort sane e.g. RR, PR). * Rnimats have various For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that rights. humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and from excessive interference. these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg Mhite neither necessarg nor sufficient significant connections, inasmuch rights), having for as rights are nonethetess protect permissibie there to serve worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such de-foresters, as mag otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human practices sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their interests. For exampie, much animai suffering. causes experimentation unnecessarg quite there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare Thus and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced, and easier obtain to positive action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of sociai protection the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists. Granted animats have rights, some of them higher humans rights nohumans, widespread a have, main animats phenomenon of predation, a par with those that question (pace Freg) concerns which outstanding particutartg, on have. Because especiatig of the essential to the continued tivetihood of mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult one (and one comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest Regan induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when a herbivore s interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued sustenance, avoidabte others as in human Predation is not of course the ontg source of territoriatitg, slaughter of whates and dotphins. serious conflict of interests; for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected). Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population been converted into increase serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective the but integral part much of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's, hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic as themes probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism reduces an have individuats, that those items items such (constituting the base ctass) have a fixed -23- �(equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for and that vaLues (derived) Ls ecosystems, of whaLes additive an simpLy functLon the of aLLenabLe, such structures, organised and or atoms as Lt. within CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon and LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a infringing path, and maximization preservatLon enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to has that LndLvLduaL (Lnherent) LnLtLaL to everg simiLarLy woraL exLstence (and vaLue suboptimaL The rights view desLderata. contLnued Like the considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions, and the reasons for revising the vaLue eLsewhere than which are wore LncLude sun the of predators, theLr LndLvLduaL escaLation The the of theg though components, be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth mag LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn vaLue. detaLL Ln the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems, (Ln tgpLcaLLg expLaLned are assumptions, the through probLems wLthout system, reductLon of theorLes deserves, rights however, some eLaboratLon. R serLous cLash of Lnterest, as between carnLvores and herbLvores, fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg rLghts, of unLess too Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the many extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a Ln contLnuLng mistaken to eLevatLon that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls LnfrLnged bg LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe. a MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe cases of to Lnterfere some Ln predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be appLLed hoLd to gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated issues in these bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but at further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf, verg Least, dubiousLg permissibLe. High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are On contrary, the virtuaLLy aLL the remaining naturaL radicaLLg unsatisfactory. systems containing Large carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a Can t an rights to, right fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute though their rLghts to Life. to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some confLict, and inconsistency even, of rights, obLigations and so on, is inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags. Some can, but not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often -24- �significant) sorts of cases. In these terns, bg accommodated Mag of up confLLct sgstematic reguLar such confLLct anatogous S3tisfactoriig It Ls too reguLar, deontLc does sgstem not because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc cases, structures: for then much too much rather not of rLghts or prLncLpLes. confLLet sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent muLtipLg is predatton Ls time cases. R confLLct, repuzziing spent undermines MhLch fash Lon to deaL wLth sattsfactorg more redecLdLng and the point and force of prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach (no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach: right. feeL doesn't p.33) DC, at aLL Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek R Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature. R aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in superior excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood to right does not an give unquaLified Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse. In these terms, a Lion that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The different. Mith situation their take chances. rights to Life are not predatorg is essentiaLLg not LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find LJeak, themseives in threatening situations, such as traveL humans animats or wiiderness If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe therebg or action highspeed infringed animats where (and defending their animats are territories LnvoLved, not shouid be HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL, persecuted). except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their chances with naturaL predators. Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming with predation and Like issues happens, what grips is through zoning, or more generaLLg through bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface what to and eisewhere. is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves of out a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions big For wiiderness as Locus, Lt is much to think hoLLsticaLLg, easier predation as an LntegraL and significant part of such a rich naturaL the as to see structure rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting. (The adjustment of ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg; wiiderness is an appropriatetg generat notion, not get a proper name.) The action of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness areas, in taking preg conservativeLg, Ln defending their territories and so -25- on, �LnvoLves no LtseLf Ln infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a career. that tresspassLng Darwin Ln earLg hLs brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the a OnLg deng Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as with predatLon, to undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses and repLacenents of sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng naturaL MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde, thought Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg, huMan-engtneered that even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan breakdown, who efforts, whtch especLaLLg are prone to soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg can theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs the as there are and More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters norMaLLg straightforward huMan chLLdbirth, provide weLL-docuMented ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or the of evidence as MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one the ecoLogicaL Laws to of encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive huMan interference Ln naturaL regions. It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue a Lwags as poLiticaL high wickedness, evoLutionarg not it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of as Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not there inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate Long is process - that the no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved adapted in weLL wag a to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent it is far froM cLear that Nature of such huMans, provides rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL an optiMat sgsteM; Law" argued for eLsewhere: see SM). The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step with deontic best MoraLLtg, principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see were with that vaLue SH). Even it be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt. Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing environnent; naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite and often dazzLing, Lf LeveLs of vaLue. Richard SgLvan via Bungendore -26- for the adequate, �RustraLia 2621 NOTES 1- For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of that thought environmentaL Lt far of southern and western Rmerican schooLs, out fLows the surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that emerges typLcaLLy the froM prestigious More universities Ln LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres LLke Oxford. 2. May ThLs a strike MoraL as theorist aiMost cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics - as curious as a order in aLso and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are different. assessMents Cost/benefit depend on a vaLue theory of soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity. 3- EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and amounts what choice seLf-appointed chosen, (p.!*). makers entitLement a to in There are probiems according PP, to we free and rationaL use regarding of contexts, since entitLement moves in the these rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights. The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving a moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage. MoraL notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges and catagoriaL features are investigated and put to principLed work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the dLvisions of ref Leets cLassification things in terms of such features, where theg appLy, as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy these features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not. (Even if they were and a hierarchy aLL Not probiematic. resuLted, hierarchies are need that damaging, e.g. ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may oniy were when be. not be mereLy It is hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to, power or priviLege or favour, that theg warrant the criticism hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy been directed at certain power hierarchies are of this sort.) -27- hierarchies; but not aLL �UorrLes about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers an (west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth LMpoverLshed ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears both as deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such Ln where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts Regan's, Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon. 5. StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on standLng vaLue-Ln-LtseLf wLth Freg, Ln equates who worst and proceeds to bound Lt (p.!+S), beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs part happens as coLLapse of a of wore wLdespread huwanLstLc utLLLtarLan Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further casuaLLtg. 6. PossLbLLLtg and forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes probabtLLtg are basLc to the Ma Ln arguwents the to LMMoraLLtg of nucLear arrangements: see LiP. 7. But Fox has M3de a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an attempt Ls bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM woraLLtg as Ln a generaL bad Lnstttutton, cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much enMeshed whtch damage, Ls of has a poor thoroughtg Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg; Lt does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg. 8. UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But what are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features. 8. SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts taLk resuLt froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged that rLghts are verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg, prtncLpLe of such p3rstMong, as OccuM s weLL as provLdtng a pasttng such propertLes, such as betng objeettons of such crude LnstruMents as OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have have a razor, such ent Lt Les shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts (as bg derLvatLve rLghts; froM rLghts certaLn obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects. -28- �10. The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern Ls one, a verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20 right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to senses of the substantive brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN. RLthough the takes anaLgsis frow off one Ma Ln OED sense, the eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected 1.3 as whLch that MoraLLg just or due concerned Ls (as in LnvoLveMent activities); be no issues concerning opportunitg (as in rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights state-iMposed such equitg or ... which is right-doing ). But there wiLL Main Ln wLth senses, not to in participate are priMariig issues for MoraL these actors. 11. reLevant or coMMunities to capabie or individuats within theM, i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies. The status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such exact arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00 is or further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00 a is. 13. Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for who Leaps to the cone Lus ion that sentience, beings and the "higher ... is an the fact that huMan aniMats have experiences or MentaL states the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg (p.^3). No arguMent at aLL are possessors of MoraL rights than appeaL to (other is to be found for this ciatM, a authoritg) surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting for Freg, faiLure suppig to others arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the MereLg citing Light of his eartier reMarks that sentieneg as a criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe respects are provided ... arguMents in these subsequent chapters, such arguMents are . Rs we shaLL see in scarce on the ground (p.33). lit- Too Leg s anaLgsis standard account substituting can "right of for desires , an wouLd Mark out onLg subcLass rights, of be upgraded, and brought into Line with (adopted to" Ln EE, p.176), chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt iMportant roughLg consequentiai exercisabLe criticisM teLLs against EE). -2?- feature rLghts (a of a siMLLar �IS. Rn important exanpLe is the argunent which bg broken is concedLng to that vaLue, equat not p.33, PP aLL hunans, serLousLg genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss. 16. London,1932). RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega, the But qutte not Ls natter not a reputation of sLnpLe, so vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats decisive. carefuL definition, which wouLd however render nore R sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is 'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg OED account, so upon the vegetabie a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL foods; food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of Life'. 17. that not decisivetg support vegetartantsn, even inproved connerciat faming does UtLLitarianisn invoLving s Laugh ter and of so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive aninats, argunent). Ln Rnd fact fLawed the case utititarian vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work for of one choice of of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36). 13. sone Uhite such terntnoLogg distinction singuLarLg is unfortunate given the non-obsoiete patient . Most aninats are not patients. senses of the noun 13. the inportant, is For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict such as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and threats to rabid foxes to the crunch; hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the then strict norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane aLL and hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones for cases, for subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and respectfuL defective farngard greater C3n practices vaLue assunption be p.3^.2). condenned, R is snuggLed into the rights view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth (see DE, si). 20. On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn. 21. Predation bg Large carnivores can conpared with hunan travet be usefuLLg, sporting and predation (no accident of -30- course) favourabig, accidents. UhiLe the nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order aninaL and of nagnitude, appears to invoLve �rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though reduct ton tn vatue tn the removat tt tnvotve may some of on-gotng ttves, tt atso offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts. REFERENCES J.B. A t Catttcott, On the tntrtnstc vatues of nonhuman spectes' tn The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press, 1386; pp.138-172. R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London, 1377. J. Fetnberg, The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press; Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68. U. Fox, R postcrtpt on 2(1+) (1385) 17-23. deep ecotogy and tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs B. Freedman, Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168. R.G. Frey, Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats, 1880. K.E. Goodpaster, 308-325. Ctarendon, Oxford, On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378) I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con, Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386. J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373. H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good tn Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136. C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty, 1385. E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs 5(1383 )l+7-61. T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383; to as HR. T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs', Envtronmentat Ethtcs 3(1381) 13-31+; referred to as NP. J. Rodman, Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an -31- �ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56. J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.185-8. R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR. R. Rout Leg, In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe cannibatism , Green Series, RSSS. RNU; referred to as DC. R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB. R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and nucLear-deferrence and the poLiticaL faLL-out , Green Series, RSSS, RNU 1981+; referred to as UP. R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental Ph i Losophg (e.d. D. Plannison and others) RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE. ' 1 T. Rgan, The case for animaL rights' in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39. % C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+. R. SgLvan, R critique of deep ecoiogg', 1+1(1985); referred to as DE. Radicatj^hiLosophg 1+0(1985) ana R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN. D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees, UadsMorth, CaLLfornia, 1988; referred to as PP. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MORRL fWERS WHER - EM-JIROtVEtfrOLLV? Begond moraL extens ion isms. Some find us of mereig not ourseives at with odds mainstream environmentaL thinking - which remains shaLLow, heaviig exptoitative, and LikeLg disastrous, not ontg for mang other species but for mang humans as weLL - but uneasg atso with main deeper environmentaL approaches, most of which now emanate from North Rmerica. ELsewhere I have, to mg cost, taken issue with Deep Ecotogg, a movement with European origins quickig captured Ln CaLifornia; but here I wLsh to crLtLcLse forms of Norat Extensionism that now have a main base Ln Southern USF)!, forms that etaborate moraL standtng, consLderabLLLtg, and rLghts theorLes. the crLtLcLsm wLLL not be puretg negative; posLtLve atternatLve posLtLons Rgain wLLL beg Ln to emerge Ln earLg mornLng outLLne. extensLonLsms extend moraL Ltg and convent Lona L chauvLnLstLc moraL MoraL apparatus conventLonaL Lts begond (but certaLnLg subjects and areas where Lt has not been appLLed, certaLn confLnes to unwarranted) or eLse, more LLkeLg, has been used for dLscrLmLnatLon and other negatLve purposes. Theg sLmpLg extend wag the moraL apparatus wLthout much Ln the assumptions vatue, (equaL appLLed to a wider cLass equat of rLghts, of adjustment, consLderatLons, etc.) sLmpLg equaL a (Rs subjects. moraL egaLLtarLan wLth tgpe, generaL moraL ex tens Lon isms have been described and criticised Ln some detaiL Ln EE, p.lSSff., under and the tgpicaL and usefuL weapon movements of Liberation with proceed couLd Ln Rodman.) MoraL ex tens LonLsm is a MoraLisms Nature LabLe more rLghts and accurate movements Less but equipment). Seen from a conservative opposition, moraL to moraLitg bend to iLLegitimate certain interests, etc), are equaLitg, standing, but in ang case evergthing is sufficientLg in order, at Least on the boundaries, as it ex tens Lon isms endeavour not onLg do the since (rights, such impressive pubLLcLg extensLonLsms purposes, extensions make nonsense of the notions invoLved (though is! from Seen a wider perspective, environmentaL not aLwags unjustified in where theg go, but Ln how theg go, in the pseudo-egaLitarian facades of the extensions, and more important in where theg stop. For though priviLege is widened and so diiuted, it remains. The zones of extension remain too Limited, and things outside the usuai as forests, species, ecosgstems, continue mistreatment, expioitation and so on (see EE, things be to p.llf.1). Nor can such substantiaL to open the sorts of invoLved pLausibLg be brought within the extension foLd (though isoLated efforts are not Lacking); for theg appear to Lack requisite which extensions, extensions operate, such as sentience, LndividuaLitg, or whatever. For exampLe, the verg characteristics pain-receptivitg, idea of an on interests, environmentaL ethic, which serves to protect uninhabited environments and to Justifg requisite respect for naturat sgstems and communities, founders on the moraL rights position propounded bg Regan in defence of certain animats (RR p.35^ff). Mang a Ls MoraLLtg weapon, purpose depLoged bg pressure and often interest groups. Throughout Modern hLstorg Lt has tgpLcaLLg been used to and justLfg wLde a actLvLtg of range and hostLLe practices ground naturaL to envLronnents. HuMans are entLtLed to thLs or that, whLch interfere; thetr needs generate these or those requLreMents, whLch ought to be Met there though even are costs to LocaL envLronnents, and so forth. Those opposed to MoraLLtg - there Ls a Long and dLstLnguLshed phLLosophLcaL chaLn froM Lao-tsu and PLgden - have a poLnt MoraLLtLes Lt when MoraL-poLnts-of-vLew and to coMes The MoraLLtg. such HLnckfuss through daMage of seeM substanttaLLg hLgher than the often benefLts conferred. For the restrLctLons theg LMpose are heavg, and work often the wrong wags. R sort of cost/benefLt assessMent of MoraLLtg thus gets under wag2, supposedLg gLetdLng negatLve resutts. Mang are the arguMents for MoraLLtg, begLnntng wLth the cLaLM that Lt Ls oneseLf and one s LLfe wLthout LapsLng Lnto Morat taLk, conduct to LMpossLbLe concepts, practLces and, generaLLsLng, back Lnto MoraLLtg. Part of the response to such fauttg arguMents Ls atwags that there are dLstLnctLons, LnsLsted upon bg LeadLng MoraL theorLsts theMsetves, between vaLue Matters and MoraLLtg, tougher dLstLnctLon, (practLcaL hard j^s (whLch axLoLogg to to avoLd) MaLntaLn, between there Ls a further deontLc expressLons Rnd deontLes. and practLcat between expedLent oughts and shouLds for Lnstance) and MoraL ones. ULth and such dev Lees, antL-MoroLLsts, who do have a soLLd case agaLnst objectLve or absoLute MoraLLtLes, can escape MoraL hooks. Hagbe the net a carefuL practLtLoner can shun deontLc dLscourse, but wouLdn t on the treatMent of envtronMents be worse rather than better?, LMpact soMe of the grossest practLces? The quest Lons can doesn t MoraLLtg coLLect a range of answers, LncLudLng such uncharLtabLe ones as: Not so cLearLg constraLn that one wouLd notLce. The MaLn LMpact of MoraLLtg affaLrs; and even here onLg the grossest appear to be turned around through abuses, of an Ls Lnput on chauvLnLstLc, as such froM sLaverg, huMan MoraLLtg. huMan Even so the persuavLve force and LnfLuence of MoraL consLderatLons, properLg redLrected, are not thLngs to be LLghtLg abandoned. For rLghtLg dLrected theg posLtLveLg Ln thLngs contrLbute couLd that Matter socLaLLg and envLronMentaLLg. In partLcuLar, MoraLLtg affords soMe needed protect Lon and, especLaLLg as rectLfLed, offers the prospect of More, More protectLon, Less dLscrLMLnatLon. But actuaL protectLon Ls tgpLcaLLg provLded, where Lt Ls, through verg channeLLed MoraL ftowLng, through aLL too LegaL often, rather to the than wrong dLfferent LnstLtutLons; wLth fraMeworks, part Les, such as the Lt Ls the benefLts strong and estabLLshed. HakLng MoraLLtg work the rLght wags, where Lt does ftgure serLousLg, Ls, Moreover, uncoMfortabtg LLke MakLng weapons work for peace (MoraLLtg beLng a MaLn force behLnd wars and preparatLon for wars), More LLke than Lt ought to be. -2- Nor is Lt nearLg as easg as Lt was: beating swords Lnto pioughshares, to provide an assauit on the environMent instead of other creatures, subMarine to peaceful purposes (genuineLg peacefut ones, or a prettg easg feat coMpared wLth converting an Fl-11 fighter-boMber or a Modern technoLogicaL LLke was that course, of is; Ln the Liest, theg re peacenakers). For Locat chauvLnLsn, Ln one fom guns another or (huMan, Ls now deeptg natLonat, state or race), LLkeLg, More entrenched Ln Most bureaucratLc arrangeMents and an LntegaL part supportLng of scLences and technoLogg. Even so, whatever Locat practLces, MoraL theorg socLaL can be rectified; the theorLsLng can be accoMpLLshed, even Lf a new MoraLLtg not and appLLed, successfuttg Must awaLt Ls Lts post-RrMeggedon dag. Thus the protected battte to dutg expand MoraLLtg goes on. There are two Ma Ln battLe—LLnes over whLch LdeoLogLcaL wars antL-MoraLLsts) equated) nottons: MoraL status, rLghts, sag, even an outsLde surveg such as thLs But the tern can scarceLg escape attogether MoraL def Ln Lt tons Ls so stack (as dLet tonarg reveaL) that tern (Ln LatLn ortgLn Just a substitute for the Greek expressLon for to have becoMe Linked to features and behaviour of accountabLe such MoraL group: narrower the ang Ls bound to be partLg LegLsLatLve. R Ma Ln Modern tendeneg Ls for the use ttght of as to what Makes soMethtng, a consLderatLon or perMLssLon, MoraL. Lssue coMMon cLuster consLderatLon, retevance, a on foLLowLng These LLnes wLLL be surveged Ln turn; needLess to . ... the standing, consLderabLLLtg,... The second LLne concentrates perMissions, to are fought as regards MoraL extensLon Lssues, LLnes parportedLg MarkLng MoraL outer bounds. The fLrst LLne concerns (often (guaLnt ethicai ) (hunan) actors, as character, disposition, action, virtue. These are the areas where MoraL attributes are at hoMe. Hence MoraL notions tend to occupg inner pLaces Ln the Much Larger evaLuative circLe, and not to extend without sone forcing to naturaL that are not accountabLe actors. PartLg for these reasons too, the terM objects MoraL , Much favoured Ln ex tens Lona List enterprises, tends to be shunned Ln The notion of deeper environMentaL theorg. SiMoraL RgaLnst MoraL standing and siMpiistic ethicaL tgpoLogies. standing, introduced notion of LegaL standing, is coning to pLag environMentaL heavg, but ethics. It is anaiogg questionabte bg a Major, with the RngLo-RMerLcan but d3Maging, danaging because, verg briefLg, rote it wouLd paint a rather arbitrarg, bLack/white boundarg - segregating off those that have not froM those territorg. that have MoraL standing - across Much conpLex More Rs to its rote, it Ls soMetiMes ctaiMed that adoption and defence criterion in of MoraL standing is probieM soLving; absoiuteLg basic reasonabLg addressing of a in environMentaL thinking and the Lssue of MoraL standLng Must be vLewed as a benchMark of ang pLausLbLe "environMentaL ethic"' (PP, pl6). None of thLs Ls so evLdent, especLaLLg gLven the MurkLness of the not Lon of MoraL standing. In the sane vein, an a necessarg condition ... for Lt is stated that ethicaL theorg is the Most [}] defensibLe criterion of moraL standing adequate Such statements are suretg overstatements. For, Ln pLace, fLrst the there can be, and Lndeed appear to be eth Les, which count as environmentaL ones, which do not LncLude a not Lon of moraL ecoLogLcat Rodman s deep Naess s (e.g. ecotogg, sensLbLLLtg). Secondtg, etaboratLons of these theorLes can cLaLms to adequacg, wtthout introducing, and perhaps expLLcLttg warranted make standing rejecting (for the sorts of reasons gLven betow), a notLon of morat standing. For these sorts of reasons, too, Regan's moraL of notLon attempt (Ln NP) to a make standing Lntegrat to the verg Ldea of an environmentaL ethic, part of the conditions of adequacg for such as ethic, is far off course (as weii as ahistoricai, a piece of footnoted Regan s retrospective account of Legisiation). as But, it happens, standing, according to which a being has moraL morat standing if and onig if we moratig ought to consider how it is affected bg a given action or poiieg, both enabies elimination of the notion as a parasitic middieman) bg substitution using the exposed (thus biconditionaL invoLved in the conditions of adequacg, and aiso enabies straightforward satisfaction of the conditions tgpes of ethics that are hardLg environmental. Consider a forest bg sgstem about be to buiidozed, or the Moon about to be bg tourized an Rmerican—based transnational Hang the development or progress ethics these dags that wiii at Low we ought to consider how the forest or the Moon wiLL be that affected, but then cLaim that we shouid proceed, though perhaps in a modified wag. Thus, in such contexts, the forest and the Moon have moraL standing. Rn so, such a deveiopment ethics meets Regan s conditions for an environmentaL ethic; for the forest and the Moon are nonhuman beings, and indeed nonconscious beings, which have moraL standing. The resuLt is not what Regan intended; for he proceed to suggest (p.21^,p.3O) that intrinsic vaLue is a necessarg condition standLng, something his footnoted for moraL account does not guarantee. The LegaListic notion of moraL standing is not so cLear and distinct after aLL. Rn initiaL tacticaL point against the notion of moraL standing concerns its origin, on the modei of LegaL standing. LegaL standing is for ang sufficientLg comprehensive notion of a sometimes entering into moraL consideration (which can be true of aLmost angthing). For one reason, some decidedtg restrictive assumptions, concerning interests and whatever has such standing. But mang things of vaLue, which enter assessment on modeL dubious it imports rights into ethicaL occasions, do not have, and are not the sorts of things that can significantig have, interests or hoLd rights. LegaL standing aLwags operates terms of having of thing in certain sorts of interests, which can be represented, whereas what has or deserves environmentaL standing mag not have interests, sort of that couLd or be the have interests, even as derived (as in the case of LegaL persons, such as companies) from those of its members. More often -4- indeed, Legat have to standing to have certain rights, duties, protectton, etc., is begtnntng with the rtght of betng abLe to proceed to the courts. room Of course there ts constderabte standtng not ton the widen to Legat of tn RustraLia can even exctude environmentaL organtsattons) and (which "cLaimants to admit, through representatton, other to the PresentLg, courts. for sure, the modeL ts Much too narrow, restrtcttng access to certatn capitalist cLaimants. But there are severe conceptuat dtfftcutttes tn the wag and persons of broadentng the standtng not ton objects, agatn because to encompass Limitations the the mang requisite environmentaL nottons of tnterests and rtghts impose. Organtsattons of persons, such as partnershtps, coattttons and so on, do not exceed (easg stretchtng at Most of) these Limits, stnce tnterests and rtghts accrue frow coMponent members: untnhabtted ecosgsteMs, the MonuMents, and bg a brazen, and tMptaustbte, overrtdtng of Ontg constderabtg. do, Like naturat these conceptuat ttMttattons (such as Stone ts prepared to fancg Rmerican courts tndutgtng tn) can the in-buiLt severe tnternat restrtcttons of the wodet Legat be overcome. coutd be recogntsed, account of the Stttt the tnadequactes of Lts Legat 3natogg anaLogg behtnd, Left unimpeded fresh a and now standtng woraL rather propose free-fLoattng not Lon offered. Van De Veer and Pterce are rash enough to an expLLcatton of Recordtng to them, can be construed atong these LLnes. whtch For ang thtng X, X has woraL standtng Lff the continued extstence of X fISl. tnterests Lts theg sag Ln that weLL-betng have postttve moraL weight stLpuLattng theg re the but this; theg re or (PP. p.3). RctuaLLg, not free simpig to given that Lt ts a notton wtth some currencg aLreadg, soMethtng theg sttputate, recogntze Ln proceeding at once to consider various to their standard answers basic question Llhich things have MoraL standing? . The account proposed is wore in LittLe curious, not to sag obscure and scarceLg graMMaticat. Later theg a than effect substitute a tortuous Less nameLg account, generaLLtg (in interpretation) MS2. X has moraL standing iff the (continued) existence positive moraL weight (see e.g. p^., plG: pureLg since future items mag have ancestors). Either wag the account is weight and having moraL continued some moraL circutar, or shouLd however be significance, since having X of wetfare has deLeted, as mag dead positive moraL standing are interdependent notions (cf. Goodpaster. p-311). In fact some of the probLems with the account coutd have been avoided bg cutting out the troubLesome middLe part and moving on to the simpLer, expLLcitLg circutar, H33. But has X then as moraL standing Lff X possesses (or obtains) positive moraL weight. a expLication, the definition might aimost as weLL drop out; Lt expticates nothing, connecting some near sgnongms onLg. Perhaps it is better to ask: Uhat work does the notion do? -5- The troubie Ls except that theories, whLch LegLsLate as to what has moraL partLcuLar on standing, the notion Ln fact does verg because hoMe Ma Ln whose eth Les, chauvLnLstLc base does whLch LLes wLthLn the not extend or traveL unsatLsfactorg; wLth as coMpetence, or m s Ln sorts of reason for theLr Lnadequacg are weLL The personhood). are (such cLassLfLcatLons bLoLogLcaL socLopsgchoLogLcsL dLstLnctLons (such as LLnguLstLc capacLtg or potentLaL standLng MoraL Homo sap Lens or of the zooLogLcaL bLngdon) or wLth spec Les the of the wLder to onLg unstabLe and rather arbLtrarg, but tend to not ctassLfLcatLons ethLcaL MeMbershLp are theg trad Lt LonaL of weLL for ethLcs, It Ls one of those confLnes envLronMentaL settLng. RLL the MaLn crLterLa proposed confuse envLronmentaL Ln work Ls LLttLe agreement about what determLnes Lt. there not Lons, LLttLe enough documented Ln PP (and Ln Much other earLLer LLterature, e.g. EE) DespLte the enthusLasM shown for the not Lon of Morat standLng, then, no satLsfactorg crLterLon for Morat standLng eMerges, or Ls Ln ctear sLght, Ln PP - or Lt eLsewhere It remaLns to be denonstrated that there Ls a stabLe, seens. non-arbttrarg context-LnvarLant notLon of MoraL standLng worth pursuLng. Rather the notLon tends to force awkward choLces (e.g. those offered Ln PP on p.S.) The for reason the needs what cost-benefLt LMperatLves be to Looked at presuppose a Morat Ln appLLcatLons assessments, (whLch thLs dLffLcuLt notLon, that does no present Lt wouLd decLsLvetg Ls evLdent enough: usefuL work, space, about enthusLasM and deLLMLt of the categorLcaL of deLLMLtatLons behLnd proposed some notLon, for Lnstance use of the dLstLnctLon to reduce the humanLstLc/chauvLnLstLc foLd (partLg moraL ). MoraL standLng Ls not a MoraLLg bg use of the term achLeved Ls search unLverse, usuaLLg of persons), and so Morat search space towards the confLnes of the thLs MoraL confLLct Lssues, utLLLtarLan forth. There are as weLL More sLnLster uLterLor purposes appLLcatLons the neutraL notLon, but a fraMework and cuLturaLLg dependent one; hence some of Lts LLmLtatLons. ConsLder standLng moraL Lnstead of work, Lnstead of straLghtforward pragmatLcs, what supposed to confer or remove? It Ls assumed that Lf X has moraL standLng (m-s) then moraL agents have presumptLve obLLgatLons, and dutLes to X, e.g. Let to Lt theg otherwLse not atone, do not to confLne Lt or underMLne Lts Lnterests; but (cf-p.3-p.tt). Or, to put Lt the other wag around, thLng has m-s Lt Ls entLtLed to conttnued exLstence, pursuLt of whereas Lf Lacks m-s, Lt Lt does not have thLs protectLon, 3 Lnstead there Ls entLtLement to Lnterfere wLth Lt . def Ln Lt Lon of moraL standLng ... Lf somethLng weLL-beLng Just does not LtseLf moraLLg count Lts Lf a Lnterests, Lt does not count, .... Indeed, so Lt Ls Lacks (p.t+). The moraL saLd, standLng, defLnLtLon Bg Lts however deLLvers no such resuLt; a further LmpLausLbLe assumptLons, (reductLon of weLght to weLL-beLng, equaLLtg condLtLons for countLng) from an underLgLng moraL wLthout pLcture of assessment are LmpLLcLtLg Lncorporated (a utLLLtarLan pLcture where Ltems m-s are dLscounted, and trade-offs contempLated, p.16). -6- of Ltems wLth m-s are soon Such appLication an if division; accordingtg LmpLies an unfortunate aLL-or-nothing item is tn tt gets (carefut) constderatton, otherwise Lt gets nothing - exacttg what the Legat anatogg impLies: a proper heartng Lf be and otherwise nothtng. Hhat this bLack-and-white division shoutd standing contrasted with ts not removaL of att distinctions, but rather a wore sophisticated ethicat such tgpoLogg, that of the annutar picture (of EE, p.107 and DC, p.2). The as tgpoiogg is based on a Listing of ethicaiLg re Levant such as having vaiue, weLL-being, appropriate p.!2).^ the character aLL-or-nothing from at Least Modified becomes evident of various (e.g. p.5) to keep it afLoat, e.g. duties capacities, so and and forth; to moraL standing distinctions soon duties) (direct to needs be introduced as opposed to (indirect, and perhaps derivative, duties). The wain strategg regarding duties autonomg, and postuLates and princ ip Les are geared to these (cf. aLso PP ethicaL That preferences, features adopted in PP to save the aLL-or-nothing context-independent boundarg consists in appeaL to the speciaLLg-adjusted notion of presumptive duties. MoraL standing is assumed to be necessarg and sufficient for presumptive duties: specificaLLg PSI. floraL agents iff But have a presumptive dutg to X has moraL standing (this takes up the content of signposted item 1, p.t*.). presumptive are duties even more prone to be bg upset circumstances than the oider prima facie duties (which the notion the notion overriding expands); standing, p.S), the forged connections things than without much too simpLe, as wiLL are for appear. FirstLg, a more comptex cLassification of things is required purposes so operates even more as a theorg-saving device. But even as so hedged around, and so extended (bg derivative duties, duties regarding moraL decentLg] X [to treat it moraLLg moraL a hard division into moraL countabLes and others, a nonarbitrarg cLassification such as that of the annutar picture. SecondLg, rights and duties, which the notion of moraL standing is supposed to bound. Link rather with vaLue, and extent of vaLue (see SM). Much of the importance ascribed to moraL standing or moraL consideration comes from confLating it with vaLue consideration, which is in turn equated with having some (non-negLigibLe) vaLue, bearing account, and counted, perhaps (if sometimes that wouLd be taken into in ang compLete vaLue assessment. Though moraL attributes are evidentLg a subcLass commonpLace vaLue of surprising, vaLue as attributes, e.g. in the confiation CaLLicott). is Possessing intrinsic or inherent vaLue is even offered sometimes as an aLternative to moraL status (cf. PP, p.16 fn 3); but more often the confusion is Less bLatant. Indeed PP begin bg warning us about sLipperiness (fn 3), soon stides itsetf from m-s to intrinsic vaLue with their being evident, and considerabLe, (p.S) and before Long has identified moraL standing of things vaLuabte prove in damaging. Goodpaster themseLves Towards Lapses (p.I6). Such equations are not the end of his essag, on being moraLLg from -7- moraL considerabiLitg into that Hag that natters for ctains wade. For exanpte, Ln vatue-for-itsetf, psgchotogicat or hedonLstLc capacities sophLstLcated unnecessaritg seen Lt Ls true when Lt cones to Locating the ntnLnaL condLtLons for sonethLng s deserving to be Lts for vatued own (p.320); sake Lt not so obvious that theg are too but sophLstLcated for the capture of norat consLderabLLLtg. R sLnLLar conftatLon at work Ln Goodpaster s hgpothesis that that there Ls a nonaccLdentaL affLnLtg between a person s or a socLetg s conceptLon of and vatue ontg — consLderabLLLtg to appears obtaLn where vatue Ls unreduced (LLLLcLtg) contracted to a range where norat considerations enter; for exanpte tn Goodpaster's sotitarg LLLustration, the setting is hedonisn (when as where, of conceptLon Lts (p.3t*). The affLnLtg — nore than accLdentat for vatue and noraL consLderabLLLtg vatue Ls no doubt norat considerabititg Ls, so far as norat natters are attowed to enter, characteristicattg bounded at botton bg sone sentience criterion). The biocentric criterion for norat considerabititg that Goodpaster Leaps to (p.313) has itsetf to be differenttg Looked at if exchanged for vatue-in-itsetf. For Life is point even norat the obvioustg Less stopping vatue consideration. Rssune, for instance, that Wars or the Moon has for estate no [significient] Life. Theg stitt have vatue; indeed theg nag have reat vatue verg chauvinistic vatue "neasure ) now that theg are beconing hunantg (a accessibte nining, residentiat and other transfiguring purposes). Suppose (for further, what is not at att untiketg, that sgstens natch that Moon the has fornations sone shoutd be the that thensetves, into account in ang environnentat inpact assessnent of taken projects interfering with parts of the Moon. But insist or naturat nonunents of the Rnerican arid Lands. It is a the defensible ctain, these dags, that the Moon nonunents have vatue in which is considerabititg Lt woutd be LnptausLbte to Moon nonunents are norattg considerabte; for theg are not the right sorts of things (as a natter of significance) to have noraL attributes. It is just not the feature of having intrinsic vatue that shoutd be separated fron that of having norat status. Sone of the circte have suggests different sone exanpte, For connotations. notions beLng Ln noraL the consLderabLe norat dinension, sone weight to be taken into account, suitabte not neretg sone retevance. Consideration atso characteristicattg requires the iten in question has interests or at Least a such tetos), an that agent discussion-setting can phrase be deserves norat weLL-being towards considerate notions are deptoged that wag (eg. p.31 does norat retevance, R different get nere artifacts are norattg etc., dependent, quarrg that (a Goodpaster s Rnd nornattg the notion do presunabtg nornattg woutd not. Nor, not it erroneoustg, reLevant on occasions (for sinitar reasons norat significance differs fron standing). MoraL retevance renains context Like that another different notion sonetines equated with norat standing (e.g. PLuhar p.^7), though since does nornattg an organisn'; PP p.3 inpose these Linitations, e.g. those of awe, respect, appear, (as or consideration ). certain organisns'; and in Goodpaster's Leap.) woutd norat an etusive, has evaded contenporarg norat phitosophers of -8- high standing, despite Much effort put Lnto other chase. the however, Since these are not goLng to be put to serLous work - Most of theM are, Like notLons MoraL standing, better MothbaLLed or - scrapped we qutetLg can bgpass the vaiue the nuances and differences. CertaLnLg MoraL considerations and vaiue interconnect, wider notion and Moraiitg, if wag theg inportant in which not at derivative, Least with R dependent. Most connect is through LiMitat ions on interference. MoraLitg preciudes the gross reduction of vaLue. LittLe R More preciseLg, a actor is not norMaLLg entitLed to interfere deLiberateLg in such a wag as MoraL to reduce signifLeantLg overaLL vaLue (or risk the various possibiLitg of such reduction^). But exact forMuLation of such noninterference princ ip Les is a sensitive Matter MainLg because deontic principLes do not excLude soMe vaLue, provided it is sufficientLg Linited - a Matter to which we of reduction - shaLL be obLiged to return. Bg contrast with MoraL considerabiLitg, and standing Like, the vaLue notions are fundaMentaL, and not at aLL easiLg avoided, even bg anti-Moraiists, in the regions of environMentat ethics.^ SoMe of the anaiogue notions are however, e.g. a thing warrants vaLue consideration iff it has vaLue; it triviaL is of vaLue reLevance iff it has nonnegiigibte vaLue circuMstances); the (in Even so the ana Logue notions heLp in shifting the issues and showing where the reaL prob ten Lies with the group of MoraL notions, naneig in what Makes soMething Morai. It this notion too that has induced the unwarranted narrow ing of focus, to chauvinistic concerns. For a coMMonp Lace answer, certainig wrong, to what deternines what is MoraL is: hunan concerns. Rather, etc. what is MoraL has to do with interest-independent vaLue and with a certain iMpartiaLitg and Lack of discrininations (i.e. in More oLd-fashioned forMs, with justice and goodness), features refLected fornaLLg in suitabLe universaLizabiiitg of principie.^ So conceived, MoraL Matters do not terMinate at narrower certain ethicaL tgpes, which excLude the wider environnent. The width of concern wouLd be better revested bg repLacing ethicaL*. equivaLent ethics a of (For coMparison, rec Lass ification as consider "environMentat bg MoraL its originaL the effect in environMentat MoraLs" environMentat or Moratitg"). $2. Rgainst environMentaLLg-restrictive rights packages. EthicaL standing does not striettg get or grant a thing rights. Standing gets an iteM door for hearing. a hearing; in an ethicaL it Mag, or Mag not, be conceded or granted rights in the Rights inpLg sone standing, but not vice versa; sone standing is even, if gou Like, a proper part of a right. MhiLe such an equation is not Much excuse for identifging standing and rights (short assuMption that of the astonishing but prevaLent aLL reLations are identities), stiLL too often the differences are giossed over, having MoraL rights is equated with having MoraL standing The stoppage between the notions Goodpaster exptoits (p.3I8) CaLLicott). (e.g. Ln converting conditions on having rights into conditions (expioitation consideration free not exersibie rights is Much Less piausibie for Underneath consideration). MoraL these equations and conventions Lie important assunptions; triviaL MoraL deserving since wh3t is piausibie for costs, of for just not the More that what has a status therebg has a right, for instance to get in one but the ethicaL door, consideration are assuMption the rendered that equivaLent having and rights standing or a coMMon Middie terM, such as through having interests, being capabLe of being represented, being abLe to benefit. For exaMpte, an iteM has MoraL standing (or deserves MoraL consideration) iff it has iff it has (or even have) rights. (or can have) interests, i.e. iMpiicit appear but (with Minor Such equations quaLifications) in Goodpaster, and exp Lie it etsewhere, for a wide notion if "interests" extending to aLL Living things; but Much More coMMontg theg appear (e.g. as in Freg) for a verg Much More restricted of (huManoid) interest. notion If such fauLtg equations did hoLd, what has been said against MoraL standing wouLd appLg to that extend aiso against rights. But theg do not, and rights require More independent investigation. contrast Bg with anti-Moratists, who wouLd reject (MoraL) rights taLk and institutions aitogether, and with Mang utiLitarians, who view notion of considerabte suspicion at Least, it wiLL be argued, in g passing, that rights are aLrcght . The chief targets for criticisM wiLL be (MoraL) rights with certain unduLg narrow theories rights, of which wouLd have, if theg stood, decidedLg unfavourabLe environMentat consequences. RLthough for which he has iLLegitiMateig bagged the titie view, Regan's particuLar the rights view (as if an aniMat rights supporter had to adopt his sort of view), is verg far froM the attention, worst of these theories, it is worth singLing out for speciaL it has score heaviLg been proMoted since in environMentat ethics Literature and it does exceedingig weLL, coMpared with its usuaL chauvinistic rivaLs, in certain areas of Major environMentat concern, such as the (Mis-)treatMent of aniMats. R theorg of rights a coMprises representation (in the fashion of other package, which can be given fornaL theories) genetic as containing the foLLowing coMponents: D. a definition of a right, and P. further postuLates (perhaps independentLg argued for) deLiMiting rights. Rs MatheMaticaL exaMpLes (such as those of vector space and categorg) reveaL there is a good deat of stippage between D ord inarg usage controts and P. But because of the More on phiLosophicaL theories, onLg so Much in the wag of postuLates can be puMped into the definitions offered. The package aLso coMMontg includes as weLL 0. a set of canonicaL forMS into which aLL (nondiscarded) rights Locutions or cases can be put, and perhaps aLso (with ground prepared through C) R. a set of reduction scheMes for eiiMinating transLation, reduction ruLes, etc. -10- rights Locutions, e.g. bg The of rLghts advocated bg Regan convenLentLg Lends theory partLcuLar LtseLf to separatLon Lnto these components, as weLL as suggestLng genetLc such breakdown. It begLns wLth a neat defLnLtLon of rLght drawn from HLLL, accordLng to whLch a rLght Ls, roughLg, a vaLLd (or suffLcLent) cLaLm whLch socLetg shouLd It guarantee. Ls coup Led wLth a serLes of prLncLpLes or postubates, each gLven some Lndependent support, of whLch the most basLc Ls the rLght of and treatment. respectfuL to patLents canonLcat RLthough expLLcLtLg addressed, one does emerge, whLch takes the form to [not] , where - onLg rLghts-hotder on the theorg, but Lt X[s] of The rLght as for Lnstance not Ln to permtts (the pLuraLLsatLon partLcuLar to some sort of utLLLtarLan anatgsLs, Ls strongLg resisted the rLghts vLew features onto LndLvLduaLs). FLnaLLg reductLon of rLghts, Ln back dLstrLbutLng context not are The basLc form Ls sLnguLar, appLgLng to LndLvLduaLs, who are the harm . LncLuded forms Lntroduces an LnfLnLtLvaL ctause LndLcatLng a tgpe of to actLon or actLvLtg. The cLauses mag be negated, unduLg agents moraL has a LLttLe more thLs LrreducLbLe the Ls Lt poLnt, (Ln rLghts vLew as opposed to a mot Leg arrag of reduct LonLstLc posLtLons, wLth 'the' sLgnLfgLng a coLLectLve.) be UhLLe Regan s rLghts package wLLL crLtLcLsed, Ln sLgnLfLeant rejected, through Lts varLatLon a dLfferent rLghts theorg wLLL emerge. respects Some of the crucLaL prLncLpLes Regan arrLves at depend theg and heavLLg upon - though do not foLLow from - defLnLtLon of rLght(s) he defends. Hnd severaL of the unnecessarLLg restrLctLve features of the vLew do fLow from eLaboratLon of thLs defLnLtLon, Ln partLcuLar the LLmLtatLon of rLghts to certaLn LndLvLduaL thLngs, to anLmaLs. It Ls Lmportant then to begLn wLth, and hard to avoLd, the certaLn Lssue of defLnLtLon. To ground the varLant defLnLtLon and theorg of rLghts to be reached fLrmLg Ln usage, consLder fLrst the maLn reLevant sense^' of rLght (to) gLven bg the Oxford EngLLsh DLctLonarg, vLz. 11.7 JustLfLabLe cLaLms, on LegaL or grounds, to have or obtaLn some thLng, or to act Ln a certaLn wag. of gLven rLghts sLmLLar core: hLm the Ln bg MLLL (whLch of ... account Regan cLaLms to endorse, p.369.) contaLns a a person s rLght ....[Ls] a vaLLd cLaLm upon socLetg possessLon The moraL somethLng socLetg to protect ought to defend...', MLLL provtdes, however, an Lmportant Lnsurance or cover cLause, as to who Ls supposed to cover the cLaLm, whLch the OED account does whLch Regan after a brLef dLscussLon aLso correctLg omLts (begLnnLng p.270). That Ls, rLght not LncLude, and quLckLg contracts to the Less than adequate vaLLd cLaLm; but the force of MLLL s Lnsurance cover Ls supposed to foLLow, prLmarLLg Ln vLrtue of what Ls pushed Lnto the Ldea of a cLaLm. Rs Lt turns out, Regan, now features of rLghts LmLtatLng FeLnberg s Lt does foLLow, but not Ln that wag. trLcks, trLes to puLL substantLve out of the notLon of a cLaLm. But the notLon does not bear the weLght theg trg to Lmpose upon Lt; a stronger rope Ls needed for -11- such acts than ciaim can suppig. The cruciai act, which tries to read anticipated features of the notion of riqht into that of ciaim, faiis at the outset: is entitied to treatment of a certain kind is to assert that someone... ... To wake a ciaim and that the treatment is due or owed directig to the individuai ... in question. To a make individuais, ciaim thus, invoives both ciaims-to and ciaims-against... (p.271). Such an anaigsis of making a ciaim imports much the that ordinarg notion does not support, nameig, in the first piace, that it invoives or asserts entitiement, entitiement to treatment of a certain sort, secondig, that it is a transaction between individuais^, thirdig, that the imputed treatment is owed it is a ciaim-against given individuais. But in making directig to the ciaimant, such ciaims as that one has visited Mount Rthos, has seen the iark ascend, at tea one sunset, doing ang of those things in ang straightforward not is sense. There is nothing significant due or owed, directed at other took individuais in the the demanding assertions wag, or at need not be aii; and no entitiement to speciai treatment is asked for. Ciaim is a transitive verb, so it as requires weii as subjects, ciaimants, objects, ciaims, propositionai items tgpicaiig introduced bg or 'to . Someone who makes a that ciaims ciaim that something or to (have or have done) something. But that is aii. Onig some ciaims are directed against others, onig some ciaims are entitiements. Rnd if is it ciaims that are entitiements that are to be distinguished, it wouid be better to start with entitiements (cf McCioskeg). Just such a fresh start wiii be made, in the first stage of modification of the definitions OED integration and it with Miii's definition. Upon of separating off iegai rights (which Regan correctig distinguishes in prettg much the standard wag, p.267), the foiiowing then resuits: M2. Vaiid entitiement, on morai grounds, to something (of a correct categorg). The changes (from 11.7) deserve some justification. Firstig, or have obtain or something, characteristic fiii to to in act a certain "justifiabie justifiabie to (to) something , iogicaiig adds iittie content. For each something entaiis and mag to be entitiement ciaims sufficient, ent ireig warrant vaiid. from Thirdig, and ang case entitiing ones, and that in are i.e. dubious ciaims-against preconceptions, without be regarded appears most need not ciaim restrict to on but aiso the ciaim because make or the sheds unduig and expected ciass of rights havers or haver of a it, but it is hard to escape the assumption that if something has a ciaim then it shouid be the sort of thing potentiaiig?) important entitiement hoiders, what can have or ho id rights, to ciaimants. Of course the right as grounds morai ciaim , not mereig for the reasons given, that improves upon invoived an sort of justification, which as it turns out is not fuiig some adequate, can be given, whereas for a right the derivation has converseig an entitiement to have something. Secondig, is not strong enough; a ciaimed entitiement if (To) phrase wag , which gives the of the sorts of entitiement is an entitiement to something, entitiement the stake that ciaims. Thus use of the term -12- can ciaim (at ieast makes it an even tougher uphiLL struggLe to work the powerfut rights medicine on behatf of wttd animats and wiLde messes. Of course too, what cLaims are wade coutd be wade through indirectLg, representatives; the tern but representatives" suggests verg easiig that rights havers have interests to be represented. Opportunitg wake the to interests" shouid not be afforded rights" to dubious inference from bg the basic definition; and "entitLement" gives appropriate distance. R Lot hangs on choice of basic (as then terms other in chaiienging phiiosophicai areas, such as the fundamentsLs of reasoning), even if it seems to right' newcomers, as it does to dictionaries, that entitLement cLaim' and are more or Less interchangeabLe (each is characterised in standard dictionaries partLg in terms of the others) tautoLogous. and expticative satisfactorg UeLL, Like definitions that M2 definitions virtuaLLg are are but anaLgtic, preferabLg not trivaLLg circuiar, eLse informativeness is sacrificed. R weakness of the entitLement account (hard to credit after Regan's attack upon it) is that it risks the Latter. Mhat is needed in pLace of entitLement, putative entitLement' expression, right , i.e. it a since doesn t a becomes an entitLement, or right, when vaLiditg is that appropriateLg estabLished, and so on. From this angLe, better something, is write in To vaLiditg. avoid a is sLightLg a reaL or supposed to amounts sometimes cLaim cLaim' these probLems with avaiiabie terminoiogg, there is a case for coining a rather immediate expression basic definition something, R vaLid in that something (after fiLL to into in M2) and avoid disappearance of the VaLid something, on to something , which couLd embrace Lots of items other than rights). term suitabie entitLement, titiement ; is which a or a is titiement aLLeged or putative mag or mag not be correctLg vaLidated, en-ed (cf. titLe *6. That which justifies or substantiates a cLaim; a aLLeged (e.g. vacuitg quant ificationaL recognised right', Const, with cLaimed .) R titiement is a transformation ground inf. of a or right; of to, suitabie hence, an of the thing in, deontic principLe, cat Led a susta in ing principLe. For instance, the form It is mostig permissibie [for X] to R , where suitabie, gieLds the titiement form There is a titiement [for X] R . Requirements for what conditions objects (Rs) and suitabiLitg, subjects (Xs) shouLd satisfg, are investigated in what foLLows. Before trging for a mark-3 definition of right (to), MiLL, as interpreted bg Regan (pp.270-1). MiLL titiements are to be vaLidated: depend on compLiance its independentLg estabLished' the vaLiditg of with (p.270), derivation from these correct moraL stack, the vaguer a right (to) moraL principLes us return a right, whose correct that he beiieves, takes up, must have been vaLiditg principLes. to as to how provides...guidance princ ip Les i.e. Let It is the removing the "moraL grounds" (cf. M2 and 11.7). Then in the mark-3 version, is a M3. VaLid titiement, from correct moraL principLes, appropriate) item. The LogicaL form is aLmost immediate: -13- to some (categoriaLLg H3S. premLsses correct worst prtncLpLes SustaLnLng prtnctpLe as to R vaLLd dertvatton cone Lus con There Ls a tttLement to R RssumLng evergthtng Ls Ln order Ln the scheme H3S, the inference to a rLght-to R Ls then LmmedLate, bg f13. The whoLe pattern Ls at once duLg reLatLvLsabLe to suLtabLe havers. Thus X has a rLght to R Lff X has a tttLement, vaLLd Trow correct woraL prtncLpLes, to R, somethtng that a suLtabLe reLatLvLsed derLvatLon wag estabLLsh. candLdates The fLLL to R provLde a famLLLar LLst, e.g. out freedom from unnecessarg sufferLng, respectfuL treatment, satLsfg sound LLfe, needs, support, rewarding work, a fatr go, etc.. Bg no means aLL of these candLdates can be vaLLdated, wLthout at Least severaL basLc restrLct the quaLLftcatLon, consLderabLe and categorg of subjects, L.e. the LogLcaL sort of Ltem that can have the purported tttLement. Such a scheme, as f13S not (whLLe entLretg wLthout adequate eLaborated notLon of tLtLement) both enabLes further features of and revests much about rtghts. derLved important addttLon to the deftnLtLon of ought to protect can hoLders, be regards as correct moraL rLght , of a requLrement and therefore rLghts, to Lnsure protectLon, dLffuse correLatLve dutLes 3pptg prtncLpLes, to Ls no doubt Ls thus a consequentLaL over vaLLd characterLstLc poLnt of R tLtLements. as socLetLes Lt transmLt uphoLd, feature. SLmLLarLg such obLLgatLons to uphoLd rLghts are not feature from thetr character. In parttcuLar, the FeLnberg-Regan cLaLm-agaLnst component of thetr proposed anaLgsts Ls not part of the meanLng of that soctetg that that reLevant soctettes ought to part of the deftnLtLon of rLghts, but a LogLcaLLg emergent dertvatLve be separated as a consequence; Lt Ls not (as uphoLd them. But such functors, as obLLgatLon to derLvatLons; to rtghts In the fLrst pLace, Lt shows that HLLLs dLcttonarg defLnLtLons atso LndLcate) a deftntng feature. For true duLg 3 rLght, but somethtng foLLows from the prtncLpLes sustatntng a rLght to somethtng. For Lnstance, Lf Lt Ls generaLLg permtsstbLe to LLve others, free from unnecessarg suffering then moraL agents are therebg prohtbLted from causing unnecessarg sufferLng; -14- and prohLbLtLon the functor Ls transnLtted the down cLaLn-agaLnst certain, tgpLcaLLg unspecLfLed, norat agents R derLvatLon.^ Ls consequentLaL a feature of vaLLd tLtLenents to, transnLtted fron the sustaLnLng noraL prLncLpLe. (ThLs Ls whg Regan can aLwags easLLg nanage to fLLL out a cLaLn-agaLnst forn where a McCLoskeg ent Lt Lenent can be estabLLshed; see RR p.231). SecondLg, the schene and defLnLtLon nake Lt evLdent that seLf-evLdent puretg or rLghts. axLonatLc a aLwags defence It foLLows, then, that ang theorg rLghts bg reference to such derLvatLons. cLaLns are no For ang rLght that stands up, that connands the tLtte, has a vaLLd derLvatLon. Rnd there Ls Lags there of that seLf-evLdent rLghts (such as FIcCLoskeg s), or axLonatLc rLghts to (such as DworkLn's), and ang decLaratLons, constLtuttons or bLLL of rLghts (such as that RnerLcan) the announces seLf-evLdent rLghts, Ls nLstaken. RLghts are aLwags derLvatLve fron other parts of an ethLcaL sgsten. ThLrdLg, the theorg shows dLrectLg the "derLvatLve character" of rLghts, and hetps to LndLcate the extent of theLr eLLnLnabLLLtg. For Lf rLghts are ever to be estabLLshed, then there nust, Ln the end, be correct noraL prLncLpLes, as there are, fron whLch tLtLenents do derLve. Thus a requLrenent of ground hoLds, are rLghts and generated fron other noraL prLncLpLes, Ln partLcuLar those of pernLssLon and obLLgatLon. RLghts are derLvatLve, not Ln the sense that there Ls a precLse recLpe for transLatLng rLghts dLscourse out - ang adequate transLatLon renaLns wLthLn the rLghts cLrcLe, of entLtLenent, cLaLns, etc. - but Ln the derLvatLonaL sense, that theg derLve fron another part of the deontLc area, that argunents and JustLfLcatLons for then go back to deontLc prLncLpLes. Because of theLr nuLtLpLg derLvatLve character, rLghts are dLspensLbLe after a fashLon, and at sone cost. So theg envLronnentaL ethLcaL enterprLses. not are But Ln essentLaL absoLuteLg a strongLg for LndLvLduaLLstLc rLghts-orLented socLetg, such as the USR, where rLghts notLons (and partLcuLarLg LndLvLduaL propertg notLons) are taken verg serLousLg, Lt Ls a snart strategg to nake heavg use of then, after the node of Regan. EnvLronnentaL posLtLons can do thLs aLso, bg derLvLng approprLate tLtLenents. RLghts are not nereLg derLvatLve, because, for Lnstance, of the force theg are accorded and the rotes theg can pLag when adnLtted. Rs RnerLcan wrLters stress, rLghts are anong the weLghtLest of others (hence the Lnportance Ln a noraL consLderatLons, whLch noraL or evLronnentaL cause of obtaLnLng rLghts accredLtatLon). RLghts certaLnLg have Lnportant protectLve and rotes, of Ln persuasLve so Lnsurance sheLterLng Ltens fron powerfuL actors and Lnterests. For those sorts prLncLpLes, and truno on. argunentatLve reasons too, Lnputed rLghts are Lnportant Ln reLnforcLng gettLng others to take Ltens serLousLg, to treat then decentLg, Ln The socLaL advantages LnstLtutLonaLLsatLon of rLghts accordLngLg offers not to be taken LLghtLg or abandoned. For these sorts of reasons, too, rLghts are not superfLuous (as Freg Ls LncLLned to suggest: -15- he aLso incLined to suggest, not aLtogether consistentLg, that there aren t ang is woraL rtghts, p.7, p.17). Granted that for Mang purposes we can proceed back Lt ts not a consequence that Me prtnctpLes froM which rtghts derive; stLLL, the can get a Long as weLL without theM, stLLL Less that there potnt no ts advantage or Set-theorettctans can get a Long without nunbers; woMen can get theM. to to aLong wtthout thetr bras, soMe of theM teLL us; nucLear reactors can get aLong wtthout doubLe shteLdtng, so Russ Lan experts used to teLL us. R fourth set of consequences of the rtghts package offered Ls that there Ls no basts for various restrtcttons wtdetg tMposed upon the having senttence, tnterest, as such etc. (a rather now rtghts, of faniLiar test). Constder tnterests ftrst, stnee an "tnterests" restr Let Lon on rights-havers Ls pervasive. Nothtng Ln the deftnttton and dertvatton schene gtven, or Ln Ln the Ln suttabLLLtg requtreMents). Yet a cruciaL theg coutd be incorporated, Ln defLntttons McCLoskeg, MiLL, ...), requtres such tnterests (though (OED, vLctnttg other preMtss the issue of whether things other than persons, aninats especiaLLg, can have rights Links rights-hoLding with interest. R tgpicaL bridge princLpLe is RI. OnLg iteMs which (can) have MoraL rights (cf. Freg, p.5). Rs Freg RI is observes, not obvious (he Later appLies a strong forM of RI, without 3ngthing Much in the wag of argunent, nonetheiess), and has had Mang with notabtg rivaLs, interests repLaced bg other candidates put up for gaining MoraL standing (rationaLitg, Language, sentience, etc. - the saMe tiresoMe List).^ How then does the interest requireMent, RI, gain its wide accreditation and grip? For an astonishing series of bad reasons (as FreedMan Ln effect brings out), 1) inc Lud ing: we Usage; speak of Ltens Lacking interests (individuaLitg, etc.) as don't possessing rights (thus Ln effect McCLoskeg). and non-usage to has be backed In fact we do, bg other consideration if arbitrariness and prejudice are to be avoided (FreedMan pp. 160-1). 2) RbgsMaL anaigses, such as TooLeg s anaLgsis of X has a right to R as to refrain fron actions that wouLd deprive hiM (again dissected bg FreedMan p.161 ff.)^ it of and coupied 3) Mistaken thenes, such as Feinberg s (drawn fron McCLoskeg) that protection of an interest, and hence [it is ciaiMed] for right it cLaiM). Must have Nothing characteristicaLLg an interest however requires afford (FreedMan, is that reasoning a right is a sonething to a have p.16^., who upsets the inferred the protection rights that of an interest; as far as the Meaning of goes it can be of a thing or a sgsteM. t*) exercising roughig if R desires X, then others are under a prina-facie obLLgation with sgnongnous have; others and Confusion of having right with right a a right (pp.162-3), or even with being abLe to cLain a right. Though these are evidentLg different, and entaitMents froM having to exercising or to cLaining evidentLg faiL, such confLations are encouraged bg easg but unwarranted transition, such as those froM having a cLaiM to Making or being abLe to Make a cLain. But, to reiterate, rights have nothing highig intiMate -16- to do with the Mak Lng bg c La LMS of a hoLder (though no doubt an art Lou Late Maker of cLaLMS hoLds soMe advantage Ln achLevLng Lts and others cLaLns). R creature or LteM wLth cLaLMS Mag have no abLLLtg or coMpetence to Make or present theM; or be the sort of thLng that can. ^a) ContractLons of rLghts to a subcLass of rLghts, such as exercLsabLe rLghts, Lndeed Lnterest-protectLng rLghts, accountabLe rLghts, etc. Then conatLve requLreMents do foLLow (e.g. what has an exercLsabLe rLght Must presunabLg at sone stage be suLtabLg aLLve and capabLe but reLevant actLvLtg), requLreMents foLLow froM the subcLassLfLcatLon LnvoLved, not froM the such notLon of rLght. of For Lnstance, the Lnterest-protectLng aspect of tnterest-protecttng rLghts foLLows froM the Lnterest-protectLng restrLctLon, not froM the notLon of rLghts, whLch Mag serve to protect thLngs LackLng interests (especLaLLg under chauvLnLstLcaLLg-favoured hLgh redefLnLtLons of Lnterests). R reLated cLuster of poLnts appLLes to attenpts to rLghts restrLct to persons or to LndLvLduaLs, atteMpts aLso tgpLcaLLg underpLnned bg the assuMptton that what has or can have rLghts Must have Lnterests, or desLres, or a suLtabLe conatLve LLfe, or whatever. But nothLng Ln the notLon of rLghts restrLcts rLghts to persons, or to LndLvLduaLs, or persons" Ln a generous LegaL sense; nothLng restrLcts theM to LndLvLduaLs and "persons". RLL these restr Let Lons on rLght-hoLders are Lnposed, wLthout Much or suffLcLent justLfLcatLon, usuaLLg for LdeoLogLcaL reasons, such as bLockLng LegLtLMate cLaLMS on behaLf of daMaged dLsadvantaqe LteMs or sgsteMs, MerLtLng protect Lon. or §3. and rebuiLding environMentaLLg. the rLghts vLew Deconstructing Most iMportant, Regan's sharp LiMitation of rLghts LndLvLduaL to Consider, a subjects, LLMLtatLon whLch has a Most daMaging effect on the abLLLtg of hLs rLghts vLew to cope decentLg spec Les, concernLng rare 3nd endangered (e.g. Regan s pp.395-6). prob Lens of our tines, such as those envLronnentaL Major wLth forest does restrLctLon ecosgsteMs, wLLderness, foLLow froM not even etc. hLs own defLnLtLon of a rLght, as a vaLLd ciaiM. Rather the restrLctLon Ls progressLveLg LnfLLtrated, as postuLates the concerning are eLaborated. It is not rights uniforMig inf titrated (and in other work Rgan appears to abandon restrictions to individuaLs, e.g. HP, p.32). For instance at a cLosing stage (in p.39S) RR, a arguMent against priviLeged status for rare or endangered species begins, brief because paradigMatic right-hoLders are individuaLs (In sgLLogistic extended IndividuaLs forM the arguMents runs: ParadigM3tic right-hoLders are individuaLs. not acquire ang further rights if theg beLong to rare or endangered species. do Therefore, paradigMatic right-hoLders do not so acquire further rights. So the rights view does not acknow Ledge ang priviLeged MoraL status on the part of rare endangered or species right-hoLders needn t be individuaLs, aniMais.) of so The restricted beginning after aLL, onLg the species (with a if are paradigMs MoraL the about or MeMbers species e.g., as Hutiean entities, certaintg then treated, individuaLs, at Least BoodnanesqLg). But earLier Regan view as Look undercutting the brief argunent. For siMpig consider sone further non-paradignatic right-hoLders, such as endangered species theiisetves. it Makes of announces, rights The Species are not individuaLs, and the rights view does not recognise the MoraL rights of species to is view 3ngthing rights individuaLs. (p.3S9). Thus individuaLs, whatever theg are (no characterisation is actuaLLg offered), are not MereLg the right-hoLders; paradigMatic theg right-hoLders. The More conciiiatorg paradigMatic Line gives wag to the exhaust iron-fisted thene of (p.361), according the to aLLeged individuaListic nature of MoraL rights which the notion of MoraL rights cannot be neaningfuLLg appiied other than to individuaLs (p.36I). Rs far as evergdag, MoraL and LegaL usage goes this just isn t true; there is no such categoriaL restriction. Uhg trg to iMpose such an iMpLausibLe and environnentaLLg daMaginq atoMistic restriction on a rights view? Or, siMiLarLg, on a MoraL standing view? EMending the brief arguMent awag froM anti-environMentaL ends indicates whg. a rebuiit rights view, an individuaL Mag acquire More rights, and warrant More protection, bg be Longing to an endangered group, in virtue of princ ip Les such as that significant endangered species ought to be protected. creatures wouLd hoLd different But then different rights, contradicting Regan's assuMption that aLL aniMaLs are equaL* (p.395) - at Least in rights heid, this, On but as a Matter of definition) in and basis (the of inherent vaLue'. Here is the source of the troubLe, of individuaListic restrictions, not the basic account but the adjoined equaLitg assuMptions. -18- of rights, restriction to individuats Ls not just an optionaL extra Ln Regan s The package, that can simpig be pee Led off. rLghts appt LeatLons of super-imposed theorg, the but Ls essentLaL wLth for the given coherence a super-individuaL, such as a specLes, If postuLates. equaLLtg hetd rLghts on an equaL basts It Ls requLred not ontg Ln major Lt, composLng LndLvLduaLs the then the wouLd both have more rLghts than Lts LndLvLduaLs (those of aLL super-individuaL Lts components) and the same rLghts (cf.DE on bLocentrLc egaLitarianism; DC, Furthermore, equaLLtg assumptLons are verg heavLLg depLoged Ln foLLowing p.3S). through LmpLLcatLons of the LndLvLduaL rLghts view, where dLfferentLaL treatment of different sorts of creatures Ls repeatedLg ruLed out bg appeats to equaLLtg. IntegraL as equaLLtg assumptLons are to Regan s LndLvLduaL-rLghts view, theg are neLther part of more ordLnarg ref Leet Lons on rLghts nor part of what Ls meant bg rLghts, but addLtLonat postuLates. Theg can accordLngLg be removed, and deconstructLon on of the rLghts exactLg view thLs Ls EquaLLtg done. assumptLons concernLng moraL rLghts are supposed, Ln the fLrst pLace, to from dLrectLg dLstLnguLshLng moraL rLghts, for Lnstance unLversaLLtg features absoLute are quaLLt Les, theg do Ls aspect ref Leets and equaLLtg features (p.267). But aLL thLs "equaLLtg rLghts foLLow that (p.368). It does not come Ln degrees not foLLow that one Ltem cannot have more rLghts than another (because, e.g., of Ltems the sort of thLng Lt Ls), or therefore that aLL bund Les equaL that have have rLghts of (even baste) rLghts. Nor does equaLLtg of basLc rLghts foLLow from unLversaLLtg requLrements, but ontg a certain Ln LmpartLaLLtg treatment (often confused however wLth egatttartanLsm). equaLLtg NeLther nor assumptLons LndLvLduaLLstLc restrtctLons emerge then; and Ln fact theg do not fLgure eLsewhere Ln the anaLgsLs of rLghts To them fend we have to foLLow gLven. the text past the anaLgsLs, through to the LntroductLon of the fundamentaL respect prtncLpLe and the rLght respectfuL to treatment (p.277 ff.), where both equaLLtg and LndLvLduaLLtg enter Ln a bLg wag, both beLng imported parts of the theorg of Lnherent vaLue (and assocLated as justLce prLncLpLe) from a previous chapter. For what Ls rLght those of who have argued Ls basic the Lnherent vaLue to... respectfuL treatment (p.277), where Lnherent vaLue Ls bg def Ln Lt Lon confLned to LndLvLduaLs and somethLng aLL suLtabLg conatLve LndLvLduaLs (those subject-of-a-Life) have equaLLg. ConsLder subjects' vaLue as - what we LL caLL Lnherent LndLvLduaLs vaLue. ... aLL who have Lnherent vaLue have Lt equaLLg p.23S ff.). (pp p.37; Inherent vaLue Ls thus a theoretLcaL notLon, conforming sLmLLarLg to HR various postuLates, notabLg LndLvLduaLLtg and equaLLtg. ObviousLg the theorg of Lnherent vaLue can be varied, pLace of Lnherent vaLue, LndLvLduaL as Regan effectiveLg admits (p.362). Consider, then, Ln LnLtLaL or connate vaLue, X, or not, as foLLows: the vaLue of X, defined, for ang Ltem if ang, as an Ltem (and not as a mere receptacLe). In pLace of the equaLitg postuLated for Lnherent vaLue, Lt assumed that, for Ls ang X and Y of the same ethicaL tgpe, X and Y have the came -17- connate vaLue. Then, white connate vaLue Ls not verg Mett characterised, Ls Lt as adequateLg specified as Lnherent V3tue, and can carrg Lts work-Load. showing Before that Let s Look at differences, and Limitations, of the notion. Mhite inherent vaLue is an aLL-or-nothing (certain affairs individual tgpes have Lt, nothing eLse does, but has zero vaLue), connate vaLue Ls not. Not that have (non-zero) connate vaLue need have equaL positive vaLue or tgpes aLL positive vaLue at aLL. DeviLs, certainLg if theg existed, wouLd negative vaLue connate disboLicainess, if (their ontoLogicaL no nonexistence proofs objects are to be beLLeved.) Connate doubt have decidedLg to adding their the existence of top connate vaLue of are vaLues somewhat thus initiaL Like LeveLs of perfection. Connate vaLue Ls, Like inherent vaLue properLg understood, at an best initiaL assignment. The assignments Like those of initiaL are probabiLLtg under a principLe of indifference (particuLarLg vaLue; connate out themseLves presumptive those of inherent vaLue invoLves a further tgpoLogg). UntiL actors, objects, sort their bg initiaL Life-stgLes, can which vaLue, then intrinsic vaLue gets cLarified; compare a be theg states worLd-Lines, posteriori a diminished as or increased receive probabiLLtg assignments. Thus too connate vaLue is not aLL that is taken into account in discerning moraL and so Ln deriving rights. Further vaLue-making or vaiue-detracting prtncLpLes, features of things which affect intrinsic vaLue are aLso reLevant. 0 criticaL question is whether connate vaLue can serve to carrg enough (not aLL, of course) of the requisite argument; in particuLar, that to a respect principLe. appears Examination to show that it can, at Least to this extent: insofar as the argument (pp.277-9) based on respectfuL fact, Ln individuat bg to item substitute connate made is principLe, principLe as aLso to repLace required, nameig resuLts defence of the modified, succeeds. It does, as inspection of the bg shows, where the the same substitutions as before. The modified principLe Looks near-anaLgtic: Ue are to treat those items which have connate that respect their connate vaLue (pp.2t+8). The modified respect wags in and presupposed argument (pp.258-60) for the modified respect principLe soon vaLue right throughout, and to verifg bg inspection that aLL detaiLs that evergthing does work as weLL, given that the modified the features of moraL rights. But it is straightforward to verifg concerning respect to inherent for work just as weLL. Minor use of some points aireadg those vaLue succeeds, so does that based instead on connate vaLue. It treatment suffices, inherent principLe appLies of course to species and sgstems, as weLL as for individuaLs, and so does the expanded right to respectfuL treatment. Much of the remainder of Regan's text can be simiLarLg reinterpreted, but again bg no means aLL.15 (Limitations of space, time, and energg preciude a fuLLer de- and re-construction). Some initiaL indication onLg of the expanded environmentaL rights theorg offered. But it which repLaces the moraL rights view wiLL be is important to observe right awag, that mang of the goats of -20- the anLmaL rights Movement, as Regan conceives Lt Largetg intact under the expanded rLghts theorg (e.g. can PP,p.32), perhaps (minus remain totaLitg the cLaims), for instance, the theme of aboLition of the use of animats Ln scLence. But not aLL the further postulates of Regan's rLghts view remain intact, most notabLg that of vegetarianism, which Ls not a consequence of themes of rLghts movement. Nonethe Less? animat the rLghts view hotds that the LndLvLduaL h3s a dutg to Lead a vegetarian Mag of LLfe supererogatorg; Lt (p.351,p.3^.6) to thLs permLssLbLe Ls vegetarianism Ls (p.39!+); But (p.3^6). obLLgatorg' cone Lus Lon the appear to most the arguments the not Ls Lt that Ls estab LLsh not to consume the products of commercLaL animat agrLcuLture (LncLudLng Since the anLmaL Lndustrg routLneLg presumabLg eggs and pureLg bread sausages). vLoLates the rLghts of these anLmaLs, for the reasons Ls Lt given, wrong to purchase Lts products. That Ls whg, on the rLghts view, vegetarLanLsm Ls moraLLg obLLgatorg, (p.3SI,LtaLLs added). Rs an argument to vegetarLanLsm (a vegetarLan beLng, one who abstaLns from anLmaL food, and LLves on veqatabLe food, and, '16 ----usuaLLg eggs, mitk, etc ), the argument Ls a major nonsequLtur (Likewise the argument, p.3^.6)^\ For there are mang wags of obtaLnLng anLmaL food whLch do not LnvoLve commercLaL anLmaL agrLcuLture or commercLaL practLces (the no proper of focus Regan's sLnce attach, such practLces tgpLcaLLg dLsrespectfuL and insensitive use and rLghts vLoLatLons). Examp Les of practLces huntLng-gatherLng LLfestgLes, of doubt Lead LncLude to the the gardenLng cuLtures of the Pie Lanes La and PoLgnesia, of subsLstence farmLng and of some of the new communes. Regan's further argument (Lt wouLd be unfaLr to stick hLm wLth the awfuL page 3nd 351 with eatLng dogs) commLts hLm, moreover, to the moraL LmproprLetg of (as these extensive tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes weLL as mtnor ones), newfangLed Lnsofar as theg LnvoLve the kiLLLng of pLgs and fLsh and occasLonaL wLLdLLfe and so R chLef reason gLven Ls that on. end theLr LLves are brought to an untLmeLg antmaLs' (e.g. p.39^.). But suppose, to dLspose fLrst of strLct tLme has come, vegetarLanLsm, that or, more straLghtforwardLg, that theg are aLreadg dead. Mhat precLudes respectfuL use? Rn expanded rLghts theorg does not entaLL vegetarLanLsm - ang more connected theorLes, such as aLL that consLderatLon, or rLvaL theorLes such as restrLctLons, wLthout further Large sent Lent utLLLtarLanLsm, are Longer no sentient or entaLL moraL deserve such dLetarg assumptLons. For there are mang tgpes of circumstance where Lt Ls perfectLg permLssLbLe to which beLngs than eat dead creatures, things which wLLL not now attain sentience (as DC exp Lains and argues). The more probLematic area Ls not that of consuming what is aLreadg dead, but of causing prematureLg, Ln order death (or, to a Lesser extent, Letting die) to achieve that option or, to gieLd it as a bg-product. For this appears to infringe rights to Life and LLveLihood and to vioLate moraL standing of creatures interfered with so drasticaLLg. Rppears to. For even ethicaL theorLes that now concede various rLghts to -21- anLmaLs bauLk anLmaLs. Rnd at for sone patLents, Papuans the rLghts extensive to LLfe and LLveLhood to own vLew provLdes, Ln the categorLaL dLstLnctLon between Regan's noraL agents and moraL treatment, such admLttLng ground of treatment dLfferentLaL further and pLgs, a peopLe dLstLnctLon Ln whLch Regan hLmseLf takes refuge when pressed. Regan s dLfferentLaL justLfgLng for So how tLght Ls Ln partLcuLar when reconsLdered as appLgLng agaLnst arguMent, tradLtLonaL LLfestgLes rather than agaLnst modern commercLaL practLces? The buLk of the crucLaL argument ff.) dLd not treat resources. Nor dLd theg (p.3{+^); receptacLes does sLmpLg cuLtures tradLtLonaL renewabLe (p.3t*3 appLg. not anLmaLs just as resources, stLLL Less as as anLmaLs treat Lnstruments mere excLude some kLLLLng of anLmaLs - or do theg? It wouLd seem that of tradLtLonaL unLLke peopLes, provLsLon (p.3t*3), are prLncLpLe dubLous admLtted commercLaL under derLved supposedLg who farmers Regan's from prLncLpLe LLbertg respect prLncLpLe, p.332). R the LncLudLng fundumentaL respect prLncLpLe LtseLf. On a straLght readLng requLres whLch that treatment creatures of vaLue Lnherent are however Some excLuded. Ls not of for prLncLpLe, the countervaLLLng respectfuL No excLuded. LnfrLnged because a creature of Lnher- nt vaLue persLst, come what mag. There use Ls respectfuL of the kLnd of vatue theg have (p.277), such uses of anLmaLs are not wLth a (p.331, stgLe of better tradLtLonaL practLces Ls excLuded under the more the Ln practLces the vLoLate the respect crLtLcaL quest Lon Ls whether the respectfuL use of anLmaLs, food, Papua, pLgs before kLLLLng. CarefuL, respectfuL practLces do not exchanged often or consLder the respectfuL treatment of mang hunter-gatherer groups Ln aborLgLnaL RustraLLa, or the practLces of gardenLng peopLes Ln who Large and Bg does rLghts are therebg a acquLre not Ln LndLctLons Lnterference rLght text Regan s to (and eLsewhere Ln hLs "preservatLon prLncLpLe") whLch wouLd go far towards sustaLnLng the vegetarLan concLusLons he faLLs to reach, and therebg to ruLLng tradLtLonaL the bLoconatLvLst assumptLons that Lt Ls LLfestgLes LnadmLssLbLe. Such are aLwags wrong to destrog LLfe (verg specLat cLrcumstances apart perhaps), that Lt Ls never permLssLbLe to reduce vaLue catastrophLcaLLg the wag that LLfe anLmaLs brLnqtrg to an untLMeLg end does. But Ln fact Regan does not endorse such prLncLpLes, strongLg rejectLng prLncLpLes LLke the pacLfLst prLncLpLe use or harmfuL destructLve wLth LncompatLbLe bLoconatLvLst the vLoLence "LLbertg" assumptLons, no (p.287); prLncLpLes matter as Lnterpreted. dLffLcuLt how wouLd maxLMLae never to bLoconatLvLsm appears Lndeed to NonetheLess, LLve bg, are hLghLg appeaLLng to mang ethLcaL pacesetters and theorg desLgners, especLaLLg who an to mang vaLue. But theg throw the whoLe naturaL order Lnto ethLcaL dLsorder; predatLon, fuLL terrLtorLaL defence and mang other commonpLace naturaL happenLngs are thrown Lnto ethLcaL doubt or MorLd magbe a Ls not verg rendered LnadmLssLbLe. ilagbe The RequLred the wag Lt surprLsLngLg Ls (LesLLe's thesLs) after aLL; dLfferent predator-free sLn-eradLcated RequLred, where V3tue j^s maxLmLzed? -22- post-naturaL worLd Ls $4.' Ti'tt'eMsnts and substantiaL prob tews. tivehood: and predation, territoriatitg other the dust that status-quo-supporting phiiosophers Despite have raised, there is no doubt, tooking through the ctoud, but that * Rnimats have various interests, mang of then of the human as those of instance, sustenance, survivat, sex, species, sheiter (see for animats, sort sane e.g. RR, PR). * Rnimats have various For exampte, theg have, in the same wag that rights. humans do, a right to iive free from unnecessarg suffering, and from excessive interference. these ciaims are substantiaitg independent (having interests is Logicaitg Mhite neither necessarg nor sufficient significant connections, inasmuch rights), having for as rights are nonethetess protect permissibie there to serve worthwhiie interests which more powerfui operators, such de-foresters, as mag otherwise override or ignore. There is no doubt, furthermore, that present human practices sgstematicaLLg infringe animai rights, especiatig those tied to their interests. For exampie, much animai suffering. causes experimentation unnecessarg quite there is a powerfui case for changing these practices (compare Thus and contrast Freg p.t*.), a case both enhanced, and easier obtain to positive action upon, bg the due admission of relevant rights. Rttainment of the sorts of sociai protection the widespread admission of rights can iead to shouid not be underestimated, in the wag it is bg utiiitarians and anti-moraiists. Granted animats have rights, some of them higher humans rights nohumans, widespread a have, main animats phenomenon of predation, a par with those that question (pace Freg) concerns which outstanding particutartg, on have. Because especiatig of the essential to the continued tivetihood of mang creatures, the issue can took tike an exceedingtg difficult one (and one comes to grief upon). There are undoubtedtg serious confticts of interest Regan induced through the phenomenon, some of them unavoidable as when a herbivore s interest in continued existence ctashes with a carnivore s interest in continued sustenance, avoidabte others as in human Predation is not of course the ontg source of territoriatitg, slaughter of whates and dotphins. serious conflict of interests; for instance, C3n atso iead to serious encounters, particutartg in situations of expanding poputations (thus too the issues are connected). Such matters as predation, territoriatitg and population been converted into increase serious prob terns bg mistaken atomistic views of vaiue and associated excessive ciaims as to rights. Removing these defective the but integral part much of atomistic non-utititarian positions such as Regan's, hotds that vaiue (or utititg) is a feature, at bottom, of atomistic as themes probtematic. The vatue theorg involved, tgpified bg utilitarianism reduces an have individuats, that those items items such (constituting the base ctass) have a fixed -23- (equaL) vaLue whLLe theg persist, which Ls not substitutibLe for and that vaLues (derived) Ls ecosystems, of whaLes additive an simpLy functLon the of aLLenabLe, such structures, organised and or atoms as Lt. within CharacteristicaLLg aLso theses of maximization and preservatLon of present vaLue are incorporated Lnto the theorg. On such assumptions, predatLon and LnvoLve a reductLon Ln vaLue, at Least Ln the shorter tern, and so a infringing path, and maximization preservatLon enhances the prob Lens bg postuLating a rLght to has that LndLvLduaL (Lnherent) LnLtLaL to everg simiLarLy woraL exLstence (and vaLue suboptimaL The rights view desLderata. contLnued Like the considerabLLitg posLtLons add to the dLffLcuLtLes). But the assumptions LnvoLved shouLd be removed. Both the wag the probLems are generated fron the assumptions, and the reasons for revising the vaLue eLsewhere than which are wore LncLude sun the of predators, theLr LndLvLduaL escaLation The the of theg though components, be hLghLg vaLuabLe Ln theLr own rLght, wLth mag LLves of herbLvores substituted for wLthtn vaLue. detaLL Ln the Breen SerLes, especLaLLg OC ^). Host important, ecosystems, (Ln tgpLcaLLg expLaLned are assumptions, the through probLems wLthout system, reductLon of theorLes deserves, rights however, some eLaboratLon. R serLous cLash of Lnterest, as between carnLvores and herbLvores, fortunateLg does not therebg Lnduce an imcompatibLLLtg rLghts, of unLess too Lnterests are eievated to rLghts. But just thLs appears to happen when the many extensLve (but not LnvarLabLe) Lnterests of LLvLng creatures exLst are sharpLg upgraded to unquaLLfLed rLghts to LLfe (a Ln contLnuLng mistaken to eLevatLon that Ls common Ln ethLcaL thought). The rLght to LLfe of a success Lon of gnus Ls LnfrLnged bg LLon whLch aLso has a rLght to sustenance to sustaLn Lts LLfe. a MLth the advance of technoLogg Lt wouLd now be possLbLe cases of to Lnterfere some Ln predatLon, e.g. that of the remaLnLng Large carnLvores, to uphoLd gnu rLghts , bg switchLng the carnLvores to an appropriate vegetarian dLet (and, to avoLd cuLLLng, our spLended contraceptLve technoLogg couLd be appLLed hoLd to gnu popuLatLon Ln check). But to deaL wLth aLL cases of predatLon and assocLated issues in these bizarre sorts of wags Ls not onig practicaLLg LmpossLbLe; but at further, such extensLve interference with naturaL ecosgstems is LtseLf, verg Least, dubiousLg permissibLe. High-tech vegetarLan-stgLe resoLutLons of probLems of predatLon, territoriaLitg and so on, are On contrary, the virtuaLLy aLL the remaining naturaL radicaLLg unsatisfactory. systems containing Large carnLvores shouLd be Left substantiaLLg intact or restored towards their naturaL states. These ecosystems ought to persist, and have a Can t an rights to, right fLourishing LnvoLves reguLar vioLation of aLLeged absoLute though their rLghts to Life. to LLfe be Left intact (L.e. mereLg moraLLg extended from unauthentic human setting), and the probLems skirted around? Rfter aLL, some confLict, and inconsistency even, of rights, obLigations and so on, is inevitabLe, and can be LogLcaLLg Lived with in these Latter paraconsistent dags. Some can, but not too much. ConfLict shouLd be confined to exceptionaL (often -24- significant) sorts of cases. In these terns, bg accommodated Mag of up confLLct sgstematic reguLar such confLLct anatogous S3tisfactoriig It Ls too reguLar, deontLc does sgstem not because theg remove part of the poLnt of deontLc cases, structures: for then much too much rather not of rLghts or prLncLpLes. confLLet sgstematic and commonpLace. R sufficientLg effLcLent muLtipLg is predatton Ls time cases. R confLLct, repuzziing spent undermines MhLch fash Lon to deaL wLth sattsfactorg more redecLdLng and the point and force of prLncLpLes, is revision of principLe. Furthermore, a confLLct of rights approach (no more than a confLLct of vaLues approach: right. feeL doesn't p.33) DC, at aLL Lion Ls not acting MrongLg or infringing rights MhoLesaLe, everg Meek R Mhen it mag kLLL an anteLope or other creature. R aLternative, atreadg indicated, consists then in Minding in superior excessive titLement concessions, so as to avoid extensive confLLct. R strong and Legitimate interest in a continuing LiveLihood to right does not an give unquaLified Life, which can be conferred against associated predators. It affords onLg a defeasibLe right, which can be forfeited or Lapse. In these terms, a Lion that takes a Meaker aged gnu, taiLing or separated from a herd, does not vioLate Lts defeasibLe right to Life. The different. Mith situation their take chances. rights to Life are not predatorg is essentiaLLg not LLL-equipped or reck Less humans who put themseLves Ln or find LJeak, themseives in threatening situations, such as traveL humans animats or wiiderness If theg therebu Lose their Lives, their defeasibLe therebg or action highspeed infringed animats where (and defending their animats are territories LnvoLved, not shouid be HL id animats such as gnus are aLmost aiwags on Mitderness traveL, persecuted). except when imprisoned in zoos; theg properLg take their chances with naturaL predators. Rs pursuit of this approach suggests, a hetpfuL wag of coming with predation and Like issues happens, what grips is through zoning, or more generaLLg through bioregionaLLsm, which zones regions of the earth s surface what to and eisewhere. is protected, what Ls permissibie and right, Ln wiiderness can be significantLg different from that in urban areas. R tiger that moves of out a wiiderness to a supposedLg easier Life in a citg where incautious citizens are pLentifuL, cannot expect 3nd doesn t merit the same treatment as Lt did wiiderness, nameLg being Left LargeLg atone. Moreover, with bioregions big For wiiderness as Locus, Lt is much to think hoLLsticaLLg, easier predation as an LntegraL and significant part of such a rich naturaL the as to see structure rather than isoLated action of individuaLs without a further just ifg ing setting. (The adjustment of ethicaL principtes to regions, and Large communities, need invoLves no Loss of universaLizabLLitg; wiiderness is an appropriatetg generat notion, not get a proper name.) The action of carnivores (LncLuding traditionaL peoptes) in wiiderness areas, in taking preg conservativeLg, Ln defending their territories and so -25- on, LnvoLves no LtseLf Ln infringeMents of rLghts then, whether what Ls taken Ls huMan or not (Ls "repL3cabLe" or not). There Ls Moreover no need for Lnstance Lf a carnLvore had coMsuMed a career. that tresspassLng Darwin Ln earLg hLs brash utLLLtarLan wouLd LnsLst, or pretend, that, when aLL the a OnLg deng Lts frequent vioLence and death, nag LnvoLve Loss of vaLue, as with predatLon, to undo-abLe cowputat tons are done, the sufferLng and Losses and repLacenents of sgsteMS, net vaLue of overaLL naturaL processes Ls aLwags approxtMattng naturaL MaxtMaLLtg. On the other stde, thought Lt wouLd be a supreMe technoLogtcaL opttMtst sgsteMS couLd perforw nearLg as sattsfactortLg, huMan-engtneered that even on a qutte Modest scaLe. HuMan breakdown, who efforts, whtch especLaLLg are prone to soMettMes Make soMe SMaLL iMproveMents around the edges; MostLg can theg reLg upon expottLng what Ls aLreadg there or nearbg. Rs a worktng ruLe, the More huMans interfere wLth naturaL processes, the More probLeMs the as there are and More thtngs go wrong. Med LeaL experience wLth intervention, even in Matters norMaLLg straightforward huMan chLLdbirth, provide weLL-docuMented ruLe at work. The chances of huMans iMproving, technicaLLg or the of evidence as MoraLLg, upon Nature Ln wLLderness areas Ls exceedLngLg sLight. To adapt one the ecoLogicaL Laws to of encapsuLate the working ruLe: Nature generaLLg does better than huMans. Its coroLLarg Ls: CurtaLL excessive huMan interference Ln naturaL regions. It does not Matter if, because of predation and the Like, vaLue a Lwags as poLiticaL high wickedness, evoLutionarg not it Might be. Mith the persistence of sin and prevaLence of as Ls copious reason for conjecturing that we do not there inhabit the best of possibLe worLds. Besides we 3re free to specuLate Long is process - that the no doubt a rather restricted, heaviLg interfered with, and verg hit and Miss business - did not turn out as perfectLg as Lt Might have. Major ecosgsteMs certainLg do not appear to have evoLved adapted in weLL wag a to (or anticipating, so to sag) the 3rrivai of Modern huMans with their enorMOUs destructive capacitg and wLLL to power. But, even apart froM the advent it is far froM cLear that Nature of such huMans, provides rather Nature satisizes (an adjustMent of ecoLogicaL an optiMat sgsteM; Law" argued for eLsewhere: see SM). The facts of satisization do not put Nature out of step with deontic best MoraLLtg, principLes. For deontic principLes aLso answer back eventuaLLg to sufficient LeveLs of vaLue, not to MaxiMaL consequences (see were with that vaLue SH). Even it be Maximized, obLigation certainLg does not require Lt. Predation can take a rightfuL pLace Ln such a satisizing environnent; naturaL sgsteMS which have evoLved with predation seeM to offer quite and often dazzLing, Lf LeveLs of vaLue. Richard SgLvan via Bungendore -26- for the adequate, RustraLia 2621 NOTES 1- For aLL that I an crLtLcaL of Much of that thought environmentaL Lt far of southern and western Rmerican schooLs, out fLows the surpasses the drearg and reactionary anti-environmentaL dross that emerges typLcaLLy the froM prestigious More universities Ln LndustrLaL north-eastern USR and British LLght-engLneerLng centres LLke Oxford. 2. May ThLs a strike MoraL as theorist aiMost cost/benefit ana Lysis of (mainstream) econoMics - as curious as a order in aLso and having reaL point - wouLd strike econoMists. But the cases are different. assessMents Cost/benefit depend on a vaLue theory of soMe (perhaps degenerate) sort, but not necessarily on MoraLity. 3- EntitLement to whom? On traditionaL views, and amounts what choice seLf-appointed chosen, (p.!*). makers entitLement a to in There are probiems according PP, to we free and rationaL use regarding of contexts, since entitLement moves in the these rights-circLe and items with m-s May Lack rights. The annuLar picture is open to the separate charges of being but a devious sort of moraL ex tens ion ism and of introducing or invoLving a moraL hierarchy, both of which set scenes for condemnation. But neither charge is justified in a form that wouLd do damage. MoraL notions are not extended, rather their proper significience ranges and catagoriaL features are investigated and put to principLed work. Rs to the matter of hierarchy, the dLvisions of ref Leets cLassification things in terms of such features, where theg appLy, as capacities and capabiiities. This wouLd yieLd a hierarchy these features ranked, which on the annuLar picture they are not. (Even if they were and a hierarchy aLL Not probiematic. resuLted, hierarchies are need that damaging, e.g. ciassificatoru ones, such as BioLogicaL divisions may oniy were when be. not be mereLy It is hierarchies serve to distribute, or become a means to, power or priviLege or favour, that theg warrant the criticism hierarchies have encountered. That criticism wouLd have deservedLy been directed at certain power hierarchies are of this sort.) -27- hierarchies; but not aLL UorrLes about LnstaLLLng a MoraL power hterarchg or pecktng order and accoMpangtng MoraL eLLtes are one reason whg sone philosophers an (west go qutteLg atong wLth eLLtes) operate wtth LMpoverLshed ethLcaL tgpotogg. For instance, a Mtsp Laced egaLLtartantsM appears both as deep ecoLogg, Ln bLo-con3ttvtsM 3nd Ln rLghts vLews such Ln where both Lnherent vaLue and the equaL basLc rLghts Regan's, Lt supports behave Ln an aLL-or-nothLng fash Lon. 5. StwLLar funng busLness Ls goLng on standLng vaLue-Ln-LtseLf wLth Freg, Ln equates who worst and proceeds to bound Lt (p.!+S), beLow, not bLocentrLcaLLg as Ln Goodpaster, but bg sentLence. ThLs part happens as coLLapse of a of wore wLdespread huwanLstLc utLLLtarLan Major ethtcaL dtsttnctLons, wLth rLghts as a further casuaLLtg. 6. PossLbLLLtg and forws of nonLnterference prLncLpLes probabtLLtg are basLc to the Ma Ln arguwents the to LMMoraLLtg of nucLear arrangements: see LiP. 7. But Fox has M3de a sustaLned - though now apparentLg parttaLLg repeated - attewpt to do so, tn hts crtttctsM of axtotogg. Such an attempt Ls bound to faLL. VaLues are baste and LnescapabLe (theg enter even Lnto truth cLatms). Thus, for Lnstance, a crtttctsM woraLLtg as Ln a generaL bad Lnstttutton, cost/beneftt record and, has wrought Much enMeshed whtch damage, Ls of has a poor thoroughtg Ln vaLue concerns. RntL-MoraLtsm depends on axLoLogg; Lt does not sustain and antt-axtoLogg. 8. UnLversaLLzabLLLtg Ls used Ln the text because Lt Ls famLLLar. But what are reaLLg Lwportant are LntersubstLtutLvLLg and reptaceMent prLncLpLes, whtch underLLe generaLLztbLLLtg and other features. 8. SoMe of opposttton and standard objeettons to rLghts taLk resuLt froM Mtsgutded ontoLogtcaL assuMpttons. For exaMpLe, Lt Ls aLteged that rLghts are verg curtous sorts of entctLes, untversaLs that sctence casts no LLght upon and does not need. RccordtngLg, prtncLpLe of such p3rstMong, as OccuM s weLL as provLdtng a pasttng such propertLes, such as betng objeettons of such crude LnstruMents as OccoM s razor: consutt JB, Lndex). Creatures have have a razor, such ent Lt Les shouLd be dLscarded. Object-theorg shortcLrcuLts (as bg derLvatLve rLghts; froM rLghts certaLn obLtgattons; but rLghts do not exLst, soMewhere, or at aLL. RLghts are LogtcaLLg weLL-enough behaved nonexLatent objects. -28- 10. The not Lon of right[sj, though -a coMparativetg Modern Ls one, a verg coMpLex one, sone of the conpLexLtg beLng ref Leoted Ln the 20 right' LLsted Ln the OED. Rn atteMpt to senses of the substantive brLng sone order and sgsteM to thLs coMptexLtg Ls Made Ln SN. RLthough the takes anaLgsis frow off one Ma Ln OED sense, the eLaboratLon wLLL Lead bg or through other connected 1.3 as whLch that MoraLLg just or due concerned Ls (as in LnvoLveMent activities); be no issues concerning opportunitg (as in rights to work) or LLbertg (as in rights state-iMposed such equitg or ... which is right-doing ). But there wiLL Main Ln wLth senses, not to in participate are priMariig issues for MoraL these actors. 11. reLevant or coMMunities to capabie or individuats within theM, i.e. he reguLarLg resorts to individualizing strategies. The status of iterated deontic princ ip Les invoLved in such exact arguMents can be Left open, e.g. whether OOC is entaLLed bg 00 is or further substantive principie which can be asserted when 00 a is. 13. Not aLL these substitutes are incoMpatibLe, fortunateLg for who Leaps to the cone Lus ion that sentience, beings and the "higher ... is an the fact that huMan aniMats have experiences or MentaL states the uLtiMate and fundaMentai basis of the ctaiM that theg (p.^3). No arguMent at aLL are possessors of MoraL rights than appeaL to (other is to be found for this ciatM, a authoritg) surprising OMission in an author who is fond of LaMbasting for Freg, faiLure suppig to others arguMents (e.g. p.7) - especiaLLg in the MereLg citing Light of his eartier reMarks that sentieneg as a criterion for the possession of MoraL rights neither shows that it is one nor even creates the presuMption that it is, ... untiL soMe respects are provided ... arguMents in these subsequent chapters, such arguMents are . Rs we shaLL see in scarce on the ground (p.33). lit- Too Leg s anaLgsis standard account substituting can "right of for desires , an wouLd Mark out onLg subcLass rights, of be upgraded, and brought into Line with (adopted to" Ln EE, p.176), chooses or wouLd chose . Even so Lt iMportant roughLg consequentiai exercisabLe criticisM teLLs against EE). -2?- feature rLghts (a of a siMLLar IS. Rn important exanpLe is the argunent which bg broken is concedLng to that vaLue, equat not p.33, PP aLL hunans, serLousLg genet LeaLLg defectLve and weLL-endowed contractuaLLg-capabLe, need have equat connate vaLue, and thus renoving the preniss. 16. London,1932). RecordLng to the Concise EngLLsh DLcttonarg (Onega, the But qutte not Ls natter not a reputation of sLnpLe, so vegetartantsn on the basts of the avaiLabititg of dead aninats decisive. carefuL definition, which wouLd however render nore R sone hunter-gathers (and even sone cannibats) vegetarians, is 'one who Lives whoLLg or principaLLg OED account, so upon the vegetabie a person who on principle abstains fron ang forn of aninaL foods; food, or at Least such as Ls obtained bg the direct destruction of Life'. 17. that not decisivetg support vegetartantsn, even inproved connerciat faming does UtLLitarianisn invoLving s Laugh ter and of so Regan correctLg contends (p.3S0 suns up his extensive aninats, argunent). Ln Rnd fact fLawed the case utititarian vegetartantsn Ls effectiveLg abandoned in the recent work for of one choice of of its Leading proponents, Singer (see DC, p.36). 13. sone Uhite such terntnoLogg distinction singuLarLg is unfortunate given the non-obsoiete patient . Most aninats are not patients. senses of the noun 13. the inportant, is For exanpLe, in a range of, adnittedLg difficuLt, confiict such as Lifeboat situations (p.32^,p.351), and nore inportant, as regards interspecies reL3tions (p.357 ff.). and threats to rabid foxes to the crunch; hunans aLwags outrank aninats. (So nuch for the then strict norat restrictions, grounded in ... inherent vaiue , the sane aLL and hunans (e.g. p.353). Despite his discLainers, Regan s egaLitarian princ ip Les ring hoLLow when Lt cones for cases, for subjects-of-a-LLfe, on the strength of which even carefuL and respectfuL defective farngard greater C3n practices vaLue assunption be p.3^.2). condenned, R is snuggLed into the rights view, seriousLg detracting fron its environnentaL depth (see DE, si). 20. On bioconativisn see CaLLicott; Leading ideas go back to -Jainisn. 21. Predation bg Large carnivores can conpared with hunan travet be usefuLLg, sporting and predation (no accident of -30- course) favourabig, accidents. UhiLe the nunber of kiLLings annuaLLg are of a siniLar order aninaL and of nagnitude, appears to invoLve rather Less suffertng and pstn. Rnd though reduct ton tn vatue tn the removat tt tnvotve may some of on-gotng ttves, tt atso offers some very constderabte compensattng ecosystemtc beneftts. REFERENCES J.B. A t Catttcott, On the tntrtnstc vatues of nonhuman spectes' tn The Preservatton of Spectes (e.d. B.G.Norton) Prtnceton Untverstty Press, 1386; pp.138-172. R. Dworktns, Taktng Rtghts Sertousty, Duckworth, London, 1377. J. Fetnberg, The rtghts of antmats and unborn generattons, tn Phttosophy and Envtronmentat Crtsts (e.d. M.J. Btackstone) Untverstty of Georgta Press; Rthens, 1371+, pp. 1+3-68. U. Fox, R postcrtpt on 2(1+) (1385) 17-23. deep ecotogy and tntrtnstc vatue , The Trumoeter The enttty-restrtctton of rights: Notes on a fashion tn ethtcs B. Freedman, Hetaphttosophy 12(1381) 153-168. R.G. Frey, Interests and Rtghts. The Case Rgatnst Rntmats, 1880. K.E. Goodpaster, 308-325. Ctarendon, Oxford, On betnq moratty constderabte , Journat of Phttosophy 75(1378) I. H tnckf uss, The Morat Soctety: Its Structure and Effects, rev used ve rs con, Untverstty of Queenstand, 1386. J. Lestte, Vatue and Extstence, Oxford, 1373. H.J. McCtoskey, Respect for humans morat rtghts versus maxtmtztng good tn Uttttty and Rtghts (e.d. R.6. Frey), Btackwett, Oxford, 1385 pp.121-136. C. Ptgden, Nthtttsm: a Defence, Ph.D Thests, LaTrobe Untverstty, 1385. E.B. PLuhar, The Justtftcatton for envtronmentat etttc , Envtronmentat Ethtcs 5(1383 )l+7-61. T. Regan, The Case for Rntmat Rtghts, Routtedge & Kegan Paut, London, 1383; to as HR. T. Regan, On the nature and posstbtttty of on envtronmentat ethtcs', Envtronmentat Ethtcs 3(1381) 13-31+; referred to as NP. J. Rodman, Theory and practtce tn the envtronnentat Movement: notes towards an -31- ecoiogg of experience', Ln The Search for Rbsotute VaLues Ln a Changing UorLd, InternationaL CuLturaL Foundation, New Yorh 1978, pp.1+5-56. J. Rodman, Ecoiogg sensibiLitg , in Ethics and the Environment (ed. D. Scherer and T. Rttig), Prentice HiLL, NJ, 1983, pp.88-92; reprinted in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.185-8. R. RoutLeg, RLLeged probLems in attributing beLiefs and intensionaiitg to animats , Inquirg 21+ (1981) 387-L17; referred to as PR. R. Rout Leg, In defence of cannibaLism. I. Tgpes of admissibte and LnadmissibLe cannibatism , Green Series, RSSS. RNU; referred to as DC. R. Rout Leg, Exp Loring Pie inong's JungLe and Begond, RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1979; referred to as JB. R. Rout Leg, Liar and Peace I On the ethics of Large-scaLe nucLear Mar and nucLear-deferrence and the poLiticaL faLL-out , Green Series, RSSS, RNU 1981+; referred to as UP. R. and V. Rout Leg, Human chauvinism and environmentaL ethics , in Environmental Ph i Losophg (e.d. D. Plannison and others) RSSS, RustraLian NationaL Universitg, 1980, pp.98-189; referred to as EE. ' 1 T. Rgan, The case for animaL rights' in VanDeVeer and Pierce, pp.32-39. % C.D. Stone, ShouLd Trees have Standing? Towards Legat Rights for NaturaL Objects Kaufmann, Los RLtos, 197!+. R. SgLvan, R critique of deep ecoiogg', 1+1(1985); referred to as DE. Radicatj^hiLosophg 1+0(1985) ana R. SgLvan, SuppLanting maximization, and other utiLitarian assumptions, in Western ethicai ideoiogg , Topci, 1986, to appear; referred to as SN. D. VanDeVeer and C. Pierce (e.ds), PeopLe, Penguins, and PLas tic Trees, UadsMorth, CaLLfornia, 1988; referred to as PP.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 20, Item 1: Draft of Moral matters matter - environmentally? Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft. Paper published, Sylvan R (1997) 'Do moral matters matter- environmentally?', Between the species, 3(4):163-176. https://doi.org/10.15368/bts.1987v3n4.2 Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 20, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:dde401f">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:dde401f</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - [Item not listed with location] Box 20: More Green Como House Como House > [Item not listed with location] https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e982e570c60865b3674aefbc54296e15.pdf 85a1e7e591aff80e1814d6e487e4fc61 PDF Text Text �— ?HUMAN CHAUVINISM AND.ENVIRONMENTAL.ETHICS* Richard and Vai Routley / * . * Class chauvinism has been and remains a cardinal weakness of most . moral codes - including, so it will°be argued, Western ethics. * A most serious failure 6f Western ethics is its human chauvinism or anthropo^centricism - a chauvinism which emerges in a refined, and apparently more reds&n*able, form as person chauvinism in much modern ethical theory. * w What is chauvinism? $ * Class chauvinism, in the relevant sense, is sz^Etant^aZ-Z-z/ differential, discriminatory and inferior treatment (by sufficiently many members of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not enff-ZcZen^ justification. Pnwan chauvinism is class chauvinism where the class is humans, wuZ-e chauvinism where the class is human males, an-Z/zzaZ. chauvinism where the class is animals, etc. It would be bazf, to say the least, if Western ethics, in its various strands, were to turn out to rest on human, or person, chauvinism. For Western ethics would then have no better foundation than, and be open to the same sorts of objections as, moral codes based on other sorts of chauvinisms, e.g. on familial, national, sexual, racial or socio-economic class chauvinism - in particular it would be open to the objection that This paper (which considerably elaborates R. Routley 'Is There a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?', Procee^-Znps of Zz/ze XPt/z ^orZ^ Ccnpress of PTz^Z-cscp/zz/, 1 (1973), pp.205-10), was drafted in 1973 and read in 1974 at the University of Indiana, Bloomington, at Notre Dame University, and at the Conference on The Good Society held at the University of Victoria, Canada. Since the main virtue of the paper has been that it'has generated much interesting discussion, the original form has been retained, though the authors are no longer especially happy with the form, and many theses remain insufficiently developed or defended. But in order not to remove the previous and continuing criticism, no substantial deletions have been made, even though the paper has been raided and segments of it presented in improved form elsewhere, especially (a) R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism', in MoraZ P/z-ZZosopTzz/ an<7 t?ze Tzjentp-F-Zrst Centnrz/ (edited by K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre), Notre Dame University Press, 1979, and (b) R. and V. Routley, 'An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preferences CTzo^ce an<i FaZzve, RSSS, Australian National University, 1977. However some sizeable additions have been made, with a view to increasing the intelligibility and enlarging the scope of the original draft, and meet­ ing some of the many objections. 1 �it discriminated against nonhumans in a prejudiced and unwarranted way, and would thereby stand condemned. For it is hard to see how an ethic based on simple spoo-Zes loyalty could have any greater claim to absolute­ ness or deserve any more respect than moral codes based on simple loyalty to national, sexual, or racial classes. Such an ethic could no more command allegiance - once the facts are brought into clear view - than other normally-deplored examples of localised class chauvinism, such as the Mafia or protection agencies or rackets or enclaves of slavery. Unfortunately prevailing Western ethics appear to be of just this sort. §1. THE WESTERN CASE FOR ITS HUMAN (OR PERSON) CHAUVINISM: THE FIRST LINES OF DEFENCE It is important, then, for defenders of the Western ideology to be able to show - *Zf it can be shown - that an ethic which discriminates strongly in favour of humans, as Western ethics apparently does, is not chauvinistic. Otherwise the ethic stands condemned. Of course not every distinction in treatment qualifies as chauvinistic - the distinction in treatment may not be substantial or systematic, and there may be an adequate and explicable basis for the distinction, so that some discrimin­ ation is warranted. In order to escape the charge of human chauvinism, it has to be shown how and why the drastic and general discrimination in favour of humans sanctioned and enjoined by modern (as by historical) Western ethical systems is warranted, and that it has an adequate basis. The extent of this chauvinism, especially with respect to animals, is at last - after centuries of a priori prejudice and gross distortion of the characteristics of wild animals and wilderness - beginning to be spelt 1 out. It is at least clear from the outset that an adequate justification cannot be provided which simply selects all and only these members of the species human (i.e. /zowo sap*Zo?zs) as zoologically defined. There is nothing about the characteristic of TzMwazzZZp itself (as distinct perhaps from its accompanying properties) which could provide a justification for overwhelmingly favourable treatment for humans (and unfavourable treatment for nonhumans) as opposed to other possible, and possibly some actual, nonhuman creatures. Once again, an adequate ethic and justification can­ not possibly be based on blind and unthinking species loyalty. The same 1 See, e.g., S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (eds), Mor azzd Morals. -Z^Zo Z/ze zzzaZ^roat/TzozzZ of yzorz-ZzMwaMS, Gollancz, London, 1971; P. Singer, ?l?z-Z7na:Z f-Z^oraf-ZoM. pzezj o^/z-Zos for OMr of azz*Z/??aZs, Cape, London, 1976; S.R.L. Clark, y/zo A7oraZ of ^H-ZwaZs, Clarendon, Oxford, 1977. 2 �CB objection applies against the simple need's argument: the commonly assumed domination of human needs over all else (e.g. over all environ­ mental considerations) has, if it is to have any merit, to be based on more than speciesism.^ We shall have to look then for some other not merely taxonomic characteristic to provide the sought justification. It will emerge however, that any such characteristic is held or may be held by nonhumans, and is not held, or potentially not held, by all items of the species human. Of course there are many characteristics which can, as a contingent matter, be used to distinguish human beings as a general class from other higher animals - although in fact with increasing knowledge of animals it is no longer clear that some of these characteristics distinguish as clearly as was assumed a priori in the past. For example, humans have a language, and a culture of a certain sort and even various logics. And, as we are accustomed to have people point out, other terrestrial animals do not conduct philosophical discussions on environmental ethics. However not only is participation in these activities potentially available to nonhuman creatures, and these characteristics possibly possessed by some, but these activities are not generally engaged in even by humans (particularly the power elite), many humans lack the requisite competence, and even among those who do qualify, such activities are carried out to a very varying extent. We run the risk, then, in applying such demanding criteria, of ruling out, of classing as deserving of "sub-human" or "sub­ person" treatment, a considerable class of human beings — items most humans would consider as worthy of better treatment than that normally accorded by humans to nonhuman animals. What is more important however is that such criteria as human language, culture, human civilization, human intentionality, or whatever, appear to provide no satisfactory for the substantially unfavourable treatment allotted those falling outside the privileged class. should there be such strong discrimination in favour of creatures having a (certain sort of)^ language or a higher level of intelligence and against creatures or items which do not, in favour of things with a certain sort of culture or a certain logic and against those without? Especially when some of these criteria are clearly, and 2 As McCloskey remarked (in a letter dated 5.7.77 containing many helpful comments) 'talking about needs does little but obscure the problem, as needs, to be normatively relevant, involve reference to goods; and that merely transfers the problem'. 3 On next page. 3 �*3 unjustifiably,loaded in favour of human interests, achievements and By contrast the very many respects in which some or sorts of animals are superior bo bMfnans (many are noted in V.B. Droscher, Tbe abilities (cf. the cultural loading of various intelligence tests). 4?ibmaZ Parcaptbo^, Allen, London, of tbe Sassos. 1969) are rarely considered; yet some of these features would, if taken in the same serious way as some respects in which humans excell, justify a reverse chauvinism (which could be reflected as, for exampZ-e, in the Hindu treatment of cows). The only sort of justification for the discrimination that might appear convincing - that those who have the given characteristic (e.g. those that are more intelligent, or more rational, or richer) are more valuable or worth special treatment - is vitiated by the fact that were it accepted by Western ethics it would warrant similar discrimination humans (or persons). For how do we show that the allegedly warranted discrimination is sufficiently different from making substantial (class) distinctions between humans in terms of their level of intelli­ gence, linguistic or logical ability, or level or kind of cultural achievement - so that those with "lower" levels of these valued abilities are treated in a consistently inferior way and regarded as available for the use of the others? In short, these characteristics do not provide adequate justification for the substantially inferior treatment accorded those not having them, and so the charge of chauvinism is not escaped by producing them. A similar set of points applies against a number of other criteria^ traditionally or recently proposed to distinguish the privileged class. Often these are propounded in terms of personhood and criteria for being a parson (the class marked out for privileged treatment being the class of persons) rather than criteria for being bz^wan - in order to escape difficulties raised by young, senile, decrepit, stupid, irrational, 3 For undoubtedly many mammals, birds and insects can communicate, some times in ways analogous to language, even if the honorific term 'language' is withheld (see - to select an unfavourable source the discussion in E.O. Wilson, SocZobboZ-opp. Belknap, Cambridge Mass., 1975, chapter 8 ff.). It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that the ascription of some linguistic ability, and of elementary languages, to nonhuman creatures should not be withheld, see e.q. the details assembled in E. Linden, 4p<2s_, Penguin,New York, 1976. (But contrast Wilson, op. cit., pp.555 59, and to set this in proper perspective, consider Wilson s discussion of ethics and aesthetics a few pages later, pp.562-65.) 4 Many of the criteria that have been proposed are assessed, and found wanting, in Routley (a). 4 �damaged and defective humans, extraterrestrial creatures, and super animals; to avoid the merely contingent connections between being human and having requisite person-determining characteristics (such as ration­ ality or knowledge) supposed to warrant discriminatory treatment; and t defeat, though it is a pyrrhic victory, the charge of human chauvinism (or equivalents of the charge, such as anthropocentricism or speciesism). But much the same problems then arise in terms of criteria for u person, and the chauvinism problem reappears as the problem of furnish­ ing criteria which are suitably clearcut, and do separate persons from assumed nonpersons, and which would provide an adequate justification for substantially privileged treatment for persons and inferior treatment for nonpersons. Unless such a justification is forthcoming the charge of person is not escaped. Most of the criteria proposed for personhood fall down in just these sorts of ways, e.g. being autonomous, the having of projects, the producing of junk, the assessing of some of one's performances as successful or not, the awareness of oneself as an agent or initiator. Not only does it appear that (the more worthy of) such criteria apply (or could apply) to many nonhuman animals - thus animals are generally more autonomous (in main senses of the term) than humans, many animals have projects (e.g. home and nest building), and they are well aware of themselves, as opposed to rivals, as initiators of 5 projects - and that they do not apply uniformly to humans or indeed to persons in any ordinary sense; but again it is extremely difficult to see what there is in these characteristics which would warrant or justify the vast difference in treatment between the privileged and nonprivileged classes, or justify regarding the non-privileged class as something available for the of the privileged class. Similar objections can be lodged against the proposal that knowledge or the possession of knowledge, provides feature. (or u crMc^uZ) distinguishing It can hardly provide the appropriate filter, since it not only gives no sharp cut-off point,but does not even always rank humans or persons above nonhumans or nonpersons. Moreover, taken seriously it should lead to substantial moral differentiation between persons, a person's moral rating also fluctuating during his lifetime. In any case, For example, the shiftless intelligent person, or the primitive person, who has no projects and engages in no moral reflection, and thus offends protestant ethics, is not thereby deregisterable as a person, any more than an intelligent animal with projects can join the union. On next page. 5 �4 why rank knowledge so highly: for (pace Socrates) knowledge is not the foundation of virtue, but is frequently turned to evil ends, and even where it is meritorious it is not the sole (or even a crucial) criterion of worth. Similar difficulties apply too to the historic criterion of ratZozzaZZZp, along with the added problem that it is -very difficult to say what it is in any clear or generally acceptable way, or to prevent it from degenerating into a simple "pro" word. If a hallmark of rationality is commitment to the consequences of what one believes and seriously says, then many humans fail the test. If, on the other hand rationality i^, for example, the ability to discover and pursue courses and actions likely to achieve desired goals (direct action toward goals), ability to solve problems concerned, etc., then plainly many animals have it, and possibly to a greater extent than humans in some cases (and of certain humans in almost all cases). If it were the ability, e.g. to do ZopZc (say propositional calculus) or to assess reasoning verbally, then the (biassed) criterion would be far too strong and rule out many humans. Again, why should one make such a marked discrimination on this basis? What is so meritorious about this characteristic, that it warrants such a marked distinction? Nothing (at least in the ordinary academic's view, or logicians would receive more favoured treatment). Other criteria, which yield an analytic connection between being a person and enjoying freedom or having rationality, in part beg the question. For in D?zat respect is it that persons - or worse, just persons - are free. Also the justificatory problem, as to how the claimed freedom or rationality warrants such differential treatment, remains. Characterisations of parsons vary enormously, from so strong that they rule out suburban humans who are not "self-made" enterpreneurs, to so weak that they admit very wa^z/ animals. An (unintentional) example of the latter is the following: persons, that is, ... beings who are not only sentient but also capable of intensional autonomous action, beings that must be ascribed not only states of consciousness but also states of belief, thought and intention (A. Townsend, 'Radical vegetarians , 4zzstraZasZa?z JoMrzzaZ of P/zZZosop/zz/, 57 (1979), p.89). 6 in addition, the relation "a has at least as much knowledge as b is only a partial ordering. For example, a dog's and a child s knowledge may be incomparable, because they know about different matters how to do quite different sorts of things, etc. (The idea that knowledge is the key to moral discrimination, that it is what makes humans rank t way Western ethics ranks them, may be found in C.B. Daniels, PaaZMaZZoK of FZTzZcaZ T/zoorZes, Philosophy in Canada Monograph, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1975.) 6 �O) Most rats and rabbits satisfy the conditions: conscious animals that have intentions they are sentient, (e.g. to get through some barrier such as a floor or a fence), beliefs and thoughts (e.g. that there is For his further argument Townsend preferred food beyond the barrier). shifts - without notice, but in a way that is quite typical of this scene - to wzzcTz stronger requirements upon being a person (such that one who does not meet them is incapacitated as a person) which rule out many humans, e.g. 'The person must recognise canons of evidence and inference warranting changes in his beliefs, and be capable of changing his beliefs 7 accordingly' (op. cit., p.90). In meeting hypothetical objections, Townsend slips in a further require ment of rationality, but the characterisation of person given does not include any such requirement. Subsequently, however, Townsend commits himself, without argument, to the thesis that 'a fairly high degree of rationality is prerequisite' to attributing 'intensionality' (as dis­ tinct from 'intentionality'). This is not going to help much. For, firstly, rationality is very much a notion which admits of degrees, without the relatively sharp cut-off stages required for person as a notion of orthodox moral relevance, or possessed by the notion of /zzzwczzz to which Townsend sneaks back in his chauvinistic conclusion (p.93). Secondly, Tzozj high a degree is prerequisite for being a person? If only enough to satisfy the conditions for being a person, then the animals that are persons have it. If more, then either the initial characterisation of a person fails or the thesis breaks down. The much stronger requirements upon being a person that Townsend sub­ sequently appeals to are said to derive from S.I. Benn. But, if any­ thing they strengthen one of the stronger of several zzozze^zz-Zz^uZezzf characterisations of (zzatz^raZ) person - none of them equivalent to /zzzzzzuzz - that Benn has at various times offered. While Benn's weaker characterisations appear to admit at least many "higher" animals, e.g. that of a natural person as a chooser, conscious of himself as able to make a difference to the way the world goes, by deciding to do this rather than that, having projects, therefore, of his own, whose life experience may consequently be understood, not simply as a chronicle of events, but as an enterprise, on which he puts his own construct­ ion ((a) 'The protection and limitation of privacy, Part I', ^MstraZ-Zazz Lazj JozzrzzczZ, 52 (1978), p.605); the stronger characterisations which invoke (rather vaguely specified, and cZ-Z//ere?zt) minimum conditions of rationality in belief and action said to imply respoTzs-Zb-ZZ-Ztz/ on the part of the person for what s/he does, though they do zzcf - exclude many of the creatures admitted by weaker characterisations. For such stronger characterisations see 'Individuality, autonomy and community' in CozzzzzzMzz-Ztz/ (ed. E. Kamenka) Edward Arnold (forthcoming) and (c) 'Freedom, autonomy and the concept of a person', ProceecZ-Zzzps o/ t?ze ^r-Zs^oteZ-Zuzz Society, 76 (1976), pp.109-30. 7 �D The foregoing points, taken together, support our contention that it is not possible to provide criteria which would distinguishing, in the sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have prefer­ ences or preferred states.For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some rather and tests for membership of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for the preferences of other creatures. Accordingly fka skarp woraZ ethics by philosophers and others alike, commonly accepted m aZZ ofkar a^-fmaZ speafas, Zacks a safZsfacforz/ cokarazif bcsZs. The distinction, which historically rested on the assumption that humans possessed a soul (or higher reason) but that other animals, brutes, did not, appears to have been uncritically retained even after the religious beliefs or philosophical theories underpinning it have been abandoned. Given that the distinction underlying human chauvinism fails, is there anywhere satisfactory demarcations of moral relevance can be made among things? Yes, several divisions^ of mcraZ can be made; but of these coincides with a division into human and others. Consider, first, the question of consideration fiards others, and the matter of which offers are to be taken into account in cases where others' interests and preferences are affected by some action. Insofar as moral consideration for others (among sentient items) is based on analogical (empathetic, and essentially inductive) principles, such as taking account of their worthwhile preferences, objectives, interests etc., 8 There are of course further arguments for the contention, for example from the anatomical and physiological affinities of human and other animals, from their common evolutionary history, and so on. The arguments are of varying force; for example, evolutionary arguments can be arrested, temporarily, by the claim that there was a quantum jump" in human evolutionary development which did not occur with other creatures with a previously shared evolutionary history (cf. Wilson, op. cit.). 9 Although the divisions may be conceptually sharp enough, they are any­ thing but sharp when applied in the field to the variety of creature and circumstances that occur. For example, preference-havers is, so far at least, sharp enough, but it is far from clear which creatures qualify, e.g. which, if any, Crustacea? For the present most of t ese potential decision cases are cases for cheerful indecision; _ u , alternatively, the divisions may be viewed - perhaps better not a sharp boundaries, but as gradation states, as where two colours m a rainbow meet. 8 * �c- it is difficult to see how such consideration can fail to apply to all (including nonhuman) preference-having creatures; and one does not need to apply criteria such as linguistic ability, navigational ability, intelligence, piano-playing, hunting skill, etc., to obtain a basis for such consideration (indeed one cannot). The /zuzzz^zz^ a/* pr^yerezzces (and of preferences revealed through choices) is however a quite sufficient basis for z^/zz^s of consideration and concern. It is at this point, we suggest, that the requisite, important and non-arbitrary distinction is to be drawn which marks out the class of creatures towards which obligations may be held; that is, the usually recognised principles of consideration towards others (of the privileged class) properly extend or should be generalised to consideration for other creatures having prefer­ ences, and t/ze correspazz^zzy pezzaraZ zza^ to putt afTzars a/zZ-^pa^azz pr^zzc^pZ-e ("at/zer preyerezzce-TzuzJersJ tzzto a c%spreyerra<^ stato y*ar zza paa<i raasazz. Insofar as moral behaviour is based on consideration for others and not harming others, preference-having provides an adequate basis, and does appear to provide a sufficient justification for substantially different treatment for preference-having over non-preference-having items - because items without preference cannot (literally) be put into a dispreferred state. Thus preference-having appears to tie in with an important basis for moral obligation, and appears to provide a superior criterion, for a sort of moral consideration, to other criteria sometimes proposed such as sentience - or, differently, intelligence - especially since in the absence of preferences such notions as /zurzzztzz^ something (in a way that does affect it) and damaging its interests become difficult of application (not to say nonsignificant, except in extended senses). The unsatisfactoriness of the sentience criterion for what one can hold obligations ^azJarzis can be grasped from the case of the sentient machine or purely sentient creature which does not have preferen­ ces, does not care what state it is in or whether it is destroyed,etc. The sentience criterion is often converted by utilitarians into a suffer­ ing criterion, by taking pain as a paradigm of sentience: but plainly the two criteria diverge since some sentient creatures may never feel pain or suffer. Suffering is even less satisfactory than sentience; for suffering is neither necessary nor sufficient for being in a dispreferred state (consider masochists who suffer but are not in a dispreferred state, and well-treated workers who are in a dispreferred state but do not suffer). Preference-having provides a lower bound; it is a sufficient but zzat zzecassurz/ condition for being an object of this sort of moral 9 �consideration and concern. That it is not necessary is revealed, independently of environmental examples, by the following sorts of cases: the treatment of "human vegetables", successful stoics, and science­ fiction cases in which people are brain-washed into performing certain goals and having no dispreferred states apart from the programmed goals. In all three cases the question of dispreferences does not arise, but relevant moral issues can.*^ The necessary condition, that corresponds to preference-having as a sufficient condition, appears to be capability at some time (e.g. previously, when developed) for preference-having. It has been taken for granted that many animals (from species higher on the evolutionary scale) have preferences, make choices, and the like. This is the merest commonsense, which can be readily confirmed in a scientific way. For example, some of the preference-rankings of a black­ tail wallaby as to types of foliage to eat are readily established by observation, and it is fairly straightforward verifying that bushrats prefer cheese to soap, this preference being revealed by regular choices. It has however been claimed by some recent philosophers, for reasons apparently different from those offered by traditional philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes,that animals do not have intentions, or at least do not have them in a full sense. It is unclear whether these intentions, which are taken to include thoughts and beliefs and, perhaps, desires, include preferences; but it is hard to see how preferences, which are intentional, are excluded if desires are included in intentions. The recent arguments to show that animals do not really have intentions, which do not bear much investigation even in such central cases as belief,12 appear extremely feeble when applied to preference. For the arguments start from the claim that we cannot say zjTzat it is that animals As N Griffin, who supplied the examples, remarked a similar thing happens also in less extreme cases of the type brought in to prominence, e.q. by the women's movement: that it is possible, by means of indoctrination, to limit the range of someone's dispreferences; treatment of such persons may still remain immoral even when it does not place them outside the (artificially widened) range of their preferred states. 11 The traditional reasons look slight also in the case of preferences and choices. It would have been claimed - the theory forces the claim Interestingly, choices - that animals' choices could not be rational, of many animals conform to behavioural criteria for rationality pro posed in economics. (forthcoming) 12 See J. Bishop, 'More thought on thought and talk', and R Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs to anima s , paper'prepared for the B.Ztef conference, University of Queensland, 1979. 10 �believe (of course very often we can, and unproblematically) and fall back on the claim that animals lack concepts of a fit sort. In the case of preferences, however, there is often no problem in saying what it is animals prefer, or in confirming the claim. Nor is it that we cannot attribute propositional-style preferences to animals; if black-tail wallabies prefer, as they do, new foliage to old then they prefer the foliage's being new over the foliage's being old. As for the concept claim, in the sense in which is delineated in psychology, animals have concepts. And if a philosopher's notion of "concept gets in the way of the claim that free dogs prefer bones to carrots (or other vegetables) then it is not the claim that requires revision, but the philosopher's notion. The preference-having criteria appear to distinguish non-arbitrarily and sharply enough between higher animals and other items, and to rule out of the relevant class elementary animals, trees, rocks and also some human items, e.g. human kidneys. The criteria plainly exclude inanimate objects, and they separate animate objects. For while living creatures such as plants and elementary animals can be said in an extended sense to have and also optimal living conditions, e.g., for healthy develop­ ment, and in sense to have preferred states or environments, they do not have preferences, and cannot be put into states they disprefer. All that is required for an 'interest' or 'welfare' in the broad sense is a telos or life-goal, as possessed by living things, or an equilibrium or system goal, as possessed by living ecosystems. At the same time the criteria indicate another important division. For in a wider sense, animate objects which do not (significantly) have preferences or make choices, are sometimes said to have or 'preferred environments' (as, e.g., in 'the plant prefers a sunny frost-free location with a well drained soil'). us say that the or preferred states To avoid confusion let of animate objects and also such biological items as ecosystems can be affected in one way or another, e.g. increased, decreased, upset.For instance, the wellbeing of a coastal community and of the individual trees in it can be reduced to zero by sandmining, and it can be seriously threatened by pumping waste detergent 13 in this broad sense too, living things, things that participate in the growth process, have interests. However under a narrower and more common determinate of the slippery term 'interests', only preference­ havers have interests (again sentient creatures do not provide the boundary). Because the term 'interests' so readily admits of high redefinition, and the infiltration of chauvinism, its use is better limited (or even avoided), in favour of other more stable terms. 11 �There is a general obligation principle into the nearby ocean. corresponding likewise to this more comprehensive class of welfare bearers, namely, sz/sf67??s ohjecfs <9r ^<90<i reason. Moral does not of course end with what is in some way animate, much as the class of valuable objects is not tied to what relates suitably to central preference-havers. In suitable settings, a (virtually) dead landscape, a rare stone, a cave, can be items of moral or aesthetic concern; indeed any object of value can in principle be of such concern, and in principle at least, value or disvalue, and so of woraZ concern. almost any sort of object. <2% object of There can then be obligations Naturally only a fraction of the things that exist have especial value, and only a few of the things that exist will be things concerning which some of us have obligations. Furthermore these sorts of obligations do not in general reduce to the conditions or arrangements (e.g. contractual or joint welfare arrangements) of preference-havers or some select subclass thereof (what will sub­ sequently be called, as the argument is developed, the base cZass). Just as there are relevant divisions beyond the class of preference­ havers, so there are within the class. Thus the suggestion that the class towards which moral obligations (and a corresponding sort of moral concern which takes account of creatures' states) may be held is bounded by the class of preference-havers, does not of course imply that d^st^^ot^o^s can be made the class of preference-havers with respect to the kind of behaviour appropriate to them. For example, obligations which by no means exhaust obligations - can only be held directly (as distinct from by way of a representative) with respect to a much narrower class of creatures, from which many humans are excluded. The class is also distinct from the class of persons, at least as 'person' is usually characterised. What emerges is an of types of objects of moral relevance, some matched by types of moral obligation (described toward the end of Routley (a)), with nested zones representing respectively different sorts of objects - such as, objects of moral concern, welfare-having objects, preference-havers (and choice-makers), right-holders, obligationholders and responsibility-bearers, those contractually-comnitted-and the different sorts of obligations that can significantly apply to such objects. Not all the types of objects indicated are distinct, nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. For strictly the labels given should be expanded, as the distinctions are categorial ones, so that what matters is not whether an object is, for instance, 12 �contractually committed in some fashion but whether it is the sort of thing that can be, whether it can significantly enter into or be committed by arrangements of a contractual kind. is to Similarly function as a categorial marker, that marks out the sorts of things that can (significantly) have preferences: the assumption that preference­ havers coincide with choice-makers is based on this categorial reading. Although the annular picture is (as will become clear in §5) important for the environmental alternative to be elaborated, and in meeting object­ ions to it, the countercharge has been laid that it reintroduces chauvin­ ism through its inegalitarian distinctions. This is a mistake: not every sort of ethical distinction, certainly not a justified distinction, involves chauvinism. Chauvinism is exhibited where, for example, objects of a favoured class are treated in a preferential way to superior items of an excluded class,e.g. defective humans as against apes, degenerate French against normal Pygmies. The annular picture neither involves nor encourages such differences in treatment: it is neutral and unchauvinistic, for the reason that it relies only on categorial distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions (see the semantical analyses of §5). It is certainly in no way species chauvinist or human chauvinist For none of the zones of the annular picture comprises the class of humans (or its minor variant the class of persons); for this class is not of moral relevance. The reason is that the human/nonhuman distinction is not an ethically significant one, and can, and should, be demoted from its dominant, and damaging, position in ethical theory. notion of But dropping the out of ethics, is only part of the ethical change that is called for: taking due account of nonhumans is also required. In particular - to return to the theme - what is quite unacceptable, 14 and based on a set of distinctions which are arbitrary and unjustifiable, differential treatment enjoined nonpersons as distinct is the ex from persons under Western ethics, and the view that only persons or humans have any (nonderivative) right to moral consideration and concern as preference-havers and that there are obligations towards other creatures such a criticism of chauvinism is based firmly 14 According to Q. Gibson ----- ----. . . . ' " This is simply on Western ethical equality and egalitarian principles,. ___ The general argument not so: there is no reliance on such principles, feature -f cannot be what justifies the differential takes the form; ----- — - . . . treatment of humans and nonhumans, because either f is not morally relevant or not all humans have f or some nonhumans have f., Neither Nei__. equality nor substitutions based upon equality are invoked at any stage. 13 �only insofar as these are or reduce to obligations to persons or humans. §2. THE EXTENT OF CHAUVINISM, AND FURTHER LINES OF DEFENCE Western ethics are, then, human chauvinist in that they characterist ically take humans (or, to make a slight improvement, persons) to be the only items worthy of proper moral consideration, and sanction or even enjoin substantially inferior treatment for the class of non-human preference-having creatures, without - so it certainly appears - adequate justification. The prevailing nineteenth century Western attitude to wild creatures is evident from Judge Blackstone (quoted approvingly in Penguin, London, 1967, pp.431): W. Cobbett, E^raZ With regard likewise to wild animals, aZZ rT?a%kZ%<7 arZ^ZnaZ bz/ the the Creator a right to pursue and take away any fowl or insect of the air, any fish or inhabitant of the waters, and any beast or reptile of the field: and this natural right still continues in every individual, unless where it is restrained by the civil laws of the country. And when a man has once so seized them, they become, while living his qualified property, or if dead, are absolutely his own. Prevailing Western attitudes have not shifted markedly since that time; for example, foresters, widely regarded as socially responsible, think nothing of dislodging from their homes and environment, or even destroying, communities of animals which do not directly interfere with human welfare. But there is another very important broader respect in which Western ethics are human (or person) chauvinistic, namely in the treat­ ment accorded to and attitude taken towards the broader class of natural items such as trees and forests, herbs, grasslands and swamps, soils and waterways and ecosystems. Unlike higher animals such items cannot liter­ ally be put into dispreferred states (and in Z/zZs obvious sense, as opposed to the wider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare, they have no interests), but they can be damaged or destroyed or have their eroded or impaired. The Western, chauvinistic, assumption is that this can only happen where human interests are affected. The basic assumption is that value attaches essentially only to humans or to what serves or bears on human interests, or derivatively, to items which derive from human skill, ingenuity or labour. Since natural items have no other value, there is no restriction on the way they are treated insofar as this does not interfere with others; as far as ZsoZate^ natural things are con­ cerned anything is permissible. 14 �It is, at base, because of these chauvinistic features of Western ethics that there is a need for a new ethic and value theory (and so derivatively for a new economics, and new politics, etc.) setting out not just people's relations to preference-havers generally but also (along with many other things) people's relations to the natural environment - in Leopold's words 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ct/zer essuz/s (A. Leopold, A Coz^/ztz/ New York, 1966, p.238). /Uzzzu^zuc It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature - insofar at least as they do not affect others, as pollution and vandalism do - are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects. It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold, Fraser Darling and many others, both earlier and later, take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, then, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that merely an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct, what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations; for example, what is permissible on the prevailing ethics will be no longer permissible on the new. For as matters stand, as Leopold himself explains, humans generally do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others, and is accordingly permissible on prevailing ethics. As Leopold says: A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the coi^munity creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society (op. cit., p.245). Only recently has such behaviour begun to be seriously questioned and become the subject of criticism,e.g. by environmentalists. Under what will be accounted an eyz^trozi/TzeMtuZ gtTz^c, however, such traditionally 15 �permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. That ethics and morality are not, and never have been, restricted to human concerns, or exclusively to relations between persons, is important in rebutting objections to the very idea of an environmental ethic, based on the premiss that morality just is restricted (definitionally) to human relationships (and connected values) and is not significant beyond that. The problem of moral relations with respect to preference-havers other than persons and to inanimate items cannot be resolved or escaped simply by declaring morality to apply solely,or as a matter of meaning or defin­ ition only to humans (or to persons). For first, such a solution would run counter to the common view that humans are subject to some moral con­ straints, even if comparatively minor ones, towards other creatures; the having of such constraints cannot be ruled out definitionally, and corres pondingly the judgments formulating these constraints or prohibitions cannot be ruled out as nonsignificant, yet they are surely moral. The only way in the end, that the claim gets support is by a narrow, and no longer acceptable, account of what is moral in terms of concern with humans alone (cf. S6). Likewise, the question of the moral interrelations of humans with intelligent nonhuman extraterrestrial beings, even if at present hypothetical, is certainly a meaningful one, and some interesting and clearly moral issues of this sort are frequently raised in science fiction. Only if the extent of morality is, somewhat misleadingly, reconstrue in terms of the class of constraints on the behaviour of those it applies to - that is, in terms of limitations, as distinct from moral freedom does the claim that Western morality is restricted to humans (or persons) begin to gain plausibility. For it is true that beyond the favoured base class, humans or persons, few constraints are supposed to operate (and ad hoc ones at that) unless the welfare of members of the base class is adversely affected. Under an environmental ethic, such as that Leopold advocates, this would change: previously unconstrained behaviour would be morally circumscribed, and in this sense the scope of morality would be extended. It is not evident, however, that a ethic ethic, an in the case at hand, is required to accommodate even radical new judgments seriously constraining traditionally approved conduct, i.e. imposing limitations on behaviour previously considered morally permissible. For one reason it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. 16 For, �notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure. They are nonetheless (pace Quineans) perfectly good objects for investigation. Furthermore, there is a tendency to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic: e.g. the Christian ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. There are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the new principles and evaluations; that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethic, and that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The possibility that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the not inflexible framework of prevailing Western ethics, may appear open because there is not a single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civiliz­ ation: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. The Western ethic is not so monolithic. In particular, three important traditions in Western ethical views n ,been mapped .3 out: 4. 15 a concerning man's relation to nature have recently dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custod­ ian, and the cooperative position with man as perfector. the only traditions; Nor are these primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream StoicAugustine view - it exists only for his sake^^), whereas on an See especially (a) J. Passmore, Man's Fespons^btZ^^z/ for Duckworth, London, 1974; also R. Nash, ^tZderness an^ t/ze Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973. (All further references to Passmore's work are, unless otherwise indicated, to Passmore (a).) The dominant position has also been sketched in many other recent texts, e.g. I. McHarg, Z)es^<yn Doubleday, New York, 1969, while the lesser traditions have been appealed to in meeting criticisms of the Western ethic as involving the dominant view. The masculine particles are appropriate; so is the resulting tone. �environmental ethic man is not so free to do as s/he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. (as further considered in §4) who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with a deeper environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from sub­ stantial human interference, whether of the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable but ecologically impoverished European small farm and village langscape. According to the cooperative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potential­ ities, the test of perfection being basically purposes; /or while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Thus these positions figure among those of the shallow ecological movement (as depicted by A. Naess, 16 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement', Tr^M^rz/ (1973), 95-100): longer term. they are typically exploitative, even if only in the Although these lesser positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, and allow for some of the modern extensions of the Western ethic that have been made, e.g. concerning the treatment of animals and criticisms of vandalism, they are not well-developed, fit poorly into the prevailing framework, and do zzof p<9 /ar orozz^Zz. For in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough­ going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying 17 that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for /zzzzzzor 17 if 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered innocuous at least as regards it actual effects. Note that the total use principle, in the usual sense, is tied to the resource view of nature (cf. (d) R. and V. Routley, F-z^/zt /or z^/ze Forests, Third Edition, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1975). Such a principle, like the requirement of economic growth, emerges directly from - it is an integral part of neoclassical economic theory. 18 �18 "humanized". As the important Western traditions mentioned exclude an environ­ mental ethic, it would appear, at first glance anyway, that such an ethic - not primitive, mystical or romantic - would be new alright - or at least new from a Western perspective. For, from a wider perspective, which takes due account of traditional societies (such as those of some American Indians, Australian Aboriginals, and Pygmies), there is, it will turn out, nothing so very new about what is included in (as distinct from the theoretical setting of) the "new" ethics. Even from the narrow Western perspective, the matter is not so straightforward. for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified, in particular by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others.^ It may be that some such non-inter­ ference proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary); and that it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased vn.th natural items would not affect others (a^oT^terfereMcg assMwpf^^). it may, the Be this as appears, at least for many thinkers to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environ­ ment for no satisfactory (taxable) returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, 18 Humanization, and humanitarian measures, may be a cloak for human chauvinism - in which case, far from being virtuous, they may be positively undesirable. 19 Also, as Leopold has observed, the class of has been ively widened, e.g. from the family group, to the tribe, to the nation or race, even to all humans including often enough future humans but rarely further in the West until recently. of 20 The assumption is not the same as its relative, Benn's 'that no one may legitimately frustrate or prevent (or interfere with) a person's doing what he chooses to do, ^nles there is some reason for preventing him (Benn (c), op. cit., in from (a) P.605). The principle is said to derive from 'the notion of a person' ^e.g. (a), p.605), but it only so derives given commission ofPfhe fallacy of conversion of an A-proposition. Moreover even reduced to a 'formal principle ... locating the onus of justification (cf (a)) the principle is dubious, especially given principles of respect for objects other than persons, with which persons may be interfering. It is, however, a formal principle that will help to keep entreprenuerial humans happy. �* GrozjZ/z <2%^ Dgcaz/, T/ze ^oZz^ZZc^ ^gcowgs York, 1972) that blends with the modified position; be criticised on welfare grounds; and so on. Fr^hZ^w^ New vandalism can usually The modified position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have, since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser trad­ itions, is adequate as an environmental ethic. chauvinism. None moves outside human They are all encompassed under the t^es-Zs - the view that the earth and all its non-human contents exist or are available for human benefit or to serve human interests, and hence that humans are entitled to manipulate the world and its systems as they want, in their own interests - which is but the ecological restatement of the strong thesis of human chauvinism, according to which items outside the privil­ eged human class have no value except one as instrumental value (both theses are criticised in Routley (a)). To escape from chauvinism, and from its thesis, a new ethic -Zs wanted, as we now try to show. §3. GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST WESTERN ETHICS The main argument is directed primarily against the modified dominant position, but will incidentally show the inadequacy of the lesser Western traditions. The strategy is to locate core features of Western ethics, and to reveal through examples their thoroughgoing chauvinism and class bias, and in this way to provide decisive grounds for rejecting For the general argument some more technical points have to be made them. first. (An) spgcZyZc ethic, is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a and a more generic notion, a specific ethics are grouped. under which (As usual, a weZu-ethic is a theory about ethics, super-ethics, their features and fundamental notions.) An ^Z/zZcaZ sz/sZsw s is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or a theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgments concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights and responsibilities, what is valued, and so forth, (On newer perceptions an ethical system will include rather less in the way of prescriptions, of duties, obligations and the like, and more as to what are matters of care and of concern and for respect.) Since an ethical system is propositional in character, such notions as consistency, coherence, independence of 20 a �assumptions, and the like, apply to it without further ado. It is evident, from a consideration of competing or incompatible values and principles, that are sz/s^ews. Moreover appropriately general criteria for rationality will not reduce this class to a singleton. Accordingly, there is logical space for a^terrzaf^re A general or lawlike proposition of a system (characterised along similar lines to a scientific law) is a pr^Mc^pZe; and certainly if systems Si and S2 contain different principles, they they are different systems. It will follow then that an environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined if it differs on some principles. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from each Western ethical system on some core principle or other embedded in that Western system, then these systems differ from the Western super-ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that that ethic can be sufficiently characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It would suffice then to locate a common core principle and to provide environmental counterexamples to it. It is illuminating (and necessary, so it will emerge) to attempt to do a little more than this minimum, with a view to bringing out the basic assumptions of the Western super-ethic. Two major classes of evaluative statements, commonly distinguished, are axiological statements, concerning what is good, worthwhile, valuable, best, etc., and deontological state­ ments, which concern what is obligatory, permissible, wrong, etc. Now there appear to be core principles of Western ethics on both axiological and deontic fronts, principles, for example, as to what is valuable and as to what is permissible. Naturally these principles are interconnected, because anything is permitted with respect to what has no value except insofar as it interferes with what does have value. A strong historical case can be made out for what is commonly assumed, that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super- ethic. example. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core deontic principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified A recent formulation of this principle runs as 21 follows (Barkley and Seckier, op. cit., p.58): dominant position. On next page. 21 �The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that (D) one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others {and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably}. The principle, which is built into or derivable from most traditional ethical theories, may be alternatively formulated in terms of permissib­ ility, as the principle that <2 person's (foes no^ ^n^er/ere zJ-^/z o^/zers, ^s perw^ss^&^e provt^e^ (i.e. other people, including perhaps the A related economic principle is that free enterprise can operate agent). within similar limits. It is because of these permissibility formulations that the principle - which incorporates fundamental features of (human or person) chauvinism - is sometimes hailed as a freedom principle; for it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which degrade the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to It is worth remarking that 'harming others' in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breath, for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure, because 'other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: 21 it makes a difference to the extent - and privilege - of The principle is attributed by Barkley and Seckier to Mill, though something like it was fairly common currency in nineteenth century European thought. It appears, furthermore, that Mill would have rejected the principle on account of clause (2): thus, for example: Those interests, I contend, authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, ozzZz/ in respect of those actions of each, which concern the interest of o^Zzer people (J.S. Mill, (/^^Z^^ar^uzz^szzzj L^&gr^z/ az-z^f 7?eprese?z^az^zze ^ozz6r?z777g?z^, Everyman's Library, Dent, London, 1910, p.74, emphasis added). The deletion of clause (2) from (D) does not affect the general argument: hence the braces. (We owe this reference and the points in the next footnote to N. Griffin.) A similarly modified form of (D) is found in much recent Western literature, even radical literature which purports to make due allow­ ance for environmental concerns. A good example of the latter is I. Illich, TcoZs /cr Cofz^ttz^uZ-z^z/, Calder & Boyers, London, 1973, where Mill's (D) appears, in various forms, at several places (e.g. p.xii, p.41). What this indicates is that Illich's "convivial society" will not - if its principles are taken seriously - move beyond chauvinism in its treatment of animals and the natural environment; it will at best yield some form of resource conservation. 22 �a the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of other persons it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to nondiscountable future others, and whether to poss^bZe others. The latter would make the principle untestable and com­ and it is generally assumed that it pletely unworkable in practice; applies at most to present and (some) future others, to those to whom it would make a (fairly immediate) difference (thus excluding past others ). For the purposes of the general argument however, the problems in specify­ ing the class of others is not material, so long as the class includes no 23 more than persons that at some time exist. Fortunately the main argument is not very sensitive to the precise formulation of principle (D). Not only can clause (2) be deleted, and 'other' left rather unspecific, but additions can be made; then even if the main argument does not succeed, m-z^or succeed. o/ t/ze zzzu^M arpz^g?^ An important case concerns the treatment of animals. Unless (D) is construed widely (extending 'other'), or hedged by further qualifying clauses,24 the basic principle fails to take proper account of concern for animals, especially that one should not inflict "unnecessary cruelty or "impermissible" harm. animals then comes to matter; these issues can be avoided. What counts as per^ss^Me Tzurzzz to and familiar conflict issues arise. But For the core principle (D), of basic chauvinism, can be modified to include (historically recent) moral concern for higher animals by adding, after 'harm others', something like 'or harm animals unnecessarily'. Then however the new principle succumbs to the 22 Although the interests and preferences of past others are excluded in conventional utilitarianism, as in (welfare) economic theory and vot inq theory, these are often respected in ethical and legal settings, e.g. in wills, last wishes, etc. Similarly (as N. Griffin also point­ ed out), in the treatment of "human vegetables", past preferences of the person when capable of making decisions are often taken to be morally relevant, or even decisive, to the question as to whether to keep the body alive. 23 if merely possible persons are included then the valuational rankings of environmental ethics, indeed of virtually any ethics, can be reflected in a "utilitarian" fashion. The argument of (c) R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', (accepted for publication in 1974; still forthcoming?), can be used to show this. 24 or unless it can be made out, what seems entirely implausible, that what is wrong with torturing animals is not what it does to them but the way it affects other people (the Aquinas-Kant thesis). 23 �main argument - upon at most simple variation of the counterexamples to be given. Modification becomes more important in the case of standard ethical theories which lead to principles conflicting with (D), such as utilitar­ ianism does unless (D) and the maximisation principle of utilitarianism are appropriately segregated, e.g. by severing connections at some point in the chain connecting entitlement, permissibility, right, maximum utility. For, as in widely recognised, net utility may be increased in ways that violate (D), e.g. by injustice to, or the infliction of suffer­ ing upon, or harming, some individual by others. Thus utilitarianisms in the tradition of Mill, which both include (D) and characterise entitlement in utilitarian terms, are inconsistent (as simple hypothetical cases show). To avoid counterexamples it is not enough merely to distinguish higher and lower utilities, though this is an initial step in what is required, namely - ideally by constraints (as is explained in §5) - o/ unconstrained Although qualification of utilitar­ ianism principles to ensure (D), as a restriction (but not the orzZz/ restriction) on what is permissible,is the proper course, it is a course not all utilitarians are prepared to follow. To defeat isms, it is not enough to adduce counterexamples to (D). utilitarian­ Counterexamples to some other core principle of such utilitarianisms must be located; otherwise the main argument fails against a quite standard, and important, class of positions supporting chauvinism and the Dominion thesis. Fortunately, again, neither a suitable core principle nor appropriate counterexamples are hard to find. The common utilitarian principle provides such a core, and several of the examples directed against (D) serve to counter it (in its various forms). An axiological principle corresponding to (D) (%72<i to some of its variants) runs along these lines: (A) Only those objects which are of use or concern to humans (or persons), or which are the product of human (or person) labour or ingenuity, are of value; thus these are all that need to be taken into account in determining best choice or best course of action, what is good, etc. Roughly, value consists in answering back to certain features of human (or person) involvement. No calculus of value or what is best need look beyond human values. According to a matching value-ranking thesis, item a is better than b only if a serves human concerns more than b. A narrower version of principle (A) embedded in main forms of Marxism is 24 �the human labour theory of value. 25 Thus a corollary will be that Marxism is certainly - unless severely modified - no direction in which to seek an environmental ethic or social theory. There may appear to be exceptions to principle (A) in such objects But although values are assigned to works of art where as works of art. these may not positively affect human welfare, the basis for assigning value is usually taken to be the human skill or ingenuity involved in their production. principle (A). Hence such assignments do not extend, or violate, Indeed the problem raised by natural objects which cost nothing to produce and involved nothing human is very different from the matter of valuing art objects. objects rctse <2 problem. There are also other important differences between natural objects and works of art, apart from the characteristic noninvolvement of humans, namely those turning on the issues of replaceability and the reversibility of destruction. Human artefacts are always replaceable by similar objects, e.g. modern cities, especially concrete jungles are all too similar and replaceable, and using modern techniques paintings can be substanially duplicated; whereas there is no possibility of replicating, even remotely, such as extinct species or real damaged or destroyed natural objects jungles (or lost or vanishing cultures). In terms of replacement costs, these are much more valuable than such human artefacts as material works of art. Thus attempts to assimilate natural objects to material works of art break down. There is an additional reason for rejecting a now familiar approach to natural objects through works of art, namely that it is premissed on the assumption that some sort of chauvinistic account of works of art is adequate: that is not so, as the (intermediate) situation of objet trouve begins to reveal. It is in connection with principles qualification to (D) and especially (A) that the ethics (already required at several points) becomes important for the argument; for various non-Western ethics have not adopted these principles, e.g. both American Indians and Australian Aborigines appear to recognise clearly values in natural items which are not reducible (simply or at all) to human values - and apparently not essentially theistic (supra-human). In any case Western ethics and 25 According to some Marxists, and apparently to Marx, the labour theory is superceded when the period of accumulation is completed and the post­ scarcity era reached. But by the time this high-energy high-tech stage is reached, if ever, irreparable and frequently irreversible environmental damage will have been wreaked. 26 On next page. 25 �p attitudes, and more comprehensively the associated ideologies, are of critical importance; for it is to these and Western influence that the world's main - serious and very extensive - environmental problems can be ascribed. Hypothetical situations are introduced in designing counterexamples to core principles (D) and (A). The basis of the method lies in the semantical analyses of permissibility, obligation and value statements which stretch out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some permitted situation, what is obligatory in every such situation, and what is wrong is excluded m every such situation. But the main point to grasp for the counterexamples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over a class of situations. Thus hypothetical cases are logically perfectly legitimate and cannot be ruled out on one pretext or another, e.g. as rare, as desert island cases, as hypothetical, The counterexamples to (D) and (A) presented depend largely on etc. designing situations different from the actual where there are either too few or too many humans or persons. But alternative special situations where interference with others is minimized or is immaterial are readily devised. (i) The example. The last man (or woman or person) surviving the collapse of the world system sets to work eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to principle (D) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly and destroying things of value (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the Characteristically Westerners have attempted to recast these value systems, sometimes misleadingly, in a religious guise - probably because it was thought that there was no non-religious way of presenting them so as to make them intelligible or have them comprehended. Thus they get represented as basically chauvinistic in view of the relations of Man and God. On these semantical analyses, which avoid all the usual problems of modal theories of axiological and deontic terms, see R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, and others, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979, chapters 7 and 8. A sketch is given in §5 below. The situations or worlds with respect to which the interpretation is made permit of different construals; e.g. instead of permitted situ­ ations, the situations can be construed evaluatively as ideal situations. 26 �3 Q formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). The usual vandalism charge does not apply against Mr. Last Man since he does no damage to others. Moreover, Mr. Last Man's activities may be toned down to avoid any vandalism charge, yet succumb to the (extended) chauvinist charge, e.g. he may simply destroy sows environ­ mentally valuable things unnecessarily (without due reason or some need). (ii) The Zest pgopZe example. to the last people example. The last man example can be extended We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have One considers the last people in blocked any chance of reproduction. order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfect­ ing the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the sheer enjoyment of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining natural forests disappear in favour of pastures or plantations,and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinction. behaved badly; of value; On an environmental ethic the last people have they have done what is impermissible and destroyed much for they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the core principles (D) and (A), and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions under more obvious construals of these principles. Indeed the main point of elaborating this extension of the last man example is because principles (D) and (A) may, as they stand, appear to conflict with stewardship, cooperation and perfection positions, as the last man example reveals. The apparent conflict between these positions and principle (D) may be definitively removed, it seems, by conjoining a further proviso to the principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people who are not vandals do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of 28 reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. 28 On next page. 27 �(iii) The ^reu^ eTz^repr^KeMr example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). industrialist; The last man is an he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and even meets Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". It may be objected, however, that there is no reason or warrant for the great entrepreneur's production and it is simply wasteful. But we can easily amend the example by adding consumers who want to use the out­ put. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend (iii) to the socket!/ example (iv): the society looks depressingly like ours except for its reproductive incapacity. (v) The species example. The blue whale (reduced to a 29 mixed good on the economic picture ) is on the verge of extinction because of its qualities as a private good, as a profitable source of oil and meat. whalers; The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compen­ sate the whalers if they desist; destruction. nor need whale hunting be wilful (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man's 28 There are however elements in the lesser traditions - especially if 'cooperation' and 'perfection' are reconstrued in less chauvinistic and homocentric terms - which point the way to a more satisfactory ethic. 29 The example is adapted from Barkley and Seckier, op. cit., who nicely expose the orthodox economic picture. To make the example more difficult for utilitarians in the tradition of Bentham, it can be further supposed that the killing of the whalesis near instantaneous and painless, the whale products are very valuable to humans and indeed irreplaceable, and that the whales led a good life while they lived. (Would the killing of remote groups of humans under similar conditions be then so much worse?). 28 �* activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism did not cease allocating whales to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would: instead the market system ground inexorably (for the sorts of reasons well-explained in Barkley and Seckier, op. cit.) along the private demand curve until the blue whale population was no longer viable. It has been objected that the operation of the free market is restrained by ethical principles - or rather legally enforced copies thereof; for example, it would be profitable to exploit child labour, but moral prohibitions, legally enforced, exclude such exploitation of children. But the case is quite different; children, unlike young animals such as vealers, are already shielded under the modified dominant position. If anything, the "objection" is a further illustration of chauvinism at work.^O Although the vanishing species example given does not apply decisively against extended utilitarianisms, such as that of Bentham, which widen the base class to all sentient creatures, the case is easily varied so that it does: class of tropical plant species simply select one of the currently threatened with extinction. (vi) The /actorz/ /arm example. On the farm animals of various sorts are kept under artificial, confined conditions and simply used for the market goods they deliver, e.g. eggs in the case of battery hens, milk in the case of rotor cows, veal in the case of calves. The animals are subject to whatever conditions (e.g. forced feeding, iron deficient diets, constant lighting) will deliver maximal quantities of desired goods for the human commodity market. The animals do not necessarily suffer pain (and insofar as they do in behaviourally conspicuous ways the problem can For the most part the operation of the free market is only constrained by chauvinistic principles: otherwise enterpreneurs tend to undertake whatever apparently profitable business activity they can get away with, including substantial exploitation of animals and widespread environ­ mental destruction, and their lack of concern is illustrated by such facts as that they are generally prepared to pay taxes (e.g. to compensate other humans) rather than to forgo their activities in cases such as river and lake pollution and forest removal. In fact, of course, fairly unfettered operation of the market tends to encourage more restricted chauvinisms, e.g. the exploitation of cheap foreign or female labour in the secondary labour market. 29 �be met by antibiotics), but they are imprisoned under dispreferred conditions. The threatment of the animals on the "farm" is perfectly permissible according to the core principle (or at least minor adjustments to exclude unnecessary suffering will ensure conformity), but on an The treatment of the animals on the farm environmental ethic it is not. also seems to conform to the principles of the lesser traditions, insofar as these principles are spelled out in a way that can be applied to the example, that is so long as cooperation and perfection are construed in intended chauvinistic fashion. (vii) The example. The wilderness, though isolated and rarely visited or thought about by environmentalists, is known to contain nothing of use to humans, such as seed or drug supplies, that is not adequately replicated elsewhere. It does contain however some "low quality" forest that could supply pulpwood on a commercial basis were the local government to provide subsidies on the usual basis. The logging would destroy the wilderness in a largely irreversible way (e.g. it grows on high sand dune country or on lateritic soils) and kill many animals which live in the forest. sees The prevailing with the destruction of such ethic wrong nothing a wilderness, nor do the lesser traditions: a deeper environmental ethic does. Again the example requires variation, e.g. to a wilderness devoid of sentient individuals, if it is to counter clearly such extensions of Western ethics as those of animal liberationists. For this sort of reason we do not want to overstate or overrate the role of as distinct from variations upon such examples. examples - Firstly, people deeply committed to human chauvinism - as many, perhaps most, people are - will find some of the examples unconvincing because they depend on non- chauvinistic assumptions. Secondly, there are rejoinders to some of the examples based on the prevailing ethic. In this case what we claim is that there are variations on, and elaborations of the examples which meet such considerations. In connection with this we do not want to deny that there are other strands supplementing the prevailing ethic which are critical of some activities of the sort described in the examples, e.g. anti-vandalism principles and strictures against conspicuous consumption But, as remarked, these principles as reflected, e.g. in sumptuary laws. have not been adequately incorporated in the prevailing ethic in such a way as to meet variations on the examples or to serve environmental purposes; and if the attempt were made to fully incorporate such princi­ ples once again a new ethic would be the upshot. (Compare the situation before the change from an ethic which sanctioned Tzu/na??. slavery.) 30 �* In summary,what the examples show is that core axiological and deontic assumptions of the Western super-ethic are environmentally inadequate; and accordingly Western ethics should be superseded by a more environmentally adequate ethic. The class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on such an environmental ethic than it is in the Western superethic, and the class of noninstrumentally valuable objects is correspondingly wider than it is on the Western super-ethic. But is not an environmentalist ethic going too far in implying that these people - those of the examples and respected entrepreneurs and industrialists and bureaucrats, farmers and fishermen and foresters - are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, since destructive of what is valuable, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the destruction of the forest where the people may live, or the slaughter of remaining blue whales, or the gross exploitation of experimental or factory-farm animals for private profit or as part of the latest 5 year plan. Those who organise or engage in such activities are (to a greater or lesser extent, depending on their mode of engagement) morally culpable. Models of permissible respected life styles and of the good life (for others to emulate) depend upon what the underlying ethic accounts good and evil, permissible or not, and so forth; and changes with change of ethic. A new ethic is needed not merely to accommodate the evaluations, prescriptions and models indicated, in a way decidedly different from Western ethics, but in order to cope with a much wider range of more practical, and often more controversial, cases where Western ethics yield (without epicycling, i.e. extensive resort to theory-saving strategems) unacceptable or inadequately grounded results. An alternative ethic is also needed by a growing number of valuers because they have values, interests and new concerns of ecological sorts which do not fit in with, but conflict with, central features of prevailing Western ethics. There is occurring, it seems, a far-reaching cultural, and ethical change, a change in consciousness, and in particular a change in attitudes to what is natural and the natural environment (a change which may eventually be as fundamental as, and partly overturn, the humanist changes of the Enlightenment). A new ethic is accordingly needed to reflect and formul­ ate, and enable the defence and application of, a new, increasingly felt, 31 �a but not so far well-articulated system of values, in much the same way that a system of probability was needed and formulated to articulate and systematise likelihood and probability principles, and relevant logic systems required to capture pre-analytic views of entailment. The explication of environmental ethics is a similar theoretical concern; again, as commonly, theory lags behind the facts of change and the felt data. Furthermore, just as entailment systems are not uniquely determined, or desired or accepted by every thinker, so ezzzz*Zr<9zzwe7zfaZ. be %%-z^MeZz/ (ie^grzzz-Zzzg^, or adopted by every valuer. will zzct On the contrary, as is plain enough, their adaption and furtherance will be vigorously resisted by many vested interests, as - to take just one instance - the furtherance of programmes for the elimination of environmental sources of cancer is vigorously opposed by industrial chemical companies. The matter of persuading other, valuers to accept values and principles of a new ethic is of course a further and somewhat separate issue from the question of need for such an ethic. The procedures for trying to effect changes in values are but variations on the usual pro­ cedures, and like them are not fully effective: excluding coercion and education, they include, for example, argumentation, and propaganda, in each case of many sorts.As usual, too, where there is a broad common 32 basis, especially in felt evaluations and emotional presentation, effecting a change, or a conversion, will generally be an easier task. In the case of transformation to environmental values, what is often important are distinctive features regarding the factual bases of many of the evaluations. correcting In particular, there is the matter of removing or /zz^scozzcept^oTZS on a broad range of matters of Some of these sorts are considered in more detail in (c) J. Passmore, 'Ecological problems and persuasion' in PpnaZ^fz/ ipz^erTzaz^ozzaZ u?Z(Z Comparative t/vrisprz/devce (ed. G. Dorsey) , Oceana Publications, New York, 1977, pp.431-42. The apposite term 'emotional presentation' is adapted from Meinong; see especially Ov FmotiozzaZ Presentation (trans. M.L. Schubert-Kalsi), Northwestern University Press, 1972. The notion of emotional present­ ation can play an important role in the explanation of how emotions enter into (environmental) evaluations, the objects evaluated (canyons, mountains, giant trees) often being emotionally presented. A little more precisely, the connections are these: A value ranking (e.g. c is better, more valuable, than d) of a valuer is explained emotionally through - it does not reduce to - certain preference rankings of the valuer; and the preference rankings have in turn dual factual and emotional bases, in the same sort of way that an item may be preferred or chosen in virtue of its factual features and the valuer's emotional responses to those. The main details of such a semantical analysis of value, which is discussed in §5, are given in Routley (c). 32 �environmental concern; for example, about animals, their various behaviour, abilities, etc; about the alleged gulf between humans and other animals and the uniqueness of humans and each human; about the profitability, or desirability, or necessity, of environmentally destruct­ ive enterprises; about the inevitability of current Western social arrangements and about the history of the way these particular arrange­ ments developed. There is, moreover, the matter of sheer information, for example as to how free animals live together and what they do; about how factory and experimental animals are treated, and in the latter case for what: about the sources and effects of various forms of pollution and the reasons for it; about how natural creatures such as whales or environments such as forests are commonly dealt with, for what products, by what interests, for what ends. Naturally (given a fact/value division) none of this information is entirely conclusive support for a change in ethic; for many of the evaluations the data helps support can be included in other ethics (including sometimes modifications of prevailing ethics), while remaining evaluations can, at worst, be simply rejected (as e.g., those utilitarians who extend consideration just to sentient creatures are obliged to reject versions of the last man argument where no sentient creatures are affected). Althouth a new ethic is needed, for the reasons indicated, and although such an ethic can,furthermore, be a considerable asset in practical environmental argument (e.g., as to the point of trying to 33 retain a piece of not-especially-unique near-wilderness), for many practical ecological purposes, there is no need to apply it or to fall back on it. For example, virtually the whole environmental issue of destructive forestry in Australia can be argued without invoking any unconventional ethical principles or values at all, i.e. entirely within the prevailing chauvinistic framework. environmental disputes. The same sort of point applies to But, it by no means applies to all. A corollary is an inadequacy in the presentation of environmental problems and suggested solutions in standard (human) ecology texts (such as P. and JssMss A. Erlich's Freeman, San Francisco, 1970, to select one example), which are set 34 e/zf-ZreZz/ within the chauvinistic framework. Also, differently, in the way that theories are in enabling one to see how to move and argue in a discussion. Quite properly given prevailing sentiments, according to some erring conservationists, who account themselves "realists". 33 �Since it is sometimes charged - despite all that has been said that an environmental ethic does not differ in practice from that of more conventional "chauvinistic" ethics, there is point in spelling out in Firstly, many conventional yet other ways how it can differ in practice: positions, in particular social contract and sympathy theories, cannot take proper account of moral obligation to future humans (who are not in the immediate future). Since the usual attempt to argue, in terms of value and benefit to humans, that natural areas ecosystems generally should not be destroyed or degraded depends critically on introducing possible future humans who will suffer or be worse off as a result of its destruction or degradation, it is plain that an environ­ and mental ethic will differ radically from such conventional positions. That is, the usual argument depends on the reduction of value of a natural item to the interests of present and /nfure humans, in which reduction future humans must play a critical role if conclusions not blatantly opposed to conservation are to be reached. Hence there will usually be a very great gulf between the practical value judgements of conservation ethics and those of conventional positions which discount the (non- immediate) future. Secondly, as we have already seen through examples, there are practical differences between an environmental ethic and conventional instrumental views which do take account of the interests of past, present and future humans, differences which emerge sharply at the It is, however, unnecessary to hypothetical (possible world) level. turn to possible world examples to see that normally there would be very great differences in the practical valuations and behaviour of those who believe that natural items can have value and create obligations not reducible (in any way) to human interests and those who do not, as the following further examples show. Example 1. We need only consider the operation of zJorZd, for example, the concept of damapo to a natural item, and the associated notion of coTnpeMsafdoM for that damage. C. Stone, for instance, in STzo^Zd Troes ^fuTid^Mp? Thus Towards LepaZ. /"or ZVufMraZ- Objocfs (Avon Books, New York, 1975) notes the practical legal differences between taking the damage to a polluted river as affecting its intrinsic value, and taking it as just affecting human river users. In the one case one will see adequate compensation as restoring the original state of the river (rectifying the wrong to the river) and in the other as compensating those present (or future) humans who will suffer from its pollution. As Stone points out, the sum 34 �adequate to compensate the latter may well be much less than that required to restore the river to its unpolluted state, thus making it economic, and in terms of the human chauvinist theory, fair and reason­ able, to compensate those damaged and continue pollution of the river. In the first case, of course, adequate compensation or restoration for the harm done would have to consist in restoring the river to its unpolluted condition and will not just be paid to the people affected. Compare here Stone's example of compensation for injury to a Greek slave; in the instrumentalist case this will involve compensating the slave's owner for the loss of his slave's working time; in the other, where the slave is regarded as not merely an instrument for his owner, it will compensate the sZuue not the for this compensation will also take account of the pain and suffering of the slave, even where this has not affected his working ability. There is a difference not only in the amount of compensation, but to zj/zow it is directed. In the case of a natural item damage may be compensated by payment to a trust set up to protect and restore it. Example 2. The believer in intrinsic values may avoid making unnecessary and excessive noise in the forest, out of respect for the forest and its nonhuman inhabitants. She will do this even when it is certain that there is no other human around to know the difference. For one to whom the forest and its inhabitants are merely another conventional utility, however, there will be no such constraint. He may avoid unnecessary noise if he thinks it will disturb other humans, but if he is certain none are about to hear him he will feel at liberty to make as much and as loud a noise as he chooses, and this will affect his behaviour. Examples like this cannot be dealt with by the introduction of future humans, since they will be unable to hear the noise in question. To claim that the making of noise in such circumstances is a matter of no importance, and therefore there is no important difference in behaviour, is of course to assess the matter through human chauvinist eyes. question-begging. From the intrinsic viewpoint it So such a claim is make a difference, and be reflected in practical behavioural difference. Example 3. Consider an aboriginal tribe which holds a particular place to be sacred, and where this sanctity and intrinsic valuableness and beauty is celebrated by a number of beautiful cave paintings. A typically "progressive" instrumentalist Western view would hold the cave (and perhaps place) to be worth preservation because of its value to the aboriginal people, and because of the artistic merit of the human arti­ facts, the cave paintings the cave contained. 35 To the "enlightened" �Westerner, if the tribe should cease to exist, and the paintings be i destroyed, it would be permissible to destroy the place if this should be in what is judged to be the best interests of human kind, e.g. to get at the uranium underneath. To the aboriginal the human artifacts, the cave paintings would be irrelevant, a celebration of the value of the place, but certainly not a surrogate for it, and the obligation to the place would not die because the tribe disappeared or declined. Similarly no ordinary sum of money would be able to compensate for the loss of such a place, in the way that it might for something conceived of as a utility or convenience, as having value only because of the benefits it confers on the "users" of it. There is an enormous or difference between feeling that a place should be valued or respected for itself, for its perceived beauty and character., and.feeling that it should not be defaced because it is valued by one's fellow humans, and provides pleasurable sensations or money or convenience for them. Compare too the differences between feeling that a yellow robin, say, is a fellow creature in many ways akin to oneself, and feeling that it is a nice little yellow and grey, basically clockwork, aesthetic object. These differences in emotional presentation are accompanied by or expressed by an enormous range of behavioural differences, of which the examples given represent only a very small sample. The sort of behaviour by each viewpoint and thought by it, the concept of what one is free to do, for example, will normally be very different. It is certainly no coincidence that cultures holding to the intrinsic view have normally been far less destructive of nature than the dominant Western human chauvinist culture. In summary, the claim that there is no difference, that the intrinsic value viewpoint is empty verbalisation, does not stand up to examination. The capacity - no doubt exaggerated, but nonetheless far from negligible - of Western industrial societies to solve their ecological problems (at least to their own pathetically low standards) within a chauvinistic framework, does considerably complicate, and obstruct, an alternative more practical argument to the need for a new ethic, /row that in no other way ... [than] prepared[ness] to accept a "new ethic", as distinct even from adding one or two new moral principles to an accepted common ... can modern industrial 35 societies solve their ecological problems. On next page. 36 �Not only does the argument encounter various objections - most obviously that many of the problems can be solved, if not within Western ethics, in immediate extensions of them - but the case suggested would hardly be a satisfactory basis for the type of ethic sought. It is not so much that it would be a chauvinistic way of arriving at a supposedly nonchauvinistic ethic, for bad procedures can lead to good results; rather it is that important ecological problems, shaping environmental ethics, such as preservation of substantial tracts of wilderness and just treatment of animals, tend to be written off in industrial societies as not serious problems. But even if the argument suggested has too narrow a problem base, and so may yield too limited a change in attitudes as compared with the main theoretical argument, the argument merits fuller formulation and further investigation. The argument to need for ethical revision is as follows: (1) A satisfactory solution to environmental problems (of modern industrial societies) implies (the adoption of) an alternative environmental ethic. (2) A satisfactory solution to environmental problems is needed. Therefore, an alternative environmental ethic is needed.36 The argument is valid, given, what seems correct, that pimplies q implies that p is needed implies that q is needed. The second premiss is or can be made analytic, on the sense of 'satisfactory' 'satisfactory' imply 'needed'); (e.g. by having so the case is complete if the first premiss can be established (in the same sense of 'satisfactory'), and the conclusion is then plausible to at least the extent the premiss is. Al37 though the first premiss, or something like it, is widely endorsed, cogent 35 Passmore (c) op. cit., p.438. According to Passmore (p.431), By common consent, there are four major ecological problems: pollution, the exhaustion of resources, the destruction of species, and overpopulation ... To solve such problems involves finding a way either of altering types of human conduct or of preventing that human conduct from having its present consequences. In what follows the assumption that 'there are four major ecological problems' gets rejected. 36 This implies only, that a new ethic is necessary for solving environmental problems, and not of course that it is 37 Even Passmore, though previously (e.g. in (a)) highly critical of proposals for new ethics, gives qualified endorsement to an assumption of this sort ((c), p.441). ... I do not doubt, all the same, that our attitudes to nature stand badly in need of revision and that, as they stand, they form a major obstacle to the solution of ecological problems. 37 �# arguments for it are few and it is no simple matter rendering the premiss plausible. Moreover rendering it plausible involves a substant­ ial detour through social theory; for the case for the premiss proceeds along these sorts of lines: (3) Unless there are (certain) major changes in socio-economic structure, environmental problems will not be satisfactorily solved. (4) The major changes in socio-economic structure involve ethic. an alternative A much stronger thesis than (3) has been argued for using systems analysis, namely that without very extensive socio-economic changes, modern industrial society will collapse; but several of the assumptions made in the analysis are doubtful or disputed. independently of that stronger thesis; But (3) has been argued for example, it will follow from the thesis (of Falk, Commoner and others) 'that the modern industrial ethic as we have known it is not sustainable on ecological grounds'.^ In a sense, (3) is obvious; for it is present socio-economic arrangements that have produced many of the present serious environmental problems; without major changes in those arrangements most of the problems will What is not immediately evident is persist or, more likely, intensify. that the major changes called for, in satisfying (3), suffice for (4). However reflection on the specific types of changes required - for example at a superficial level, human population limitation, reduction of poll­ ution, more sensible resource usage, selective economic growth - reveals that significant changes in value, and also in what is considered permissible, are bound to be involved in the changes. plausible, and therewith the intended conclusion. So (4) is decidedly But the argument leaves the detailed character of the needed alternative ethic rather obscure; and it may well be that the ethic so yielded is somewhat chauvinistic in character. The more practical argument cannot entirely supplant the main theoretical argument. In sum, there are good and pressing reasons to investigate the alternatives to chauvinistic ethics, especially human chauvinism, because such chauvinistic ethics are discriminatory, because the case for them 38 39 See, in particular, D. Meadows and others, Potomac Associates, Washington, D.C., 1972. PtwZts to CrozjtT?, R.A. Falk, 'Anarchism and world order', Pornos IX, 1978, p.66. Falk refers for the case to B.Commoner, TPs CZosZ^p CZroZo, Knopf, New York, 1971; R.A. Falk, T/zZs PZo^ot, Random House, New York. 1971; E. Goldsmith and others EZMoprZut /or F^rvZ^aZ, Houghton and Miflin, Boston, 1972, and Meadows et aZ., op. cit. 38 O �does not stand up to examination, and because they have been involved in the destruction of much of value and now threaten the viability of much that is valuable. § 4 . ENVIRONMENTAL ALTERNATIVES : NARROWING THE CHOICE AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS . The basic - and basically mistaken - doctrine of the Western super-ethic is, as we have seen, that people, humans of whatever shape or form, are the fundamental carriers or objects of value and that all other items are valuable only in an instrumental or derivative way. It is important, in­ deed mandatory in a genuine environmental ethic, to reject this view and allow natural items to have a value in their own right, ^yz i/ze sazzze /as/z^oM as peopZ-e, both for the reasons outlined above, of the theoret­ ical unsatisfactoriness and arbitrariness of the traditional view, and for more practical reasons, namely, to help ensure the ecological sustain­ ability of modern society, and in optimising human welfare. It has often been pointed out that 'a totally humanised world would diminish us as 40 human beings', that the traditional view of humans, or classes of humans, as dominant, and of natural items as without value except where they serve human or class interests - a view that often carries contempt for nature leads not only to the destruction of much that is of value but (paradoxic­ ally) to counterproductive results even with respect to human welfare. Thus McHarg (in attractively coloured rhetoric) Show me a man-oriented society in which it is believed that reality exists only because man can perceive it, that the cosmos is a struct­ ure erected to support man on its pinnacle, that man exclusively is divine and given dominion over all things, indeed that God is made in the image of man, and I will predict the nature of its cities and their landscape. I need not look far for we have seen them-the hot­ dog stands, the neon shill, the ticky-tacky houses, dysgenic city and mined landscapes. centric man; This is the image of the anthropomorphic, anthropo­ he seeks not unity with nature but conquest (op. cit.). The rejection of this view and its replacement by a view in which natural items can be regarded as of value and as worthy of our respect for themselves and not merely for what we can get out of them or what use we 40 see e.g. the discussion at pp.116-17 of (a) J. Rodman, 'The Liberation of nature', Irz^z^rz/, 20 (1977) 83-145. All subsequent references to Rodman's work without further indication are to this article. Note well that the rejection of human chauvinism does Moi imply that no chauvinistic arguments - or rafTzsr, arguments that are usually stated in chauvinistic form - carry weight. On the contrary, some chauvinistic arguments (e.g. those supporting wilderness retention and species preservation) carry considerable weight; and, since the prevailing industrial ethics remain chauvinistic, environmentalists would be rash not to use them. 39 �& can make of them, is becoming increasingly widespread in parts of the environmental movement. It is this primarily that makes for an important ideological split in the conservation movement, between what Naess (op. cit.) called sTzaZZozj and Fesp ecology, between those who see conservation as just a matter of wiser, better-controlled exploitation of the environment — something which is compatible with denying value to everything except man and those who see it at least in part as involving a recognition of value for natural items independent of man, and hence as involving (at least to some extent) a The gzEpZo^a^opz view, which is first view, the long-term or closely tied to prevailing more enlightened economic assumptions, tends to make heavy use of the watershed term 'resource'; the problem of conserv­ ation is seen as one of 'zjFss Mse oy resoMrcss', a resource being something of use to humans or persons. On this view, which does not get beyond the confines of human chauvinism, and so is no direction for.a satisfactory environmental ethic to take, items which have no perceivable use to man, i.e. non-resources, can be destroyed without loss; and the environmental problem is viewed as largely one of making people aware of the extent to which natural items and processes have Fustrz^gnPaZ- value, i.e. of how far we are dependent on them and they are of to us. There is no recognition either that some items might be valuable precisely they are independent of man. Resource Conservation, or the shallow position, is the first of the 42 four ideal types that Rodman discerns in his investigation of the contemporary environmental movement. The deeper ecological position gets split under Rodman's division into three ideological positions - though Rodman prefers to put the matter in symbolic or experiential terms, in terms of forms of consciousness - namely Wilderness Preservation, Nature Moralism, and Ecological Resistance. Though the positions discerned are neither characterised in an exclusive fashion, nor exhaustive of ecological positions, and though we shall have to look beyond all the positions for a satisfactory environmental ethic, nonetheless they afford an excellent perspective on the main types of alternative positions that have been adopted by those within environmental movements. It is not uncommon to encounter attempts to write the shallow position into the very meaning or definition of e.g. 'conservation is the use of resources to the greatest advantage of man', 4 Furvez/ py Fcrgsz^rz/ T^FMSz^r^es. ParP FT. Foresfrz/ Pe^gZ.opz7?e?2^ PZ-arz. Draft (31 October, 1974), p.ll - a blatantly chauvinistic account. On next page. 40 �According to (Wilderness) Preservation, which focusses on wilderness, wilderness is to be preserved for the wilderness experience, wilderness offers a natural cathedral, a sacred place where human beings can transcend the limitations of everyday experience and become renewed through contact with the power of creation ((b), p.49). The values discerned in wilderness and natural landscape are primarily aesthetic and quasi-religious, or mystical, 'the experience of the holy is esthetically mediated'; what is valuable remains human experiences. Thus the Wilderness Preservation position does not move outside the sphere of human chauvinism, and can no more than Resource Conservation offer a frame for an environmental ethic. Rodman reaches a similar conclusion: Resource Conservation and Wilderness Preservation appear variations on the theme of wise use, the former oriented to the [efficient] production of commodities for human consumption, the latter to providing human amenities ((b), p.50). For this reason, the Wilderness Preservation position fails even on the score of justifying the preservation of wilderness - on the very task it was designed to accomplish - in a range of circumstances. Like other See especially (b) J. Rodman, 'Theory and practice in the environmental movement: notes towards an ecology of experience', in Search for VuZzzes a International Cultural Foundation, New York, 1978, pp.45-56. Some of the types are portrayed in greater detail in other Rodman papers. The remainder of this largely new section on environmental ethical alternatives is heavily indebted, in ways the references mostly make plain, to Rodman's work. His work covers a vast range of interlinked topics; only those of immediate relevance have been touched upon. But there is very much in the remainder that repays careful reading, and zzzMc/z to think about and to question or reject, reaching perhaps its lowest point in the paradoxical themes: Just as our statements about other people tend also to be concealed statements about ourselves, so statements about non­ human nature tend to be concealed statements about the human condition, and movements to liberate nonhuman nature tend also to be movements to liberate the repressed potentials of human nature (p.105). In part because these themes and the related myth of microcosm are taken seriously, and not for the evident falsehoods they are, in part because the ethical adequacy of the human/nonhuman distinction is never seriously questioned (e.g. it is taken for granted, what is not the case, that rights apply to humans and are problematic beyond them), and in part because of the characteristically chauvinistic emphasis on human experience and the endeavour to bring everything within that experiential purvue, and the associated weight assigned to human symbolic, mythic and ritual activities, one is left with the feeling, at the end of all the investigations one can profitably follow Rodman through, that one has not got beyond the confines of human chauvinism. 41 �instrumentalist accounts of wilderness value, it breaks down entirely with examples like the Last Man, assuming that Mr. Last Man is never turned on by natural spendour. More alarmingly, under readily conceivable developments, it would allow the elimination of wilderness entirely. For consider the Wilderness Experience Machine, a low-impact low-tech philosophical machine, recently patented by I.M. Diabolic, which can duplicate entirely, even for groups of people, wilderness experiences, but in a downtown room. As far as the psychological experience goes, this machine can provide a complete substitute for any actual wilderness, and were the value of wilderness to reside in the experience it afforded, could entirely replace it and eliminate the alleged need for it. Most environmentalists would be (rightly) dissatisfied with, not to say appalled by, the idea that Wilderness Experience Machines could sub­ stitute for wildernesses, since they provided the same experiences. what else they wanted, the answer would of course be: Asked Wildernesses, not merely wilderness experiences. Wildernesses are valuable in their own right, over and above the experiences they can afford.43 Really, that is, they consider wildernesses intrinsically valuable, but have been pushed by the prevailing ethical ethos into stating, and misrepresenting, their position in experiential terms. There is some independent evidence that the Wilderness Preservation position is frequently a disguised intrinsic value position, in the attitude taken to examples like the Last Man case, that purely hypothetical experiencers (who may vanish into counterfactuals) are good enough, and that in some real-life cases it is enough that wilderness is there to be contemplated, whether or not anyone actually takes advantage of its presence to gain experiences, or indeed whether or not it is in fact contemplated. Such examples remove the disguise and reveal the position as at bottom an intrinsic value position. In that event it is however better to avoid the disguise; for the case for wilder­ ness preservation which starts from the position that some wilderness tracts have intrinsic as well as merely instrumental value is substantially stronger than any position which assigns them merely instrumental value. Wilderness lovers and nature conservationists have in fact worked out - or concocted - a set of arguments to show why wildernesses and nature conservation are of benefit to humans, to argue for their instrumental — The concept of zjfZ-demess too can vary with the operative ideology, e.g. on certain views, such as Wilderness Preservation, wilderness comprises areas that are (or provide the opportunity for use), e.g. used for experiential enrichment. By contrast, on a genuine Environ­ mental Resistance view, wilderness is a wild area, use of which is not implied: it may never be used, and it may not matter that it affords no opportunity for (human) use. (Under popular high redefinition of 'wilderness', there are of course no wildernesses remaining on the earth, and wilderness vanishes as soon as humanly experienced.) 42 �value. For example, there are various arguments from the scientific value, or usefulness, of wilderness, e.g. for the study of natural eco­ systems, for the investigation of plant history and evolution, as a repository of genetic diversity, etc. These arguments, which (like parallel arguments for species preservation) are not to be especially as regards persuasive force, can be put in nonchauvinistic form; for science and knowledge are not linked essentially with, for example, the feature of being human. Often however - e.g. where the wilderness defended has, so far as it is known, little that is very special to offer - such arguments appear to be merely a conventional front for the real (or deeper) reasons - and in sofne instances, correspondingly weak and unpersuasive (as Fraser Darling has remarked, and Passmore has tried to show in (a)) - the real reasons being based on the perception of nonuseful properties of value. This is particularly marked in the case of arguments for preserving the most complex and beautiful of the world's plant communities, tropical rainforest. Such arguments as that various uninvestigated rainforest trees may at some time be found to contain useful drugs, by no means exhaust the true value of the rainforest. For it is in the intrinsic, i.e. noninstrumental, value of the rainforest that the main reason for not unduly interfering with it, e.g. not interfering in ways that threaten its stability or viability, lies. In particular, destruction of a wilderness, such as a rainforest, would significantly diminish intrinsic value, and so should (in general) be resisted. Environmentalists who are aware of these sorts of problems and dangers with resource use approaches to wilderness preservation sometimes attempt to formulate their alternative view in terms of one of the lesser traditions, most popularly in terms of the image, in which man is seen as the steward of the earth - an analogy which, as Passmore points out (in (a)), is problematic outside a religious context. For who is man steward to? If not to God, then how is the analogy to be unpacked, and what conditions must "stewardship" conform to? If "good stewardship" is management in the interests of humans, or humanity, then the position does not go beyond Resource Conservation; if it is manage44 ment to serve intrinsic values, or God, then good stewardship is but a cover for the recognition of intrinsic values, which are better introduced directly. Thus admitting values which are not instrumental, which do not answer back in some way to states or conditions of humans is a feature of all satisfactory deeper ecological alternatives. In order to allow for such intrinsic values and/or associated attitudes of respect, e.g. for 44 on some interpretations; chauvinism. on others theism may serve to reinforce human 43 �nature and various natural things, it is however unnecessary to adopt a religious backdrop such as the "Good Stewardship" image suggests, or even a semi-religious framework such as a mystical or superstitious one with taboos and sacred places as symbolic and ritual elements. A theory of intrinsic value which assigns intrinsic value to wilderness and species of free animals, for good reasons, can be entirely naturalistic (in a main sense of that much-abused term). The third, somewhat amorphous, cluster of positions Rodman describes, Nature Moralisms, do just that, assign intrinsic, noninstrumental, value to natural items, such as - on some versions of the position wilderness. [An] alternative perspective ... [to] the theme of wise use 45 ... is provided by the tradition growing out of the humane movement, recently radicalised by animal liberationists, and sometimes generalised to embrace non-animal beings as well. to the economic ethos of Resource In contrast Conservation and the religious/ esthetic character of Wilderness Preservation, this perspective is strikingly moral in style. Its notion of human virtue is not prudence or reverence, but justice. In contrast to the caste­ bound universe of the Resource Conservationist, the Natural Moralist affirms the democratic principle that all natural entities (or, more narrowly, all forms of life) have intrinsic value, and that wild animals, plants, rivers, and whole ecosystems have a right to exist, flourish and reproduce - or at least that human beings have no right to exploit or unnecessarily harm or destroy other members of the biotic community. In contrast to the aristo­ cratic universe of Wilderness Preservation, where some places (and some forms of recreation) are holier than others and certain types of natural entities ... are traditionally more worthy of being saved than others ..., the world of the Nature Moralist is characterised by an apparent egalitarianism ((b), p.50, my rearrangement). Each of the sweep of environmental alternatives indicated can be seen as an of conventional Western ethics: intrinsic value is extended uniformly to all animals or certain favoured features of all these, e.g. their experience, happiness, avoidance of suffering, or is extended to all living creatures or systems, or is extended to all natural items or even to objects - it may or may 45 be distributed uniformly or equally; Human use and human experience, it might be added. 44 �rather independently, rights may be ceded to all animals, or to some or all living things, or to all things, or, alternatively and differently, right-holders' rights with respect to some or other of these classes are restricted; and similarly other deontic notions, justice, obligation, even perhaps duty, may extend to apply to larger classes of items than all humans or persons. The sweep, which is impressive, is intended to include both extended utilitarianisms, e.g. Bentham's utilitarianism as revamped by Singer according to which all sentient creatures are entitled to equal consider­ ation of interest, and extended (legal) rights doctrines, e.g. the assignment of rights or legal standing to all natural objects as suggested by, for instance, Stone. 46 It also includes Darwin's ethic and Leopold s 47 "land ethic". In order to capture some of the intended examples of Nature Moralists, and all the Moral Extension positions, Rodman's characterisation requires some adjustment - which will be taken for granted in what follows. For example, Singer and other animal liberation- ists do not assign intrinsic value to all forms of life, or even to all animals; but (as Rodman is well aware) to all sentient creatures; that is, further classifications have to be taken into account. The egalitarian, or uniformity, assumptions that serve in character­ ising Natural Moralism are mistaken. Not all objects are of equal value; some are more valuable then others, while some have little or no value (and some have a negative value).4^ Impressive though the sweep of extensions is, all the positions indicated should be rejected on one ground or another, and sometimes on several grounds. Against positions which do not extend the class of objects of moral concern and candidates for value to include all objects, variants of the counterexamples to the Western super-ethic can be directed. Consider, for instance, the positions (of usual animal liber- ationists) which extend the moral boundaries just to include sentient creatures (or e.g. preference-havers). Adapt the Last Man and Last People examples, the Wilderness example, etc., by removing all (inessential) animals from the examples, e.g. the wilderness contains no animals, in the Last People situation there are no other animals than the 46 p. Singer, .4 ZVozJ Random House, New York, 1975; for (7%r C. Stone, op. cit. <?y 47 At least on a straightforward reading of Leopold's eventual position, but not according to Rodman; see his contrast of Leopold with Stone,, p.110. Darwin's ethic, which anticipates Leopold's, is presented m C. Darwin, of Muzz, Second edition, J. Murray, London, 1883. 4 8 On next page. 45 �1* Then the counterexamples apply as before last people themselves. against the liberation positions. It is unnecessary to go quite so far afield to fault such positions, at least in practice: as Rodman might put it, they are countered by the facts of experience: ... I need only to stand in the midst of a clear-cut forest, a strip-mined hillside, a defoliated jungle, or a dammed canyon to feel uneasy with assumptions that could yield the conclusion that no human action can make any difference to the welfare of anything but sentient animals (p.89). But an advantage of the counterexamples is that the same examples, among many others (e.g. situations devoid of sentient creatures, situations where the message of experience conflicts with justice or fairness), reveals the erroneousness of the well-sponsored thesis, a simple analogue of empiricism, that all value or sentient, objects). derives from experience (of experiential, A corollary is that value is not to be assessed either, in any simple way, in terms of the facts of experience. Insofar as Nature Moralism relies upon simple extensions of utilitarianisms, or of subjectivisms, to include a larger class of subjects, (a larger base class), such as all present sentient creatures, or all preference-havers at any one time, etc., it is open not merely to adaptations of the argument against chauvinism (animal chauvinism is not that much more satisfactory than human chauvinism), but most of the Nor, on Moral Extensions, need all objects that have rights have equal rights. Rights may not be very democratically distributed. Some things have rights, e.g. as a result of agreements, of a sort others do not hold or are not capable of holding. Even rights to exist, to flourish and to reproduce (each case is different) are in much doubt where there is scarcity or conflict and where some right holders are taken to be worth much more than others. Nor are such leading examplars of Natural Moralism as Singer and Stone, though they are concerned to extend principles of justice, committed to equality of rights assumptions. Stone explicitly rejects equal distribution of rights; but the principle that all natural objects are equal in having rights, which really says no more than that they all have rights, is at best a very weak egalitarian principle. Singer offers (and presumably would offer) no equality of rights principle, rejects an equality of treatment principle, and proposes as a principle of equality a (near vacuous) principle of equal consideration of interests. Not, this time, knowledge. But amusingly "value empiricism" collapses into empiricism proper given the Socratic identification: Value (generalising Virtue) is knowledge. The only natural stopping point under value empiricism is, of course, with all creatures that have (or could have) the relevant experiences: again not with humans. 46 �standard objections to utilitarians, subjectivisms, etc. Many versions of Nature Moralism may than be defeated on rather conventional grounds. There emerges, further, a dilemma for extensions. Either the crucial notions of right and intrinsic value are extended to all sentient creatures (experience-havers), in which case the objections just lodged apply, or they are extended more sweepingly, e.g. to all natural objects. But the latter involves attributing to such items attributes they do not have, most obviously rights to such objects as stones; it also violates the conditions that have to be met for the holding of rights and for the entitlement of rights. Thus, for example, Stone considers underpinning his extension of rights, beyond sentient creatures in the ordinary sense - or of legal rights beyond recognised "legal persons" - by a postulate of 50 universal sentience or consciousness; in short, by an unacceptable metaphysics, or myth. There are several further objections which work against many versions of Natural Moralism to which Rodman draws attention: (1) Moral Extensions are 'inadequate to articulate the intention that sustains the [environmental] movement' wilderness preservation movements. (p.88), specifically wilderness and It takes but little argument to show that utilitarian ethics, such as Singer's, so far from assisting the environmental movement, can (if adopted) reinforce the case wilderness and preservation of wild species. But an extension like Stone's extension of legal rights can help, and has helped, at least in the courts where its meta-physical underpining is unlikely to be glimpsed. The basic point is however that the rights talk does not connect with, and is insensitive to, the experiential basis. Mere extensions of moral notions such as interest or right or justice are insufficient to treat and do just­ ice to the multi-dimensional depth of environmental issues, such as the damming of a river (p.115). Part of the reason is said to be that the usual moral aparatus, which was evolved in the case of certain person-to-person 50 See Rodman's discussion, pp.92-3. But Rodman overstates his case m claiming that 'some such postulate as universal consciousness is there­ fore necessary if the notion of rights for trees is not to seem a rootless fancy'. For , as explained below, extended rights can be defined by a rather "natural extension" of the familiar notion of right, without any such postulate; and grounds of entitlement can be traced back to value of the items. Certainly extended rights sever what linkage there may have been between rights and liabilities, but with the modern separations of rights from responsibilities that linkage was already damaged or broken. 47 �* relations, is inadequate for getting to grips with a new dimension of moral experience, that concerned with environment, and inadequate to reflect ecological sensibility. Rodman tries to press, however, a much stronger, and rather more dubious, theme, the By adapting the moral/legal theory of 'rights', [the movement] may sell its soul, its roots in mythic and ritual experience, to get easier judicial standing (p.88); and more savagely, the progressive extension model of ethics, while holding out the promise of transcending the homocentric perspective of modern culture, subtly fulfills and legitimates the basic project of modernity - the total conquest of nature by man (p.97, also 'p.119)7* " While neither of these large claims is strictly true - soul-selling is simply avoided through adoption of the notion of extended-right, which can yield a conservative extension of the original position; and even utilitarians may be committed to blocking projects which threaten free animals - each has a substantial point. Part of the point behind the latter claim is worth developing separately:- (2) Moral Extensions typically cast natural objects, notably animals, in the role of inferior humans, 'legal incompetents', imbeciles, human vegetables, and the like. They are ... degraded by our failure to respect them for having their own existence, their own character and potentialities, their own forms of excellence, their own integrity, a degradation usually reflected in our reduction of 'them to the status of instruments for our own ends', and not removed 'by "giving" them rights, by assigning them to the status of inferior human beings' (p.94). Many of us know where the treatment of natural objects as mere means for human ends tends to lead and has led. The mistaken treatment of them as inferior humans, a treatment which fails to see and 'respect the otherness of nonhuman forms of life', leads in the same direction. For given that animals, for example, are inferior, it is legitimate to treat them also as inferior; a greater value principle, which moral extensions typically endorse, yields a similar result. The needs of increasing populations of superior humans will eventually outweigh, if they do not do so already, the cases of inferior inhabitants of this finite earth for the retention of their natural habitats. 48 For their rights and their �In the larger perspective, the Moral values will be less than "ours". Extensions, with their built-in greater value assumptions, do legitimate the conquest of nature by humans. Thus too they fail seriously, on what will soon enough be quite practical grounds, as satisfactory environmental ethics. (3) The extensions, like the parent ethics which they extend, are narrowly individualistic, and insufficiently holistic. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of utilitarianisms, which in principle arrive at all assessments by some sort of calculations, e.g. summations and perhaps averaging, from an initially given unit conforming to requisite equality conditions, e.g. equal consideration, equal units of suffering. In practice of course the method is, almost invariably, to pretend that the calculations will yield results which agree with alternatively and previously arrived at, usually intuitive, often prejudiced, evaluations; that is, in practice the method is not applied except in a handwaving back-up fashion. The method is not applied in part because there are serious, well enough known, problems in applying it. The individualistic bias carried over in other moral extensions, e.g. any experiential theory, likewise limits their satisfactoriness. It is to understate the matter to say merely that 'the moral atomism that focuses on individual animals and their subjective experiences does not seem well adapted to coping with ecological systems' (p.89), 'to explore the notion of shared habitat and the notion that an organism's relationship to its natural environment may be an important part of the organism's character' ((b), p.52). A moral atomism that focuses on individuals, discounting their interrelations, is bound to result in ecological complexes that matter (such as ecosystems, wilderness, and species) getting seriously short-changed. To illustrate:- Under atomism, the value of a complex, or the rights of a complex, amount to no more than those of its individual members; but since these are, in isolation from the complex, no more valuable than other things of their order, e.g. one gentian than another, a bush rat from a Norwegian rat, there no special merit in a complex, or rights attaching to it, in virtue of its rareity or uniqueness or special features as a complex. Thus, for instance, a utilitarianism under which only individual animals count assigns, and can assign, no special value to species, and can (as remarked) be used to argue against preservation of species: Since all animals are equal - or at least all animals of the same genus are more or less equal - one can substitute for another. For a rare species of rat to die out painlessly cannot matter while there are plenty of other rats. A rights theory is in similar difficulties so long 49 �w as rights are assigned only to individuals, taken in isolation from their environmental setting (i.e. only to the usual separable individuals of philosophical theory). These problems may be avoided, in part, by assign­ ing rights to complexes (given the notion of rights will take that much further stretching; which it will not if right holders are assumed to be conscious or to be preference-havers), and by attributing independent value to complexes. But, since the value of a whole is sometimes more than the sum of the separable values of its individual members, this move involves the rejection of usual atomism, utilitarianisms in particular. The objection against the narrow individualism of the extensions - a defect they share with standard ethics which do not admit of ready extension, such as contract theories - soon broadens into an objection that these extensions are built on an inadequate metaphysics, a metaphysics of rather isolated individuals who (or which) are seriously depauperate in An ethics presupposes a metaphysics at their relations with other objects. least through its choice of base class: thus for example, usual homocen- tric formulations of utilitarianisms and contract theories suppose a base class of narrowly self-interested humans. The remedy is not (as Rodman suggests in various places in his elaboration of Ecological Resistance) to move to holism: to do so would be to accept the other half of a false dichotomy mainstream philosophical thought engenders (cf. Routley (g), this volume). It is rather to move to a metaphysics that is built on a concept­ ion of objects (which may or may not be individuals) which are rich in their interrelations and connections. In summary, the moral extensions are the wrong direction in which to seek a satisfactory environmental ethic. But the failure of Nature Moralism does not mean, as Rodman tends to assume, that all positions 51 that are moral in style are thereby ruled out. For one thing, Nature Moralism, as characterised (or generalised), is far from exhaustive of the range of prima facie viable moral positions. More satisfactory positions will simply avoid the damaging assumptions of Nature Moralism (and likewise those of inadequate ethical positions, such as contract theories or naturalism, and those linking morality to legality; For another, if the quest is for an ruled out. cf. p.103). moral notions can hardly be Even if it is assumed that the call for a 'new ethic' is 'to guide the human/nature relationship (p.95) - a somewhat unfortunate way of putting it - whereas what matters is the human/nature relationship itself, and that in coping with that relation fixation on morality or 51 His thesis of the 'limitation of the moral/legal stage of unconscious­ ness' is investigated in more detail in what follows. 50 �G. $ legality is a serious handicap, and may contribute to the problem of the relationship rather than helping solve it (pp.103-4); still part of the problem is that of indicating entitlements of agents with respect to their environment, what sort of exploitation, if any, is permissible, what the limits on conventional morality are, and discovering 'a larger normative order within which we and our species-specific moral and legal systems have a niche' (p.97). Nor, in outlining Ecological Resistance, does Rodman shrink from using - he could not avoid the effect of - axiological terms such as 'good' and deontic terms such as 'should'; he does not doubt, for example, that some of what is natural that is threatened is valuable and that threats to it should be resisted; and he admits that 'prudence, justice, and reverence may be essential parts of a[n ecologic­ ally] good life'. Ecological Resistance, which is said to be the alternative 'most faithful to the integrity of experience', exhibits indeed the negativity of resistance. The position is founded on action, resistance, and theory only emerges retrospectively (if perhaps at all). Its (insufficiently qualified) central principle is 'that diversity is natural, good and threatened by the forces of monoculture'. The struggle between these forces, diversity and monoculture - between (ecological) good and evil occurs in several different spheres of experience, i.e. at various levels, which reflect one another. Resistance is not undertaken for self-interest or utilitarian reasons, or for moral reasons, or for religious or mystical reasons (such as preventing profanation), but because the threat to the [natural object or system] ... is perceived aZso as a threat to the self, or rather to the principle of diversity and spontaneity that is the endangered side of the basic balance that defines and sustains the very nature of things ((b), p.54). The disjunction, 'or', separates however two rather different (though combin­ able) reasons-cum-motives for resistance. The second disjunct yields the following reasons for resistance (which are linked by a metaphysical assumption connecting diversity and spontaneity with the nature of things): (i) The threat to the natural item is a threat to the principle of diversity and spontaneity. So, by the central principle, it is a threat to what is good, etc. (ii) The threat to the natural object 'is a threat to the very nature of things': (as to how consider the example of the wild river threatened by a dam, p.115). So - by an unstated, but nonetheless implied and assumed, principle, that the very nature of things is good (and natural) it is a threat to the forces of good. 51 �W- The first disjunct yields a further, different, argument; in simplest form: (iii) The threat to the natural object is a threat to oneself. What is a threat to oneself is bad and to be resisted, so what is a threat to the natural object is bad and has to be resisted (since what is bad should, in general, be resisted). Although the arguments are valid, the underlying principles are faulty; for instance, the diversity (and spontaneity) principle because it is too simple (and so too does not harmonize with the nature of things) ; and the second principle, the intrinsic merit of the very nature of the things, because not everything that is the case or is natural is meritor ­ ious, e.g. genuinely natural disasters. Rodman plans to avoid obstacles to adopting nature as an absolute standard and, at the same time, to bridge the gap the principle spans, by resort to a version of naturalism which equates 'the "natural" with the "moral"' (pp.96-7). But for well- known reasons which can be supported (e.g. those telling against objective ethics of the sort such naturalism would yield), substantive evaluative assumptions cannot be removed in this fashion; though they can be suppressed, they reappear as soon as connections between empirical grounds and evaluative judgments based upon them are queried. The trouble, characteristic of reductionism, arises from the mistaken attempt to collapse a grounding, or founding, relation to an identity, to close the gap - which is not problematic but is widely thought to be problem­ atic - between value and empirical fact by a reduction of value to fact, of the thesis that evaluative features are grounded on natural features to the thesis that evaluative features are nothing but certain natural , 52 features (e.g. to be good is just to have certain natural features). 52 Rodman interprets naturalistically the statement of Jonas's that he quotes approvingly (p.95): Only an ethic which is grounded in the breadth of being, not merely in the singularity or oddness of man, can have significance in the scheme of things ... an ethics no longer founded on divine authority [or upon human arete], must be founded on a principle discoverable in the nature of things ... . He interprets it in terms of 'an ontologically-grounded moral order in the "the phenomenon of life" or "the nature of things".' In this way can be avoided the reduction of 'the quest for an ethics ... to prattle about "values" taken in abstraction from the "facts" of experience'. But Jonas's statement can be construed nonnaturalistically, by taking the founding or grounding relation seriously, as connecting, but not reducing, values to empirical facts. So construed the statement does help in delineating the sort of environmental ethics sought. 52 * �C Such reductions commit the naturalistic and prescriptive fallacies which can be avoided neither by thinking 'our way through or around them' (p.97), nor by holistic assimilation of morality in a 'more encompassing ethical life' (p.103 and note 66). But details of the fallacies need not detain us, since we can consider immediately Rodman's important suggestion 53 for circumnavigating them (pp.103-4). Under natural social conditions, such as are obtained in some traditional societies and in some free animal societies (as ethological studies reveal), but have been lost in modern societies, law and morality, at least in their coercive aspects, would disappear, as they did in William Morris's yrow TVozj/zgre, and somewhat as they would in a Kantian community of fully autonomous beings. In terms of modern physics, morality and law are not invariants but vary under transformation of axes, and in fact vanish or prove eliminable under a suitable transformations, e.g. to a natural condition. There is a similar natural condition for morality and legality, a condition in which the prohibitions now prescribed 54 Conscience and the State would have operated "naturally by God, (i.e. from inside the organism, as a matter of course) , and patterns now stated prescriptively could have been stated descriptively. When the Way is abandoned, then we get Humanity and Justice (T<2<9 T6 , #18) (p.103). Even if a change of social axes could place us back on the Way, or on the way to the Way, morality is not really avoidable in our local frame where we are far from the Way. So ethical disputes over environmental matters are also unavoidable;^ for those a satisfactory ethic is a desideratum, and can help in bringing about a change of social axes. Thus too, the identity of the prescriptive with the descriptive, of "ought" with (suitable) "is", is a merely contingent (extensional) one and fails in The suggestion helps explain not only Rodman's naturalism, but his thesis of the limitation of morality and legality; it also introduces the anarchistic social change view that suffuses much of the (very uneven) later parts of (a): the view appears therein as the elabor ation of what is 'unthinkable'. Given prevailing socio-economic conditions it should be rather: that would (ideally) be prescribed. Let us hope, for environmental reasons, that the principles that are lived by in natural conditions bear not too great a resemblance to those now prescribed. Nor is there, in the local frame, much alternative but to resort to legal strategies, where they can be applied (where standing is granted) to delay "the war against nature". 53 �V alternative situations; * hence, as always, there is no deduction of "ought" from "is", since deducibility would require coincidence in the alternative situations. Nor would morality — as distinct from legality, which requires some codification - strictly disappear under natural conditions, though its coercive aspects would: on the whole, as they ought to be. things would simply be, But while deontology would have a much diminished role (as it does on the preferred environmental ethic), axiology (the theory of value) would still have its place - some objects (e.g. diverse landscapes) would be more valuable than others (monocultural landscapes), some not valuable, etc. (As things stand, of course, axiology does have an important place in working out the theory of Ecological Resistance, especially in assessing its central principle of diversity.) The upshot is that without much elaboration (like that indicated below) of an axiological kind; which connects value through a grounding relation, as distinct from an identity, with the run of things (but not aZZ things) that are natural, reason (ii) for ecological resistance fails. Does reason (i), which is premissed on the central principle that diversity is good and natural and threatened by monoculture, fare any better? While it is a matter of fact that that diversity is threatened, indeed is being very rapidly reduced by the forces of monoculture, diver­ sity is not, as opponents of ecological values are wont to point out, an entirely unqualified good. Nor is diversity is always natural: a temperate rain forest can be "enriched" and rendered more diverse by interplanting of exotics (a practice foresters have applied, e.g. in New Zealand) but the result is not natural and sometimes at least bad. Or, differently, ecological diversity can often be increased by increasing edges between ecosystems, but the practice of increasing edges can easily be unnatural and far from good, as, e.g. in rainforest logging with (say) 50% canopy retention. So although a reduction of diversity is commonly bad, since the reduction reduces the quality of an ecological whole, and increase in diversity good, diversity can not be accepted as a solo principle. In fact, Rodman often couples diversity with other factors, such as naturalness (inadmissible in determining, noncircularly, what is good and natural), richness, spontaneity and integrity, which help to remove various of the counterexamples to a diversity principle. procedure points in the direction to be pursued: The replacement of the over- simple principle of diversity by a principle combining all relevant ecological factors. After all ecological sensibility - ecological resist­ ance is assumed to be the position of the person of ecological sensibility - requires sensitivity to all such ecological factors. 54 Once it is determined, �* through consideration of a mix of ecological factors, that, or whether, a natural object is good or valuable the reasons for resistance can be restated: (iv) Where a natural object is valuable - as natural objects are, a natural object does not have to be very ecologically distinctive to be valuable - the threat to the natural object is a threat to what is But, other things being equal, threats to what is valuable valuable. should be resisted. So, similarly, threats to natural objects should often be resisted - and always (on whatever level) resisted where the objects are valuable and the costs of resisting are not overridingly high (to begin to spell out the ceteris paribus clause). It remains to tie in reason (iii), a key premiss of which can now take the initial form that the threat to a valuable natural object is a threat to oneself. A threat to what is valuable, to what one as a valuer values, is athreat to the valuer, to oneself, for these are one's values. To make some of those connections good again requires an excursion into axiology, one, this time, that connects what is valuable with a valuer's values. But Rodman, in trying to connect the threats to natural objects and to oneself, is forced further microcosm: afield, and resorts to the myth of 'Ecological Resistance involves a ritual affirmation of the Myth of Microcosm' universe' (OED). ((b), p.5.4), i.e. the view of man 'as epitome of the While such an affirmation - without the ritual - would yield the requisite connection, it is a classic piece of anthropocentric- ism, quite hostile to a nonchauvinistic position, and, fortunately, inessential to genuine ecological resistance. What Rodman reaches for from the myth (which could be restated in terms of seZ/, without its classic homocentric bias) is however extremely important: account of the it is an which is not a separate subject isolated from its (natural) environment (as a Humean individual is), but is connected intensionally and causally interrelated with that environment. Rodman introduces this metaphysics in rather old-fashioned terms: Ecological Resistance ... assumes a version of the theory of internal relations: the human personality discovers its structure through interaction with the nonhuman order. I am what I am at least partly in my relation to my natural environment, and changes in that environ­ ment affect my own identity. If I stand idly by and let it be destroyed, a part of me is destroyed or seriously deranged ((b) p. 54). Not Man Apart, in the terms of Friends of the Earth. 55 �w For among my interests are its interests, part of my welfare is its welfare; I am identified in part with it.^ The metaphysics deepens, then, the reasons for resistance. A resister 'does not stand over against "his environment" as manager, sight-seer, or do-gooder; he is an integral part of [it]' ((b), p.56). But the environmental metaphysics, that underlies and helps support the ethics, that is part of a fuller environmental theory, need not be, and should not be if it is to be coherent, as (Hegelian and) holistic as Rodman immediately goes on to suppose that it is: __ By making the principle of diversity central, Ecological Resistance can incorporate the other three perspectives as moments within the dialectic of a larger whole. an esthetic religiosity have niches Economics, morality, and in the ecology of our experience of nature, and each has its limits (p.56 continued). But a principle of diversity which opposes the forces of monoculture will not yield f/z-fs pluralism, unless illegitimately extrapolated to theories where its merit is much less evident, especially when some of these theories are not only mutually inconsistent but false. Rodman risks the distinctive features of Ecological Resistance for a dubious synthesis. It is only true that the positions can be combined if the first three positions are verz/ limited indeed, and then a trivial combination with each theory working where it works (which may be nowhere actual in the case of the religious component) can be managed. Moreover Ecological Resistance properly developed, will lead to economic and ethical theories which compete with the rather conventional, and environmentally defective theories of, respectively, Resource Conservation and Natural Moralism. Not only is Ecological Resistance severely handicapped by having implausible holistic theses tacked in to it (not all of which have been discussed); further, Ecological Resistance is too negative. A more positive theory - which includes a theory of value and, ultimately, for a fuller environmental position, a metaphysics - is required, not only for orientation and to meet felt needs of environmentalists already noted, but for more effective, coherent and systematic resistance. S'? it is but a short step to the ; fully ecological sensibility [which] knows with Carl Sandburg that: There is an eagle in me ... and the eagle flies among the Rocky Mountains of my dreams and fights among the Sierra crags of what I want ... . And I got the eagle ... from the wilderness, (p.118) The poem almost admits of neutral logical formalisation. 56 �§5. THE VIABILITY OF THE SORT OF ALTERNATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC SELECTED It is not necessary for an environmental ethic to take a set position on all the issues so far raised for environmental ethics (or others, such as whether, and if so which, ecological principles should be integrated for example, it does not with the ethical system) ; to decide exactly But it can hardly avoid determining which items do or can have rights. some of the boundaries in a way different from conventional ethics if it is to count as an environmental ethic. In particular, the issues of what sort of items have or carry noninstrumental value, and how they obtain it, cannot be escaped indefinitely. Without the assignment of (intrinsic) value to some items independent of the states and conditions of humans, an ethic would remain within the confines of human chauvinism. But how, it is all too often asked, is such an assignment possible, or rational? In any case, the environmental examples already relied upon (in §3) pre­ suppose items. the assignment of intrinsic value to nonhuman, and to nonsentient So a theory of value is not only unavoidable but owed. that can be adopted on an environmental Of the many accounts of ethic, the following has much to recommend it:- Some values are instru­ mental, i.e. a means or an instrument to something else that has value, and some are not, but are non-instrumental or intrinsic. Some values at least must be intrinsic, some objects valuable in themselves and not as a means to other ends. not, however, imply That a value is (reckoned to be) intrinsic does that it is absolute or system independent; the values that are intrinsic on one ethical theory may be instrumental or relative on another. More controversially, values may be in one way or another, on other things, on other values or, importantly, on non­ values (such as experiences or felt needs, or facts or natural objects); but while some values are reducible to others, others are not but are That is, contrary to naturalism and to other forms of For reductionism such as subjectivism, some values are irreducible. analogues of the naturalistic and prescriptive fallacies, formulated in irreducible. terms of 'valuable', are fallacies. In particular, evaluative judgments, such as those as to what is valuable, are not deducible from nonvaluative judgments, such as those as to what is conventionally valued or what is 58 experienced. That values in natural items are intrinsic does not imply that they are naturalistic. eliminating or Indeed intrinsic value cannot - on pain of - amount to being natural, or reduce to the experiences of humans or of sentient creatures, to their suffering or happiness or preferences. 58 On next page. 57 �w Although some of these things, some of these experiences, some do not, but have no value, or a negative value or disvalue; value, 59 and some things, e.g. some experiences or some natural objects, have more value (are more valuable) than others. of value, but by no means everything is. Almost anything can be an object Value is distributed unevenly throughout the universe in something the way that electrical charge is; some items have positive quantities of varying degrees of intensity (e.g. a thundercloud may carry a positive charge, and have positive value), some negative, and some none. There are however important differences: elect­ rical charge is a quantitative notion, value a qualitative, comparative, one; charges are always commensurable, values less certainly or straight­ forwardly so;60 and the distribution of values (and especially of intrinsic values) is much more theory (system, or viewpoint) relative than .the di^sbributtdn of charges. For example, on an environmental view, matiy of the plants Mr Last Man eliminates have (intrinsic) value, whereas on animal liberation (usual animal chauvinist) views the plants have no value if no animals remain: there would be no similar disagreement about whether the plants were electrically charged. Evaluative features such as worth, merit, beauty are features which behave in rather the way that philosophers of science now mistakenly suppose that behave: empirical features they do not have a hard observational basis but are decidedly theory-dependent, though the theories involved are evaluative in character and not empirical. To assert that value or redness or remoteness is distributed through the universe is not to imply that these features, value or redness or For an outline of how this nondeducibility thesis, which yields a nondefinability thesis, may be proved (in limited contexts), see the final section of R. and V. Routley, 'The semantics of first degree entailment', ZVoMS, 6 (1972), pp. 335-59. A simpler argument against naturalistic reducibility of values is a consequence of the intensionality of values and the fact that intensional notions cannot be extensionally analysed (syntactically), which is what naturalistism characteristically assumes. Strictly the account of instrumental value should be widened if disvalues as well as (positive) values are to be taken proper account of. That is, mcrg may be at best a partial order, and so an inadequate basis on which to define total utility functions, and on which to rationally reconstruct modern economic theory. If this is so, as Godfrey Smith has suggested, and the orderings cannot be completed, applications of the optimistisation models subsequently introduced will have to work with partial functions. 58 �remoteness, exist, or are to be found in the universe. undermines much criticism of nonsubjective values; The point alone for example, Mackie's empiricist case is premissed on the false assumption that the existence of values is necessary to objectivism, which he does not distinguish from nonsubjectivism. Mackie's "argument from queernessis similarly broken at the outset: since values are not entities at all, they are not strange sorts of entities. To see how unpersuasive Mackie's argument should be, replace '(objective) values' throughout by, e.g., ordinals'. universe; 'transfinite They too would be 'utterly different from'anything in Mackie's but that does not show that there are no transfinite ordinals. Thus too, since values are not entities, the account of value being developed is Met a reaZ-Zst one (in the ordinary sense).62 Values, of one sort or another, are features objects may have or lack; they are not subjective, they are not features which reduce to states or conditions of subjects or valuers. But no more are they object­ ive features, natural or empirical features of objects, features entirely detached from valuers. A largely unquestioned false dichotomy between subjective and objective ethical theories has served to rule out important options (it has been helped by a connected false dichotomy between instrumental and detached accounts of value: see Routley (b)). In simplest terms, an objective account of value has values "located" in objects entirely independently of valuers, in the way that (inertial) mass is located in physical objects independently of observers; more satisfactorily, objects have values and masses irrespective of valuers or observers. Objectivism forces intuitionism, when it is inquired how values are apprehended or known; thus a fuller objective theory is almost always accompanied by an account, so far always unsatisfactory, 61 The position is that for properties and relations argued in (e) R. Routley, EepcTX'd, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. Such objects do not exist, but they have important theoretical, explanatory, and other roles. 62 j.c. Mackie, Ft/zZcs. especially pp.38-9. F-ZpTzt Penguin, 1977; see 62 So undermining 0K6 part of D. Mannison's claim that we want to defend a reaZ-Zst theory of values, i.e. a theory of values that accounts for the truth of "x has value" with no ineliminable reference to the interests and concerns of the evaluating group ('Critique of a proposal for an "environmental ethic'", this volume). The further parts of Mannison's claim are assessed in what immediately follows. We are indebted to Mannison for forcing us to try to work out what is wrong and right about detached value theses. 59 �3 characteristically modelled on sense perception, of the way in which 64 values are intuited or apprehended. It is also regularly assumed on objective accounts that values exist, in the world; noneism) that is a separable assumption. but evidently (given By contrast, a subjective account finds values in, or not independent of, actual subjects, and commonly as linked with the pyschological states of valuers. Although subjectivism, like objectivism, comes in a variety of forms, it is always required that where an item is valued there exists, at sometime or other, a valuer who values it: "no values without a valuer" holds, in a strong, an excessively strong,implausible and erroneous, form; namely, a world without existing valuers in it is, by that very fact, a world without values. Fortunately - since both objectivisms and subjectivisms suffer from serious, and mostly well-known, defects - the positions are not exhaustive. The way between is perhaps best revealed in terms of alter­ native worlds.65 Although values in a world (more precisely, that items in that world a have evaluative features) always depend upon a valuer existing in sows world, the valuer may not exist in the world of the values (i.e. the valuer may not exist in a). For example, our claim that a certain world without valuers, e.g. a pure plant world of botanically rich form, is a fine world, depends on our existing in this world (in order to make the claim, in fact); "make sense" but it does not demand in order to (of course the claim is significant) or to be true, what is ex hypothesis ruled out, the existence of valuers in the pure plant world. That the world is a fine one, is dependent on a valuer in some world (and that valuer's assessments of value and, if you like, theory or overview of what is valuable and not); by contrast, that the world contains only plants of this or that leaf type, biomass or colour, does not depend upon a perceiver.66 since values are not entirely independent of a valuer in the way that empirical properties are independent of an observer, the An important corollary is that resulting account is not objective. transworld evaluation does not require objectivism, nor (as we shall see) intuitionism. Call the resulting account, which is neither objective nor, (short for, neither objective nor as is evident, subjective, subjective: the term is ugly but memorable). For a fuller account and worthwhile criticism, see N. Smith, Penguin, 1954. The use of worlds in ethical theorising, which is old, soon leads into world semantical analyses of ethical notions, which is newer but will also be taken for granted: it is ^problematic. On next page. 60 �The replacement of the (no detachable values) thesis, (1) There are no values without a valuer, by the revised thesis, (1°) There are no values which are entirely independent of a valuer, still affords the requisite semantical connections between values and valuers subjectivists have been at pains to maintain, still allows for the requisite theory dependence and cultural relativity of values, and still avoids the extravagances of objectivism. The replacement enables the defeat of various sophistical arguments designed to show, in virtue of the conceptual character of evaluative terms, that the case so far presented against human (or person) chauvinism collapses. argument of this sort runs thus: A simple Objectivism is untenable; but that leaves subjectivism, which validates (1), as the only alternative; and subjectivism undermines the counterexamples to chauvinism.6& One defect of this argument lies in the assumption that a theory can just dispose of counterexamples, when commonly examples are harder data than any theory. Note that the difference between evaluative and empirical properties is not adequately explained counterfactually: if an appropriate valuer - it cannot be an arbitrarily chosen valuer - were placed in the world it would rate the world fine, to be sure; but equally a suitable observer would perceive perceptual properties. Both these things objectivism can quite well allow. Partly for this reason Rescher's attempt to maintain his initially subjectivist thesis that value must be benefit-oriented, while admitting Moore's comparison of unoccupied worlds, is unsuccessful. Rescher's thesis really gets modified to: value must be potential-benefit-oriented - with which an objectivist might well agree, since it becomes a truism if 'benefit' is construed sufficiently widely (e.g. as 'value'), once unscrambled counterfactually thus:the unseen sunset has aesthetic value because of the potential benefits it affords ... [i.e.] someone were placed on to such a world, he be able to appreciate and enjoy this sunset. (N. Rescher, Prentice Hill, 1969 , pp.136-37.) But insofar as Rescher wants to suggest that value comes down to potential-benefit-orientation, that the unseen sunset has value jMst because of the potential benefits, which are entirely captured counter­ factually, objectivists will rightly object; even if no one were placed in this world, the sunset which delivered no benefits the world, would still have value, still be beautiful. In short, a counterfactually-extended subjectivism remains inadequate. The requisite relation of entire independence is explained semantically in terms of worlds. The truth of A is not entirely independent of b iff, in every model, for every world of the model in which A holds there is some world of the model in which b exists. The valuer of (1°) need not exist; it is only required (in each model) that it exist in some world. Such an argument appears, in essentials, in R. Elliot, species?', this publication. 61 'Why preserve �9 Such a procedure is methodologically unsound. In this case the examples tell against subjectivism, and point to another defect in the theoretical argument, namely the reliance on the false objective/subjective dichotomy. It has been objected 69 that the nonjective way between subjective and objective is unsatisfactory, for the reason that (1°) results in unacceptible assignments of value. But the objection depends upon under­ standing 'a valuer' in (1°) not in the intended way, as 'a certain (or definite) valuer' , the determination of valuer being MpoM the values concerned, but as a choice term, as 'an arbitrarily chosen valuer', or 'some valuer or other (you choose)' - which would require, what can never happen, that every hypothetical valuer agrees in the values assigned. A precisely similar misunderstanding of (1) likewise gives strange results: namely that any state of affairs, however environmentally appalling, is valuable because we can find a valuer, e.g. a spokesman for your local development association., who would account it valuable. understood yields no such bizarre results: But (1) properly all it guarantees is that, where a state of affairs has a value then there is a certain valuer (zj/z^cT? depending upon the state of affairs and the value assigned, i.e. the choice is heavily constrained) who assigns that value to that state. Similarly in the case of (1°) choice of appropriate valuers is a dependent choice, not an arbitrary one. There are several, deeper (because metaphysically grounded), sophistical arguments that conclude on the basis of (1) among other 70 things, that human, or at least person, chauvinism is unavoidable. These arguments too fail with (1). It is simply a (common) mistake to think that values and rights do not have a meaning, or an application, outside the human context or situation: to establish this point (on which Moore rightly insisted) it is enough to point out again that (hypothetical) valuers, not necessarily human or persons, can assign 69 For example by R. Elliot op. cit. Elliot's objection depends on a misconstrual. The original draft of this paper pointed out that principle (1) is strictly mistaken: it would be a little more accurate to assert that there are no values without possible valuers. A world in which there are no valuers extant may still contain valuable items. It does not follow from this, what Elliot infers, that 'a state of affairs has value if it is such that it would be valued by some sentient individual if such an individual were to exist', with 'some' read 'some or other'. 70 These arguments are examined in detail in Routley (a), and found wanting. The objections there lodged apply equally against variations of the arguments built on (1°) . What follows in the text on sorne of these arguments is largely a condensation of some of the points developed more fully there. 62 �C Q values with respect to situations and worlds devoid of humans and of persons altogether. But though these deeper arguments strictly fail with the demise of (1), they can be readily restated in terms of (1°), which can equally be taken (given further assumptions) to support the thesis that persons (or preference-havers) are the primary items of value or, more strongly, that persons are the ozzZ-y items of intrinsic value. One of these arguments relies on the idea that persons are the source of value. But the argument trades on an ambiguity. A person is the source of value-judgements and values in one sense, i.e. s/he is the valuer; but not in another, namely s/he is not responsible for valued item having its valued properties. Nor is there any licence for reducing the values assigned to those that serve the interests of the valuer. The argument is likely to be given the following sort of initial elaboration: By (1°), whatever has a value has its value in virtue of an assignment from certain valuers. But valuers are always persons. The argument is however ever has a value gets its value from persons. defective. Therefore what­ For even if values were always assigned by persons the items their values from persons assigned values do not thereby yet or (or those of persons). They have what value they have partly in virtue of features of their own. Nonetheless, the argument continues, the empirical features of objects valued are relevant because they are taken into account in preference rankings on which valuers base their assignments. By (1°) (or a derivative) values are relational properties not properties simpliciter as objectivism would have it. They are relational properties which depend on certain features of the related item. Which features, of values? Well, obviously, preferences and interests of valuers. So, it is con­ cluded, values answer to, or reduce to, interests of persons: no alternative to chauvinism. there is Rather similar arguments lead to such (mistaken) conclusions as that rights are interest-oriented, that 71 obligations must answer to people's interests, etc. etc. The arguments can furthermore - in case the transit seemed excessively swift - be filled out, for example as follows: By (1°), Thus, e.g. K. Baier, T/ze AforczZ Po^yzt o/ Ithaca, 1958. 63 Cornell University Press, �-B. Values depend upon valuers, upon their value assignments or rankings. -A. These value rankings depend upon valuers' preference rankings. A. Hence Values depend upon, or are determined through, the preference rankings of valuers. B. Valuers' preference rankings are determined through valuers' interests. C. Valuers are humans [persons]. Therefore D. Values are determined through, or depend upon, human [or 72 persons'] interests. Hence, it is sometimes concluded, not only is it perfectly acceptable for humans to reduce matters of value and morality to matters of human, interest, there is no rational or feasible alternative to doing so: any alternative to chauvinism is simply incoherent. With the replacement of (1) by (1°), premiss (C) is rendered implausible unless 'human' is supplanted by 'person' (where the variable 'person' is so characterised that all valuers are persons, something some accounts of person would rule out). Thus, without (1), the argument leads at best to person chauvinism. Nor does -B follow from (1°): "not entirely independent of" does not imply "dependent upon", but at best "partially dependent upon". However it does seem that values are, in a sense, determined through value assignments - assignments made certainly in virtue of features of the objects valued and of preference rankings of valuers, that is having dual factual and attitudinal bases - but assign­ ments nevertheless. Accordingly, the central part of the argument can be reformulated, in a way which locates the main source of damage, thus A'. Values are determined through value assignments [preference rankings] of valuers. B'. The value assignments [preference ranking] of valuers are determined through valuers' interests. In order to reach what amounts to chauvinism 73 from B', however, 'interest' has to be narrowly construed, after the fashion of egoism, as 'own, self- centred or selfish, interest'. D'. Otherwise the conclusion, Values are determined through valuers' interests, Many variations on this argument are considered in Routley (a); and obviously there are yet other variations, e.g. value assignments could be directly linked with interests. On next page. 64 �c Q is innocuous; valuers. it does nothing to confine what determines value, to For valuers' interests may concern almost anything, and in particular may include the interests of nonvaluers(as in 'its interest is among my interests') and the welfare of natural systems. understood, is no more chauvinistic than: D', so Values are value-centred. To succeed the argument has to narrow the elements assessed in determining value to features of the base class of persons [or humans]; their interests and welfare alone. e.g. to For if we have to look beyond this class to assess value - even to determine interests and welfare - then the argument to chauvinism fails. Thus the argument has, in order to suc­ ceed, to rely upon assumptions either of egoism - valuers' interests are restricted to their own (perhaps enlightened) self-interest - or of a group analogue - valuers' interests are restricted to those of the group, the base class - where (to indicate the final trick in the argument) there is, in each case, a slide on the elastic term 'interests', e.g. from ^?z) f/z^r ozjzz ozjyz Mses or purposes. to t/z^^r ozjzz u^urztape., or t/ze^r It is evident enough that in order to succeed the argument has to assume one of the very points at issue, that interests, which are progressively restricted to chauvinistic interests, are so restricted.74 But consider, to expose the character of the assumptions made, parallel arguments to egoism and groupism, i.e. group egoism: AE. Persons always act (in freely chosen cases, or rational cases) in the way they prefer or choose, i.e. in accord with their (revealed) preference rankings. BE. Individual [group] preference rankings are always determined through (reflect) self [group] interest. 71 What amounts to chauvinism; for if a position were reached in this way by a sound argument, then the position would not be chauvinistic, being justified. For this reason, it is absurd for a rational creature to present itself (as some philosophers have) as a human chauvinist or a person chauvinist. There is however a descriptive analogue of chauvinism, in which the justificatory clause is omitted; and this use of 'chauvinism' we have resorted to ourselves (as the astute reader will have observed) as an interim step. In the end of course such descriptive-chauvinism is chauvinism, since the discrimination involved is unwarranted. 74 The claim generalises: it is not possible to mount an argument for person [or human] chauvinism on the basis of the meaning, or analysis, of such notions as, o^Z^pa^o/z or r^pTzf or without assuming, in the analysis or the course of the argument, the very points at issue. This is an outcome of the viability of nonchauvinistic analyses of these notions, together with the content preservation character of genuine deductive arguments. 65 �Therefore DE. Individual persons [groups of persons] always act in ways determined in their own self [group] interests (or that reflect their own interest^). Thereafter follows the slide from "in their own interests" to "to their own advantage", or "for their own uses or purposes". The eventual con­ clusion of egoism, again parallelling the class chauvinism case, is not only that the egoistic position is perfectly in order and thoroughly rational, but that there are no alternatives; least ought to be, no other way of acting, that is, there is, or at 'that men can only choose to do what is in their own interests or that it is only rational to do Thus,person or (human) chauvinism, as based.on the central argument, 3 stands revealed as like group selfishness, "group egoism" one might almost say. Likewise the criticisms of the as we shall now call the argument through D or D', parallel those of egoism; in particular, premiss B' to those that defeat premiss BE. (or B) succumbs to similar objections Group selfishness is no more acceptable than egoism, since it depends on exactly the same set of confusions between values, preferences, interests, and advantages (encouraged by slippery terms such as 'interests' and 'self-interest') as the arguments on which egoism rests. Briefly, because one may discern or select one's own preference or value rankings, it does not follow that these rankings are set up or selected in one's own selfish (or enlightened self) interests; similarly in group cases, because a group determines its own rankings, it does not follow that it determines them in its own interests; the group includes environmental individuals. certainly not if Thus just as BE is refuted, at least prima facie, by a range of examples where preference, and value, rankings run counter to self-regarding interest, e.g. cases of otherregarding interest or altruism, so prima facie at least, B is refuted by examples where value, and also overall preference rankings, vary from group interests, e.g. cases of group altruism and extra-group-regarding interests, as in resistance movements, environmental action groups, and so on. It is often in selfish human interests (no less selfish because pertaining to a group) to open up and develop the wilderness, strip mine the earth, exploit animals, and so on, but ecological resistance workers Nowell Smith, op. cit., p.140. Nowell-Smith's very appealing critique of egoism (pp.140-44) may, by simple paraphrase, be converted into a critique of group selfishness. This is obvious once B' and BE are compared. 66 �who oppose doing so are commonly not acting just out of (their own or) human intragroup interests, but out of direct concern for the environment and its welfare. But, just as BE is not demolished by such counterexamples of apparently other-regarding and altruistic action, neither is B: in each case it can be made out that further selfish (i.e. self-regarding) inter­ ests are involved, e.g., in the case of B, that an agent did what he did, an altruistic action, because he in the egoism case, doing it. As Nowell-Smith explains 'interest' is written in as an internal accusative, thereby rendering such theses as BE true at the cost, however, of trivial- More generally, valuing something gets written in as a further sort of "interest"; whatever valuers value that does not seem to ising them. be in their interests is said to provide a further interest, either the value itself or an invented value surrogate; for example, the environ­ mentalist who works to retain a wilderness he never expects to see may be said to be so acting only because he has an interest in or derives benefit or advantage from just knowing it exists, just as he would be said to in the egoist case. "retained"; By such strategies the theses can be for then a valued item really is in valuers' interests, in the extended sense, even if they are in obvious ways seriously incon­ venienced by it, i.e. even if it is Mot in their narrow interests in the customary sense. Thus B, like BE, is preserved by stretching the elastic term 'interests', in a way that it too readily admits, to include values, or value surrogates, among interests. Then however the conclus­ ion of the Group Selfishness argument loses its intended force, and becomes the platitude that values are determined through valuers' values, just as egoism, under the extension which makes us all covert egoists, loses its sting and becomes a platitude. Human chauvinism in this form, like egoism, derives its plausibility from vacillation on the sense of 'interests', with a resulting fluctuation between a strong false thesis when interests are narrowed through group interests to group restricted interests - the real face of human chauvinism - and a trivial analytic thesis, between paradox and platitude. To reject the reductionist conclusion D, or D', is by no means to be committed to the view that the valuers and their preference rankings play %<? role in determining values and that values are a further set of In the sense of Wisdom's (meta)philosophy. The technique of rescuing philosophical theses by shifts, which begin with natural extensions of terms, enforced by accompanying redefinitions of terms - including the thesis "We're all selfish really" - is delightfully explained in J. Wisdom, dt/zer Blackwell, Oxford, 1952, especially chapter 1. 67 �mysterious independent items somehow perceived by valuers through a special (even mystical and non-rational) moral sense. An intuitionist theory of value is not required, and is not lurking in the background. One can simply admit that valuers' preference rankings play an important role in evaluation; one is not thereby committed to D unless one assumes - what amounts to premiss B - that these preference rankings reflect, or can be reduced to, valuers' (narrow) interests. Even so important problems remain unresolved, in particular, precisely what role valuers' preference-rankings play, and how this role enables the damaging features of intuitionism to be avoided. The arguments against genuinely environmental ethics from the character of are sometimes followed up by the objection that such a ethic can be given no, or no satisfactory, theory of value (or metaethic, to.use the current, but questionable, jargon transferred from logical theory). It is true that several theories of value are quickly ruled out, including mainstream noncognitive theories, which are objection­ ably chauvinistic, allowing no non-instrumental value to any non-sentient natural items. While an environmental ethic, like almost any other normative ethic, ca?? be supplied with an intuitionist theory of value, an environmental ethic, unlike most other ethics, wa?/ appear to have no option to such a theory, though the theory is unsatisfactory and causes especial problems for the ethic. 75 The unsatisfactoriness of intuitionism is in part for the usual reasons: apart from the perceptual comparison which is problematic in several ways (e.g. evaluative properties are not like perceptual properties, the moral sense is rather different from other senses), the theory is (like a purely axiomatic theory) too much of a black box, which gives no explanation of many things that call for explanation, e.g. the semantics of value, how value judgements are based on factual and emotional or attitudinal bases; but it is in part because intuitionism provides little guidance or assistance in accounting for the intrinsic value of environmental objects. These difficulties can be evaded and the problems largely resolved through a semantical theory of value, and more generally of ethical terms. Thus D. Mannison, 'the "new environmental ethic" is ... irredeemably intuitionistic' (op. cit.), and H.J. McCloskey: As far as I can see of the known, plausible meta-ethics, the only one available ... is an intuitionist one. ... [There] would still be ... the problem of associating it with a non-human-centred normative ethic, one which did not locate all values in human capacities states, goods, but accorded to environmental phenomena value in their own right. ('Ecological ethics and its justification: a critical appraisal', this volume.) 68 �For the truth-conditions, 7 8 and resulting interpretation conditions, will supply an account of meaning not only of axiological expressions but also of deontic expressions, and moreover in a way that is plainly nonchauvinistic; e.g., it enables natural items to be awarded intrinsic value in much the way that states or conditions of humans are on chauvinistic theories. Something of the shape and character of the semantical analyses emerges from the evaluation rules for important axiological and deontic 79 functions. The semantics are set within the framework of the semantics of entailment: in this way several paradoxes possible world semantics induces in deontic (and axiological) theory are automatically removed. The semantical analyses of the central axiological functor, 'that ... is better than that __ ', abbreviated 'Bt', and the key deontic predicate 'that ... is permissible', abbreviated 'P', restricted to sentential terms, take respectively the following forms: I(A Bt B, a) = 1 iff [B] i.e. [A], where [C] = {c e K: I(C, c) =1}, [C] is the range of C, the class of situations where C holds, some­ times called the proposition C expresses. In short, that A is better than that B holds in world a iff from the perspective of a, the proposition B expresses is less preferable than the proposition A expresses, where the ordering relation is spelt out in terms of a preference ranking. I(PA, a) = 1 iff, for some world b such that Tab, I(A, b) = 1; i.e., that A is permissible holds in a iff for some world b permitted as far as a is concerned, A holds in b - where the relation T is spelt out in terms of a relative permittedness relation. Enough of the semantical theory has been exposed to indicate some important features. Firstly, betterness - and something the same holds for other value terms - is assessed semantically in terms of a world- relativised preference ranking. In the simplest case, where betterness is assessed as to truth (rather than interpretation, or meaning), i.e. at actual world T, the assessment just is in terms of a preference ranking (so validating a form of premiss B above, for a technical sense of 70 Ethical judgements, both axiological and deontic, have truth values, relative to their context of occurrence. By use of context, objections, e.g. from relativity, to the attribution of truth-values to such judgements can be straightforwardly avoided. 79 Full details of the semantics are presented elsewhere, in Routley (c), and in R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, and others, PeZevuzzf TZzeZr P-ZfaZs, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. 69 �'determined'). Secondly, the semantics of can be given in descriptive terms; similarly for deontic terms such as The semantical analysis bridges the fact-value gap, by a functional linkage, without however closing it. preferential basis. For it provides no of value to its The linkage enables a simple explanation of how environmental considerations can count: criteria may be preferred. worlds satisfying environmental Sets of worlds where human interests or needs are not met but ecosystems are maintained may, for example, be prefer­ entially ranked above worlds where human needs are met at the expense of ecosystems. The way in which the factual basis, which includes environ­ mental facts - the descriptive better-making characteristics - enters into the evaluative judgments of quality, is in outline as follows: factual criteria delimit preference rankings on worlds in the same way that descriptive features of objects delimit preference rankings of these objects. It is not the case, then, that we are unable to explain zj?zz/ a natural item is valuable if we cannot point to some human interest or purpose which is served. This again assumes mistakenly, that because a valuer­ relative preference-ranking is involved, the evaluation must somehow be reducible to the interests or purposes of the valuer. That there is an allusion in the semantical unpacking of value to the preference system of a certain valuer no more requires that the items valued are valuable only insofar as they serve the valuer's interests or preferences than it does in more familiar cases such as valuing a work of art, a library or an old building. Valuers can and do value items because they perceive in them properties they take to be valuable, and in the interests of other things whose interests are their own, and not simply for what they can get out of them or how far they serve their own interests. The answer to the question 'Why is it valuable?', for a natural item, will not always be, as it must always be on the instrumental view, 'Because it is good for such and such purpose or end of the valuer or those of his group', but may be: 'Because it has properties A, B and C which the valuer holds to be valuable in virtue of considered preferences, including iterated (second order) preferences which reflect the preferences of other preference-havers. In the end, then, environmental value systems are cvz different How a seTnaTzt-fcaZ analysis - as distinct from a analysis may make bridges without involving a reduction - but leaving everything as it is - is more fully explained in R. Routley 'The semantical meta­ morphosis of metaphysics', JoMruaZ P/z^Zosop/zz/, 54 (1976), 187-205. For more on how the fact/value gap is semantically bridged see Routley (c). 70 �preference rankings, which take into account different facts from the chauvinistic systems they are beginning to compete with and aim to supplant - a different group preference ranking and network (emanating from the valuer and those like her) which is grounded in a different perception and emotional presentation of nature. The semantical meta-ethic is not as neutral as an intuitionistic meta-ethic: for the preference-rankings involved require a valuer, i.e. thesis (1°) is applied, thereby excluding objective theories. The fact that the semantical theory will work (perhaps after minor adaptions) for a range of normative theories is no serious objection. not have to be precisely tailored to a given ethic: A meta-ethic does the same (sort of) metalogic may work satisfactorily for many different logics. It is not merely that the distinctiveness of the meta-ethic may be what is more serious is that the contested; (normative) ethic, even newness of the within Western traditions, may be challenged. It has been suggested, for instance, that such ethics are but versions or minor variants of ideal utilitarianism McCloskey, op. cit.). (cf. Elliot, op. cit.; To assess this claim, and to reveal how much the preferred environmental ethic has in common with such utilitarianism and how much it differs, considering what counts as ideal utilitarianism is unavoidable. In indicating what does count, there is real point in going back to Rashdall's original explanation: ... all moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends. This view of Ethics, which combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of the ethical end I propose to call Ideal Utilitarianism. According to this view actions are right or wrong according as they tend to produce for all mankind an ideal end or good, which includes but is not limited to pleasure. ... The right action is always that which (so far as the agent has means of knowing) will produce the greatest amount of good upon the whole. (H- Rashdall, TTze T/zeorz/ o/ Fzz-z^Z, Oxford University Press, 1907, p.184.) Ideal utilitarianism is thus, according to Rashdall, nonhedonistic utilitarianism, and so conforms to the core theses of utilitarianism, namely: (i) The ethical or ideal end (the good) is determined simply by maximisation of net utility or value of certain factors or ends, typically (but not invariably) experiences or states of consciousness such as pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction of desires or preferences 71 �!* (ii) The ends or experiences are those of some given base class, e.g. mankind, present persons, sentient creatures (Pase <?Zass r^Z-az^z^sut-Zczz); and (iii) Other ethical notions, right in particular, are defined as determined in terms of the ethical end (^eZeoZ-c^-ZcuZ re^zzc^-Zozz-Zsw). A corollary of the reductionist assumption - which can take various forms, e.g. act, rule, average utilitarianism - is that maximisation is uncon­ strained by deontic requirements. The core principles are also readily discerned in that other paradigmatic ideal utilitarian, Moore, who like Rashdall, objects to (hedonistic) utilitarianism on the grounds of its hedonistic principle (e.g. p.184), and accordingly widens the ends admitted in (i), and, again like Rashdall, takes the base class to consist of humans. as assessed through its paradigm exponents *Zs thus chauvinistic, and zzo e^zz-ZrczzwezztuZ. sc/zewa /or azz Human chauvinism is in fact integral to both Rashdall'sand Moore's work. For example, Rashdall characterises r-z^TzZ; in terms of good for mankind, and endorses a strong form of the greater value assumption (p.215). And Moore not only identifies the best poss-ZbZe state of things in this world with Human Good (p.183), but considers 'by far the most valuable things we can know or -z^azy-Z/ze, are certain states of consciousness', Zzzz?n<27z consciousness (p.188, my italics). Each one of the core theses of utilitarianism is false (the case is argued in detail in Routley (b)). Contrary to (i) optimisation needs to be constrained, deontically constrained, else serious injustices to and ill-treatment of objects within the base class and, more important, objects outside that class, are all too likely. But, as against (iii) this destroys prospects of successful deontic reductions, which are, on independent grounds, improbable. To avoid the chauvinism, typically built See Pr-Zpzc-Zp-Zu Ez^/z^cu, Cambridge University Press, 1903, chapters V and VI. Moore does say (p.188) that No one, probably, ... who has asked himself the question, has even doubted that personal affection and appreciation of what is beautiful in Art or Nature, are good in themselves. But 'appreciation of what is beautiful' reduces, on Moore's account, to 'enjoyment of beautiful objects'; and any independent value in what is beautiful is 'so small as to be negligible in comparison with that which attaches to the cozzsu^ozzszzess of beauty', (p.189). Moore's chauvinistic account thus appears open to familiar objections e.g. those based on enjoyment machines (cf. the wilderness experience machine discussed above), and on beautiful worlds lacking conscious beings-which help show that beauty is what counts and not just, or primarily, experiences of beauty. Moore was not, however, entirely unaware of such points: cf. pp.194-95. 72 * �into (ii), (i) requires restatement in terms of factors which avoid base class relativisation; then clause (ii) is eliminated. The need for con­ straints in optimisation modellings of utilitarian or economic sorts can be seen from the phenomena of interrelated interests and preferences: that my interests include, or depend upon, yours, means that these cannot vary independently, but are interrelated. Repairing the defects of ideal utilitarianism results in more adequate optimisation modelling. notion of The recipe elementary analysis of the item leads to is, in essence, as follows: Maximise a weighted function (e.g. a sum) of the factors that value a determines subject to appropriate constraints: symbolically, maximise n-place function E = E(x) subject to constraining relations Rj(x) and x = <x^,...,x^>). (with j an index, Special cases of such optimisation modellings are familiar from engineering and economic applications (e.g. determination of optimal social welfare in concave programming). What is more general 82 about the model indicated, is, in particular, the form of constraints permitted, which can include that ... Xi ... X2 ..." bounds for optimals). deontic constraints, e.g. "It is forbidden (which has the effect of putting a subspace out of Since there is nothing to prevent moral prohibitions, requirements of fairness, and the like, from appearing among the constraints ethics, economics, and practical reasoning can in principle be success­ fully amalgamated. The optimisation modelling of general value theory differs significantly from that of (ideal) utilitarianism. Although maximization is fundamental in both, in utilitarianism value is characteristically replaced by net utility, measured usually in terms of experiential units of some sort, whereas in general value theory this reduction is rejected. In each case there is a of an ethical calculus, but the currency is different, being values in one case and base class or individual utilities (units of utility) in the other; but in both cases the calculus is so far (equally) unworkable except in very special cases. In each case there is an analysis into components of the objective (function) maximized, but the analysis is very different. In utilitarianism net utility is broken down into individual utilities of members of some base class. In general value theory such a reduction is rejected (except perhaps where appropriate hypothetical valuers are admitted); analysis into factors that carry value is made. instead an (But in Moore's ideal The general model is motivated, explained, illustrated, applied and defended in Routley (b) and (d) and also in R. Routley, 'The choice of logical foundations: nonclassical choices and the ultralogical choice', L<9<2"f<?a, 38 (1979). 73 �utilitarianism, unlike utilitarianism proper, the way is opened for factors, such as beauty, which carry intrinsic value and are not reducible to features of the base class or its members.) In utilitarianism deontic notions, such as right, are analysed in terms of the value theory; general value theory deontic notions are taken as given constraints are imposed on optimisations. but in and deontic Whereas the maximisations of utilitarianisms proper are (single element) unconstrained maximisations (hence the injustice, unfairness, and ill-treatment such ethics condone), general value theory optimisations are constrained. in principle While there is room for constraints in ideal utilitarianism, as there is for a switch to factors which are base-class independent - though the theory has never been elaborated to the point where these things are done - deontic constraints cannot be noncircularly imposed, given the teleological reduction thesis (so the problems of unfairness and ill-treatment remain). It is a fairly evident corollary of the differences that general value theory removes leading objections to utilitarianisms. It is not perhaps so evident, however, how it applies to environmental cases or what the factors of environmental relevance are. To expose some of the factors - and to indicate just how far an environmental ethics is dis­ tanced even from a comparatively liberal ethic like Moore's ideal utilitarianism - consider the very difficult optimisation problems as to the determination of the Ideal. Moore distinguishes (1) The Ideal, from, what is more interesting, state of things the best possZbZe state of things in this world', toward which our action should be directed' absolute ideal' (KI) and (2) 'the (2) 'the MZtZ/naZe end (p.183). Call (1) 'The 'the T ideal' or 'the this world ideal' (TI). A crucial difference between the two problems lies in the constraints: determination of TI is constrained by features - many of them unknown - of the actual world T (now and in the immediate future), by its populations of humans and of various species of living things on its various earths, by its natural features, by its physical and technological resources, limitations of which will impose characteristic scarcity constraints. By That does not imply that no analyses can be given of deontic notions. Although axiological reductions are ruled out, others are not. Certainly semantical analysis, like that already sketched for permissib­ ility, can be supplied and elaborated. Moore's teleological ethic is not far removed from Aristotle's ethic more than 2000 years earlier (which exhibits features of ideal utilitarianism) . From the point of view of this long relativelyunchanged base line, environmental ethics are not merely new and radical, but represent a paradigm shift. 74 �- contrast, KI is presumably not constrained by resources or technology (in relation to populations); this is just one reason why Leibnitz's equations of TI with KI and with things as at present fails. theless constrained. 8S KI is none­ There will, for example, be constraints forbidding unfair or ill-treatment of various sorts (given that such treatment is possible), and there will be constraints interrelating factors that are not independent. The factors entering into the modelling will no doubt represent, in some way, many of the positive goods, such as enjoyment of the "meritor­ ious" sorts that Moore managed to discern - positively weighted - and many of the evils he found - but negatively weighted (but some of these things are better represented through constraints). There remain, 86 however, many features of ecological importance that Moore never con­ templated; for example, diversity of systems and creatures, naturalness, o7 integrity of systems, stability of systems, harmony of systems. Optimising a mix of factors, which are mutually constrained, meets constant reproaches made against such ecological values as diversity. The objections take the form that enhancement of diversity as a sole factor can lead to undesirable ecological results, indeed can diminish Op net value and so be wrong on utilitarianism grounds. On the multiple factor model diversity is constrained by naturalness and stability, for example; thus net value is not going to be increased through increasing the diversity of a simple temperate rainforest by felling some of its trees and replacing them with exotic species. On the other hand, diver­ sity will be increased by planting the banks of a stream, eroded through excess clearing and overgrazing, with suitable exotic species - then birds Perhaps, moreover, there are no limiting natural laws, such as con­ servation principles, but the universe operates according to beneficient natural laws. There are distinctions here between worlds and physically possible worlds which Moore did not make. There may also be, at least in the case of KI, as Moore observed, factors that we are unaware of - at least under the intended construal of 'conceivable'. Rough and ready measures of such factors as diversity are not so difficult to come by, and, in important respects, present fewer problems than obtaining measures of pleasure that encompass, in ways that take account of interspecies and interindividual comparisons, all sentient creatures. Compare the objections made in §4 to Rodman's reliance on the single criteria of diversity; and also Passmore's points in (a) against diversity as a single criterion in arguments for preservation. 75 �and other animals will increase as well as plant diversity - and in such a case stability will also be increased in the longer term and natural­ ness not diminished (since already removed); thus overall value will be increased (it may also be increased by the enjoyment of conservationists formerly appalled by the stream landscape). Diversity,though (like enjoy­ ment or pleasure) good in itself, is (again like hedonistic values) not an unconstrained value (compare, e.g., enjoyment obtained through secret maltreatment of animals or by impoverishment of an unvisited streamside). The multiple factor model also solves the problem of how to combine traditional values, such as the virtues and creature enjoyment with what many in the West are only beginning to discern, environmental values; namely, by a constrained optimisation which takes due (i.e. weighted) account of them Thus in moving to an environmental (or nonchauvinist) ethic one is not ordinarily acknowledged welfare values for persons or humans, but simply recognising a further set of values to which such welfare values should be added. welfare values are retained; Nor is one humans, for human one is simply aiming to remove - through constraints which may reduce assignments to human values in favour of other values - the unwarranted privilege and chauvinism of the displaced Western super-ethic. One would not have come very far if, despite the claim to have recognised environmental values, one assumed that wherever there is con­ flict between natural values and human values, the latter must always prevail. This would be equivalent to assigning them very low weight, or even zero value, in all serious conflict cases. One would not have advanced far past rejection of axiological principle (A) if one then accepted, in assessments as to how things should be done, the yreafer namely that even though other things may have intrinsic value, people or humans are more valuable than anything else, and rank more highly (no matter how large their number).To allow that sows in human welfare values may sometimes - or even often, especially with increasing human populations - have to be accepted in cases of conflict is an essential part of assigning a genuine positive value to nonhuman factors. Sometimes humans, their states and conditions, do not come first: the greater value assumption should be rejected. Such an assumption - in popular form, that people come first - is extrgTMgZ-z/ widespread and is even included in animal liberation theory; cf. Singer, op. cit. For striking examples of the damaging assumption at work, see the (chauvinistic) resolutions of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. �o 4 There are many kinds of examples. Conspicuous examples are provided by recognisedly evil people (there are, under current social arrangements, plenty), whose welfare, or even lives, do not rank above, for example, valuable natural items, or the welfare of future persons. More con­ troversial are evaluations which rank the preservation of an animal species, such as the tiger, above the increase (or even retention) of human population in given areas.91 But, for the most part, the compar­ ative value of humans as opposed to other creatures and things has been greatly exaggerated. The arguments used in support of the greater value assumption are but variations of those for human chauvinism already considered, and largely rejected (in §1). Thus, for instance, Keller argues for a greater value thesis on the ground that a 'human being is the most complex thing which we know; its depth and range of experience far transcend that of any other known living thing' (p.209) Ecological Concern', Zz/^o/z, vol.6 (J.A. Keller, (1971), pp.197-209). complexity the claim is almost certainly false: are much more complex. 'Types of Motives for As regards pure tropical forest ecosystems The claim about range of experience is open to doubt, even for "normal" humans, since many animals have a much wider range of such sensory experiences as smells; and it is false of many humans. More important, range and "depth" of experience, of certain have) , does not, on its own, select sorts (those that normally establish greater value in any routine or regular way. Often enough it is no good basis for assigning greater value. The generalised optimisation model will commonly give way, in applications less sweeping and more feasible than that of the determining TI, to such special cases of it as Bayesian decision theory and cost­ benefit analysis, where these analyses allow properly for environmental values and duly incorporate ethical constraints (see Routley (a)). 90 91 It The fact of the matter is that prevailing unqualified attitudes to human welfare or the "sanctity" of human life - as opposed to other life - are shot through with inconsistency. For instance, despite common claims that human life is sacrosanct, neither the largely unquestioned military ethics nor medical ethics nor the state or "the law" take such a position: most individual humans are regarded as expendible, replaceable, and not particularly or uniquely valuable. On the prevailing ethic quite a different evaluation is taken for granted: e.g. It would be unrealistic to agree, of course, that preservation of wildlife should take precedence over providing for human needs. (S. Richardson, writing in T/ze CuTZ&erru November 29, 1974 , p.12) On an environmental ethic, while it might not be politically expedient, it would not be at all "unrealistic", to so agree. 77 �& is these more special methods that should normally be applied in trying to determine a best course of action in a range of difficult decision cases thrown up for an environmental ethics, especially cases where there is a conflict (i.e. constraining conditions) between retention of natural values (e.g. preserving a wilderness or a national park) and maintenance of humanistic values (e.g. keeping some humans alive, commonly reckoned one of the highest human-values). But for a cost-benefit weigh-up to be attempted such cases have to be described in more detail usually provided by chauvinistic philosophers who than is to direct such examples against environmental evaluations - as if furthermore, the examples were quite conclusive, when they almost always presuppose from the very beginning what is in dispute, a greater value assumption. In connection with such intended counterexamples to properly environmental ethics, two further points are worth recording: firstly, resort to such analytical methods is the rational procedure in such cases (unless a time urgency intrudes, as seldom happens, or should happen, in philosophy); secondly, an environmental ethic should not, any more than other ethics or economics, be expected to provide a decision procedure for any and every case that may arise: the theory (and accompanying intuitions) may have to be developed to resolve some cases, while other cases may go (cheerfully) undecided. On similar test or decision cases, e.g. one group of starving people versus another group in a situation of limited resources, or quality of life versus number of humans, conventional ethical theories may offer no quick, or clearcut, resolutions, etc. The optimisation model indicates, among many other things, how axiological principle (A) is to be modified. For best choice and best course of action are now determined by taking account of the further range of values, not just those that are human-based. Then (A) vanishes into the truism that only those objects that are of intrinsic value are of intrinsic value, or need be taken into account in the values of the optimisation model. How to rectify the deontic principle (D) is rather less obvious than how to adjust (A). An obvious strategy, is, however, to add further 92 Even when a case is more fully described there will, of course be (unavoidable) difficulties in quantifying some of the values, e.g. those of "intangible" factors; but these difficulties are not sub­ stantially worse than those already encountered in routine business accounting in quantifying such assets as good-will and such matters as wage relativities for different work. As L. Tribe has pointed out (in 'Ways not to think about plastic trees: new foundations for environmental law', YaZ-e AuzJ vol.83 (1974) , pp.1315-1348) the difficulties of transferring or adapting rather standard methods of assessment, such as decision theory and cost-benefit analyses, to pro vide rational decision methods in the case of environmental matters has been much exaggerated, to the detriment of the environment. 78 * �provisos. way; But it is unsatisfactory to do this in a piecemeal sort of it hardly suffices, for example, to simply add further riders excluding unnecessary cruelty to animals, speciescide, etc. What has to is unwarranted interference with other preference­ be ruled out havers (and goal-possessors) and the degrading of items of value. A revised principle appears then to go something like this:- DN. One is free to act as one wishes provided that (i) one does not unwarrantedly interfere with other preference-havers, and (ii) one does not damage or ill-treat or devalue anything of value. Though the revised principle has a rather more complex and restrictive character than freedom principle (D) and Western variants thereon, it still does the requisite task (D) set out to do, namely to state that out­ side certain prescribed areas one is free, that select behaviour is permissible.93 it is simply that the proscribed area is far larger than inadequate homocentric ethics have envisaged. But perhaps the whole conception underlying (D), and the way it fixes onus of proof, should be stood on its head. On the view behind (D), one starts from an unlimited position permitting unlimited interference and exploitation; restrictions are added primarily because other ones (again ones of the privileged class) are also starting from a similar unlimited position whose freedom of action may be (impermissibly) curtailed by one's own. So results the initial position, e.g. of (D). For inter­ ference in others' projects (no matter how exploitative) beyond this "evident" initial position,good reasons have always to be offered. alternative thoroughgoing On the respect view, which is illustrated by various nonexploitative non-Western ethics, one starts from a restricted position, a position of no interference and no exploitation, a position at peace with the natural world so to say, and allows interference - not as on thinking, restricts interference - for good reasons. thus entirely inverted: stop interference. Western The onus of proof is good reasons are required y<2r interference, not The good reasons include the collecting of fruit and nuts (and other natural "produce") for life support purposes, but not, for example, the collection of a substantial surplus of forest orchids on whim or in the hope that they may be sold at a profit. A theory of value like that outlined, though it takes it for granted, 93 The revised freedom principle is not incompatible with, but can be combined with and supplemented by, a bill of rights, charter or catechism specifying positively types of rights and of permissible conduct. 79 �A in the constraints imposed in optimisation, that there are deontic principles limiting what is done to many objects other than persons, leaves main deontic issues open, and in particular does not thereby imply that such objects have rights. For woraZ forbidding certain actions with respect to an object (fo not, in general, that object a 94 corretattle r-^p/zt. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given oak or landscape painting does not entail that the tree or painting has a correl­ ative right not to be mutilated - without (what has a point) stretching the notion of r^p*7z^. An environmental ethic like the respect ethic being advanced does not automatically commit one to the view that natural objects or artifacts sometimes have rights. It is sometimes held that some such objects do have rights, e.g. under the influence of pantheism. But construed literally, pantheism is false, since artefacts, and other inanimate objects, are not alive. The view that the class of right-holders extends beyond the class of preference-havers can however be placed on bases less extravagant than pantheism - most obviously in terms of a suitable deontic analysis of r^p?zt, for instance along the following lines: others d has a right to iff (obligation-holders) are not entitled to interfere with d's cj)ing (if d (f)'s or were to (j)). Under this account, of which emerges straight-forwardly from modern analyses of r^p/zt, a painting or a tree may indeed have "rights", such as to continue existing. Although the term 'right' can no doubt be 6^ctezz<ie(i along some such lines, the analysis leaves out essential elements of the normal notion, namely the involvement of choice. There are, once again, various competing environ­ mental ethics, some simple extensions of Western ethics which extrapolate the notion of r^p/zt, some not, some rationalistic, some not, and so on. Environmental positions can - but need not - adhere to the familiar assumption that rights divide into the following two broad classes:First, there are rights held by those (persons, in o?z6 sense) who can duly claim their rights themselves, a class which excludes many humans So rejected also is the s^rozz^ correlation thesis, presented e.g. in S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters, Pocz^aZ Pr^Tzc^pZes a7z<i ^Tze Pew<9<?r<2^<? Allen and Unwin/1959, pp.89-9, according to which 'right and duty are different names for the same normative relation, according to the point of view from which it is regarded' (thereby also elevating what is at best a coentailment into a stronger identity relation). For example, that d has a duty to look after the painting does not entail that the painting has a right to be looked after by d, in any sense of 'right' Benn and Peters are prepared to acknowledge. The weaker correlation thesis - that d has a right to R entails that at least someone else has a duty with respect to R - is not at issue. 80 & �and (so far as we know) almost all nonhuman animals. Such rights are often supposed to carry with them various responsibilities. Secondly, there are rights held by certain other (sometime sentient) creatures; though the extent of this subclass of right-holders is a controversial matter, it is generally taken to include at least infants, mentally defective humans, dead humans, and some animals. These rights do not carry corresponding responsibilities, though they are, of course, the However the assumption that certain rights - ground for various claims. the really central rights - are restricted to those who can claim them on their OM% behalf, seems to be based on the faulty idea of private (or separable) individuals as the basic metaphysical units. In a community of socio-environmental individuals there is no reason why one creature's rights should not be claimed, as infants' and animals' rights frequently are, by another: these rights are others' responsibilities. right-holder has itself no specific responsibilities. Often a Moreover the supposed division leaves it quite vague what responsibilities "central" often, it seems, they have none that right-holders are supposed to have; connect relevantly with their rights. be put on the alleged division: a primary nonderivative way). Accordingly but little weight will any preference-haver can hold rights (in That any preference-haver can hold rights is a consequence of the account of rt<y72t that usage of 'right to' appears to lead to, namely for very many (action-type) predicates cj), d has a right to iff, for every other (obligation-holder) z, z is not entitled to interfere with d if d chooses or would choose to <&. Thus that d holds rights requires of d only that it be the sort of creature that can make choices, that it be a preference-haver. The result holds good generally. Consider the other main case, where the right is to some object b: d has a right to b iff, for certain ot (a class of obligation holders, which may consist of a single person), members of a have an obligation to cede b to d if a chooses or would choose (to have) b (cf. Benn and Peters, op. cit., p.89). To be sure, there are other cases where rights to are attributed, but these appear to reduce to the cases given; which seems to amount to something like: to work. e.g. a has a right to work, a has a right to an opportunity Similar analyses - again with significance restrictions on the class of (])S and bs - apply to rights ??ot to, e.g. an animal has a right not to be kept in a cage. Rights of this sort can likewise be held by any preference-haver (but once again such rights be extended beyond this class to all natural objects). Not every right-holder bears responsibilities or carries obligations : infants for instance do not. Responsibility-bearers and obligation­ holders are a very proper subclass of humans and may only overlap the 81 �A t* class of humans, and likewise the class of potential responsibility­ bearers only overlaps the class of humans. Thus more demanding deontic notions afford no point of access for human chauvinism. To be responsible for something requires more than ability to have preferences or capacity to make choices; it implies liability to be called to account for the thing, answerability for it. Similarly, the undertaking of obligations involves entering into binding relations which imply answerability. Responsibility­ bearers and obligation-holders are thus a subclass of preference-havers, in accord with the annular theory. For answerability and accountability involve some level of linguistic competence - at the very least an ability to answer, in some language (usually presumed to be translatable, easily?, into some human language) - which many preference-havers do not possess. But responsibility and obligation lead a kind of a double life. For a creature that does not have responsibilities, may nonetheless be responsible for various things, in the sense of having done them, and sometimes done them deliberately; as, e.g., the wallaby who breaks down protecting netting and branches time and again is responsible for the demise of a Japanese plumtree. Rather similar oz^p/zf-statements hold true of subjects who do not carry obligations; consider, e.g., "wombats ought to be more careful in crossing roads". The upshot is that an environmental ethic can - despite its very different value theory - retain, in large measure, and sharpen, rather standard accounts of, and distinctions concerning, rights and obligations. It is in this respect, however, that the sort of environmental ethic being advanced differs markedly from alternative environmental ethics, e.g. those which would, implausibly, confer rights to trees, assign obligations to the soil, and so on. JM<?7z 6J?fe?zs^o?z pos^f^o/zs, of which Leopold's would be a leading example, ^Tzaf <2% eM^iro^z/??6?zfaZ ef/z^c znz^sf yoZZozJ i/zg paffgru cy hosier?? ef/z^<?s &ase <?^uss. orzZz/ a zzzzzcTz The way to a satisfactory, environmental, ethic is to reject the pattern of the Western super-ethic, not to simply extend it. The way is through some sort of annular theory which recognises categorial distinc­ tions between different sorts of things, not through a theory which would delete the legitimate distinctions between the sorts of things. latter mistaken way is unnecessary. The For example, in order to reject the instrumental view of value, and to assign natural objects intrinsic value, it is unnecessary to take Leopold's course of viewing all natural objects as having r^p/zfs in the same way as persons and preference-havers are regarded as having rights, or of persons as having obligations natural objects such as trees in the same sort of way as to other persons. Thus too there is no need to see the rejection of the instrumental 82 �<! view as mystical or anti-rational, or as reverting to the view that trees and other natural items house spirits (a view which in any case may have simply been a way of expressing an allotment of value to natural items), and hence as gross superstition. An environmental ethic can be as tough, practical, rational and secular as prevailing Western ethics. so such an ethics will lose much Even if it loses contact with its felt bases in natural things and appreciation of natural things. An environmental ethic will be much the poorer too if it limits itself to the moral terminology, and variations of the categories, of chauvinistically shaped ethics. There will much more as to care, concern and respect in the presentation and main principles of such an ethic than, what occupies standard Western ethics, duties, obligations and rights. In this way too, further problems and puzzles for environmental ethics can be resolved. For example, the view that ethical concepts can apply to the non-human world in an irreducible way is often seen as very puzzling. Much of this puzzlement is generated by attempting to transfer intact a strongly legalistic and person-oriented category of moral concepts, such as rights, moral obligations, duties, and so on, to items in the natural world where they give rise to such apparg^tZ-y problematic questions as 'Do stones have rights?', 'What are our moral obligations to trees?', and so on. If we attempt instead to apply a broader, less legalistic class of moral concepts, such as care, concern, responsibility and respect, much of the puzzling character of these still essentially moral attributions vanishes. There is no great problem for example about how we can legitimately apply notions such as respect to natural items, once a few distinctions are made. The view that the land, animals, and the natural world should be treated with respect was a common one in many hunting and gathering societies, and it is clear that this respect was not seen as generated merely by moral obligations to other persons. dimension to relations with Respect adds a moral the natural world. Respect - or the lack of it - comes out in everyday actions concerning the natural world. The following passage contrasts the Western treatment of the land which lacks respect with the careful and respectful treatment of some American Indians: The White people never cared for land or dear or bear. we Indians kill meat, we eat it all up. little holes. When we dig roots we make When we built houses, we make little holes. burn grass for grasshoppers, we don't ruin things. acorns and pinenuts. dead wood. When We don't chop down the trees. When we We shake down We only use But the White people plow up the ground, pull down the 83 �St trees, kill everything (Tozzck ike Furik, (ed. T.C. McLuhan, Sphere Books, London, 1973, p.15). The great care with which so many of the Indians utilized every portion of the carcass of a hunted animal was an expression, not of economic thrift, but of courtesy and respect (D. Lee, in Tonck ike Forik, p.15)What the respect position is based on is the fact that it is possible to make use of something without treating it as something which is no more than a means to one's ends. That is, it is possible to make use of some­ thing in limited, constrained ways - with constraints which may not derive entirely from considerations of the welfare of other humans, as in the case of the Indians' use of animals - without treating it as available for any kind of use. To so use something without treating it as available for unlimited or unconstrained use for human ends is characteristic of use. In contrast non-respectful use treats the use of the item as constrained by no considerations arising from the item itself and the user's relationship to it, but as constrained only in a derivative way, by considerations of the convenience, welfare and so forth of other humans. The Western view, as the Indians realised, is the non-respect position, that the world is available for unconstrained human use. People who hold respect positions, such as the Indians, see such a position as indicative of a lack of moral sensitivity, and sometimes in even stronger terms. The conventional wisdom of Western society tends to offer a false dichotomy of use versus respectful nonuse - a false choice which comes out especially clearly again in the treatment of animals. Here the choice presented in Western thought is typically one of eiiker use without respect or serious constraint, of using animals for example in the ways character­ istic of large-scale mass-production farming and a market economic system which are incompatible with respect, or on the other hand of not making any use of animals at all, for example, never making use of animals for food or for farming purposes. What is left out in this choice is the alternative the Indians and other non-Western people have recognised, the alternative of limited and respectful use, which enables use to be made of animals, but does not allow animals to be used in an unconstrained way or merely as a means to human ends. Such an alternative can have some applic­ ation in a Western context (for some limited examples of respectful use in the operations of a small farmer, see John Seymour, Tke Cowpiete Rook of Faber, London, 1976). A limited and respectful use position would condemn the infliction of unnecessary pain on animals, and also the treatment of animals as machines, as in factory farming. 84 It �would also condemn unecessary and wasteful killing and especially killing for amusement or "sport", which is incompatible with respect and assumes that animals can be used merely as a means for ZrZz?ZuZ human ends. But it would not necessarily oppose the use of animals in the case of approp­ riate non-trivial need, e.g. for food, although here again it would insist that the ways in which use can be made are limited, and not just by considerations of effect on other humans. The limited and respectful use position avoids some of the serious problems of the no-use position of the animal liberationists, although it shares many of the same beliefs concerning the illegitimacy of factory farming and similar disrespectful methods of making use of and exploiting animals. The no-use position faces the problem that it proposes that humans should treat animals in ways which are quite different from the ways in which animals treat one another, for example, prohibiting needful use for food. Thus the no-use position seems obliged to say either that the world would be a better place without carnivores, or else that carnivorous animals themselves are inferior, immoral, moral creatures - whichever alternative amoral or non- is taken here the bulk of animals emerge as inferior to humans, or at least vegetarian humans. It implies too that an impoverished natural order which lacked carnivores - and given what we know of ecology this would be a very highly impoverished one indeed, not to say an unworkable "natural" order - is preferable to a rich natural one with a normal proportion of carnivorous and partly carnivorous species. carnivores, Since it would imply the moral inferiority of the no-use position appears to arrive at the negation of its own starting point, (as regards e.g., the equality consideration) of all animals, human and non-human. In thus seeing humans as capable of a moral existence which most animals are not capable of, it sees man as apart from a largely amoral (or immoral) natural world, denies community with the animal and natural world,and indirectly reinforces human chauvinism. §6. TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE EXTENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL REVISION ENSUING ON ABANDONMENT OF CHAUVINISTIC ETHICS A radical change in a theory not uncommonly forces changes elsewhere - conceptual revision which affects not only the theory itself but many neighbouring areas. The phenomenon is well-known in the case of major physical theories, but it holds as well for ethical and philosophical theories; for example, a logical theory which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way has important repercussions throughout much of the rest of philosophy, and requires modification not only of logical 85 �systems and their semantics, but also, for instance, of the usual meta­ theory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is 95 tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A thorough-going environmental ethics likewise has a substantial impact and forces many changes. The escape from human chauvinism not only involves sweeping changes in ethical principles and value theory but it induces substantial reverberations elsewhere - both inwards, for example in metaphysics, in epistemology, and in the philosophy and method­ ology of science, and outwards (in subjects that presuppose value theory) in social theory, in politics, in economics and in law, and beyond. For human chauvinism is deeply embedded in Western culture, and affects not only the ideology and the institutions but the arts. Thus, for example, much of literature, and especially of ballet and film, is given over to a celebration :of things' human,', of .'the species. ,-;Eveh the. ti.RfeLy herw,eYnphas.is, for instance of the counterculture, on-human relations (a-s opposed to selfcontained private individuals of social theories) remains well within the inherited chauvinistic framework. As to the changes, let us begin again with ethics. As we have begun to see, an environmental ethic can retain, though in a much amended theoretical framework (which affects meanings of terms), virtually all the standard ethical terminology. But even at a superficial syntactical level, there will be conspicuous alterations: firstly, ethical terminology will be enriched with new environmental terms, drawn in particular from ecology, somewhat as it was expanded in the late nineteenth century by terminology from evolutionary theories; and secondly, accompanying the attitudinal shifts the new ethic involves, there will be a marked shift in ethical terminology, away from the predominance of such terms as (and examples associated with) 'obligation', to such expressions as 'care', 'respect', 'consciousness'. 'duty', 'concern', 'promise', 'contract', 'responsibility', 'trust', Because the theoretical and attitudinal frame is changed, an environmental ethic forces - as we have already found with such notions as z)oZ-Me, cZzotce, interference and (Zowa^e reexamination of, and modified analyses of, characteristic ethical notions. It requires, furthermore, reassessment of traditional and conventional analyses of such notions as nctnraZ- ri^/zt, ^ronn^Z of ri^Zzt^ and perznissib- iZitz/., especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions - much as it requires the rejection of most of the more prominent meta-ethical These points are explained in detail in Routley (e); and also in L. Goddard and R. Routley, TZze Lopic of Cipnificonce an^Z Context, Vol. 1, Scottish Academic Press, 1973, chapters 3 and 4. 86 �0 46 positions. Cursory examination of recent accounts of TzuZ^ruZ rZpTzZ^ zzzoruZ-Ztz/-, and ucf-Zczz will help illustrate and confirm these points. Hart, for example, accepts (subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant) the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, any adult human ... capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons Hart, (H.L.A. 'Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in PcZ-ZZ-ZcuZ P/z-fZoscpZzz/, (ed. A. Quinton), Blackwell, Oxford 1967). But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the basic chauvinist principle - a variant of (D) - environmental ethics reject; since if a person has a natural right he has a right. So too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straightforward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. Another example of chauvinism at work in the very setting up of the field of discussion and problems in ethics is provided by recent accounts of woruZ-ZZy, where it is simply taken for granted that 'moral' distinguishes 96 among ZzMzzzu?z actions, policies, motives and reasons, and that what is moral refers essentially to human well-being (contentment, happiness or something of this general sort, tied with appropriate states or 97 conditions of humans). Such criteria for what is moral are chauvinistically based, assuming that what does not bear on human states or conditions cannot be a moral matter. What happens in worlds without humans, how animals fare or are treated, what is done or what happens to plants or other natural objects - none of these are directly moral matters, except insofar as they impinge on human welfare. That is human 96 Thus for instance, B. Williams, AfcruZ-Ztp; 24% P^z^rodMcf-Zo^ fo Ff/z-Zcs^ Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p.79. Williams does, however, remark in his Preface (p.xiv) how 'shaky and problematic' the distinction - which he subsequently takes for granted - is. 97 See, for example, P.R. Foot, TZzeor'Zes Ft/z-Zcs, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, and G.J. Warnock, Ccwfewporurz/ AforuZ P/z-ZZosop/zz/, Macmillan, London, 1967, and also TZzg o.f MoraZ-Zfz/, Methuen, London, 1971. 87 �t* chauvinism at work, and is at the same time a reductio such criteria. s- ad absurdum of A different nonchauvinistic account of what is moral is required (a beginning can be made by adopting certain of the maligned formal criteria). It is evident that any account which meets even weak conditions of adequacy will serve to meet the objection that an environ­ mental ethic is not concerned with what is moral but is really an aesthetic theory. For the objection as usually presented depends squarely on a chauvinistic restriction on morality, all the rest of value theory being classed, or dismissed, as "(mere) aesthetics". The case of morality illustrates the characteristic way in which theories - in this case chauvinistic ethics - redefine crucial notions in their own terms to suit their own ends, such as entrenchment and fortification of the theories against objections. Further corollaries of the rejection of chauvinism include the inadequacy of recent fashionable attempts, mainly derivative from Hobhouse, at characterising a^naZf^z/ and justifying it in ways that argue from man's humanity^98 and the inadequacy of much recent, largely chauvinistic, work in the philosophy of actdan, which takes it for granted that action and 99 rationality requirements on action are bound up with human nature. The abandonment of chauvinism implies the rejection not only of much ethical analysis, but of all current major ethical positions. The bias of prevailing ethical positions, and also of economic positions, which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is especially evident. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have (at least) an ordinal p- ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p-ranking of these states in terms of individual p-rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And 98 Among such unsatisfactory liberal egalitarian positions are those presented in G. Vlastos, 'Justice and equality' in SacZaZ JnstZae (ed. R.B. Brandt), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962, and B.A.O. Williams, 'The idea of equality' in P^Zasap/zz^., PaZfZfcs and JacZafz/, Second series (ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman), Blackwell, Oxford, 1963. 99 see, e.g.^T. Nagel, T/ze Pass-Z&'ZZ'Ztz/ a/ ^ZZrnZszzz, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970. 88 �even if the base class is extended to include persons or some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. To take a simple example, if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (still unfortunately the evaluation of most Australian farmers, though it lacks any requisite empirical basis). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with sperm whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if but few in the base class happened to know that sperm whales exist or cared a jot that they do, then even the most "rational" economic decision­ making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. But whether the sperm whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Summed human interests, or preferences of certain private individuals, are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding upon what is environmentally desirable. Nor would such accidental bases be adequate. Moreover ways out of the problem do not bear much investigation. It cannot be assumed, for instance, that the base class is on the whole good, and hence will not enjoin reprehensible behaviour, because such an assumption seems false, would at best be contingently true (so that the theory would fail for different circumstances to which it should apply), and would involve a deep problem in the theory, since it would then seem to admit the determination of goodness - that of the base class, on the whole - independently of what the theory was set up to determine, among other things, goodness. Nor can it be assumed, without serious circularity, that the optimisation is constrained by requirements of justice or fairness (see Routley (b) and §5 above). The ethical and economic theories just singled out (which are based on optimisation over select features of the base class) are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to west going meta- ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. That is, the argument against utilitarian—type ethical and economic theories generalises. For instance, on social contract positions, obligations are a matter of mutual agreement 89 �between individuals of a given (but again problematic) base class; on a social justice picture, rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons;^00 while on a Kantian position, which has some vogue, obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.In each case, if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class, then that is unfortun­ ate for them: that is (rough) justice. Looking outwards from the ethics, the abandonment of chauvinism has likewise a wide set of consequences, both theoretical and practical, in economics, politics and law, and generally in the social sciences. One major practical economic impact of environmental ethics is in the extent to which free enterprise can operate unimpeded or unchanged. of business and enterpreneurial activity - to But consider <9722 option - will involve, in turn, either legal constraints, or reallocation of activity by such devices as environmental pricing, which directs activity away from environmentally undesirable pursuits. For example, if it is wrong to destroy a rare ecosystem in order to make a few more dollars, then restrictions should be imposed on business activity by one method or another. To some limited extent this is already happening in the field of pollution, but primarily because of the likely effects, direct or not too far removed, that pollution comes to have on other humans, not for a wider set of reasons, and often not for the right reasons. With a wider environ­ mental code, the public and legal intrusion into areas typically regarded as "private" and open to the free enterprise operations (of "open go") would be much more extensive. The same applies in the case of private Thus for example, [Rawls'] original position seems to presuppose not just a neutral theory of the good, but a liberal, individualistic conception according to which the best that can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own path, provided it does not interfere with the rights of others. This view is persuasively developed in the later portions of the book, but without a sense of its controver­ sial character (T. Nagel, 'Rawls on justice' , P/z^Zcsop/ztcczZ 82 (1973), p.228). Nagel also effectively argues that Rawls' original position is not neutrally determined but involves substantial moral assumptions (e.g. pp.232, 233); they are mostly, as it happens, of a chauvinistic cast. While the first of Kant's maxims is not so restricted in actual form­ ulation, others are (see H.J. Paton, AforuZ P<2M, Hutchinson, London, 1947) . And, firstly, such maxims are s^ppast?^ to be equivalent to ones formulated in terms of persons; secondly, they are supposed to be derived from features of, or connected with, people. 90 �-4 property; for example, given that it is not permissible to erode hill­ sides then there should, in this setting, be (legal) restrictions on farmers' and foresters' activities. Although the impact on the practice of economics of a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would be drastic - market negotiations, firms' activities, international trade, all would be affected - the impact on the underlying theories of preference and choice is comparatively For much of economics is squarely founded but still far from negligible. on chauvinism. less, The theoretical bias follows directly from the utilitarian bases of the theory, which is fairly explicit in welfare theory and rather heavily disguised in neoclassical theory. But although choice and value theory are, as characteristically presented in economics and elsewhere, damagingly chauvinistic, they do not have to be. For the theories can be reformulated in a non-chauvinistic way, as was indicated (in §5) above for utilitarianism - upon which economic theory is modelled. On such a revamped foundation an environmental economics to match the chosen environmental ethic can be built (for some preliminaries on this approach, see Routley (d), appendices 1 and 6). Several of the objections to base class theories such as utilitar­ ianism apply not merely against orthodox economic theory, but also to voting theory, to representative democratic systems of determination of political action. If, for, example, the base class consists of private individuals motivated by their own self-contained interest then such procedures can readily lead to most undesirable results, especially if these individuals compromise representative individuals. their autonomy through the election of For the more powerful of these representative individuals can be - and typically are, as their behaviour if not their protestations show - not favourably disposed to (the welfare of) things outside the base class or even to many members of the base class. Nearer the theoretical surface, especially in such branches of economics as "resource management", the chauvinism is more conspicuous. The following narrowly utilitarian assumption is quite typical: The goal of resource managers should be to communicate and act in ways that maximize human satisfaction (H.J. Campbell, 'Economic and social significance of upstream aquatic resources' in Forest Fs^s Oregon State University, Corcallis, 1971, p.14, also p.17). When management - where such is management becomes needed at all - the goals will be changed from such chauvinistic ones. 91 �The method of interference in "free economic enterprise", of controls and regulations, of legal and political constraints, is only one way in which leading principles of an environmental ethics can be put into effect. A quite different, and ultimately far more appealing, approach is by way of structural change, by changing the socio-economic structure in such a way that it comes to reflect on environmental ethics (by altering the frame of reference, or axes, to use the physical picture of §4, so that major problems vanish). Requisite structural change is . 102 far-reaching, both practically and theoretically in every reach of social science. For example, while on the position, capitalist markets are subject to further regulation, either directly imposed or by way of suitable pricing policies, in the s^rz^g^raZ. c/zaMgre position, capitalist markets are eliminated; while under state regulation private property is subject to further Controls,given approp­ riate structural change private property disappears. Looking inwards, an environmental ethic has an impact on the practice of many sciences other than the social sciences - what they do experimentally with natural objects (e.g. the treatment of animals in laboratory testing); how their research programmes are organised and directed (consider,e.g., projects involving irradiation or broadscale herbicide treatments of rainforests); the way classifications are made and which are made (consider, e.g. the extent to which human perception enters into classifications in botany); recommended on the basis of such sciences. and, of course, what is For as it stands human chauvinism is deeply embedded in the practice of science, directly in research and experimentation and in shaping classifications, theses and theories. Indeed the effect of a different ethic may extend even to the theory of such sciences, in particular through the bearing the ethic has 103 on metaphysics which m turn influences the foundations of such sciences. Such a new ethic would quite properly upset (as §1 should indicate) the extent to which humans are seen at the centre of things and things as accountable through them and scientific theories as 'human constructions wrestled from a hostile nature' (after Popper). It would help overthrow the pernicious chauvinistic idea that, apart from certain elementary facts, 4ZZ-es value. Me?zs<?/ze?zzjgr^, all necessity, all intensionality, all It should result too in the shattering of still widespread As (g) V. and R. Routley, 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems', this volume, begins to explain. Cf. R. Harre, TTza P/z^Zosop/ztes c/ S'c^eyzcg, Oxford University Press, 1972; and also Routley (e). 92 �***** assumptions as to the nature of animals and plants, for instance that their apparently goal—directed and intensional behaviour can be explained (away) mechanistically, and the deeply-rooted idea that some sort of Cartesian metaphysical picture of natural, as distinct from spiritual or rational, objects can be maintained (cf. again §1). In metaphysics there are at least two further important classes of effects. Firstly, the orthodox views of man's relation to nature, the dominant and modified dominant and lesser traditions, have to be abandoned and new positions worked out. In this sense, a new environmental ethic implies a similarly new metaphysic redefining Man's place in nature and human/nature relationships.104 Such a new philosophy of nature will recognise various natural objects other than humans as of independent value, so it will not be naturalistic. Nor will it view natural objects as simply available for the use, wise or otherwise, of humans. Several principles derived from the orthodox metaphysical positions will have to be abandoned and replacements worked out (as in the case of (D) in ethics) Thus superseded, for example, will be the principles of total use of natural areas for human use and of maximum long-term productivity of the earth's resources (principles criticised in their application in forestry in Routley (d)). At a deeper level, such a philosophy of nature will involve a turning away from the leading ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and of much that went with them (e.g. with the Renaissance, the rise of commerce, bureaucracy, professionalism, formal education, and subsequently, with the Enlightenment, the rise of the modern state, capitalism and scientific enlightenment). For it means the dismissal of the chauvinistic principles of theRenaissance,with 'Man as the kernel of the Universe', a creature 'half-earthly and half-divine, his body and soul form[ing] a microcosm enabling him to understand and control Nature ...'.1°5 It means too removal of the humanism of the Enlightenment, the reduction of what formerly was assigned to the religious, such as ethical and political principles, to the human, a reduction which 104 As Passmore has observed - inconsistently with what is claimed m his (a) - in 'Attitudes to Nature', Roz/aZ of PTz^oscp/zy Lectures, volume 8, Macmillan, London, 1975. As against Passmore (a) p.3, such new ethics and metaphysics need involve no abandonment of 'the analytical, critical approach which is the glory of the West : on the contrary, they may well mean a more thoroughly critical and analytical approach than hitherto. 105 goth quotations are from T^ze <?y tTzg 7?e7z<2^ss(2%<3g (ed. D. Hay) Thames and Hudson, London 1967, pp.7-10, where too main movements, practical and ideological, of the Renaissance are usefully indicated. 93 �was based on the false dichotomy, which has still not lost its hpld:, religious or humanistic. Secondly, the removal of humans from a dominant position JhT the natural order renders immediately suspect a range of familiar philosophical positions of a verificationistic or idealistic kind such as phenomenalism in epistemology (how can what exists depend on what is perceived by members of such a transitory and perhaps not so important species or ^on whether there exist perceivers?), intuitionism in mathematics, con­ ventionalism in logical theory, the Copenhagen interpretation ir^ micr<^- physics, and subjectivisms not only in ethics but in every other* * True, most of these positions are defeated on t^e basis of other considerations anyway; but it is an immediate and fur,t^ier philosophical sphere. point against them that they are damagingly chauvinistic. Thus a corollary of the thoroughgoing rejection of human chauvinism, of very considerable philosophical importance, is the rejection of all the usual forms of idealism, i.e. all positions which accord primacy to the human subject and make the existence of a world of things or the nature of things dependent upon such subjects. A paradigmatic example is phenomenalism; other examples are Kantian idealisms, Hegelianisms and later German idealisms, Christian philosophies based on the primacy of human (and superhuman) consciousness, existentialisms; more surprising examples are empiricisms - inasmuch as all knowledge and truth is supposed to be ultimately derived from human experience - and their holistic images, dialectical materialisms and Marxisms. A satisfactory environ­ mental philosophy will be significantly different from all these positions. 94 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document — ?HUMAN CHAUVINISM AND.ENVIRONMENTAL.ETHICS* Richard and Vai Routley / * . * Class chauvinism has been and remains a cardinal weakness of most . moral codes - including, so it will°be argued, Western ethics. * A most serious failure 6f Western ethics is its human chauvinism or anthropo^centricism - a chauvinism which emerges in a refined, and apparently more reds&n*able, form as person chauvinism in much modern ethical theory. * w What is chauvinism? $ * Class chauvinism, in the relevant sense, is sz^Etant^aZ-Z-z/ differential, discriminatory and inferior treatment (by sufficiently many members of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not enff-ZcZen^ justification. Pnwan chauvinism is class chauvinism where the class is humans, wuZ-e chauvinism where the class is human males, an-Z/zzaZ. chauvinism where the class is animals, etc. It would be bazf, to say the least, if Western ethics, in its various strands, were to turn out to rest on human, or person, chauvinism. For Western ethics would then have no better foundation than, and be open to the same sorts of objections as, moral codes based on other sorts of chauvinisms, e.g. on familial, national, sexual, racial or socio-economic class chauvinism - in particular it would be open to the objection that This paper (which considerably elaborates R. Routley 'Is There a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?', Procee^-Znps of Zz/ze XPt/z ^orZ^ Ccnpress of PTz^Z-cscp/zz/, 1 (1973), pp.205-10), was drafted in 1973 and read in 1974 at the University of Indiana, Bloomington, at Notre Dame University, and at the Conference on The Good Society held at the University of Victoria, Canada. Since the main virtue of the paper has been that it'has generated much interesting discussion, the original form has been retained, though the authors are no longer especially happy with the form, and many theses remain insufficiently developed or defended. But in order not to remove the previous and continuing criticism, no substantial deletions have been made, even though the paper has been raided and segments of it presented in improved form elsewhere, especially (a) R. and V. Routley, 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism', in MoraZ P/z-ZZosopTzz/ an<7 t?ze Tzjentp-F-Zrst Centnrz/ (edited by K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre), Notre Dame University Press, 1979, and (b) R. and V. Routley, 'An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism', paper presented at the Colloquium on Preferences CTzo^ce an<i FaZzve, RSSS, Australian National University, 1977. However some sizeable additions have been made, with a view to increasing the intelligibility and enlarging the scope of the original draft, and meet­ ing some of the many objections. 1 it discriminated against nonhumans in a prejudiced and unwarranted way, and would thereby stand condemned. For it is hard to see how an ethic based on simple spoo-Zes loyalty could have any greater claim to absolute­ ness or deserve any more respect than moral codes based on simple loyalty to national, sexual, or racial classes. Such an ethic could no more command allegiance - once the facts are brought into clear view - than other normally-deplored examples of localised class chauvinism, such as the Mafia or protection agencies or rackets or enclaves of slavery. Unfortunately prevailing Western ethics appear to be of just this sort. §1. THE WESTERN CASE FOR ITS HUMAN (OR PERSON) CHAUVINISM: THE FIRST LINES OF DEFENCE It is important, then, for defenders of the Western ideology to be able to show - *Zf it can be shown - that an ethic which discriminates strongly in favour of humans, as Western ethics apparently does, is not chauvinistic. Otherwise the ethic stands condemned. Of course not every distinction in treatment qualifies as chauvinistic - the distinction in treatment may not be substantial or systematic, and there may be an adequate and explicable basis for the distinction, so that some discrimin­ ation is warranted. In order to escape the charge of human chauvinism, it has to be shown how and why the drastic and general discrimination in favour of humans sanctioned and enjoined by modern (as by historical) Western ethical systems is warranted, and that it has an adequate basis. The extent of this chauvinism, especially with respect to animals, is at last - after centuries of a priori prejudice and gross distortion of the characteristics of wild animals and wilderness - beginning to be spelt 1 out. It is at least clear from the outset that an adequate justification cannot be provided which simply selects all and only these members of the species human (i.e. /zowo sap*Zo?zs) as zoologically defined. There is nothing about the characteristic of TzMwazzZZp itself (as distinct perhaps from its accompanying properties) which could provide a justification for overwhelmingly favourable treatment for humans (and unfavourable treatment for nonhumans) as opposed to other possible, and possibly some actual, nonhuman creatures. Once again, an adequate ethic and justification can­ not possibly be based on blind and unthinking species loyalty. The same 1 See, e.g., S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (eds), Mor azzd Morals. -Z^Zo Z/ze zzzaZ^roat/TzozzZ of yzorz-ZzMwaMS, Gollancz, London, 1971; P. Singer, ?l?z-Z7na:Z f-Z^oraf-ZoM. pzezj o^/z-Zos for OMr of azz*Z/??aZs, Cape, London, 1976; S.R.L. Clark, y/zo A7oraZ of ^H-ZwaZs, Clarendon, Oxford, 1977. 2 CB objection applies against the simple need's argument: the commonly assumed domination of human needs over all else (e.g. over all environ­ mental considerations) has, if it is to have any merit, to be based on more than speciesism.^ We shall have to look then for some other not merely taxonomic characteristic to provide the sought justification. It will emerge however, that any such characteristic is held or may be held by nonhumans, and is not held, or potentially not held, by all items of the species human. Of course there are many characteristics which can, as a contingent matter, be used to distinguish human beings as a general class from other higher animals - although in fact with increasing knowledge of animals it is no longer clear that some of these characteristics distinguish as clearly as was assumed a priori in the past. For example, humans have a language, and a culture of a certain sort and even various logics. And, as we are accustomed to have people point out, other terrestrial animals do not conduct philosophical discussions on environmental ethics. However not only is participation in these activities potentially available to nonhuman creatures, and these characteristics possibly possessed by some, but these activities are not generally engaged in even by humans (particularly the power elite), many humans lack the requisite competence, and even among those who do qualify, such activities are carried out to a very varying extent. We run the risk, then, in applying such demanding criteria, of ruling out, of classing as deserving of "sub-human" or "sub­ person" treatment, a considerable class of human beings — items most humans would consider as worthy of better treatment than that normally accorded by humans to nonhuman animals. What is more important however is that such criteria as human language, culture, human civilization, human intentionality, or whatever, appear to provide no satisfactory for the substantially unfavourable treatment allotted those falling outside the privileged class. should there be such strong discrimination in favour of creatures having a (certain sort of)^ language or a higher level of intelligence and against creatures or items which do not, in favour of things with a certain sort of culture or a certain logic and against those without? Especially when some of these criteria are clearly, and 2 As McCloskey remarked (in a letter dated 5.7.77 containing many helpful comments) 'talking about needs does little but obscure the problem, as needs, to be normatively relevant, involve reference to goods; and that merely transfers the problem'. 3 On next page. 3 *3 unjustifiably,loaded in favour of human interests, achievements and By contrast the very many respects in which some or sorts of animals are superior bo bMfnans (many are noted in V.B. Droscher, Tbe abilities (cf. the cultural loading of various intelligence tests). 4?ibmaZ Parcaptbo^, Allen, London, of tbe Sassos. 1969) are rarely considered; yet some of these features would, if taken in the same serious way as some respects in which humans excell, justify a reverse chauvinism (which could be reflected as, for exampZ-e, in the Hindu treatment of cows). The only sort of justification for the discrimination that might appear convincing - that those who have the given characteristic (e.g. those that are more intelligent, or more rational, or richer) are more valuable or worth special treatment - is vitiated by the fact that were it accepted by Western ethics it would warrant similar discrimination humans (or persons). For how do we show that the allegedly warranted discrimination is sufficiently different from making substantial (class) distinctions between humans in terms of their level of intelli­ gence, linguistic or logical ability, or level or kind of cultural achievement - so that those with "lower" levels of these valued abilities are treated in a consistently inferior way and regarded as available for the use of the others? In short, these characteristics do not provide adequate justification for the substantially inferior treatment accorded those not having them, and so the charge of chauvinism is not escaped by producing them. A similar set of points applies against a number of other criteria^ traditionally or recently proposed to distinguish the privileged class. Often these are propounded in terms of personhood and criteria for being a parson (the class marked out for privileged treatment being the class of persons) rather than criteria for being bz^wan - in order to escape difficulties raised by young, senile, decrepit, stupid, irrational, 3 For undoubtedly many mammals, birds and insects can communicate, some times in ways analogous to language, even if the honorific term 'language' is withheld (see - to select an unfavourable source the discussion in E.O. Wilson, SocZobboZ-opp. Belknap, Cambridge Mass., 1975, chapter 8 ff.). It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that the ascription of some linguistic ability, and of elementary languages, to nonhuman creatures should not be withheld, see e.q. the details assembled in E. Linden, 4p<2s_, Penguin,New York, 1976. (But contrast Wilson, op. cit., pp.555 59, and to set this in proper perspective, consider Wilson s discussion of ethics and aesthetics a few pages later, pp.562-65.) 4 Many of the criteria that have been proposed are assessed, and found wanting, in Routley (a). 4 damaged and defective humans, extraterrestrial creatures, and super animals; to avoid the merely contingent connections between being human and having requisite person-determining characteristics (such as ration­ ality or knowledge) supposed to warrant discriminatory treatment; and t defeat, though it is a pyrrhic victory, the charge of human chauvinism (or equivalents of the charge, such as anthropocentricism or speciesism). But much the same problems then arise in terms of criteria for u person, and the chauvinism problem reappears as the problem of furnish­ ing criteria which are suitably clearcut, and do separate persons from assumed nonpersons, and which would provide an adequate justification for substantially privileged treatment for persons and inferior treatment for nonpersons. Unless such a justification is forthcoming the charge of person is not escaped. Most of the criteria proposed for personhood fall down in just these sorts of ways, e.g. being autonomous, the having of projects, the producing of junk, the assessing of some of one's performances as successful or not, the awareness of oneself as an agent or initiator. Not only does it appear that (the more worthy of) such criteria apply (or could apply) to many nonhuman animals - thus animals are generally more autonomous (in main senses of the term) than humans, many animals have projects (e.g. home and nest building), and they are well aware of themselves, as opposed to rivals, as initiators of 5 projects - and that they do not apply uniformly to humans or indeed to persons in any ordinary sense; but again it is extremely difficult to see what there is in these characteristics which would warrant or justify the vast difference in treatment between the privileged and nonprivileged classes, or justify regarding the non-privileged class as something available for the of the privileged class. Similar objections can be lodged against the proposal that knowledge or the possession of knowledge, provides feature. (or u crMc^uZ) distinguishing It can hardly provide the appropriate filter, since it not only gives no sharp cut-off point,but does not even always rank humans or persons above nonhumans or nonpersons. Moreover, taken seriously it should lead to substantial moral differentiation between persons, a person's moral rating also fluctuating during his lifetime. In any case, For example, the shiftless intelligent person, or the primitive person, who has no projects and engages in no moral reflection, and thus offends protestant ethics, is not thereby deregisterable as a person, any more than an intelligent animal with projects can join the union. On next page. 5 4 why rank knowledge so highly: for (pace Socrates) knowledge is not the foundation of virtue, but is frequently turned to evil ends, and even where it is meritorious it is not the sole (or even a crucial) criterion of worth. Similar difficulties apply too to the historic criterion of ratZozzaZZZp, along with the added problem that it is -very difficult to say what it is in any clear or generally acceptable way, or to prevent it from degenerating into a simple "pro" word. If a hallmark of rationality is commitment to the consequences of what one believes and seriously says, then many humans fail the test. If, on the other hand rationality i^, for example, the ability to discover and pursue courses and actions likely to achieve desired goals (direct action toward goals), ability to solve problems concerned, etc., then plainly many animals have it, and possibly to a greater extent than humans in some cases (and of certain humans in almost all cases). If it were the ability, e.g. to do ZopZc (say propositional calculus) or to assess reasoning verbally, then the (biassed) criterion would be far too strong and rule out many humans. Again, why should one make such a marked discrimination on this basis? What is so meritorious about this characteristic, that it warrants such a marked distinction? Nothing (at least in the ordinary academic's view, or logicians would receive more favoured treatment). Other criteria, which yield an analytic connection between being a person and enjoying freedom or having rationality, in part beg the question. For in D?zat respect is it that persons - or worse, just persons - are free. Also the justificatory problem, as to how the claimed freedom or rationality warrants such differential treatment, remains. Characterisations of parsons vary enormously, from so strong that they rule out suburban humans who are not "self-made" enterpreneurs, to so weak that they admit very wa^z/ animals. An (unintentional) example of the latter is the following: persons, that is, ... beings who are not only sentient but also capable of intensional autonomous action, beings that must be ascribed not only states of consciousness but also states of belief, thought and intention (A. Townsend, 'Radical vegetarians , 4zzstraZasZa?z JoMrzzaZ of P/zZZosop/zz/, 57 (1979), p.89). 6 in addition, the relation "a has at least as much knowledge as b is only a partial ordering. For example, a dog's and a child s knowledge may be incomparable, because they know about different matters how to do quite different sorts of things, etc. (The idea that knowledge is the key to moral discrimination, that it is what makes humans rank t way Western ethics ranks them, may be found in C.B. Daniels, PaaZMaZZoK of FZTzZcaZ T/zoorZes, Philosophy in Canada Monograph, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1975.) 6 O) Most rats and rabbits satisfy the conditions: conscious animals that have intentions they are sentient, (e.g. to get through some barrier such as a floor or a fence), beliefs and thoughts (e.g. that there is For his further argument Townsend preferred food beyond the barrier). shifts - without notice, but in a way that is quite typical of this scene - to wzzcTz stronger requirements upon being a person (such that one who does not meet them is incapacitated as a person) which rule out many humans, e.g. 'The person must recognise canons of evidence and inference warranting changes in his beliefs, and be capable of changing his beliefs 7 accordingly' (op. cit., p.90). In meeting hypothetical objections, Townsend slips in a further require ment of rationality, but the characterisation of person given does not include any such requirement. Subsequently, however, Townsend commits himself, without argument, to the thesis that 'a fairly high degree of rationality is prerequisite' to attributing 'intensionality' (as dis­ tinct from 'intentionality'). This is not going to help much. For, firstly, rationality is very much a notion which admits of degrees, without the relatively sharp cut-off stages required for person as a notion of orthodox moral relevance, or possessed by the notion of /zzzwczzz to which Townsend sneaks back in his chauvinistic conclusion (p.93). Secondly, Tzozj high a degree is prerequisite for being a person? If only enough to satisfy the conditions for being a person, then the animals that are persons have it. If more, then either the initial characterisation of a person fails or the thesis breaks down. The much stronger requirements upon being a person that Townsend sub­ sequently appeals to are said to derive from S.I. Benn. But, if any­ thing they strengthen one of the stronger of several zzozze^zz-Zz^uZezzf characterisations of (zzatz^raZ) person - none of them equivalent to /zzzzzzuzz - that Benn has at various times offered. While Benn's weaker characterisations appear to admit at least many "higher" animals, e.g. that of a natural person as a chooser, conscious of himself as able to make a difference to the way the world goes, by deciding to do this rather than that, having projects, therefore, of his own, whose life experience may consequently be understood, not simply as a chronicle of events, but as an enterprise, on which he puts his own construct­ ion ((a) 'The protection and limitation of privacy, Part I', ^MstraZ-Zazz Lazj JozzrzzczZ, 52 (1978), p.605); the stronger characterisations which invoke (rather vaguely specified, and cZ-Z//ere?zt) minimum conditions of rationality in belief and action said to imply respoTzs-Zb-ZZ-Ztz/ on the part of the person for what s/he does, though they do zzcf - exclude many of the creatures admitted by weaker characterisations. For such stronger characterisations see 'Individuality, autonomy and community' in CozzzzzzMzz-Ztz/ (ed. E. Kamenka) Edward Arnold (forthcoming) and (c) 'Freedom, autonomy and the concept of a person', ProceecZ-Zzzps o/ t?ze ^r-Zs^oteZ-Zuzz Society, 76 (1976), pp.109-30. 7 D The foregoing points, taken together, support our contention that it is not possible to provide criteria which would distinguishing, in the sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have prefer­ ences or preferred states.For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some rather and tests for membership of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for the preferences of other creatures. Accordingly fka skarp woraZ ethics by philosophers and others alike, commonly accepted m aZZ ofkar a^-fmaZ speafas, Zacks a safZsfacforz/ cokarazif bcsZs. The distinction, which historically rested on the assumption that humans possessed a soul (or higher reason) but that other animals, brutes, did not, appears to have been uncritically retained even after the religious beliefs or philosophical theories underpinning it have been abandoned. Given that the distinction underlying human chauvinism fails, is there anywhere satisfactory demarcations of moral relevance can be made among things? Yes, several divisions^ of mcraZ can be made; but of these coincides with a division into human and others. Consider, first, the question of consideration fiards others, and the matter of which offers are to be taken into account in cases where others' interests and preferences are affected by some action. Insofar as moral consideration for others (among sentient items) is based on analogical (empathetic, and essentially inductive) principles, such as taking account of their worthwhile preferences, objectives, interests etc., 8 There are of course further arguments for the contention, for example from the anatomical and physiological affinities of human and other animals, from their common evolutionary history, and so on. The arguments are of varying force; for example, evolutionary arguments can be arrested, temporarily, by the claim that there was a quantum jump" in human evolutionary development which did not occur with other creatures with a previously shared evolutionary history (cf. Wilson, op. cit.). 9 Although the divisions may be conceptually sharp enough, they are any­ thing but sharp when applied in the field to the variety of creature and circumstances that occur. For example, preference-havers is, so far at least, sharp enough, but it is far from clear which creatures qualify, e.g. which, if any, Crustacea? For the present most of t ese potential decision cases are cases for cheerful indecision; _ u , alternatively, the divisions may be viewed - perhaps better not a sharp boundaries, but as gradation states, as where two colours m a rainbow meet. 8 * c- it is difficult to see how such consideration can fail to apply to all (including nonhuman) preference-having creatures; and one does not need to apply criteria such as linguistic ability, navigational ability, intelligence, piano-playing, hunting skill, etc., to obtain a basis for such consideration (indeed one cannot). The /zuzzz^zz^ a/* pr^yerezzces (and of preferences revealed through choices) is however a quite sufficient basis for z^/zz^s of consideration and concern. It is at this point, we suggest, that the requisite, important and non-arbitrary distinction is to be drawn which marks out the class of creatures towards which obligations may be held; that is, the usually recognised principles of consideration towards others (of the privileged class) properly extend or should be generalised to consideration for other creatures having prefer­ ences, and t/ze correspazz^zzy pezzaraZ zza^ to putt afTzars a/zZ-^pa^azz pr^zzc^pZ-e ("at/zer preyerezzce-TzuzJersJ tzzto a c%spreyerra<^ stato y*ar zza paa<i raasazz. Insofar as moral behaviour is based on consideration for others and not harming others, preference-having provides an adequate basis, and does appear to provide a sufficient justification for substantially different treatment for preference-having over non-preference-having items - because items without preference cannot (literally) be put into a dispreferred state. Thus preference-having appears to tie in with an important basis for moral obligation, and appears to provide a superior criterion, for a sort of moral consideration, to other criteria sometimes proposed such as sentience - or, differently, intelligence - especially since in the absence of preferences such notions as /zurzzztzz^ something (in a way that does affect it) and damaging its interests become difficult of application (not to say nonsignificant, except in extended senses). The unsatisfactoriness of the sentience criterion for what one can hold obligations ^azJarzis can be grasped from the case of the sentient machine or purely sentient creature which does not have preferen­ ces, does not care what state it is in or whether it is destroyed,etc. The sentience criterion is often converted by utilitarians into a suffer­ ing criterion, by taking pain as a paradigm of sentience: but plainly the two criteria diverge since some sentient creatures may never feel pain or suffer. Suffering is even less satisfactory than sentience; for suffering is neither necessary nor sufficient for being in a dispreferred state (consider masochists who suffer but are not in a dispreferred state, and well-treated workers who are in a dispreferred state but do not suffer). Preference-having provides a lower bound; it is a sufficient but zzat zzecassurz/ condition for being an object of this sort of moral 9 consideration and concern. That it is not necessary is revealed, independently of environmental examples, by the following sorts of cases: the treatment of "human vegetables", successful stoics, and science­ fiction cases in which people are brain-washed into performing certain goals and having no dispreferred states apart from the programmed goals. In all three cases the question of dispreferences does not arise, but relevant moral issues can.*^ The necessary condition, that corresponds to preference-having as a sufficient condition, appears to be capability at some time (e.g. previously, when developed) for preference-having. It has been taken for granted that many animals (from species higher on the evolutionary scale) have preferences, make choices, and the like. This is the merest commonsense, which can be readily confirmed in a scientific way. For example, some of the preference-rankings of a black­ tail wallaby as to types of foliage to eat are readily established by observation, and it is fairly straightforward verifying that bushrats prefer cheese to soap, this preference being revealed by regular choices. It has however been claimed by some recent philosophers, for reasons apparently different from those offered by traditional philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes,that animals do not have intentions, or at least do not have them in a full sense. It is unclear whether these intentions, which are taken to include thoughts and beliefs and, perhaps, desires, include preferences; but it is hard to see how preferences, which are intentional, are excluded if desires are included in intentions. The recent arguments to show that animals do not really have intentions, which do not bear much investigation even in such central cases as belief,12 appear extremely feeble when applied to preference. For the arguments start from the claim that we cannot say zjTzat it is that animals As N Griffin, who supplied the examples, remarked a similar thing happens also in less extreme cases of the type brought in to prominence, e.q. by the women's movement: that it is possible, by means of indoctrination, to limit the range of someone's dispreferences; treatment of such persons may still remain immoral even when it does not place them outside the (artificially widened) range of their preferred states. 11 The traditional reasons look slight also in the case of preferences and choices. It would have been claimed - the theory forces the claim Interestingly, choices - that animals' choices could not be rational, of many animals conform to behavioural criteria for rationality pro posed in economics. (forthcoming) 12 See J. Bishop, 'More thought on thought and talk', and R Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs to anima s , paper'prepared for the B.Ztef conference, University of Queensland, 1979. 10 believe (of course very often we can, and unproblematically) and fall back on the claim that animals lack concepts of a fit sort. In the case of preferences, however, there is often no problem in saying what it is animals prefer, or in confirming the claim. Nor is it that we cannot attribute propositional-style preferences to animals; if black-tail wallabies prefer, as they do, new foliage to old then they prefer the foliage's being new over the foliage's being old. As for the concept claim, in the sense in which is delineated in psychology, animals have concepts. And if a philosopher's notion of "concept gets in the way of the claim that free dogs prefer bones to carrots (or other vegetables) then it is not the claim that requires revision, but the philosopher's notion. The preference-having criteria appear to distinguish non-arbitrarily and sharply enough between higher animals and other items, and to rule out of the relevant class elementary animals, trees, rocks and also some human items, e.g. human kidneys. The criteria plainly exclude inanimate objects, and they separate animate objects. For while living creatures such as plants and elementary animals can be said in an extended sense to have and also optimal living conditions, e.g., for healthy develop­ ment, and in sense to have preferred states or environments, they do not have preferences, and cannot be put into states they disprefer. All that is required for an 'interest' or 'welfare' in the broad sense is a telos or life-goal, as possessed by living things, or an equilibrium or system goal, as possessed by living ecosystems. At the same time the criteria indicate another important division. For in a wider sense, animate objects which do not (significantly) have preferences or make choices, are sometimes said to have or 'preferred environments' (as, e.g., in 'the plant prefers a sunny frost-free location with a well drained soil'). us say that the or preferred states To avoid confusion let of animate objects and also such biological items as ecosystems can be affected in one way or another, e.g. increased, decreased, upset.For instance, the wellbeing of a coastal community and of the individual trees in it can be reduced to zero by sandmining, and it can be seriously threatened by pumping waste detergent 13 in this broad sense too, living things, things that participate in the growth process, have interests. However under a narrower and more common determinate of the slippery term 'interests', only preference­ havers have interests (again sentient creatures do not provide the boundary). Because the term 'interests' so readily admits of high redefinition, and the infiltration of chauvinism, its use is better limited (or even avoided), in favour of other more stable terms. 11 There is a general obligation principle into the nearby ocean. corresponding likewise to this more comprehensive class of welfare bearers, namely, sz/sf67??s ohjecfs <9r ^<90<i reason. Moral does not of course end with what is in some way animate, much as the class of valuable objects is not tied to what relates suitably to central preference-havers. In suitable settings, a (virtually) dead landscape, a rare stone, a cave, can be items of moral or aesthetic concern; indeed any object of value can in principle be of such concern, and in principle at least, value or disvalue, and so of woraZ concern. almost any sort of object. <2% object of There can then be obligations Naturally only a fraction of the things that exist have especial value, and only a few of the things that exist will be things concerning which some of us have obligations. Furthermore these sorts of obligations do not in general reduce to the conditions or arrangements (e.g. contractual or joint welfare arrangements) of preference-havers or some select subclass thereof (what will sub­ sequently be called, as the argument is developed, the base cZass). Just as there are relevant divisions beyond the class of preference­ havers, so there are within the class. Thus the suggestion that the class towards which moral obligations (and a corresponding sort of moral concern which takes account of creatures' states) may be held is bounded by the class of preference-havers, does not of course imply that d^st^^ot^o^s can be made the class of preference-havers with respect to the kind of behaviour appropriate to them. For example, obligations which by no means exhaust obligations - can only be held directly (as distinct from by way of a representative) with respect to a much narrower class of creatures, from which many humans are excluded. The class is also distinct from the class of persons, at least as 'person' is usually characterised. What emerges is an of types of objects of moral relevance, some matched by types of moral obligation (described toward the end of Routley (a)), with nested zones representing respectively different sorts of objects - such as, objects of moral concern, welfare-having objects, preference-havers (and choice-makers), right-holders, obligationholders and responsibility-bearers, those contractually-comnitted-and the different sorts of obligations that can significantly apply to such objects. Not all the types of objects indicated are distinct, nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. For strictly the labels given should be expanded, as the distinctions are categorial ones, so that what matters is not whether an object is, for instance, 12 contractually committed in some fashion but whether it is the sort of thing that can be, whether it can significantly enter into or be committed by arrangements of a contractual kind. is to Similarly function as a categorial marker, that marks out the sorts of things that can (significantly) have preferences: the assumption that preference­ havers coincide with choice-makers is based on this categorial reading. Although the annular picture is (as will become clear in §5) important for the environmental alternative to be elaborated, and in meeting object­ ions to it, the countercharge has been laid that it reintroduces chauvin­ ism through its inegalitarian distinctions. This is a mistake: not every sort of ethical distinction, certainly not a justified distinction, involves chauvinism. Chauvinism is exhibited where, for example, objects of a favoured class are treated in a preferential way to superior items of an excluded class,e.g. defective humans as against apes, degenerate French against normal Pygmies. The annular picture neither involves nor encourages such differences in treatment: it is neutral and unchauvinistic, for the reason that it relies only on categorial distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions (see the semantical analyses of §5). It is certainly in no way species chauvinist or human chauvinist For none of the zones of the annular picture comprises the class of humans (or its minor variant the class of persons); for this class is not of moral relevance. The reason is that the human/nonhuman distinction is not an ethically significant one, and can, and should, be demoted from its dominant, and damaging, position in ethical theory. notion of But dropping the out of ethics, is only part of the ethical change that is called for: taking due account of nonhumans is also required. In particular - to return to the theme - what is quite unacceptable, 14 and based on a set of distinctions which are arbitrary and unjustifiable, differential treatment enjoined nonpersons as distinct is the ex from persons under Western ethics, and the view that only persons or humans have any (nonderivative) right to moral consideration and concern as preference-havers and that there are obligations towards other creatures such a criticism of chauvinism is based firmly 14 According to Q. Gibson ----- ----. . . . ' " This is simply on Western ethical equality and egalitarian principles,. ___ The general argument not so: there is no reliance on such principles, feature -f cannot be what justifies the differential takes the form; ----- — - . . . treatment of humans and nonhumans, because either f is not morally relevant or not all humans have f or some nonhumans have f., Neither Nei__. equality nor substitutions based upon equality are invoked at any stage. 13 only insofar as these are or reduce to obligations to persons or humans. §2. THE EXTENT OF CHAUVINISM, AND FURTHER LINES OF DEFENCE Western ethics are, then, human chauvinist in that they characterist ically take humans (or, to make a slight improvement, persons) to be the only items worthy of proper moral consideration, and sanction or even enjoin substantially inferior treatment for the class of non-human preference-having creatures, without - so it certainly appears - adequate justification. The prevailing nineteenth century Western attitude to wild creatures is evident from Judge Blackstone (quoted approvingly in Penguin, London, 1967, pp.431): W. Cobbett, E^raZ With regard likewise to wild animals, aZZ rT?a%kZ%<7 arZ^ZnaZ bz/ the the Creator a right to pursue and take away any fowl or insect of the air, any fish or inhabitant of the waters, and any beast or reptile of the field: and this natural right still continues in every individual, unless where it is restrained by the civil laws of the country. And when a man has once so seized them, they become, while living his qualified property, or if dead, are absolutely his own. Prevailing Western attitudes have not shifted markedly since that time; for example, foresters, widely regarded as socially responsible, think nothing of dislodging from their homes and environment, or even destroying, communities of animals which do not directly interfere with human welfare. But there is another very important broader respect in which Western ethics are human (or person) chauvinistic, namely in the treat­ ment accorded to and attitude taken towards the broader class of natural items such as trees and forests, herbs, grasslands and swamps, soils and waterways and ecosystems. Unlike higher animals such items cannot liter­ ally be put into dispreferred states (and in Z/zZs obvious sense, as opposed to the wider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare, they have no interests), but they can be damaged or destroyed or have their eroded or impaired. The Western, chauvinistic, assumption is that this can only happen where human interests are affected. The basic assumption is that value attaches essentially only to humans or to what serves or bears on human interests, or derivatively, to items which derive from human skill, ingenuity or labour. Since natural items have no other value, there is no restriction on the way they are treated insofar as this does not interfere with others; as far as ZsoZate^ natural things are con­ cerned anything is permissible. 14 It is, at base, because of these chauvinistic features of Western ethics that there is a need for a new ethic and value theory (and so derivatively for a new economics, and new politics, etc.) setting out not just people's relations to preference-havers generally but also (along with many other things) people's relations to the natural environment - in Leopold's words 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ct/zer essuz/s (A. Leopold, A Coz^/ztz/ New York, 1966, p.238). /Uzzzu^zuc It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature - insofar at least as they do not affect others, as pollution and vandalism do - are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects. It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold, Fraser Darling and many others, both earlier and later, take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, then, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that merely an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct, what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations; for example, what is permissible on the prevailing ethics will be no longer permissible on the new. For as matters stand, as Leopold himself explains, humans generally do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others, and is accordingly permissible on prevailing ethics. As Leopold says: A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the coi^munity creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society (op. cit., p.245). Only recently has such behaviour begun to be seriously questioned and become the subject of criticism,e.g. by environmentalists. Under what will be accounted an eyz^trozi/TzeMtuZ gtTz^c, however, such traditionally 15 permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. That ethics and morality are not, and never have been, restricted to human concerns, or exclusively to relations between persons, is important in rebutting objections to the very idea of an environmental ethic, based on the premiss that morality just is restricted (definitionally) to human relationships (and connected values) and is not significant beyond that. The problem of moral relations with respect to preference-havers other than persons and to inanimate items cannot be resolved or escaped simply by declaring morality to apply solely,or as a matter of meaning or defin­ ition only to humans (or to persons). For first, such a solution would run counter to the common view that humans are subject to some moral con­ straints, even if comparatively minor ones, towards other creatures; the having of such constraints cannot be ruled out definitionally, and corres pondingly the judgments formulating these constraints or prohibitions cannot be ruled out as nonsignificant, yet they are surely moral. The only way in the end, that the claim gets support is by a narrow, and no longer acceptable, account of what is moral in terms of concern with humans alone (cf. S6). Likewise, the question of the moral interrelations of humans with intelligent nonhuman extraterrestrial beings, even if at present hypothetical, is certainly a meaningful one, and some interesting and clearly moral issues of this sort are frequently raised in science fiction. Only if the extent of morality is, somewhat misleadingly, reconstrue in terms of the class of constraints on the behaviour of those it applies to - that is, in terms of limitations, as distinct from moral freedom does the claim that Western morality is restricted to humans (or persons) begin to gain plausibility. For it is true that beyond the favoured base class, humans or persons, few constraints are supposed to operate (and ad hoc ones at that) unless the welfare of members of the base class is adversely affected. Under an environmental ethic, such as that Leopold advocates, this would change: previously unconstrained behaviour would be morally circumscribed, and in this sense the scope of morality would be extended. It is not evident, however, that a ethic ethic, an in the case at hand, is required to accommodate even radical new judgments seriously constraining traditionally approved conduct, i.e. imposing limitations on behaviour previously considered morally permissible. For one reason it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. 16 For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure. They are nonetheless (pace Quineans) perfectly good objects for investigation. Furthermore, there is a tendency to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic: e.g. the Christian ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. There are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the new principles and evaluations; that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethic, and that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The possibility that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the not inflexible framework of prevailing Western ethics, may appear open because there is not a single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civiliz­ ation: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. The Western ethic is not so monolithic. In particular, three important traditions in Western ethical views n ,been mapped .3 out: 4. 15 a concerning man's relation to nature have recently dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custod­ ian, and the cooperative position with man as perfector. the only traditions; Nor are these primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream StoicAugustine view - it exists only for his sake^^), whereas on an See especially (a) J. Passmore, Man's Fespons^btZ^^z/ for Duckworth, London, 1974; also R. Nash, ^tZderness an^ t/ze Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973. (All further references to Passmore's work are, unless otherwise indicated, to Passmore (a).) The dominant position has also been sketched in many other recent texts, e.g. I. McHarg, Z)es^<yn Doubleday, New York, 1969, while the lesser traditions have been appealed to in meeting criticisms of the Western ethic as involving the dominant view. The masculine particles are appropriate; so is the resulting tone. environmental ethic man is not so free to do as s/he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. (as further considered in §4) who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with a deeper environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from sub­ stantial human interference, whether of the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable but ecologically impoverished European small farm and village langscape. According to the cooperative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potential­ ities, the test of perfection being basically purposes; /or while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Thus these positions figure among those of the shallow ecological movement (as depicted by A. Naess, 16 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement', Tr^M^rz/ (1973), 95-100): longer term. they are typically exploitative, even if only in the Although these lesser positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, and allow for some of the modern extensions of the Western ethic that have been made, e.g. concerning the treatment of animals and criticisms of vandalism, they are not well-developed, fit poorly into the prevailing framework, and do zzof p<9 /ar orozz^Zz. For in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough­ going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying 17 that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for /zzzzzzor 17 if 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered innocuous at least as regards it actual effects. Note that the total use principle, in the usual sense, is tied to the resource view of nature (cf. (d) R. and V. Routley, F-z^/zt /or z^/ze Forests, Third Edition, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1975). Such a principle, like the requirement of economic growth, emerges directly from - it is an integral part of neoclassical economic theory. 18 18 "humanized". As the important Western traditions mentioned exclude an environ­ mental ethic, it would appear, at first glance anyway, that such an ethic - not primitive, mystical or romantic - would be new alright - or at least new from a Western perspective. For, from a wider perspective, which takes due account of traditional societies (such as those of some American Indians, Australian Aboriginals, and Pygmies), there is, it will turn out, nothing so very new about what is included in (as distinct from the theoretical setting of) the "new" ethics. Even from the narrow Western perspective, the matter is not so straightforward. for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified, in particular by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others.^ It may be that some such non-inter­ ference proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary); and that it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased vn.th natural items would not affect others (a^oT^terfereMcg assMwpf^^). it may, the Be this as appears, at least for many thinkers to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environ­ ment for no satisfactory (taxable) returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, 18 Humanization, and humanitarian measures, may be a cloak for human chauvinism - in which case, far from being virtuous, they may be positively undesirable. 19 Also, as Leopold has observed, the class of has been ively widened, e.g. from the family group, to the tribe, to the nation or race, even to all humans including often enough future humans but rarely further in the West until recently. of 20 The assumption is not the same as its relative, Benn's 'that no one may legitimately frustrate or prevent (or interfere with) a person's doing what he chooses to do, ^nles there is some reason for preventing him (Benn (c), op. cit., in from (a) P.605). The principle is said to derive from 'the notion of a person' ^e.g. (a), p.605), but it only so derives given commission ofPfhe fallacy of conversion of an A-proposition. Moreover even reduced to a 'formal principle ... locating the onus of justification (cf (a)) the principle is dubious, especially given principles of respect for objects other than persons, with which persons may be interfering. It is, however, a formal principle that will help to keep entreprenuerial humans happy. * GrozjZ/z <2%^ Dgcaz/, T/ze ^oZz^ZZc^ ^gcowgs York, 1972) that blends with the modified position; be criticised on welfare grounds; and so on. Fr^hZ^w^ New vandalism can usually The modified position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have, since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser trad­ itions, is adequate as an environmental ethic. chauvinism. None moves outside human They are all encompassed under the t^es-Zs - the view that the earth and all its non-human contents exist or are available for human benefit or to serve human interests, and hence that humans are entitled to manipulate the world and its systems as they want, in their own interests - which is but the ecological restatement of the strong thesis of human chauvinism, according to which items outside the privil­ eged human class have no value except one as instrumental value (both theses are criticised in Routley (a)). To escape from chauvinism, and from its thesis, a new ethic -Zs wanted, as we now try to show. §3. GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST WESTERN ETHICS The main argument is directed primarily against the modified dominant position, but will incidentally show the inadequacy of the lesser Western traditions. The strategy is to locate core features of Western ethics, and to reveal through examples their thoroughgoing chauvinism and class bias, and in this way to provide decisive grounds for rejecting For the general argument some more technical points have to be made them. first. (An) spgcZyZc ethic, is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a and a more generic notion, a specific ethics are grouped. under which (As usual, a weZu-ethic is a theory about ethics, super-ethics, their features and fundamental notions.) An ^Z/zZcaZ sz/sZsw s is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or a theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgments concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights and responsibilities, what is valued, and so forth, (On newer perceptions an ethical system will include rather less in the way of prescriptions, of duties, obligations and the like, and more as to what are matters of care and of concern and for respect.) Since an ethical system is propositional in character, such notions as consistency, coherence, independence of 20 a assumptions, and the like, apply to it without further ado. It is evident, from a consideration of competing or incompatible values and principles, that are sz/s^ews. Moreover appropriately general criteria for rationality will not reduce this class to a singleton. Accordingly, there is logical space for a^terrzaf^re A general or lawlike proposition of a system (characterised along similar lines to a scientific law) is a pr^Mc^pZe; and certainly if systems Si and S2 contain different principles, they they are different systems. It will follow then that an environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined if it differs on some principles. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from each Western ethical system on some core principle or other embedded in that Western system, then these systems differ from the Western super-ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that that ethic can be sufficiently characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It would suffice then to locate a common core principle and to provide environmental counterexamples to it. It is illuminating (and necessary, so it will emerge) to attempt to do a little more than this minimum, with a view to bringing out the basic assumptions of the Western super-ethic. Two major classes of evaluative statements, commonly distinguished, are axiological statements, concerning what is good, worthwhile, valuable, best, etc., and deontological state­ ments, which concern what is obligatory, permissible, wrong, etc. Now there appear to be core principles of Western ethics on both axiological and deontic fronts, principles, for example, as to what is valuable and as to what is permissible. Naturally these principles are interconnected, because anything is permitted with respect to what has no value except insofar as it interferes with what does have value. A strong historical case can be made out for what is commonly assumed, that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super- ethic. example. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core deontic principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified A recent formulation of this principle runs as 21 follows (Barkley and Seckier, op. cit., p.58): dominant position. On next page. 21 The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that (D) one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others {and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably}. The principle, which is built into or derivable from most traditional ethical theories, may be alternatively formulated in terms of permissib­ ility, as the principle that <2 person's (foes no^ ^n^er/ere zJ-^/z o^/zers, ^s perw^ss^&^e provt^e^ (i.e. other people, including perhaps the A related economic principle is that free enterprise can operate agent). within similar limits. It is because of these permissibility formulations that the principle - which incorporates fundamental features of (human or person) chauvinism - is sometimes hailed as a freedom principle; for it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which degrade the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to It is worth remarking that 'harming others' in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breath, for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure, because 'other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: 21 it makes a difference to the extent - and privilege - of The principle is attributed by Barkley and Seckier to Mill, though something like it was fairly common currency in nineteenth century European thought. It appears, furthermore, that Mill would have rejected the principle on account of clause (2): thus, for example: Those interests, I contend, authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, ozzZz/ in respect of those actions of each, which concern the interest of o^Zzer people (J.S. Mill, (/^^Z^^ar^uzz^szzzj L^&gr^z/ az-z^f 7?eprese?z^az^zze ^ozz6r?z777g?z^, Everyman's Library, Dent, London, 1910, p.74, emphasis added). The deletion of clause (2) from (D) does not affect the general argument: hence the braces. (We owe this reference and the points in the next footnote to N. Griffin.) A similarly modified form of (D) is found in much recent Western literature, even radical literature which purports to make due allow­ ance for environmental concerns. A good example of the latter is I. Illich, TcoZs /cr Cofz^ttz^uZ-z^z/, Calder & Boyers, London, 1973, where Mill's (D) appears, in various forms, at several places (e.g. p.xii, p.41). What this indicates is that Illich's "convivial society" will not - if its principles are taken seriously - move beyond chauvinism in its treatment of animals and the natural environment; it will at best yield some form of resource conservation. 22 a the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of other persons it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to nondiscountable future others, and whether to poss^bZe others. The latter would make the principle untestable and com­ and it is generally assumed that it pletely unworkable in practice; applies at most to present and (some) future others, to those to whom it would make a (fairly immediate) difference (thus excluding past others ). For the purposes of the general argument however, the problems in specify­ ing the class of others is not material, so long as the class includes no 23 more than persons that at some time exist. Fortunately the main argument is not very sensitive to the precise formulation of principle (D). Not only can clause (2) be deleted, and 'other' left rather unspecific, but additions can be made; then even if the main argument does not succeed, m-z^or succeed. o/ t/ze zzzu^M arpz^g?^ An important case concerns the treatment of animals. Unless (D) is construed widely (extending 'other'), or hedged by further qualifying clauses,24 the basic principle fails to take proper account of concern for animals, especially that one should not inflict "unnecessary cruelty or "impermissible" harm. animals then comes to matter; these issues can be avoided. What counts as per^ss^Me Tzurzzz to and familiar conflict issues arise. But For the core principle (D), of basic chauvinism, can be modified to include (historically recent) moral concern for higher animals by adding, after 'harm others', something like 'or harm animals unnecessarily'. Then however the new principle succumbs to the 22 Although the interests and preferences of past others are excluded in conventional utilitarianism, as in (welfare) economic theory and vot inq theory, these are often respected in ethical and legal settings, e.g. in wills, last wishes, etc. Similarly (as N. Griffin also point­ ed out), in the treatment of "human vegetables", past preferences of the person when capable of making decisions are often taken to be morally relevant, or even decisive, to the question as to whether to keep the body alive. 23 if merely possible persons are included then the valuational rankings of environmental ethics, indeed of virtually any ethics, can be reflected in a "utilitarian" fashion. The argument of (c) R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', (accepted for publication in 1974; still forthcoming?), can be used to show this. 24 or unless it can be made out, what seems entirely implausible, that what is wrong with torturing animals is not what it does to them but the way it affects other people (the Aquinas-Kant thesis). 23 main argument - upon at most simple variation of the counterexamples to be given. Modification becomes more important in the case of standard ethical theories which lead to principles conflicting with (D), such as utilitar­ ianism does unless (D) and the maximisation principle of utilitarianism are appropriately segregated, e.g. by severing connections at some point in the chain connecting entitlement, permissibility, right, maximum utility. For, as in widely recognised, net utility may be increased in ways that violate (D), e.g. by injustice to, or the infliction of suffer­ ing upon, or harming, some individual by others. Thus utilitarianisms in the tradition of Mill, which both include (D) and characterise entitlement in utilitarian terms, are inconsistent (as simple hypothetical cases show). To avoid counterexamples it is not enough merely to distinguish higher and lower utilities, though this is an initial step in what is required, namely - ideally by constraints (as is explained in §5) - o/ unconstrained Although qualification of utilitar­ ianism principles to ensure (D), as a restriction (but not the orzZz/ restriction) on what is permissible,is the proper course, it is a course not all utilitarians are prepared to follow. To defeat isms, it is not enough to adduce counterexamples to (D). utilitarian­ Counterexamples to some other core principle of such utilitarianisms must be located; otherwise the main argument fails against a quite standard, and important, class of positions supporting chauvinism and the Dominion thesis. Fortunately, again, neither a suitable core principle nor appropriate counterexamples are hard to find. The common utilitarian principle provides such a core, and several of the examples directed against (D) serve to counter it (in its various forms). An axiological principle corresponding to (D) (%72<i to some of its variants) runs along these lines: (A) Only those objects which are of use or concern to humans (or persons), or which are the product of human (or person) labour or ingenuity, are of value; thus these are all that need to be taken into account in determining best choice or best course of action, what is good, etc. Roughly, value consists in answering back to certain features of human (or person) involvement. No calculus of value or what is best need look beyond human values. According to a matching value-ranking thesis, item a is better than b only if a serves human concerns more than b. A narrower version of principle (A) embedded in main forms of Marxism is 24 the human labour theory of value. 25 Thus a corollary will be that Marxism is certainly - unless severely modified - no direction in which to seek an environmental ethic or social theory. There may appear to be exceptions to principle (A) in such objects But although values are assigned to works of art where as works of art. these may not positively affect human welfare, the basis for assigning value is usually taken to be the human skill or ingenuity involved in their production. principle (A). Hence such assignments do not extend, or violate, Indeed the problem raised by natural objects which cost nothing to produce and involved nothing human is very different from the matter of valuing art objects. objects rctse <2 problem. There are also other important differences between natural objects and works of art, apart from the characteristic noninvolvement of humans, namely those turning on the issues of replaceability and the reversibility of destruction. Human artefacts are always replaceable by similar objects, e.g. modern cities, especially concrete jungles are all too similar and replaceable, and using modern techniques paintings can be substanially duplicated; whereas there is no possibility of replicating, even remotely, such as extinct species or real damaged or destroyed natural objects jungles (or lost or vanishing cultures). In terms of replacement costs, these are much more valuable than such human artefacts as material works of art. Thus attempts to assimilate natural objects to material works of art break down. There is an additional reason for rejecting a now familiar approach to natural objects through works of art, namely that it is premissed on the assumption that some sort of chauvinistic account of works of art is adequate: that is not so, as the (intermediate) situation of objet trouve begins to reveal. It is in connection with principles qualification to (D) and especially (A) that the ethics (already required at several points) becomes important for the argument; for various non-Western ethics have not adopted these principles, e.g. both American Indians and Australian Aborigines appear to recognise clearly values in natural items which are not reducible (simply or at all) to human values - and apparently not essentially theistic (supra-human). In any case Western ethics and 25 According to some Marxists, and apparently to Marx, the labour theory is superceded when the period of accumulation is completed and the post­ scarcity era reached. But by the time this high-energy high-tech stage is reached, if ever, irreparable and frequently irreversible environmental damage will have been wreaked. 26 On next page. 25 p attitudes, and more comprehensively the associated ideologies, are of critical importance; for it is to these and Western influence that the world's main - serious and very extensive - environmental problems can be ascribed. Hypothetical situations are introduced in designing counterexamples to core principles (D) and (A). The basis of the method lies in the semantical analyses of permissibility, obligation and value statements which stretch out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some permitted situation, what is obligatory in every such situation, and what is wrong is excluded m every such situation. But the main point to grasp for the counterexamples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over a class of situations. Thus hypothetical cases are logically perfectly legitimate and cannot be ruled out on one pretext or another, e.g. as rare, as desert island cases, as hypothetical, The counterexamples to (D) and (A) presented depend largely on etc. designing situations different from the actual where there are either too few or too many humans or persons. But alternative special situations where interference with others is minimized or is immaterial are readily devised. (i) The example. The last man (or woman or person) surviving the collapse of the world system sets to work eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to principle (D) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly and destroying things of value (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the Characteristically Westerners have attempted to recast these value systems, sometimes misleadingly, in a religious guise - probably because it was thought that there was no non-religious way of presenting them so as to make them intelligible or have them comprehended. Thus they get represented as basically chauvinistic in view of the relations of Man and God. On these semantical analyses, which avoid all the usual problems of modal theories of axiological and deontic terms, see R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, and others, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979, chapters 7 and 8. A sketch is given in §5 below. The situations or worlds with respect to which the interpretation is made permit of different construals; e.g. instead of permitted situ­ ations, the situations can be construed evaluatively as ideal situations. 26 3 Q formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). The usual vandalism charge does not apply against Mr. Last Man since he does no damage to others. Moreover, Mr. Last Man's activities may be toned down to avoid any vandalism charge, yet succumb to the (extended) chauvinist charge, e.g. he may simply destroy sows environ­ mentally valuable things unnecessarily (without due reason or some need). (ii) The Zest pgopZe example. to the last people example. The last man example can be extended We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have One considers the last people in blocked any chance of reproduction. order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfect­ ing the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the sheer enjoyment of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining natural forests disappear in favour of pastures or plantations,and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinction. behaved badly; of value; On an environmental ethic the last people have they have done what is impermissible and destroyed much for they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the core principles (D) and (A), and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions under more obvious construals of these principles. Indeed the main point of elaborating this extension of the last man example is because principles (D) and (A) may, as they stand, appear to conflict with stewardship, cooperation and perfection positions, as the last man example reveals. The apparent conflict between these positions and principle (D) may be definitively removed, it seems, by conjoining a further proviso to the principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people who are not vandals do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of 28 reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. 28 On next page. 27 (iii) The ^reu^ eTz^repr^KeMr example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). industrialist; The last man is an he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and even meets Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". It may be objected, however, that there is no reason or warrant for the great entrepreneur's production and it is simply wasteful. But we can easily amend the example by adding consumers who want to use the out­ put. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend (iii) to the socket!/ example (iv): the society looks depressingly like ours except for its reproductive incapacity. (v) The species example. The blue whale (reduced to a 29 mixed good on the economic picture ) is on the verge of extinction because of its qualities as a private good, as a profitable source of oil and meat. whalers; The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compen­ sate the whalers if they desist; destruction. nor need whale hunting be wilful (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man's 28 There are however elements in the lesser traditions - especially if 'cooperation' and 'perfection' are reconstrued in less chauvinistic and homocentric terms - which point the way to a more satisfactory ethic. 29 The example is adapted from Barkley and Seckier, op. cit., who nicely expose the orthodox economic picture. To make the example more difficult for utilitarians in the tradition of Bentham, it can be further supposed that the killing of the whalesis near instantaneous and painless, the whale products are very valuable to humans and indeed irreplaceable, and that the whales led a good life while they lived. (Would the killing of remote groups of humans under similar conditions be then so much worse?). 28 * activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism did not cease allocating whales to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would: instead the market system ground inexorably (for the sorts of reasons well-explained in Barkley and Seckier, op. cit.) along the private demand curve until the blue whale population was no longer viable. It has been objected that the operation of the free market is restrained by ethical principles - or rather legally enforced copies thereof; for example, it would be profitable to exploit child labour, but moral prohibitions, legally enforced, exclude such exploitation of children. But the case is quite different; children, unlike young animals such as vealers, are already shielded under the modified dominant position. If anything, the "objection" is a further illustration of chauvinism at work.^O Although the vanishing species example given does not apply decisively against extended utilitarianisms, such as that of Bentham, which widen the base class to all sentient creatures, the case is easily varied so that it does: class of tropical plant species simply select one of the currently threatened with extinction. (vi) The /actorz/ /arm example. On the farm animals of various sorts are kept under artificial, confined conditions and simply used for the market goods they deliver, e.g. eggs in the case of battery hens, milk in the case of rotor cows, veal in the case of calves. The animals are subject to whatever conditions (e.g. forced feeding, iron deficient diets, constant lighting) will deliver maximal quantities of desired goods for the human commodity market. The animals do not necessarily suffer pain (and insofar as they do in behaviourally conspicuous ways the problem can For the most part the operation of the free market is only constrained by chauvinistic principles: otherwise enterpreneurs tend to undertake whatever apparently profitable business activity they can get away with, including substantial exploitation of animals and widespread environ­ mental destruction, and their lack of concern is illustrated by such facts as that they are generally prepared to pay taxes (e.g. to compensate other humans) rather than to forgo their activities in cases such as river and lake pollution and forest removal. In fact, of course, fairly unfettered operation of the market tends to encourage more restricted chauvinisms, e.g. the exploitation of cheap foreign or female labour in the secondary labour market. 29 be met by antibiotics), but they are imprisoned under dispreferred conditions. The threatment of the animals on the "farm" is perfectly permissible according to the core principle (or at least minor adjustments to exclude unnecessary suffering will ensure conformity), but on an The treatment of the animals on the farm environmental ethic it is not. also seems to conform to the principles of the lesser traditions, insofar as these principles are spelled out in a way that can be applied to the example, that is so long as cooperation and perfection are construed in intended chauvinistic fashion. (vii) The example. The wilderness, though isolated and rarely visited or thought about by environmentalists, is known to contain nothing of use to humans, such as seed or drug supplies, that is not adequately replicated elsewhere. It does contain however some "low quality" forest that could supply pulpwood on a commercial basis were the local government to provide subsidies on the usual basis. The logging would destroy the wilderness in a largely irreversible way (e.g. it grows on high sand dune country or on lateritic soils) and kill many animals which live in the forest. sees The prevailing with the destruction of such ethic wrong nothing a wilderness, nor do the lesser traditions: a deeper environmental ethic does. Again the example requires variation, e.g. to a wilderness devoid of sentient individuals, if it is to counter clearly such extensions of Western ethics as those of animal liberationists. For this sort of reason we do not want to overstate or overrate the role of as distinct from variations upon such examples. examples - Firstly, people deeply committed to human chauvinism - as many, perhaps most, people are - will find some of the examples unconvincing because they depend on non- chauvinistic assumptions. Secondly, there are rejoinders to some of the examples based on the prevailing ethic. In this case what we claim is that there are variations on, and elaborations of the examples which meet such considerations. In connection with this we do not want to deny that there are other strands supplementing the prevailing ethic which are critical of some activities of the sort described in the examples, e.g. anti-vandalism principles and strictures against conspicuous consumption But, as remarked, these principles as reflected, e.g. in sumptuary laws. have not been adequately incorporated in the prevailing ethic in such a way as to meet variations on the examples or to serve environmental purposes; and if the attempt were made to fully incorporate such princi­ ples once again a new ethic would be the upshot. (Compare the situation before the change from an ethic which sanctioned Tzu/na??. slavery.) 30 * In summary,what the examples show is that core axiological and deontic assumptions of the Western super-ethic are environmentally inadequate; and accordingly Western ethics should be superseded by a more environmentally adequate ethic. The class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on such an environmental ethic than it is in the Western superethic, and the class of noninstrumentally valuable objects is correspondingly wider than it is on the Western super-ethic. But is not an environmentalist ethic going too far in implying that these people - those of the examples and respected entrepreneurs and industrialists and bureaucrats, farmers and fishermen and foresters - are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, since destructive of what is valuable, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the destruction of the forest where the people may live, or the slaughter of remaining blue whales, or the gross exploitation of experimental or factory-farm animals for private profit or as part of the latest 5 year plan. Those who organise or engage in such activities are (to a greater or lesser extent, depending on their mode of engagement) morally culpable. Models of permissible respected life styles and of the good life (for others to emulate) depend upon what the underlying ethic accounts good and evil, permissible or not, and so forth; and changes with change of ethic. A new ethic is needed not merely to accommodate the evaluations, prescriptions and models indicated, in a way decidedly different from Western ethics, but in order to cope with a much wider range of more practical, and often more controversial, cases where Western ethics yield (without epicycling, i.e. extensive resort to theory-saving strategems) unacceptable or inadequately grounded results. An alternative ethic is also needed by a growing number of valuers because they have values, interests and new concerns of ecological sorts which do not fit in with, but conflict with, central features of prevailing Western ethics. There is occurring, it seems, a far-reaching cultural, and ethical change, a change in consciousness, and in particular a change in attitudes to what is natural and the natural environment (a change which may eventually be as fundamental as, and partly overturn, the humanist changes of the Enlightenment). A new ethic is accordingly needed to reflect and formul­ ate, and enable the defence and application of, a new, increasingly felt, 31 a but not so far well-articulated system of values, in much the same way that a system of probability was needed and formulated to articulate and systematise likelihood and probability principles, and relevant logic systems required to capture pre-analytic views of entailment. The explication of environmental ethics is a similar theoretical concern; again, as commonly, theory lags behind the facts of change and the felt data. Furthermore, just as entailment systems are not uniquely determined, or desired or accepted by every thinker, so ezzzz*Zr<9zzwe7zfaZ. be %%-z^MeZz/ (ie^grzzz-Zzzg^, or adopted by every valuer. will zzct On the contrary, as is plain enough, their adaption and furtherance will be vigorously resisted by many vested interests, as - to take just one instance - the furtherance of programmes for the elimination of environmental sources of cancer is vigorously opposed by industrial chemical companies. The matter of persuading other, valuers to accept values and principles of a new ethic is of course a further and somewhat separate issue from the question of need for such an ethic. The procedures for trying to effect changes in values are but variations on the usual pro­ cedures, and like them are not fully effective: excluding coercion and education, they include, for example, argumentation, and propaganda, in each case of many sorts.As usual, too, where there is a broad common 32 basis, especially in felt evaluations and emotional presentation, effecting a change, or a conversion, will generally be an easier task. In the case of transformation to environmental values, what is often important are distinctive features regarding the factual bases of many of the evaluations. correcting In particular, there is the matter of removing or /zz^scozzcept^oTZS on a broad range of matters of Some of these sorts are considered in more detail in (c) J. Passmore, 'Ecological problems and persuasion' in PpnaZ^fz/ ipz^erTzaz^ozzaZ u?Z(Z Comparative t/vrisprz/devce (ed. G. Dorsey) , Oceana Publications, New York, 1977, pp.431-42. The apposite term 'emotional presentation' is adapted from Meinong; see especially Ov FmotiozzaZ Presentation (trans. M.L. Schubert-Kalsi), Northwestern University Press, 1972. The notion of emotional present­ ation can play an important role in the explanation of how emotions enter into (environmental) evaluations, the objects evaluated (canyons, mountains, giant trees) often being emotionally presented. A little more precisely, the connections are these: A value ranking (e.g. c is better, more valuable, than d) of a valuer is explained emotionally through - it does not reduce to - certain preference rankings of the valuer; and the preference rankings have in turn dual factual and emotional bases, in the same sort of way that an item may be preferred or chosen in virtue of its factual features and the valuer's emotional responses to those. The main details of such a semantical analysis of value, which is discussed in §5, are given in Routley (c). 32 environmental concern; for example, about animals, their various behaviour, abilities, etc; about the alleged gulf between humans and other animals and the uniqueness of humans and each human; about the profitability, or desirability, or necessity, of environmentally destruct­ ive enterprises; about the inevitability of current Western social arrangements and about the history of the way these particular arrange­ ments developed. There is, moreover, the matter of sheer information, for example as to how free animals live together and what they do; about how factory and experimental animals are treated, and in the latter case for what: about the sources and effects of various forms of pollution and the reasons for it; about how natural creatures such as whales or environments such as forests are commonly dealt with, for what products, by what interests, for what ends. Naturally (given a fact/value division) none of this information is entirely conclusive support for a change in ethic; for many of the evaluations the data helps support can be included in other ethics (including sometimes modifications of prevailing ethics), while remaining evaluations can, at worst, be simply rejected (as e.g., those utilitarians who extend consideration just to sentient creatures are obliged to reject versions of the last man argument where no sentient creatures are affected). Althouth a new ethic is needed, for the reasons indicated, and although such an ethic can,furthermore, be a considerable asset in practical environmental argument (e.g., as to the point of trying to 33 retain a piece of not-especially-unique near-wilderness), for many practical ecological purposes, there is no need to apply it or to fall back on it. For example, virtually the whole environmental issue of destructive forestry in Australia can be argued without invoking any unconventional ethical principles or values at all, i.e. entirely within the prevailing chauvinistic framework. environmental disputes. The same sort of point applies to But, it by no means applies to all. A corollary is an inadequacy in the presentation of environmental problems and suggested solutions in standard (human) ecology texts (such as P. and JssMss A. Erlich's Freeman, San Francisco, 1970, to select one example), which are set 34 e/zf-ZreZz/ within the chauvinistic framework. Also, differently, in the way that theories are in enabling one to see how to move and argue in a discussion. Quite properly given prevailing sentiments, according to some erring conservationists, who account themselves "realists". 33 Since it is sometimes charged - despite all that has been said that an environmental ethic does not differ in practice from that of more conventional "chauvinistic" ethics, there is point in spelling out in Firstly, many conventional yet other ways how it can differ in practice: positions, in particular social contract and sympathy theories, cannot take proper account of moral obligation to future humans (who are not in the immediate future). Since the usual attempt to argue, in terms of value and benefit to humans, that natural areas ecosystems generally should not be destroyed or degraded depends critically on introducing possible future humans who will suffer or be worse off as a result of its destruction or degradation, it is plain that an environ­ and mental ethic will differ radically from such conventional positions. That is, the usual argument depends on the reduction of value of a natural item to the interests of present and /nfure humans, in which reduction future humans must play a critical role if conclusions not blatantly opposed to conservation are to be reached. Hence there will usually be a very great gulf between the practical value judgements of conservation ethics and those of conventional positions which discount the (non- immediate) future. Secondly, as we have already seen through examples, there are practical differences between an environmental ethic and conventional instrumental views which do take account of the interests of past, present and future humans, differences which emerge sharply at the It is, however, unnecessary to hypothetical (possible world) level. turn to possible world examples to see that normally there would be very great differences in the practical valuations and behaviour of those who believe that natural items can have value and create obligations not reducible (in any way) to human interests and those who do not, as the following further examples show. Example 1. We need only consider the operation of zJorZd, for example, the concept of damapo to a natural item, and the associated notion of coTnpeMsafdoM for that damage. C. Stone, for instance, in STzo^Zd Troes ^fuTid^Mp? Thus Towards LepaZ. /"or ZVufMraZ- Objocfs (Avon Books, New York, 1975) notes the practical legal differences between taking the damage to a polluted river as affecting its intrinsic value, and taking it as just affecting human river users. In the one case one will see adequate compensation as restoring the original state of the river (rectifying the wrong to the river) and in the other as compensating those present (or future) humans who will suffer from its pollution. As Stone points out, the sum 34 adequate to compensate the latter may well be much less than that required to restore the river to its unpolluted state, thus making it economic, and in terms of the human chauvinist theory, fair and reason­ able, to compensate those damaged and continue pollution of the river. In the first case, of course, adequate compensation or restoration for the harm done would have to consist in restoring the river to its unpolluted condition and will not just be paid to the people affected. Compare here Stone's example of compensation for injury to a Greek slave; in the instrumentalist case this will involve compensating the slave's owner for the loss of his slave's working time; in the other, where the slave is regarded as not merely an instrument for his owner, it will compensate the sZuue not the for this compensation will also take account of the pain and suffering of the slave, even where this has not affected his working ability. There is a difference not only in the amount of compensation, but to zj/zow it is directed. In the case of a natural item damage may be compensated by payment to a trust set up to protect and restore it. Example 2. The believer in intrinsic values may avoid making unnecessary and excessive noise in the forest, out of respect for the forest and its nonhuman inhabitants. She will do this even when it is certain that there is no other human around to know the difference. For one to whom the forest and its inhabitants are merely another conventional utility, however, there will be no such constraint. He may avoid unnecessary noise if he thinks it will disturb other humans, but if he is certain none are about to hear him he will feel at liberty to make as much and as loud a noise as he chooses, and this will affect his behaviour. Examples like this cannot be dealt with by the introduction of future humans, since they will be unable to hear the noise in question. To claim that the making of noise in such circumstances is a matter of no importance, and therefore there is no important difference in behaviour, is of course to assess the matter through human chauvinist eyes. question-begging. From the intrinsic viewpoint it So such a claim is make a difference, and be reflected in practical behavioural difference. Example 3. Consider an aboriginal tribe which holds a particular place to be sacred, and where this sanctity and intrinsic valuableness and beauty is celebrated by a number of beautiful cave paintings. A typically "progressive" instrumentalist Western view would hold the cave (and perhaps place) to be worth preservation because of its value to the aboriginal people, and because of the artistic merit of the human arti­ facts, the cave paintings the cave contained. 35 To the "enlightened" Westerner, if the tribe should cease to exist, and the paintings be i destroyed, it would be permissible to destroy the place if this should be in what is judged to be the best interests of human kind, e.g. to get at the uranium underneath. To the aboriginal the human artifacts, the cave paintings would be irrelevant, a celebration of the value of the place, but certainly not a surrogate for it, and the obligation to the place would not die because the tribe disappeared or declined. Similarly no ordinary sum of money would be able to compensate for the loss of such a place, in the way that it might for something conceived of as a utility or convenience, as having value only because of the benefits it confers on the "users" of it. There is an enormous or difference between feeling that a place should be valued or respected for itself, for its perceived beauty and character., and.feeling that it should not be defaced because it is valued by one's fellow humans, and provides pleasurable sensations or money or convenience for them. Compare too the differences between feeling that a yellow robin, say, is a fellow creature in many ways akin to oneself, and feeling that it is a nice little yellow and grey, basically clockwork, aesthetic object. These differences in emotional presentation are accompanied by or expressed by an enormous range of behavioural differences, of which the examples given represent only a very small sample. The sort of behaviour by each viewpoint and thought by it, the concept of what one is free to do, for example, will normally be very different. It is certainly no coincidence that cultures holding to the intrinsic view have normally been far less destructive of nature than the dominant Western human chauvinist culture. In summary, the claim that there is no difference, that the intrinsic value viewpoint is empty verbalisation, does not stand up to examination. The capacity - no doubt exaggerated, but nonetheless far from negligible - of Western industrial societies to solve their ecological problems (at least to their own pathetically low standards) within a chauvinistic framework, does considerably complicate, and obstruct, an alternative more practical argument to the need for a new ethic, /row that in no other way ... [than] prepared[ness] to accept a "new ethic", as distinct even from adding one or two new moral principles to an accepted common ... can modern industrial 35 societies solve their ecological problems. On next page. 36 Not only does the argument encounter various objections - most obviously that many of the problems can be solved, if not within Western ethics, in immediate extensions of them - but the case suggested would hardly be a satisfactory basis for the type of ethic sought. It is not so much that it would be a chauvinistic way of arriving at a supposedly nonchauvinistic ethic, for bad procedures can lead to good results; rather it is that important ecological problems, shaping environmental ethics, such as preservation of substantial tracts of wilderness and just treatment of animals, tend to be written off in industrial societies as not serious problems. But even if the argument suggested has too narrow a problem base, and so may yield too limited a change in attitudes as compared with the main theoretical argument, the argument merits fuller formulation and further investigation. The argument to need for ethical revision is as follows: (1) A satisfactory solution to environmental problems (of modern industrial societies) implies (the adoption of) an alternative environmental ethic. (2) A satisfactory solution to environmental problems is needed. Therefore, an alternative environmental ethic is needed.36 The argument is valid, given, what seems correct, that pimplies q implies that p is needed implies that q is needed. The second premiss is or can be made analytic, on the sense of 'satisfactory' 'satisfactory' imply 'needed'); (e.g. by having so the case is complete if the first premiss can be established (in the same sense of 'satisfactory'), and the conclusion is then plausible to at least the extent the premiss is. Al37 though the first premiss, or something like it, is widely endorsed, cogent 35 Passmore (c) op. cit., p.438. According to Passmore (p.431), By common consent, there are four major ecological problems: pollution, the exhaustion of resources, the destruction of species, and overpopulation ... To solve such problems involves finding a way either of altering types of human conduct or of preventing that human conduct from having its present consequences. In what follows the assumption that 'there are four major ecological problems' gets rejected. 36 This implies only, that a new ethic is necessary for solving environmental problems, and not of course that it is 37 Even Passmore, though previously (e.g. in (a)) highly critical of proposals for new ethics, gives qualified endorsement to an assumption of this sort ((c), p.441). ... I do not doubt, all the same, that our attitudes to nature stand badly in need of revision and that, as they stand, they form a major obstacle to the solution of ecological problems. 37 # arguments for it are few and it is no simple matter rendering the premiss plausible. Moreover rendering it plausible involves a substant­ ial detour through social theory; for the case for the premiss proceeds along these sorts of lines: (3) Unless there are (certain) major changes in socio-economic structure, environmental problems will not be satisfactorily solved. (4) The major changes in socio-economic structure involve ethic. an alternative A much stronger thesis than (3) has been argued for using systems analysis, namely that without very extensive socio-economic changes, modern industrial society will collapse; but several of the assumptions made in the analysis are doubtful or disputed. independently of that stronger thesis; But (3) has been argued for example, it will follow from the thesis (of Falk, Commoner and others) 'that the modern industrial ethic as we have known it is not sustainable on ecological grounds'.^ In a sense, (3) is obvious; for it is present socio-economic arrangements that have produced many of the present serious environmental problems; without major changes in those arrangements most of the problems will What is not immediately evident is persist or, more likely, intensify. that the major changes called for, in satisfying (3), suffice for (4). However reflection on the specific types of changes required - for example at a superficial level, human population limitation, reduction of poll­ ution, more sensible resource usage, selective economic growth - reveals that significant changes in value, and also in what is considered permissible, are bound to be involved in the changes. plausible, and therewith the intended conclusion. So (4) is decidedly But the argument leaves the detailed character of the needed alternative ethic rather obscure; and it may well be that the ethic so yielded is somewhat chauvinistic in character. The more practical argument cannot entirely supplant the main theoretical argument. In sum, there are good and pressing reasons to investigate the alternatives to chauvinistic ethics, especially human chauvinism, because such chauvinistic ethics are discriminatory, because the case for them 38 39 See, in particular, D. Meadows and others, Potomac Associates, Washington, D.C., 1972. PtwZts to CrozjtT?, R.A. Falk, 'Anarchism and world order', Pornos IX, 1978, p.66. Falk refers for the case to B.Commoner, TPs CZosZ^p CZroZo, Knopf, New York, 1971; R.A. Falk, T/zZs PZo^ot, Random House, New York. 1971; E. Goldsmith and others EZMoprZut /or F^rvZ^aZ, Houghton and Miflin, Boston, 1972, and Meadows et aZ., op. cit. 38 O does not stand up to examination, and because they have been involved in the destruction of much of value and now threaten the viability of much that is valuable. § 4 . ENVIRONMENTAL ALTERNATIVES : NARROWING THE CHOICE AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS . The basic - and basically mistaken - doctrine of the Western super-ethic is, as we have seen, that people, humans of whatever shape or form, are the fundamental carriers or objects of value and that all other items are valuable only in an instrumental or derivative way. It is important, in­ deed mandatory in a genuine environmental ethic, to reject this view and allow natural items to have a value in their own right, ^yz i/ze sazzze /as/z^oM as peopZ-e, both for the reasons outlined above, of the theoret­ ical unsatisfactoriness and arbitrariness of the traditional view, and for more practical reasons, namely, to help ensure the ecological sustain­ ability of modern society, and in optimising human welfare. It has often been pointed out that 'a totally humanised world would diminish us as 40 human beings', that the traditional view of humans, or classes of humans, as dominant, and of natural items as without value except where they serve human or class interests - a view that often carries contempt for nature leads not only to the destruction of much that is of value but (paradoxic­ ally) to counterproductive results even with respect to human welfare. Thus McHarg (in attractively coloured rhetoric) Show me a man-oriented society in which it is believed that reality exists only because man can perceive it, that the cosmos is a struct­ ure erected to support man on its pinnacle, that man exclusively is divine and given dominion over all things, indeed that God is made in the image of man, and I will predict the nature of its cities and their landscape. I need not look far for we have seen them-the hot­ dog stands, the neon shill, the ticky-tacky houses, dysgenic city and mined landscapes. centric man; This is the image of the anthropomorphic, anthropo­ he seeks not unity with nature but conquest (op. cit.). The rejection of this view and its replacement by a view in which natural items can be regarded as of value and as worthy of our respect for themselves and not merely for what we can get out of them or what use we 40 see e.g. the discussion at pp.116-17 of (a) J. Rodman, 'The Liberation of nature', Irz^z^rz/, 20 (1977) 83-145. All subsequent references to Rodman's work without further indication are to this article. Note well that the rejection of human chauvinism does Moi imply that no chauvinistic arguments - or rafTzsr, arguments that are usually stated in chauvinistic form - carry weight. On the contrary, some chauvinistic arguments (e.g. those supporting wilderness retention and species preservation) carry considerable weight; and, since the prevailing industrial ethics remain chauvinistic, environmentalists would be rash not to use them. 39 & can make of them, is becoming increasingly widespread in parts of the environmental movement. It is this primarily that makes for an important ideological split in the conservation movement, between what Naess (op. cit.) called sTzaZZozj and Fesp ecology, between those who see conservation as just a matter of wiser, better-controlled exploitation of the environment — something which is compatible with denying value to everything except man and those who see it at least in part as involving a recognition of value for natural items independent of man, and hence as involving (at least to some extent) a The gzEpZo^a^opz view, which is first view, the long-term or closely tied to prevailing more enlightened economic assumptions, tends to make heavy use of the watershed term 'resource'; the problem of conserv­ ation is seen as one of 'zjFss Mse oy resoMrcss', a resource being something of use to humans or persons. On this view, which does not get beyond the confines of human chauvinism, and so is no direction for.a satisfactory environmental ethic to take, items which have no perceivable use to man, i.e. non-resources, can be destroyed without loss; and the environmental problem is viewed as largely one of making people aware of the extent to which natural items and processes have Fustrz^gnPaZ- value, i.e. of how far we are dependent on them and they are of to us. There is no recognition either that some items might be valuable precisely they are independent of man. Resource Conservation, or the shallow position, is the first of the 42 four ideal types that Rodman discerns in his investigation of the contemporary environmental movement. The deeper ecological position gets split under Rodman's division into three ideological positions - though Rodman prefers to put the matter in symbolic or experiential terms, in terms of forms of consciousness - namely Wilderness Preservation, Nature Moralism, and Ecological Resistance. Though the positions discerned are neither characterised in an exclusive fashion, nor exhaustive of ecological positions, and though we shall have to look beyond all the positions for a satisfactory environmental ethic, nonetheless they afford an excellent perspective on the main types of alternative positions that have been adopted by those within environmental movements. It is not uncommon to encounter attempts to write the shallow position into the very meaning or definition of e.g. 'conservation is the use of resources to the greatest advantage of man', 4 Furvez/ py Fcrgsz^rz/ T^FMSz^r^es. ParP FT. Foresfrz/ Pe^gZ.opz7?e?2^ PZ-arz. Draft (31 October, 1974), p.ll - a blatantly chauvinistic account. On next page. 40 According to (Wilderness) Preservation, which focusses on wilderness, wilderness is to be preserved for the wilderness experience, wilderness offers a natural cathedral, a sacred place where human beings can transcend the limitations of everyday experience and become renewed through contact with the power of creation ((b), p.49). The values discerned in wilderness and natural landscape are primarily aesthetic and quasi-religious, or mystical, 'the experience of the holy is esthetically mediated'; what is valuable remains human experiences. Thus the Wilderness Preservation position does not move outside the sphere of human chauvinism, and can no more than Resource Conservation offer a frame for an environmental ethic. Rodman reaches a similar conclusion: Resource Conservation and Wilderness Preservation appear variations on the theme of wise use, the former oriented to the [efficient] production of commodities for human consumption, the latter to providing human amenities ((b), p.50). For this reason, the Wilderness Preservation position fails even on the score of justifying the preservation of wilderness - on the very task it was designed to accomplish - in a range of circumstances. Like other See especially (b) J. Rodman, 'Theory and practice in the environmental movement: notes towards an ecology of experience', in Search for VuZzzes a International Cultural Foundation, New York, 1978, pp.45-56. Some of the types are portrayed in greater detail in other Rodman papers. The remainder of this largely new section on environmental ethical alternatives is heavily indebted, in ways the references mostly make plain, to Rodman's work. His work covers a vast range of interlinked topics; only those of immediate relevance have been touched upon. But there is very much in the remainder that repays careful reading, and zzzMc/z to think about and to question or reject, reaching perhaps its lowest point in the paradoxical themes: Just as our statements about other people tend also to be concealed statements about ourselves, so statements about non­ human nature tend to be concealed statements about the human condition, and movements to liberate nonhuman nature tend also to be movements to liberate the repressed potentials of human nature (p.105). In part because these themes and the related myth of microcosm are taken seriously, and not for the evident falsehoods they are, in part because the ethical adequacy of the human/nonhuman distinction is never seriously questioned (e.g. it is taken for granted, what is not the case, that rights apply to humans and are problematic beyond them), and in part because of the characteristically chauvinistic emphasis on human experience and the endeavour to bring everything within that experiential purvue, and the associated weight assigned to human symbolic, mythic and ritual activities, one is left with the feeling, at the end of all the investigations one can profitably follow Rodman through, that one has not got beyond the confines of human chauvinism. 41 instrumentalist accounts of wilderness value, it breaks down entirely with examples like the Last Man, assuming that Mr. Last Man is never turned on by natural spendour. More alarmingly, under readily conceivable developments, it would allow the elimination of wilderness entirely. For consider the Wilderness Experience Machine, a low-impact low-tech philosophical machine, recently patented by I.M. Diabolic, which can duplicate entirely, even for groups of people, wilderness experiences, but in a downtown room. As far as the psychological experience goes, this machine can provide a complete substitute for any actual wilderness, and were the value of wilderness to reside in the experience it afforded, could entirely replace it and eliminate the alleged need for it. Most environmentalists would be (rightly) dissatisfied with, not to say appalled by, the idea that Wilderness Experience Machines could sub­ stitute for wildernesses, since they provided the same experiences. what else they wanted, the answer would of course be: Asked Wildernesses, not merely wilderness experiences. Wildernesses are valuable in their own right, over and above the experiences they can afford.43 Really, that is, they consider wildernesses intrinsically valuable, but have been pushed by the prevailing ethical ethos into stating, and misrepresenting, their position in experiential terms. There is some independent evidence that the Wilderness Preservation position is frequently a disguised intrinsic value position, in the attitude taken to examples like the Last Man case, that purely hypothetical experiencers (who may vanish into counterfactuals) are good enough, and that in some real-life cases it is enough that wilderness is there to be contemplated, whether or not anyone actually takes advantage of its presence to gain experiences, or indeed whether or not it is in fact contemplated. Such examples remove the disguise and reveal the position as at bottom an intrinsic value position. In that event it is however better to avoid the disguise; for the case for wilder­ ness preservation which starts from the position that some wilderness tracts have intrinsic as well as merely instrumental value is substantially stronger than any position which assigns them merely instrumental value. Wilderness lovers and nature conservationists have in fact worked out - or concocted - a set of arguments to show why wildernesses and nature conservation are of benefit to humans, to argue for their instrumental — The concept of zjfZ-demess too can vary with the operative ideology, e.g. on certain views, such as Wilderness Preservation, wilderness comprises areas that are (or provide the opportunity for use), e.g. used for experiential enrichment. By contrast, on a genuine Environ­ mental Resistance view, wilderness is a wild area, use of which is not implied: it may never be used, and it may not matter that it affords no opportunity for (human) use. (Under popular high redefinition of 'wilderness', there are of course no wildernesses remaining on the earth, and wilderness vanishes as soon as humanly experienced.) 42 value. For example, there are various arguments from the scientific value, or usefulness, of wilderness, e.g. for the study of natural eco­ systems, for the investigation of plant history and evolution, as a repository of genetic diversity, etc. These arguments, which (like parallel arguments for species preservation) are not to be especially as regards persuasive force, can be put in nonchauvinistic form; for science and knowledge are not linked essentially with, for example, the feature of being human. Often however - e.g. where the wilderness defended has, so far as it is known, little that is very special to offer - such arguments appear to be merely a conventional front for the real (or deeper) reasons - and in sofne instances, correspondingly weak and unpersuasive (as Fraser Darling has remarked, and Passmore has tried to show in (a)) - the real reasons being based on the perception of nonuseful properties of value. This is particularly marked in the case of arguments for preserving the most complex and beautiful of the world's plant communities, tropical rainforest. Such arguments as that various uninvestigated rainforest trees may at some time be found to contain useful drugs, by no means exhaust the true value of the rainforest. For it is in the intrinsic, i.e. noninstrumental, value of the rainforest that the main reason for not unduly interfering with it, e.g. not interfering in ways that threaten its stability or viability, lies. In particular, destruction of a wilderness, such as a rainforest, would significantly diminish intrinsic value, and so should (in general) be resisted. Environmentalists who are aware of these sorts of problems and dangers with resource use approaches to wilderness preservation sometimes attempt to formulate their alternative view in terms of one of the lesser traditions, most popularly in terms of the image, in which man is seen as the steward of the earth - an analogy which, as Passmore points out (in (a)), is problematic outside a religious context. For who is man steward to? If not to God, then how is the analogy to be unpacked, and what conditions must "stewardship" conform to? If "good stewardship" is management in the interests of humans, or humanity, then the position does not go beyond Resource Conservation; if it is manage44 ment to serve intrinsic values, or God, then good stewardship is but a cover for the recognition of intrinsic values, which are better introduced directly. Thus admitting values which are not instrumental, which do not answer back in some way to states or conditions of humans is a feature of all satisfactory deeper ecological alternatives. In order to allow for such intrinsic values and/or associated attitudes of respect, e.g. for 44 on some interpretations; chauvinism. on others theism may serve to reinforce human 43 nature and various natural things, it is however unnecessary to adopt a religious backdrop such as the "Good Stewardship" image suggests, or even a semi-religious framework such as a mystical or superstitious one with taboos and sacred places as symbolic and ritual elements. A theory of intrinsic value which assigns intrinsic value to wilderness and species of free animals, for good reasons, can be entirely naturalistic (in a main sense of that much-abused term). The third, somewhat amorphous, cluster of positions Rodman describes, Nature Moralisms, do just that, assign intrinsic, noninstrumental, value to natural items, such as - on some versions of the position wilderness. [An] alternative perspective ... [to] the theme of wise use 45 ... is provided by the tradition growing out of the humane movement, recently radicalised by animal liberationists, and sometimes generalised to embrace non-animal beings as well. to the economic ethos of Resource In contrast Conservation and the religious/ esthetic character of Wilderness Preservation, this perspective is strikingly moral in style. Its notion of human virtue is not prudence or reverence, but justice. In contrast to the caste­ bound universe of the Resource Conservationist, the Natural Moralist affirms the democratic principle that all natural entities (or, more narrowly, all forms of life) have intrinsic value, and that wild animals, plants, rivers, and whole ecosystems have a right to exist, flourish and reproduce - or at least that human beings have no right to exploit or unnecessarily harm or destroy other members of the biotic community. In contrast to the aristo­ cratic universe of Wilderness Preservation, where some places (and some forms of recreation) are holier than others and certain types of natural entities ... are traditionally more worthy of being saved than others ..., the world of the Nature Moralist is characterised by an apparent egalitarianism ((b), p.50, my rearrangement). Each of the sweep of environmental alternatives indicated can be seen as an of conventional Western ethics: intrinsic value is extended uniformly to all animals or certain favoured features of all these, e.g. their experience, happiness, avoidance of suffering, or is extended to all living creatures or systems, or is extended to all natural items or even to objects - it may or may 45 be distributed uniformly or equally; Human use and human experience, it might be added. 44 rather independently, rights may be ceded to all animals, or to some or all living things, or to all things, or, alternatively and differently, right-holders' rights with respect to some or other of these classes are restricted; and similarly other deontic notions, justice, obligation, even perhaps duty, may extend to apply to larger classes of items than all humans or persons. The sweep, which is impressive, is intended to include both extended utilitarianisms, e.g. Bentham's utilitarianism as revamped by Singer according to which all sentient creatures are entitled to equal consider­ ation of interest, and extended (legal) rights doctrines, e.g. the assignment of rights or legal standing to all natural objects as suggested by, for instance, Stone. 46 It also includes Darwin's ethic and Leopold s 47 "land ethic". In order to capture some of the intended examples of Nature Moralists, and all the Moral Extension positions, Rodman's characterisation requires some adjustment - which will be taken for granted in what follows. For example, Singer and other animal liberation- ists do not assign intrinsic value to all forms of life, or even to all animals; but (as Rodman is well aware) to all sentient creatures; that is, further classifications have to be taken into account. The egalitarian, or uniformity, assumptions that serve in character­ ising Natural Moralism are mistaken. Not all objects are of equal value; some are more valuable then others, while some have little or no value (and some have a negative value).4^ Impressive though the sweep of extensions is, all the positions indicated should be rejected on one ground or another, and sometimes on several grounds. Against positions which do not extend the class of objects of moral concern and candidates for value to include all objects, variants of the counterexamples to the Western super-ethic can be directed. Consider, for instance, the positions (of usual animal liber- ationists) which extend the moral boundaries just to include sentient creatures (or e.g. preference-havers). Adapt the Last Man and Last People examples, the Wilderness example, etc., by removing all (inessential) animals from the examples, e.g. the wilderness contains no animals, in the Last People situation there are no other animals than the 46 p. Singer, .4 ZVozJ Random House, New York, 1975; for (7%r C. Stone, op. cit. <?y 47 At least on a straightforward reading of Leopold's eventual position, but not according to Rodman; see his contrast of Leopold with Stone,, p.110. Darwin's ethic, which anticipates Leopold's, is presented m C. Darwin, of Muzz, Second edition, J. Murray, London, 1883. 4 8 On next page. 45 1* Then the counterexamples apply as before last people themselves. against the liberation positions. It is unnecessary to go quite so far afield to fault such positions, at least in practice: as Rodman might put it, they are countered by the facts of experience: ... I need only to stand in the midst of a clear-cut forest, a strip-mined hillside, a defoliated jungle, or a dammed canyon to feel uneasy with assumptions that could yield the conclusion that no human action can make any difference to the welfare of anything but sentient animals (p.89). But an advantage of the counterexamples is that the same examples, among many others (e.g. situations devoid of sentient creatures, situations where the message of experience conflicts with justice or fairness), reveals the erroneousness of the well-sponsored thesis, a simple analogue of empiricism, that all value or sentient, objects). derives from experience (of experiential, A corollary is that value is not to be assessed either, in any simple way, in terms of the facts of experience. Insofar as Nature Moralism relies upon simple extensions of utilitarianisms, or of subjectivisms, to include a larger class of subjects, (a larger base class), such as all present sentient creatures, or all preference-havers at any one time, etc., it is open not merely to adaptations of the argument against chauvinism (animal chauvinism is not that much more satisfactory than human chauvinism), but most of the Nor, on Moral Extensions, need all objects that have rights have equal rights. Rights may not be very democratically distributed. Some things have rights, e.g. as a result of agreements, of a sort others do not hold or are not capable of holding. Even rights to exist, to flourish and to reproduce (each case is different) are in much doubt where there is scarcity or conflict and where some right holders are taken to be worth much more than others. Nor are such leading examplars of Natural Moralism as Singer and Stone, though they are concerned to extend principles of justice, committed to equality of rights assumptions. Stone explicitly rejects equal distribution of rights; but the principle that all natural objects are equal in having rights, which really says no more than that they all have rights, is at best a very weak egalitarian principle. Singer offers (and presumably would offer) no equality of rights principle, rejects an equality of treatment principle, and proposes as a principle of equality a (near vacuous) principle of equal consideration of interests. Not, this time, knowledge. But amusingly "value empiricism" collapses into empiricism proper given the Socratic identification: Value (generalising Virtue) is knowledge. The only natural stopping point under value empiricism is, of course, with all creatures that have (or could have) the relevant experiences: again not with humans. 46 standard objections to utilitarians, subjectivisms, etc. Many versions of Nature Moralism may than be defeated on rather conventional grounds. There emerges, further, a dilemma for extensions. Either the crucial notions of right and intrinsic value are extended to all sentient creatures (experience-havers), in which case the objections just lodged apply, or they are extended more sweepingly, e.g. to all natural objects. But the latter involves attributing to such items attributes they do not have, most obviously rights to such objects as stones; it also violates the conditions that have to be met for the holding of rights and for the entitlement of rights. Thus, for example, Stone considers underpinning his extension of rights, beyond sentient creatures in the ordinary sense - or of legal rights beyond recognised "legal persons" - by a postulate of 50 universal sentience or consciousness; in short, by an unacceptable metaphysics, or myth. There are several further objections which work against many versions of Natural Moralism to which Rodman draws attention: (1) Moral Extensions are 'inadequate to articulate the intention that sustains the [environmental] movement' wilderness preservation movements. (p.88), specifically wilderness and It takes but little argument to show that utilitarian ethics, such as Singer's, so far from assisting the environmental movement, can (if adopted) reinforce the case wilderness and preservation of wild species. But an extension like Stone's extension of legal rights can help, and has helped, at least in the courts where its meta-physical underpining is unlikely to be glimpsed. The basic point is however that the rights talk does not connect with, and is insensitive to, the experiential basis. Mere extensions of moral notions such as interest or right or justice are insufficient to treat and do just­ ice to the multi-dimensional depth of environmental issues, such as the damming of a river (p.115). Part of the reason is said to be that the usual moral aparatus, which was evolved in the case of certain person-to-person 50 See Rodman's discussion, pp.92-3. But Rodman overstates his case m claiming that 'some such postulate as universal consciousness is there­ fore necessary if the notion of rights for trees is not to seem a rootless fancy'. For , as explained below, extended rights can be defined by a rather "natural extension" of the familiar notion of right, without any such postulate; and grounds of entitlement can be traced back to value of the items. Certainly extended rights sever what linkage there may have been between rights and liabilities, but with the modern separations of rights from responsibilities that linkage was already damaged or broken. 47 * relations, is inadequate for getting to grips with a new dimension of moral experience, that concerned with environment, and inadequate to reflect ecological sensibility. Rodman tries to press, however, a much stronger, and rather more dubious, theme, the By adapting the moral/legal theory of 'rights', [the movement] may sell its soul, its roots in mythic and ritual experience, to get easier judicial standing (p.88); and more savagely, the progressive extension model of ethics, while holding out the promise of transcending the homocentric perspective of modern culture, subtly fulfills and legitimates the basic project of modernity - the total conquest of nature by man (p.97, also 'p.119)7* " While neither of these large claims is strictly true - soul-selling is simply avoided through adoption of the notion of extended-right, which can yield a conservative extension of the original position; and even utilitarians may be committed to blocking projects which threaten free animals - each has a substantial point. Part of the point behind the latter claim is worth developing separately:- (2) Moral Extensions typically cast natural objects, notably animals, in the role of inferior humans, 'legal incompetents', imbeciles, human vegetables, and the like. They are ... degraded by our failure to respect them for having their own existence, their own character and potentialities, their own forms of excellence, their own integrity, a degradation usually reflected in our reduction of 'them to the status of instruments for our own ends', and not removed 'by "giving" them rights, by assigning them to the status of inferior human beings' (p.94). Many of us know where the treatment of natural objects as mere means for human ends tends to lead and has led. The mistaken treatment of them as inferior humans, a treatment which fails to see and 'respect the otherness of nonhuman forms of life', leads in the same direction. For given that animals, for example, are inferior, it is legitimate to treat them also as inferior; a greater value principle, which moral extensions typically endorse, yields a similar result. The needs of increasing populations of superior humans will eventually outweigh, if they do not do so already, the cases of inferior inhabitants of this finite earth for the retention of their natural habitats. 48 For their rights and their In the larger perspective, the Moral values will be less than "ours". Extensions, with their built-in greater value assumptions, do legitimate the conquest of nature by humans. Thus too they fail seriously, on what will soon enough be quite practical grounds, as satisfactory environmental ethics. (3) The extensions, like the parent ethics which they extend, are narrowly individualistic, and insufficiently holistic. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of utilitarianisms, which in principle arrive at all assessments by some sort of calculations, e.g. summations and perhaps averaging, from an initially given unit conforming to requisite equality conditions, e.g. equal consideration, equal units of suffering. In practice of course the method is, almost invariably, to pretend that the calculations will yield results which agree with alternatively and previously arrived at, usually intuitive, often prejudiced, evaluations; that is, in practice the method is not applied except in a handwaving back-up fashion. The method is not applied in part because there are serious, well enough known, problems in applying it. The individualistic bias carried over in other moral extensions, e.g. any experiential theory, likewise limits their satisfactoriness. It is to understate the matter to say merely that 'the moral atomism that focuses on individual animals and their subjective experiences does not seem well adapted to coping with ecological systems' (p.89), 'to explore the notion of shared habitat and the notion that an organism's relationship to its natural environment may be an important part of the organism's character' ((b), p.52). A moral atomism that focuses on individuals, discounting their interrelations, is bound to result in ecological complexes that matter (such as ecosystems, wilderness, and species) getting seriously short-changed. To illustrate:- Under atomism, the value of a complex, or the rights of a complex, amount to no more than those of its individual members; but since these are, in isolation from the complex, no more valuable than other things of their order, e.g. one gentian than another, a bush rat from a Norwegian rat, there no special merit in a complex, or rights attaching to it, in virtue of its rareity or uniqueness or special features as a complex. Thus, for instance, a utilitarianism under which only individual animals count assigns, and can assign, no special value to species, and can (as remarked) be used to argue against preservation of species: Since all animals are equal - or at least all animals of the same genus are more or less equal - one can substitute for another. For a rare species of rat to die out painlessly cannot matter while there are plenty of other rats. A rights theory is in similar difficulties so long 49 w as rights are assigned only to individuals, taken in isolation from their environmental setting (i.e. only to the usual separable individuals of philosophical theory). These problems may be avoided, in part, by assign­ ing rights to complexes (given the notion of rights will take that much further stretching; which it will not if right holders are assumed to be conscious or to be preference-havers), and by attributing independent value to complexes. But, since the value of a whole is sometimes more than the sum of the separable values of its individual members, this move involves the rejection of usual atomism, utilitarianisms in particular. The objection against the narrow individualism of the extensions - a defect they share with standard ethics which do not admit of ready extension, such as contract theories - soon broadens into an objection that these extensions are built on an inadequate metaphysics, a metaphysics of rather isolated individuals who (or which) are seriously depauperate in An ethics presupposes a metaphysics at their relations with other objects. least through its choice of base class: thus for example, usual homocen- tric formulations of utilitarianisms and contract theories suppose a base class of narrowly self-interested humans. The remedy is not (as Rodman suggests in various places in his elaboration of Ecological Resistance) to move to holism: to do so would be to accept the other half of a false dichotomy mainstream philosophical thought engenders (cf. Routley (g), this volume). It is rather to move to a metaphysics that is built on a concept­ ion of objects (which may or may not be individuals) which are rich in their interrelations and connections. In summary, the moral extensions are the wrong direction in which to seek a satisfactory environmental ethic. But the failure of Nature Moralism does not mean, as Rodman tends to assume, that all positions 51 that are moral in style are thereby ruled out. For one thing, Nature Moralism, as characterised (or generalised), is far from exhaustive of the range of prima facie viable moral positions. More satisfactory positions will simply avoid the damaging assumptions of Nature Moralism (and likewise those of inadequate ethical positions, such as contract theories or naturalism, and those linking morality to legality; For another, if the quest is for an ruled out. cf. p.103). moral notions can hardly be Even if it is assumed that the call for a 'new ethic' is 'to guide the human/nature relationship (p.95) - a somewhat unfortunate way of putting it - whereas what matters is the human/nature relationship itself, and that in coping with that relation fixation on morality or 51 His thesis of the 'limitation of the moral/legal stage of unconscious­ ness' is investigated in more detail in what follows. 50 G. $ legality is a serious handicap, and may contribute to the problem of the relationship rather than helping solve it (pp.103-4); still part of the problem is that of indicating entitlements of agents with respect to their environment, what sort of exploitation, if any, is permissible, what the limits on conventional morality are, and discovering 'a larger normative order within which we and our species-specific moral and legal systems have a niche' (p.97). Nor, in outlining Ecological Resistance, does Rodman shrink from using - he could not avoid the effect of - axiological terms such as 'good' and deontic terms such as 'should'; he does not doubt, for example, that some of what is natural that is threatened is valuable and that threats to it should be resisted; and he admits that 'prudence, justice, and reverence may be essential parts of a[n ecologic­ ally] good life'. Ecological Resistance, which is said to be the alternative 'most faithful to the integrity of experience', exhibits indeed the negativity of resistance. The position is founded on action, resistance, and theory only emerges retrospectively (if perhaps at all). Its (insufficiently qualified) central principle is 'that diversity is natural, good and threatened by the forces of monoculture'. The struggle between these forces, diversity and monoculture - between (ecological) good and evil occurs in several different spheres of experience, i.e. at various levels, which reflect one another. Resistance is not undertaken for self-interest or utilitarian reasons, or for moral reasons, or for religious or mystical reasons (such as preventing profanation), but because the threat to the [natural object or system] ... is perceived aZso as a threat to the self, or rather to the principle of diversity and spontaneity that is the endangered side of the basic balance that defines and sustains the very nature of things ((b), p.54). The disjunction, 'or', separates however two rather different (though combin­ able) reasons-cum-motives for resistance. The second disjunct yields the following reasons for resistance (which are linked by a metaphysical assumption connecting diversity and spontaneity with the nature of things): (i) The threat to the natural item is a threat to the principle of diversity and spontaneity. So, by the central principle, it is a threat to what is good, etc. (ii) The threat to the natural object 'is a threat to the very nature of things': (as to how consider the example of the wild river threatened by a dam, p.115). So - by an unstated, but nonetheless implied and assumed, principle, that the very nature of things is good (and natural) it is a threat to the forces of good. 51 W- The first disjunct yields a further, different, argument; in simplest form: (iii) The threat to the natural object is a threat to oneself. What is a threat to oneself is bad and to be resisted, so what is a threat to the natural object is bad and has to be resisted (since what is bad should, in general, be resisted). Although the arguments are valid, the underlying principles are faulty; for instance, the diversity (and spontaneity) principle because it is too simple (and so too does not harmonize with the nature of things) ; and the second principle, the intrinsic merit of the very nature of the things, because not everything that is the case or is natural is meritor ­ ious, e.g. genuinely natural disasters. Rodman plans to avoid obstacles to adopting nature as an absolute standard and, at the same time, to bridge the gap the principle spans, by resort to a version of naturalism which equates 'the "natural" with the "moral"' (pp.96-7). But for well- known reasons which can be supported (e.g. those telling against objective ethics of the sort such naturalism would yield), substantive evaluative assumptions cannot be removed in this fashion; though they can be suppressed, they reappear as soon as connections between empirical grounds and evaluative judgments based upon them are queried. The trouble, characteristic of reductionism, arises from the mistaken attempt to collapse a grounding, or founding, relation to an identity, to close the gap - which is not problematic but is widely thought to be problem­ atic - between value and empirical fact by a reduction of value to fact, of the thesis that evaluative features are grounded on natural features to the thesis that evaluative features are nothing but certain natural , 52 features (e.g. to be good is just to have certain natural features). 52 Rodman interprets naturalistically the statement of Jonas's that he quotes approvingly (p.95): Only an ethic which is grounded in the breadth of being, not merely in the singularity or oddness of man, can have significance in the scheme of things ... an ethics no longer founded on divine authority [or upon human arete], must be founded on a principle discoverable in the nature of things ... . He interprets it in terms of 'an ontologically-grounded moral order in the "the phenomenon of life" or "the nature of things".' In this way can be avoided the reduction of 'the quest for an ethics ... to prattle about "values" taken in abstraction from the "facts" of experience'. But Jonas's statement can be construed nonnaturalistically, by taking the founding or grounding relation seriously, as connecting, but not reducing, values to empirical facts. So construed the statement does help in delineating the sort of environmental ethics sought. 52 * C Such reductions commit the naturalistic and prescriptive fallacies which can be avoided neither by thinking 'our way through or around them' (p.97), nor by holistic assimilation of morality in a 'more encompassing ethical life' (p.103 and note 66). But details of the fallacies need not detain us, since we can consider immediately Rodman's important suggestion 53 for circumnavigating them (pp.103-4). Under natural social conditions, such as are obtained in some traditional societies and in some free animal societies (as ethological studies reveal), but have been lost in modern societies, law and morality, at least in their coercive aspects, would disappear, as they did in William Morris's yrow TVozj/zgre, and somewhat as they would in a Kantian community of fully autonomous beings. In terms of modern physics, morality and law are not invariants but vary under transformation of axes, and in fact vanish or prove eliminable under a suitable transformations, e.g. to a natural condition. There is a similar natural condition for morality and legality, a condition in which the prohibitions now prescribed 54 Conscience and the State would have operated "naturally by God, (i.e. from inside the organism, as a matter of course) , and patterns now stated prescriptively could have been stated descriptively. When the Way is abandoned, then we get Humanity and Justice (T<2<9 T6 , #18) (p.103). Even if a change of social axes could place us back on the Way, or on the way to the Way, morality is not really avoidable in our local frame where we are far from the Way. So ethical disputes over environmental matters are also unavoidable;^ for those a satisfactory ethic is a desideratum, and can help in bringing about a change of social axes. Thus too, the identity of the prescriptive with the descriptive, of "ought" with (suitable) "is", is a merely contingent (extensional) one and fails in The suggestion helps explain not only Rodman's naturalism, but his thesis of the limitation of morality and legality; it also introduces the anarchistic social change view that suffuses much of the (very uneven) later parts of (a): the view appears therein as the elabor ation of what is 'unthinkable'. Given prevailing socio-economic conditions it should be rather: that would (ideally) be prescribed. Let us hope, for environmental reasons, that the principles that are lived by in natural conditions bear not too great a resemblance to those now prescribed. Nor is there, in the local frame, much alternative but to resort to legal strategies, where they can be applied (where standing is granted) to delay "the war against nature". 53 V alternative situations; * hence, as always, there is no deduction of "ought" from "is", since deducibility would require coincidence in the alternative situations. Nor would morality — as distinct from legality, which requires some codification - strictly disappear under natural conditions, though its coercive aspects would: on the whole, as they ought to be. things would simply be, But while deontology would have a much diminished role (as it does on the preferred environmental ethic), axiology (the theory of value) would still have its place - some objects (e.g. diverse landscapes) would be more valuable than others (monocultural landscapes), some not valuable, etc. (As things stand, of course, axiology does have an important place in working out the theory of Ecological Resistance, especially in assessing its central principle of diversity.) The upshot is that without much elaboration (like that indicated below) of an axiological kind; which connects value through a grounding relation, as distinct from an identity, with the run of things (but not aZZ things) that are natural, reason (ii) for ecological resistance fails. Does reason (i), which is premissed on the central principle that diversity is good and natural and threatened by monoculture, fare any better? While it is a matter of fact that that diversity is threatened, indeed is being very rapidly reduced by the forces of monoculture, diver­ sity is not, as opponents of ecological values are wont to point out, an entirely unqualified good. Nor is diversity is always natural: a temperate rain forest can be "enriched" and rendered more diverse by interplanting of exotics (a practice foresters have applied, e.g. in New Zealand) but the result is not natural and sometimes at least bad. Or, differently, ecological diversity can often be increased by increasing edges between ecosystems, but the practice of increasing edges can easily be unnatural and far from good, as, e.g. in rainforest logging with (say) 50% canopy retention. So although a reduction of diversity is commonly bad, since the reduction reduces the quality of an ecological whole, and increase in diversity good, diversity can not be accepted as a solo principle. In fact, Rodman often couples diversity with other factors, such as naturalness (inadmissible in determining, noncircularly, what is good and natural), richness, spontaneity and integrity, which help to remove various of the counterexamples to a diversity principle. procedure points in the direction to be pursued: The replacement of the over- simple principle of diversity by a principle combining all relevant ecological factors. After all ecological sensibility - ecological resist­ ance is assumed to be the position of the person of ecological sensibility - requires sensitivity to all such ecological factors. 54 Once it is determined, * through consideration of a mix of ecological factors, that, or whether, a natural object is good or valuable the reasons for resistance can be restated: (iv) Where a natural object is valuable - as natural objects are, a natural object does not have to be very ecologically distinctive to be valuable - the threat to the natural object is a threat to what is But, other things being equal, threats to what is valuable valuable. should be resisted. So, similarly, threats to natural objects should often be resisted - and always (on whatever level) resisted where the objects are valuable and the costs of resisting are not overridingly high (to begin to spell out the ceteris paribus clause). It remains to tie in reason (iii), a key premiss of which can now take the initial form that the threat to a valuable natural object is a threat to oneself. A threat to what is valuable, to what one as a valuer values, is athreat to the valuer, to oneself, for these are one's values. To make some of those connections good again requires an excursion into axiology, one, this time, that connects what is valuable with a valuer's values. But Rodman, in trying to connect the threats to natural objects and to oneself, is forced further microcosm: afield, and resorts to the myth of 'Ecological Resistance involves a ritual affirmation of the Myth of Microcosm' universe' (OED). ((b), p.5.4), i.e. the view of man 'as epitome of the While such an affirmation - without the ritual - would yield the requisite connection, it is a classic piece of anthropocentric- ism, quite hostile to a nonchauvinistic position, and, fortunately, inessential to genuine ecological resistance. What Rodman reaches for from the myth (which could be restated in terms of seZ/, without its classic homocentric bias) is however extremely important: account of the it is an which is not a separate subject isolated from its (natural) environment (as a Humean individual is), but is connected intensionally and causally interrelated with that environment. Rodman introduces this metaphysics in rather old-fashioned terms: Ecological Resistance ... assumes a version of the theory of internal relations: the human personality discovers its structure through interaction with the nonhuman order. I am what I am at least partly in my relation to my natural environment, and changes in that environ­ ment affect my own identity. If I stand idly by and let it be destroyed, a part of me is destroyed or seriously deranged ((b) p. 54). Not Man Apart, in the terms of Friends of the Earth. 55 w For among my interests are its interests, part of my welfare is its welfare; I am identified in part with it.^ The metaphysics deepens, then, the reasons for resistance. A resister 'does not stand over against "his environment" as manager, sight-seer, or do-gooder; he is an integral part of [it]' ((b), p.56). But the environmental metaphysics, that underlies and helps support the ethics, that is part of a fuller environmental theory, need not be, and should not be if it is to be coherent, as (Hegelian and) holistic as Rodman immediately goes on to suppose that it is: __ By making the principle of diversity central, Ecological Resistance can incorporate the other three perspectives as moments within the dialectic of a larger whole. an esthetic religiosity have niches Economics, morality, and in the ecology of our experience of nature, and each has its limits (p.56 continued). But a principle of diversity which opposes the forces of monoculture will not yield f/z-fs pluralism, unless illegitimately extrapolated to theories where its merit is much less evident, especially when some of these theories are not only mutually inconsistent but false. Rodman risks the distinctive features of Ecological Resistance for a dubious synthesis. It is only true that the positions can be combined if the first three positions are verz/ limited indeed, and then a trivial combination with each theory working where it works (which may be nowhere actual in the case of the religious component) can be managed. Moreover Ecological Resistance properly developed, will lead to economic and ethical theories which compete with the rather conventional, and environmentally defective theories of, respectively, Resource Conservation and Natural Moralism. Not only is Ecological Resistance severely handicapped by having implausible holistic theses tacked in to it (not all of which have been discussed); further, Ecological Resistance is too negative. A more positive theory - which includes a theory of value and, ultimately, for a fuller environmental position, a metaphysics - is required, not only for orientation and to meet felt needs of environmentalists already noted, but for more effective, coherent and systematic resistance. S'? it is but a short step to the ; fully ecological sensibility [which] knows with Carl Sandburg that: There is an eagle in me ... and the eagle flies among the Rocky Mountains of my dreams and fights among the Sierra crags of what I want ... . And I got the eagle ... from the wilderness, (p.118) The poem almost admits of neutral logical formalisation. 56 §5. THE VIABILITY OF THE SORT OF ALTERNATIVE ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC SELECTED It is not necessary for an environmental ethic to take a set position on all the issues so far raised for environmental ethics (or others, such as whether, and if so which, ecological principles should be integrated for example, it does not with the ethical system) ; to decide exactly But it can hardly avoid determining which items do or can have rights. some of the boundaries in a way different from conventional ethics if it is to count as an environmental ethic. In particular, the issues of what sort of items have or carry noninstrumental value, and how they obtain it, cannot be escaped indefinitely. Without the assignment of (intrinsic) value to some items independent of the states and conditions of humans, an ethic would remain within the confines of human chauvinism. But how, it is all too often asked, is such an assignment possible, or rational? In any case, the environmental examples already relied upon (in §3) pre­ suppose items. the assignment of intrinsic value to nonhuman, and to nonsentient So a theory of value is not only unavoidable but owed. that can be adopted on an environmental Of the many accounts of ethic, the following has much to recommend it:- Some values are instru­ mental, i.e. a means or an instrument to something else that has value, and some are not, but are non-instrumental or intrinsic. Some values at least must be intrinsic, some objects valuable in themselves and not as a means to other ends. not, however, imply That a value is (reckoned to be) intrinsic does that it is absolute or system independent; the values that are intrinsic on one ethical theory may be instrumental or relative on another. More controversially, values may be in one way or another, on other things, on other values or, importantly, on non­ values (such as experiences or felt needs, or facts or natural objects); but while some values are reducible to others, others are not but are That is, contrary to naturalism and to other forms of For reductionism such as subjectivism, some values are irreducible. analogues of the naturalistic and prescriptive fallacies, formulated in irreducible. terms of 'valuable', are fallacies. In particular, evaluative judgments, such as those as to what is valuable, are not deducible from nonvaluative judgments, such as those as to what is conventionally valued or what is 58 experienced. That values in natural items are intrinsic does not imply that they are naturalistic. eliminating or Indeed intrinsic value cannot - on pain of - amount to being natural, or reduce to the experiences of humans or of sentient creatures, to their suffering or happiness or preferences. 58 On next page. 57 w Although some of these things, some of these experiences, some do not, but have no value, or a negative value or disvalue; value, 59 and some things, e.g. some experiences or some natural objects, have more value (are more valuable) than others. of value, but by no means everything is. Almost anything can be an object Value is distributed unevenly throughout the universe in something the way that electrical charge is; some items have positive quantities of varying degrees of intensity (e.g. a thundercloud may carry a positive charge, and have positive value), some negative, and some none. There are however important differences: elect­ rical charge is a quantitative notion, value a qualitative, comparative, one; charges are always commensurable, values less certainly or straight­ forwardly so;60 and the distribution of values (and especially of intrinsic values) is much more theory (system, or viewpoint) relative than .the di^sbributtdn of charges. For example, on an environmental view, matiy of the plants Mr Last Man eliminates have (intrinsic) value, whereas on animal liberation (usual animal chauvinist) views the plants have no value if no animals remain: there would be no similar disagreement about whether the plants were electrically charged. Evaluative features such as worth, merit, beauty are features which behave in rather the way that philosophers of science now mistakenly suppose that behave: empirical features they do not have a hard observational basis but are decidedly theory-dependent, though the theories involved are evaluative in character and not empirical. To assert that value or redness or remoteness is distributed through the universe is not to imply that these features, value or redness or For an outline of how this nondeducibility thesis, which yields a nondefinability thesis, may be proved (in limited contexts), see the final section of R. and V. Routley, 'The semantics of first degree entailment', ZVoMS, 6 (1972), pp. 335-59. A simpler argument against naturalistic reducibility of values is a consequence of the intensionality of values and the fact that intensional notions cannot be extensionally analysed (syntactically), which is what naturalistism characteristically assumes. Strictly the account of instrumental value should be widened if disvalues as well as (positive) values are to be taken proper account of. That is, mcrg may be at best a partial order, and so an inadequate basis on which to define total utility functions, and on which to rationally reconstruct modern economic theory. If this is so, as Godfrey Smith has suggested, and the orderings cannot be completed, applications of the optimistisation models subsequently introduced will have to work with partial functions. 58 remoteness, exist, or are to be found in the universe. undermines much criticism of nonsubjective values; The point alone for example, Mackie's empiricist case is premissed on the false assumption that the existence of values is necessary to objectivism, which he does not distinguish from nonsubjectivism. Mackie's "argument from queernessis similarly broken at the outset: since values are not entities at all, they are not strange sorts of entities. To see how unpersuasive Mackie's argument should be, replace '(objective) values' throughout by, e.g., ordinals'. universe; 'transfinite They too would be 'utterly different from'anything in Mackie's but that does not show that there are no transfinite ordinals. Thus too, since values are not entities, the account of value being developed is Met a reaZ-Zst one (in the ordinary sense).62 Values, of one sort or another, are features objects may have or lack; they are not subjective, they are not features which reduce to states or conditions of subjects or valuers. But no more are they object­ ive features, natural or empirical features of objects, features entirely detached from valuers. A largely unquestioned false dichotomy between subjective and objective ethical theories has served to rule out important options (it has been helped by a connected false dichotomy between instrumental and detached accounts of value: see Routley (b)). In simplest terms, an objective account of value has values "located" in objects entirely independently of valuers, in the way that (inertial) mass is located in physical objects independently of observers; more satisfactorily, objects have values and masses irrespective of valuers or observers. Objectivism forces intuitionism, when it is inquired how values are apprehended or known; thus a fuller objective theory is almost always accompanied by an account, so far always unsatisfactory, 61 The position is that for properties and relations argued in (e) R. Routley, EepcTX'd, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. Such objects do not exist, but they have important theoretical, explanatory, and other roles. 62 j.c. Mackie, Ft/zZcs. especially pp.38-9. F-ZpTzt Penguin, 1977; see 62 So undermining 0K6 part of D. Mannison's claim that we want to defend a reaZ-Zst theory of values, i.e. a theory of values that accounts for the truth of "x has value" with no ineliminable reference to the interests and concerns of the evaluating group ('Critique of a proposal for an "environmental ethic'", this volume). The further parts of Mannison's claim are assessed in what immediately follows. We are indebted to Mannison for forcing us to try to work out what is wrong and right about detached value theses. 59 3 characteristically modelled on sense perception, of the way in which 64 values are intuited or apprehended. It is also regularly assumed on objective accounts that values exist, in the world; noneism) that is a separable assumption. but evidently (given By contrast, a subjective account finds values in, or not independent of, actual subjects, and commonly as linked with the pyschological states of valuers. Although subjectivism, like objectivism, comes in a variety of forms, it is always required that where an item is valued there exists, at sometime or other, a valuer who values it: "no values without a valuer" holds, in a strong, an excessively strong,implausible and erroneous, form; namely, a world without existing valuers in it is, by that very fact, a world without values. Fortunately - since both objectivisms and subjectivisms suffer from serious, and mostly well-known, defects - the positions are not exhaustive. The way between is perhaps best revealed in terms of alter­ native worlds.65 Although values in a world (more precisely, that items in that world a have evaluative features) always depend upon a valuer existing in sows world, the valuer may not exist in the world of the values (i.e. the valuer may not exist in a). For example, our claim that a certain world without valuers, e.g. a pure plant world of botanically rich form, is a fine world, depends on our existing in this world (in order to make the claim, in fact); "make sense" but it does not demand in order to (of course the claim is significant) or to be true, what is ex hypothesis ruled out, the existence of valuers in the pure plant world. That the world is a fine one, is dependent on a valuer in some world (and that valuer's assessments of value and, if you like, theory or overview of what is valuable and not); by contrast, that the world contains only plants of this or that leaf type, biomass or colour, does not depend upon a perceiver.66 since values are not entirely independent of a valuer in the way that empirical properties are independent of an observer, the An important corollary is that resulting account is not objective. transworld evaluation does not require objectivism, nor (as we shall see) intuitionism. Call the resulting account, which is neither objective nor, (short for, neither objective nor as is evident, subjective, subjective: the term is ugly but memorable). For a fuller account and worthwhile criticism, see N. Smith, Penguin, 1954. The use of worlds in ethical theorising, which is old, soon leads into world semantical analyses of ethical notions, which is newer but will also be taken for granted: it is ^problematic. On next page. 60 The replacement of the (no detachable values) thesis, (1) There are no values without a valuer, by the revised thesis, (1°) There are no values which are entirely independent of a valuer, still affords the requisite semantical connections between values and valuers subjectivists have been at pains to maintain, still allows for the requisite theory dependence and cultural relativity of values, and still avoids the extravagances of objectivism. The replacement enables the defeat of various sophistical arguments designed to show, in virtue of the conceptual character of evaluative terms, that the case so far presented against human (or person) chauvinism collapses. argument of this sort runs thus: A simple Objectivism is untenable; but that leaves subjectivism, which validates (1), as the only alternative; and subjectivism undermines the counterexamples to chauvinism.6& One defect of this argument lies in the assumption that a theory can just dispose of counterexamples, when commonly examples are harder data than any theory. Note that the difference between evaluative and empirical properties is not adequately explained counterfactually: if an appropriate valuer - it cannot be an arbitrarily chosen valuer - were placed in the world it would rate the world fine, to be sure; but equally a suitable observer would perceive perceptual properties. Both these things objectivism can quite well allow. Partly for this reason Rescher's attempt to maintain his initially subjectivist thesis that value must be benefit-oriented, while admitting Moore's comparison of unoccupied worlds, is unsuccessful. Rescher's thesis really gets modified to: value must be potential-benefit-oriented - with which an objectivist might well agree, since it becomes a truism if 'benefit' is construed sufficiently widely (e.g. as 'value'), once unscrambled counterfactually thus:the unseen sunset has aesthetic value because of the potential benefits it affords ... [i.e.] someone were placed on to such a world, he be able to appreciate and enjoy this sunset. (N. Rescher, Prentice Hill, 1969 , pp.136-37.) But insofar as Rescher wants to suggest that value comes down to potential-benefit-orientation, that the unseen sunset has value jMst because of the potential benefits, which are entirely captured counter­ factually, objectivists will rightly object; even if no one were placed in this world, the sunset which delivered no benefits the world, would still have value, still be beautiful. In short, a counterfactually-extended subjectivism remains inadequate. The requisite relation of entire independence is explained semantically in terms of worlds. The truth of A is not entirely independent of b iff, in every model, for every world of the model in which A holds there is some world of the model in which b exists. The valuer of (1°) need not exist; it is only required (in each model) that it exist in some world. Such an argument appears, in essentials, in R. Elliot, species?', this publication. 61 'Why preserve 9 Such a procedure is methodologically unsound. In this case the examples tell against subjectivism, and point to another defect in the theoretical argument, namely the reliance on the false objective/subjective dichotomy. It has been objected 69 that the nonjective way between subjective and objective is unsatisfactory, for the reason that (1°) results in unacceptible assignments of value. But the objection depends upon under­ standing 'a valuer' in (1°) not in the intended way, as 'a certain (or definite) valuer' , the determination of valuer being MpoM the values concerned, but as a choice term, as 'an arbitrarily chosen valuer', or 'some valuer or other (you choose)' - which would require, what can never happen, that every hypothetical valuer agrees in the values assigned. A precisely similar misunderstanding of (1) likewise gives strange results: namely that any state of affairs, however environmentally appalling, is valuable because we can find a valuer, e.g. a spokesman for your local development association., who would account it valuable. understood yields no such bizarre results: But (1) properly all it guarantees is that, where a state of affairs has a value then there is a certain valuer (zj/z^cT? depending upon the state of affairs and the value assigned, i.e. the choice is heavily constrained) who assigns that value to that state. Similarly in the case of (1°) choice of appropriate valuers is a dependent choice, not an arbitrary one. There are several, deeper (because metaphysically grounded), sophistical arguments that conclude on the basis of (1) among other 70 things, that human, or at least person, chauvinism is unavoidable. These arguments too fail with (1). It is simply a (common) mistake to think that values and rights do not have a meaning, or an application, outside the human context or situation: to establish this point (on which Moore rightly insisted) it is enough to point out again that (hypothetical) valuers, not necessarily human or persons, can assign 69 For example by R. Elliot op. cit. Elliot's objection depends on a misconstrual. The original draft of this paper pointed out that principle (1) is strictly mistaken: it would be a little more accurate to assert that there are no values without possible valuers. A world in which there are no valuers extant may still contain valuable items. It does not follow from this, what Elliot infers, that 'a state of affairs has value if it is such that it would be valued by some sentient individual if such an individual were to exist', with 'some' read 'some or other'. 70 These arguments are examined in detail in Routley (a), and found wanting. The objections there lodged apply equally against variations of the arguments built on (1°) . What follows in the text on sorne of these arguments is largely a condensation of some of the points developed more fully there. 62 C Q values with respect to situations and worlds devoid of humans and of persons altogether. But though these deeper arguments strictly fail with the demise of (1), they can be readily restated in terms of (1°), which can equally be taken (given further assumptions) to support the thesis that persons (or preference-havers) are the primary items of value or, more strongly, that persons are the ozzZ-y items of intrinsic value. One of these arguments relies on the idea that persons are the source of value. But the argument trades on an ambiguity. A person is the source of value-judgements and values in one sense, i.e. s/he is the valuer; but not in another, namely s/he is not responsible for valued item having its valued properties. Nor is there any licence for reducing the values assigned to those that serve the interests of the valuer. The argument is likely to be given the following sort of initial elaboration: By (1°), whatever has a value has its value in virtue of an assignment from certain valuers. But valuers are always persons. The argument is however ever has a value gets its value from persons. defective. Therefore what­ For even if values were always assigned by persons the items their values from persons assigned values do not thereby yet or (or those of persons). They have what value they have partly in virtue of features of their own. Nonetheless, the argument continues, the empirical features of objects valued are relevant because they are taken into account in preference rankings on which valuers base their assignments. By (1°) (or a derivative) values are relational properties not properties simpliciter as objectivism would have it. They are relational properties which depend on certain features of the related item. Which features, of values? Well, obviously, preferences and interests of valuers. So, it is con­ cluded, values answer to, or reduce to, interests of persons: no alternative to chauvinism. there is Rather similar arguments lead to such (mistaken) conclusions as that rights are interest-oriented, that 71 obligations must answer to people's interests, etc. etc. The arguments can furthermore - in case the transit seemed excessively swift - be filled out, for example as follows: By (1°), Thus, e.g. K. Baier, T/ze AforczZ Po^yzt o/ Ithaca, 1958. 63 Cornell University Press, -B. Values depend upon valuers, upon their value assignments or rankings. -A. These value rankings depend upon valuers' preference rankings. A. Hence Values depend upon, or are determined through, the preference rankings of valuers. B. Valuers' preference rankings are determined through valuers' interests. C. Valuers are humans [persons]. Therefore D. Values are determined through, or depend upon, human [or 72 persons'] interests. Hence, it is sometimes concluded, not only is it perfectly acceptable for humans to reduce matters of value and morality to matters of human, interest, there is no rational or feasible alternative to doing so: any alternative to chauvinism is simply incoherent. With the replacement of (1) by (1°), premiss (C) is rendered implausible unless 'human' is supplanted by 'person' (where the variable 'person' is so characterised that all valuers are persons, something some accounts of person would rule out). Thus, without (1), the argument leads at best to person chauvinism. Nor does -B follow from (1°): "not entirely independent of" does not imply "dependent upon", but at best "partially dependent upon". However it does seem that values are, in a sense, determined through value assignments - assignments made certainly in virtue of features of the objects valued and of preference rankings of valuers, that is having dual factual and attitudinal bases - but assign­ ments nevertheless. Accordingly, the central part of the argument can be reformulated, in a way which locates the main source of damage, thus A'. Values are determined through value assignments [preference rankings] of valuers. B'. The value assignments [preference ranking] of valuers are determined through valuers' interests. In order to reach what amounts to chauvinism 73 from B', however, 'interest' has to be narrowly construed, after the fashion of egoism, as 'own, self- centred or selfish, interest'. D'. Otherwise the conclusion, Values are determined through valuers' interests, Many variations on this argument are considered in Routley (a); and obviously there are yet other variations, e.g. value assignments could be directly linked with interests. On next page. 64 c Q is innocuous; valuers. it does nothing to confine what determines value, to For valuers' interests may concern almost anything, and in particular may include the interests of nonvaluers(as in 'its interest is among my interests') and the welfare of natural systems. understood, is no more chauvinistic than: D', so Values are value-centred. To succeed the argument has to narrow the elements assessed in determining value to features of the base class of persons [or humans]; their interests and welfare alone. e.g. to For if we have to look beyond this class to assess value - even to determine interests and welfare - then the argument to chauvinism fails. Thus the argument has, in order to suc­ ceed, to rely upon assumptions either of egoism - valuers' interests are restricted to their own (perhaps enlightened) self-interest - or of a group analogue - valuers' interests are restricted to those of the group, the base class - where (to indicate the final trick in the argument) there is, in each case, a slide on the elastic term 'interests', e.g. from ^?z) f/z^r ozjzz ozjyz Mses or purposes. to t/z^^r ozjzz u^urztape., or t/ze^r It is evident enough that in order to succeed the argument has to assume one of the very points at issue, that interests, which are progressively restricted to chauvinistic interests, are so restricted.74 But consider, to expose the character of the assumptions made, parallel arguments to egoism and groupism, i.e. group egoism: AE. Persons always act (in freely chosen cases, or rational cases) in the way they prefer or choose, i.e. in accord with their (revealed) preference rankings. BE. Individual [group] preference rankings are always determined through (reflect) self [group] interest. 71 What amounts to chauvinism; for if a position were reached in this way by a sound argument, then the position would not be chauvinistic, being justified. For this reason, it is absurd for a rational creature to present itself (as some philosophers have) as a human chauvinist or a person chauvinist. There is however a descriptive analogue of chauvinism, in which the justificatory clause is omitted; and this use of 'chauvinism' we have resorted to ourselves (as the astute reader will have observed) as an interim step. In the end of course such descriptive-chauvinism is chauvinism, since the discrimination involved is unwarranted. 74 The claim generalises: it is not possible to mount an argument for person [or human] chauvinism on the basis of the meaning, or analysis, of such notions as, o^Z^pa^o/z or r^pTzf or without assuming, in the analysis or the course of the argument, the very points at issue. This is an outcome of the viability of nonchauvinistic analyses of these notions, together with the content preservation character of genuine deductive arguments. 65 Therefore DE. Individual persons [groups of persons] always act in ways determined in their own self [group] interests (or that reflect their own interest^). Thereafter follows the slide from "in their own interests" to "to their own advantage", or "for their own uses or purposes". The eventual con­ clusion of egoism, again parallelling the class chauvinism case, is not only that the egoistic position is perfectly in order and thoroughly rational, but that there are no alternatives; least ought to be, no other way of acting, that is, there is, or at 'that men can only choose to do what is in their own interests or that it is only rational to do Thus,person or (human) chauvinism, as based.on the central argument, 3 stands revealed as like group selfishness, "group egoism" one might almost say. Likewise the criticisms of the as we shall now call the argument through D or D', parallel those of egoism; in particular, premiss B' to those that defeat premiss BE. (or B) succumbs to similar objections Group selfishness is no more acceptable than egoism, since it depends on exactly the same set of confusions between values, preferences, interests, and advantages (encouraged by slippery terms such as 'interests' and 'self-interest') as the arguments on which egoism rests. Briefly, because one may discern or select one's own preference or value rankings, it does not follow that these rankings are set up or selected in one's own selfish (or enlightened self) interests; similarly in group cases, because a group determines its own rankings, it does not follow that it determines them in its own interests; the group includes environmental individuals. certainly not if Thus just as BE is refuted, at least prima facie, by a range of examples where preference, and value, rankings run counter to self-regarding interest, e.g. cases of otherregarding interest or altruism, so prima facie at least, B is refuted by examples where value, and also overall preference rankings, vary from group interests, e.g. cases of group altruism and extra-group-regarding interests, as in resistance movements, environmental action groups, and so on. It is often in selfish human interests (no less selfish because pertaining to a group) to open up and develop the wilderness, strip mine the earth, exploit animals, and so on, but ecological resistance workers Nowell Smith, op. cit., p.140. Nowell-Smith's very appealing critique of egoism (pp.140-44) may, by simple paraphrase, be converted into a critique of group selfishness. This is obvious once B' and BE are compared. 66 who oppose doing so are commonly not acting just out of (their own or) human intragroup interests, but out of direct concern for the environment and its welfare. But, just as BE is not demolished by such counterexamples of apparently other-regarding and altruistic action, neither is B: in each case it can be made out that further selfish (i.e. self-regarding) inter­ ests are involved, e.g., in the case of B, that an agent did what he did, an altruistic action, because he in the egoism case, doing it. As Nowell-Smith explains 'interest' is written in as an internal accusative, thereby rendering such theses as BE true at the cost, however, of trivial- More generally, valuing something gets written in as a further sort of "interest"; whatever valuers value that does not seem to ising them. be in their interests is said to provide a further interest, either the value itself or an invented value surrogate; for example, the environ­ mentalist who works to retain a wilderness he never expects to see may be said to be so acting only because he has an interest in or derives benefit or advantage from just knowing it exists, just as he would be said to in the egoist case. "retained"; By such strategies the theses can be for then a valued item really is in valuers' interests, in the extended sense, even if they are in obvious ways seriously incon­ venienced by it, i.e. even if it is Mot in their narrow interests in the customary sense. Thus B, like BE, is preserved by stretching the elastic term 'interests', in a way that it too readily admits, to include values, or value surrogates, among interests. Then however the conclus­ ion of the Group Selfishness argument loses its intended force, and becomes the platitude that values are determined through valuers' values, just as egoism, under the extension which makes us all covert egoists, loses its sting and becomes a platitude. Human chauvinism in this form, like egoism, derives its plausibility from vacillation on the sense of 'interests', with a resulting fluctuation between a strong false thesis when interests are narrowed through group interests to group restricted interests - the real face of human chauvinism - and a trivial analytic thesis, between paradox and platitude. To reject the reductionist conclusion D, or D', is by no means to be committed to the view that the valuers and their preference rankings play %<? role in determining values and that values are a further set of In the sense of Wisdom's (meta)philosophy. The technique of rescuing philosophical theses by shifts, which begin with natural extensions of terms, enforced by accompanying redefinitions of terms - including the thesis "We're all selfish really" - is delightfully explained in J. Wisdom, dt/zer Blackwell, Oxford, 1952, especially chapter 1. 67 mysterious independent items somehow perceived by valuers through a special (even mystical and non-rational) moral sense. An intuitionist theory of value is not required, and is not lurking in the background. One can simply admit that valuers' preference rankings play an important role in evaluation; one is not thereby committed to D unless one assumes - what amounts to premiss B - that these preference rankings reflect, or can be reduced to, valuers' (narrow) interests. Even so important problems remain unresolved, in particular, precisely what role valuers' preference-rankings play, and how this role enables the damaging features of intuitionism to be avoided. The arguments against genuinely environmental ethics from the character of are sometimes followed up by the objection that such a ethic can be given no, or no satisfactory, theory of value (or metaethic, to.use the current, but questionable, jargon transferred from logical theory). It is true that several theories of value are quickly ruled out, including mainstream noncognitive theories, which are objection­ ably chauvinistic, allowing no non-instrumental value to any non-sentient natural items. While an environmental ethic, like almost any other normative ethic, ca?? be supplied with an intuitionist theory of value, an environmental ethic, unlike most other ethics, wa?/ appear to have no option to such a theory, though the theory is unsatisfactory and causes especial problems for the ethic. 75 The unsatisfactoriness of intuitionism is in part for the usual reasons: apart from the perceptual comparison which is problematic in several ways (e.g. evaluative properties are not like perceptual properties, the moral sense is rather different from other senses), the theory is (like a purely axiomatic theory) too much of a black box, which gives no explanation of many things that call for explanation, e.g. the semantics of value, how value judgements are based on factual and emotional or attitudinal bases; but it is in part because intuitionism provides little guidance or assistance in accounting for the intrinsic value of environmental objects. These difficulties can be evaded and the problems largely resolved through a semantical theory of value, and more generally of ethical terms. Thus D. Mannison, 'the "new environmental ethic" is ... irredeemably intuitionistic' (op. cit.), and H.J. McCloskey: As far as I can see of the known, plausible meta-ethics, the only one available ... is an intuitionist one. ... [There] would still be ... the problem of associating it with a non-human-centred normative ethic, one which did not locate all values in human capacities states, goods, but accorded to environmental phenomena value in their own right. ('Ecological ethics and its justification: a critical appraisal', this volume.) 68 For the truth-conditions, 7 8 and resulting interpretation conditions, will supply an account of meaning not only of axiological expressions but also of deontic expressions, and moreover in a way that is plainly nonchauvinistic; e.g., it enables natural items to be awarded intrinsic value in much the way that states or conditions of humans are on chauvinistic theories. Something of the shape and character of the semantical analyses emerges from the evaluation rules for important axiological and deontic 79 functions. The semantics are set within the framework of the semantics of entailment: in this way several paradoxes possible world semantics induces in deontic (and axiological) theory are automatically removed. The semantical analyses of the central axiological functor, 'that ... is better than that __ ', abbreviated 'Bt', and the key deontic predicate 'that ... is permissible', abbreviated 'P', restricted to sentential terms, take respectively the following forms: I(A Bt B, a) = 1 iff [B] i.e. [A], where [C] = {c e K: I(C, c) =1}, [C] is the range of C, the class of situations where C holds, some­ times called the proposition C expresses. In short, that A is better than that B holds in world a iff from the perspective of a, the proposition B expresses is less preferable than the proposition A expresses, where the ordering relation is spelt out in terms of a preference ranking. I(PA, a) = 1 iff, for some world b such that Tab, I(A, b) = 1; i.e., that A is permissible holds in a iff for some world b permitted as far as a is concerned, A holds in b - where the relation T is spelt out in terms of a relative permittedness relation. Enough of the semantical theory has been exposed to indicate some important features. Firstly, betterness - and something the same holds for other value terms - is assessed semantically in terms of a world- relativised preference ranking. In the simplest case, where betterness is assessed as to truth (rather than interpretation, or meaning), i.e. at actual world T, the assessment just is in terms of a preference ranking (so validating a form of premiss B above, for a technical sense of 70 Ethical judgements, both axiological and deontic, have truth values, relative to their context of occurrence. By use of context, objections, e.g. from relativity, to the attribution of truth-values to such judgements can be straightforwardly avoided. 79 Full details of the semantics are presented elsewhere, in Routley (c), and in R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, and others, PeZevuzzf TZzeZr P-ZfaZs, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. 69 'determined'). Secondly, the semantics of can be given in descriptive terms; similarly for deontic terms such as The semantical analysis bridges the fact-value gap, by a functional linkage, without however closing it. preferential basis. For it provides no of value to its The linkage enables a simple explanation of how environmental considerations can count: criteria may be preferred. worlds satisfying environmental Sets of worlds where human interests or needs are not met but ecosystems are maintained may, for example, be prefer­ entially ranked above worlds where human needs are met at the expense of ecosystems. The way in which the factual basis, which includes environ­ mental facts - the descriptive better-making characteristics - enters into the evaluative judgments of quality, is in outline as follows: factual criteria delimit preference rankings on worlds in the same way that descriptive features of objects delimit preference rankings of these objects. It is not the case, then, that we are unable to explain zj?zz/ a natural item is valuable if we cannot point to some human interest or purpose which is served. This again assumes mistakenly, that because a valuer­ relative preference-ranking is involved, the evaluation must somehow be reducible to the interests or purposes of the valuer. That there is an allusion in the semantical unpacking of value to the preference system of a certain valuer no more requires that the items valued are valuable only insofar as they serve the valuer's interests or preferences than it does in more familiar cases such as valuing a work of art, a library or an old building. Valuers can and do value items because they perceive in them properties they take to be valuable, and in the interests of other things whose interests are their own, and not simply for what they can get out of them or how far they serve their own interests. The answer to the question 'Why is it valuable?', for a natural item, will not always be, as it must always be on the instrumental view, 'Because it is good for such and such purpose or end of the valuer or those of his group', but may be: 'Because it has properties A, B and C which the valuer holds to be valuable in virtue of considered preferences, including iterated (second order) preferences which reflect the preferences of other preference-havers. In the end, then, environmental value systems are cvz different How a seTnaTzt-fcaZ analysis - as distinct from a analysis may make bridges without involving a reduction - but leaving everything as it is - is more fully explained in R. Routley 'The semantical meta­ morphosis of metaphysics', JoMruaZ P/z^Zosop/zz/, 54 (1976), 187-205. For more on how the fact/value gap is semantically bridged see Routley (c). 70 preference rankings, which take into account different facts from the chauvinistic systems they are beginning to compete with and aim to supplant - a different group preference ranking and network (emanating from the valuer and those like her) which is grounded in a different perception and emotional presentation of nature. The semantical meta-ethic is not as neutral as an intuitionistic meta-ethic: for the preference-rankings involved require a valuer, i.e. thesis (1°) is applied, thereby excluding objective theories. The fact that the semantical theory will work (perhaps after minor adaptions) for a range of normative theories is no serious objection. not have to be precisely tailored to a given ethic: A meta-ethic does the same (sort of) metalogic may work satisfactorily for many different logics. It is not merely that the distinctiveness of the meta-ethic may be what is more serious is that the contested; (normative) ethic, even newness of the within Western traditions, may be challenged. It has been suggested, for instance, that such ethics are but versions or minor variants of ideal utilitarianism McCloskey, op. cit.). (cf. Elliot, op. cit.; To assess this claim, and to reveal how much the preferred environmental ethic has in common with such utilitarianism and how much it differs, considering what counts as ideal utilitarianism is unavoidable. In indicating what does count, there is real point in going back to Rashdall's original explanation: ... all moral judgements are ultimately judgements as to the value of ends. This view of Ethics, which combines the utilitarian principle that Ethics must be teleological with a non-hedonistic view of the ethical end I propose to call Ideal Utilitarianism. According to this view actions are right or wrong according as they tend to produce for all mankind an ideal end or good, which includes but is not limited to pleasure. ... The right action is always that which (so far as the agent has means of knowing) will produce the greatest amount of good upon the whole. (H- Rashdall, TTze T/zeorz/ o/ Fzz-z^Z, Oxford University Press, 1907, p.184.) Ideal utilitarianism is thus, according to Rashdall, nonhedonistic utilitarianism, and so conforms to the core theses of utilitarianism, namely: (i) The ethical or ideal end (the good) is determined simply by maximisation of net utility or value of certain factors or ends, typically (but not invariably) experiences or states of consciousness such as pleasure, enjoyment, satisfaction of desires or preferences 71 !* (ii) The ends or experiences are those of some given base class, e.g. mankind, present persons, sentient creatures (Pase <?Zass r^Z-az^z^sut-Zczz); and (iii) Other ethical notions, right in particular, are defined as determined in terms of the ethical end (^eZeoZ-c^-ZcuZ re^zzc^-Zozz-Zsw). A corollary of the reductionist assumption - which can take various forms, e.g. act, rule, average utilitarianism - is that maximisation is uncon­ strained by deontic requirements. The core principles are also readily discerned in that other paradigmatic ideal utilitarian, Moore, who like Rashdall, objects to (hedonistic) utilitarianism on the grounds of its hedonistic principle (e.g. p.184), and accordingly widens the ends admitted in (i), and, again like Rashdall, takes the base class to consist of humans. as assessed through its paradigm exponents *Zs thus chauvinistic, and zzo e^zz-ZrczzwezztuZ. sc/zewa /or azz Human chauvinism is in fact integral to both Rashdall'sand Moore's work. For example, Rashdall characterises r-z^TzZ; in terms of good for mankind, and endorses a strong form of the greater value assumption (p.215). And Moore not only identifies the best poss-ZbZe state of things in this world with Human Good (p.183), but considers 'by far the most valuable things we can know or -z^azy-Z/ze, are certain states of consciousness', Zzzz?n<27z consciousness (p.188, my italics). Each one of the core theses of utilitarianism is false (the case is argued in detail in Routley (b)). Contrary to (i) optimisation needs to be constrained, deontically constrained, else serious injustices to and ill-treatment of objects within the base class and, more important, objects outside that class, are all too likely. But, as against (iii) this destroys prospects of successful deontic reductions, which are, on independent grounds, improbable. To avoid the chauvinism, typically built See Pr-Zpzc-Zp-Zu Ez^/z^cu, Cambridge University Press, 1903, chapters V and VI. Moore does say (p.188) that No one, probably, ... who has asked himself the question, has even doubted that personal affection and appreciation of what is beautiful in Art or Nature, are good in themselves. But 'appreciation of what is beautiful' reduces, on Moore's account, to 'enjoyment of beautiful objects'; and any independent value in what is beautiful is 'so small as to be negligible in comparison with that which attaches to the cozzsu^ozzszzess of beauty', (p.189). Moore's chauvinistic account thus appears open to familiar objections e.g. those based on enjoyment machines (cf. the wilderness experience machine discussed above), and on beautiful worlds lacking conscious beings-which help show that beauty is what counts and not just, or primarily, experiences of beauty. Moore was not, however, entirely unaware of such points: cf. pp.194-95. 72 * into (ii), (i) requires restatement in terms of factors which avoid base class relativisation; then clause (ii) is eliminated. The need for con­ straints in optimisation modellings of utilitarian or economic sorts can be seen from the phenomena of interrelated interests and preferences: that my interests include, or depend upon, yours, means that these cannot vary independently, but are interrelated. Repairing the defects of ideal utilitarianism results in more adequate optimisation modelling. notion of The recipe elementary analysis of the item leads to is, in essence, as follows: Maximise a weighted function (e.g. a sum) of the factors that value a determines subject to appropriate constraints: symbolically, maximise n-place function E = E(x) subject to constraining relations Rj(x) and x = <x^,...,x^>). (with j an index, Special cases of such optimisation modellings are familiar from engineering and economic applications (e.g. determination of optimal social welfare in concave programming). What is more general 82 about the model indicated, is, in particular, the form of constraints permitted, which can include that ... Xi ... X2 ..." bounds for optimals). deontic constraints, e.g. "It is forbidden (which has the effect of putting a subspace out of Since there is nothing to prevent moral prohibitions, requirements of fairness, and the like, from appearing among the constraints ethics, economics, and practical reasoning can in principle be success­ fully amalgamated. The optimisation modelling of general value theory differs significantly from that of (ideal) utilitarianism. Although maximization is fundamental in both, in utilitarianism value is characteristically replaced by net utility, measured usually in terms of experiential units of some sort, whereas in general value theory this reduction is rejected. In each case there is a of an ethical calculus, but the currency is different, being values in one case and base class or individual utilities (units of utility) in the other; but in both cases the calculus is so far (equally) unworkable except in very special cases. In each case there is an analysis into components of the objective (function) maximized, but the analysis is very different. In utilitarianism net utility is broken down into individual utilities of members of some base class. In general value theory such a reduction is rejected (except perhaps where appropriate hypothetical valuers are admitted); analysis into factors that carry value is made. instead an (But in Moore's ideal The general model is motivated, explained, illustrated, applied and defended in Routley (b) and (d) and also in R. Routley, 'The choice of logical foundations: nonclassical choices and the ultralogical choice', L<9<2"f<?a, 38 (1979). 73 utilitarianism, unlike utilitarianism proper, the way is opened for factors, such as beauty, which carry intrinsic value and are not reducible to features of the base class or its members.) In utilitarianism deontic notions, such as right, are analysed in terms of the value theory; general value theory deontic notions are taken as given constraints are imposed on optimisations. but in and deontic Whereas the maximisations of utilitarianisms proper are (single element) unconstrained maximisations (hence the injustice, unfairness, and ill-treatment such ethics condone), general value theory optimisations are constrained. in principle While there is room for constraints in ideal utilitarianism, as there is for a switch to factors which are base-class independent - though the theory has never been elaborated to the point where these things are done - deontic constraints cannot be noncircularly imposed, given the teleological reduction thesis (so the problems of unfairness and ill-treatment remain). It is a fairly evident corollary of the differences that general value theory removes leading objections to utilitarianisms. It is not perhaps so evident, however, how it applies to environmental cases or what the factors of environmental relevance are. To expose some of the factors - and to indicate just how far an environmental ethics is dis­ tanced even from a comparatively liberal ethic like Moore's ideal utilitarianism - consider the very difficult optimisation problems as to the determination of the Ideal. Moore distinguishes (1) The Ideal, from, what is more interesting, state of things the best possZbZe state of things in this world', toward which our action should be directed' absolute ideal' (KI) and (2) 'the (2) 'the MZtZ/naZe end (p.183). Call (1) 'The 'the T ideal' or 'the this world ideal' (TI). A crucial difference between the two problems lies in the constraints: determination of TI is constrained by features - many of them unknown - of the actual world T (now and in the immediate future), by its populations of humans and of various species of living things on its various earths, by its natural features, by its physical and technological resources, limitations of which will impose characteristic scarcity constraints. By That does not imply that no analyses can be given of deontic notions. Although axiological reductions are ruled out, others are not. Certainly semantical analysis, like that already sketched for permissib­ ility, can be supplied and elaborated. Moore's teleological ethic is not far removed from Aristotle's ethic more than 2000 years earlier (which exhibits features of ideal utilitarianism) . From the point of view of this long relativelyunchanged base line, environmental ethics are not merely new and radical, but represent a paradigm shift. 74 - contrast, KI is presumably not constrained by resources or technology (in relation to populations); this is just one reason why Leibnitz's equations of TI with KI and with things as at present fails. theless constrained. 8S KI is none­ There will, for example, be constraints forbidding unfair or ill-treatment of various sorts (given that such treatment is possible), and there will be constraints interrelating factors that are not independent. The factors entering into the modelling will no doubt represent, in some way, many of the positive goods, such as enjoyment of the "meritor­ ious" sorts that Moore managed to discern - positively weighted - and many of the evils he found - but negatively weighted (but some of these things are better represented through constraints). There remain, 86 however, many features of ecological importance that Moore never con­ templated; for example, diversity of systems and creatures, naturalness, o7 integrity of systems, stability of systems, harmony of systems. Optimising a mix of factors, which are mutually constrained, meets constant reproaches made against such ecological values as diversity. The objections take the form that enhancement of diversity as a sole factor can lead to undesirable ecological results, indeed can diminish Op net value and so be wrong on utilitarianism grounds. On the multiple factor model diversity is constrained by naturalness and stability, for example; thus net value is not going to be increased through increasing the diversity of a simple temperate rainforest by felling some of its trees and replacing them with exotic species. On the other hand, diver­ sity will be increased by planting the banks of a stream, eroded through excess clearing and overgrazing, with suitable exotic species - then birds Perhaps, moreover, there are no limiting natural laws, such as con­ servation principles, but the universe operates according to beneficient natural laws. There are distinctions here between worlds and physically possible worlds which Moore did not make. There may also be, at least in the case of KI, as Moore observed, factors that we are unaware of - at least under the intended construal of 'conceivable'. Rough and ready measures of such factors as diversity are not so difficult to come by, and, in important respects, present fewer problems than obtaining measures of pleasure that encompass, in ways that take account of interspecies and interindividual comparisons, all sentient creatures. Compare the objections made in §4 to Rodman's reliance on the single criteria of diversity; and also Passmore's points in (a) against diversity as a single criterion in arguments for preservation. 75 and other animals will increase as well as plant diversity - and in such a case stability will also be increased in the longer term and natural­ ness not diminished (since already removed); thus overall value will be increased (it may also be increased by the enjoyment of conservationists formerly appalled by the stream landscape). Diversity,though (like enjoy­ ment or pleasure) good in itself, is (again like hedonistic values) not an unconstrained value (compare, e.g., enjoyment obtained through secret maltreatment of animals or by impoverishment of an unvisited streamside). The multiple factor model also solves the problem of how to combine traditional values, such as the virtues and creature enjoyment with what many in the West are only beginning to discern, environmental values; namely, by a constrained optimisation which takes due (i.e. weighted) account of them Thus in moving to an environmental (or nonchauvinist) ethic one is not ordinarily acknowledged welfare values for persons or humans, but simply recognising a further set of values to which such welfare values should be added. welfare values are retained; Nor is one humans, for human one is simply aiming to remove - through constraints which may reduce assignments to human values in favour of other values - the unwarranted privilege and chauvinism of the displaced Western super-ethic. One would not have come very far if, despite the claim to have recognised environmental values, one assumed that wherever there is con­ flict between natural values and human values, the latter must always prevail. This would be equivalent to assigning them very low weight, or even zero value, in all serious conflict cases. One would not have advanced far past rejection of axiological principle (A) if one then accepted, in assessments as to how things should be done, the yreafer namely that even though other things may have intrinsic value, people or humans are more valuable than anything else, and rank more highly (no matter how large their number).To allow that sows in human welfare values may sometimes - or even often, especially with increasing human populations - have to be accepted in cases of conflict is an essential part of assigning a genuine positive value to nonhuman factors. Sometimes humans, their states and conditions, do not come first: the greater value assumption should be rejected. Such an assumption - in popular form, that people come first - is extrgTMgZ-z/ widespread and is even included in animal liberation theory; cf. Singer, op. cit. For striking examples of the damaging assumption at work, see the (chauvinistic) resolutions of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment. o 4 There are many kinds of examples. Conspicuous examples are provided by recognisedly evil people (there are, under current social arrangements, plenty), whose welfare, or even lives, do not rank above, for example, valuable natural items, or the welfare of future persons. More con­ troversial are evaluations which rank the preservation of an animal species, such as the tiger, above the increase (or even retention) of human population in given areas.91 But, for the most part, the compar­ ative value of humans as opposed to other creatures and things has been greatly exaggerated. The arguments used in support of the greater value assumption are but variations of those for human chauvinism already considered, and largely rejected (in §1). Thus, for instance, Keller argues for a greater value thesis on the ground that a 'human being is the most complex thing which we know; its depth and range of experience far transcend that of any other known living thing' (p.209) Ecological Concern', Zz/^o/z, vol.6 (J.A. Keller, (1971), pp.197-209). complexity the claim is almost certainly false: are much more complex. 'Types of Motives for As regards pure tropical forest ecosystems The claim about range of experience is open to doubt, even for "normal" humans, since many animals have a much wider range of such sensory experiences as smells; and it is false of many humans. More important, range and "depth" of experience, of certain have) , does not, on its own, select sorts (those that normally establish greater value in any routine or regular way. Often enough it is no good basis for assigning greater value. The generalised optimisation model will commonly give way, in applications less sweeping and more feasible than that of the determining TI, to such special cases of it as Bayesian decision theory and cost­ benefit analysis, where these analyses allow properly for environmental values and duly incorporate ethical constraints (see Routley (a)). 90 91 It The fact of the matter is that prevailing unqualified attitudes to human welfare or the "sanctity" of human life - as opposed to other life - are shot through with inconsistency. For instance, despite common claims that human life is sacrosanct, neither the largely unquestioned military ethics nor medical ethics nor the state or "the law" take such a position: most individual humans are regarded as expendible, replaceable, and not particularly or uniquely valuable. On the prevailing ethic quite a different evaluation is taken for granted: e.g. It would be unrealistic to agree, of course, that preservation of wildlife should take precedence over providing for human needs. (S. Richardson, writing in T/ze CuTZ&erru November 29, 1974 , p.12) On an environmental ethic, while it might not be politically expedient, it would not be at all "unrealistic", to so agree. 77 & is these more special methods that should normally be applied in trying to determine a best course of action in a range of difficult decision cases thrown up for an environmental ethics, especially cases where there is a conflict (i.e. constraining conditions) between retention of natural values (e.g. preserving a wilderness or a national park) and maintenance of humanistic values (e.g. keeping some humans alive, commonly reckoned one of the highest human-values). But for a cost-benefit weigh-up to be attempted such cases have to be described in more detail usually provided by chauvinistic philosophers who than is to direct such examples against environmental evaluations - as if furthermore, the examples were quite conclusive, when they almost always presuppose from the very beginning what is in dispute, a greater value assumption. In connection with such intended counterexamples to properly environmental ethics, two further points are worth recording: firstly, resort to such analytical methods is the rational procedure in such cases (unless a time urgency intrudes, as seldom happens, or should happen, in philosophy); secondly, an environmental ethic should not, any more than other ethics or economics, be expected to provide a decision procedure for any and every case that may arise: the theory (and accompanying intuitions) may have to be developed to resolve some cases, while other cases may go (cheerfully) undecided. On similar test or decision cases, e.g. one group of starving people versus another group in a situation of limited resources, or quality of life versus number of humans, conventional ethical theories may offer no quick, or clearcut, resolutions, etc. The optimisation model indicates, among many other things, how axiological principle (A) is to be modified. For best choice and best course of action are now determined by taking account of the further range of values, not just those that are human-based. Then (A) vanishes into the truism that only those objects that are of intrinsic value are of intrinsic value, or need be taken into account in the values of the optimisation model. How to rectify the deontic principle (D) is rather less obvious than how to adjust (A). An obvious strategy, is, however, to add further 92 Even when a case is more fully described there will, of course be (unavoidable) difficulties in quantifying some of the values, e.g. those of "intangible" factors; but these difficulties are not sub­ stantially worse than those already encountered in routine business accounting in quantifying such assets as good-will and such matters as wage relativities for different work. As L. Tribe has pointed out (in 'Ways not to think about plastic trees: new foundations for environmental law', YaZ-e AuzJ vol.83 (1974) , pp.1315-1348) the difficulties of transferring or adapting rather standard methods of assessment, such as decision theory and cost-benefit analyses, to pro vide rational decision methods in the case of environmental matters has been much exaggerated, to the detriment of the environment. 78 * provisos. way; But it is unsatisfactory to do this in a piecemeal sort of it hardly suffices, for example, to simply add further riders excluding unnecessary cruelty to animals, speciescide, etc. What has to is unwarranted interference with other preference­ be ruled out havers (and goal-possessors) and the degrading of items of value. A revised principle appears then to go something like this:- DN. One is free to act as one wishes provided that (i) one does not unwarrantedly interfere with other preference-havers, and (ii) one does not damage or ill-treat or devalue anything of value. Though the revised principle has a rather more complex and restrictive character than freedom principle (D) and Western variants thereon, it still does the requisite task (D) set out to do, namely to state that out­ side certain prescribed areas one is free, that select behaviour is permissible.93 it is simply that the proscribed area is far larger than inadequate homocentric ethics have envisaged. But perhaps the whole conception underlying (D), and the way it fixes onus of proof, should be stood on its head. On the view behind (D), one starts from an unlimited position permitting unlimited interference and exploitation; restrictions are added primarily because other ones (again ones of the privileged class) are also starting from a similar unlimited position whose freedom of action may be (impermissibly) curtailed by one's own. So results the initial position, e.g. of (D). For inter­ ference in others' projects (no matter how exploitative) beyond this "evident" initial position,good reasons have always to be offered. alternative thoroughgoing On the respect view, which is illustrated by various nonexploitative non-Western ethics, one starts from a restricted position, a position of no interference and no exploitation, a position at peace with the natural world so to say, and allows interference - not as on thinking, restricts interference - for good reasons. thus entirely inverted: stop interference. Western The onus of proof is good reasons are required y<2r interference, not The good reasons include the collecting of fruit and nuts (and other natural "produce") for life support purposes, but not, for example, the collection of a substantial surplus of forest orchids on whim or in the hope that they may be sold at a profit. A theory of value like that outlined, though it takes it for granted, 93 The revised freedom principle is not incompatible with, but can be combined with and supplemented by, a bill of rights, charter or catechism specifying positively types of rights and of permissible conduct. 79 A in the constraints imposed in optimisation, that there are deontic principles limiting what is done to many objects other than persons, leaves main deontic issues open, and in particular does not thereby imply that such objects have rights. For woraZ forbidding certain actions with respect to an object (fo not, in general, that object a 94 corretattle r-^p/zt. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given oak or landscape painting does not entail that the tree or painting has a correl­ ative right not to be mutilated - without (what has a point) stretching the notion of r^p*7z^. An environmental ethic like the respect ethic being advanced does not automatically commit one to the view that natural objects or artifacts sometimes have rights. It is sometimes held that some such objects do have rights, e.g. under the influence of pantheism. But construed literally, pantheism is false, since artefacts, and other inanimate objects, are not alive. The view that the class of right-holders extends beyond the class of preference-havers can however be placed on bases less extravagant than pantheism - most obviously in terms of a suitable deontic analysis of r^p?zt, for instance along the following lines: others d has a right to iff (obligation-holders) are not entitled to interfere with d's cj)ing (if d (f)'s or were to (j)). Under this account, of which emerges straight-forwardly from modern analyses of r^p/zt, a painting or a tree may indeed have "rights", such as to continue existing. Although the term 'right' can no doubt be 6^ctezz<ie(i along some such lines, the analysis leaves out essential elements of the normal notion, namely the involvement of choice. There are, once again, various competing environ­ mental ethics, some simple extensions of Western ethics which extrapolate the notion of r^p/zt, some not, some rationalistic, some not, and so on. Environmental positions can - but need not - adhere to the familiar assumption that rights divide into the following two broad classes:First, there are rights held by those (persons, in o?z6 sense) who can duly claim their rights themselves, a class which excludes many humans So rejected also is the s^rozz^ correlation thesis, presented e.g. in S.I. Benn and R.S. Peters, Pocz^aZ Pr^Tzc^pZes a7z<i ^Tze Pew<9<?r<2^<? Allen and Unwin/1959, pp.89-9, according to which 'right and duty are different names for the same normative relation, according to the point of view from which it is regarded' (thereby also elevating what is at best a coentailment into a stronger identity relation). For example, that d has a duty to look after the painting does not entail that the painting has a right to be looked after by d, in any sense of 'right' Benn and Peters are prepared to acknowledge. The weaker correlation thesis - that d has a right to R entails that at least someone else has a duty with respect to R - is not at issue. 80 & and (so far as we know) almost all nonhuman animals. Such rights are often supposed to carry with them various responsibilities. Secondly, there are rights held by certain other (sometime sentient) creatures; though the extent of this subclass of right-holders is a controversial matter, it is generally taken to include at least infants, mentally defective humans, dead humans, and some animals. These rights do not carry corresponding responsibilities, though they are, of course, the However the assumption that certain rights - ground for various claims. the really central rights - are restricted to those who can claim them on their OM% behalf, seems to be based on the faulty idea of private (or separable) individuals as the basic metaphysical units. In a community of socio-environmental individuals there is no reason why one creature's rights should not be claimed, as infants' and animals' rights frequently are, by another: these rights are others' responsibilities. right-holder has itself no specific responsibilities. Often a Moreover the supposed division leaves it quite vague what responsibilities "central" often, it seems, they have none that right-holders are supposed to have; connect relevantly with their rights. be put on the alleged division: a primary nonderivative way). Accordingly but little weight will any preference-haver can hold rights (in That any preference-haver can hold rights is a consequence of the account of rt<y72t that usage of 'right to' appears to lead to, namely for very many (action-type) predicates cj), d has a right to iff, for every other (obligation-holder) z, z is not entitled to interfere with d if d chooses or would choose to <&. Thus that d holds rights requires of d only that it be the sort of creature that can make choices, that it be a preference-haver. The result holds good generally. Consider the other main case, where the right is to some object b: d has a right to b iff, for certain ot (a class of obligation holders, which may consist of a single person), members of a have an obligation to cede b to d if a chooses or would choose (to have) b (cf. Benn and Peters, op. cit., p.89). To be sure, there are other cases where rights to are attributed, but these appear to reduce to the cases given; which seems to amount to something like: to work. e.g. a has a right to work, a has a right to an opportunity Similar analyses - again with significance restrictions on the class of (])S and bs - apply to rights ??ot to, e.g. an animal has a right not to be kept in a cage. Rights of this sort can likewise be held by any preference-haver (but once again such rights be extended beyond this class to all natural objects). Not every right-holder bears responsibilities or carries obligations : infants for instance do not. Responsibility-bearers and obligation­ holders are a very proper subclass of humans and may only overlap the 81 A t* class of humans, and likewise the class of potential responsibility­ bearers only overlaps the class of humans. Thus more demanding deontic notions afford no point of access for human chauvinism. To be responsible for something requires more than ability to have preferences or capacity to make choices; it implies liability to be called to account for the thing, answerability for it. Similarly, the undertaking of obligations involves entering into binding relations which imply answerability. Responsibility­ bearers and obligation-holders are thus a subclass of preference-havers, in accord with the annular theory. For answerability and accountability involve some level of linguistic competence - at the very least an ability to answer, in some language (usually presumed to be translatable, easily?, into some human language) - which many preference-havers do not possess. But responsibility and obligation lead a kind of a double life. For a creature that does not have responsibilities, may nonetheless be responsible for various things, in the sense of having done them, and sometimes done them deliberately; as, e.g., the wallaby who breaks down protecting netting and branches time and again is responsible for the demise of a Japanese plumtree. Rather similar oz^p/zf-statements hold true of subjects who do not carry obligations; consider, e.g., "wombats ought to be more careful in crossing roads". The upshot is that an environmental ethic can - despite its very different value theory - retain, in large measure, and sharpen, rather standard accounts of, and distinctions concerning, rights and obligations. It is in this respect, however, that the sort of environmental ethic being advanced differs markedly from alternative environmental ethics, e.g. those which would, implausibly, confer rights to trees, assign obligations to the soil, and so on. JM<?7z 6J?fe?zs^o?z pos^f^o/zs, of which Leopold's would be a leading example, ^Tzaf <2% eM^iro^z/??6?zfaZ ef/z^c znz^sf yoZZozJ i/zg paffgru cy hosier?? ef/z^<?s &ase <?^uss. orzZz/ a zzzzzcTz The way to a satisfactory, environmental, ethic is to reject the pattern of the Western super-ethic, not to simply extend it. The way is through some sort of annular theory which recognises categorial distinc­ tions between different sorts of things, not through a theory which would delete the legitimate distinctions between the sorts of things. latter mistaken way is unnecessary. The For example, in order to reject the instrumental view of value, and to assign natural objects intrinsic value, it is unnecessary to take Leopold's course of viewing all natural objects as having r^p/zfs in the same way as persons and preference-havers are regarded as having rights, or of persons as having obligations natural objects such as trees in the same sort of way as to other persons. Thus too there is no need to see the rejection of the instrumental 82 <! view as mystical or anti-rational, or as reverting to the view that trees and other natural items house spirits (a view which in any case may have simply been a way of expressing an allotment of value to natural items), and hence as gross superstition. An environmental ethic can be as tough, practical, rational and secular as prevailing Western ethics. so such an ethics will lose much Even if it loses contact with its felt bases in natural things and appreciation of natural things. An environmental ethic will be much the poorer too if it limits itself to the moral terminology, and variations of the categories, of chauvinistically shaped ethics. There will much more as to care, concern and respect in the presentation and main principles of such an ethic than, what occupies standard Western ethics, duties, obligations and rights. In this way too, further problems and puzzles for environmental ethics can be resolved. For example, the view that ethical concepts can apply to the non-human world in an irreducible way is often seen as very puzzling. Much of this puzzlement is generated by attempting to transfer intact a strongly legalistic and person-oriented category of moral concepts, such as rights, moral obligations, duties, and so on, to items in the natural world where they give rise to such apparg^tZ-y problematic questions as 'Do stones have rights?', 'What are our moral obligations to trees?', and so on. If we attempt instead to apply a broader, less legalistic class of moral concepts, such as care, concern, responsibility and respect, much of the puzzling character of these still essentially moral attributions vanishes. There is no great problem for example about how we can legitimately apply notions such as respect to natural items, once a few distinctions are made. The view that the land, animals, and the natural world should be treated with respect was a common one in many hunting and gathering societies, and it is clear that this respect was not seen as generated merely by moral obligations to other persons. dimension to relations with Respect adds a moral the natural world. Respect - or the lack of it - comes out in everyday actions concerning the natural world. The following passage contrasts the Western treatment of the land which lacks respect with the careful and respectful treatment of some American Indians: The White people never cared for land or dear or bear. we Indians kill meat, we eat it all up. little holes. When we dig roots we make When we built houses, we make little holes. burn grass for grasshoppers, we don't ruin things. acorns and pinenuts. dead wood. When We don't chop down the trees. When we We shake down We only use But the White people plow up the ground, pull down the 83 St trees, kill everything (Tozzck ike Furik, (ed. T.C. McLuhan, Sphere Books, London, 1973, p.15). The great care with which so many of the Indians utilized every portion of the carcass of a hunted animal was an expression, not of economic thrift, but of courtesy and respect (D. Lee, in Tonck ike Forik, p.15)What the respect position is based on is the fact that it is possible to make use of something without treating it as something which is no more than a means to one's ends. That is, it is possible to make use of some­ thing in limited, constrained ways - with constraints which may not derive entirely from considerations of the welfare of other humans, as in the case of the Indians' use of animals - without treating it as available for any kind of use. To so use something without treating it as available for unlimited or unconstrained use for human ends is characteristic of use. In contrast non-respectful use treats the use of the item as constrained by no considerations arising from the item itself and the user's relationship to it, but as constrained only in a derivative way, by considerations of the convenience, welfare and so forth of other humans. The Western view, as the Indians realised, is the non-respect position, that the world is available for unconstrained human use. People who hold respect positions, such as the Indians, see such a position as indicative of a lack of moral sensitivity, and sometimes in even stronger terms. The conventional wisdom of Western society tends to offer a false dichotomy of use versus respectful nonuse - a false choice which comes out especially clearly again in the treatment of animals. Here the choice presented in Western thought is typically one of eiiker use without respect or serious constraint, of using animals for example in the ways character­ istic of large-scale mass-production farming and a market economic system which are incompatible with respect, or on the other hand of not making any use of animals at all, for example, never making use of animals for food or for farming purposes. What is left out in this choice is the alternative the Indians and other non-Western people have recognised, the alternative of limited and respectful use, which enables use to be made of animals, but does not allow animals to be used in an unconstrained way or merely as a means to human ends. Such an alternative can have some applic­ ation in a Western context (for some limited examples of respectful use in the operations of a small farmer, see John Seymour, Tke Cowpiete Rook of Faber, London, 1976). A limited and respectful use position would condemn the infliction of unnecessary pain on animals, and also the treatment of animals as machines, as in factory farming. 84 It would also condemn unecessary and wasteful killing and especially killing for amusement or "sport", which is incompatible with respect and assumes that animals can be used merely as a means for ZrZz?ZuZ human ends. But it would not necessarily oppose the use of animals in the case of approp­ riate non-trivial need, e.g. for food, although here again it would insist that the ways in which use can be made are limited, and not just by considerations of effect on other humans. The limited and respectful use position avoids some of the serious problems of the no-use position of the animal liberationists, although it shares many of the same beliefs concerning the illegitimacy of factory farming and similar disrespectful methods of making use of and exploiting animals. The no-use position faces the problem that it proposes that humans should treat animals in ways which are quite different from the ways in which animals treat one another, for example, prohibiting needful use for food. Thus the no-use position seems obliged to say either that the world would be a better place without carnivores, or else that carnivorous animals themselves are inferior, immoral, moral creatures - whichever alternative amoral or non- is taken here the bulk of animals emerge as inferior to humans, or at least vegetarian humans. It implies too that an impoverished natural order which lacked carnivores - and given what we know of ecology this would be a very highly impoverished one indeed, not to say an unworkable "natural" order - is preferable to a rich natural one with a normal proportion of carnivorous and partly carnivorous species. carnivores, Since it would imply the moral inferiority of the no-use position appears to arrive at the negation of its own starting point, (as regards e.g., the equality consideration) of all animals, human and non-human. In thus seeing humans as capable of a moral existence which most animals are not capable of, it sees man as apart from a largely amoral (or immoral) natural world, denies community with the animal and natural world,and indirectly reinforces human chauvinism. §6. TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE EXTENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL REVISION ENSUING ON ABANDONMENT OF CHAUVINISTIC ETHICS A radical change in a theory not uncommonly forces changes elsewhere - conceptual revision which affects not only the theory itself but many neighbouring areas. The phenomenon is well-known in the case of major physical theories, but it holds as well for ethical and philosophical theories; for example, a logical theory which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way has important repercussions throughout much of the rest of philosophy, and requires modification not only of logical 85 systems and their semantics, but also, for instance, of the usual meta­ theory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is 95 tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A thorough-going environmental ethics likewise has a substantial impact and forces many changes. The escape from human chauvinism not only involves sweeping changes in ethical principles and value theory but it induces substantial reverberations elsewhere - both inwards, for example in metaphysics, in epistemology, and in the philosophy and method­ ology of science, and outwards (in subjects that presuppose value theory) in social theory, in politics, in economics and in law, and beyond. For human chauvinism is deeply embedded in Western culture, and affects not only the ideology and the institutions but the arts. Thus, for example, much of literature, and especially of ballet and film, is given over to a celebration :of things' human,', of .'the species. ,-;Eveh the. ti.RfeLy herw,eYnphas.is, for instance of the counterculture, on-human relations (a-s opposed to selfcontained private individuals of social theories) remains well within the inherited chauvinistic framework. As to the changes, let us begin again with ethics. As we have begun to see, an environmental ethic can retain, though in a much amended theoretical framework (which affects meanings of terms), virtually all the standard ethical terminology. But even at a superficial syntactical level, there will be conspicuous alterations: firstly, ethical terminology will be enriched with new environmental terms, drawn in particular from ecology, somewhat as it was expanded in the late nineteenth century by terminology from evolutionary theories; and secondly, accompanying the attitudinal shifts the new ethic involves, there will be a marked shift in ethical terminology, away from the predominance of such terms as (and examples associated with) 'obligation', to such expressions as 'care', 'respect', 'consciousness'. 'duty', 'concern', 'promise', 'contract', 'responsibility', 'trust', Because the theoretical and attitudinal frame is changed, an environmental ethic forces - as we have already found with such notions as z)oZ-Me, cZzotce, interference and (Zowa^e reexamination of, and modified analyses of, characteristic ethical notions. It requires, furthermore, reassessment of traditional and conventional analyses of such notions as nctnraZ- ri^/zt, ^ronn^Z of ri^Zzt^ and perznissib- iZitz/., especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions - much as it requires the rejection of most of the more prominent meta-ethical These points are explained in detail in Routley (e); and also in L. Goddard and R. Routley, TZze Lopic of Cipnificonce an^Z Context, Vol. 1, Scottish Academic Press, 1973, chapters 3 and 4. 86 0 46 positions. Cursory examination of recent accounts of TzuZ^ruZ rZpTzZ^ zzzoruZ-Ztz/-, and ucf-Zczz will help illustrate and confirm these points. Hart, for example, accepts (subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant) the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, any adult human ... capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons Hart, (H.L.A. 'Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in PcZ-ZZ-ZcuZ P/z-fZoscpZzz/, (ed. A. Quinton), Blackwell, Oxford 1967). But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the basic chauvinist principle - a variant of (D) - environmental ethics reject; since if a person has a natural right he has a right. So too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straightforward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. Another example of chauvinism at work in the very setting up of the field of discussion and problems in ethics is provided by recent accounts of woruZ-ZZy, where it is simply taken for granted that 'moral' distinguishes 96 among ZzMzzzu?z actions, policies, motives and reasons, and that what is moral refers essentially to human well-being (contentment, happiness or something of this general sort, tied with appropriate states or 97 conditions of humans). Such criteria for what is moral are chauvinistically based, assuming that what does not bear on human states or conditions cannot be a moral matter. What happens in worlds without humans, how animals fare or are treated, what is done or what happens to plants or other natural objects - none of these are directly moral matters, except insofar as they impinge on human welfare. That is human 96 Thus for instance, B. Williams, AfcruZ-Ztp; 24% P^z^rodMcf-Zo^ fo Ff/z-Zcs^ Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p.79. Williams does, however, remark in his Preface (p.xiv) how 'shaky and problematic' the distinction - which he subsequently takes for granted - is. 97 See, for example, P.R. Foot, TZzeor'Zes Ft/z-Zcs, Oxford University Press, London, 1967, and G.J. Warnock, Ccwfewporurz/ AforuZ P/z-ZZosop/zz/, Macmillan, London, 1967, and also TZzg o.f MoraZ-Zfz/, Methuen, London, 1971. 87 t* chauvinism at work, and is at the same time a reductio such criteria. s- ad absurdum of A different nonchauvinistic account of what is moral is required (a beginning can be made by adopting certain of the maligned formal criteria). It is evident that any account which meets even weak conditions of adequacy will serve to meet the objection that an environ­ mental ethic is not concerned with what is moral but is really an aesthetic theory. For the objection as usually presented depends squarely on a chauvinistic restriction on morality, all the rest of value theory being classed, or dismissed, as "(mere) aesthetics". The case of morality illustrates the characteristic way in which theories - in this case chauvinistic ethics - redefine crucial notions in their own terms to suit their own ends, such as entrenchment and fortification of the theories against objections. Further corollaries of the rejection of chauvinism include the inadequacy of recent fashionable attempts, mainly derivative from Hobhouse, at characterising a^naZf^z/ and justifying it in ways that argue from man's humanity^98 and the inadequacy of much recent, largely chauvinistic, work in the philosophy of actdan, which takes it for granted that action and 99 rationality requirements on action are bound up with human nature. The abandonment of chauvinism implies the rejection not only of much ethical analysis, but of all current major ethical positions. The bias of prevailing ethical positions, and also of economic positions, which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is especially evident. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have (at least) an ordinal p- ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p-ranking of these states in terms of individual p-rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And 98 Among such unsatisfactory liberal egalitarian positions are those presented in G. Vlastos, 'Justice and equality' in SacZaZ JnstZae (ed. R.B. Brandt), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962, and B.A.O. Williams, 'The idea of equality' in P^Zasap/zz^., PaZfZfcs and JacZafz/, Second series (ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman), Blackwell, Oxford, 1963. 99 see, e.g.^T. Nagel, T/ze Pass-Z&'ZZ'Ztz/ a/ ^ZZrnZszzz, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1970. 88 even if the base class is extended to include persons or some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. To take a simple example, if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (still unfortunately the evaluation of most Australian farmers, though it lacks any requisite empirical basis). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with sperm whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if but few in the base class happened to know that sperm whales exist or cared a jot that they do, then even the most "rational" economic decision­ making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. But whether the sperm whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Summed human interests, or preferences of certain private individuals, are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding upon what is environmentally desirable. Nor would such accidental bases be adequate. Moreover ways out of the problem do not bear much investigation. It cannot be assumed, for instance, that the base class is on the whole good, and hence will not enjoin reprehensible behaviour, because such an assumption seems false, would at best be contingently true (so that the theory would fail for different circumstances to which it should apply), and would involve a deep problem in the theory, since it would then seem to admit the determination of goodness - that of the base class, on the whole - independently of what the theory was set up to determine, among other things, goodness. Nor can it be assumed, without serious circularity, that the optimisation is constrained by requirements of justice or fairness (see Routley (b) and §5 above). The ethical and economic theories just singled out (which are based on optimisation over select features of the base class) are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to west going meta- ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. That is, the argument against utilitarian—type ethical and economic theories generalises. For instance, on social contract positions, obligations are a matter of mutual agreement 89 between individuals of a given (but again problematic) base class; on a social justice picture, rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons;^00 while on a Kantian position, which has some vogue, obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.In each case, if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class, then that is unfortun­ ate for them: that is (rough) justice. Looking outwards from the ethics, the abandonment of chauvinism has likewise a wide set of consequences, both theoretical and practical, in economics, politics and law, and generally in the social sciences. One major practical economic impact of environmental ethics is in the extent to which free enterprise can operate unimpeded or unchanged. of business and enterpreneurial activity - to But consider <9722 option - will involve, in turn, either legal constraints, or reallocation of activity by such devices as environmental pricing, which directs activity away from environmentally undesirable pursuits. For example, if it is wrong to destroy a rare ecosystem in order to make a few more dollars, then restrictions should be imposed on business activity by one method or another. To some limited extent this is already happening in the field of pollution, but primarily because of the likely effects, direct or not too far removed, that pollution comes to have on other humans, not for a wider set of reasons, and often not for the right reasons. With a wider environ­ mental code, the public and legal intrusion into areas typically regarded as "private" and open to the free enterprise operations (of "open go") would be much more extensive. The same applies in the case of private Thus for example, [Rawls'] original position seems to presuppose not just a neutral theory of the good, but a liberal, individualistic conception according to which the best that can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own path, provided it does not interfere with the rights of others. This view is persuasively developed in the later portions of the book, but without a sense of its controver­ sial character (T. Nagel, 'Rawls on justice' , P/z^Zcsop/ztcczZ 82 (1973), p.228). Nagel also effectively argues that Rawls' original position is not neutrally determined but involves substantial moral assumptions (e.g. pp.232, 233); they are mostly, as it happens, of a chauvinistic cast. While the first of Kant's maxims is not so restricted in actual form­ ulation, others are (see H.J. Paton, AforuZ P<2M, Hutchinson, London, 1947) . And, firstly, such maxims are s^ppast?^ to be equivalent to ones formulated in terms of persons; secondly, they are supposed to be derived from features of, or connected with, people. 90 -4 property; for example, given that it is not permissible to erode hill­ sides then there should, in this setting, be (legal) restrictions on farmers' and foresters' activities. Although the impact on the practice of economics of a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would be drastic - market negotiations, firms' activities, international trade, all would be affected - the impact on the underlying theories of preference and choice is comparatively For much of economics is squarely founded but still far from negligible. on chauvinism. less, The theoretical bias follows directly from the utilitarian bases of the theory, which is fairly explicit in welfare theory and rather heavily disguised in neoclassical theory. But although choice and value theory are, as characteristically presented in economics and elsewhere, damagingly chauvinistic, they do not have to be. For the theories can be reformulated in a non-chauvinistic way, as was indicated (in §5) above for utilitarianism - upon which economic theory is modelled. On such a revamped foundation an environmental economics to match the chosen environmental ethic can be built (for some preliminaries on this approach, see Routley (d), appendices 1 and 6). Several of the objections to base class theories such as utilitar­ ianism apply not merely against orthodox economic theory, but also to voting theory, to representative democratic systems of determination of political action. If, for, example, the base class consists of private individuals motivated by their own self-contained interest then such procedures can readily lead to most undesirable results, especially if these individuals compromise representative individuals. their autonomy through the election of For the more powerful of these representative individuals can be - and typically are, as their behaviour if not their protestations show - not favourably disposed to (the welfare of) things outside the base class or even to many members of the base class. Nearer the theoretical surface, especially in such branches of economics as "resource management", the chauvinism is more conspicuous. The following narrowly utilitarian assumption is quite typical: The goal of resource managers should be to communicate and act in ways that maximize human satisfaction (H.J. Campbell, 'Economic and social significance of upstream aquatic resources' in Forest Fs^s Oregon State University, Corcallis, 1971, p.14, also p.17). When management - where such is management becomes needed at all - the goals will be changed from such chauvinistic ones. 91 The method of interference in "free economic enterprise", of controls and regulations, of legal and political constraints, is only one way in which leading principles of an environmental ethics can be put into effect. A quite different, and ultimately far more appealing, approach is by way of structural change, by changing the socio-economic structure in such a way that it comes to reflect on environmental ethics (by altering the frame of reference, or axes, to use the physical picture of §4, so that major problems vanish). Requisite structural change is . 102 far-reaching, both practically and theoretically in every reach of social science. For example, while on the position, capitalist markets are subject to further regulation, either directly imposed or by way of suitable pricing policies, in the s^rz^g^raZ. c/zaMgre position, capitalist markets are eliminated; while under state regulation private property is subject to further Controls,given approp­ riate structural change private property disappears. Looking inwards, an environmental ethic has an impact on the practice of many sciences other than the social sciences - what they do experimentally with natural objects (e.g. the treatment of animals in laboratory testing); how their research programmes are organised and directed (consider,e.g., projects involving irradiation or broadscale herbicide treatments of rainforests); the way classifications are made and which are made (consider, e.g. the extent to which human perception enters into classifications in botany); recommended on the basis of such sciences. and, of course, what is For as it stands human chauvinism is deeply embedded in the practice of science, directly in research and experimentation and in shaping classifications, theses and theories. Indeed the effect of a different ethic may extend even to the theory of such sciences, in particular through the bearing the ethic has 103 on metaphysics which m turn influences the foundations of such sciences. Such a new ethic would quite properly upset (as §1 should indicate) the extent to which humans are seen at the centre of things and things as accountable through them and scientific theories as 'human constructions wrestled from a hostile nature' (after Popper). It would help overthrow the pernicious chauvinistic idea that, apart from certain elementary facts, 4ZZ-es value. Me?zs<?/ze?zzjgr^, all necessity, all intensionality, all It should result too in the shattering of still widespread As (g) V. and R. Routley, 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems', this volume, begins to explain. Cf. R. Harre, TTza P/z^Zosop/ztes c/ S'c^eyzcg, Oxford University Press, 1972; and also Routley (e). 92 ***** assumptions as to the nature of animals and plants, for instance that their apparently goal—directed and intensional behaviour can be explained (away) mechanistically, and the deeply-rooted idea that some sort of Cartesian metaphysical picture of natural, as distinct from spiritual or rational, objects can be maintained (cf. again §1). In metaphysics there are at least two further important classes of effects. Firstly, the orthodox views of man's relation to nature, the dominant and modified dominant and lesser traditions, have to be abandoned and new positions worked out. In this sense, a new environmental ethic implies a similarly new metaphysic redefining Man's place in nature and human/nature relationships.104 Such a new philosophy of nature will recognise various natural objects other than humans as of independent value, so it will not be naturalistic. Nor will it view natural objects as simply available for the use, wise or otherwise, of humans. Several principles derived from the orthodox metaphysical positions will have to be abandoned and replacements worked out (as in the case of (D) in ethics) Thus superseded, for example, will be the principles of total use of natural areas for human use and of maximum long-term productivity of the earth's resources (principles criticised in their application in forestry in Routley (d)). At a deeper level, such a philosophy of nature will involve a turning away from the leading ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and of much that went with them (e.g. with the Renaissance, the rise of commerce, bureaucracy, professionalism, formal education, and subsequently, with the Enlightenment, the rise of the modern state, capitalism and scientific enlightenment). For it means the dismissal of the chauvinistic principles of theRenaissance,with 'Man as the kernel of the Universe', a creature 'half-earthly and half-divine, his body and soul form[ing] a microcosm enabling him to understand and control Nature ...'.1°5 It means too removal of the humanism of the Enlightenment, the reduction of what formerly was assigned to the religious, such as ethical and political principles, to the human, a reduction which 104 As Passmore has observed - inconsistently with what is claimed m his (a) - in 'Attitudes to Nature', Roz/aZ of PTz^oscp/zy Lectures, volume 8, Macmillan, London, 1975. As against Passmore (a) p.3, such new ethics and metaphysics need involve no abandonment of 'the analytical, critical approach which is the glory of the West : on the contrary, they may well mean a more thoroughly critical and analytical approach than hitherto. 105 goth quotations are from T^ze <?y tTzg 7?e7z<2^ss(2%<3g (ed. D. Hay) Thames and Hudson, London 1967, pp.7-10, where too main movements, practical and ideological, of the Renaissance are usefully indicated. 93 was based on the false dichotomy, which has still not lost its hpld:, religious or humanistic. Secondly, the removal of humans from a dominant position JhT the natural order renders immediately suspect a range of familiar philosophical positions of a verificationistic or idealistic kind such as phenomenalism in epistemology (how can what exists depend on what is perceived by members of such a transitory and perhaps not so important species or ^on whether there exist perceivers?), intuitionism in mathematics, con­ ventionalism in logical theory, the Copenhagen interpretation ir^ micr<^- physics, and subjectivisms not only in ethics but in every other* * True, most of these positions are defeated on t^e basis of other considerations anyway; but it is an immediate and fur,t^ier philosophical sphere. point against them that they are damagingly chauvinistic. Thus a corollary of the thoroughgoing rejection of human chauvinism, of very considerable philosophical importance, is the rejection of all the usual forms of idealism, i.e. all positions which accord primacy to the human subject and make the existence of a world of things or the nature of things dependent upon such subjects. A paradigmatic example is phenomenalism; other examples are Kantian idealisms, Hegelianisms and later German idealisms, Christian philosophies based on the primacy of human (and superhuman) consciousness, existentialisms; more surprising examples are empiricisms - inasmuch as all knowledge and truth is supposed to be ultimately derived from human experience - and their holistic images, dialectical materialisms and Marxisms. A satisfactory environ­ mental philosophy will be significantly different from all these positions. 94  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 20, Item 2: Draft of Human chauvinism and environmental ethics Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. Handwritten on attached leaf to paper: 57-85 Taken out for age. Paper published, Routley R and Routley V (1980) 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Mannison DS, McRobbie, MA, Routley R (eds) Environmental philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:31eb305">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:31eb305</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - [Item not listed with location] Box 20: More Green Como House Como House > [Item not listed with location] https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/1d651af96cc7b07825a4edfa9eabdc93.pdf c09e6df28a2be8efc88346ca0115f7fb PDF Text Text �HUMAN CHAUVINISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS * Richard and Vai Routley Class chauvinism has been and remains a cardinal weakness of most moral codes - including, so it will be argued, Western ethics. A most serious failure of Western ethics is its human chauvinism or anthropocentricism - a chauvinism which emerges in a refined, and apparently more reasonable, form as person chauvinism in much modern ethical theory. What is chauvinism? Class chauvinism, in the relevant sense, is differential, discriminatory and inferior treatment (by sufficiently many members of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not justification. PLzwan chauvinism is class chauvinism where the class is humans, zzzuZe chauvinism where the class is human males, chauvinism where the class is animals, etc. It would be bud, to say the least, if Western ethics, in its various strands, were to turn out to rest on human, or person, chauvinism. For Western ethics would then have no better foundation than, and be open to the same sorts of objections as, moral codes based on other sorts of chauvinisms, e.g. on familial, national, sexual, racial or socio-economic class chauvinism - in particular it would be open to the objection that * This paper (which considerably elaborates R. Routley 'Is There a need for d ew, an environmental, ethic?', of f/ze XVfb VorZd P3 1 (1973), pp.205-10), was drafted in 1973 and read in 19 he University of Indiana, Bloomington, at Notre Dame University, an t the Conference on The Good Society held at the University of Canada. Since the main virtue of the paper has been that it h ed much interesting discussion, the original form has been retained, the authors are no longer especially happy with the form, an theses remain insufficiently developed or e the previous and continuing defended. But in order have been made, even though the criticism, no substanti paper has been raided and segments o it presented in improved form 'Against the inevitability elsewhere, especially (a) R. and V. Rou of human chauvinism', in MoruZ P/zfZosopbz/ e University Press, (edited by K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre), Notre 1978, and (b) R. and V. Routley, 'An expensiv , Choice utilitarianism', paper presented at the Colloquium on some u?zd VuZz^g, RSSS, Australian National University, 1977. sizeable additions have been made, with a view to incre intelligibility and enlarging the scope of the original draft, ing some of the many objections. 1 �v' it discriminated against nonhumans in a prejudiced and unwarranted way, and would thereby stand condemned. For it is hard to see how an ethic based on simple species loyalty could have any greater claim to absolute­ ness or deserve any more respect than moral codes based on simple loyalty to national, sexual, or racial classes. Such an ethic could no more command allegiance - once the facts are brought into clear view - than other normally-deplored examples of localised class chauvinism, such as the Mafia or protection agencies or rackets or enclaves of slavery. Unfortunately prevailing Western ethics appear to be of just this sort. §1. THE WESTERN CASE FOR ITS HUMAN (OR PERSON) CHAUVINISM: THE FIRST LINES OF DEFENCE It is important, then, for defenders of the Western ideology to be able to show - i/ it can be shown - that an ethic which discriminates strongly in favour of humans, as Western ethics apparently does, is not chauvinistic. Otherwise the ethic stands condemned. Of course not every distinction in treatment qualifies as chauvinistic - the distinction in treatment may not be substantial or systematic, and there may be an adequate and explicable basis for the distinction, so that some discrimin­ ation is warranted. In order to escape the charge of human chauvinism, it has to be shown how and why the drastic and general discrimination in favour of humans sanctioned and enjoined by modern (as by historical) Western ethical systems is warranted, and that it has an adequate basis. The extent of this chauvinism, especially with respect to animals, is at last - after centuries of a priori prejudice and gross distortion of the characteristics of wild animals and wilderness - beginning to be spelt 'x out. 1 'X It is at least clear from the outset that an adequate justification cannot be provided which simply selects all and only these members of the species human (i.e. Zzcmo sup^e^s) as zoologically defined. nothing about the characteristic of There is itself (as distinct perhaps from its accompanying properties) which could provide a justification for overwhelmingly favourable treatment for humans (and unfavourable treatment for nonhumans) as opposed to other possible, and possibly some actual, nonhuman creatures. Once again, an adequate ethic and justification can­ not possibly be based on blind and unthinking species loyalty. The same 1 See, e.g., S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (eds), 4^iwcZs^ and* Morals. 4% <?y Gollancz, London, 1971; P. Singer, 4 net.) /or cy Cape, London, 1976; S.R.L. Clark, 7'Zie -Staffs <?y 4^iwaZs, Clarendon, Oxford, 1977. 2 �Meeds argument: objection applies against the simple the commonly assumed domination of human needs over all else (e.g. over all environ­ mental considerations) has, if it is to have any merit, to be based on 2 more than speciesism. We shall have to look then for some other not merely taxonomic characteristic to provide the sought justification. It will emerge however, that any such characteristic is held or may be held by nonhumans, and is not held, or potentially not held, by all items of the species human. Of course there are many characteristics which can, as a contingent matter, be used to distinguish human beings as a general class from other higher animals - although in fact with increasing knowledge of animals it is no longer clear that some of these characteristics distinguish as clearly as was assumed a priori in the past. For example, humans have a language, and a culture of a certain sort and even various logics. And, as we are accustomed to have people point out, other terrestrial animals do not conduct philosophical discussions on environmental ethics. However not only is participation in these activities potentially available to nonhuman creatures, and these characteristics possibly possessed by some, but these activities are not generally engaged in even by humans (particularly the power elite), many humans lack the requisite competence, and even among those who do qualify, such activities are carried out to a very varying extent. We run the risk, then, in applying such demanding criteria, of ruling out, of classing as deserving of "sub-human" or "sub­ person" treatment, a considerable class of human beings - items most humans would consider as worthy of better treatment than that normally accorded by humans to nonhuman animals. What is more important however is that such criteria as human language, culture, human civilization, human intentionality, or whatever, appear to provide no satisfactory for the substantially unfavourable treatment allotted those falling outside the privileged class. should there be such strong discrimination in favour of language or a higher level of creatures having a (certain sort of) intelligence and against creatures or items which do not, in favour of things with a certain sort of culture or a certain logic and against those without? Especially when some of these criteria are clearly, and As McCloskey remarked (in a letter dated 5.7.77 containing many helpful comments) 'talking about needs does little but obscure the problem, as needs, to be normatively relevant, involve reference to goods; and that merely transfers the problem'. On next page. 3 �unjustifiably,loaded in favour of human interests, achievements and abilities (cf. the cultural loading of various intelligence tests). By contrast the very many respects in which some uvimuT-s or sorts of animals are corsftierabZi/ s^pericr to /zMwars (many are noted in V.B. Droscher, T^e Mayic o/ * t^e Senses. /VeM Diseorerfes tn ^nfmat Perception, Allen, London, 1969) are rarely considered; yet some of these features would, if taken in the same serious way as some respects in which humans excell, justify a reverse chauvinism (which could be reflected as, /or example, in the Hindu treatment of cows). The only sort of justification for the discrimination that might appear convincing - that those who have the given characteristic (e.g. those that are more intelligent, or more rational, or richer) are more valuable or worth special treatment - is vitiated by the fact that were it accepted by Western ethics it would warrant similar discrimination hcfMccv humans (or persons). For how do we show that the allegedly warranted discrimination is sufficiently different from making substantial (class) distinctions between humans in terms of their level of intelli­ gence, linguistic or logical ability, or level or kind of cultural achievement - so that those with "lower" levels of these valued abilities are treated in a consistently inferior way and regarded as available for the use of the others? In short, these characteristics do not provide adequate justification for the substantially inferior treatment accorded those not having them, and so the charge of chauvinism is not escaped by producing them. A similar set of points applies against a number of other criteria traditionally or recently proposed to distinguish the privileged class. 4 Often these are propounded in terms of personhood and criteria for being a pgrscyz (the class marked out for privileged treatment being the class of persons) rather than criteria for being /zvmuTZ - in order to escape difficulties raised by young, senile, decrepit, stupid, irrational, For undoubtedly many mammals, birds and insects can communicate, some­ times in ways analogous to language, even if the honorific term 'language' is withheld (see - to select an unfavourable source - the discussion in E.O. Wilson, TZze ZVetJ SpvtTzesis, Belknap, Cambridge Mass., 1975, chapter 8 ff.). It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that the ascription of some linguistic ability, and of elementary languages, to nonhuman creatures should not be withheld; see, e.g. the details assembled in E. Linden, 4pes^ Mev Lavpvupe, Penguin, New York, 1976. (But contrast Wilson, op. cit., pp.555-59, and to set this in proper perspective, consider Wilson's discussion of ethics and aesthetics a few pages later, pp.562-65.) Many of the criteria that have been proposed are assessed, and found wanting, in Routley (a). 4 �damaged and defective humans, extraterrestrial creatures, and super animals; to avoid the merely contingent connections between being human and having requisite person-determining characteristics (such as ration­ ality or knowledge) supposed to warrant discriminatory treatment; and to defeat, though it is a pyrrhic victory, the charge of human chauvinism (or equivalents of the charge, such as anthropocentricism or speciesism). But much the same problems then arise in terms of criteria for a person, and the chauvinism problem reappears as the problem of furnish­ ing criteria which are suitably clearcut, and do separate persons from assumed nonpersons, and which would provide an adequate justification for substantially privileged treatment for persons and inferior treatment for nonpersons. Unless such a justification is forthcoming the charge of person c^unrin^sm is not escaped. Most of the criteria proposed for personhood fall down in just these sorts of ways, e.g. being autonomous, the having of projects, the producing of junk, the assessing of some of one's performances as successful or not, the awareness of oneself as an Not only does it appear that (the more worthy of) such criteria apply (or could apply) to many nonhuman animals - thus agent or initiator. animals are generally more autonomous (in main senses of the term) than humans, many animals have projects (e.g. home and nest building), and they are well aware of themselves, as opposed to rivals, as initiators of 5 projects - and that they do not apply uniformly to humans or indeed to persons in any ordinary sense; but again it is extremely difficult to see what there is in these characteristics which would warrant or justify the vast difference in treatment between the privileged and nonprivileged classes, or justify regarding the non-privileged class as something available for the of the privileged class. Similar objections can be lodged against the proposal that knowledge or the possession of knowledge, provides f/zg (or a ur^c-Lai!-) distinguishing It can hardly provide the appropriate filter, since it not only gives no sharp cut-off point, 6 but does not even always rank humans or feature. persons above nonhumans or nonpersons. Moreover, taken seriously it should lead to substantial moral differentiation between persons, a person's moral rating also fluctuating during his lifetime. In any case, For example, the shiftless intelligent person, or the primitive person, who has no projects and engages in no moral reflection, and thus offends protestant ethics, is not thereby deregisterable as a person, any more than an intelligent animal with projects can join the union. .6 on next page. 5 �why rank knowledge so highly: for (paca Socrates) knowledge is not the foundation of virtue, but is frequently turned to evil ends, and even where it is meritorious it is not the sole (or even a crucial) criterion of worth. Similar difficulties apply too to the historic criterion of along with the added problem that it is very difficult to say what it is in any clear or generally acceptable way, or to prevent it from degenerating into a simple "pro" word. If a hallmark of rationality is commitment to the consequences of what one believes and seriously says, then many humans fail the test. If, on the other hand rationality is, for example, the ability to discover and pursue courses and actions likely to achieve desired goals (direct action toward goals), ability to solve problems concerned, etc., then plainly many animals have it, and possibly to a greater extent than humans in some cases (and of certain humans in If it were the ability, e.g. to do (say propositional calculus) or to assess reasoning verbally, then the (biassed) almost all cases). criterion would be far too strong and rule out many humans. Again, why should one make such a marked discrimination on this basis? What is so meritorious about this characteristic, that it warrants such a marked distinction? Nothing (at least in the ordinary academic's view, or logicians would receive more favoured treatment). Other criteria, which yield an analytic connection between being a person and enjoying freedom or having rationality, in part beg the question. For in persons - are free. respect is it that persons - or worse, just Also the justificatory problem, as to how the claimed freedom or rationality warrants such differential treatment, remains. Characterisations of persons vary enormously, from so strong that they rule out suburban humans who are not "self-made" enterpreneurs, to so weak that they admit very /nanp animals. An (unintentional) example of the latter is the following: persons, that is, ... beings who are not only sentient but also capable of intensional autonomous action, beings that must be ascribed not only states of consciousness but also states of belief, thought and intention (A. Townsend, /iMstraZasfar 'Radical vegetarians', PAfZosopTip, 57 (1979), p.89). 6 In addition, the relation "a has at least as much knowledge as b" is only a partial ordering. For example, a dog's and a child's knowledge may be incomparable, because they know about different matters, how to do quite different sorts of things, etc. (The idea that knowledge is the key to moral discrimination, that it is what makes humans rank the way Western ethics ranks them, may be found in C.B. Daniels, TZze 6>y FZ^fcaZ Y'/ieorfgs, Philosophy in Canada Monograph, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1975.) 6 �Most rats and rabbits satisfy the conditions: they are sentient, conscious animals that have intentions (e.g. to get through some barrier such as a floor or a fence), beliefs and thoughts preferred food beyond the barrier). (e.g. that there is For his further argument Townsend shifts - without notice, but in a way that is quite typical of this scene - to stronger requirements upon being a person (such that one who does not meet them is incapacitated as a person) which rule out many humans, e.g. 'The person must recognise canons of evidence and inference warranting changes in his beliefs, and be capable of changing his beliefs 7 accordingly' (op. cit., p.90). In meeting hypothetical objections, Townsend slips in a further require­ ment of rationality, but the characterisation of person given does not include any such requirement. Subsequently, however, Townsend commits himself, without argument, to the thesis that 'a fairly high degree of rationality is prerequisite' to attributing 'intensionality' (as dis­ tinct from 'intentionality'). This is not going to help much. For, firstly, rationality is very much a notion which admits of degrees, without the relatively sharp cut-off stages required for pgrscvz as a notion of orthodox moral relevance, or possessed by the notion of to which Townsend sneaks back in his chauvinistic conclusion (p.93). Secondly, TzozJ high a degree is prerequisite for being a person? If only enough to satisfy the conditions for being a person, then the animals that are persons have it. If more, then either the initial characterisation of a person fails or the thesis breaks down. The much stronger requirements upon being a person that Townsend sub­ sequently appeals to are said to derive from S.I. Benn. But, if any­ thing they strengthen one of the stronger of several KOHegtcZvaZenf characterisations of (%afMruZ) person - none of them equivalent to - that Benn has at various times offered. While Benn's weaker characterisations appear to admit at least many "higher" animals, e.g. that of a natural person as a chooser, conscious of himself as able to make a difference to the way the world goes, by deciding to do this rather than that, having projects, therefore, of his own, whose life experience may consequently be understood, not simply as a chronicle of events, but as an enterprise, on which he puts his own construct­ ion ((a) 'The protection and limitation of privacy, Part I', LazJ <7a^r?za:Z, 52 (1978), p.605); the stronger characterisations which invoke (rather vaguely specified, and (Ziy/greuf) minimum conditions of rationality in belief and action said to imply respcHsfbiZitp on bhe part of the person for what s/he does, though they do - exclude many of the creatures admitted by weaker characterisations. For such stronger characterisations see 'Individuality, autonomy and community' in CowwL/yrZfp (ed. E. Kamenka) Edward Arnold (forthcoming) and (c) 'Freedom, autonomy and the concept of a person', c/ thg PocZefp, 76 (1976), pp.109-30. 7 �The foregoing points, taken together, support our contention that it is not possible to provide criteria which would distinguishing, in the sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have preferg ences or preferred states. For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some rather and traded tests for membership of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for the preferences of other creatures. Accordingly sk<2rp nzoraZ commonly accepted in ethics by philosophers and others alike, hgfzjggzz uZZ Tztzwuzzs Zacks a satfs/cctcr^ cokcrcrzt basfs. anZmaZ aZZ ofker The distinction, which historically rested on the assumption that humans possessed a soul (or higher reason) but that other animals, brutes, did not, appears to have been uncritically retained even after the religious beliefs or philosophical theories underpinning it have been abandoned. Given that the distinction underlying human chauvinism fails, is there anywhere satisfactory demarcations of moral relevance can be made 9 among things? Yes, several divisions of wcrcZ can be made; but of these coincides with a division into human and others. Consider, first, the question of consideration others, and the matter of which offers are to be taken into account in cases where others' interests and preferences are affected by some action. Insofar as moral consideration for others (among sentient items) is based on analogical (empathetic, and essentially inductive) principles, such as taking account of their worthwhile preferences, objectives, interests etc., There are of course further arguments for the contention, for example from the anatomical and physiological affinities of human and other animals, from their common evolutionary history, and so on. These arguments are of varying force; for example, evolutionary arguments can be arrested, temporarily, by the claim that there was a "quantum jump" in human evolutionary development which did not occur with other creatures with a previously shared evolutionary history (cf. Wilson, op. cit.). Although the divisions may be conceptually sharp enough, they are any­ thing but sharp when applied in the field to the variety of creatures and circumstances that occur. For example, preference-havers is, so far at least, sharp enough, but it is far from clear which creatures qualify, e.g. which, if any, Crustacea? For the present most of these potential decision cases are cases for cheerful indecision; but, alternatively, the divisions may be viewed - perhaps better - not as sharp boundaries, but as gradation states, as where two colours in a rainbow meet. 8 �it is difficult to see how such consideration can fail to apply to all (including nonhuman) preference-having creatures; and one does not need to apply criteria such as linguistic ability, navigational ability, intelligence, piano-playing, hunting skill, etc., to obtain a basis for such consideration (indeed one cannot). of preferences (and The of preferences revealed through choices) is however a quite sufficient basis for sort of consideration and concern. It is at this point, we suggest, that the requisite, important and non-arbitrary distinction is to be drawn which marks out the class of creatures towards which obligations may be held; that is, the usually recognised principles of consideration towards others (of the privileged class) properly extend or should be generalised to consideration for other creatures having prefer­ ences, and t/ze corresponding penerut defecsihZe odtipution principle is not to pnt others ("ot/zer pre/erence-Zzurers? into a dispre/erred state for no pood reason. Insofar as moral behaviour is based on consideration for others and not harming others, preference-having provides an adequate basis, and does appear to provide a sufficient justification for substantially different treatment for preference-having over non-preference-having items - because items without preference cannot (literally) be put into a dispreferred state. Thus preference-having appears to tie in with an important basis for moral obligation, and appears to provide a superior criterion, for a certain serf of moral consideration, to other criteria sometimes proposed such as sentience - or, differently, intelligence especially since in the absence of preferences such notions as Jzurminp something (in a way that does affect it) and damaging its interests become difficult of application (not to say nonsignificant, except in extended senses). The unsatisfactoriness of the sentience criterion for what one can hold obligations towards can be grasped from the case of the sentient machine or purely sentient creature which does not have preferen­ ces, does not care what state it is in or whether it is destroyed,etc. The sentience criterion is often converted by utilitarians into a suffer­ ing criterion, by taking pain as a paradigm of sentience: but plainly the two criteria diverge since some sentient creatures may never feel pain or suffer. Suffering is even less satisfactory than sentience; for suffering is neither necessary nor sufficient for being in a dispreferred state (consider masochists who suffer but are not in a dispreferred state, and well-treated workers who are in a dispreferred state but do not suffer). Preference-having provides a lower bound; it is a sufficient but -not necessary condition for being an object of this sort of moral 9 �consideration and concern. That it is not necessary is revealed, independently of environmental examples, by the following sorts of cases: the treatment of "human vegetables", successful stoics, and science­ fiction cases in which people are brain-washed into performing certain goals and having no dispreferred states apart from the programmed goals. In all three cases the question of dispreferences does not arise, but relevant moral issues can.^^ The necessary condition, that corresponds to preference-having as a sufficient condition, appears to be capability at some time (e.g. previously, when developed) for preference-having. It has been taken for granted that many animals (from species higher on the evolutionary scale) have preferences, make choices, and the like. This is the merest commonsense, which can be readily confirmed in a scientific way. For example, some of the preference-rankings of a black­ tail wallaby as to types of foliage to eat are readily established by observation, and it is fairly straightforward verifying that bushrats prefer cheese to soap, this preference being revealed by regular choices. It has however been claimed by some recent philosophers, for reasons apparently different from those offered by traditional philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes,H that animals do not have intentions, or at least do not have them in a full sense. It is unclear whether these intentions, which are taken to include thoughts and beliefs and, perhaps, desires, include preferences; but it is hard to see how preferences, which are intentional, are excluded if desires are included in intentions. The recent arguments to show that animals do not really have intentions, which do not bear much investigation even in such central cases as 12 belief, appear extremely feeble when applied to preference. For the arguments start from the claim that we cannot say zj/zuf it is that animals As N. Griffin, who supplied the examples, remarked a similar thing happens also in less extreme cases of the type brought in to prominence, e.g., by the women's movement: that it is possible, by means of indoctrination, to limit the range of someone's dispreferences; treatment of such persons may still remain immoral even when it does not place them outside the (artificially widened) range of their preferred states. The traditional reasons look slight also in the case of preferences and choices. It would have been claimed - the theory forces the claim - that animals' choices could not be rational. Interestingly, choices of many animals conform to behavioural criteria for rationality pro­ posed in economics. See J. Bishop, 'More thought on thought and talk', (forthcoming) and R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs to animals', paper prepared for the FeZig/ conference, University of Queensland, 1979. 10 �believe (of course very often we can, and unproblematically) and fall back on the claim that animals lack concepts of a fit sort. In the case of preferences, however, there is often no problem in saying what it is animals prefer, or in confirming the claim. Nor is it that we cannot attribute propositional-style preferences to animals; if black-tail wallabies prefer, as they do, new foliage to old then they prefer the foliage's being new over the foliage's being old. As for the concept claim, in the sense in which concept is delineated in psychology, animals have concepts. And if a philosopher's notion of "concept" gets in the way of the claim that free dogs prefer bones to carrots (or other vegetables) then it is not the claim that requires revision, but the philosopher's notion. The preference-having criteria appear to distinguish non-arbitrarily and sharply enough between higher animals and other items, and to rule out of the relevant class elementary animals, trees, rocks and also some human items, e.g. human kidneys. The criteria plainly exclude inanimate objects, and they separate animate objects. For while living creatures such as plants and elementary animals can be said in an extended sense to have and also optimal living conditions, e.g., for healthy develop­ ment, and in sense to have preferred states or environments, they do not have preferences, and cannot strictly be harmed or have their welfare affected, in that they can be put into states they disprefer. Nor do empathy and analogical considerations extend beyond preference-having creatures: for only these can care about how they are treated. At the same time the criteria indicate another important division. For in a wider sense, animate objects which do not (significantly) have preferences or make choices, are sometimes said to have 'preferred states' or 'preferred environments' (as, e.g., in 'the plant prefers a sunny frost-free location with a well drained soil'). us say that the or To avoid confusion let of animate objects and also such biological items as ecosystems can be affected in one way or another, e.g. increased, decreased, upset. For instance, the wellbeing of a coastal community and of the individual trees in it can be reduced to zero by sandmining, and it can be seriously threatened by pumping waste detergent In this broad sense too, living things, things that participate in the growth process, have interests. However under a narrower and more common determinate of the slippery term 'interests', only preference­ havers have interests (again sentient creatures do not provide the boundary). Because the term 'interests' so readily admits of high redefinition, and the infiltration of chauvinism, its use is better limited (or even avoided), in favour of other more stable terms. 11 �into the nearby ocean. There is a general obligation principle corresponding likewise to this more comprehensive class of welfare­ bearers, namely, z-zat fa jaaparjise tTze zJaHhefzzp a_f ?zatzzraZ abjaafs or sz/sfews zjft/zaz^t paad reasor. Moral coroerr does not of course end with what is in some way animate, much as the class of valuable objects is not tied to what relates suitably to central preference-havers. In suitable settings, a (virtually) dead landscape, a rare stone, a cave, can be items of moral or aesthetic concern; indeed any object of value can in principle be of such concern, and arzp abjact car., in principle at least, be ar object a/ value or disvalue, and so of morat corcerr. corcerrfry almost any sort of object. There can then be obligations Naturally only a fraction of the things that exist have especial value, and only a few of the things that exist will be things concerning which some of us have obligations. Furthermore these sorts of obligations do not in general reduce to the conditions or arrangements (e.g. contractual or joint welfare arrangements) of preference-havers or some select subclass thereof (what will sub­ sequently be called, as the argument is developed, the base c^ass). Just as there are relevant divisions beyond the class of preference­ havers, so there are within the class. Thus the suggestion that the class hazards which moral obligations (and a corresponding serf of moral concern which takes account of creatures' states) may be held is bounded by the class of preference-havers, does not of course imply that %a dfsfizzcfiazzs can be made zjffbfrz the class of preference-havers with respect to the kind of behaviour appropriate to them. For example, cazifracfzzaT- obligations - which by no means exhaust obligations - can only be held directly (as distinct from by way of a representative) with respect to a much narrower class of creatures, from which many humans are excluded. The class is also distinct from the class of persons, at least as 'person' is usually characterised. What emerges is an ann^Zar pfcfzzra of types of objects of moral relevance, some matched by types of moral obligation (described toward the end of Routley (a)), with nested zones representing respectively different sorts of objects - such as, objects of moral concern, welfare-having objects, preference-havers (and choice-makers), right-holders, obligation­ holders and responsibility-bearers, those contractually-committed-and the different sorts of obligations that can significantly apply to such objects. Not all the types of objects indicated are distinct, nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. For strictly the labels given should be expanded, as the distinctions are categorial ones, so that what matters is not whether an object is, for instance, 12 �contractually committed in some fashion but whether it is the sort of thing that can be, whether it can significantly enter into or be committed by arrangements of a contractual kind. is to Similarly function as a categorial marker, that marks out the sorts of things that can (significantly) have preferences: the assumption that preference­ havers coincide with choice-makers is based on this categorial reading. Although the annular picture is (as will become clear in §5) important for the environmental alternative to be elaborated, and in meeting object­ ions to it, the countercharge has been laid that it reintroduces chauvin­ ism through its inegalitarian distinctions. This is a mistake: not every sort of ethical distinction, certainly not a justified distinction, involves chauvinism. Chauvinism is exhibited where, for example, objects of a favoured class are treated in a preferential way to superior items of an exluded class, e.g. defective humans as against apes, degenerate French against normal Pygmies. The annular picture neither involves nor encourages such differences in treatment: it is neutral and unchauvin- istic, for the reason that it relies only on categorial distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions (see the semantical analyses of §5). It is certainly in no way species chauvinist or human chauvinist. For none of the zones of the annular picture comprises the class of humans (or its minor variant the class of persons); for this class is not of moral relevance. The reason is that the human/nonhuman distinction is not an ethically significant one, and can, and should, be demoted from its dominant, and damaging, position in ethical theory. But dropping the notion of out of ethics, is only part of the ethical change that is called for: taking due account of nonhumans is also required. In particular - to return to the theme - what is quite unacceptable, . . 14 and based on a set of distinctions which are arbitrary and unjustifiable, is the differential treatment enjoined nonpersons as distinct from persons under Western ethics, and the view that only persons or humans have any (nonderivative) right to moral consideration and concern as preference-havers and that there are obligations towards other creatures 14 According to Q. Gibson such a criticism of chauvinism is based firmly on Western ethical equality and egalitarian principles. This is simply not so: there is no reliance on such principles. The general argument takes the form; feature f cannot be what justifies the differential treatment of humans and nonhumans, because either f is not morally relevant or not all humans have f or some nonhumans have f. Neither equality nor substitutions based upon equality are invoked at any stage. Moreover Western equality principles - at least as convention­ ally formulated - are in serious doubt, especially with the rejection of human chauvinism (see further §6). 13 �only insofar as these are or reduce to obligations to persons or humans. §2. THE EXTENT OF CHAUVINISM, AND FURTHER LINES OF DEFENCE Western ethics are, then, human chauvinist in that they characterist­ ically take humans (or, to make a slight improvement, persons) to be the only items worthy of proper moral consideration, and sanction or even enjoin substantially inferior treatment for the class of non-human preference-having creatures, without - so it certainly appears - adequate justification. The prevailing nineteenth century Western attitude to wild creatures is evident from Judge Blackstone (quoted approvingly in W. Cobbett, Penguin, London, 1967, pp.431): With regard likewise to wild animals, aZZ bub by tbe o/ ZTzg Creator a right to pursue and take away any fowl or insect of the air, any fish or inhabitant of the waters, and any beast or reptile of the field: and this natural right still continues in every individual, unless where it is restrained by the civil laws of the country. And when a man has once so seized them, they become, while living his qualified property, or if dead, are absolutely his own. Prevailing Western attitudes have not shifted markedly since that time; for example, foresters, widely regarded as socially responsible, think nothing of dislodging from their homes and environment, or even destroying, communities of animals which do not directly interfere with human welfare. But there is another very important broader respect in which Western ethics are human (or person) chauvinistic, namely in the treat­ ment accorded to and attitude taken towards the broader class of natural items such as trees and forests, herbs, grasslands and swamps, soils and waterways and ecosystems. Unlike higher animals such items cannot liter­ ally be put into dispreferred states (and in fbbs obvious sense, as opposed to the wider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare, they have no interests), but they can be damaged or destroyed or have their uaZ^e eroded or impaired. The Western, chauvinistic, assumption is that this can only happen where human interests are affected. The basic assumption is that value attaches essentially only to humans or to what serves or bears on human interests, or derivatively, to items which derive from human skill, ingenuity or labour. Since natural items have no other value, there is no restriction on the way they are treated insofar as this does not interfere with others; as far as -ZsoZufgb natural things are con­ cerned anything is permissible. 14 �It is, at base, because of these chauvinistic features of Western ethics that there is a need for a new ethic and value theory (and so derivatively for a new economics, and new politics, etc.) setting out not just people's relations to preference-havers generally but also (along with many other things) people's relations to the natural environment - in Leopold's words 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' (A. Leopold, SuTzd" zlZ-muzzur? zjvt/z ot/zer essays on Conservation, New York, 1966, p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature - insofar at least as they do not affect others, as pollution and vandalism do - are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects. It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold, Fraser Darling and many others, both earlier and later, take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, then, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that merely an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct, what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations; for example, what is permissible on the prevailing ethics will be no longer permissible on the new. For as matters stand, as Leopold himself explains, humans generally do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others, and is accordingly permissible on prevailing ethics. As Leopold says: A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society (op. cit., p.245). Only recently has such behaviour begun to be seriously questioned and become the subject of criticism, e.g. by environmentalists. Under what will be accounted an erzvvroHwgutaZ. et/zvc, however, such traditionally 15 �permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. That ethics and morality are not, and never have been, restricted to human concerns, or exclusively to relations between persons, is important in rebutting objections to the very idea of an environmental ethic, based on the premiss that morality just is restricted (definitionally) to human relationships (and connected values) and is not significant beyond that. The problem of moral relations with respect to preference-havers other than persons and to inanimate items cannot be resolved or escaped simply by declaring morality to apply solely,or as a matter of meaning or defin­ ition only to humans (or to persons). For first, such a solution would run counter to the common view that humans are subject to seme moral con­ straints, even if comparatively minor ones, towards other creatures; the having of such constraints cannot be ruled out definitionally, and corres­ pondingly the judgments formulating these constraints or prohibitions cannot be ruled out as nonsignificant, yet they are surely moral. The only way in the end, that the claim gets support is by a narrow, and no longer acceptable, account of what is mcraZ in terms of concern with humans alone (cf. §6). Likewise, the question of the moral interrelations of humans with intelligent nonhuman extraterrestrial beings, even if at present hypothetical, is certainly a meaningful one, and some interesting and clearly moral issues of this sort are frequently raised in science fiction. Only if the extent of morality is, somewhat misleadingly, reconstrued in terms of the class of constraints on the behaviour of those it applies to - that is, in terms of limitations, as distinct from moral freedom does the claim that Western morality is restricted to humans (or persons) begin to gain plausibility. For it is true that beyond the favoured base class, humans or persons, few constraints are supposed to operate (and ad hoc ones at that) unless the welfare of members of the base class is adversely affected. Under an environmental ethic, such as that Leopold advocates, this would change: previously unconstrained behaviour would sense the scope of morality would be morally circumscribed, and in be extended. It is not evident, however, that a ethic, an ethic in the case at hand, is required to accommodate even radical new judgments seriously constraining traditionally approved conduct, i.e. imposing limitations on behaviour previously considered morally permissible. For one reason it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. 16 For, �notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure. They are nonetheless (pace Quineans) perfectly good objects for investigation. Furthermore, there is a tendency to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic: e.g. the Christian ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. There are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the new principles and evaluations; that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethic, and that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The possibility that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the not inflexible framework of prevailing Western ethics, may appear open because there is not a single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civiliz­ ation: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. The Western ethic is not so monolithic In particular, three important traditions in Western ethical views 15 concerning man's relation to nature have recently been mapped out: a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custod­ ian, and the cooperative position with man as perfector. the only traditions; Nor are these primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic16 Augustine view - it exists only for his sake ), whereas on an See especially (a) J. Passmore, Afurz's Duckworth, London, 1974; also R. Nash, Affzzd, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973. (All further references to Passmore's work are, unless otherwise indicated, to Passmore (a).) The dominant position has also been sketched in many other recent texts, e.g. I. McHarg, Doubleday, New York, 1969, while the lesser traditions have been appealed to in meeting criticisms of the Western ethic as involving the dominant view. The masculine particles are appropriate; 17 so is the resulting tone. �environmental ethic man is not so free to do as s/he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. (as further considered in §4) who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with a deeper environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from sub­ stantial human interference, whether of the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable but ecologically impoverished European small farm and village langscape. According to the cooperative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potential­ ities, the test of perfection being basically /ur while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Thus these positions figure among those of the shallow ecological movement (as depicted by A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement', 16 (1973), 95-100): longer term. they are typically exploitative, even if only in the Although these lesser positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, and allow for some of the modern extensions of the Western ethic that have been made, e.g. concerning the treatment of animals and criticisms of vandalism, they are not well-developed, fit poorly into the prevailing framework, and do ^<9 /ar For in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough­ going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for 17 if 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered innocuous at least as regards it actual effects. Note that the total use principle, in the usual sense, is tied to the resource view of nature (cf. (d) R. and V. Routley, T/ze /or f/ze Forests, Third Edition, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1975). Such a principle, like the requirement of economic growth, emerges directly from - it is an integral part of neoclassical economic theory. 18 �"humanized". As the important Western traditions mentioned exclude an environ­ mental ethic, it would appear, at first glance anyway, that such an ethic - not primitive, mystical or romantic - would be new alright - or at least new from a Western perspective. For, from a wider perspective, which takes due account of traditional societies (such as those of some American Indians, Australian Aboriginals, and Pygmies), there is, it will turn out, nothing so very new about what is included in (as distinct from the theoretical setting of) the "new" ethics. Even from the narrow Western perspective, the matter is not so straightforward: for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified, in particular by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this 19 physically interferes with others. " It may be that some such non-inter­ ference proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary); and that it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural 20 items would not affect others (a?2CMfnfcr/cre?Ycc cssz^npffcyz). Be this as it may, the wcdfyfeti pcsfffoz? appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environ­ ment for no satisfactory (taxable) returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Humanization, and humanitarian measures, may be a cloak for human chauvinism - in which case, far from being virtuous, they may be positively undesirable. Also, as Leopold has observed, the class of others has been progress­ ively widened, e.g. from the family group, to the tribe, to the nation or race, even to all humans including often enough future humans - but rarely further in the West until recently. 20 The assumption is not the same as its relative, Benn's principle of rzo^-i^fcrycrcuce, 'that no one may legitimately frustrate or prevent (or interfere with) a person's doing what he chooses to do, unless there is some reason for preventing him' (Benn (c), op. cit.; inset from (a), p.605). The principle is said to derive from 'the notion of a person' (e.g. (a), p.605), but it only so derives given commission of the fallacy of conversion of an A-proposition. Moreover even reduced to a 'formal principle ... locating the onus of justification' (cf.(a)), the principle is dubious, especially cyiven principles of respect for objects other than persons, with which persons may be interfering. It is, however, a formal principle that will help to keep entreprenuerial humans happy. 19 �Pggg:2/, Grczjf?? T^g S c7Mf7c?? * f-ggcwgs f/zg PrchZgw^ York, 1972) that blends with the modified position; be criticised on welfare grounds; and so on. New vandalism can usually The modified position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have, since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser trad­ itions, is adequate as an environmental ethic. chauvinism. None moves outside human They are all encompassed under the Dowz'nic?? t??gsis - the view that the earth and all its non-human contents exist or are available for human benefit or to serve human interests, and hence that humans are entitled to manipulate the world and its systems as they want, in their own interests - which is but the ecological restatement of the strong thesis of human chauvinism, according to which items outside the privil­ eged human class have no value except one as instrumental value (both theses are criticised in Routley (a)). To escape from chauvinism, and from its thesis, a new ethic 7s wanted, as we now try to show. §3. GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST WESTERN ETHICS The main argument is directed primarily against the modified dominant position, but will incidentally show the inadequacy of the lesser Western traditions. The strategy is to locate core features of Western ethics, and to reveal through examples their thoroughgoing chauvinism and class bias, and in this way to provide decisive grounds for rejecting For the general argument some more technical points have to be made them. first. (An) gf^7g is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a spgcffiu ethic, and a more generic notion, a SMpgr-gf^fg, under which specific ethics are grouped. (As usual, a wgfu-ethic is a theory about ethics, super-ethics, their features and fundamental notions.) An sz/sfgm s is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or a theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgments concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights and responsibilities, what is valued, and so forth. (On newer perceptions an ethical system will include rather less in the way of prescriptions, of duties, obligations and the like, and more as to what are matters of care and of concern and for respect.) Since an ethical system is propositional in character, such notions as consistency, coherence, independence of 20 �assumptions, and the like, apply to it without further ado. It is evident, from a consideration of competing or incompatible values and principles, that t/zgre are Z^z/iz-z-ZteZz/ wary gf/zZcuZ sz/stezns. Moreover appropriately general criteria for rationality will not reduce this class to a singleton. . Accordingly, there is logical space for aZferratire ratiaraZ etTzies. A general or lawlike proposition of a system (characterised along similar lines to a scientific law) is a pr-ZzzcZpZe; and certainly if systems Si and S2 contain different principles, they they are different systems. It will follow then that an environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined if it differs on some principles. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from each Western ethical system on some core principle or other embedded in that Western system, then these systems differ from the Western super-ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that that ethic can be sufficiently characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It would suffice then to locate a common core principle and to provide environmental counterexamples to it. It is illuminating (and necessary, so it will emerge) to attempt to do a little more than this minimum, with a view to bringing out the basic assumptions of the Western super-ethic. Two major classes of evaluative statements, commonly distinguished, are axiological statements, concerning what is good, worthwhile, valuable, best, etc., and deontological state­ ments, which concern what is obligatory, permissible, wrong, etc. Now there appear to be core principles of Western ethics on both axiological and deontic fronts, principles, for example, as to what is valuable and as to what is permissible. Naturally these principles are interconnected, because anything is permitted with respect to what has no value except insofar as it interferes with what does have value. A strong historical case can be made out for what is commonly assumed, that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the superethic. example. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core deontic principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominant position. A recent formulation of this principle runs as 21 follows (Barkley and Seckier, op. cit., p.58): 21 On next page. 21 �The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that (D) one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others {and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably}. The principle, which is built into or derivable from most traditional ethical theories, may be alternatively formulated in terms of permissib­ ility, as the principle that a pgrscu's action is <ioos not intor/ere zjit/z others, profide<i if (i.e. other people, including perhaps the A related economic principle is that free enterprise can operate agent). within similar limits. It is because of these permissibility formulations that the principle - which incorporates fundamental features of (human or person) chauvinism - is sometimes hailed as a freedom principle; for it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which degrade the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to It is worth remarking that 'harming others' in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breath, for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Mo'reover the width of the principle is so far obscure, because 'other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent - and privilege - of The principle is attributed by Barkley and Seckier to Mill, though something like it was fairly common currency in nineteenth century European thought. It appears, furthermore, that Mill would have rejected the principle on account of clause (2): thus, for example: Those interests, I contend, authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, ouZi/ in respect of those actions of each, which concern the interest of people (J.S. Mill, f-Zbgrfy Everyman's Library, Dent, London, 1910, p.74, emphasis added). The deletion of clause (2) from (D) does not affect the general argument: hence the braces. (We owe this reference and the points in the next footnote to N. Griffin.) A similarly modified form of (D) is found in much recent Western literature, even radical literature which purports to make due allow­ ance for environmental concerns. A good example of the latter is I. Illich, TcoZs /or Calder & Boyers, London, 1973, where Mill's (D) appears, in various forms, at several places (e.g. p.xii, p.41). What this indicates is that Illich's "convivial society" will not - if its principles are taken seriously - move beyond chauvinism in its treatment of animals and the natural environment; it will at best yield some form of resource conservation. 22 �the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of other persons it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to nondiscountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle untestable and com­ and it is generally assumed that it pletely unworkable in practice; applies at most to present and (some) future others, to those to whom it 22 would make a (fairly immediate) difference (thus excluding past others ). For the purposes of the general argument however, the problems in specify­ ing the class of others is not material, so long as the class includes no 23 more than persons that at some time exist. Fortunately the main argument is not very sensitive to the precise formulation of principle (D). Not only can clause (2) be deleted, and 'other' left rather unspecific, but additions can be made; then even if the main argument does not succeed, minor oarianfs a/ fba main argument zjiZ^ snccooti. An important case concerns the treatment of animals. Unless (D) is construed widely (extending 'other'), or hedged by further qualifying clauses,the basic principle fails to take proper account of concern for animals, especially that one should not inflict "unnecessary" cruelty or "impermissible" harm. animals then comes to matter; these issues can be avoided. What counts as permissible harm to and familiar conflict issues arise. But For the core principle (0), of basic chauvinism, can be modified to include (historically recent) moral concern for higher animals by adding, after 'harm others', something like 'or harm animals unnecessarily'. Then however the new principle succumbs to the Although the interests and preferences of past others are excluded in conventional utilitarianism, as in (welfare) economic theory and vot­ ing theory, these are often respected in ethical and legal settings, e.g. in wills, last wishes, etc. Similarly (as N. Griffin also point­ ed out), in the treatment of "human vegetables", past preferences of the person when capable of making decisions are often taken to be morally relevant, or even decisive, to the question as to whether to keep the body alive. If merely possible persons are included then the valuational rankings of environmental ethics, indeed of virtually any ethics, can be reflected in a "utilitarian" fashion. The argument of (c) R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', /Vaas (accepted for publication in 1974; still forthcoming?), can be used to show this. Or unless it can be made out, what seems entirely implausible, that what is wrong with torturing animals is not what it does to them but the way it affects other people (the Aquinas-Kant thesis). 23 �attitudes, and more comprehensively the associated ideologies, are of critical importance; for it is to these and Western influence that the world's main - serious and very extensive - environmental problems can be ascribed. Hypothetical situations are introduced in designing counterexamples to core principles (D) and (A). The basis of the method lies in the semantical analyses of permissibility, obligation and value statements which stretch out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some permitted situation, what is obligatory in every such situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every such situation. ' But the main point to grasp for the counterexamples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over a class of situations. Thus hypothetical cases are logically perfectly legitimate and cannot be ruled out on one pretext or another, e.g. as rare, as desert island cases, as hypothetical, The counterexamples to (D) and (A) presented depend largely on etc. designing situations different from the actual where there are either too few or too many humans or persons. But alternative special situations where interference with others is minimized or is immaterial are readily devised. (i) The example. The last man (or woman or person) surviving the collapse of the world system sets to work eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to principle (D) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly and destroying things of value (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the Characteristically Westerners have attempted to recast these value systems, sometimes misleadingly, in a religious guise - probably because it was thought that there was no non-religious way of presenting them so as to make them intelligible or have them comprehended. Thus they get represented as basically chauvinistic in view of the relations of Man and God. On these semantical analyses, which avoid all the usual problems of modal theories of axiological and deontic terms, see R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, and others, T/zefr RSSS, Australian National University, 1979, chapters 7 and 8. A sketch is given in §5 below. The situations or worlds with respect to which the interpretation is made permit of different construals; e.g. instead of permitted situ­ ations, the situations can be construed evaluatively as ideal situations. 26 �formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). The usual vandalism charge does not apply against Mr. Last Man since he does no damage to others. Moreover, Mr. Last Man's activities may be toned down to avoid any vandalism charge, yet succumb to the (extended) chauvinist charge, e.g. he may simply destroy seme environ­ mentally valuable things unnecessarily (without due reason or some need). (ii) The Zusf pecpZe example. to the last people example. The last man example can be extended We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfect­ ing the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the sheer enjoyment of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining natural forests disappear in favour of pastures or plantations,and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinction. behaved badly; of value; On an environmental ethic the last people have they have done what is impermissible and destroyed much for they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the core principles (D) and (A), and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions under more obvious construals of these principles. Indeed the main point of elaborating this extension of the last man example is because principles (D) and (A) may, as they stand, appear to conflict with stewardship, cooperation and perfection positions, as the last man example reveals. The apparent conflict between these positions and principle (D) may be definitively removed, it seems, by conjoining a further proviso to the principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people who are not vandals do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of 28 reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. 2 8 On next page. 27 �(iii) The grreat e^frgpre^gz/r example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). industrialist; The last man is an he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and even meets Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". It may be objected, however, that there is no reason or warrant for the great entrepreneur's production and it is simply wasteful. But we can easily amend the example by adding consumers who want to use the out­ put. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend (iii) to the sociefz/ example (iv): the society looks depressingly like ours except for its reproductive incapacity. (v) The example. The blue whale (reduced to a 29 mixed good on the economic picture ) is on the verge of extinction because of its qualities as a private good, as a profitable source of oil and meat. whalers; The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compen­ sate the whalers if they desist; destruction. nor need whale hunting be wilful (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man's 2 8 There are however elements in the lesser traditions - especially if 'cooperation' and 'perfection' are reconstrued in less chauvinistic and homocentric terms - which point the way to a more satisfactory ethic. 29 The example is adapted from Barkley and Seckier, op. cit., who nicely expose the orthodox economic picture. To make the example more difficult for utilitarians in the tradition of Bentham, it can be further supposed that the killing of the whalesis near instantaneous and painless, the whale products are very valuable to humans and indeed irreplaceable, and that the whales led a good life while they lived. (Would the killing of remote groups of humans under similar conditions be then so much worse?). 28 �activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism did not cease allocating whales to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would: instead the market system ground inexorably (for the tragedy-of-the-privatised-commons type reasons well-explained in Barkley and Seckier, op. cit.) along the private demand curve until the blue whale population was no longer viable. It has been objected that the operation of the free market is restrained by ethical principles - or rather legally enforced copies thereof; for example, it would be profitable to exploit child labour, but moral prohibitions, legally enforced, exclude such exploitation of children. But the case is quite different; children, unlike young animals such as vealers, are already shielded under the modified dominant position. If anything, the "objection" is a further illustration of chauvinism at work. 30 Although the vanishing species example given does not apply decisively against extended utilitarianisms, such as that of Bentham, which widen the base class to all sentient creatures, the case is easily varied so that it does: class of tropical plant species simply select one of the currently threatened with extinction. (vi) The fuufory farw example. On the farm animals of various sorts are kept under artificial, confined conditions and simply used for the market goods they deliver, e.g. eggs in the case of battery hens, milk in the case of rotor cows, veal in the case of calves. The animals are subject to whatever conditions (e.g. forced feeding, iron deficient diets, constant lighting) will deliver maximal quantities of desired goods for the human commodity market. The animals do not necessarily suffer pain (and insofar as they do in behaviourally conspicuous ways the problem can For the most part the operation of the free market is only constrained by chauvinistic principles: otherwise enterpreneurs tend to undertake whatever apparently profitable business activity they can get away with, including substantial exploitation of animals and widespread environ­ mental destruction, and their lack of concern is illustrated by such facts as that they are generally prepared to pay taxes (e.g. to compensate other humans) rather than to forgo their activities in cases such as river and lake pollution and forest removal. In fact, of course, fairly unfettered operation of the market tends to encourage more restricted chauvinisms, e.g. the exploitation of cheap foreign or female labour in the secondary labour market. 29 �be met by antibiotics), but they are imprisoned under dispreferred conditions. The threatment of the animals on the "farm" is perfectly permissible according to the core principle (or at least minor adjustments to exclude unnecessary suffering will ensure conformity), but on an environmental ethic it is not. The treatment of the animals on the farm also seems to conform to the principles of the lesser traditions, insofar as these principles are spelled out in a way that can be applied to the example, that is so long as cooperation and perfection are construed in intended chauvinistic fashion. (vii) The MiZderness example. The wilderness, though isolated and rarely visited or thought about by environmentalists, is known to contain nothing of use to humans, such as seed or drug supplies, that is not adequately replicated elsewhere. It does contain however some "low quality" forest that could supply pulpwood on a commercial basis were the local government to provide subsidies on the usual basis. The logging would destroy the wilderness in a largely irreversible way (e.g. it grows on high sand dune country or on lateritic soils) and kill many animals which live in the forest. The prevailing ethic sees nothing wrong with the destruction of such a wilderness, nor do the lesser traditions: a deeper environmental ethic does. Again the example requires variation, e.g. to a wilderness devoid of sentient individuals, if it is to counter clearly such extensions of Western ethics as those of animal liberationists. For this sort of reason we do not want to overstate or overrate the role of as distinct from variations upon such examples. examples - Firstly, people deeply committed to human chauvinism - as many, perhaps most, people are - will find some of the examples unconvincing because they depend on non- chauvinistic assumptions. Secondly, there are rejoinders to some of the examples based on the prevailing ethic. In this case what we claim is that there are variations on, and elaborations of the examples which meet such considerations. In connection with this we do not want to deny that there are other strands supplementing the prevailing ethic which are critical of some activities of the sort described in the examples, e.g. anti-vandalism principles and strictures against conspicuous consumption But, as remarked, these principles as reflected, e.g. in sumptuary laws. have not been adequately incorporated in the prevailing ethic in such a way as to meet variations on the examples or to serve environmental purposes; and if the attempt were made to fully incorporate such princi­ ples once again a new ethic would be the upshot. before the change from an ethic which sanctioned 30 (Compare the situation slavery.) �In summary,what the examples show is that core axiological and deontic assumptions of the Western super-ethic are environmentally inadequate; and accordingly Western ethics should be superseded by a more environmentally adequate ethic. The class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on such an environmental ethic than it is in the Western superethic, and the class of noninstrumentally valuable objects is correspondingly wider than it is on the Western super-ethic. But is not an environmentalist ethic going too far in implying that these people - those of the examples and respected entrepreneurs and industrialists and bureaucrats, farmers and fishermen and foresters - are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, since destructive of what is valuable, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the destruction of the forest where the people may live, or the slaughter of remaining blue whales, or the gross exploitation of experimental or factory-farm animals for private profit or as part of the latest 5 year plan. Those who organise or engage in such activities are (to a greater or lesser extent, depending on their mode of engagement) morally culpable. Models of permissible respected life styles and of the good life (for others to emulate) depend upon what the underlying ethic accounts good and evil, permissible or not, and changes with change of ethic. A new ethic is needed not merely to accommodate the evaluations, and so forth; prescriptions and models indicated, in a way decidedly different from Western ethics, but in order to cope with a much wider range of more practical, and often more controversial, cases where Western ethics yield (without epicycling, i.e. extensive resort to theory-saving strategems) unacceptable or inadequately grounded results. An alternative ethic is also needed by a growing number of valuers because they have values, interests and new concerns of ecological sorts which do not fit in with, but conflict with, central features of prevailing Western ethics. There is occurring, it seems, a far-reaching cultural, and ethical change, a change in consciousness, and in particular a change in attitudes to what is natural and the natural environment (a change which may eventually be as fundamental as, and partly overturn, the humanist changes of the Enlightenment). A new ethic is accordingly needed to reflect and formul­ ate, and enable the defence and application of, a new, increasingly fel,t, 31 �but not so far well-articulated system of values, in much the same way that a system of probability was needed and formulated to articulate and systematise likelihood and probability principles, and relevant logic systems required to capture pre-analytic views of entailment. The explication of environmental ethics is a similar theoretical concern; again, as commonly, theory lags behind the facts of change and the felt data. Furthermore, just as entailment systems are not uniquely determined, or desired or accepted by every thinker, so enoironwontuZ gt/zios will not be nnip^otp detorwZng<i, or adopted by every valuer. On the contrary, as is plain enough, their adaption and furtherance will be vigorously resisted by many vested interests, as - to take just one instance - the furtherance of programmes for the determination of environmental sources of cancer is vigorously opposed by industrial chemical companies. The matter of persuading other valuers to accept values and principles of a new ethic is of course a further and somewhat separate issue from the question of need for such an ethic. The procedures for trying to effect changes in values are but variations on the usual pro­ cedures, and like them are not fully effective: excluding coercion and education, they include, for example, argumentation, and propaganda, in each case of many sorts. 31 As usual, too, where there is a broad common 32 basis, especially in felt evaluations and emotional presentation, effecting a change, or a conversion, will generally be an easier task. In the case of transformation to environmental values, what is often important are distinctive features regarding the factual bases of many of the evaluations. correcting In particular, there is the matter of removing or /Tztsoonooptions on a broad range of matters of Some of these sorts are considered in more detail in (c) J. Passmore, 'Ecological problems and persuasion' in FpnoZZtp arid Freedom. * JntornutZonoZ and Comparattvo c/nr-Zoprz/donoo (ed. G. Dorsey), Oceana Publications, New York, 1977, pp.431-42. The apposite term 'emotional presentation' is adapted from Meinong; see especially FwotZonaZ Prosentatton (trans. M.L. Schubert-Kalsi), Northwestern University Press, 1972. The notion of emotional present­ ation can play an important role in the explanation of how emotions enter into (environmental) evaluations, the objects evaluated (canyons, mountains, giant trees) often being emotionally presented. A little more precisely, the connections are these: A value ranking (e.g. c is better, more valuable, than d) of a valuer is explained emotionally through - it does not reduce to - certain preference rankings of the valuer; and the preference rankings have in turn dual factual and emotional bases, in the same sort of way that an item may be preferred or chosen in virtue of its factual features and the valuer's emotional responses to those. The main details of such a semantical analysis of value, which is discussed in §5, are given in Routley (c). 32 �environmental concern; for example, about animals, their various behaviour, abilities, etc; about the alleged gulf between humans and other animals and the uniqueness of humans and each human; about the profitability, or desirability, or necessity, of environmentally destruct­ ive enterprises; about the inevitability of current Western social arrangements and about the history of the way these particular arrange­ ments developed. There is, moreover, the matter of sheer information, for example as to how free animals live together and what they do; about how factory and experimental animals are treated, and in the latter case for what: about the sources and effects of various forms of pollution and the reasons for it; about how natural creatures such as whales or environments such as forests are commonly dealt with, for what products, by what interests, for what ends. Naturally (given a fact/value division) none of this information is entirely conclusive support for a change in ethic; for many of the evaluations the data helps support can be included in other ethics (including sometimes modifications of prevailing ethics), while remaining evaluations can, at worst, be simply rejected (as e.g., those utilitarians who extend consideration just to sentient creatures are obliged to reject versions of the last man argument where no sentient creatures are affected). Although a new ethic is needed, for the reasons indicated, and although such an ethic can,furthermore, be a considerable asset in practical environmental argument (e.g., as to the point of trying to retain a piece of not-especially-unique near-wilderness), for many practical ecological purposes, there is no need to apply it or to fall back on it. For example, virtually the whole environmental issue of destructive forestry in Australia can be argued without invoking any unconventional ethical principles or values at all, i.e. entirely within the prevailing chauvinistic framework. wap??/ environmental disputes. The same sort of point applies to But, it by no means applies to all. A corollary is an inadequacy in the presentation of environmental problems and suggested solutions in standard (human) ecology texts Tssz^gs A. Erlich's (such as P. and FuoZ-Ctyz/, Freeman, San Francisco, 1970, to select one example), which are set erzf-freZz/ within the chauvinistic framework.^4 Also, differently, in the way that theories are in enabling one to see how to move and argue in a discussion. Quite properly given prevailing sentiments, according to some erring conservationists, who account themselves "realists". 33 �Since it is sometimes charged - despite all that has been said - that an environmental ethic does not differ in practice from that of more conventional "chauvinistic" ethics, there is point in spelling out in yet other ways how it can differ in practice: Firstly, many conventional positions, in particular social contract and sympathy theories, cannot take proper account of moral obligation to future humans (who are not in the immediate future). Since the usual attempt to argue, in terms of value and benefit to humans, that natural areas and ecosystems generally should not be destroyed or degraded depends critically on introducing possible future humans who will suffer or be worse off as a result of its destruction or degradation, it is plain that an environ­ mental ethic will differ radically from such conventional positions. That is, the usual argument depends on the reduction of value of a natural item to the interests of present and /Izf^re humans, in which reduction future humans must play a critical role if conclusions not blatantly opposed to conservation are to be reached. Hence there will usually be a very great gulf between the practical value judgements of conservation ethics and those of conventional positions which discount the (nonimmediate) future. Secondly, as we have already seen through examples, there are practical differences between an environmental ethic and conventional instrumental views which dr take account of the interests of past, present and future humans, differences which emerge sharply at the It is, however, unnecessary to hypothetical (possible world) level. turn to possible world examples to see that normally there would be very great differences in the practical valuations and behaviour of those who believe that natural items can have value and create obligations not reducible (in any way) to human interests and those who do not, as the following further examples show. We need only consider the operation of irtersioraZ- corcepfs Example 1. Mif/zizz uctz^^Z- zjerZ-d, for example, the concept of duwupe to a natural item, and the associated notion of campezzsaffrr for that damage. C. Stone, for instance, in S/za^Zd Trees #are Sfardirp? Tdp^fs /dr /Vaf^raZ. dhj^efs Thus Tabards L^pcZ (Avon Books, New York, 1975) notes the practical legal differences between taking the damage to a polluted river as affecting its intrinsic value, and taking it as just affecting human river users. In the one case one will see adequate compensation as restoring the original state of the river (rectifying the wrong to the river) and in the other as compensating those present (or future) humans who will suffer from its pollution. As Stone points out, the sum 34 �adequate to compensate the latter may well be much less than that required to restore the river to its unpolluted state, thus making it economic, and in terms of the human chauvinist theory, fair and reason­ able, to compensate those damaged and continue pollution of the river. In the first case, of course, adequate compensation or restoration for the harm done would have to consist in restoring the river to its unpolluted condition and will not just be paid to the people affected. Compare here Stone's example of compensation for injury to a Greek slave; in the instrumentalist case this will involve compensating the slave's owner for the loss of his slave's working time; in the other, where the slave is regarded as not merely an instrument for his owner, it will compensate the sZaue not the ozjyzer, for this compensation will also take account of the pain and suffering of the slave, even where this has not affected his working ability. There is a difference not only in the amount of compensation, but to zj/zow it is directed. In the case of a natural item damage may be compensated by payment to a trust set up to protect and restore it. The believer in intrinsic values may avoid making unnecessary and excessive noise in the forest, out of respect for the forest and its Example 2. nonhuman inhabitants. She will do this even when it is certain that there is no other human around to know the difference. For one to whom the forest and its inhabitants are merely another conventional utility, however, there will be no such constraint. He may avoid unnecessary noise if he thinks it will disturb other humans, but if he is certain none are about to hear him he will feel at liberty to make as much and as loud a noise as he chooses, and this will affect his behaviour. Examples like this cannot be dealt with by the introduction of future humans, since they will be unable to hear the noise in question. To claim that the making of noise in such circumstances is a matter of no importance, and therefore there is no important difference in behaviour, is of course to assess the matter through human chauvinist eyes. question-begging. From the intrinsic viewpoint it So such a claim is make a difference, and be reflected in practical behavioural difference. Example 3. Consider an aboriginal tribe which holds a particular place to be sacred, and where this sanctity and intrinsic valuableness and beauty is celebrated by a number of beautiful cave paintings. A typically "progressive" instrumentalist Western view would hold the cave (and perhaps place) to be worth preservation because of its value to the aboriginal people, and because of the artistic merit of the human arti­ facts, the cave paintings the cave contained. 35 To the "enlightened" �Westerner, if the tribe should cease to exist, and the paintings be destroyed, it would be permissible to destroy the place if this should be in what is judged to be the best interests of human kind, e.g. to get at the uranium underneath. To the aboriginal the human artifacts, the cave paintings would be irrelevant, a celebration of the value of the place, but certainly not a surrogate for it, and the obligation to the place would not die because the tribe disappeared or declined. Similarly no ordinary sum of money would be able to compensate for the loss of such a place, in the way that it might for something conceived of as a utility or convenience, as having value only because of the benefits it confers on the "users" of it. There is an enormous /gZt or difference between feeling that a place should be valued or respected for itself, for its perceived beauty and character, and feeling that it should not be defaced because it is valued by one's fellow humans, and provides pleasurable sensations or money or convenience for them. Compare too the differences between feeling that a yellow robin, say, is a fellow creature in many ways akin to oneself, and feeling that it is a nice little yellow and grey, basically clockwork, aesthetic object. These differences in emotional presentation are accompanied by or expressed by an enormous range of behavioural differences, of which the examples given represent only a very small The sort of behaviour uurrarzteti by each viewpoint and thought by it, the concept of what one is free to do, for example, will normally be very different. It is certainly no coincidence that cultures sample. holding to the intrinsic view have normally been far less destructive of nature than the dominant Western human chauvinist culture. In summary, the claim that there is no reaZ practical difference, that the intrinsic value viewpoint is empty verbalisation, does not stand up to examination. The capacity - no doubt exaggerated, but nonetheless far from negligible - of Western industrial societies to solve their ecological problems (at least to their own pathetically low standards) within a chauvinistic framework, does considerably complicate, and obstruct, an alternative more practical argument to the need for a new ethic, t/ze arpMwezzt yrcm problems, that in no other way ... [than] prepared[ness] to accept a "new ethic", as distinct even from adding one or two new moral principles to an accepted common ... can modern industrial 35 societies solve their ecological problems. On next page. 36 �Not only does the argument encounter various objections - most obviously that many of the problems can be solved, if not within Western ethics, in immediate extensions of them - but the case suggested would hardly be a satisfactory basis for the type of ethic sought. It is not so much that it would be a chauvinistic way of arriving at a supposedly nonchauvinistic ethic, for bad procedures can lead to good results; rather it is that important ecological problems, shaping environmental ethics, such as preservation of substantial tracts of wilderness and just treatment of animals, tend to be written off in industrial societies as not serious problems. But even if the argument suggested has too narrow a problem base, and so may yield too limited a change in attitudes as compared with the main theoretical argument, the argument merits fuller formulation and further investigation. The argument to need for ethical revision is as follows: (1) A satisfactory solution to environmental problems (of modern industrial societies) implies (the adoption of) an alternative (2) environmental ethic. A satisfactory solution to environmental problems is needed. Therefore, an alternative environmental ethic is needed. The argument is valid, given, what seems correct, that pimplies q implies that p is needed implies that q is needed. The second premiss is or can be made analytic, on the sense of 'satisfactory' 'satisfactory' imply 'needed'); (e.g. by having so the case is complete if the first premiss can be established (in the same sense of 'satisfactory'), and the conclusion is then plausible to at least the extent the premiss is. Al37 though the first premiss, or something like it, is widely endorsed, cogent 3 5 Passmore (c) op. cit., p.438. According to Passmore (p.431), By common consent, there are four major pollution, the exhaustion of resources, species, and overpopulation ... To solve such problems involves finding types of human conduct or of preventing having its present consequences. ecological problems: the destruction of a way either of altering that human conduct from In what follows the assumption that 'there are four major ecological problems' gets rejected. 36 Here and elsewhere, 'environmental' less interchangeably. and 'ecological' are used more or 37 Even Passmore, though previously (e.g. in (a)) highly critical of proposals for new ethics, gives qualified endorsement to an assumption of this sort ((c), p.441). ... I do not doubt, all the same, that our attitudes to nature stand badly in need of revision and that, as they stand, they form a major obstacle to the solution of ecological problems. 37 �arguments for it are few and it is no simple matter rendering the premiss plausible. Moreover rendering it plausible involves a substant­ ial detour through social theory; for the case for the premiss proceeds along these sorts of lines: (3) Unless there are (certain) major changes in socio-economic structure, environmental problems will not be satisfactorily solved. (4) The major changes in socio-economic structure involve an alternative ethic. A much stronger thesis than (3) has been argued for using systems analysis, namely that without very extensive socio-economic changes, modern industrial society will collapse; but several of the assumptions made in the analysis are doubtful or disputed. independently of that stronger thesis; But (3) has been argued for example, it will follow from the thesis (of Falk, Commoner and others) 'that the modern industrial ethic as we have known it is not sustainable on ecological grounds'. 39 In a sense, (3) is obvious; for it is present socio-economic arrangements that have produced many of the present serious environmental problems; without major changes in those arrangements most of the problems will persist or, more likely, intensify. What is not immediately evident is that the major changes called for, in satisfying (3), suffice for (4). However reflection on the specific 'types of changes required - for example at a superficial level, human population limitation, reduction of poll­ ution, more sensible resource usage, selective economic growth - reveals that significant changes in value, and also in what is considered permissible, are bound to be involved in the changes. plausible, and therewith the intended conclusion. So (4) is decidedly But the argument leaves the detailed character of the needed alternative ethic rather obscure; and it may well be that the ethic so yielded is somewhat chauvinistic in character. The more practical argument cannot entirely supplant the main theoretical argument. In sum, there are good and pressing reasons to investigate the alternatives to chauvinistic ethics, especially human chauvinism, because such chauvinistic ethics are discriminatory, because the case for them 38 39 See, in particular, D. Meadows and others, T/ze Limits fa GrgzjfZz, Potomac Associates, Washington, D.C., 1972. R.A. Falk, 'Anarchism and world order', FVozncs IX, 1978, p.66. Falk refers for the case to B.Commoner, TTze CZrsizzy Circle, Knopf, New York, 1971; R.A. Falk, PZuzzef, Random House, New York. 1971; E. Goldsmith and others /or SMrrfzJuZ, Houghton and Miflin, Boston, 1972, and Meadows of uZ-., op. cit. 38 �does not stand up to examination, and because they have been involved in the destruction of much of value and now threaten the viability of much that is valuable. §4 . ENVIRONMENTAL ALTERNATIVES : NARROWING THE CHOICE AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC The basic-and basically mistaken-doctrine of the Western super-ethic is, as we have seen, that people, humans of whatever shape or form, are the fundamental carriers or objects of value and that all other items are valuable only in an instrumental or derivative way. It is important, in­ deed mandatory in a genuine environmental ethic, to reject this view and allow natural items to have a value in their own right, iz? t/ze same /as/ziazz as CzzaZzza^Ze? peapZe, both for the reasons outlined above, of the theoret­ ical unsatisfactoriness and arbitrariness of the traditional view, and for more practical reasons, namely, to help ensure the ecological sustain­ ability of modern society, and in optimising human welfare. It has often been pointed out that 'a totally humanised world would diminish us as 40 human beings', that the traditional view of humans, or classes of humans, as dominant, and of natural items as without value except where they serve human or class interests-a view that often carries contempt for nature leads not only to the destruction of much that is of value but (paradoxic­ ally) to counterproductive results even with respect to human welfare. Thus McHarg (in attractively coloured rhetoric):- Show me a man-oriented society inwhich it is believed that reality exists only because man can perceive it, that the cosmos is a struct­ ure erected to support man on its pinnacle, that man exclusively is divine and given dominion over all things, indeed that God is made in the image of man, and I will predict the nature of its cities and their landscape. I need not look far for we have seen them-the hot­ dog stands, the neon shill, the ticky-tacky houses, dysgenic city and mined landscapes. centric man; This is the image of the anthropomorphic, anthropo­ he seeks not unity with nature but conquest (op. cit.). The rejection of this view and its replacement by a view in which natural items can be regarded as of value and as worthy of our respect for themselves and not merely for what we can get out of them or what use we 40 See e.g. the discussion at pp.116-17 of (a) J. Rodman, 'The Liberation of nature', IzzgMfrz/, 20 (1977) 83-145. All subsequent references to Rodman's work without further indication are to this article. Note well that the rejection of human chauvinism does z?ot imply that no chauvinistic arguments - or rather, arguments that are usually stated in chauvinistic form - carry weight. On the contrary, some chauvinistic arguments (e.g. those supporting wilderness retention and species preservation) carry considerable weight; and, since the prevailing industrial ethics remain chauvinistic, environmentalists would be rash not to use them. 39 �can make of them, is becoming increasingly widespread in parts of the environmental movement. It is this primarily that makes for an important ideological split in the conservation movement, between what Naess (op. cit.) called and Teep ecology, between those who see conservation as just a matter of wiser, better-controlled topper-term exploitation of the environment - something which is compatible with denying value to 42 ... everything except man ' and those who see it at least in part as involving a recognition of value for natural items independent of man, and hence as involving (at least to some extent) a Ttf^erept uttitp(7e to Mature. The first view, the long-term or erttpbteped e^ptoitatior view, which is closely tied to prevailing more enlightened economic assumptions, tends to make heavy use of the watershed term 'resource'; the problem of conserv­ ation is seen as one of 'zjfse pse of resources', a resource being something of use to humans or persons. On this view, which does not get beyond the confines of human chauvinism, and so is no direction for a satisfactory environmental ethic to take, items which have no perceivable use to man, i.e. non-resources, can be destroyed without loss; and the environmental problem is viewed as largely one of making people aware of the extent to which natural items and processes have frstr^meptut value, i.e. of how far we are dependent on them and they are of pse to us. There is no recognition either that some items might be valuable precisely because they are independent of man. Resource Conservation, or the shallow position, is the first of the 42 four ideal types that Rodman discerns in his investigation of the contemporary environmental movement. The deeper ecological position gets split under Rodman's division into three ideological positions - though Rodman prefers to put the matter in symbolic or experiential terms, in terms of forms of consciousness - namely Wilderness Preservation, Nature Moralism, and Ecological Resistance. Though the positions discerned are neither characterised in an exclusive fashion, nor exhaustive of ecological positions, and though we shall have to look beyond all the positions for a satisfactory environmental ethic, nonetheless they afford an excellent perspective on the main types of alternative positions that have been adopted by those within environmental movements. It is not uncommon to encounter attempts to write the shallow position into the very meaning or definition of copseraotiop, e.g. 'conservation is the use of resources to the greatest advantage of man', 4 Sprrep of /Ipstrotfap Forestry and tVood-Fused Ipd^strfes. Part PT. Prodpcttop Forestry Peretopmept PZup. Draft (31 October, 1974), p.ll - a blatantly chauvinistic account. On next page. 40 �According to (Wilderness) Preservation, which focusses on wilderness, wilderness is to be preserved for the wilderness experience, wilderness offers a natural cathedral, a sacred place where human beings can transcend the limitations of everyday experience and become renewed through contact with the power of creation ((b), p.49). The values discerned in wilderness and natural landscape are primarily aesthetic and quasi-religious, or mystical, 'the experience of the holy is esthetically mediated'; what is valuable remains human experiences. Thus the Wilderness Preservation position does not move outside the sphere of human chauvinism, and can no more than Resource Conservation offer a frame for an environmental ethic. conclusion: Rodman reaches a similar Resource Conservation and Wilderness Preservation appear variations on the theme of wise use, the former oriented to the [efficient] production of commodities for human consumption, the latter to providing human amenities ((b), p.50). For this reason, the Wilderness Preservation position fails even on the score of justifying the preservation of wilderness - on the very task it was designed to accomplish - in a range of circumstances. Like other See especially (b) J. Rodman, 'Theory and practice in the environmental movement: notes towards an ecology of experience', in Search /or i?? a ^orZ-d^ International Cultural Foundation, New York, 1978, pp.45-56. Some of the types are portrayed in greater detail in other Rodman papers. The remainder of this largely new section on environmental ethical alternatives is heavily indebted, in ways the references mostly make plain, to Rodman's work. His work covers a vast range of interlinked topics; only those of immediate relevance have been touched upon. But there is very much in the remainder that repays careful reading, and TnMc/z to think about and to question or reject, reaching perhaps its lowest point in the paradoxical themes: Just as our statements about other people tend also to be concealed statements about ourselves, so statements about non­ human nature tend to be concealed statements about the human condition, and movements to liberate nonhuman nature tend also to be movements to liberate the repressed potentials of human nature (p.105). In part because these themes and the related myth of microcosm are taken seriously, and not for the evident falsehoods they are, in part because the ethical adequacy of the human/nonhuman distinction is never seriously questioned (e.g. it is taken for granted, what is not the case, that rights apply to humans and are problematic beyond them), and in part because of the characteristically chauvinistic emphasis on human experience and the endeavour to bring everything within that experiential purvue, and the associated weight assigned to human symbolic, mythic and ritual activities, one is left with the feeling, at the end of all the investigations one can profitably follow Rodman through, that one has not got beyond the confines of human chauvinism. 41 �instrumentalist accounts of wilderness value, it breaks down entirely With examples like the Last Man, assuming that Mr. Last Man is never turned on by natural spendour. More alarmingly, under readily conceivable developments, it would allow the elimination of wilderness entirely. For consider the Wilderness Experience Machine, a low-impact low-tech philosophical machine, recently patented by I.M. Diabolic, which can duplicate entirely, even for groups of people, wilderness experiences, but in a downtown room. As far as the psychological experience goes, this machine can provide a complete substitute for any actual wilderness, and were the value of wilderness to reside in the experience it afforded, could entirely replace it and eliminate the alleged need for it. Most environmentalists would be (rightly) dissatisfied with, not to say appalled by, the idea that Wilderness Experience Machines could sub­ stitute for wildernesses, since they provided the same experiences. what else they wanted, the answer would of course be: Asked Wildernesses, not merely wilderness experiences. Wildernesses are valuable in their own right, over and above the experiences they can afford. 4 3 Really, that is, they consider wildernesses intrinsically valuable, but have been pushed by the prevailing ethical ethics into stating, and misrepresenting, their position in experiential terms. There is some independent evidence that the Wilderness Preservation position is frequently a disguised intrinsic value position, in the attitude taken to examples like the Last Man case, that purely hypothetical experiencers (who may vanish into counterfactuals) are good enough, and that in some real-life cases it is enough that wilderness is there to be contemplated, whether or not anyone actually takes advantage of its presence to gain experiences, or indeed whether or not it is in fact contemplated. Such examples remove the disguise and reveal the position as at bottom an intrinsic value position. In that event it is however better to avoid the disguise; for the case for wilder­ ness preservation which starts from the position that some wilderness tracts have intrinsic as well as merely instrumental value is substantially stronger than any position which assigns them merely instrumental value. Wilderness lovers and nature conservationists have in fact worked out - or concocted - a set of arguments to show why wildernesses and nature conservation are of benefit to humans, to argue for their instrumental The concept of too can vary with the operative ideology, e.g. on certain views, such as Wilderness Preservation, wilderness comprises areas that are (or provide the opportunity for use), e.g. used for experiential enrichment. By contrast, on a genuine Environ­ mental Resistance view, wilderness is a wild area, use of which is not implied: it may never be used, and it may not matter that it affords no opportunity for (human) use. (Under popular high redefinition of 'wilderness', there are of course no wildernesses remaining on the earth, and wilderness vanishes as soon as humanly experienced.) 42 �value. For example, there are various arguments from the scientific value, or usefulness, of wilderness, e.g. for the study of natural eco­ systems, for the investigation of plant history and evolution, as a repository of genetic diversity, etc. These arguments, which (like parallel arguments for species preservation) are not to be especially as regards persuasive force, can be put in nonchauvinistic form; for science and knowledge are not linked essentially with, for example, the feature of being human. Often however - e.g. where the wilderness defended has, so far as it is known, little that is very special to offer - such arguments appear to be merely a conventional front for the real (or deeper) reasons - and in seme instances, correspondingly weak and unpersuasive (as Fraser Darling has remarked, and Passmore has tried to show in (a)) - the real reasons being based on the perception of nonuseful properties of value. This is particularly marked in the case of arguments for preserving the most complex and beautiful of the world's plant communities, tropical rainforest. Such arguments as that various uninvestigated rainforest trees may at some time be found to contain useful drugs, by no means exhaust the true value of the rainforest. For it is in the intrinsic, i.e. noninstrumental, value of the rainforest that the main reason for not unduly interfering with it, e.g. not interfering in ways that threaten its stability or viability, lies. In particular, destruction of a wilderness, such as a rainforest, would significantly diminish intrinsic value, and so should (in general) be resisted. Environmentalists who are aware of these sorts of problems and dangers with resource use approaches to wilderness preservation sometimes attempt to formulate their alternative view in terms of one of the lesser traditions, most popularly in terms of the image, in which man is seen as the steward of the earth - an analogy which, as Passmore points out (in (a)), is problematic outside a religious context. For who is man steward to? If not to God, then how is the analogy to be unpacked, and what conditions must "stewardship" conform to? If "good stewardship" is management in the interests of humans, or humanity, then the position does not go beyond Resource Conservation; if it is manage4 4 ment to serve intrinsic values, or God, then good stewardship is but a cover for the recognition of intrinsic values, which are better introduced directly. Thus admitting values which are not instrumental, which do not answer back in some way to states or conditions of humans is a feature of all satisfactory deeper ecological alternatives. In order to allow for such intrinsic values and/or associated attitudes of respect, e.g. for On some interpretations; chauvinism. on others theism may serve to reinforce human 43 �nature and various natural things, it is however unnecessary to adopt a religious backdrop such as the "Good Stewardship" image suggests, or even a semi-religious framework such as a mystical or superstitious one with taboos and sacred places as symbolic and ritual elements. A theory of intrinsic value which assigns intrinsic value to wilderness and species of free animals, for good reasons, can be entirely naturalistic (in a main sense of that much-abused term). The third, somewhat amorphous, cluster of positions Rodman describes, noninstrumental, value to natural items, such as - on some versions of the position wilderness. Nature Moralisms, do just that, assign intrinsic, f/zat [An] alternative perspective ... [to] the theme of wise use 4 5 ... is provided by the tradition growing out of the humane movement, recently radicalised by animal liberationists, and sometimes generalised to embrace non-animal beings as well. In contrast to the economic ethos of Resource Conservation and the religious/ esthetic character of Wilderness Preservation, this perspective is strikingly moral in style. Its notion of human virtue is not prudence or reverence, but justice. In contrast to the caste­ bound universe of the Resource Conservationist, the Natural Moralist affirms the democratic principle that all natural entities (or, more narrowly, all forms of life) have intrinsic value, and that wild animals, plants, rivers, and whole ecosystems have a right to exist, flourish and reproduce - or at least that human beings have no right to exploit or unnecessarily harm or destroy other members of the biotic community. In contrast to the aristo­ cratic universe of Wilderness Preservation, where some places (and some forms of recreation) are holier than others and certain types of natural entities ... are traditionally more worthy of being saved than others ..., the world of the Nature Moralist is characterised by an apparent egalitarianism ((b), p.50^ my rearrangement). Each of the sweep of environmental alternatives indicated can be seen as an of conventional Western ethics: intrinsic value is extended uniformly to all animals or certain favoured features of all these, e.g. their experience, happiness, avoidance of suffering, or is extended to all living creatures or systems, or is extended to all natural items or even to objects - it may or may be distributed uniformly or equally; Human use and human experience, it might be added. 44 �rather independently, rights may be ceded to all animals, or to some or all living things, or to all things, or, alternatively and differently, right-holders' rights with respect to some or other of these classes are restricted; and similarly other deontic notions, justice, obligation, even perhaps duty, may extend to apply to larger classes of items than all humans or persons. The sweep, which is impressive, is intended to include both extended utilitarianisms, e.g. Bentham's utilitarianism as revamped by Singer according to which all sentient creatures are entitled to equal consider­ ation of interest, and extended (legal) rights doctrines, e.g. the assignment of rights or legal standing to all natural objects as suggested by, for instance, Stone.it also includes Darwin's ethic and Leopold's "land ethic". 4 7 In order to capture some of the intended examples of Nature Moralists, and all the Moral Extension positions, Rodman's characterisation requires some adjustment - which will be taken for granted in what follows. For example, Singer and other animal liberation- ists do not assign intrinsic value to all forms of life, or even to all animals; but (as Rodman is well aware) to all sentient creatures; that is, further classifications have to be taken into account. The egalitarian, or uniformity, assumptions that serve in character­ ising Natural Moralism are mistaken. Not all objects are of equal value; some are more valuable then others, while some have little or no value (and some have a negative value). Impressive though the sweep of extensions is, all the positions indicated should be rejected on one ground or another, and sometimes on several grounds. Against positions which do not extend the class of objects of moral concern and candidates for value to include all objects, variants of the counterexamples to the Western super-ethic can be directed. Consider, for instance, the positions (of usual animal liber- ationists) which extend the moral boundaries just to include sentient creatures (or e.g. preference-havers). Adapt the Last Man and Last People examples, the Wilderness example, etc., by removing all (inessential) animals from the examples, e.g. the wilderness contains no animals, in the Last People situation there are no other animals than the 46 p. singer, *??; E-ZEerafZc /VeD Random House, New York, 1975; C. Stone, op. cit. 47 at least on a straightforward reading of Leopold's eventual position: but not according to Rodman; see his contrast of Leopold with Stone, p.110. Darwin's ethic, which anticipates Leopold's, is presented in C. Darwin, Second edition, J. Murray, London, 1883. 48 On next page. 45 �last people themselves. Then the counterexamples apply as before against the liberation positions. It is unnecessary to go quite so far afield to fault such positions, at least in practice: facts of experience: as.Rodman might put it, they are countered by the ... I need only to stand in the midst of a clear-cut forest, a strip-mined hillside, a defoliated jungle, or a dammed canyon to feel uneasy with assumptions that could yield the conclusion that no human action can make any difference to the welfare of anything but sentient animals (p.89). But an advantage of the counterexamples is that the same examples, among many others (e.g. situations devoid of sentient creatures, situations where the message of experience conflicts with justice or fairness), reveals the erroneousness of the well-sponsored thesis, a simple analogue of empiricism, that all value 49 derives from experience (of experiential, or sentient, objects). A corollary is that value is not to be assessed either, in any simple way, in terms of the facts of experience. Insofar as Nature Moralism relies upon simple extensions of utilitarianisms, or of subjectivisms, to include a larger class of subjects, (a larger base class), such as all present sentient creatures, or all preference-havers at any one time, * etc., it is open not merely to adaptations of the argument against chauvinism (animal chauvinism is not that much more satisfactory than human chauvinism), but most of the Nor, on Moral Extensions, need all objects that have rights have equal rights. Rights may not be very democratically distributed. Some things have rights, e.g. as a result of agreements, of a sort others do not hold or are not capable of holding. Even rights to exist, to flourish and to reproduce (each case is different) are in much doubt where there is scarcity or conflict and where some right holders are taken to be worth much more than others. Nor are such leading examplars of Natural Moralism as Singer and Stone, though they are concerned to extend principles of justice, committed to equality of rights assumptions. Stone explicitly rejects equal distribution of rights; but the principle that all natural objects are equal in having rights, which really says no more than that they all have rights, is at best a very weak egalitarian principle. Singer offers (and presumably would offer) no equality of rights principle, rejects an equality of treatment principle, and proposes as a principle of equality a (near vacuous) principle of equal consideration of interests. Not, this time, knowledge. But amusingly "value empiricism" collapses into empiricism proper given the Socratic identification: Value (generalising Virtue) is knowledge. The only natural stopping point under value empiricism is, of course, with all creatures that have (or could have) the relevant experiences: again not with humans. 46 �standard objections to utilitarians, subjectivisms, etc. Many versions of Nature Moralism may than be defeated on rather conventional grounds. There emerges, further, a dilemma for extensions. Either the crucial notions of right and intrinsic value are extended to all sentient creatures (experience-havers), in which case the objections just lodged apply, or they are extended more sweepingly, e.g. to all natural objects. But the latter involves attributing to such items attributes they do not have, most obviously rights to such objects as stones; it also violates the conditions that have to be met for the holding of rights and for the entitlement of rights. Thus, for example, Stone considers underpinning his extension of rights, beyond sentient creatures in the ordinary sense - or of legal rights beyond recognised "legal persons" - by a postulate of 50 universal sentience or consciousness; in short, by an unacceptable metaphysics, or myth. There are several further objections which work against many versions of Natural Moralism to which Rodman draws attention: (1) Moral Extensions are 'inadequate to articulate the intention that sustains the [environmental] movement' wilderness preservation movements. (p.88), specifically wilderness and It takes but little argument to show that utilitarian ethics, such as Singer's, so far from assisting the environmental movement, can (if adopted) reinforce the case wilderness and preservation of wild species. But an extension like Stone's extension of legal rights can help, and has helped, at least in the courts where its meta-physical underpining is unlikely to be glimpsed. The basic point is however that the rights talk does not connect with, and is insensitive to, the experiential basis. Mere extensions of moral notions such as interest or right or justice are insufficient to treat and do just­ ice to the multi-dimensional depth of environmental issues, such as the damming of a river (p.115). Part of the reason is said to be that the usual moral aparatus, which was evolved in the case of certain person-to-person See Rodman's discussion, pp.92-3. But Rodman overstates his case in claiming that 'some such postulate as universal consciousness is there­ fore necessary if the notion of rights for trees is not to seem a rootless fancy'. For, as explained below, extended rights can be defined by a rather "natural extension" of the familiar notion of right, without any such postulate; and grounds of entitlement can be traced back to value of the items. Certainly extended rights sever what linkage there may have been between rights and liabilities, but with the modern separations of rights from responsibilities that linkage was already damaged or broken. 47 �relations, is inadequate for getting to grips with a new dimension of moral experience, that concerned with environment, and inadequate to reflect ecological sensibility. Rodman tries to press, however, a much stronger, and rather more dubious, theme, the SsZZ-onf thesis: By adapting the moral/legal theory of 'rights', [the movement] may sell its soul, its roots in mythic and ritual experience, to get easier judicial standing (p.88); and more savagely, the progressive extension model of ethics, while holding out the promise of transcending the homocentric perspective of modern culture, subtly fulfills and legitimates the basic project of modernity - the total conquest of nature by man (p.97, also p.119). While neither of these large claims is strictly true - soul-selling is simply avoided through adoption of the notion of extended-right, which can yield a conservative extension of the original position; and even utilitarians may be committed to blocking projects which threaten free animals - each has a substantial point. Part of the point behind the latter claim is worth developing separately:(2) Moral Extensions typically cast natural objects, notably animals, in the role of inferior humans, 'legal incompetents', imbeciles, human vegetables, and the like. They are ... degraded by our failure to respect them for having their own existence, their own character and potentialities, their own forms of excellence, their own integrity, a degradation usually reflected in our reduction of 'them to the status of instruments for our own ends', and not removed 'by "giving" them rights, by assigning them to the status of inferior human beings' (p.94). Many of us know where the treatment of natural objects as mere means The mistaken treatment of them for human ends tends to lead and has led. as inferior humans, a treatment which fails to see and 'respect the otherness of nonhuman forms of life', leads in the same direction. For given that animals, for example, are inferior, it is legitimate to treat them also as inferior; a greater value principle, which moral extensions typically endorse, yields a similar result. The needs of increasing populations of superior humans will eventually outweigh, if they do not do so already, the cases of inferior inhabitants of this finite earth for the retention of their natural habitats. 48 For their rights and their �In the larger perspective, the Moral values will be less than "ours". Extensions, with their built-in greater value assumptions, do legitimate the conquest of nature by humans. Thus too they fail seriously, on what will soon enough be quite practical grounds, as satisfactory environmental ethics. (3) The extensions, like the parent ethics which they extend, are narrowly individualistic, and insufficiently holistic. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of utilitarianisms, which in principle arrive at all assessments by some sort of calculations, e.g. summations and perhaps averaging, from an initially given unit conforming to requisite equality conditions, e.g. equal consideration, equal units of suffering. In practice of course the method is, almost invariably, to pretend that the calculations will yield results which agree with alternatively and previously arrived at, usually intuitive, often prejudiced, evaluations; that is, in practice the method is not applied except in a handwaving back-up fashion. The method is not applied in part because there are serious, well enough known, problems in applying it. The individualistic bias carried over in other moral extensions, e.g. any experiential theory, likewise limits their satisfactoriness. It is to understate the matter to say merely that 'the moral atomism that focuses on individual animals and their subjective experiences does not seem well adapted to coping with ecological systems' (p.89), 'to explore the notion of shared habitat and the notion that an organism's relationship to its natural environment may be an important part of the organism's character' ((b), p.52). A moral atomism that focuses on individuals, discounting their interrelations, is bound to result in ecological complexes that matter (such as ecosystems, wilderness, and species) getting seriously short-changed. To illustrate:- Under atomism, the value of a complex, or the rights of a complex, amount to no more than those of its individual members; but since these are, in isolation from the complex, no more valuable than other things of their order, e.g. one gentian than another, a bush rat from a Norwegian rat, there no special merit in a complex, or rights attaching to it, in virtue of its rareity or uniqueness or special features as a complex. Thus, for instance, a utilitarianism under which only individual animals count assigns, and can assign, no special value to species, and can (as remarked) be used to argue against preservation of species: Since all animals are equal - or at least all animals of the same genus are more or less equal - one can substitute for another. Fora rare species of rat to die out painlessly cannot matter while there are plenty of other rats. A rights theory is in similar difficulties so long 49 �as rights are assigned only to individuals, taken in isolation from their environmental setting (i.e. only to the usual separable individuals of philosophical theory). These problems may be avoided, in part, by assign­ ing rights to complexes (given the notion of rights will take that much further stretching; which it will not if right holders are assumed to be conscious or to be preference-havers), and by attributing independent value to complexes. But, since the value of a whole is sometimes more than the sum of the separable values of its individual members, this move involves the rejection of usual atomism, utilitarianisms in particular. The objection against the narrow individualism of the extensions - a defect they share with standard ethics which do not admit of ready extension, such as contract theories - soon broadens into an objection that these extensions are built on an inadequate metaphysics, a metaphysics of rather isolated individuals who (or which) are seriously depauperate in An ethics presupposes a metaphysics at their relations with other objects. least through its choice of base class: thus for example, usual homocen- tric formulations of utilitarianisms and contract theories suppose a base class of narrowly self-interested humans. The remedy is not (as Rodman suggests in various places in his elaboration of Ecological Resistance) to move to holism: to do so would be to accept the other half of a false dichotomy mainstream philosophical thought engenders (cf. Routley (g), this volume). It is rather to move to a metaphysics that is built on a concept­ ion of objects (which may or may not be individuals) which are rich in their interrelations and connections. In summary, the moral extensions are the wrong direction in which to seek a satisfactory environmental ethic. But the failure of Nature Moralism does not mean, as Rodman tends to assume, that all positions that are moral in style are thereby ruled out. 51 For one thing, Nature Moralism, as characterised (or generalised), is far from exhaustive of the range of prima facie viable moral positions. More satisfactory positions will simply avoid the damaging assumptions of Nature Moralism (and likewise those of inadequate ethical positions, such as contract theories or naturalism, and those linking morality to legality; For another, if the quest is for an ruled out. cf. p.103). moral notions can hardly be Even if it is assumed that the call for a 'new ethic' is 'to guide the human/nature relationship (p.95) - a somewhat unfortunate way of putting it - whereas what matters is the human/nature relationship itself, and that in coping with that relation fixation on morality or 51 His thesis of the 'limitation of the moral/legal stage of unconscious­ ness' is investigated in more detail in what follows. 50 �legality is a serious handicap, and may contribute to the problem of the relationship rather than helping solve it (pp.103-4); still part of the problem is that of indicating entitlements of agents with respect to their environment, what sort of exploitation, if any, is permissible, what the limits on conventional morality are, and discovering 'a larger normative order within which we and our species-specific moral and legal systems (p.97). have a niche' Nor, in outlining Ecological Resistance, does Rodman shrink from using - he could not avoid the effect of - axiological terms such as 'good' and deontic terms such as 'should'; he does not doubt, for example, that some of what is natural that is threatened is valuable and that threats to it should be resisted; and he admits that 'prudence, justice, and reverence may be essential parts of a[n ecologic­ ally] good life'. Ecological Resistance, which is said to be the alternative 'most faithful to the integrity of experience', exhibits indeed the negativity of resistance. The position is founded on action, resistance, and theory only emerges retrospectively (if perhaps at all). Its (insufficiently qualified) central principle is 'that diversity is natural, good and threatened by the forces of monoculture'. The struggle between these forces, diversity and monoculture - between (ecological) good and evil - occurs in several different spheres of experience, i.e. at various levels, which reflect one another. Resistance is not undertaken for self-interest or utilitarian reasons, or for moral reasons, or for religious or mystical reasons (such as preventing profanation), but because the threat to the [natural object or system] ... is perceived aZso as a threat to the self, or rather to the principle of diversity and spontaneity that is the endangered side of the basic balance that defines and sustains the very nature of things ((b), p.54). The disjunction, 'or', separates however two rather different (though combin­ able) reasons-cum-motives for resistance. The second disjunct yields the following reasons for resistance (which are linked by a metaphysical assumption connecting diversity and spontaneity with the nature of things): (i) The threat to the natural item is a threat to the principle of diversity and spontaneity. So, by the central principle, it is a threat to what is good, etc. (ii) The threat to the natural object 'is a threat to the very nature of things': (as to how consider the example of the wild river threatened by a dam, p.115). So - by an unstated, but nonetheless implied and assumed, principle, that the very nature of things is good (and natural) it is a threat to the forces of good. 51 �The first disjunct yields form: a further, different, argument; in simplest (iii) The threat to the natural object is a threat to oneself. What is a threat to oneself is bad and to be resisted, so what is a threat to the natural object is bad and has to be resisted (since what is bad should, in general, be resisted). Although the arguments are valid, the underlying principles are faulty; for instance, the diversity (and spontaneity) principle because it is too simple (and so too does not harmonize with the nature of things); and the second principle, the intrinsic merit of the very nature of the things, because not everything that is the case or is natural is meritor­ ious, e.g. genuinely natural disasters. Rodman plans to avoid obstacles to adopting nature as an absolute standard and, at the same time, to bridge the gap the principle spans, by resort to a version of naturalism which equates 'the "natural" with the "moral"' (pp.96-7). But for well- known reasons which can be supported (e.g. those telling against objective ethics of the sort such naturalism would yield), substantive evaluative assumptions cannot be removed in this fashion; though they can be suppressed, they reappear as soon as connections between empirical The trouble, characteristic of reductionism, arises from the mistaken attempt grounds and evaluative judgments based upon them are queried. to collapse a grounding, or founding, relation to an identity, to close the gap - which is not problematic but is widely thought to be problem­ atic - between value and empirical fact by a reduction of value to fact, of the thesis that evaluative features are grounded on natural features to the thesis that evaluative features are nothing but certain natural 52 features (e.g. to be good is just to have certain natural features). 52 Rodman interprets naturalistically the statement of Jonas's that he quotes approvingly (p.95): Only an ethic which is grounded in the breadth of being, not merely in the singularity or oddness of man, can have significance in the scheme of things ... an ethics no longer founded on divine authority [or upon human arete], must be founded on a principle discoverable in the nature of things ... . He interprets it in terms of 'an ontologically-grounded moral order in the "the phenomenon of life" or "the nature of things".' In this way can be avoided the reduction of 'the quest for an ethics ... to prattle about "values" taken in abstraction from the "facts" of experience'. But Jonas's statement can be construed nonnaturalistically, by taking the founding or grounding relation seriously, as connecting, but not reducing, values to empirical facts. So construed the statement does help in delineating the sort of environmental ethics sought. 52 �Such reductions commit the naturalistic and prescriptive fallacies - which can be avoided neither by thinking 'our way through or around them' (p.97), nor by holistic assimilation of morality in a 'more encompassing ethical life' (p.103 and note 66). But details of the fallacies need not detain us, since we can consider immediately Rodman's important suggestion 53 for circumnavigating them (pp.103-4). Under natural social conditions, such as are obtained in some traditional societies and in some free animal societies (as ethological studies reveal), but have been lost in modern societies, law and morality, at least in their coercive aspects, would disappear, as they did in William Morris's /row and somewhat as they would in a Kantian community of fully autonomous beings. In terms of modern physics, morality and law are not invariants but vary under transformation of axes, and in fact vanish or prove eliminable under a suitable transformations, e.g. to a natural condition. There is a similar natural condition for morality and legality, a condition in which the prohibitions now prescribed 54 by God, Conscience and the State would have operated "naturally" (i.e. from inside the organism, as a matter of course), and patterns now stated prescriptively could have been stated descriptively. When the Way is abandoned, then we get Humanity and Justice (Tac Te #18) (p.103). Even if a change of social axes could place us back on the Way, or on the way to the Way, morality is not really avoidable in our local frame where we are far from the Way. So ethical disputes over environmental matters 55 are also unavoidable; * for those a satisfactory ethic is a desideratum, and can help in bringing about a change of social axes. Thus too, the identity of the prescriptive with the descriptive, of "ought" with (suitable) "is", is a merely contingent (extensional) one and fails in 53 The suggestion helps explain not only Rodman's naturalism, but his thesis of the limitation of morality and legality; it also introduces the anarchistic social change view that suffuses much of the (very uneven) later parts of (a): the view appears therein as the elabor­ ation of what is 'unthinkable'. 54 Given prevailing socio-economic conditions it should be rather: that would (ideally) be prescribed. Let us hope, for environmental reasons, that the principles that are lived by in natural conditions bear not too great a resemblance to those now prescribed. 55 Nor is there, in the local frame, much alternative but to resort to legal strategies, where they can be applied (where standing is granted), to delay "the war against nature". 53 �alternative situations; hence, as always, there is no deduction of "ought" from "is", since deducibility would require coincidence in the alternative situations. Nor would morality - as distinct from legality, which requires some codification - strictly disappear under natural conditions, though its coercive aspects would: on the whole, as they ought to be. things would simply be, But while deontology would have a much diminished role (as it does on the preferred environmental ethic), axiology (the theory of value) would still have its place - some objects (e.g. diverse landscapes) would be more valuable than others (monocultural landscapes), some not valuable, etc. (As things stand, of course, axiology does have an important place in working out the theory of Ecological Resistance, especially in assessing its central principle of diversity.) The upshot is that without much elaboration (like that indicated below) of an axiological kind, which connects value through a grounding relation, as distinct from an identity, with the run of things (but not aZZ things) that are natural, reason (ii) for ecological resistance fails. Does reason (i), which is premissed on the central principle that diversity is good and natural and threatened by monoculture, fare any better? While it is a matter of fact that that diversity is threatened, indeed is being very rapidly reduced by the forces of monoculture, diver­ sity is not, as opponents of ecological values are wont to point out, an entirely unqualified good. Nor is diversity is always natural: a temperate rain forest can be "enriched" and rendered more diverse by interplanting of exotics (a practice foresters have applied, e.g. in New Zealand) but the result is not natural and sometimes at least bad. Or, differently, ecological diversity can often be increased by increasing edges between ecosystems, but the practice of increasing edges can easily be unnatural and far from good, as, e.g. in rainforest logging with (say) 50% canopy retention. So although a reduction of diversity is commonly bad, since the reduction reduces the quality of an ecological whole, and increase in diversity good, diversity can not be accepted as a solo principle. In fact, Rodman often couples diversity with other factors, such as naturalness (inadmissible in determining, noncircularly, what is good and natural), richness, spontaneity and integrity, which help to remove various of the counterexamples to a diversity principle. The procedure points in the direction to be pursued: replacement of the oversimple principle of diversity by a principle combining all relevant ecological factors. After all ecological sensibility - ecological resist­ ance is assumed to be the position of the person of ecological sensibility requires sensitivity to all such ecological factors. 54 Once it is determined �through consideration of a mix of ecological factors, that, or whether, a natural object is good or valuable the reasons for resistance can be restated: (iv) Where a natural object is valuable - as c/fe?? natural objects are, a natural object does not have to be very ecologically distinctive to be valuable - the threat to the natural object is a threat to what is But, other things being equal, threats to what is valuable valuable. should be resisted. So, similarly, threats to natural objects should often be resisted - and always (on whatever level) resisted where the objects are valuable and the costs of resisting are not overridingly high (to begin to spell out the ceteris paribus clause). It remains to tie in reason (iii), a key premiss of which can now take the initial form that the threat to a valuable natural object is a threat to oneself. A threat to what is valuable, to what one as a valuer values, is a threat to the valuer, to oneself, for these are one's values. To make some of those connections good again requires an excursion into axiology, one, this time, that connects what is valuable with a valuer's values. But Rodman, in trying to connect the threats to natural objects and to oneself, is forced further afield, and resorts to the myth of microcosm: 'Ecological Resistance involves a ritual affirmation of the Myth of Microcosm' universe' (OED). ((b), p.5.4), i.e'. the view of man 'as epitome of the While such an affirmation - without the ritual - would yield the requisite connection, it is a classic piece of anthropocentric- ism, quite hostile to a nonchauvinistic position, and, fortunately, inessential to genuine ecological resistance. What Rodman reaches for from the myth (which could be restated in terms of without its classic homocentric bias) is however extremely important: it is an account of the which is not a separate subject isolated from its (natural) environment (as a Humean individual is),56 but is connected intensionally and causally interrelated with that environment. Rodman introduces this metaphysics in rather old-fashioned terms: Ecological Resistance ... assumes a version of the theory of internal relations: the human personality discovers its structure through interaction with the nonhuman order. I am what I am at least partly in my relation to my natural environment, and changes in that environ­ ment affect my own identity. If I stand idly by and let it be destroyed, a part of me is destroyed or seriously deranged ((b) p. 54). Not Man Apart, in the terms of Friends of the Earth. 55 �For among my interests are its interests, part of my welfare is its 57 welfare; I am identified in part with it. The metaphysics deepens, A resister 'does not stand over against then, the reasons for resistance. "his environment" as manager, sight-seer, or do-gooder; integral part of [it]' he is an ((b), p.56). But the environmental metaphysics, that underlies and helps support the ethics, that is part of a fuller environmental theory, need not be, and should not be if it is to be coherent, as (Hegelian and) holistic as Rodman immediately goes on to suppose that it is: ... By making the principle of diversity central, Ecological Resistance can incorporate the other three perspectives as moments within the dialectic of a larger whole. Economics, morality, and an esthetic religiosity have niches in the ecology of our experience of nature, and each has its limits (p.56 continued). But a principle of diversity which opposes the forces of monoculture will not yield pluralism, unless illegitimately extrapolated to theories where its merit is much less evident, especially when some of these theories are not only mutually inconsistent but false. Rodman risks the distinctive features of Ecological Resistance for a dubious synthesis. It is only true that the positions can be combined if the first three positions are limited indeed, and then a trivial combination with each theory working where it works (which may be nowhere actual in the case of the religious component) can be managed. Moreover Ecological Resistance properly developed, will lead to economic and ethical theories which compete with the rather conventional, and environmentally defective theories of, respectively, Resource Conservation and Natural Moralism. Not only is Ecological Resistance severely handicapped by having implausible holistic theses tacked in to it (not all of which have been discussed); further, Ecological Resistance is too negative. A more positive theory - which includes a theory of value and, ultimately, for a fuller environmental position, a metaphysics - is required, not only for orientation and to meet felt needs of environmentalists already noted, but for more effective, coherent and systematic resistance. It is but a short step to the 'fully ecological sensibility [which] knows with Carl Sandburg that:' There is an eagle in me ... and the eagle flies among the Rocky Mountains of my dreams and fights among the Sierra crags of what I want ... . And I got the eagle ... from the wilderness, (p.118) The poem almost admits of neutral logical formalisation. 56 �trees, kill everything f/xe Farf/z, (ed. T.C. McLuhan, Sphere Books, London, 1973, p.15). The great care with which so many of the Indians utilized every portion of the carcass of a hunted animal was an expression, not of economic thrift, but of courtesy and respect (D. Lee, in Farf/z, p.15)- What the respect position is based on is the fact that it is possible to make use of something without treating it as something which is no more than a means to one's ends. That is, it is possible to make use of some­ thing in limited, constrained ways - with constraints which may not derive entirely from considerations of the welfare of other humans, as in the case of the Indians' use of animals - without treating it as available for any kind of use. To so use something without treating it as available for unlimited or unconstrained use for human ends is characteristic of use. In contrast non-respectful use treats the use of the item as constrained by no considerations arising from the item itself and the user's relationship to it, but as constrained only in a derivative way, by considerations of the convenience, welfare and so forth of other humans. The Western view, as the Indians realised, is the non-respect position, that the world is available for unconstrained human use. People who hold respect positions, such as the Indians, see such a position as indicative of a lack of moral sensitivity, and sometimes in even stronger terms. The conventional wisdom of Western society tends to offer a false dichotomy of use versus respectful nonuse - a false choice which comes out especially clearly again in the treatment of animals. Here the choice presented in Western thought is typically one of edf/zer use without respect or serious constraint, of using animals for example in the ways character­ istic of large-scale mass-production farming and a market economic system which are incompatible with respect, or on the other hand of not making any use of animals at all, for example, never making use of animals for food or for farming purposes. What is left out in this choice is the alternative the Indians and other non-Western people have recognised, the alternative of limited and respectful use, which enables use to be made of animals, but does not allow animals to be used in an unconstrained way or merely as a means to human ends. Such an alternative can have some applic­ ation in a Western context (for some limited examples of respectful use in the operations of a small farmer, see John Seymour, CompZtsfe Faber, London, 1976). A limited and respectful use position would condemn the infliction of unnecessary pain on animals, and also the treatment of animals as machines, as in factory farming. 84 It �would also condemn unecessary and wasteful killing and especially killing for amusement or "sport", which is incompatible with respect and assumes that animals can be used merely as a means for human ends. But it would not necessarily oppose the use of animals in the case of approp­ riate non-trivial need, e.g. for food, although here again it would insist that the ways in which use can be made are limited, and not just by considerations of effect on other humans. The limited and respectful use position avoids some of the serious problems of the no-use position of the animal liberationists, although it shares many of the same beliefs concerning the illegitimacy of factory farming and similar disrespectful methods of making use of and exploiting animals. The no-use position faces the problem that it proposes that humans should treat animals in ways which are quite different from the ways in which animals treat one another, for example, prohibiting needful use for food. Thus the no-use position seems obliged to say either that the world would be a better place without carnivores, or else that carnivorous animals themselves are inferior, immoral, moral creatures - whichever, alternative amoral or non- is taken here the bulk of animals emerge as inferior to humans, or at least vegetarian humans. It implies too that an impoverished natural order which lacked carnivores - and given what we know of ecology this would be a very highly impoverished one indeed, not to say an unworkable "natural" order - is preferable to a rich natural one with a normal proportion of carnivorous and partly carnivorous species. carnivores, Since it would imply the moral inferiority of the no-use position appears to arrive at the negation of its own starting point, (as regards e.g., the equality consideration) of all animals, human and non-human. In thus seeing humans as capable of a moral existence which most animals are not capable of, it sees man as apart from a largely amoral, (or immoral) natural world, denies community with the animal and natural world,and indirectly reinforces human chauvinism. §6. TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE EXTENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL REVISION ENSUING ON ABANDONMENT OF CHAUVINISTIC ETHICS A radical change in a theory not uncommonly forces changes elsewhere - conceptual revision which affects not only the theory itself but many neighbouring areas. The phenomenon is well-known in the case of major physical theories, but it holds as well for ethical and philosophical theories; for example, a logical theory which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way has important repercussions throughout much of the rest of philosophy, and requires modification not only of logical 85 �systems and their semantics, but also, for instance, of the usual meta­ theory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is 95 tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A thorough-going environmental ethics likewise has a substantial impact and forces many changes. The escape from human chauvinism not only involves sweeping changes in ethical principles and value theory but it induces substantial'reverberations elsewhere - both inwards, for example in metaphysics, in epistemology, and in the philosophy and method­ ology of science, and outwards (in subjects that presuppose value theory) in social theory, in politics, in economics and in law, and beyond. For human chauvinism is deeply embedded in Western culture, and affects not only the ideology and the institutions but the arts. Thus, for example, much of literature, and especially of ballet and film, is given over to a celebration of things human, of the species. Even the timely new emphasis, for instance of the counterculture, on human relations (as opposed to self- contained private individuals of social theories) remains well within the inherited chauvinistic framework. As to the changes, let us begin again with ethics. As we have begun to see, an environmental ethic can retain, though in a much amended theoretical framework (which affects meanings of terms), virtually all the standard ethical terminology. But even at a superficial syntactical level, there will be conspicuous alterations: firstly, ethical terminology will be enriched with new environmental terms, drawn in particular from ecology, somewhat as it was expanded in the late nineteenth century by terminology from evolutionary theories; and secondly, accompanying the attitudinal shifts the new ethic involves, there will be a marked shift in ethical terminology, away from the predominance of such terms as (and examples associated with) 'obligation', to such expressions as 'care', 'respect', 'consciousness'. 'duty', 'concern', 'promise', 'responsibility', 'contract', 'trust', Because the theoretical and attitudinal frame is changed, an environmental ethic forces - as we have already found with such notions as and - reexamination of, and modified analyses of, characteristic ethical notions. It requires, furthermore, reassessment of traditional and conventional analyses of such notions as natural right, ground of right, and permissib­ ility, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions - much as it requires the rejection of most of the more prominent meta-ethical gr These points are explained in detail in Routley (e); and also in L. Goddard and R. Routley, T/ze py urui Context, Vol. 1, Scottish Academic Press, 1973, chapters 3 and 4. 86 �positions. Cursory examination of recent accounts of nutMruZ wcrcZZtpj jMst-Zce and cctfc?? will help illustrate and confirm these points. Hart, for example, accepts (subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant) the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, any adult human ... capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons (H.L.A. Hart, 'Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in PcZZticuZ PbiZoscpbp, (ed. A. Quinton), Blackwell, Oxford 1967). But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the basic chauvinist principle - a variant of (D) - environmental ethics reject; since if a person has a natural right he has a right. So too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straightforward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. Another example of chauvinism at work in the very setting up of the field of discussion and problems in ethics is provided by recent accounts of .^ercZ'Ztp, where it is simply taken for granted that 'moral' distinguishe 96 among actions, policies, motives and reasons, and that what is moral refers essentially to human well-being (contentment, happiness or something of this general sort, tied with appropriate states or conditions of humans). Such criteria for what is moral are chauvinistic- ally based, assuming that what does not bear on human states or conditions cannot be a moral matter. What happens in worlds without humans, how animals fare or are treated, what is done or what happens to plants or other natural objects - none of these are directly moral matters, except insofar as they impinge on human welfare. That is human 96 Thus for instance, B. Williams, ^eruZitz/.- Xx tc Effies, Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p.79. Williams does, however, remark in his Preface (p.xiv) how 'shaky and problematic' the distinction - which he subsequently takes for granted - is. 97 see, for example, P.R. Foot, Tbecries cf FtZrZcs, Oxford University Press, London, 1967,and G.J. Warnock, Oc^tewpcrcrp McraZ PhZZcscpbp, Macmillan, London, 1967, and also The Object cf AfcrcZZty, Methuen, London, 1971. 87 �chauvinism at work, and is at the same time a reductio such criteria. ad absurdum of A different nonchauvinistic account of what is moral is required (a beginning can be made by adopting certain of the maligned formal criteria). It is evident that any account which meets even weak conditions of adequacy will serve to meet the objection that an environmental ethic is not concerned with what is moral but is really an aesthetic theory. For the objection as usually presented depends squarely on a chauvinistic restriction on morality, all the rest of value theory being classed, or dismissed, as "(mere) aesthetics". The case of morality illustrates the characteristic way in which theories - in this case chauvinistic ethics - redefine crucial notions in their own terms to suit their own ends, such as entrenchment and fortification of the theories against objections. Further corollaries of the rejection of chauvinism include the inadequacy of recent fashionable attempts, mainly derivative from Hobhouse, at characterising eguuZitp and justifying it in ways that argue from man's humanity,98 and the inadequacy of much recent, largely chauvinistic, work which takes it for granted that action and 99 rationality requirements on action are bound up with human nature. in the philosophy of The abandonment of chauvinism implies the rejection not only of much ethical analysis, but of all current major ethical positions. The bias of prevailing ethical positions, and also of economic positions, which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is especially evident. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have (at least) an ordinal p- ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p-ranking of these states in terms of individual p-rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking, The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. go And Among such unsatisfactory liberal egalitarian positions are those presented in G. Vlastos, 'Justice and equality' in JooiuZ (ed. R.B. Brandt), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962, and B.A.O. Williams, ' The idea of equality' in P^i^osoph^, Pacifies artJ Jpcietz/, Second series (ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman), Blackwell, Oxford, 1963. 99 gee, e.g. T. Nagel, TTns PossiM7-7fi/ of Oxford, 1970. 88 Clarendon Press, �even if the base class is extended to include persons or some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. To take a simple example, if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (still unfortunately the evaluation of most Australian farmers, though it lacks any requisite empirical basis). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with sperm whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if but few in the base class happened to know that sperm whales exist or cared a jot that they do, then even the most "rational economic decision­ making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. But whether the sperm whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Summed human interests, or preferences of certain private individuals, are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding upon what is environmentally desirable. Nor would such accidental bases be adequate. Moreover ways out of the problem do not bear much investigation. It cannot be assumed, for instance, that the base class is on the whole good, and hence will not enjoin reprehensible behaviour, because such an assumption seems false, would at best be contingently true (so that the theory would fail for different circumstances to which it should apply), and would involve a deep problem in the theory, since it would then seem to admit the determination of goodness - that of the base class, on the whole - independently of what the theory was set up to determine, among other things, goodness. Nor can it be assumed, without serious circularity that the optimisation is constrained by requirements of justice or fairness (see Routley (b) and §5 above). The ethical and economic theories just singled out (which are based on optimisation over select features of the base class) are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to mosf going meta- ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. That is, the argument against utilitarian-type ethical and economic theories generalises. For instance, on social contract positions, obligations are a matter of mutual agreement 89 �between individuals of a given (but again problematic) base class; on a social justice picture, rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons;while on a Kantian position, which has some vogue, obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.In each case, if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class, then that is unfortun­ ate for them: that is (rough) justice. Looking outwards from the ethics, the abandonment of chauvinism has likewise a wide set of consequences, both theoretical and practical, in One economics, politics and law, and generally in the social sciences major practical economic impact of environmental ethics is in the extent to which free enterprise can operate unimpeded or unchanged. of business and enterpreneurial activity - to But consider one option - will involve, in turn, either legal constraints, or reallocation of activity by such devices as environmental pricing, which directs activity away from environmentally undesirable pursuits. For example, if it is wrong to destroy a rare ecosystem in order to make a few more dollars, then restrictions should be imposed on business activity by one method or another. To some limited extent this is already happening in the field of pollution, but primarily because of the likely effects, direct or not too far removed, that pollution comes to have on other humans, not for a wider set of reasons, and often not for the right reasons. With a wider environ mental code, the public and legal intrusion into areas typically regarded as "private" and open to the free enterprise operations (of "open go") would be much more extensive. The same applies in the case of private 100 Thus for example, [Rawls'] original position seems to presuppose not just a neutral theory of the good, but a liberal, individualistic conception according to which the best that can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own path, provided it does not interfere with the rights of others. This view is persuasively developed in the later portions of the book, but without a sense of its controver­ sial character (T. Nagel, 'Rawls on justice', PkiZcscphicuZ 82 (1973), p.228). Nagel also effectively argues that Rawls' original position is not neutrally determined but involves substantial moral assumptions (e.g. pp.232, 233); they are mostly, as it happens, of a chauvinistic cast. 10^ While the first of Kant's maxims is not so restricted in actual form­ ulation, others are (see H.J. Paton, TPe Hutchinson, London, 1947. And, firstly, such maxims are s^pp<9se^ to be equivalent to ones formulated in terms of persons; secondly, they are supposed to be derived from features of, or connected with, people. 90 �property; for example, given that it is not permissible to erode hill­ sides then there should, in this setting, be (legal) restrictions on farmers' and foresters' activities. Although the impact on the practice of economics of a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would be drastic - market negotiations, firms' activities,-international trade, all would be affected - the impact on the underlying theories of preference and choice is comparatively less, but still far from negligible. For much of economics is squarely founded on chauvinism. The theoretical bias follows directly from the utilitarian bases of the theory, which is fairly explicit in welfare theory and rather heavily disguised in neoclassical theory. But although choice and value theory are, as characteristically presented in economics and elsewhere, damagingly chauvinistic, they do not have to be. For the theories can be reformulated in a non-chauvinistic way, as was indicated (in §5) above for utilitarianism - upon which economic theory is modelled. On such a revamped foundation an environmental economics to match the chosen environmental ethic can be built (for some preliminaries on this approach, see Routley (d), appendices 1 and 6). Several of the objections to base class theories such as utilitar­ ianism apply not merely against orthodox economic theory, but also to voting theory, to representative democratic systems of determination of political action. If, for, example, the base class consists of private individuals motivated by their own self-contained interest then such procedures can readily lead to most undesirable results, especially if these individuals compromise representative individuals. their autonomy through the election of For the more powerful of these representative individuals can be - and typically are, as their behaviour if not their protestations show - not favourably disposed to (the welfare of) things outside the base class or even to many members of the base class. Nearer the theoretical surface, especially in such branches of economics as "resource management", the chauvinism is more conspicuous. The following narrowly utilitarian assumption is quite typical: The goal of resource managers should be to communicate and act in ways that maximize human satisfaction (H.J. Campbell, 'Economic and social significance of upstream aquatic resources' in Forest Fses Oregon State University, Corcallis, 1971, p-14, also p.17). When management - where such is management becomes needed at all - the goals will be changed from such chauvinistic ones. 91 �The method of interference in "free economic enterprise", of controls and regulations, of legal and political constraints, is only one way in which leading principles of an environmental ethics can be put into effect. A quite different, and ultimately far more appealing, approach is by way of structural change, by changing the socio-economic structure in such a way that it comes to reflect on environmental ethics (by altering the frame of reference, or axes, to use the physical picture of §4, so.that major problems vanish). Requisite structural change is 102 . far-reaching, both practically and theoretically' in every reach of social science. For example, while on the position, capitalist markets are subject to further regulation, either directly imposed or by way of suitable pricing policies, in the sfrzzcfLzraZ- position, capitalist markets are eliminated; while under state regulation private property is subject to further controls,given approp­ riate structural change private property disappears. Looking inwards, an environmental ethic has an impact on the practice of many sciences other than the social sciences - what they do experimentally with natural objects (e.g. the treatment of animals in laboratory testing); how their research programmes are organised and directed (consider, e.g., projects involving irradiation or broadscale herbicide treatments of rainforests); the way classifications are made and which are made (consider, e.g. the extent to which human perception enters into classifications in botany); recommended on the basis of such sciences. and, of course, what is For as it stands human chauvinism is deeply embedded in the practice of science, directly in research and experimentation and in shaping classifications, theses and theories. Indeed the effect of a different ethic may extend even to the theory of such sciences, in particular through the bearing the ethic has 103 on metaphysics which in turn influences the foundations or such sciences. Such a new ethic would quite properly upset (as §1 should indicate) the extent to which humans are seen at the centre of things and things as accountable through them and scientific theories as 'human constructions wrestled from a hostile nature' (after Popper). It would help overthrow the pernicious chauvinistic idea that, apart from certain elementary facts, AZZes value. isf AfeyzscZzoMMor^., all necessity, all intensionality, all It should result too in the shattering of still widespread As (g) V. and R. Routley, 'Social theory, self management and environmental problems', this volume, begins to explain. Cf. R. Harre, P/zi^osop?zies of 1972; and also Routley (e). 92 Oxford University Press, �assumptions as to the nature of animals and plants, for instance that their apparently goal-directed and intensional behaviour can be explained (away) mechanistically, and the deeply-rooted idea that some sort of Cartesian metaphysical picture of natural, as distinct from spiritual or rational, objects can be maintained (cf. again §1). In metaphysics there are at least two further important classes of effects. Firstly, the orthodox views of man's relation to nature, the dominant and modified dominant and lesser traditions, have to be abandoned and new positions worked out. In this sense, a new environmental ethic implies a similarly new metaphysic redefining Man's place in nature and human/nature relationships.^^4 such a new philosophy of nature will recognise various natural objects other than humans as of independent value, so it will not be naturalistic. Nor will it view natural objects as simply available for the use, wise or otherwise, of humans. Several principles derived from the orthodox metaphysical positions will have to be abandoned and replacements worked out (as in the case of (D) in ethics). Thus superseded, for example, will be the principles of total use of natural areas for human use and of maximum long-term productivity of the earth's resources (principles criticised in their application in forestry in Routley (d)). At a deeper level, such a philosophy of nature will involve a turning away from the leading ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and of much that went with them (e.g. with the Rennaissance, the rise of commerce, bureaucracy, professionalism, formal education, and subsequently, with the Enlightenment, the rise of the modern state, capitalism and scientific enlightenment). For it means the dismissal of the chauvinistic principles of the Renaissance, with 'Man as the kernel of the Universe', a creature 'half-earthly and half—divine, his body and soul form[ing] a microcosm enabling him to understand and control Nature . ..'.^O-^ It means too removal of the humanism of the Enlightenment, the reduction of what formerly was assigned to the religious, such as ethical and political principles, to the human, a reduction which 404 Passmore has observed - inconsistently with what is claimed in his (a) - in 'Attitudes to Nature', Poz/aZ. Irzstitz^te P/ziZ-csopTzz/ lectures, volume 8, Macmillan, London, 1975. As against Passmore (a) p.3, such new ethics and metaphysics need involve no abandonment of 'the analytical, critical approach which is the glory of the West': on the contrary, they may well mean a more thoroughly critical and analytical approach than hitherto. 104 goth quotations are from ?7ze <9/ t/z<3 Pgrzaissa^cg (ed. D. Hay) Thames and Hudson, London 1967, pp.7-10, where too main movements, practical and ideological, of the Renaissance are usefully indicated. 93 �was based on the false dichotomy, which has still not lost its hold: reli.gious or humanistic. Secondly, the removal of humans from a dominant position in the natural order renders immediately suspect a range of familiar philosophical positions of a verificationistic or idealistic kind such as phenomenalism in epistemology (how can what exists depend on what is perceived by members of such a transitory and perhaps not so important species or on whether there exist <2722/ perceivers?), intuitionism in mathematics, con­ ventionalism in logical theory, the Copenhagen interpretation in micro­ physics, and subjectivisms not only in ethics but in every other philosophical sphere. True, most of these positions are defeated on the basis of other considerations anyway; but it is an immediate and further point against them that they are damagingly chauvinistic. Thus a corollary of the thoroughgoing rejection of human chauvinism, of very considerable philosophical importance, is the rejection of all 'the usual forms of idealism, i.e. all positions which accord primacy to the human subject and make the existence of a world of things or the nature of things dependent upon such subjects. A paradigmatic example is phenomenalism; other examples are Kantian idealisms, Hegelianisms and later German idealisms, Christian philosophies based on the primacy of human (and superhuman) consciousness, existentialisms; more surprising examples are empiricisms - inasmuch as all knowledge and truth is supposed to be ultimately derived from human experience - and their holistic images, dialectical materialisms and Marxisms. A satisfactory environ­ mental philosophy will be significantly different from all these positions. 94 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document HUMAN CHAUVINISM AND ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS * Richard and Vai Routley Class chauvinism has been and remains a cardinal weakness of most moral codes - including, so it will be argued, Western ethics. A most serious failure of Western ethics is its human chauvinism or anthropocentricism - a chauvinism which emerges in a refined, and apparently more reasonable, form as person chauvinism in much modern ethical theory. What is chauvinism? Class chauvinism, in the relevant sense, is differential, discriminatory and inferior treatment (by sufficiently many members of the class) for items outside the class, for which there is not justification. PLzwan chauvinism is class chauvinism where the class is humans, zzzuZe chauvinism where the class is human males, chauvinism where the class is animals, etc. It would be bud, to say the least, if Western ethics, in its various strands, were to turn out to rest on human, or person, chauvinism. For Western ethics would then have no better foundation than, and be open to the same sorts of objections as, moral codes based on other sorts of chauvinisms, e.g. on familial, national, sexual, racial or socio-economic class chauvinism - in particular it would be open to the objection that * This paper (which considerably elaborates R. Routley 'Is There a need for d ew, an environmental, ethic?', of f/ze XVfb VorZd P3 1 (1973), pp.205-10), was drafted in 1973 and read in 19 he University of Indiana, Bloomington, at Notre Dame University, an t the Conference on The Good Society held at the University of Canada. Since the main virtue of the paper has been that it h ed much interesting discussion, the original form has been retained, the authors are no longer especially happy with the form, an theses remain insufficiently developed or e the previous and continuing defended. But in order have been made, even though the criticism, no substanti paper has been raided and segments o it presented in improved form 'Against the inevitability elsewhere, especially (a) R. and V. Rou of human chauvinism', in MoruZ P/zfZosopbz/ e University Press, (edited by K. Goodpaster and K. Sayre), Notre 1978, and (b) R. and V. Routley, 'An expensiv , Choice utilitarianism', paper presented at the Colloquium on some u?zd VuZz^g, RSSS, Australian National University, 1977. sizeable additions have been made, with a view to incre intelligibility and enlarging the scope of the original draft, ing some of the many objections. 1 v' it discriminated against nonhumans in a prejudiced and unwarranted way, and would thereby stand condemned. For it is hard to see how an ethic based on simple species loyalty could have any greater claim to absolute­ ness or deserve any more respect than moral codes based on simple loyalty to national, sexual, or racial classes. Such an ethic could no more command allegiance - once the facts are brought into clear view - than other normally-deplored examples of localised class chauvinism, such as the Mafia or protection agencies or rackets or enclaves of slavery. Unfortunately prevailing Western ethics appear to be of just this sort. §1. THE WESTERN CASE FOR ITS HUMAN (OR PERSON) CHAUVINISM: THE FIRST LINES OF DEFENCE It is important, then, for defenders of the Western ideology to be able to show - i/ it can be shown - that an ethic which discriminates strongly in favour of humans, as Western ethics apparently does, is not chauvinistic. Otherwise the ethic stands condemned. Of course not every distinction in treatment qualifies as chauvinistic - the distinction in treatment may not be substantial or systematic, and there may be an adequate and explicable basis for the distinction, so that some discrimin­ ation is warranted. In order to escape the charge of human chauvinism, it has to be shown how and why the drastic and general discrimination in favour of humans sanctioned and enjoined by modern (as by historical) Western ethical systems is warranted, and that it has an adequate basis. The extent of this chauvinism, especially with respect to animals, is at last - after centuries of a priori prejudice and gross distortion of the characteristics of wild animals and wilderness - beginning to be spelt 'x out. 1 'X It is at least clear from the outset that an adequate justification cannot be provided which simply selects all and only these members of the species human (i.e. Zzcmo sup^e^s) as zoologically defined. nothing about the characteristic of There is itself (as distinct perhaps from its accompanying properties) which could provide a justification for overwhelmingly favourable treatment for humans (and unfavourable treatment for nonhumans) as opposed to other possible, and possibly some actual, nonhuman creatures. Once again, an adequate ethic and justification can­ not possibly be based on blind and unthinking species loyalty. The same 1 See, e.g., S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (eds), 4^iwcZs^ and* Morals. 4% <?y Gollancz, London, 1971; P. Singer, 4 net.) /or cy Cape, London, 1976; S.R.L. Clark, 7'Zie -Staffs <?y 4^iwaZs, Clarendon, Oxford, 1977. 2 Meeds argument: objection applies against the simple the commonly assumed domination of human needs over all else (e.g. over all environ­ mental considerations) has, if it is to have any merit, to be based on 2 more than speciesism. We shall have to look then for some other not merely taxonomic characteristic to provide the sought justification. It will emerge however, that any such characteristic is held or may be held by nonhumans, and is not held, or potentially not held, by all items of the species human. Of course there are many characteristics which can, as a contingent matter, be used to distinguish human beings as a general class from other higher animals - although in fact with increasing knowledge of animals it is no longer clear that some of these characteristics distinguish as clearly as was assumed a priori in the past. For example, humans have a language, and a culture of a certain sort and even various logics. And, as we are accustomed to have people point out, other terrestrial animals do not conduct philosophical discussions on environmental ethics. However not only is participation in these activities potentially available to nonhuman creatures, and these characteristics possibly possessed by some, but these activities are not generally engaged in even by humans (particularly the power elite), many humans lack the requisite competence, and even among those who do qualify, such activities are carried out to a very varying extent. We run the risk, then, in applying such demanding criteria, of ruling out, of classing as deserving of "sub-human" or "sub­ person" treatment, a considerable class of human beings - items most humans would consider as worthy of better treatment than that normally accorded by humans to nonhuman animals. What is more important however is that such criteria as human language, culture, human civilization, human intentionality, or whatever, appear to provide no satisfactory for the substantially unfavourable treatment allotted those falling outside the privileged class. should there be such strong discrimination in favour of language or a higher level of creatures having a (certain sort of) intelligence and against creatures or items which do not, in favour of things with a certain sort of culture or a certain logic and against those without? Especially when some of these criteria are clearly, and As McCloskey remarked (in a letter dated 5.7.77 containing many helpful comments) 'talking about needs does little but obscure the problem, as needs, to be normatively relevant, involve reference to goods; and that merely transfers the problem'. On next page. 3 unjustifiably,loaded in favour of human interests, achievements and abilities (cf. the cultural loading of various intelligence tests). By contrast the very many respects in which some uvimuT-s or sorts of animals are corsftierabZi/ s^pericr to /zMwars (many are noted in V.B. Droscher, T^e Mayic o/ * t^e Senses. /VeM Diseorerfes tn ^nfmat Perception, Allen, London, 1969) are rarely considered; yet some of these features would, if taken in the same serious way as some respects in which humans excell, justify a reverse chauvinism (which could be reflected as, /or example, in the Hindu treatment of cows). The only sort of justification for the discrimination that might appear convincing - that those who have the given characteristic (e.g. those that are more intelligent, or more rational, or richer) are more valuable or worth special treatment - is vitiated by the fact that were it accepted by Western ethics it would warrant similar discrimination hcfMccv humans (or persons). For how do we show that the allegedly warranted discrimination is sufficiently different from making substantial (class) distinctions between humans in terms of their level of intelli­ gence, linguistic or logical ability, or level or kind of cultural achievement - so that those with "lower" levels of these valued abilities are treated in a consistently inferior way and regarded as available for the use of the others? In short, these characteristics do not provide adequate justification for the substantially inferior treatment accorded those not having them, and so the charge of chauvinism is not escaped by producing them. A similar set of points applies against a number of other criteria traditionally or recently proposed to distinguish the privileged class. 4 Often these are propounded in terms of personhood and criteria for being a pgrscyz (the class marked out for privileged treatment being the class of persons) rather than criteria for being /zvmuTZ - in order to escape difficulties raised by young, senile, decrepit, stupid, irrational, For undoubtedly many mammals, birds and insects can communicate, some­ times in ways analogous to language, even if the honorific term 'language' is withheld (see - to select an unfavourable source - the discussion in E.O. Wilson, TZze ZVetJ SpvtTzesis, Belknap, Cambridge Mass., 1975, chapter 8 ff.). It is becoming increasingly evident, however, that the ascription of some linguistic ability, and of elementary languages, to nonhuman creatures should not be withheld; see, e.g. the details assembled in E. Linden, 4pes^ Mev Lavpvupe, Penguin, New York, 1976. (But contrast Wilson, op. cit., pp.555-59, and to set this in proper perspective, consider Wilson's discussion of ethics and aesthetics a few pages later, pp.562-65.) Many of the criteria that have been proposed are assessed, and found wanting, in Routley (a). 4 damaged and defective humans, extraterrestrial creatures, and super animals; to avoid the merely contingent connections between being human and having requisite person-determining characteristics (such as ration­ ality or knowledge) supposed to warrant discriminatory treatment; and to defeat, though it is a pyrrhic victory, the charge of human chauvinism (or equivalents of the charge, such as anthropocentricism or speciesism). But much the same problems then arise in terms of criteria for a person, and the chauvinism problem reappears as the problem of furnish­ ing criteria which are suitably clearcut, and do separate persons from assumed nonpersons, and which would provide an adequate justification for substantially privileged treatment for persons and inferior treatment for nonpersons. Unless such a justification is forthcoming the charge of person c^unrin^sm is not escaped. Most of the criteria proposed for personhood fall down in just these sorts of ways, e.g. being autonomous, the having of projects, the producing of junk, the assessing of some of one's performances as successful or not, the awareness of oneself as an Not only does it appear that (the more worthy of) such criteria apply (or could apply) to many nonhuman animals - thus agent or initiator. animals are generally more autonomous (in main senses of the term) than humans, many animals have projects (e.g. home and nest building), and they are well aware of themselves, as opposed to rivals, as initiators of 5 projects - and that they do not apply uniformly to humans or indeed to persons in any ordinary sense; but again it is extremely difficult to see what there is in these characteristics which would warrant or justify the vast difference in treatment between the privileged and nonprivileged classes, or justify regarding the non-privileged class as something available for the of the privileged class. Similar objections can be lodged against the proposal that knowledge or the possession of knowledge, provides f/zg (or a ur^c-Lai!-) distinguishing It can hardly provide the appropriate filter, since it not only gives no sharp cut-off point, 6 but does not even always rank humans or feature. persons above nonhumans or nonpersons. Moreover, taken seriously it should lead to substantial moral differentiation between persons, a person's moral rating also fluctuating during his lifetime. In any case, For example, the shiftless intelligent person, or the primitive person, who has no projects and engages in no moral reflection, and thus offends protestant ethics, is not thereby deregisterable as a person, any more than an intelligent animal with projects can join the union. .6 on next page. 5 why rank knowledge so highly: for (paca Socrates) knowledge is not the foundation of virtue, but is frequently turned to evil ends, and even where it is meritorious it is not the sole (or even a crucial) criterion of worth. Similar difficulties apply too to the historic criterion of along with the added problem that it is very difficult to say what it is in any clear or generally acceptable way, or to prevent it from degenerating into a simple "pro" word. If a hallmark of rationality is commitment to the consequences of what one believes and seriously says, then many humans fail the test. If, on the other hand rationality is, for example, the ability to discover and pursue courses and actions likely to achieve desired goals (direct action toward goals), ability to solve problems concerned, etc., then plainly many animals have it, and possibly to a greater extent than humans in some cases (and of certain humans in If it were the ability, e.g. to do (say propositional calculus) or to assess reasoning verbally, then the (biassed) almost all cases). criterion would be far too strong and rule out many humans. Again, why should one make such a marked discrimination on this basis? What is so meritorious about this characteristic, that it warrants such a marked distinction? Nothing (at least in the ordinary academic's view, or logicians would receive more favoured treatment). Other criteria, which yield an analytic connection between being a person and enjoying freedom or having rationality, in part beg the question. For in persons - are free. respect is it that persons - or worse, just Also the justificatory problem, as to how the claimed freedom or rationality warrants such differential treatment, remains. Characterisations of persons vary enormously, from so strong that they rule out suburban humans who are not "self-made" enterpreneurs, to so weak that they admit very /nanp animals. An (unintentional) example of the latter is the following: persons, that is, ... beings who are not only sentient but also capable of intensional autonomous action, beings that must be ascribed not only states of consciousness but also states of belief, thought and intention (A. Townsend, /iMstraZasfar 'Radical vegetarians', PAfZosopTip, 57 (1979), p.89). 6 In addition, the relation "a has at least as much knowledge as b" is only a partial ordering. For example, a dog's and a child's knowledge may be incomparable, because they know about different matters, how to do quite different sorts of things, etc. (The idea that knowledge is the key to moral discrimination, that it is what makes humans rank the way Western ethics ranks them, may be found in C.B. Daniels, TZze 6>y FZ^fcaZ Y'/ieorfgs, Philosophy in Canada Monograph, Halifax, Nova Scotia, 1975.) 6 Most rats and rabbits satisfy the conditions: they are sentient, conscious animals that have intentions (e.g. to get through some barrier such as a floor or a fence), beliefs and thoughts preferred food beyond the barrier). (e.g. that there is For his further argument Townsend shifts - without notice, but in a way that is quite typical of this scene - to stronger requirements upon being a person (such that one who does not meet them is incapacitated as a person) which rule out many humans, e.g. 'The person must recognise canons of evidence and inference warranting changes in his beliefs, and be capable of changing his beliefs 7 accordingly' (op. cit., p.90). In meeting hypothetical objections, Townsend slips in a further require­ ment of rationality, but the characterisation of person given does not include any such requirement. Subsequently, however, Townsend commits himself, without argument, to the thesis that 'a fairly high degree of rationality is prerequisite' to attributing 'intensionality' (as dis­ tinct from 'intentionality'). This is not going to help much. For, firstly, rationality is very much a notion which admits of degrees, without the relatively sharp cut-off stages required for pgrscvz as a notion of orthodox moral relevance, or possessed by the notion of to which Townsend sneaks back in his chauvinistic conclusion (p.93). Secondly, TzozJ high a degree is prerequisite for being a person? If only enough to satisfy the conditions for being a person, then the animals that are persons have it. If more, then either the initial characterisation of a person fails or the thesis breaks down. The much stronger requirements upon being a person that Townsend sub­ sequently appeals to are said to derive from S.I. Benn. But, if any­ thing they strengthen one of the stronger of several KOHegtcZvaZenf characterisations of (%afMruZ) person - none of them equivalent to - that Benn has at various times offered. While Benn's weaker characterisations appear to admit at least many "higher" animals, e.g. that of a natural person as a chooser, conscious of himself as able to make a difference to the way the world goes, by deciding to do this rather than that, having projects, therefore, of his own, whose life experience may consequently be understood, not simply as a chronicle of events, but as an enterprise, on which he puts his own construct­ ion ((a) 'The protection and limitation of privacy, Part I', LazJ <7a^r?za:Z, 52 (1978), p.605); the stronger characterisations which invoke (rather vaguely specified, and (Ziy/greuf) minimum conditions of rationality in belief and action said to imply respcHsfbiZitp on bhe part of the person for what s/he does, though they do - exclude many of the creatures admitted by weaker characterisations. For such stronger characterisations see 'Individuality, autonomy and community' in CowwL/yrZfp (ed. E. Kamenka) Edward Arnold (forthcoming) and (c) 'Freedom, autonomy and the concept of a person', c/ thg PocZefp, 76 (1976), pp.109-30. 7 The foregoing points, taken together, support our contention that it is not possible to provide criteria which would distinguishing, in the sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have preferg ences or preferred states. For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some rather and traded tests for membership of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for the preferences of other creatures. Accordingly sk<2rp nzoraZ commonly accepted in ethics by philosophers and others alike, hgfzjggzz uZZ Tztzwuzzs Zacks a satfs/cctcr^ cokcrcrzt basfs. anZmaZ aZZ ofker The distinction, which historically rested on the assumption that humans possessed a soul (or higher reason) but that other animals, brutes, did not, appears to have been uncritically retained even after the religious beliefs or philosophical theories underpinning it have been abandoned. Given that the distinction underlying human chauvinism fails, is there anywhere satisfactory demarcations of moral relevance can be made 9 among things? Yes, several divisions of wcrcZ can be made; but of these coincides with a division into human and others. Consider, first, the question of consideration others, and the matter of which offers are to be taken into account in cases where others' interests and preferences are affected by some action. Insofar as moral consideration for others (among sentient items) is based on analogical (empathetic, and essentially inductive) principles, such as taking account of their worthwhile preferences, objectives, interests etc., There are of course further arguments for the contention, for example from the anatomical and physiological affinities of human and other animals, from their common evolutionary history, and so on. These arguments are of varying force; for example, evolutionary arguments can be arrested, temporarily, by the claim that there was a "quantum jump" in human evolutionary development which did not occur with other creatures with a previously shared evolutionary history (cf. Wilson, op. cit.). Although the divisions may be conceptually sharp enough, they are any­ thing but sharp when applied in the field to the variety of creatures and circumstances that occur. For example, preference-havers is, so far at least, sharp enough, but it is far from clear which creatures qualify, e.g. which, if any, Crustacea? For the present most of these potential decision cases are cases for cheerful indecision; but, alternatively, the divisions may be viewed - perhaps better - not as sharp boundaries, but as gradation states, as where two colours in a rainbow meet. 8 it is difficult to see how such consideration can fail to apply to all (including nonhuman) preference-having creatures; and one does not need to apply criteria such as linguistic ability, navigational ability, intelligence, piano-playing, hunting skill, etc., to obtain a basis for such consideration (indeed one cannot). of preferences (and The of preferences revealed through choices) is however a quite sufficient basis for sort of consideration and concern. It is at this point, we suggest, that the requisite, important and non-arbitrary distinction is to be drawn which marks out the class of creatures towards which obligations may be held; that is, the usually recognised principles of consideration towards others (of the privileged class) properly extend or should be generalised to consideration for other creatures having prefer­ ences, and t/ze corresponding penerut defecsihZe odtipution principle is not to pnt others ("ot/zer pre/erence-Zzurers? into a dispre/erred state for no pood reason. Insofar as moral behaviour is based on consideration for others and not harming others, preference-having provides an adequate basis, and does appear to provide a sufficient justification for substantially different treatment for preference-having over non-preference-having items - because items without preference cannot (literally) be put into a dispreferred state. Thus preference-having appears to tie in with an important basis for moral obligation, and appears to provide a superior criterion, for a certain serf of moral consideration, to other criteria sometimes proposed such as sentience - or, differently, intelligence especially since in the absence of preferences such notions as Jzurminp something (in a way that does affect it) and damaging its interests become difficult of application (not to say nonsignificant, except in extended senses). The unsatisfactoriness of the sentience criterion for what one can hold obligations towards can be grasped from the case of the sentient machine or purely sentient creature which does not have preferen­ ces, does not care what state it is in or whether it is destroyed,etc. The sentience criterion is often converted by utilitarians into a suffer­ ing criterion, by taking pain as a paradigm of sentience: but plainly the two criteria diverge since some sentient creatures may never feel pain or suffer. Suffering is even less satisfactory than sentience; for suffering is neither necessary nor sufficient for being in a dispreferred state (consider masochists who suffer but are not in a dispreferred state, and well-treated workers who are in a dispreferred state but do not suffer). Preference-having provides a lower bound; it is a sufficient but -not necessary condition for being an object of this sort of moral 9 consideration and concern. That it is not necessary is revealed, independently of environmental examples, by the following sorts of cases: the treatment of "human vegetables", successful stoics, and science­ fiction cases in which people are brain-washed into performing certain goals and having no dispreferred states apart from the programmed goals. In all three cases the question of dispreferences does not arise, but relevant moral issues can.^^ The necessary condition, that corresponds to preference-having as a sufficient condition, appears to be capability at some time (e.g. previously, when developed) for preference-having. It has been taken for granted that many animals (from species higher on the evolutionary scale) have preferences, make choices, and the like. This is the merest commonsense, which can be readily confirmed in a scientific way. For example, some of the preference-rankings of a black­ tail wallaby as to types of foliage to eat are readily established by observation, and it is fairly straightforward verifying that bushrats prefer cheese to soap, this preference being revealed by regular choices. It has however been claimed by some recent philosophers, for reasons apparently different from those offered by traditional philosophers such as Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes,H that animals do not have intentions, or at least do not have them in a full sense. It is unclear whether these intentions, which are taken to include thoughts and beliefs and, perhaps, desires, include preferences; but it is hard to see how preferences, which are intentional, are excluded if desires are included in intentions. The recent arguments to show that animals do not really have intentions, which do not bear much investigation even in such central cases as 12 belief, appear extremely feeble when applied to preference. For the arguments start from the claim that we cannot say zj/zuf it is that animals As N. Griffin, who supplied the examples, remarked a similar thing happens also in less extreme cases of the type brought in to prominence, e.g., by the women's movement: that it is possible, by means of indoctrination, to limit the range of someone's dispreferences; treatment of such persons may still remain immoral even when it does not place them outside the (artificially widened) range of their preferred states. The traditional reasons look slight also in the case of preferences and choices. It would have been claimed - the theory forces the claim - that animals' choices could not be rational. Interestingly, choices of many animals conform to behavioural criteria for rationality pro­ posed in economics. See J. Bishop, 'More thought on thought and talk', (forthcoming) and R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs to animals', paper prepared for the FeZig/ conference, University of Queensland, 1979. 10 believe (of course very often we can, and unproblematically) and fall back on the claim that animals lack concepts of a fit sort. In the case of preferences, however, there is often no problem in saying what it is animals prefer, or in confirming the claim. Nor is it that we cannot attribute propositional-style preferences to animals; if black-tail wallabies prefer, as they do, new foliage to old then they prefer the foliage's being new over the foliage's being old. As for the concept claim, in the sense in which concept is delineated in psychology, animals have concepts. And if a philosopher's notion of "concept" gets in the way of the claim that free dogs prefer bones to carrots (or other vegetables) then it is not the claim that requires revision, but the philosopher's notion. The preference-having criteria appear to distinguish non-arbitrarily and sharply enough between higher animals and other items, and to rule out of the relevant class elementary animals, trees, rocks and also some human items, e.g. human kidneys. The criteria plainly exclude inanimate objects, and they separate animate objects. For while living creatures such as plants and elementary animals can be said in an extended sense to have and also optimal living conditions, e.g., for healthy develop­ ment, and in sense to have preferred states or environments, they do not have preferences, and cannot strictly be harmed or have their welfare affected, in that they can be put into states they disprefer. Nor do empathy and analogical considerations extend beyond preference-having creatures: for only these can care about how they are treated. At the same time the criteria indicate another important division. For in a wider sense, animate objects which do not (significantly) have preferences or make choices, are sometimes said to have 'preferred states' or 'preferred environments' (as, e.g., in 'the plant prefers a sunny frost-free location with a well drained soil'). us say that the or To avoid confusion let of animate objects and also such biological items as ecosystems can be affected in one way or another, e.g. increased, decreased, upset. For instance, the wellbeing of a coastal community and of the individual trees in it can be reduced to zero by sandmining, and it can be seriously threatened by pumping waste detergent In this broad sense too, living things, things that participate in the growth process, have interests. However under a narrower and more common determinate of the slippery term 'interests', only preference­ havers have interests (again sentient creatures do not provide the boundary). Because the term 'interests' so readily admits of high redefinition, and the infiltration of chauvinism, its use is better limited (or even avoided), in favour of other more stable terms. 11 into the nearby ocean. There is a general obligation principle corresponding likewise to this more comprehensive class of welfare­ bearers, namely, z-zat fa jaaparjise tTze zJaHhefzzp a_f ?zatzzraZ abjaafs or sz/sfews zjft/zaz^t paad reasor. Moral coroerr does not of course end with what is in some way animate, much as the class of valuable objects is not tied to what relates suitably to central preference-havers. In suitable settings, a (virtually) dead landscape, a rare stone, a cave, can be items of moral or aesthetic concern; indeed any object of value can in principle be of such concern, and arzp abjact car., in principle at least, be ar object a/ value or disvalue, and so of morat corcerr. corcerrfry almost any sort of object. There can then be obligations Naturally only a fraction of the things that exist have especial value, and only a few of the things that exist will be things concerning which some of us have obligations. Furthermore these sorts of obligations do not in general reduce to the conditions or arrangements (e.g. contractual or joint welfare arrangements) of preference-havers or some select subclass thereof (what will sub­ sequently be called, as the argument is developed, the base c^ass). Just as there are relevant divisions beyond the class of preference­ havers, so there are within the class. Thus the suggestion that the class hazards which moral obligations (and a corresponding serf of moral concern which takes account of creatures' states) may be held is bounded by the class of preference-havers, does not of course imply that %a dfsfizzcfiazzs can be made zjffbfrz the class of preference-havers with respect to the kind of behaviour appropriate to them. For example, cazifracfzzaT- obligations - which by no means exhaust obligations - can only be held directly (as distinct from by way of a representative) with respect to a much narrower class of creatures, from which many humans are excluded. The class is also distinct from the class of persons, at least as 'person' is usually characterised. What emerges is an ann^Zar pfcfzzra of types of objects of moral relevance, some matched by types of moral obligation (described toward the end of Routley (a)), with nested zones representing respectively different sorts of objects - such as, objects of moral concern, welfare-having objects, preference-havers (and choice-makers), right-holders, obligation­ holders and responsibility-bearers, those contractually-committed-and the different sorts of obligations that can significantly apply to such objects. Not all the types of objects indicated are distinct, nor is the listing intended to be exhaustive but rather illustrative. For strictly the labels given should be expanded, as the distinctions are categorial ones, so that what matters is not whether an object is, for instance, 12 contractually committed in some fashion but whether it is the sort of thing that can be, whether it can significantly enter into or be committed by arrangements of a contractual kind. is to Similarly function as a categorial marker, that marks out the sorts of things that can (significantly) have preferences: the assumption that preference­ havers coincide with choice-makers is based on this categorial reading. Although the annular picture is (as will become clear in §5) important for the environmental alternative to be elaborated, and in meeting object­ ions to it, the countercharge has been laid that it reintroduces chauvin­ ism through its inegalitarian distinctions. This is a mistake: not every sort of ethical distinction, certainly not a justified distinction, involves chauvinism. Chauvinism is exhibited where, for example, objects of a favoured class are treated in a preferential way to superior items of an exluded class, e.g. defective humans as against apes, degenerate French against normal Pygmies. The annular picture neither involves nor encourages such differences in treatment: it is neutral and unchauvin- istic, for the reason that it relies only on categorial distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions (see the semantical analyses of §5). It is certainly in no way species chauvinist or human chauvinist. For none of the zones of the annular picture comprises the class of humans (or its minor variant the class of persons); for this class is not of moral relevance. The reason is that the human/nonhuman distinction is not an ethically significant one, and can, and should, be demoted from its dominant, and damaging, position in ethical theory. But dropping the notion of out of ethics, is only part of the ethical change that is called for: taking due account of nonhumans is also required. In particular - to return to the theme - what is quite unacceptable, . . 14 and based on a set of distinctions which are arbitrary and unjustifiable, is the differential treatment enjoined nonpersons as distinct from persons under Western ethics, and the view that only persons or humans have any (nonderivative) right to moral consideration and concern as preference-havers and that there are obligations towards other creatures 14 According to Q. Gibson such a criticism of chauvinism is based firmly on Western ethical equality and egalitarian principles. This is simply not so: there is no reliance on such principles. The general argument takes the form; feature f cannot be what justifies the differential treatment of humans and nonhumans, because either f is not morally relevant or not all humans have f or some nonhumans have f. Neither equality nor substitutions based upon equality are invoked at any stage. Moreover Western equality principles - at least as convention­ ally formulated - are in serious doubt, especially with the rejection of human chauvinism (see further §6). 13 only insofar as these are or reduce to obligations to persons or humans. §2. THE EXTENT OF CHAUVINISM, AND FURTHER LINES OF DEFENCE Western ethics are, then, human chauvinist in that they characterist­ ically take humans (or, to make a slight improvement, persons) to be the only items worthy of proper moral consideration, and sanction or even enjoin substantially inferior treatment for the class of non-human preference-having creatures, without - so it certainly appears - adequate justification. The prevailing nineteenth century Western attitude to wild creatures is evident from Judge Blackstone (quoted approvingly in W. Cobbett, Penguin, London, 1967, pp.431): With regard likewise to wild animals, aZZ bub by tbe o/ ZTzg Creator a right to pursue and take away any fowl or insect of the air, any fish or inhabitant of the waters, and any beast or reptile of the field: and this natural right still continues in every individual, unless where it is restrained by the civil laws of the country. And when a man has once so seized them, they become, while living his qualified property, or if dead, are absolutely his own. Prevailing Western attitudes have not shifted markedly since that time; for example, foresters, widely regarded as socially responsible, think nothing of dislodging from their homes and environment, or even destroying, communities of animals which do not directly interfere with human welfare. But there is another very important broader respect in which Western ethics are human (or person) chauvinistic, namely in the treat­ ment accorded to and attitude taken towards the broader class of natural items such as trees and forests, herbs, grasslands and swamps, soils and waterways and ecosystems. Unlike higher animals such items cannot liter­ ally be put into dispreferred states (and in fbbs obvious sense, as opposed to the wider sense of 'interests' tied to welfare, they have no interests), but they can be damaged or destroyed or have their uaZ^e eroded or impaired. The Western, chauvinistic, assumption is that this can only happen where human interests are affected. The basic assumption is that value attaches essentially only to humans or to what serves or bears on human interests, or derivatively, to items which derive from human skill, ingenuity or labour. Since natural items have no other value, there is no restriction on the way they are treated insofar as this does not interfere with others; as far as -ZsoZufgb natural things are con­ cerned anything is permissible. 14 It is, at base, because of these chauvinistic features of Western ethics that there is a need for a new ethic and value theory (and so derivatively for a new economics, and new politics, etc.) setting out not just people's relations to preference-havers generally but also (along with many other things) people's relations to the natural environment - in Leopold's words 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' (A. Leopold, SuTzd" zlZ-muzzur? zjvt/z ot/zer essays on Conservation, New York, 1966, p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature - insofar at least as they do not affect others, as pollution and vandalism do - are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects. It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold, Fraser Darling and many others, both earlier and later, take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, then, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that merely an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct, what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations; for example, what is permissible on the prevailing ethics will be no longer permissible on the new. For as matters stand, as Leopold himself explains, humans generally do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others, and is accordingly permissible on prevailing ethics. As Leopold says: A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society (op. cit., p.245). Only recently has such behaviour begun to be seriously questioned and become the subject of criticism, e.g. by environmentalists. Under what will be accounted an erzvvroHwgutaZ. et/zvc, however, such traditionally 15 permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. That ethics and morality are not, and never have been, restricted to human concerns, or exclusively to relations between persons, is important in rebutting objections to the very idea of an environmental ethic, based on the premiss that morality just is restricted (definitionally) to human relationships (and connected values) and is not significant beyond that. The problem of moral relations with respect to preference-havers other than persons and to inanimate items cannot be resolved or escaped simply by declaring morality to apply solely,or as a matter of meaning or defin­ ition only to humans (or to persons). For first, such a solution would run counter to the common view that humans are subject to seme moral con­ straints, even if comparatively minor ones, towards other creatures; the having of such constraints cannot be ruled out definitionally, and corres­ pondingly the judgments formulating these constraints or prohibitions cannot be ruled out as nonsignificant, yet they are surely moral. The only way in the end, that the claim gets support is by a narrow, and no longer acceptable, account of what is mcraZ in terms of concern with humans alone (cf. §6). Likewise, the question of the moral interrelations of humans with intelligent nonhuman extraterrestrial beings, even if at present hypothetical, is certainly a meaningful one, and some interesting and clearly moral issues of this sort are frequently raised in science fiction. Only if the extent of morality is, somewhat misleadingly, reconstrued in terms of the class of constraints on the behaviour of those it applies to - that is, in terms of limitations, as distinct from moral freedom does the claim that Western morality is restricted to humans (or persons) begin to gain plausibility. For it is true that beyond the favoured base class, humans or persons, few constraints are supposed to operate (and ad hoc ones at that) unless the welfare of members of the base class is adversely affected. Under an environmental ethic, such as that Leopold advocates, this would change: previously unconstrained behaviour would sense the scope of morality would be morally circumscribed, and in be extended. It is not evident, however, that a ethic, an ethic in the case at hand, is required to accommodate even radical new judgments seriously constraining traditionally approved conduct, i.e. imposing limitations on behaviour previously considered morally permissible. For one reason it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. 16 For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure. They are nonetheless (pace Quineans) perfectly good objects for investigation. Furthermore, there is a tendency to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic: e.g. the Christian ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. There are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the new principles and evaluations; that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethic, and that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The possibility that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the not inflexible framework of prevailing Western ethics, may appear open because there is not a single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civiliz­ ation: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. The Western ethic is not so monolithic In particular, three important traditions in Western ethical views 15 concerning man's relation to nature have recently been mapped out: a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custod­ ian, and the cooperative position with man as perfector. the only traditions; Nor are these primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic16 Augustine view - it exists only for his sake ), whereas on an See especially (a) J. Passmore, Afurz's Duckworth, London, 1974; also R. Nash, Affzzd, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1973. (All further references to Passmore's work are, unless otherwise indicated, to Passmore (a).) The dominant position has also been sketched in many other recent texts, e.g. I. McHarg, Doubleday, New York, 1969, while the lesser traditions have been appealed to in meeting criticisms of the Western ethic as involving the dominant view. The masculine particles are appropriate; 17 so is the resulting tone. environmental ethic man is not so free to do as s/he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. (as further considered in §4) who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with a deeper environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from sub­ stantial human interference, whether of the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable but ecologically impoverished European small farm and village langscape. According to the cooperative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potential­ ities, the test of perfection being basically /ur while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Thus these positions figure among those of the shallow ecological movement (as depicted by A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement', 16 (1973), 95-100): longer term. they are typically exploitative, even if only in the Although these lesser positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, and allow for some of the modern extensions of the Western ethic that have been made, e.g. concerning the treatment of animals and criticisms of vandalism, they are not well-developed, fit poorly into the prevailing framework, and do ^<9 /ar For in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough­ going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for 17 if 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered innocuous at least as regards it actual effects. Note that the total use principle, in the usual sense, is tied to the resource view of nature (cf. (d) R. and V. Routley, T/ze /or f/ze Forests, Third Edition, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1975). Such a principle, like the requirement of economic growth, emerges directly from - it is an integral part of neoclassical economic theory. 18 "humanized". As the important Western traditions mentioned exclude an environ­ mental ethic, it would appear, at first glance anyway, that such an ethic - not primitive, mystical or romantic - would be new alright - or at least new from a Western perspective. For, from a wider perspective, which takes due account of traditional societies (such as those of some American Indians, Australian Aboriginals, and Pygmies), there is, it will turn out, nothing so very new about what is included in (as distinct from the theoretical setting of) the "new" ethics. Even from the narrow Western perspective, the matter is not so straightforward: for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified, in particular by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this 19 physically interferes with others. " It may be that some such non-inter­ ference proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary); and that it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural 20 items would not affect others (a?2CMfnfcr/cre?Ycc cssz^npffcyz). Be this as it may, the wcdfyfeti pcsfffoz? appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environ­ ment for no satisfactory (taxable) returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Humanization, and humanitarian measures, may be a cloak for human chauvinism - in which case, far from being virtuous, they may be positively undesirable. Also, as Leopold has observed, the class of others has been progress­ ively widened, e.g. from the family group, to the tribe, to the nation or race, even to all humans including often enough future humans - but rarely further in the West until recently. 20 The assumption is not the same as its relative, Benn's principle of rzo^-i^fcrycrcuce, 'that no one may legitimately frustrate or prevent (or interfere with) a person's doing what he chooses to do, unless there is some reason for preventing him' (Benn (c), op. cit.; inset from (a), p.605). The principle is said to derive from 'the notion of a person' (e.g. (a), p.605), but it only so derives given commission of the fallacy of conversion of an A-proposition. Moreover even reduced to a 'formal principle ... locating the onus of justification' (cf.(a)), the principle is dubious, especially cyiven principles of respect for objects other than persons, with which persons may be interfering. It is, however, a formal principle that will help to keep entreprenuerial humans happy. 19 Pggg:2/, Grczjf?? T^g S c7Mf7c?? * f-ggcwgs f/zg PrchZgw^ York, 1972) that blends with the modified position; be criticised on welfare grounds; and so on. New vandalism can usually The modified position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have, since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser trad­ itions, is adequate as an environmental ethic. chauvinism. None moves outside human They are all encompassed under the Dowz'nic?? t??gsis - the view that the earth and all its non-human contents exist or are available for human benefit or to serve human interests, and hence that humans are entitled to manipulate the world and its systems as they want, in their own interests - which is but the ecological restatement of the strong thesis of human chauvinism, according to which items outside the privil­ eged human class have no value except one as instrumental value (both theses are criticised in Routley (a)). To escape from chauvinism, and from its thesis, a new ethic 7s wanted, as we now try to show. §3. GENERAL ENVIRONMENTAL ARGUMENTS AGAINST WESTERN ETHICS The main argument is directed primarily against the modified dominant position, but will incidentally show the inadequacy of the lesser Western traditions. The strategy is to locate core features of Western ethics, and to reveal through examples their thoroughgoing chauvinism and class bias, and in this way to provide decisive grounds for rejecting For the general argument some more technical points have to be made them. first. (An) gf^7g is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a spgcffiu ethic, and a more generic notion, a SMpgr-gf^fg, under which specific ethics are grouped. (As usual, a wgfu-ethic is a theory about ethics, super-ethics, their features and fundamental notions.) An sz/sfgm s is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or a theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgments concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights and responsibilities, what is valued, and so forth. (On newer perceptions an ethical system will include rather less in the way of prescriptions, of duties, obligations and the like, and more as to what are matters of care and of concern and for respect.) Since an ethical system is propositional in character, such notions as consistency, coherence, independence of 20 assumptions, and the like, apply to it without further ado. It is evident, from a consideration of competing or incompatible values and principles, that t/zgre are Z^z/iz-z-ZteZz/ wary gf/zZcuZ sz/stezns. Moreover appropriately general criteria for rationality will not reduce this class to a singleton. . Accordingly, there is logical space for aZferratire ratiaraZ etTzies. A general or lawlike proposition of a system (characterised along similar lines to a scientific law) is a pr-ZzzcZpZe; and certainly if systems Si and S2 contain different principles, they they are different systems. It will follow then that an environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined if it differs on some principles. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from each Western ethical system on some core principle or other embedded in that Western system, then these systems differ from the Western super-ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that that ethic can be sufficiently characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It would suffice then to locate a common core principle and to provide environmental counterexamples to it. It is illuminating (and necessary, so it will emerge) to attempt to do a little more than this minimum, with a view to bringing out the basic assumptions of the Western super-ethic. Two major classes of evaluative statements, commonly distinguished, are axiological statements, concerning what is good, worthwhile, valuable, best, etc., and deontological state­ ments, which concern what is obligatory, permissible, wrong, etc. Now there appear to be core principles of Western ethics on both axiological and deontic fronts, principles, for example, as to what is valuable and as to what is permissible. Naturally these principles are interconnected, because anything is permitted with respect to what has no value except insofar as it interferes with what does have value. A strong historical case can be made out for what is commonly assumed, that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the superethic. example. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core deontic principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominant position. A recent formulation of this principle runs as 21 follows (Barkley and Seckier, op. cit., p.58): 21 On next page. 21 The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that (D) one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others {and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably}. The principle, which is built into or derivable from most traditional ethical theories, may be alternatively formulated in terms of permissib­ ility, as the principle that a pgrscu's action is <ioos not intor/ere zjit/z others, profide<i if (i.e. other people, including perhaps the A related economic principle is that free enterprise can operate agent). within similar limits. It is because of these permissibility formulations that the principle - which incorporates fundamental features of (human or person) chauvinism - is sometimes hailed as a freedom principle; for it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which degrade the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to It is worth remarking that 'harming others' in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breath, for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Mo'reover the width of the principle is so far obscure, because 'other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent - and privilege - of The principle is attributed by Barkley and Seckier to Mill, though something like it was fairly common currency in nineteenth century European thought. It appears, furthermore, that Mill would have rejected the principle on account of clause (2): thus, for example: Those interests, I contend, authorise the subjection of individual spontaneity to external control, ouZi/ in respect of those actions of each, which concern the interest of people (J.S. Mill, f-Zbgrfy Everyman's Library, Dent, London, 1910, p.74, emphasis added). The deletion of clause (2) from (D) does not affect the general argument: hence the braces. (We owe this reference and the points in the next footnote to N. Griffin.) A similarly modified form of (D) is found in much recent Western literature, even radical literature which purports to make due allow­ ance for environmental concerns. A good example of the latter is I. Illich, TcoZs /or Calder & Boyers, London, 1973, where Mill's (D) appears, in various forms, at several places (e.g. p.xii, p.41). What this indicates is that Illich's "convivial society" will not - if its principles are taken seriously - move beyond chauvinism in its treatment of animals and the natural environment; it will at best yield some form of resource conservation. 22 the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of other persons it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to nondiscountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle untestable and com­ and it is generally assumed that it pletely unworkable in practice; applies at most to present and (some) future others, to those to whom it 22 would make a (fairly immediate) difference (thus excluding past others ). For the purposes of the general argument however, the problems in specify­ ing the class of others is not material, so long as the class includes no 23 more than persons that at some time exist. Fortunately the main argument is not very sensitive to the precise formulation of principle (D). Not only can clause (2) be deleted, and 'other' left rather unspecific, but additions can be made; then even if the main argument does not succeed, minor oarianfs a/ fba main argument zjiZ^ snccooti. An important case concerns the treatment of animals. Unless (D) is construed widely (extending 'other'), or hedged by further qualifying clauses,the basic principle fails to take proper account of concern for animals, especially that one should not inflict "unnecessary" cruelty or "impermissible" harm. animals then comes to matter; these issues can be avoided. What counts as permissible harm to and familiar conflict issues arise. But For the core principle (0), of basic chauvinism, can be modified to include (historically recent) moral concern for higher animals by adding, after 'harm others', something like 'or harm animals unnecessarily'. Then however the new principle succumbs to the Although the interests and preferences of past others are excluded in conventional utilitarianism, as in (welfare) economic theory and vot­ ing theory, these are often respected in ethical and legal settings, e.g. in wills, last wishes, etc. Similarly (as N. Griffin also point­ ed out), in the treatment of "human vegetables", past preferences of the person when capable of making decisions are often taken to be morally relevant, or even decisive, to the question as to whether to keep the body alive. If merely possible persons are included then the valuational rankings of environmental ethics, indeed of virtually any ethics, can be reflected in a "utilitarian" fashion. The argument of (c) R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', /Vaas (accepted for publication in 1974; still forthcoming?), can be used to show this. Or unless it can be made out, what seems entirely implausible, that what is wrong with torturing animals is not what it does to them but the way it affects other people (the Aquinas-Kant thesis). 23 attitudes, and more comprehensively the associated ideologies, are of critical importance; for it is to these and Western influence that the world's main - serious and very extensive - environmental problems can be ascribed. Hypothetical situations are introduced in designing counterexamples to core principles (D) and (A). The basis of the method lies in the semantical analyses of permissibility, obligation and value statements which stretch out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some permitted situation, what is obligatory in every such situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every such situation. ' But the main point to grasp for the counterexamples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over a class of situations. Thus hypothetical cases are logically perfectly legitimate and cannot be ruled out on one pretext or another, e.g. as rare, as desert island cases, as hypothetical, The counterexamples to (D) and (A) presented depend largely on etc. designing situations different from the actual where there are either too few or too many humans or persons. But alternative special situations where interference with others is minimized or is immaterial are readily devised. (i) The example. The last man (or woman or person) surviving the collapse of the world system sets to work eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to principle (D) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly and destroying things of value (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the Characteristically Westerners have attempted to recast these value systems, sometimes misleadingly, in a religious guise - probably because it was thought that there was no non-religious way of presenting them so as to make them intelligible or have them comprehended. Thus they get represented as basically chauvinistic in view of the relations of Man and God. On these semantical analyses, which avoid all the usual problems of modal theories of axiological and deontic terms, see R. Routley, R.K. Meyer, and others, T/zefr RSSS, Australian National University, 1979, chapters 7 and 8. A sketch is given in §5 below. The situations or worlds with respect to which the interpretation is made permit of different construals; e.g. instead of permitted situ­ ations, the situations can be construed evaluatively as ideal situations. 26 formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). The usual vandalism charge does not apply against Mr. Last Man since he does no damage to others. Moreover, Mr. Last Man's activities may be toned down to avoid any vandalism charge, yet succumb to the (extended) chauvinist charge, e.g. he may simply destroy seme environ­ mentally valuable things unnecessarily (without due reason or some need). (ii) The Zusf pecpZe example. to the last people example. The last man example can be extended We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfect­ ing the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the sheer enjoyment of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining natural forests disappear in favour of pastures or plantations,and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinction. behaved badly; of value; On an environmental ethic the last people have they have done what is impermissible and destroyed much for they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the core principles (D) and (A), and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions under more obvious construals of these principles. Indeed the main point of elaborating this extension of the last man example is because principles (D) and (A) may, as they stand, appear to conflict with stewardship, cooperation and perfection positions, as the last man example reveals. The apparent conflict between these positions and principle (D) may be definitively removed, it seems, by conjoining a further proviso to the principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people who are not vandals do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of 28 reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. 2 8 On next page. 27 (iii) The grreat e^frgpre^gz/r example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). industrialist; The last man is an he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and even meets Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". It may be objected, however, that there is no reason or warrant for the great entrepreneur's production and it is simply wasteful. But we can easily amend the example by adding consumers who want to use the out­ put. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend (iii) to the sociefz/ example (iv): the society looks depressingly like ours except for its reproductive incapacity. (v) The example. The blue whale (reduced to a 29 mixed good on the economic picture ) is on the verge of extinction because of its qualities as a private good, as a profitable source of oil and meat. whalers; The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compen­ sate the whalers if they desist; destruction. nor need whale hunting be wilful (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man's 2 8 There are however elements in the lesser traditions - especially if 'cooperation' and 'perfection' are reconstrued in less chauvinistic and homocentric terms - which point the way to a more satisfactory ethic. 29 The example is adapted from Barkley and Seckier, op. cit., who nicely expose the orthodox economic picture. To make the example more difficult for utilitarians in the tradition of Bentham, it can be further supposed that the killing of the whalesis near instantaneous and painless, the whale products are very valuable to humans and indeed irreplaceable, and that the whales led a good life while they lived. (Would the killing of remote groups of humans under similar conditions be then so much worse?). 28 activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism did not cease allocating whales to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would: instead the market system ground inexorably (for the tragedy-of-the-privatised-commons type reasons well-explained in Barkley and Seckier, op. cit.) along the private demand curve until the blue whale population was no longer viable. It has been objected that the operation of the free market is restrained by ethical principles - or rather legally enforced copies thereof; for example, it would be profitable to exploit child labour, but moral prohibitions, legally enforced, exclude such exploitation of children. But the case is quite different; children, unlike young animals such as vealers, are already shielded under the modified dominant position. If anything, the "objection" is a further illustration of chauvinism at work. 30 Although the vanishing species example given does not apply decisively against extended utilitarianisms, such as that of Bentham, which widen the base class to all sentient creatures, the case is easily varied so that it does: class of tropical plant species simply select one of the currently threatened with extinction. (vi) The fuufory farw example. On the farm animals of various sorts are kept under artificial, confined conditions and simply used for the market goods they deliver, e.g. eggs in the case of battery hens, milk in the case of rotor cows, veal in the case of calves. The animals are subject to whatever conditions (e.g. forced feeding, iron deficient diets, constant lighting) will deliver maximal quantities of desired goods for the human commodity market. The animals do not necessarily suffer pain (and insofar as they do in behaviourally conspicuous ways the problem can For the most part the operation of the free market is only constrained by chauvinistic principles: otherwise enterpreneurs tend to undertake whatever apparently profitable business activity they can get away with, including substantial exploitation of animals and widespread environ­ mental destruction, and their lack of concern is illustrated by such facts as that they are generally prepared to pay taxes (e.g. to compensate other humans) rather than to forgo their activities in cases such as river and lake pollution and forest removal. In fact, of course, fairly unfettered operation of the market tends to encourage more restricted chauvinisms, e.g. the exploitation of cheap foreign or female labour in the secondary labour market. 29 be met by antibiotics), but they are imprisoned under dispreferred conditions. The threatment of the animals on the "farm" is perfectly permissible according to the core principle (or at least minor adjustments to exclude unnecessary suffering will ensure conformity), but on an environmental ethic it is not. The treatment of the animals on the farm also seems to conform to the principles of the lesser traditions, insofar as these principles are spelled out in a way that can be applied to the example, that is so long as cooperation and perfection are construed in intended chauvinistic fashion. (vii) The MiZderness example. The wilderness, though isolated and rarely visited or thought about by environmentalists, is known to contain nothing of use to humans, such as seed or drug supplies, that is not adequately replicated elsewhere. It does contain however some "low quality" forest that could supply pulpwood on a commercial basis were the local government to provide subsidies on the usual basis. The logging would destroy the wilderness in a largely irreversible way (e.g. it grows on high sand dune country or on lateritic soils) and kill many animals which live in the forest. The prevailing ethic sees nothing wrong with the destruction of such a wilderness, nor do the lesser traditions: a deeper environmental ethic does. Again the example requires variation, e.g. to a wilderness devoid of sentient individuals, if it is to counter clearly such extensions of Western ethics as those of animal liberationists. For this sort of reason we do not want to overstate or overrate the role of as distinct from variations upon such examples. examples - Firstly, people deeply committed to human chauvinism - as many, perhaps most, people are - will find some of the examples unconvincing because they depend on non- chauvinistic assumptions. Secondly, there are rejoinders to some of the examples based on the prevailing ethic. In this case what we claim is that there are variations on, and elaborations of the examples which meet such considerations. In connection with this we do not want to deny that there are other strands supplementing the prevailing ethic which are critical of some activities of the sort described in the examples, e.g. anti-vandalism principles and strictures against conspicuous consumption But, as remarked, these principles as reflected, e.g. in sumptuary laws. have not been adequately incorporated in the prevailing ethic in such a way as to meet variations on the examples or to serve environmental purposes; and if the attempt were made to fully incorporate such princi­ ples once again a new ethic would be the upshot. before the change from an ethic which sanctioned 30 (Compare the situation slavery.) In summary,what the examples show is that core axiological and deontic assumptions of the Western super-ethic are environmentally inadequate; and accordingly Western ethics should be superseded by a more environmentally adequate ethic. The class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on such an environmental ethic than it is in the Western superethic, and the class of noninstrumentally valuable objects is correspondingly wider than it is on the Western super-ethic. But is not an environmentalist ethic going too far in implying that these people - those of the examples and respected entrepreneurs and industrialists and bureaucrats, farmers and fishermen and foresters - are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, since destructive of what is valuable, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the destruction of the forest where the people may live, or the slaughter of remaining blue whales, or the gross exploitation of experimental or factory-farm animals for private profit or as part of the latest 5 year plan. Those who organise or engage in such activities are (to a greater or lesser extent, depending on their mode of engagement) morally culpable. Models of permissible respected life styles and of the good life (for others to emulate) depend upon what the underlying ethic accounts good and evil, permissible or not, and changes with change of ethic. A new ethic is needed not merely to accommodate the evaluations, and so forth; prescriptions and models indicated, in a way decidedly different from Western ethics, but in order to cope with a much wider range of more practical, and often more controversial, cases where Western ethics yield (without epicycling, i.e. extensive resort to theory-saving strategems) unacceptable or inadequately grounded results. An alternative ethic is also needed by a growing number of valuers because they have values, interests and new concerns of ecological sorts which do not fit in with, but conflict with, central features of prevailing Western ethics. There is occurring, it seems, a far-reaching cultural, and ethical change, a change in consciousness, and in particular a change in attitudes to what is natural and the natural environment (a change which may eventually be as fundamental as, and partly overturn, the humanist changes of the Enlightenment). A new ethic is accordingly needed to reflect and formul­ ate, and enable the defence and application of, a new, increasingly fel,t, 31 but not so far well-articulated system of values, in much the same way that a system of probability was needed and formulated to articulate and systematise likelihood and probability principles, and relevant logic systems required to capture pre-analytic views of entailment. The explication of environmental ethics is a similar theoretical concern; again, as commonly, theory lags behind the facts of change and the felt data. Furthermore, just as entailment systems are not uniquely determined, or desired or accepted by every thinker, so enoironwontuZ gt/zios will not be nnip^otp detorwZng<i, or adopted by every valuer. On the contrary, as is plain enough, their adaption and furtherance will be vigorously resisted by many vested interests, as - to take just one instance - the furtherance of programmes for the determination of environmental sources of cancer is vigorously opposed by industrial chemical companies. The matter of persuading other valuers to accept values and principles of a new ethic is of course a further and somewhat separate issue from the question of need for such an ethic. The procedures for trying to effect changes in values are but variations on the usual pro­ cedures, and like them are not fully effective: excluding coercion and education, they include, for example, argumentation, and propaganda, in each case of many sorts. 31 As usual, too, where there is a broad common 32 basis, especially in felt evaluations and emotional presentation, effecting a change, or a conversion, will generally be an easier task. In the case of transformation to environmental values, what is often important are distinctive features regarding the factual bases of many of the evaluations. correcting In particular, there is the matter of removing or /Tztsoonooptions on a broad range of matters of Some of these sorts are considered in more detail in (c) J. Passmore, 'Ecological problems and persuasion' in FpnoZZtp arid Freedom. * JntornutZonoZ and Comparattvo c/nr-Zoprz/donoo (ed. G. Dorsey), Oceana Publications, New York, 1977, pp.431-42. The apposite term 'emotional presentation' is adapted from Meinong; see especially FwotZonaZ Prosentatton (trans. M.L. Schubert-Kalsi), Northwestern University Press, 1972. The notion of emotional present­ ation can play an important role in the explanation of how emotions enter into (environmental) evaluations, the objects evaluated (canyons, mountains, giant trees) often being emotionally presented. A little more precisely, the connections are these: A value ranking (e.g. c is better, more valuable, than d) of a valuer is explained emotionally through - it does not reduce to - certain preference rankings of the valuer; and the preference rankings have in turn dual factual and emotional bases, in the same sort of way that an item may be preferred or chosen in virtue of its factual features and the valuer's emotional responses to those. The main details of such a semantical analysis of value, which is discussed in §5, are given in Routley (c). 32 environmental concern; for example, about animals, their various behaviour, abilities, etc; about the alleged gulf between humans and other animals and the uniqueness of humans and each human; about the profitability, or desirability, or necessity, of environmentally destruct­ ive enterprises; about the inevitability of current Western social arrangements and about the history of the way these particular arrange­ ments developed. There is, moreover, the matter of sheer information, for example as to how free animals live together and what they do; about how factory and experimental animals are treated, and in the latter case for what: about the sources and effects of various forms of pollution and the reasons for it; about how natural creatures such as whales or environments such as forests are commonly dealt with, for what products, by what interests, for what ends. Naturally (given a fact/value division) none of this information is entirely conclusive support for a change in ethic; for many of the evaluations the data helps support can be included in other ethics (including sometimes modifications of prevailing ethics), while remaining evaluations can, at worst, be simply rejected (as e.g., those utilitarians who extend consideration just to sentient creatures are obliged to reject versions of the last man argument where no sentient creatures are affected). Although a new ethic is needed, for the reasons indicated, and although such an ethic can,furthermore, be a considerable asset in practical environmental argument (e.g., as to the point of trying to retain a piece of not-especially-unique near-wilderness), for many practical ecological purposes, there is no need to apply it or to fall back on it. For example, virtually the whole environmental issue of destructive forestry in Australia can be argued without invoking any unconventional ethical principles or values at all, i.e. entirely within the prevailing chauvinistic framework. wap??/ environmental disputes. The same sort of point applies to But, it by no means applies to all. A corollary is an inadequacy in the presentation of environmental problems and suggested solutions in standard (human) ecology texts Tssz^gs A. Erlich's (such as P. and FuoZ-Ctyz/, Freeman, San Francisco, 1970, to select one example), which are set erzf-freZz/ within the chauvinistic framework.^4 Also, differently, in the way that theories are in enabling one to see how to move and argue in a discussion. Quite properly given prevailing sentiments, according to some erring conservationists, who account themselves "realists". 33 Since it is sometimes charged - despite all that has been said - that an environmental ethic does not differ in practice from that of more conventional "chauvinistic" ethics, there is point in spelling out in yet other ways how it can differ in practice: Firstly, many conventional positions, in particular social contract and sympathy theories, cannot take proper account of moral obligation to future humans (who are not in the immediate future). Since the usual attempt to argue, in terms of value and benefit to humans, that natural areas and ecosystems generally should not be destroyed or degraded depends critically on introducing possible future humans who will suffer or be worse off as a result of its destruction or degradation, it is plain that an environ­ mental ethic will differ radically from such conventional positions. That is, the usual argument depends on the reduction of value of a natural item to the interests of present and /Izf^re humans, in which reduction future humans must play a critical role if conclusions not blatantly opposed to conservation are to be reached. Hence there will usually be a very great gulf between the practical value judgements of conservation ethics and those of conventional positions which discount the (nonimmediate) future. Secondly, as we have already seen through examples, there are practical differences between an environmental ethic and conventional instrumental views which dr take account of the interests of past, present and future humans, differences which emerge sharply at the It is, however, unnecessary to hypothetical (possible world) level. turn to possible world examples to see that normally there would be very great differences in the practical valuations and behaviour of those who believe that natural items can have value and create obligations not reducible (in any way) to human interests and those who do not, as the following further examples show. We need only consider the operation of irtersioraZ- corcepfs Example 1. Mif/zizz uctz^^Z- zjerZ-d, for example, the concept of duwupe to a natural item, and the associated notion of campezzsaffrr for that damage. C. Stone, for instance, in S/za^Zd Trees #are Sfardirp? Tdp^fs /dr /Vaf^raZ. dhj^efs Thus Tabards L^pcZ (Avon Books, New York, 1975) notes the practical legal differences between taking the damage to a polluted river as affecting its intrinsic value, and taking it as just affecting human river users. In the one case one will see adequate compensation as restoring the original state of the river (rectifying the wrong to the river) and in the other as compensating those present (or future) humans who will suffer from its pollution. As Stone points out, the sum 34 adequate to compensate the latter may well be much less than that required to restore the river to its unpolluted state, thus making it economic, and in terms of the human chauvinist theory, fair and reason­ able, to compensate those damaged and continue pollution of the river. In the first case, of course, adequate compensation or restoration for the harm done would have to consist in restoring the river to its unpolluted condition and will not just be paid to the people affected. Compare here Stone's example of compensation for injury to a Greek slave; in the instrumentalist case this will involve compensating the slave's owner for the loss of his slave's working time; in the other, where the slave is regarded as not merely an instrument for his owner, it will compensate the sZaue not the ozjyzer, for this compensation will also take account of the pain and suffering of the slave, even where this has not affected his working ability. There is a difference not only in the amount of compensation, but to zj/zow it is directed. In the case of a natural item damage may be compensated by payment to a trust set up to protect and restore it. The believer in intrinsic values may avoid making unnecessary and excessive noise in the forest, out of respect for the forest and its Example 2. nonhuman inhabitants. She will do this even when it is certain that there is no other human around to know the difference. For one to whom the forest and its inhabitants are merely another conventional utility, however, there will be no such constraint. He may avoid unnecessary noise if he thinks it will disturb other humans, but if he is certain none are about to hear him he will feel at liberty to make as much and as loud a noise as he chooses, and this will affect his behaviour. Examples like this cannot be dealt with by the introduction of future humans, since they will be unable to hear the noise in question. To claim that the making of noise in such circumstances is a matter of no importance, and therefore there is no important difference in behaviour, is of course to assess the matter through human chauvinist eyes. question-begging. From the intrinsic viewpoint it So such a claim is make a difference, and be reflected in practical behavioural difference. Example 3. Consider an aboriginal tribe which holds a particular place to be sacred, and where this sanctity and intrinsic valuableness and beauty is celebrated by a number of beautiful cave paintings. A typically "progressive" instrumentalist Western view would hold the cave (and perhaps place) to be worth preservation because of its value to the aboriginal people, and because of the artistic merit of the human arti­ facts, the cave paintings the cave contained. 35 To the "enlightened" Westerner, if the tribe should cease to exist, and the paintings be destroyed, it would be permissible to destroy the place if this should be in what is judged to be the best interests of human kind, e.g. to get at the uranium underneath. To the aboriginal the human artifacts, the cave paintings would be irrelevant, a celebration of the value of the place, but certainly not a surrogate for it, and the obligation to the place would not die because the tribe disappeared or declined. Similarly no ordinary sum of money would be able to compensate for the loss of such a place, in the way that it might for something conceived of as a utility or convenience, as having value only because of the benefits it confers on the "users" of it. There is an enormous /gZt or difference between feeling that a place should be valued or respected for itself, for its perceived beauty and character, and feeling that it should not be defaced because it is valued by one's fellow humans, and provides pleasurable sensations or money or convenience for them. Compare too the differences between feeling that a yellow robin, say, is a fellow creature in many ways akin to oneself, and feeling that it is a nice little yellow and grey, basically clockwork, aesthetic object. These differences in emotional presentation are accompanied by or expressed by an enormous range of behavioural differences, of which the examples given represent only a very small The sort of behaviour uurrarzteti by each viewpoint and thought by it, the concept of what one is free to do, for example, will normally be very different. It is certainly no coincidence that cultures sample. holding to the intrinsic view have normally been far less destructive of nature than the dominant Western human chauvinist culture. In summary, the claim that there is no reaZ practical difference, that the intrinsic value viewpoint is empty verbalisation, does not stand up to examination. The capacity - no doubt exaggerated, but nonetheless far from negligible - of Western industrial societies to solve their ecological problems (at least to their own pathetically low standards) within a chauvinistic framework, does considerably complicate, and obstruct, an alternative more practical argument to the need for a new ethic, t/ze arpMwezzt yrcm problems, that in no other way ... [than] prepared[ness] to accept a "new ethic", as distinct even from adding one or two new moral principles to an accepted common ... can modern industrial 35 societies solve their ecological problems. On next page. 36 Not only does the argument encounter various objections - most obviously that many of the problems can be solved, if not within Western ethics, in immediate extensions of them - but the case suggested would hardly be a satisfactory basis for the type of ethic sought. It is not so much that it would be a chauvinistic way of arriving at a supposedly nonchauvinistic ethic, for bad procedures can lead to good results; rather it is that important ecological problems, shaping environmental ethics, such as preservation of substantial tracts of wilderness and just treatment of animals, tend to be written off in industrial societies as not serious problems. But even if the argument suggested has too narrow a problem base, and so may yield too limited a change in attitudes as compared with the main theoretical argument, the argument merits fuller formulation and further investigation. The argument to need for ethical revision is as follows: (1) A satisfactory solution to environmental problems (of modern industrial societies) implies (the adoption of) an alternative (2) environmental ethic. A satisfactory solution to environmental problems is needed. Therefore, an alternative environmental ethic is needed. The argument is valid, given, what seems correct, that pimplies q implies that p is needed implies that q is needed. The second premiss is or can be made analytic, on the sense of 'satisfactory' 'satisfactory' imply 'needed'); (e.g. by having so the case is complete if the first premiss can be established (in the same sense of 'satisfactory'), and the conclusion is then plausible to at least the extent the premiss is. Al37 though the first premiss, or something like it, is widely endorsed, cogent 3 5 Passmore (c) op. cit., p.438. According to Passmore (p.431), By common consent, there are four major pollution, the exhaustion of resources, species, and overpopulation ... To solve such problems involves finding types of human conduct or of preventing having its present consequences. ecological problems: the destruction of a way either of altering that human conduct from In what follows the assumption that 'there are four major ecological problems' gets rejected. 36 Here and elsewhere, 'environmental' less interchangeably. and 'ecological' are used more or 37 Even Passmore, though previously (e.g. in (a)) highly critical of proposals for new ethics, gives qualified endorsement to an assumption of this sort ((c), p.441). ... I do not doubt, all the same, that our attitudes to nature stand badly in need of revision and that, as they stand, they form a major obstacle to the solution of ecological problems. 37 arguments for it are few and it is no simple matter rendering the premiss plausible. Moreover rendering it plausible involves a substant­ ial detour through social theory; for the case for the premiss proceeds along these sorts of lines: (3) Unless there are (certain) major changes in socio-economic structure, environmental problems will not be satisfactorily solved. (4) The major changes in socio-economic structure involve an alternative ethic. A much stronger thesis than (3) has been argued for using systems analysis, namely that without very extensive socio-economic changes, modern industrial society will collapse; but several of the assumptions made in the analysis are doubtful or disputed. independently of that stronger thesis; But (3) has been argued for example, it will follow from the thesis (of Falk, Commoner and others) 'that the modern industrial ethic as we have known it is not sustainable on ecological grounds'. 39 In a sense, (3) is obvious; for it is present socio-economic arrangements that have produced many of the present serious environmental problems; without major changes in those arrangements most of the problems will persist or, more likely, intensify. What is not immediately evident is that the major changes called for, in satisfying (3), suffice for (4). However reflection on the specific 'types of changes required - for example at a superficial level, human population limitation, reduction of poll­ ution, more sensible resource usage, selective economic growth - reveals that significant changes in value, and also in what is considered permissible, are bound to be involved in the changes. plausible, and therewith the intended conclusion. So (4) is decidedly But the argument leaves the detailed character of the needed alternative ethic rather obscure; and it may well be that the ethic so yielded is somewhat chauvinistic in character. The more practical argument cannot entirely supplant the main theoretical argument. In sum, there are good and pressing reasons to investigate the alternatives to chauvinistic ethics, especially human chauvinism, because such chauvinistic ethics are discriminatory, because the case for them 38 39 See, in particular, D. Meadows and others, T/ze Limits fa GrgzjfZz, Potomac Associates, Washington, D.C., 1972. R.A. Falk, 'Anarchism and world order', FVozncs IX, 1978, p.66. Falk refers for the case to B.Commoner, TTze CZrsizzy Circle, Knopf, New York, 1971; R.A. Falk, PZuzzef, Random House, New York. 1971; E. Goldsmith and others /or SMrrfzJuZ, Houghton and Miflin, Boston, 1972, and Meadows of uZ-., op. cit. 38 does not stand up to examination, and because they have been involved in the destruction of much of value and now threaten the viability of much that is valuable. §4 . ENVIRONMENTAL ALTERNATIVES : NARROWING THE CHOICE AMONG ENVIRONMENTAL ETHIC The basic-and basically mistaken-doctrine of the Western super-ethic is, as we have seen, that people, humans of whatever shape or form, are the fundamental carriers or objects of value and that all other items are valuable only in an instrumental or derivative way. It is important, in­ deed mandatory in a genuine environmental ethic, to reject this view and allow natural items to have a value in their own right, iz? t/ze same /as/ziazz as CzzaZzza^Ze? peapZe, both for the reasons outlined above, of the theoret­ ical unsatisfactoriness and arbitrariness of the traditional view, and for more practical reasons, namely, to help ensure the ecological sustain­ ability of modern society, and in optimising human welfare. It has often been pointed out that 'a totally humanised world would diminish us as 40 human beings', that the traditional view of humans, or classes of humans, as dominant, and of natural items as without value except where they serve human or class interests-a view that often carries contempt for nature leads not only to the destruction of much that is of value but (paradoxic­ ally) to counterproductive results even with respect to human welfare. Thus McHarg (in attractively coloured rhetoric):- Show me a man-oriented society inwhich it is believed that reality exists only because man can perceive it, that the cosmos is a struct­ ure erected to support man on its pinnacle, that man exclusively is divine and given dominion over all things, indeed that God is made in the image of man, and I will predict the nature of its cities and their landscape. I need not look far for we have seen them-the hot­ dog stands, the neon shill, the ticky-tacky houses, dysgenic city and mined landscapes. centric man; This is the image of the anthropomorphic, anthropo­ he seeks not unity with nature but conquest (op. cit.). The rejection of this view and its replacement by a view in which natural items can be regarded as of value and as worthy of our respect for themselves and not merely for what we can get out of them or what use we 40 See e.g. the discussion at pp.116-17 of (a) J. Rodman, 'The Liberation of nature', IzzgMfrz/, 20 (1977) 83-145. All subsequent references to Rodman's work without further indication are to this article. Note well that the rejection of human chauvinism does z?ot imply that no chauvinistic arguments - or rather, arguments that are usually stated in chauvinistic form - carry weight. On the contrary, some chauvinistic arguments (e.g. those supporting wilderness retention and species preservation) carry considerable weight; and, since the prevailing industrial ethics remain chauvinistic, environmentalists would be rash not to use them. 39 can make of them, is becoming increasingly widespread in parts of the environmental movement. It is this primarily that makes for an important ideological split in the conservation movement, between what Naess (op. cit.) called and Teep ecology, between those who see conservation as just a matter of wiser, better-controlled topper-term exploitation of the environment - something which is compatible with denying value to 42 ... everything except man ' and those who see it at least in part as involving a recognition of value for natural items independent of man, and hence as involving (at least to some extent) a Ttf^erept uttitp(7e to Mature. The first view, the long-term or erttpbteped e^ptoitatior view, which is closely tied to prevailing more enlightened economic assumptions, tends to make heavy use of the watershed term 'resource'; the problem of conserv­ ation is seen as one of 'zjfse pse of resources', a resource being something of use to humans or persons. On this view, which does not get beyond the confines of human chauvinism, and so is no direction for a satisfactory environmental ethic to take, items which have no perceivable use to man, i.e. non-resources, can be destroyed without loss; and the environmental problem is viewed as largely one of making people aware of the extent to which natural items and processes have frstr^meptut value, i.e. of how far we are dependent on them and they are of pse to us. There is no recognition either that some items might be valuable precisely because they are independent of man. Resource Conservation, or the shallow position, is the first of the 42 four ideal types that Rodman discerns in his investigation of the contemporary environmental movement. The deeper ecological position gets split under Rodman's division into three ideological positions - though Rodman prefers to put the matter in symbolic or experiential terms, in terms of forms of consciousness - namely Wilderness Preservation, Nature Moralism, and Ecological Resistance. Though the positions discerned are neither characterised in an exclusive fashion, nor exhaustive of ecological positions, and though we shall have to look beyond all the positions for a satisfactory environmental ethic, nonetheless they afford an excellent perspective on the main types of alternative positions that have been adopted by those within environmental movements. It is not uncommon to encounter attempts to write the shallow position into the very meaning or definition of copseraotiop, e.g. 'conservation is the use of resources to the greatest advantage of man', 4 Sprrep of /Ipstrotfap Forestry and tVood-Fused Ipd^strfes. Part PT. Prodpcttop Forestry Peretopmept PZup. Draft (31 October, 1974), p.ll - a blatantly chauvinistic account. On next page. 40 According to (Wilderness) Preservation, which focusses on wilderness, wilderness is to be preserved for the wilderness experience, wilderness offers a natural cathedral, a sacred place where human beings can transcend the limitations of everyday experience and become renewed through contact with the power of creation ((b), p.49). The values discerned in wilderness and natural landscape are primarily aesthetic and quasi-religious, or mystical, 'the experience of the holy is esthetically mediated'; what is valuable remains human experiences. Thus the Wilderness Preservation position does not move outside the sphere of human chauvinism, and can no more than Resource Conservation offer a frame for an environmental ethic. conclusion: Rodman reaches a similar Resource Conservation and Wilderness Preservation appear variations on the theme of wise use, the former oriented to the [efficient] production of commodities for human consumption, the latter to providing human amenities ((b), p.50). For this reason, the Wilderness Preservation position fails even on the score of justifying the preservation of wilderness - on the very task it was designed to accomplish - in a range of circumstances. Like other See especially (b) J. Rodman, 'Theory and practice in the environmental movement: notes towards an ecology of experience', in Search /or i?? a ^orZ-d^ International Cultural Foundation, New York, 1978, pp.45-56. Some of the types are portrayed in greater detail in other Rodman papers. The remainder of this largely new section on environmental ethical alternatives is heavily indebted, in ways the references mostly make plain, to Rodman's work. His work covers a vast range of interlinked topics; only those of immediate relevance have been touched upon. But there is very much in the remainder that repays careful reading, and TnMc/z to think about and to question or reject, reaching perhaps its lowest point in the paradoxical themes: Just as our statements about other people tend also to be concealed statements about ourselves, so statements about non­ human nature tend to be concealed statements about the human condition, and movements to liberate nonhuman nature tend also to be movements to liberate the repressed potentials of human nature (p.105). In part because these themes and the related myth of microcosm are taken seriously, and not for the evident falsehoods they are, in part because the ethical adequacy of the human/nonhuman distinction is never seriously questioned (e.g. it is taken for granted, what is not the case, that rights apply to humans and are problematic beyond them), and in part because of the characteristically chauvinistic emphasis on human experience and the endeavour to bring everything within that experiential purvue, and the associated weight assigned to human symbolic, mythic and ritual activities, one is left with the feeling, at the end of all the investigations one can profitably follow Rodman through, that one has not got beyond the confines of human chauvinism. 41 instrumentalist accounts of wilderness value, it breaks down entirely With examples like the Last Man, assuming that Mr. Last Man is never turned on by natural spendour. More alarmingly, under readily conceivable developments, it would allow the elimination of wilderness entirely. For consider the Wilderness Experience Machine, a low-impact low-tech philosophical machine, recently patented by I.M. Diabolic, which can duplicate entirely, even for groups of people, wilderness experiences, but in a downtown room. As far as the psychological experience goes, this machine can provide a complete substitute for any actual wilderness, and were the value of wilderness to reside in the experience it afforded, could entirely replace it and eliminate the alleged need for it. Most environmentalists would be (rightly) dissatisfied with, not to say appalled by, the idea that Wilderness Experience Machines could sub­ stitute for wildernesses, since they provided the same experiences. what else they wanted, the answer would of course be: Asked Wildernesses, not merely wilderness experiences. Wildernesses are valuable in their own right, over and above the experiences they can afford. 4 3 Really, that is, they consider wildernesses intrinsically valuable, but have been pushed by the prevailing ethical ethics into stating, and misrepresenting, their position in experiential terms. There is some independent evidence that the Wilderness Preservation position is frequently a disguised intrinsic value position, in the attitude taken to examples like the Last Man case, that purely hypothetical experiencers (who may vanish into counterfactuals) are good enough, and that in some real-life cases it is enough that wilderness is there to be contemplated, whether or not anyone actually takes advantage of its presence to gain experiences, or indeed whether or not it is in fact contemplated. Such examples remove the disguise and reveal the position as at bottom an intrinsic value position. In that event it is however better to avoid the disguise; for the case for wilder­ ness preservation which starts from the position that some wilderness tracts have intrinsic as well as merely instrumental value is substantially stronger than any position which assigns them merely instrumental value. Wilderness lovers and nature conservationists have in fact worked out - or concocted - a set of arguments to show why wildernesses and nature conservation are of benefit to humans, to argue for their instrumental The concept of too can vary with the operative ideology, e.g. on certain views, such as Wilderness Preservation, wilderness comprises areas that are (or provide the opportunity for use), e.g. used for experiential enrichment. By contrast, on a genuine Environ­ mental Resistance view, wilderness is a wild area, use of which is not implied: it may never be used, and it may not matter that it affords no opportunity for (human) use. (Under popular high redefinition of 'wilderness', there are of course no wildernesses remaining on the earth, and wilderness vanishes as soon as humanly experienced.) 42 value. For example, there are various arguments from the scientific value, or usefulness, of wilderness, e.g. for the study of natural eco­ systems, for the investigation of plant history and evolution, as a repository of genetic diversity, etc. These arguments, which (like parallel arguments for species preservation) are not to be especially as regards persuasive force, can be put in nonchauvinistic form; for science and knowledge are not linked essentially with, for example, the feature of being human. Often however - e.g. where the wilderness defended has, so far as it is known, little that is very special to offer - such arguments appear to be merely a conventional front for the real (or deeper) reasons - and in seme instances, correspondingly weak and unpersuasive (as Fraser Darling has remarked, and Passmore has tried to show in (a)) - the real reasons being based on the perception of nonuseful properties of value. This is particularly marked in the case of arguments for preserving the most complex and beautiful of the world's plant communities, tropical rainforest. Such arguments as that various uninvestigated rainforest trees may at some time be found to contain useful drugs, by no means exhaust the true value of the rainforest. For it is in the intrinsic, i.e. noninstrumental, value of the rainforest that the main reason for not unduly interfering with it, e.g. not interfering in ways that threaten its stability or viability, lies. In particular, destruction of a wilderness, such as a rainforest, would significantly diminish intrinsic value, and so should (in general) be resisted. Environmentalists who are aware of these sorts of problems and dangers with resource use approaches to wilderness preservation sometimes attempt to formulate their alternative view in terms of one of the lesser traditions, most popularly in terms of the image, in which man is seen as the steward of the earth - an analogy which, as Passmore points out (in (a)), is problematic outside a religious context. For who is man steward to? If not to God, then how is the analogy to be unpacked, and what conditions must "stewardship" conform to? If "good stewardship" is management in the interests of humans, or humanity, then the position does not go beyond Resource Conservation; if it is manage4 4 ment to serve intrinsic values, or God, then good stewardship is but a cover for the recognition of intrinsic values, which are better introduced directly. Thus admitting values which are not instrumental, which do not answer back in some way to states or conditions of humans is a feature of all satisfactory deeper ecological alternatives. In order to allow for such intrinsic values and/or associated attitudes of respect, e.g. for On some interpretations; chauvinism. on others theism may serve to reinforce human 43 nature and various natural things, it is however unnecessary to adopt a religious backdrop such as the "Good Stewardship" image suggests, or even a semi-religious framework such as a mystical or superstitious one with taboos and sacred places as symbolic and ritual elements. A theory of intrinsic value which assigns intrinsic value to wilderness and species of free animals, for good reasons, can be entirely naturalistic (in a main sense of that much-abused term). The third, somewhat amorphous, cluster of positions Rodman describes, noninstrumental, value to natural items, such as - on some versions of the position wilderness. Nature Moralisms, do just that, assign intrinsic, f/zat [An] alternative perspective ... [to] the theme of wise use 4 5 ... is provided by the tradition growing out of the humane movement, recently radicalised by animal liberationists, and sometimes generalised to embrace non-animal beings as well. In contrast to the economic ethos of Resource Conservation and the religious/ esthetic character of Wilderness Preservation, this perspective is strikingly moral in style. Its notion of human virtue is not prudence or reverence, but justice. In contrast to the caste­ bound universe of the Resource Conservationist, the Natural Moralist affirms the democratic principle that all natural entities (or, more narrowly, all forms of life) have intrinsic value, and that wild animals, plants, rivers, and whole ecosystems have a right to exist, flourish and reproduce - or at least that human beings have no right to exploit or unnecessarily harm or destroy other members of the biotic community. In contrast to the aristo­ cratic universe of Wilderness Preservation, where some places (and some forms of recreation) are holier than others and certain types of natural entities ... are traditionally more worthy of being saved than others ..., the world of the Nature Moralist is characterised by an apparent egalitarianism ((b), p.50^ my rearrangement). Each of the sweep of environmental alternatives indicated can be seen as an of conventional Western ethics: intrinsic value is extended uniformly to all animals or certain favoured features of all these, e.g. their experience, happiness, avoidance of suffering, or is extended to all living creatures or systems, or is extended to all natural items or even to objects - it may or may be distributed uniformly or equally; Human use and human experience, it might be added. 44 rather independently, rights may be ceded to all animals, or to some or all living things, or to all things, or, alternatively and differently, right-holders' rights with respect to some or other of these classes are restricted; and similarly other deontic notions, justice, obligation, even perhaps duty, may extend to apply to larger classes of items than all humans or persons. The sweep, which is impressive, is intended to include both extended utilitarianisms, e.g. Bentham's utilitarianism as revamped by Singer according to which all sentient creatures are entitled to equal consider­ ation of interest, and extended (legal) rights doctrines, e.g. the assignment of rights or legal standing to all natural objects as suggested by, for instance, Stone.it also includes Darwin's ethic and Leopold's "land ethic". 4 7 In order to capture some of the intended examples of Nature Moralists, and all the Moral Extension positions, Rodman's characterisation requires some adjustment - which will be taken for granted in what follows. For example, Singer and other animal liberation- ists do not assign intrinsic value to all forms of life, or even to all animals; but (as Rodman is well aware) to all sentient creatures; that is, further classifications have to be taken into account. The egalitarian, or uniformity, assumptions that serve in character­ ising Natural Moralism are mistaken. Not all objects are of equal value; some are more valuable then others, while some have little or no value (and some have a negative value). Impressive though the sweep of extensions is, all the positions indicated should be rejected on one ground or another, and sometimes on several grounds. Against positions which do not extend the class of objects of moral concern and candidates for value to include all objects, variants of the counterexamples to the Western super-ethic can be directed. Consider, for instance, the positions (of usual animal liber- ationists) which extend the moral boundaries just to include sentient creatures (or e.g. preference-havers). Adapt the Last Man and Last People examples, the Wilderness example, etc., by removing all (inessential) animals from the examples, e.g. the wilderness contains no animals, in the Last People situation there are no other animals than the 46 p. singer, *??; E-ZEerafZc /VeD Random House, New York, 1975; C. Stone, op. cit. 47 at least on a straightforward reading of Leopold's eventual position: but not according to Rodman; see his contrast of Leopold with Stone, p.110. Darwin's ethic, which anticipates Leopold's, is presented in C. Darwin, Second edition, J. Murray, London, 1883. 48 On next page. 45 last people themselves. Then the counterexamples apply as before against the liberation positions. It is unnecessary to go quite so far afield to fault such positions, at least in practice: facts of experience: as.Rodman might put it, they are countered by the ... I need only to stand in the midst of a clear-cut forest, a strip-mined hillside, a defoliated jungle, or a dammed canyon to feel uneasy with assumptions that could yield the conclusion that no human action can make any difference to the welfare of anything but sentient animals (p.89). But an advantage of the counterexamples is that the same examples, among many others (e.g. situations devoid of sentient creatures, situations where the message of experience conflicts with justice or fairness), reveals the erroneousness of the well-sponsored thesis, a simple analogue of empiricism, that all value 49 derives from experience (of experiential, or sentient, objects). A corollary is that value is not to be assessed either, in any simple way, in terms of the facts of experience. Insofar as Nature Moralism relies upon simple extensions of utilitarianisms, or of subjectivisms, to include a larger class of subjects, (a larger base class), such as all present sentient creatures, or all preference-havers at any one time, * etc., it is open not merely to adaptations of the argument against chauvinism (animal chauvinism is not that much more satisfactory than human chauvinism), but most of the Nor, on Moral Extensions, need all objects that have rights have equal rights. Rights may not be very democratically distributed. Some things have rights, e.g. as a result of agreements, of a sort others do not hold or are not capable of holding. Even rights to exist, to flourish and to reproduce (each case is different) are in much doubt where there is scarcity or conflict and where some right holders are taken to be worth much more than others. Nor are such leading examplars of Natural Moralism as Singer and Stone, though they are concerned to extend principles of justice, committed to equality of rights assumptions. Stone explicitly rejects equal distribution of rights; but the principle that all natural objects are equal in having rights, which really says no more than that they all have rights, is at best a very weak egalitarian principle. Singer offers (and presumably would offer) no equality of rights principle, rejects an equality of treatment principle, and proposes as a principle of equality a (near vacuous) principle of equal consideration of interests. Not, this time, knowledge. But amusingly "value empiricism" collapses into empiricism proper given the Socratic identification: Value (generalising Virtue) is knowledge. The only natural stopping point under value empiricism is, of course, with all creatures that have (or could have) the relevant experiences: again not with humans. 46 standard objections to utilitarians, subjectivisms, etc. Many versions of Nature Moralism may than be defeated on rather conventional grounds. There emerges, further, a dilemma for extensions. Either the crucial notions of right and intrinsic value are extended to all sentient creatures (experience-havers), in which case the objections just lodged apply, or they are extended more sweepingly, e.g. to all natural objects. But the latter involves attributing to such items attributes they do not have, most obviously rights to such objects as stones; it also violates the conditions that have to be met for the holding of rights and for the entitlement of rights. Thus, for example, Stone considers underpinning his extension of rights, beyond sentient creatures in the ordinary sense - or of legal rights beyond recognised "legal persons" - by a postulate of 50 universal sentience or consciousness; in short, by an unacceptable metaphysics, or myth. There are several further objections which work against many versions of Natural Moralism to which Rodman draws attention: (1) Moral Extensions are 'inadequate to articulate the intention that sustains the [environmental] movement' wilderness preservation movements. (p.88), specifically wilderness and It takes but little argument to show that utilitarian ethics, such as Singer's, so far from assisting the environmental movement, can (if adopted) reinforce the case wilderness and preservation of wild species. But an extension like Stone's extension of legal rights can help, and has helped, at least in the courts where its meta-physical underpining is unlikely to be glimpsed. The basic point is however that the rights talk does not connect with, and is insensitive to, the experiential basis. Mere extensions of moral notions such as interest or right or justice are insufficient to treat and do just­ ice to the multi-dimensional depth of environmental issues, such as the damming of a river (p.115). Part of the reason is said to be that the usual moral aparatus, which was evolved in the case of certain person-to-person See Rodman's discussion, pp.92-3. But Rodman overstates his case in claiming that 'some such postulate as universal consciousness is there­ fore necessary if the notion of rights for trees is not to seem a rootless fancy'. For, as explained below, extended rights can be defined by a rather "natural extension" of the familiar notion of right, without any such postulate; and grounds of entitlement can be traced back to value of the items. Certainly extended rights sever what linkage there may have been between rights and liabilities, but with the modern separations of rights from responsibilities that linkage was already damaged or broken. 47 relations, is inadequate for getting to grips with a new dimension of moral experience, that concerned with environment, and inadequate to reflect ecological sensibility. Rodman tries to press, however, a much stronger, and rather more dubious, theme, the SsZZ-onf thesis: By adapting the moral/legal theory of 'rights', [the movement] may sell its soul, its roots in mythic and ritual experience, to get easier judicial standing (p.88); and more savagely, the progressive extension model of ethics, while holding out the promise of transcending the homocentric perspective of modern culture, subtly fulfills and legitimates the basic project of modernity - the total conquest of nature by man (p.97, also p.119). While neither of these large claims is strictly true - soul-selling is simply avoided through adoption of the notion of extended-right, which can yield a conservative extension of the original position; and even utilitarians may be committed to blocking projects which threaten free animals - each has a substantial point. Part of the point behind the latter claim is worth developing separately:(2) Moral Extensions typically cast natural objects, notably animals, in the role of inferior humans, 'legal incompetents', imbeciles, human vegetables, and the like. They are ... degraded by our failure to respect them for having their own existence, their own character and potentialities, their own forms of excellence, their own integrity, a degradation usually reflected in our reduction of 'them to the status of instruments for our own ends', and not removed 'by "giving" them rights, by assigning them to the status of inferior human beings' (p.94). Many of us know where the treatment of natural objects as mere means The mistaken treatment of them for human ends tends to lead and has led. as inferior humans, a treatment which fails to see and 'respect the otherness of nonhuman forms of life', leads in the same direction. For given that animals, for example, are inferior, it is legitimate to treat them also as inferior; a greater value principle, which moral extensions typically endorse, yields a similar result. The needs of increasing populations of superior humans will eventually outweigh, if they do not do so already, the cases of inferior inhabitants of this finite earth for the retention of their natural habitats. 48 For their rights and their In the larger perspective, the Moral values will be less than "ours". Extensions, with their built-in greater value assumptions, do legitimate the conquest of nature by humans. Thus too they fail seriously, on what will soon enough be quite practical grounds, as satisfactory environmental ethics. (3) The extensions, like the parent ethics which they extend, are narrowly individualistic, and insufficiently holistic. This is particularly conspicuous in the case of utilitarianisms, which in principle arrive at all assessments by some sort of calculations, e.g. summations and perhaps averaging, from an initially given unit conforming to requisite equality conditions, e.g. equal consideration, equal units of suffering. In practice of course the method is, almost invariably, to pretend that the calculations will yield results which agree with alternatively and previously arrived at, usually intuitive, often prejudiced, evaluations; that is, in practice the method is not applied except in a handwaving back-up fashion. The method is not applied in part because there are serious, well enough known, problems in applying it. The individualistic bias carried over in other moral extensions, e.g. any experiential theory, likewise limits their satisfactoriness. It is to understate the matter to say merely that 'the moral atomism that focuses on individual animals and their subjective experiences does not seem well adapted to coping with ecological systems' (p.89), 'to explore the notion of shared habitat and the notion that an organism's relationship to its natural environment may be an important part of the organism's character' ((b), p.52). A moral atomism that focuses on individuals, discounting their interrelations, is bound to result in ecological complexes that matter (such as ecosystems, wilderness, and species) getting seriously short-changed. To illustrate:- Under atomism, the value of a complex, or the rights of a complex, amount to no more than those of its individual members; but since these are, in isolation from the complex, no more valuable than other things of their order, e.g. one gentian than another, a bush rat from a Norwegian rat, there no special merit in a complex, or rights attaching to it, in virtue of its rareity or uniqueness or special features as a complex. Thus, for instance, a utilitarianism under which only individual animals count assigns, and can assign, no special value to species, and can (as remarked) be used to argue against preservation of species: Since all animals are equal - or at least all animals of the same genus are more or less equal - one can substitute for another. Fora rare species of rat to die out painlessly cannot matter while there are plenty of other rats. A rights theory is in similar difficulties so long 49 as rights are assigned only to individuals, taken in isolation from their environmental setting (i.e. only to the usual separable individuals of philosophical theory). These problems may be avoided, in part, by assign­ ing rights to complexes (given the notion of rights will take that much further stretching; which it will not if right holders are assumed to be conscious or to be preference-havers), and by attributing independent value to complexes. But, since the value of a whole is sometimes more than the sum of the separable values of its individual members, this move involves the rejection of usual atomism, utilitarianisms in particular. The objection against the narrow individualism of the extensions - a defect they share with standard ethics which do not admit of ready extension, such as contract theories - soon broadens into an objection that these extensions are built on an inadequate metaphysics, a metaphysics of rather isolated individuals who (or which) are seriously depauperate in An ethics presupposes a metaphysics at their relations with other objects. least through its choice of base class: thus for example, usual homocen- tric formulations of utilitarianisms and contract theories suppose a base class of narrowly self-interested humans. The remedy is not (as Rodman suggests in various places in his elaboration of Ecological Resistance) to move to holism: to do so would be to accept the other half of a false dichotomy mainstream philosophical thought engenders (cf. Routley (g), this volume). It is rather to move to a metaphysics that is built on a concept­ ion of objects (which may or may not be individuals) which are rich in their interrelations and connections. In summary, the moral extensions are the wrong direction in which to seek a satisfactory environmental ethic. But the failure of Nature Moralism does not mean, as Rodman tends to assume, that all positions that are moral in style are thereby ruled out. 51 For one thing, Nature Moralism, as characterised (or generalised), is far from exhaustive of the range of prima facie viable moral positions. More satisfactory positions will simply avoid the damaging assumptions of Nature Moralism (and likewise those of inadequate ethical positions, such as contract theories or naturalism, and those linking morality to legality; For another, if the quest is for an ruled out. cf. p.103). moral notions can hardly be Even if it is assumed that the call for a 'new ethic' is 'to guide the human/nature relationship (p.95) - a somewhat unfortunate way of putting it - whereas what matters is the human/nature relationship itself, and that in coping with that relation fixation on morality or 51 His thesis of the 'limitation of the moral/legal stage of unconscious­ ness' is investigated in more detail in what follows. 50 legality is a serious handicap, and may contribute to the problem of the relationship rather than helping solve it (pp.103-4); still part of the problem is that of indicating entitlements of agents with respect to their environment, what sort of exploitation, if any, is permissible, what the limits on conventional morality are, and discovering 'a larger normative order within which we and our species-specific moral and legal systems (p.97). have a niche' Nor, in outlining Ecological Resistance, does Rodman shrink from using - he could not avoid the effect of - axiological terms such as 'good' and deontic terms such as 'should'; he does not doubt, for example, that some of what is natural that is threatened is valuable and that threats to it should be resisted; and he admits that 'prudence, justice, and reverence may be essential parts of a[n ecologic­ ally] good life'. Ecological Resistance, which is said to be the alternative 'most faithful to the integrity of experience', exhibits indeed the negativity of resistance. The position is founded on action, resistance, and theory only emerges retrospectively (if perhaps at all). Its (insufficiently qualified) central principle is 'that diversity is natural, good and threatened by the forces of monoculture'. The struggle between these forces, diversity and monoculture - between (ecological) good and evil - occurs in several different spheres of experience, i.e. at various levels, which reflect one another. Resistance is not undertaken for self-interest or utilitarian reasons, or for moral reasons, or for religious or mystical reasons (such as preventing profanation), but because the threat to the [natural object or system] ... is perceived aZso as a threat to the self, or rather to the principle of diversity and spontaneity that is the endangered side of the basic balance that defines and sustains the very nature of things ((b), p.54). The disjunction, 'or', separates however two rather different (though combin­ able) reasons-cum-motives for resistance. The second disjunct yields the following reasons for resistance (which are linked by a metaphysical assumption connecting diversity and spontaneity with the nature of things): (i) The threat to the natural item is a threat to the principle of diversity and spontaneity. So, by the central principle, it is a threat to what is good, etc. (ii) The threat to the natural object 'is a threat to the very nature of things': (as to how consider the example of the wild river threatened by a dam, p.115). So - by an unstated, but nonetheless implied and assumed, principle, that the very nature of things is good (and natural) it is a threat to the forces of good. 51 The first disjunct yields form: a further, different, argument; in simplest (iii) The threat to the natural object is a threat to oneself. What is a threat to oneself is bad and to be resisted, so what is a threat to the natural object is bad and has to be resisted (since what is bad should, in general, be resisted). Although the arguments are valid, the underlying principles are faulty; for instance, the diversity (and spontaneity) principle because it is too simple (and so too does not harmonize with the nature of things); and the second principle, the intrinsic merit of the very nature of the things, because not everything that is the case or is natural is meritor­ ious, e.g. genuinely natural disasters. Rodman plans to avoid obstacles to adopting nature as an absolute standard and, at the same time, to bridge the gap the principle spans, by resort to a version of naturalism which equates 'the "natural" with the "moral"' (pp.96-7). But for well- known reasons which can be supported (e.g. those telling against objective ethics of the sort such naturalism would yield), substantive evaluative assumptions cannot be removed in this fashion; though they can be suppressed, they reappear as soon as connections between empirical The trouble, characteristic of reductionism, arises from the mistaken attempt grounds and evaluative judgments based upon them are queried. to collapse a grounding, or founding, relation to an identity, to close the gap - which is not problematic but is widely thought to be problem­ atic - between value and empirical fact by a reduction of value to fact, of the thesis that evaluative features are grounded on natural features to the thesis that evaluative features are nothing but certain natural 52 features (e.g. to be good is just to have certain natural features). 52 Rodman interprets naturalistically the statement of Jonas's that he quotes approvingly (p.95): Only an ethic which is grounded in the breadth of being, not merely in the singularity or oddness of man, can have significance in the scheme of things ... an ethics no longer founded on divine authority [or upon human arete], must be founded on a principle discoverable in the nature of things ... . He interprets it in terms of 'an ontologically-grounded moral order in the "the phenomenon of life" or "the nature of things".' In this way can be avoided the reduction of 'the quest for an ethics ... to prattle about "values" taken in abstraction from the "facts" of experience'. But Jonas's statement can be construed nonnaturalistically, by taking the founding or grounding relation seriously, as connecting, but not reducing, values to empirical facts. So construed the statement does help in delineating the sort of environmental ethics sought. 52 Such reductions commit the naturalistic and prescriptive fallacies - which can be avoided neither by thinking 'our way through or around them' (p.97), nor by holistic assimilation of morality in a 'more encompassing ethical life' (p.103 and note 66). But details of the fallacies need not detain us, since we can consider immediately Rodman's important suggestion 53 for circumnavigating them (pp.103-4). Under natural social conditions, such as are obtained in some traditional societies and in some free animal societies (as ethological studies reveal), but have been lost in modern societies, law and morality, at least in their coercive aspects, would disappear, as they did in William Morris's /row and somewhat as they would in a Kantian community of fully autonomous beings. In terms of modern physics, morality and law are not invariants but vary under transformation of axes, and in fact vanish or prove eliminable under a suitable transformations, e.g. to a natural condition. There is a similar natural condition for morality and legality, a condition in which the prohibitions now prescribed 54 by God, Conscience and the State would have operated "naturally" (i.e. from inside the organism, as a matter of course), and patterns now stated prescriptively could have been stated descriptively. When the Way is abandoned, then we get Humanity and Justice (Tac Te #18) (p.103). Even if a change of social axes could place us back on the Way, or on the way to the Way, morality is not really avoidable in our local frame where we are far from the Way. So ethical disputes over environmental matters 55 are also unavoidable; * for those a satisfactory ethic is a desideratum, and can help in bringing about a change of social axes. Thus too, the identity of the prescriptive with the descriptive, of "ought" with (suitable) "is", is a merely contingent (extensional) one and fails in 53 The suggestion helps explain not only Rodman's naturalism, but his thesis of the limitation of morality and legality; it also introduces the anarchistic social change view that suffuses much of the (very uneven) later parts of (a): the view appears therein as the elabor­ ation of what is 'unthinkable'. 54 Given prevailing socio-economic conditions it should be rather: that would (ideally) be prescribed. Let us hope, for environmental reasons, that the principles that are lived by in natural conditions bear not too great a resemblance to those now prescribed. 55 Nor is there, in the local frame, much alternative but to resort to legal strategies, where they can be applied (where standing is granted), to delay "the war against nature". 53 alternative situations; hence, as always, there is no deduction of "ought" from "is", since deducibility would require coincidence in the alternative situations. Nor would morality - as distinct from legality, which requires some codification - strictly disappear under natural conditions, though its coercive aspects would: on the whole, as they ought to be. things would simply be, But while deontology would have a much diminished role (as it does on the preferred environmental ethic), axiology (the theory of value) would still have its place - some objects (e.g. diverse landscapes) would be more valuable than others (monocultural landscapes), some not valuable, etc. (As things stand, of course, axiology does have an important place in working out the theory of Ecological Resistance, especially in assessing its central principle of diversity.) The upshot is that without much elaboration (like that indicated below) of an axiological kind, which connects value through a grounding relation, as distinct from an identity, with the run of things (but not aZZ things) that are natural, reason (ii) for ecological resistance fails. Does reason (i), which is premissed on the central principle that diversity is good and natural and threatened by monoculture, fare any better? While it is a matter of fact that that diversity is threatened, indeed is being very rapidly reduced by the forces of monoculture, diver­ sity is not, as opponents of ecological values are wont to point out, an entirely unqualified good. Nor is diversity is always natural: a temperate rain forest can be "enriched" and rendered more diverse by interplanting of exotics (a practice foresters have applied, e.g. in New Zealand) but the result is not natural and sometimes at least bad. Or, differently, ecological diversity can often be increased by increasing edges between ecosystems, but the practice of increasing edges can easily be unnatural and far from good, as, e.g. in rainforest logging with (say) 50% canopy retention. So although a reduction of diversity is commonly bad, since the reduction reduces the quality of an ecological whole, and increase in diversity good, diversity can not be accepted as a solo principle. In fact, Rodman often couples diversity with other factors, such as naturalness (inadmissible in determining, noncircularly, what is good and natural), richness, spontaneity and integrity, which help to remove various of the counterexamples to a diversity principle. The procedure points in the direction to be pursued: replacement of the oversimple principle of diversity by a principle combining all relevant ecological factors. After all ecological sensibility - ecological resist­ ance is assumed to be the position of the person of ecological sensibility requires sensitivity to all such ecological factors. 54 Once it is determined through consideration of a mix of ecological factors, that, or whether, a natural object is good or valuable the reasons for resistance can be restated: (iv) Where a natural object is valuable - as c/fe?? natural objects are, a natural object does not have to be very ecologically distinctive to be valuable - the threat to the natural object is a threat to what is But, other things being equal, threats to what is valuable valuable. should be resisted. So, similarly, threats to natural objects should often be resisted - and always (on whatever level) resisted where the objects are valuable and the costs of resisting are not overridingly high (to begin to spell out the ceteris paribus clause). It remains to tie in reason (iii), a key premiss of which can now take the initial form that the threat to a valuable natural object is a threat to oneself. A threat to what is valuable, to what one as a valuer values, is a threat to the valuer, to oneself, for these are one's values. To make some of those connections good again requires an excursion into axiology, one, this time, that connects what is valuable with a valuer's values. But Rodman, in trying to connect the threats to natural objects and to oneself, is forced further afield, and resorts to the myth of microcosm: 'Ecological Resistance involves a ritual affirmation of the Myth of Microcosm' universe' (OED). ((b), p.5.4), i.e'. the view of man 'as epitome of the While such an affirmation - without the ritual - would yield the requisite connection, it is a classic piece of anthropocentric- ism, quite hostile to a nonchauvinistic position, and, fortunately, inessential to genuine ecological resistance. What Rodman reaches for from the myth (which could be restated in terms of without its classic homocentric bias) is however extremely important: it is an account of the which is not a separate subject isolated from its (natural) environment (as a Humean individual is),56 but is connected intensionally and causally interrelated with that environment. Rodman introduces this metaphysics in rather old-fashioned terms: Ecological Resistance ... assumes a version of the theory of internal relations: the human personality discovers its structure through interaction with the nonhuman order. I am what I am at least partly in my relation to my natural environment, and changes in that environ­ ment affect my own identity. If I stand idly by and let it be destroyed, a part of me is destroyed or seriously deranged ((b) p. 54). Not Man Apart, in the terms of Friends of the Earth. 55 For among my interests are its interests, part of my welfare is its 57 welfare; I am identified in part with it. The metaphysics deepens, A resister 'does not stand over against then, the reasons for resistance. "his environment" as manager, sight-seer, or do-gooder; integral part of [it]' he is an ((b), p.56). But the environmental metaphysics, that underlies and helps support the ethics, that is part of a fuller environmental theory, need not be, and should not be if it is to be coherent, as (Hegelian and) holistic as Rodman immediately goes on to suppose that it is: ... By making the principle of diversity central, Ecological Resistance can incorporate the other three perspectives as moments within the dialectic of a larger whole. Economics, morality, and an esthetic religiosity have niches in the ecology of our experience of nature, and each has its limits (p.56 continued). But a principle of diversity which opposes the forces of monoculture will not yield pluralism, unless illegitimately extrapolated to theories where its merit is much less evident, especially when some of these theories are not only mutually inconsistent but false. Rodman risks the distinctive features of Ecological Resistance for a dubious synthesis. It is only true that the positions can be combined if the first three positions are limited indeed, and then a trivial combination with each theory working where it works (which may be nowhere actual in the case of the religious component) can be managed. Moreover Ecological Resistance properly developed, will lead to economic and ethical theories which compete with the rather conventional, and environmentally defective theories of, respectively, Resource Conservation and Natural Moralism. Not only is Ecological Resistance severely handicapped by having implausible holistic theses tacked in to it (not all of which have been discussed); further, Ecological Resistance is too negative. A more positive theory - which includes a theory of value and, ultimately, for a fuller environmental position, a metaphysics - is required, not only for orientation and to meet felt needs of environmentalists already noted, but for more effective, coherent and systematic resistance. It is but a short step to the 'fully ecological sensibility [which] knows with Carl Sandburg that:' There is an eagle in me ... and the eagle flies among the Rocky Mountains of my dreams and fights among the Sierra crags of what I want ... . And I got the eagle ... from the wilderness, (p.118) The poem almost admits of neutral logical formalisation. 56 trees, kill everything f/xe Farf/z, (ed. T.C. McLuhan, Sphere Books, London, 1973, p.15). The great care with which so many of the Indians utilized every portion of the carcass of a hunted animal was an expression, not of economic thrift, but of courtesy and respect (D. Lee, in Farf/z, p.15)- What the respect position is based on is the fact that it is possible to make use of something without treating it as something which is no more than a means to one's ends. That is, it is possible to make use of some­ thing in limited, constrained ways - with constraints which may not derive entirely from considerations of the welfare of other humans, as in the case of the Indians' use of animals - without treating it as available for any kind of use. To so use something without treating it as available for unlimited or unconstrained use for human ends is characteristic of use. In contrast non-respectful use treats the use of the item as constrained by no considerations arising from the item itself and the user's relationship to it, but as constrained only in a derivative way, by considerations of the convenience, welfare and so forth of other humans. The Western view, as the Indians realised, is the non-respect position, that the world is available for unconstrained human use. People who hold respect positions, such as the Indians, see such a position as indicative of a lack of moral sensitivity, and sometimes in even stronger terms. The conventional wisdom of Western society tends to offer a false dichotomy of use versus respectful nonuse - a false choice which comes out especially clearly again in the treatment of animals. Here the choice presented in Western thought is typically one of edf/zer use without respect or serious constraint, of using animals for example in the ways character­ istic of large-scale mass-production farming and a market economic system which are incompatible with respect, or on the other hand of not making any use of animals at all, for example, never making use of animals for food or for farming purposes. What is left out in this choice is the alternative the Indians and other non-Western people have recognised, the alternative of limited and respectful use, which enables use to be made of animals, but does not allow animals to be used in an unconstrained way or merely as a means to human ends. Such an alternative can have some applic­ ation in a Western context (for some limited examples of respectful use in the operations of a small farmer, see John Seymour, CompZtsfe Faber, London, 1976). A limited and respectful use position would condemn the infliction of unnecessary pain on animals, and also the treatment of animals as machines, as in factory farming. 84 It would also condemn unecessary and wasteful killing and especially killing for amusement or "sport", which is incompatible with respect and assumes that animals can be used merely as a means for human ends. But it would not necessarily oppose the use of animals in the case of approp­ riate non-trivial need, e.g. for food, although here again it would insist that the ways in which use can be made are limited, and not just by considerations of effect on other humans. The limited and respectful use position avoids some of the serious problems of the no-use position of the animal liberationists, although it shares many of the same beliefs concerning the illegitimacy of factory farming and similar disrespectful methods of making use of and exploiting animals. The no-use position faces the problem that it proposes that humans should treat animals in ways which are quite different from the ways in which animals treat one another, for example, prohibiting needful use for food. Thus the no-use position seems obliged to say either that the world would be a better place without carnivores, or else that carnivorous animals themselves are inferior, immoral, moral creatures - whichever, alternative amoral or non- is taken here the bulk of animals emerge as inferior to humans, or at least vegetarian humans. It implies too that an impoverished natural order which lacked carnivores - and given what we know of ecology this would be a very highly impoverished one indeed, not to say an unworkable "natural" order - is preferable to a rich natural one with a normal proportion of carnivorous and partly carnivorous species. carnivores, Since it would imply the moral inferiority of the no-use position appears to arrive at the negation of its own starting point, (as regards e.g., the equality consideration) of all animals, human and non-human. In thus seeing humans as capable of a moral existence which most animals are not capable of, it sees man as apart from a largely amoral, (or immoral) natural world, denies community with the animal and natural world,and indirectly reinforces human chauvinism. §6. TOWARDS AN ENVIRONMENTAL PHILOSOPHY: A PRELIMINARY SKETCH OF THE EXTENT OF PHILOSOPHICAL REVISION ENSUING ON ABANDONMENT OF CHAUVINISTIC ETHICS A radical change in a theory not uncommonly forces changes elsewhere - conceptual revision which affects not only the theory itself but many neighbouring areas. The phenomenon is well-known in the case of major physical theories, but it holds as well for ethical and philosophical theories; for example, a logical theory which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way has important repercussions throughout much of the rest of philosophy, and requires modification not only of logical 85 systems and their semantics, but also, for instance, of the usual meta­ theory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is 95 tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A thorough-going environmental ethics likewise has a substantial impact and forces many changes. The escape from human chauvinism not only involves sweeping changes in ethical principles and value theory but it induces substantial'reverberations elsewhere - both inwards, for example in metaphysics, in epistemology, and in the philosophy and method­ ology of science, and outwards (in subjects that presuppose value theory) in social theory, in politics, in economics and in law, and beyond. For human chauvinism is deeply embedded in Western culture, and affects not only the ideology and the institutions but the arts. Thus, for example, much of literature, and especially of ballet and film, is given over to a celebration of things human, of the species. Even the timely new emphasis, for instance of the counterculture, on human relations (as opposed to self- contained private individuals of social theories) remains well within the inherited chauvinistic framework. As to the changes, let us begin again with ethics. As we have begun to see, an environmental ethic can retain, though in a much amended theoretical framework (which affects meanings of terms), virtually all the standard ethical terminology. But even at a superficial syntactical level, there will be conspicuous alterations: firstly, ethical terminology will be enriched with new environmental terms, drawn in particular from ecology, somewhat as it was expanded in the late nineteenth century by terminology from evolutionary theories; and secondly, accompanying the attitudinal shifts the new ethic involves, there will be a marked shift in ethical terminology, away from the predominance of such terms as (and examples associated with) 'obligation', to such expressions as 'care', 'respect', 'consciousness'. 'duty', 'concern', 'promise', 'responsibility', 'contract', 'trust', Because the theoretical and attitudinal frame is changed, an environmental ethic forces - as we have already found with such notions as and - reexamination of, and modified analyses of, characteristic ethical notions. It requires, furthermore, reassessment of traditional and conventional analyses of such notions as natural right, ground of right, and permissib­ ility, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions - much as it requires the rejection of most of the more prominent meta-ethical gr These points are explained in detail in Routley (e); and also in L. Goddard and R. Routley, T/ze py urui Context, Vol. 1, Scottish Academic Press, 1973, chapters 3 and 4. 86 positions. Cursory examination of recent accounts of nutMruZ wcrcZZtpj jMst-Zce and cctfc?? will help illustrate and confirm these points. Hart, for example, accepts (subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant) the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, any adult human ... capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons (H.L.A. Hart, 'Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in PcZZticuZ PbiZoscpbp, (ed. A. Quinton), Blackwell, Oxford 1967). But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the basic chauvinist principle - a variant of (D) - environmental ethics reject; since if a person has a natural right he has a right. So too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straightforward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. Another example of chauvinism at work in the very setting up of the field of discussion and problems in ethics is provided by recent accounts of .^ercZ'Ztp, where it is simply taken for granted that 'moral' distinguishe 96 among actions, policies, motives and reasons, and that what is moral refers essentially to human well-being (contentment, happiness or something of this general sort, tied with appropriate states or conditions of humans). Such criteria for what is moral are chauvinistic- ally based, assuming that what does not bear on human states or conditions cannot be a moral matter. What happens in worlds without humans, how animals fare or are treated, what is done or what happens to plants or other natural objects - none of these are directly moral matters, except insofar as they impinge on human welfare. That is human 96 Thus for instance, B. Williams, ^eruZitz/.- Xx tc Effies, Harper & Row, New York, 1972, p.79. Williams does, however, remark in his Preface (p.xiv) how 'shaky and problematic' the distinction - which he subsequently takes for granted - is. 97 see, for example, P.R. Foot, Tbecries cf FtZrZcs, Oxford University Press, London, 1967,and G.J. Warnock, Oc^tewpcrcrp McraZ PhZZcscpbp, Macmillan, London, 1967, and also The Object cf AfcrcZZty, Methuen, London, 1971. 87 chauvinism at work, and is at the same time a reductio such criteria. ad absurdum of A different nonchauvinistic account of what is moral is required (a beginning can be made by adopting certain of the maligned formal criteria). It is evident that any account which meets even weak conditions of adequacy will serve to meet the objection that an environmental ethic is not concerned with what is moral but is really an aesthetic theory. For the objection as usually presented depends squarely on a chauvinistic restriction on morality, all the rest of value theory being classed, or dismissed, as "(mere) aesthetics". The case of morality illustrates the characteristic way in which theories - in this case chauvinistic ethics - redefine crucial notions in their own terms to suit their own ends, such as entrenchment and fortification of the theories against objections. Further corollaries of the rejection of chauvinism include the inadequacy of recent fashionable attempts, mainly derivative from Hobhouse, at characterising eguuZitp and justifying it in ways that argue from man's humanity,98 and the inadequacy of much recent, largely chauvinistic, work which takes it for granted that action and 99 rationality requirements on action are bound up with human nature. in the philosophy of The abandonment of chauvinism implies the rejection not only of much ethical analysis, but of all current major ethical positions. The bias of prevailing ethical positions, and also of economic positions, which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is especially evident. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have (at least) an ordinal p- ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p-ranking of these states in terms of individual p-rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking, The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. go And Among such unsatisfactory liberal egalitarian positions are those presented in G. Vlastos, 'Justice and equality' in JooiuZ (ed. R.B. Brandt), Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962, and B.A.O. Williams, ' The idea of equality' in P^i^osoph^, Pacifies artJ Jpcietz/, Second series (ed. P. Laslett and W.G. Runciman), Blackwell, Oxford, 1963. 99 gee, e.g. T. Nagel, TTns PossiM7-7fi/ of Oxford, 1970. 88 Clarendon Press, even if the base class is extended to include persons or some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. To take a simple example, if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (still unfortunately the evaluation of most Australian farmers, though it lacks any requisite empirical basis). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with sperm whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if but few in the base class happened to know that sperm whales exist or cared a jot that they do, then even the most "rational economic decision­ making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. But whether the sperm whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Summed human interests, or preferences of certain private individuals, are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding upon what is environmentally desirable. Nor would such accidental bases be adequate. Moreover ways out of the problem do not bear much investigation. It cannot be assumed, for instance, that the base class is on the whole good, and hence will not enjoin reprehensible behaviour, because such an assumption seems false, would at best be contingently true (so that the theory would fail for different circumstances to which it should apply), and would involve a deep problem in the theory, since it would then seem to admit the determination of goodness - that of the base class, on the whole - independently of what the theory was set up to determine, among other things, goodness. Nor can it be assumed, without serious circularity that the optimisation is constrained by requirements of justice or fairness (see Routley (b) and §5 above). The ethical and economic theories just singled out (which are based on optimisation over select features of the base class) are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to mosf going meta- ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. That is, the argument against utilitarian-type ethical and economic theories generalises. For instance, on social contract positions, obligations are a matter of mutual agreement 89 between individuals of a given (but again problematic) base class; on a social justice picture, rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons;while on a Kantian position, which has some vogue, obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons.In each case, if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class, then that is unfortun­ ate for them: that is (rough) justice. Looking outwards from the ethics, the abandonment of chauvinism has likewise a wide set of consequences, both theoretical and practical, in One economics, politics and law, and generally in the social sciences major practical economic impact of environmental ethics is in the extent to which free enterprise can operate unimpeded or unchanged. of business and enterpreneurial activity - to But consider one option - will involve, in turn, either legal constraints, or reallocation of activity by such devices as environmental pricing, which directs activity away from environmentally undesirable pursuits. For example, if it is wrong to destroy a rare ecosystem in order to make a few more dollars, then restrictions should be imposed on business activity by one method or another. To some limited extent this is already happening in the field of pollution, but primarily because of the likely effects, direct or not too far removed, that pollution comes to have on other humans, not for a wider set of reasons, and often not for the right reasons. With a wider environ mental code, the public and legal intrusion into areas typically regarded as "private" and open to the free enterprise operations (of "open go") would be much more extensive. The same applies in the case of private 100 Thus for example, [Rawls'] original position seems to presuppose not just a neutral theory of the good, but a liberal, individualistic conception according to which the best that can be wished for someone is the unimpeded pursuit of his own path, provided it does not interfere with the rights of others. This view is persuasively developed in the later portions of the book, but without a sense of its controver­ sial character (T. Nagel, 'Rawls on justice', PkiZcscphicuZ 82 (1973), p.228). Nagel also effectively argues that Rawls' original position is not neutrally determined but involves substantial moral assumptions (e.g. pp.232, 233); they are mostly, as it happens, of a chauvinistic cast. 10^ While the first of Kant's maxims is not so restricted in actual form­ ulation, others are (see H.J. Paton, TPe Hutchinson, London, 1947. And, firstly, such maxims are s^pp<9se^ to be equivalent to ones formulated in terms of persons; secondly, they are supposed to be derived from features of, or connected with, people. 90 property; for example, given that it is not permissible to erode hill­ sides then there should, in this setting, be (legal) restrictions on farmers' and foresters' activities. Although the impact on the practice of economics of a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would be drastic - market negotiations, firms' activities,-international trade, all would be affected - the impact on the underlying theories of preference and choice is comparatively less, but still far from negligible. For much of economics is squarely founded on chauvinism. The theoretical bias follows directly from the utilitarian bases of the theory, which is fairly explicit in welfare theory and rather heavily disguised in neoclassical theory. But although choice and value theory are, as characteristically presented in economics and elsewhere, damagingly chauvinistic, they do not have to be. For the theories can be reformulated in a non-chauvinistic way, as was indicated (in §5) above for utilitarianism - upon which economic theory is modelled. On such a revamped foundation an environmental economics to match the chosen environmental ethic can be built (for some preliminaries on this approach, see Routley (d), appendices 1 and 6). Several of the objections to base class theories such as utilitar­ ianism apply not merely against orthodox economic theory, but also to voting theory, to representative democratic systems of determination of political action. If, for, example, the base class consists of private individuals motivated by their own self-contained interest then such procedures can readily lead to most undesirable results, especially if these individuals compromise representative individuals. their autonomy through the election of For the more powerful of these representative individuals can be - and typically are, as their behaviour if not their protestations show - not favourably disposed to (the welfare of) things outside the base class or even to many members of the base class. Nearer the theoretical surface, especially in such branches of economics as "resource management", the chauvinism is more conspicuous. The following narrowly utilitarian assumption is quite typical: The goal of resource managers should be to communicate and act in ways that maximize human satisfaction (H.J. Campbell, 'Economic and social significance of upstream aquatic resources' in Forest Fses Oregon State University, Corcallis, 1971, p-14, also p.17). When management - where such is management becomes needed at all - the goals will be changed from such chauvinistic ones. 91 The method of interference in "free economic enterprise", of controls and regulations, of legal and political constraints, is only one way in which leading principles of an environmental ethics can be put into effect. A quite different, and ultimately far more appealing, approach is by way of structural change, by changing the socio-economic structure in such a way that it comes to reflect on environmental ethics (by altering the frame of reference, or axes, to use the physical picture of §4, so.that major problems vanish). Requisite structural change is 102 . far-reaching, both practically and theoretically' in every reach of social science. For example, while on the position, capitalist markets are subject to further regulation, either directly imposed or by way of suitable pricing policies, in the sfrzzcfLzraZ- position, capitalist markets are eliminated; while under state regulation private property is subject to further controls,given approp­ riate structural change private property disappears. Looking inwards, an environmental ethic has an impact on the practice of many sciences other than the social sciences - what they do experimentally with natural objects (e.g. the treatment of animals in laboratory testing); how their research programmes are organised and directed (consider, e.g., projects involving irradiation or broadscale herbicide treatments of rainforests); the way classifications are made and which are made (consider, e.g. the extent to which human perception enters into classifications in botany); recommended on the basis of such sciences. and, of course, what is For as it stands human chauvinism is deeply embedded in the practice of science, directly in research and experimentation and in shaping classifications, theses and theories. Indeed the effect of a different ethic may extend even to the theory of such sciences, in particular through the bearing the ethic has 103 on metaphysics which in turn influences the foundations or such sciences. Such a new ethic would quite properly upset (as §1 should indicate) the extent to which humans are seen at the centre of things and things as accountable through them and scientific theories as 'human constructions wrestled from a hostile nature' (after Popper). It would help overthrow the pernicious chauvinistic idea that, apart from certain elementary facts, AZZes value. isf AfeyzscZzoMMor^., all necessity, all intensionality, all It should result too in the shattering of still widespread As (g) V. and R. Routley, 'Social theory, self management and environmental problems', this volume, begins to explain. Cf. R. Harre, P/zi^osop?zies of 1972; and also Routley (e). 92 Oxford University Press, assumptions as to the nature of animals and plants, for instance that their apparently goal-directed and intensional behaviour can be explained (away) mechanistically, and the deeply-rooted idea that some sort of Cartesian metaphysical picture of natural, as distinct from spiritual or rational, objects can be maintained (cf. again §1). In metaphysics there are at least two further important classes of effects. Firstly, the orthodox views of man's relation to nature, the dominant and modified dominant and lesser traditions, have to be abandoned and new positions worked out. In this sense, a new environmental ethic implies a similarly new metaphysic redefining Man's place in nature and human/nature relationships.^^4 such a new philosophy of nature will recognise various natural objects other than humans as of independent value, so it will not be naturalistic. Nor will it view natural objects as simply available for the use, wise or otherwise, of humans. Several principles derived from the orthodox metaphysical positions will have to be abandoned and replacements worked out (as in the case of (D) in ethics). Thus superseded, for example, will be the principles of total use of natural areas for human use and of maximum long-term productivity of the earth's resources (principles criticised in their application in forestry in Routley (d)). At a deeper level, such a philosophy of nature will involve a turning away from the leading ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment and of much that went with them (e.g. with the Rennaissance, the rise of commerce, bureaucracy, professionalism, formal education, and subsequently, with the Enlightenment, the rise of the modern state, capitalism and scientific enlightenment). For it means the dismissal of the chauvinistic principles of the Renaissance, with 'Man as the kernel of the Universe', a creature 'half-earthly and half—divine, his body and soul form[ing] a microcosm enabling him to understand and control Nature . ..'.^O-^ It means too removal of the humanism of the Enlightenment, the reduction of what formerly was assigned to the religious, such as ethical and political principles, to the human, a reduction which 404 Passmore has observed - inconsistently with what is claimed in his (a) - in 'Attitudes to Nature', Poz/aZ. Irzstitz^te P/ziZ-csopTzz/ lectures, volume 8, Macmillan, London, 1975. As against Passmore (a) p.3, such new ethics and metaphysics need involve no abandonment of 'the analytical, critical approach which is the glory of the West': on the contrary, they may well mean a more thoroughly critical and analytical approach than hitherto. 104 goth quotations are from ?7ze <9/ t/z<3 Pgrzaissa^cg (ed. D. Hay) Thames and Hudson, London 1967, pp.7-10, where too main movements, practical and ideological, of the Renaissance are usefully indicated. 93 was based on the false dichotomy, which has still not lost its hold: reli.gious or humanistic. Secondly, the removal of humans from a dominant position in the natural order renders immediately suspect a range of familiar philosophical positions of a verificationistic or idealistic kind such as phenomenalism in epistemology (how can what exists depend on what is perceived by members of such a transitory and perhaps not so important species or on whether there exist <2722/ perceivers?), intuitionism in mathematics, con­ ventionalism in logical theory, the Copenhagen interpretation in micro­ physics, and subjectivisms not only in ethics but in every other philosophical sphere. True, most of these positions are defeated on the basis of other considerations anyway; but it is an immediate and further point against them that they are damagingly chauvinistic. Thus a corollary of the thoroughgoing rejection of human chauvinism, of very considerable philosophical importance, is the rejection of all 'the usual forms of idealism, i.e. all positions which accord primacy to the human subject and make the existence of a world of things or the nature of things dependent upon such subjects. A paradigmatic example is phenomenalism; other examples are Kantian idealisms, Hegelianisms and later German idealisms, Christian philosophies based on the primacy of human (and superhuman) consciousness, existentialisms; more surprising examples are empiricisms - inasmuch as all knowledge and truth is supposed to be ultimately derived from human experience - and their holistic images, dialectical materialisms and Marxisms. A satisfactory environ­ mental philosophy will be significantly different from all these positions. 94  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 20, Item 3: Draft of Human chauvinism and environmental ethics Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. Pages 57-85 missing. Paper published, Routley R and Routley V (1980) 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Mannison DS, McRobbie, MA, Routley R (eds) Environmental philosophy, Dept. of Philosophy, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=val+routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 20, Item 3 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf + [94] leaves. Type The nature or genre of the resource Correspondence Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:31eb305">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:31eb305</a> Box 20: More Green Como House Como House > [Item not listed with location] https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6db9a961bde3d0b17db9e298cfd1671c.pdf 85ed333c9f621698d20f3ac1ca75434a PDF Text Text ��� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Booklets notes Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Booklets - Ms notes. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [3] leaves. 4.83 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fac1e9d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fac1e9d</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Shelves - Top - Pile 3 Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2eda98db09164dd828449f4feb143531.pdf 4bd02eb1ecb56a9392c4cdbd4272e853 PDF Text Text PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busy work includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. —— --------- ------------------ 1------ CL .A. — Tgqg-- / ----- L—------------------------------------- cr/ 1 z/ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busy work includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. —— --------- ------------------ 1------ CL .A. — Tgqg-- / ----- L—------------------------------------- cr/ 1 z/  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft abstract of Paradigmatic roots of environmental problems Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 24 May 1995. Trimmed paper pasted on leaf with annotations. Handwritten top of printout: Run new copy. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-24 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 2.6 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7a8f99b">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7a8f99b</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Shelves - Top - Pile 3 Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b9fca5817f01bde715e15d193d55a5e6.pdf e836ad9123330e9aedfdc0894abba404 PDF Text Text 3.7.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: an initial reports Much of what follows is organised around the following thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and to support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socio- environmental news. Presumably that expands, in tum, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. because there are lesser or recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the qualification is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Western philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even crm'ca/, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main title evolved from that of Caidera, P/n/o-yo/y/iy C7in.y, who was searching (rather unsuccessfuiiy) for a Latin-American phiiosophy. Some of this report was thought through in Brasi!, under the partial support of FASPEC. 2 See, for instance, the expiication of Taoism in UTD. �2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.^ There are crises conditions in in wany (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine That we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume efforts to control environmental and social problems.^ They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be 'better off persists, conveniently buttressed by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non-European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does aat have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks, women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. �3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: * the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set.^ Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example * the dominant modern paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. * the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schema, was contrasted, by Cotgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example * a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises (environment construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so? But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates around 'the current development model', what went wrong with it and what might replace it, Paleocrassus never bothers to explain that model or For �4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.s It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.^ Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and 'the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover, 10 or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.n To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy -> technological mastery (supremacy, dominance) -* environmental destruction — or some such, with ' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted faces a validity issue). to supply its components. But what can be gleaned indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as "expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. �5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a philosophy end. 12 That argument is by contraposition, and then thesis: Western transmission from an evident premiss. (Thatcherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi- mystical "thought"—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposed that modern German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however, in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artificial dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of and preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestant philosophy, in particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared: the further development of highly exploitative Christian attitudes to nature (and to pagans) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modern appropriation theories of property (notably by Locke), which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in colonized lands, and are now ceding undue power to exploitative corporations. Consider its less direct role in the preparing ground for industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants, its natural landforms and its matter were and are of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?). For the second linkage, Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructive technology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy of the ancient fallacy of equivocation. �6 many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where for instance philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). Unfortunately such examples are exceptions; as a rule, noticed philosophy appears to have helped in underwriting, shaping and even fostering dominant practices. It could regularly have been different: wherever theory operated to influence practice, philosophy could have served negatively, as a prime element of That too could be a significant role for philosophy today. Whatever the extent—arguably, then, very substantial—to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources. 14 For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in uneven detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct* is Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes', vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just "preservationist attitudes", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere "discouragement" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy in a region). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously':FiryfZy, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are 13 On the place in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, in EE, p.!46ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. �7 philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: * minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. * figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. * medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. 5<?C(?K(7Zy, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.^ Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^ Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 17 The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory, and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his 77:c EtAZcj of EnvZronwcnto/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that what Attfield pronounces as Hargrove's historical "excess" needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. �8 ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference. A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into process" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy—Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's of r/ic a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. For requisite �9 mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a super- valuational fashion, the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is independently grasped by Singer . in his account of the dominant Western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotelianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant of dominion in more ominous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper; it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'. It is a little surprising, too, that the usual uncritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis �10 When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the -Sr/Twym Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of CArz-sTzamry for at least its Erst eighteen centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom, and Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God gave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.^ Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history it has not included much concern. Moreover, lesser Christian alternatives, notably stewardship and perfectionism, whiie they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural world, offer little improvement upon longer term invidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of now emphasized desiderata: retention of wilderness, and maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity. As disturbingly, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers (historical linkage diminished) discourse. discourse to the substantially equivalent �11 Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard piecemeal work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modern rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued that although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: "Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable." Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a "speciesist", his system is not speciesist.^ If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Naess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding "double standards' in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly anthropocentric is consistently ignored by deep 21 Thus for example by Drengson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. �12 ecologists, as far as I have been able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: "Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may."23 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re­ appraisal (in an overdue history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz's overall position does just that. Consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).24 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast: he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.25). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university 'in favour of the 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's 24 For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p. 172. 25 'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump', Cottingham p. 193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. is fully cited in Bookchin. �13 more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appears due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not make undesirable changes in nature'.27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as/^'Zing 'to provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... 'to scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man'.28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infallibility-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. �14 metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life­ styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.29 Things even deteriorated on many fronts under the main philosophical movements that succeeded Leibnitz in Germany, and overwhelmed European and much of Western philosophy for more than a century, namely Kantianism and subsequent German idealism. Virtually all the prominent positions in this philosophical galaxy, in the main strongly supportive of a supposedly enlightened Protestantism, presumed and imposed a blanketing human chauvinism and associated social reductionism. For example, the universal universe of Kantian ethics comprosed the circle of humans (and perhaps super humans) only; nothing else counted, and even the proper treatment of animals (which was at least not entirely neglected) was supposed reduced to that of interhuman relations. Regrettably human chauvinistic assumptions also underlay and handicapped more benign reccessive alternatives in Germany, such as those afforded by Herder and through the much heralded nature romanticism movement. As is widely appreciated now, later parts of the broad German mainstream flowing on from Kant were much more deleterious, neglecting Enlightenment advances and sponsoring elements of Aryan or super-race chauvinism. Things were certainly rather different off the Continent in modern England, but in most environmental respects hardly better. But no doubt a different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced most of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and also otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, a reductionistic ideas, impressions or sense-data empiricism characteristically sharing the anthropocentrism of idealism,. Worse, this empiricism normally expands through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism.30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been comparatively little improvement in recent times. For positivism and its irrationalist successors, all ecologically shallow, all committed to technofix and for the most part to social engineering, have been prime 29 Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /otj of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see Sylvan 94. �15 philosophical inputs into the physical sciences and also into mainstream economics. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main philosophical informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory, and so on. Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these places are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-information factories. Unfortunately, the other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as conceptual analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, as environmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many respects worse. Anthropocentric emphases remain heavy in both French and German philosophy, which are the predominant forms. Both existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mired in human chauvinism. Social criticism, which has at least seriously addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communicational theory of Habermas is heavily biassed in favour of articulate humans, and excludes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-faH. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of —or end m present dominant form—with end period. Similarly, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy that leads to disaster, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, gray and brown sorts, which accordingly are liable to critical rejection. No end is implied to less grand and greener regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. 31 Such a theme is developed, though poorly and in a social setting, by Gellner. His case applies, with even more force, to environmental matters. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments for his floated claims. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet "communism". And so on; see also above. �16 Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stoked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. "Great thinker" and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspects of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their arguments are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. There woM/J be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in the South. Consider French philosophy, which along with Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is not established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability. Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place of tribally recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [integrated destruction] projects. Through a 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions on Latin-American philosophy. �17 regional network, a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a c<x.s^ for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. Naturalism regionalism does not preclude global linkages; what it should resist are forms of imperialism.^ None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., TiTyfory env/ronwenf? , Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., evo/Mf/on', Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Filosofia e Crise, Pela filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 1985. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocratic to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Gellner, E., Words & Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a study of ideology, V. Gollancz, London, 1959. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. 34 Fortunately we have not yet ascended to an edified world philosophy, any more than the worfd car (despite American efforts at globalization, including Solomon and Higgins), but the number of mainstream models is now rather small, and almost all so far are noisy and polluting. �18 Hruschka, J., '77z^ /z^z/z/zzzz^^ /zrzzzcz/?/^ z2zzz7 or/z^r ^z*Zy G^z*z7z#zz azz^zczparzozzj o/ zzrz/z^z*z^zzz r/z^ozy\ UtiHtas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., '77z^ ^zzz7 o/ ^/zzZojz?/?/zy\ address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historical survey of western philosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959. Routley, R., azzzZ Zzzzzzt^ o/^r^zgzzz^ zzz ^zzvzrozzzzz^zzrzz/ r/zozzg/zr <xzz<7 acfzozz',Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., 'Dozzzzzzazzf 2?rzz7s7z z^o/ogy, wzlTz r^Z^v<azzZ gzzvzrozzzzz^zz^Z coroZZz7z*z^\ typescript, Canberra, 1994. Sylvan, R., 7zzz/?a!cr o/^ZfezTzarzve ^ys't^zzz^ ozz z/z^ EzzZzg/zr^zzzzz^zzy Pro/^cf', typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Uropzzzj, 7ho azz<7 Eco/ogy', Green Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 3.7.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: an initial reports Much of what follows is organised around the following thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and to support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socio- environmental news. Presumably that expands, in tum, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. because there are lesser or recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the qualification is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Western philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even crm'ca/, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main title evolved from that of Caidera, P/n/o-yo/y/iy C7in.y, who was searching (rather unsuccessfuiiy) for a Latin-American phiiosophy. Some of this report was thought through in Brasi!, under the partial support of FASPEC. 2 See, for instance, the expiication of Taoism in UTD. 2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.^ There are crises conditions in in wany (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine That we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume efforts to control environmental and social problems.^ They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be 'better off persists, conveniently buttressed by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non-European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does aat have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks, women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. 3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: * the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set.^ Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example * the dominant modern paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. * the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schema, was contrasted, by Cotgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example * a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises (environment construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so? But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates around 'the current development model', what went wrong with it and what might replace it, Paleocrassus never bothers to explain that model or For 4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.s It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.^ Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and 'the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover, 10 or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.n To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy -> technological mastery (supremacy, dominance) -* environmental destruction — or some such, with ' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted faces a validity issue). to supply its components. But what can be gleaned indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as "expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. 5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a philosophy end. 12 That argument is by contraposition, and then thesis: Western transmission from an evident premiss. (Thatcherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi- mystical "thought"—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposed that modern German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however, in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artificial dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of and preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestant philosophy, in particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared: the further development of highly exploitative Christian attitudes to nature (and to pagans) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modern appropriation theories of property (notably by Locke), which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in colonized lands, and are now ceding undue power to exploitative corporations. Consider its less direct role in the preparing ground for industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants, its natural landforms and its matter were and are of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?). For the second linkage, Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructive technology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy of the ancient fallacy of equivocation. 6 many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where for instance philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). Unfortunately such examples are exceptions; as a rule, noticed philosophy appears to have helped in underwriting, shaping and even fostering dominant practices. It could regularly have been different: wherever theory operated to influence practice, philosophy could have served negatively, as a prime element of That too could be a significant role for philosophy today. Whatever the extent—arguably, then, very substantial—to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources. 14 For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in uneven detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct* is Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes', vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just "preservationist attitudes", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere "discouragement" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy in a region). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously':FiryfZy, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are 13 On the place in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, in EE, p.!46ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. 7 philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: * minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. * figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. * medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. 5<?C(?K(7Zy, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.^ Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^ Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 17 The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory, and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his 77:c EtAZcj of EnvZronwcnto/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that what Attfield pronounces as Hargrove's historical "excess" needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. 8 ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference. A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into process" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy—Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's of r/ic a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. For requisite 9 mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a super- valuational fashion, the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is independently grasped by Singer . in his account of the dominant Western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotelianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant of dominion in more ominous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper; it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'. It is a little surprising, too, that the usual uncritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis 10 When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the -Sr/Twym Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of CArz-sTzamry for at least its Erst eighteen centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom, and Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God gave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.^ Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history it has not included much concern. Moreover, lesser Christian alternatives, notably stewardship and perfectionism, whiie they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural world, offer little improvement upon longer term invidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of now emphasized desiderata: retention of wilderness, and maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity. As disturbingly, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers (historical linkage diminished) discourse. discourse to the substantially equivalent 11 Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard piecemeal work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modern rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued that although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: "Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable." Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a "speciesist", his system is not speciesist.^ If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Naess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding "double standards' in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly anthropocentric is consistently ignored by deep 21 Thus for example by Drengson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. 12 ecologists, as far as I have been able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: "Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may."23 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re­ appraisal (in an overdue history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz's overall position does just that. Consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).24 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast: he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.25). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university 'in favour of the 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's 24 For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p. 172. 25 'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump', Cottingham p. 193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. is fully cited in Bookchin. 13 more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appears due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not make undesirable changes in nature'.27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as/^'Zing 'to provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... 'to scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man'.28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infallibility-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. 14 metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life­ styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.29 Things even deteriorated on many fronts under the main philosophical movements that succeeded Leibnitz in Germany, and overwhelmed European and much of Western philosophy for more than a century, namely Kantianism and subsequent German idealism. Virtually all the prominent positions in this philosophical galaxy, in the main strongly supportive of a supposedly enlightened Protestantism, presumed and imposed a blanketing human chauvinism and associated social reductionism. For example, the universal universe of Kantian ethics comprosed the circle of humans (and perhaps super humans) only; nothing else counted, and even the proper treatment of animals (which was at least not entirely neglected) was supposed reduced to that of interhuman relations. Regrettably human chauvinistic assumptions also underlay and handicapped more benign reccessive alternatives in Germany, such as those afforded by Herder and through the much heralded nature romanticism movement. As is widely appreciated now, later parts of the broad German mainstream flowing on from Kant were much more deleterious, neglecting Enlightenment advances and sponsoring elements of Aryan or super-race chauvinism. Things were certainly rather different off the Continent in modern England, but in most environmental respects hardly better. But no doubt a different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced most of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and also otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, a reductionistic ideas, impressions or sense-data empiricism characteristically sharing the anthropocentrism of idealism,. Worse, this empiricism normally expands through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism.30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been comparatively little improvement in recent times. For positivism and its irrationalist successors, all ecologically shallow, all committed to technofix and for the most part to social engineering, have been prime 29 Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /otj of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see Sylvan 94. 15 philosophical inputs into the physical sciences and also into mainstream economics. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main philosophical informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory, and so on. Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these places are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-information factories. Unfortunately, the other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as conceptual analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, as environmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many respects worse. Anthropocentric emphases remain heavy in both French and German philosophy, which are the predominant forms. Both existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mired in human chauvinism. Social criticism, which has at least seriously addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communicational theory of Habermas is heavily biassed in favour of articulate humans, and excludes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-faH. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of —or end m present dominant form—with end period. Similarly, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy that leads to disaster, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, gray and brown sorts, which accordingly are liable to critical rejection. No end is implied to less grand and greener regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. 31 Such a theme is developed, though poorly and in a social setting, by Gellner. His case applies, with even more force, to environmental matters. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments for his floated claims. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet "communism". And so on; see also above. 16 Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stoked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. "Great thinker" and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspects of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their arguments are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. There woM/J be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in the South. Consider French philosophy, which along with Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is not established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability. Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place of tribally recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [integrated destruction] projects. Through a 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions on Latin-American philosophy. 17 regional network, a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a c<x.s^ for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. Naturalism regionalism does not preclude global linkages; what it should resist are forms of imperialism.^ None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., TiTyfory env/ronwenf? , Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., evo/Mf/on', Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Filosofia e Crise, Pela filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 1985. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocratic to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Gellner, E., Words & Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a study of ideology, V. Gollancz, London, 1959. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. 34 Fortunately we have not yet ascended to an edified world philosophy, any more than the worfd car (despite American efforts at globalization, including Solomon and Higgins), but the number of mainstream models is now rather small, and almost all so far are noisy and polluting. 18 Hruschka, J., '77z^ /z^z/z/zzzz^^ /zrzzzcz/?/^ z2zzz7 or/z^r ^z*Zy G^z*z7z#zz azz^zczparzozzj o/ zzrz/z^z*z^zzz r/z^ozy\ UtiHtas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., '77z^ ^zzz7 o/ ^/zzZojz?/?/zy\ address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historical survey of western philosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959. Routley, R., azzzZ Zzzzzzt^ o/^r^zgzzz^ zzz ^zzvzrozzzzz^zzrzz/ r/zozzg/zr <xzz<7 acfzozz',Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., 'Dozzzzzzazzf 2?rzz7s7z z^o/ogy, wzlTz r^Z^v<azzZ gzzvzrozzzzz^zz^Z coroZZz7z*z^\ typescript, Canberra, 1994. Sylvan, R., 7zzz/?a!cr o/^ZfezTzarzve ^ys't^zzz^ ozz z/z^ EzzZzg/zr^zzzzz^zzy Pro/^cf', typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Uropzzzj, 7ho azz<7 Eco/ogy', Green Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Grand philosophies and environmental crises: an initial report Subject The topic of the resource Printout (photocopy) of draft, dated 7 June 1995. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-07-03 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1cbefab">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1cbefab</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d95c8ba51440c590d49d8f2a4673afe9.pdf fb19d1d026a9b5d22a65104fa1b83d67 PDF Text Text 23.5.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: many problems and a few solutions, i Much of what follows is organised around the following thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socioenvironmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. because there are lesser or because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). Weyarn, because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the qualification is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of crz'y<?y, one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even crmca/, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main tide evolved from that of Caldera, unsuccessfully) for a Latin-American philosophy. 2 See, for instance, the explication of Taoism in UTD. anJ CrAyAy, who was searching (rather �2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.^ There are crises conditions in wany in wany (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine 'that we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume 1 efforts to control environmental and social problems.4 They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be 'better off persists, conveniently propped by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does nor have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks^women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. �3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: * the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set? Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example * the dominant modem paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. * the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schemata, was contrasted, by Colgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example * a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises (environs?!; construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so? But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates aroun^ 'the current For model', what �4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.a It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of pf anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.^ Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and 'the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover, *o or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.n To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy — or some such, with -* technological mastery (supremacy dominance) -> environmental destruction ' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted fo faces a validity issue). supply its components. But what can be gleamed indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as 'expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism coMp/gJ heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. �5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a philosophy end. an evident premiss. That argument is by contraposition, and thesis: Western transmission from (Thatherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi- mstical "thought"—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposes that modem German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artifical dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of an^preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestan philosophy in ^particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared, the further development of highly exploitative Christen attitudes to nature (and to programs) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modem theories of property (notably by Locke) which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in coroized lands. Consider its less direct role in the- preparing ground for (^^(industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants and its matter were of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). But wherever theory operated to influence 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?)^/For the second linkage Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructiv&-teehnology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy the ancient fallacy of equivocation. "7 ? . �6 practice, philosophy would have served negatively, as a prime element of That could be a significant rubber philosophy today. Whatever the extend (arguably, substantial) to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources.^ For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in greater detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct' is Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes', vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just "preservationist attitudes", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere "discouragement" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously':- Firsf/y, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: * minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. 13 On the rule in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, REE, p.l46ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. �7 * figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. * medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^ Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 1? The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his of Fnvironwgnro/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove's historical "excess" needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. �8 human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.^ A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into "process" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as 7K<2m.yfr<?<27?i? How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy —Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought ' mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a superb valuational fashion the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's Wiy^fow of the Wejr, a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. For requisite It is a little surprising, too, that the usual ameritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis Power. �9 usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is ^Independently grasped by Singer in his account of the dominant western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotlianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creations, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those , concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant ofj^\^v dominion in more onimous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all the^ moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'. When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild on^ (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. �10 Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the Si/wima Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of C/irfyham/y for at least its first eighteen j centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom^ And Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this Weyarn because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God J^fave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.20 / Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history is has not include^much concern. However, lesser Christian, notably stewardship and perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural workd, offer little improvement upon longer term insidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of emphasized and enhancement of biodiversity. As distinctively, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard detailed work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail^ by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers fracton discourse to the substantially equivalent (historical linkage diminished) paroJfgm discourse. �11 a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modem rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued and although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: "Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable." Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a "speciesist", his system is not speciesist.^ If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Waess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding 'double standards' in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly antliopocentric is consistently ignored by deep ecologists, as far as I have been^able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: "Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we 21 Thus for example by Dregson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin. <' �12 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re- ....... (in a history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz s overall position does just that, consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).^ Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.2$). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university "in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat' and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of 24 For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. 25 'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump', Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. ��13 Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appear due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cMwu/Zafive/y make undesirable changes in nature' .27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as /hi/mg To provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... To scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man' .28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life- 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infaHibihty-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. �styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.^ A different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced much of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, with this empiricism expanding through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism. 30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been compentively little improvement in recent times. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main cal informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory,... . Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-knowledge factories. The other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as cor^epttial analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, asunvisionmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many which are the predominant form. But existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mixed in human chauvinism. Social criticism which has at least seriously A / addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communcational' theory of Habernus favours articulate humans, and includes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-fall. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who 29 Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /oty of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see "Dominant British ideology'. 31 This theme is developed, in a social setting, by Gelher. His case applies, with over more force, to environmental matters. �15 would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of change, or end m present dominant form, with end, end period. For another, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, that leads to disaster, and accordingly is liable to rejection. No end is implied to less grand regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stroked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. "Great thinker" and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspect of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their argument are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, A different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet "communism". And so on; see also above. 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions in Latin-American philosophy. �16 There be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in South. Consider French philosophy, which along with A Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is n^ established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability.34 Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [abstruction] projects. Through a regional network a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., /t&rory o/p/tf/ojop/ty Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. 34 We do not quite have world philosophy, any more than the world car (despite American efforts, including Solomin & Higgins), but the numbermnainstream Odels is now rather small, and almost all so fai/ are noisy and polluting. A �17 Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., 'R^ZZ-ycoverZng ^voZMfZoK", Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Fiiosofia e Crise, Peia filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 198 5. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocrat to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Halls, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. Hruschka, J., '7%^ gr^a^-yf AappZ/z^jj prZncZpZe anJ ^arZy German anrZcZparfan^ p/ ariZ/rarZan r/z^ozy", Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., '77z^ gzzz7 p/* p/zZZo.yop/zy', address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland^ Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., 'DozzzZnanf I3rZfZ.y/z ZzZ^oZogy', typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., 7wp<2cf p/gZ^rnafZve <yyyfe/?z.y ozz Z/z^ EzzZZg/z^zzzzz^zzr Prp/^crtypescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., '<y UfopZzzy, 7ho amZ D^p EcoZogyGreen Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. Routley, R., "RoZgj <2K<7 ZZzzzZ^ p/p^r^Zgmjy Zzz g7zvZrozzmg/zZ<2Z r/zozzg/zr azzJ z7crZozz",Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historicai survey of western phiiosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 23.5.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: many problems and a few solutions, i Much of what follows is organised around the following thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socioenvironmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. because there are lesser or because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). Weyarn, because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.^ However the qualification is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of crz'y<?y, one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even crmca/, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main tide evolved from that of Caldera, unsuccessfully) for a Latin-American philosophy. 2 See, for instance, the explication of Taoism in UTD. anJ CrAyAy, who was searching (rather 2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.^ There are crises conditions in wany in wany (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine 'that we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume 1 efforts to control environmental and social problems.4 They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be 'better off persists, conveniently propped by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does nor have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks^women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. 3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: * the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set? Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example * the dominant modem paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. * the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schemata, was contrasted, by Colgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example * a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises (environs?!; construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so? But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates aroun^ 'the current For model', what 4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.a It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of pf anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.^ Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and 'the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment". In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover, *o or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.n To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy — or some such, with -* technological mastery (supremacy dominance) -> environmental destruction ' symbolising leads to, or yields (granted fo faces a validity issue). supply its components. But what can be gleamed indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as 'expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods' (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism coMp/gJ heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. 5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a philosophy end. an evident premiss. That argument is by contraposition, and thesis: Western transmission from (Thatherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasi- mstical "thought"—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposes that modem German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artifical dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of an^preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestan philosophy in ^particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared, the further development of highly exploitative Christen attitudes to nature (and to programs) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modem theories of property (notably by Locke) which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in coroized lands. Consider its less direct role in the- preparing ground for (^^(industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants and its matter were of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). But wherever theory operated to influence 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore's end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger's later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p.17?)^/For the second linkage Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructiv&-teehnology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy the ancient fallacy of equivocation. "7 ? . 6 practice, philosophy would have served negatively, as a prime element of That could be a significant rubber philosophy today. Whatever the extend (arguably, substantial) to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources.^ For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in greater detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove's case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as 'substantially correct' is Hargrove's 'verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes', vastly less than Hargrove's actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just "preservationist attitudes", and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere "discouragement" of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove's indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield's criticism: a restriction to philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield's exceptions to 'the adverse impacts of Western philosophy', those alleged 'philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously':- Firsf/y, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: * minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. 13 On the rule in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman's preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, REE, p.l46ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. 7 * figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. * medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato's philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.^ Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato's indifference and lack of ecological concern. 1? The reasons for Plato's indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato's philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato's conception of the 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his of Fnvironwgnro/ Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove's historical "excess" needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. 8 human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.^ A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into "process" philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as 7K<2m.yfr<?<27?i? How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of 'mainstream' in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy —Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy. 19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought ' mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a superb valuational fashion the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell's Wiy^fow of the Wejr, a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. For requisite It is a little surprising, too, that the usual ameritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell's work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis Power. 9 usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is ^Independently grasped by Singer in his account of the dominant western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotlianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creations, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of 'dominion'; and those , concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God's behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant ofj^\^v dominion in more onimous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all the^ moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man's dominion was to be understood. 'Doth God care for oxen?' asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one's ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that 'to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition'. When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild on^ (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. 10 Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the Si/wima Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God's command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of C/irfyham/y for at least its first eighteen j centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom^ And Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this Weyarn because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God J^fave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.20 / Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history is has not include^much concern. However, lesser Christian, notably stewardship and perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural workd, offer little improvement upon longer term insidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of emphasized and enhancement of biodiversity. As distinctively, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard detailed work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail^ by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers fracton discourse to the substantially equivalent (historical linkage diminished) paroJfgm discourse. 11 a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modem rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes' significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental pieced Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza's contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza's theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued and although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: "Spinoza's contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable." Ame Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a "speciesist", his system is not speciesist.^ If Spinoza's system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Waess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza's contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding 'double standards' in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly antliopocentric is consistently ignored by deep ecologists, as far as I have been^able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza's extraordinary statement: "Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we 21 Thus for example by Dregson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza's Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin. <' 12 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re- ....... (in a history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz's position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz s overall position does just that, consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).^ Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.2$). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university "in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat' and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz's lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of 24 For Leibnitz's anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz's immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. 25 'Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump', Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz's extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. 13 Leibnitz's philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes' philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appear due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cMwu/Zafive/y make undesirable changes in nature' .27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as /hi/mg To provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature' ... To scientific advance'. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw 'order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man' .28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life- 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infaHibihty-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.^ A different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced much of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, with this empiricism expanding through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism. 30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been compentively little improvement in recent times. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main cal informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory,... . Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-knowledge factories. The other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as cor^epttial analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, asunvisionmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many which are the predominant form. But existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mixed in human chauvinism. Social criticism which has at least seriously A / addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communcational' theory of Habernus favours articulate humans, and includes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-fall. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who 29 Leibnitz's standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with /oty of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see "Dominant British ideology'. 31 This theme is developed, in a social setting, by Gelher. His case applies, with over more force, to environmental matters. 15 would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of change, or end m present dominant form, with end, end period. For another, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, that leads to disaster, and accordingly is liable to rejection. No end is implied to less grand regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stroked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. "Great thinker" and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspect of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their argument are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, A different in different regions, with their own pantheons of prominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet "communism". And so on; see also above. 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions in Latin-American philosophy. 16 There be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in South. Consider French philosophy, which along with A Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is n^ established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability.34 Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [abstruction] projects. Through a regional network a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., /t&rory o/p/tf/ojop/ty Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. 34 We do not quite have world philosophy, any more than the world car (despite American efforts, including Solomin & Higgins), but the numbermnainstream Odels is now rather small, and almost all so fai/ are noisy and polluting. A 17 Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., 'R^ZZ-ycoverZng ^voZMfZoK", Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Fiiosofia e Crise, Peia filosofia latino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 198 5. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocrat to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Halls, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. Hruschka, J., '7%^ gr^a^-yf AappZ/z^jj prZncZpZe anJ ^arZy German anrZcZparfan^ p/ ariZ/rarZan r/z^ozy", Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., '77z^ gzzz7 p/* p/zZZo.yop/zy', address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland^ Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds ), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., 'DozzzZnanf I3rZfZ.y/z ZzZ^oZogy', typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., 7wp<2cf p/gZ^rnafZve <yyyfe/?z.y ozz Z/z^ EzzZZg/z^zzzzz^zzr Prp/^crtypescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., '<y UfopZzzy, 7ho amZ D^p EcoZogyGreen Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. Routley, R., "RoZgj <2K<7 ZZzzzZ^ p/p^r^Zgmjy Zzz g7zvZrozzmg/zZ<2Z r/zozzg/zr azzJ z7crZozz",Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historicai survey of western phiiosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Grand philosophies and environmental crises: many problems and a few solutions Subject The topic of the resource Printout (photocopy) of draft, with emendations and annotations, dated 23 May 1995. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-23 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [18] leaves. 50.54 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9a8cf49">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9a8cf49</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/c6afa206de867f56284fb042bf1e4d96.pdf 560deaadb6ccc8955f96eb21f7a78881 PDF Text Text 9/5/95 IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS ON THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT There is a recent debate, arising out of older debates, concerning logic, rationality, truth, science and, more sweepingly, the Enlightenment Project. It is a debate where the concentrated intellectual superpower formed from those substantially committed to the Project is matched against dispersed anti- or counter-Enlightenment forces, and so confronted with protracted guerilla activity. Historically furthermore, the scattered and diverse counter-movement has taken various different forms at different times. In the main respects the recent debate has crystallised into one between definite realism and an egalitarian relativism (as revealed in a useful working example, the debate in Z Papery Oct-Dec 1992). Let's call these sides rea/^m and re/af/VLym for short, though the divisions are more complex than that (for one reason, because "realism" comprehends an idealist "anti-realism", and "relativism" includes "constructive" forms). The contrast is invariably presented (as in the debate in Z Papery) as between f/te ane correct theory, that ultimately delivered by Science, on the one side, and many stories, many points of view perhaps equally good, on the other.i But, presented thus, it is almost obvious that what is offered affords a/a/.ye contrast. For omitted are alternatives with more than one correct account (some of these accounts perhaps better than others), but with many other stories faulted. For instance, neglected is my own preferred /mJiPe way, which recognises many correct accounts, none absolute, and many defective stories.2 Such further plurallistic alternatives are not glimpsed for several reasons: one is a false underlying absolute (one) verytAy relative (many) dichotomy^; another is a false (also absolute) character accredited to received 1 See Albert's Editorial, p.2, and the clearly stated position of 'the three defendents', namely Albert, Chomsky and Ehrenreich. It is both curious and revealing that the debate should have taken f/?A polarized course, given the question addressed to 'the six critics' (of the Enlightenment Project). Namely, 'Do we need to reject/transcend/escape an old way of thinking variously called Western Rationality/Science/Logic if we are to attain a better world? (quoted p.17). Put differently, what is role of received "enlightenment" in a/! Amelioration Project? Because of these <%/erenf issues there is much (loose) arguing at cross-purposes in Z Papers 2 Such a way is elaborated in DP. �2 logic and scientific methodology. Thus a longer subtitle for the present exercise might well run: the concerning logic, rationality, science, truth and all that: the Enlightenment Project and its Enemies, a pluralistic resolution. Realists take their stand on the basis of received logic and scientific methodology, typically as if that were an indisputable given, in great intellectual shape. A couple of statements will confirm this: ... we do not have to transcend science or rationality as a prerequisite to developing worthy vision and strategy... logic and the roles of evidence are here to stay. Moreover, they're on our side.4 Even some small criticism of science is justified; for instance 'science is sometimes narrow, mechanical, colonizing or hypocritical'.$ What lie beyond such critical reach are rationality, reason and logic; '... to critique reason or logic as being at the root of sciences many ills is wrong' 'and has no role in making the world better'. Despite extensive left political activity, 'I have not once criticized rationality or logic, and anti-intellectualism has always been anathema to me'.6 Others appear fractionally more cautious about reason and logic (not Science!): ...in a discussion...there are certain familiar ground rules: those of rational inquiry, ... what seems to be under discussion here is whether we should abide by these ground rules at all (trying to improve them as we proceed?). If the answer is that we are to abide by them, then the discussion is over: we've implicitly accepted the legitimacy of rational inquiry. If they are to be abandoned, then we cannot proceed until we learn what replaces the commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, and other out-dated notions.^ Before a final quoted sentence rounding off this passage notice the equations made: procedures in a discussion (ground rules) = methods of rational inquiry = commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, etc. 3 Conspicuous in Albert's own efforts. Albert attempts to recast the multi-faceted debate in these elementary white and black terms: rationality and science 'real science' which is one and unified) versus anti-rationalism, which is utterly relativist. Anti-rationalism he can then jammer as abandoning truth as well as science, as giving away rational and intelligent (and effective) methods, and as accordingly self-defeating in arguing for ameliorating social change (see p.51). 4 Albert, Z Papery, p.51. 5 One sample from half a page of 'balancing criticism' in Albert, p.50. 6 Albert, p.56. 7 Like Neurath in his boat, a favourite image of the American intellectual establishment. 8 Chomsky, Z papery. �3 The last are variants upon (Albert's) methods of standard logic (consistency-based) and rules of evidence. Discussion or debate has accordingly been narrowed (in broad form): 1. by a rationality constraint 2. by explication of rationality through a standard system (by consistency, maximum expected utility, etc.). Pictorially: rational inquiry standard rational inquiry discussion/ inquiry Short of some instruction on this matter... new procedures or ideas to replace the old...we are reduced to primal screams.^ That is hardly so. Almost everyone is familiar with inquiries, debates, arguments and generally procedures that do not proceed rationally, by any means or standards, but which do not reduce to screams (though some no doubt do). Regrettably few, by contrast, are familiar with aZ^rnaf/ve systems of rationality and logic by which inquiry and so forth can proceed, quite rationally. These alternatives confound and upset realism and the Enlightenment Project.^ That impact of alternatives on the Enlightenment Project—an impact not recognised or acknowledged by realists—is a main topic to be pursued. But first the uniform, definite realist Project. The Project itself which persists. The Enlightenment Project can be drawn out of standard accounts of the Enlightenment and the world discerned under it. The Project involved proceeding in accord with Enlightenment practices and in bringing its vision to fruition. First, then, a revealing picture ot 9 Chomsky continuing Z Papery, p.52. 10 The useful term Project coalesces in the course of the debate. In the course of trying to shame and chastise left intellectuals and left counterparts for their neglect of human concerns, of emancipation, removal of oppresion and similar, Chomsky assigns a central place to the "project of the Enlightenment" in serving emancipation, in displacing oppressors, removing monopolies of the powerful, and supplying liberating information and technology. That expression which he has drawn from essays he is commenting upon, quickly contracts to "the Enlightenment project (same page, p.57). My own opinion is that Chomsky has grossly overestimated the positive role of the Enlightenment Project in achieving emancipation and social amelioration. Patently too, he similarly underrates environmental negativities and externalities of implementations of the Project. �4 the world discerned by the Enlightenment and the associated ideology (drawn from Berlin), and secondly the sort of accompanying Project which that yields. The world discerned was a rational scientific world conforming to 'materialism, utilitarianism, ethical naturalism and atheism': Whatever the differences that divided the French /z/zzZagop/z^g and their disciples in other countries...there existed nevertheless a wide ca/zg^zzgzzg: it rested on an acceptance of what was in effect, a secular version of the old natural law doctrine according to which the nature of things possessed a permanent unalterable structure, differences and changes in the world being subject to universal and immutable laws. These laws were discoverable in principle by the use of r^agozz and controlled observation, of which the methods of the natural gcz^zzc^g constituted the most successful application. The most powerful instrument in the acquisition of knowledge was held to be mathematics... f/ze /zaf/z fo ^nawZ^g^ wag f/zaf q/V/z^ na/araZ gcz^zzc^g; that is to say, all statements with claims to truth must be public, communicable, testable—capable of verification or falsification by methods open to and accepted by any rational investigator. From this it followed that aZZ ar/z^r %?^g q/aza/zarzZy w^re R? and in particular such foundations of faith as sacred texts, divine revelation and the dogmatic pronouncements of its authorised interpreters, tradition, prescription, immemorial wisdom, private intuition and all other forms of non-rational or transcendent sources of putative knowledge. This principle was held to apply to both the human and the non-human world: to abstract disciplines, such as logic or mathematics, to the applied sciences which established the laws of the behaviour of inanimate bodies, plants, animals and human beings, and to the normative disciplines which revealed the true nature of ultimate human goals, and the correct rules of conduct, public and private, social and political, moral and aesthetic. According to this doctrine, aZZ g^KZ/z/ig qz/^gaozzg were zzz qrznczqZe azzgweraZzZe.* rraf/z wag one, error multiple; the true answers must of necessity be universal and immutable, that is, true everywhere, at all times, for all men, and discoverable by the appropriate use of reason, by relevant experience, observation and the methods of experiment, logic, calculation. A logically connected structure of rules, laws, generalisations, susceptible of demonstration or, at least in practice, of a high degree of confirmation (and, where required, of application appropriate to differing circumstances) could, at least in principle, be constructed, and could replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance, laziness, guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy, and, above all, what Helvetius called 'interested error', which enabled the cunning and the strong to dominate and exploit the stupid, ignorant and weak, and had throughout human history been largely responsible for the vices, follies and miseries of mankind. Only knowledge, that is, the growth of the sciences, could rescue mankind from these largely self-induced evils. Some believed that certainty in empirical matters was attainable, others that no more than high probability could be achieved; some were pessimistic about progress towards virtue or happiness, others were more sanguine. But the majority of the q/zzZagaq/z^g were agreed that if irrational passions could be controlled, and ignorance, prejudice, fear and greed diminished, an end could be made to the worst confusions in �5 human thought and feelings, which led to blind fanaticism in thought and savage barbarism in practice. ** Though we should contest very many of those claims, it would be foolish to deny that there was that was enlightened, by comparison with what had gone before, in Enlightenment proposals. 12 In many respects, the proposals were socially and otherwise enlightened, though definitely not environmentally so. Proper affords a brief convenient way of alluding to the prime aims and objectives of the Enlightenment, which largely coincide with those of modern secular science broadly construed. Central among emphasized objectives were: pursuit of the truth; exact deployment of rational methods, including logical argumentation; reliance on science and especially rigorous empirical procedures. A suitable mnemonic would be TRASH, (short for truth and reason, and science and (atheistic) humanism). The Project also included these components: * as regards of rational and scientific practice and methods, and of other methods, such as those depending upon closed authority, private or organisational revelation, magic and so on. * bringing to^h/mon.* the intelligent inhabitants of the Earth (humans) in particular in their practice; corollaries are extensive, and include and programs (e.g. humans have to be in a position to use their intelligence, and not ill, disabled, enslaved, etc.); o&raMimg that accessible correct information. For all its apparent merits, the project had, and has, a large downside. For example, the Project underwrites monopolies and elites, namely those who held control of the correct methods, the right procedures. It brings in its train all those strait-jacketing features now so familiar in scientific and intellectual life: experts, technocracy, the peer group process, procedural correctness, scientific accountability, and so on. (Plurallistic criticism will pull the blocks from under all this familiar rigmarole.) What looks even worse (from outside), main oppositional groups assume a similar set of assumptions. Present monopolies and elites are simply mistaken about the truth, which they have no monopoly upon and do not even hold. Nonetheless truth will out (e.g. with enough publicity or disguised propaganda, when the public wake up or become informed, or whatever). Then that opposition, in possession of truth and rationality (or its relevant variants, 11 Berlin pp. 162-4. 12 See DP, final chapter. A critique of both the Enlightenment project and its Anti-Enlightenment alternatives is offered in this work. �6 facts and consistency, etc.) will triumph. These oppositional groups have premissed their opposition upon similar monistic illusions (but nor is pluralistic truth hidden away in the background). 13 Criticism of the Project: trashing TRASH. As a sidelight, the Project was in principle. It implied that there was a set of methods by which any sought piece of knowledge could be obtained. But given the logical systematization the Project presumed (with its consistency requirements, etc.), there are no such methods; there are inevitable limitations to knowledge.^ The problems with the Project are not restricted to knowledge and information. The idea that all genuine questions are in principle answerable is similarly flawed. As there are unknowable truths, so there are unanswerable questions. As a result, the Project has to withdraw, to retract some of its sweeping claims—else it fragments, admitting different logical theories which skirt the limitations, in different ways. Much as with naive set theory, where consistencizing repairs yield many competing alternatives, none intellectually decisive, so it is elsewhere. Paradoxes and puzzles produce a plurality or "solutions". Likewise, and in any case, the Project fragments, or rather plurallizes, so it can be argued. But, most important for present purposes the Project fragmented, and was to fragment. The Project breaks up into a plurality—of projects, frameworks, ideologies, and so forth— because of of one sort or another. Fundamental among these are alternative systems of logic, alternative correct systems, and therewith of alternative frameworks of reason and rationality. As von Wright has contended, "there is not one logic which is But from such a plurality of logics derives a plurality of reasoning and rational procedures, and therewith of all theoretical domains deploying logical methods. From 13 Most of my own experience confirms the contention (defended at the beginning of JB) that truth, even in fairly degenerate forms, win not out. Certainly not on its own; but I grant that we should be working and agitating to force truth (plural) out. Even then truth may not emerge and be recognised in time, before people are hanged, or species or cultures lost. The traditional tag is itself infected with falsity. The erroneous assumption that truth (similarly reason) will win out on its own, without agitation or political activity is also a prime reason, or excuse, for much academic and scientific inactivity and complacency. An associated illusion in that f/7^y have grasped the truth or, if not, have a better grasp upon it (now singular) than any others. It is an illusion shared with—what enjoys significantly less respectable evidence—monistic religion. 14 Details are given in NL. 15 Havas, agreeing with von Wright's thesis (presented in his 'Logic unified ), p.149. �7 these flow, directly or by analogous arguments, alternatives elsewhere, indeed everywhere in sciences and arts.*6 Alternative is intended to take in a wide sweep of alternatives: alternative logics, alternative mathematical systems, alternative theories or theoretical systems more generally, alternative cultural arrangements, and shifting definitely down to a semantical level, alternative actual worlds, alternative realities, and so on. An obvious reaction—had all the alternatives now (beginning to be) appreciated been systematically assembled at once, in an appropriate show of alternative strength—should have been pluralization of the Enlightenment Project. Each viable system of alternatives would have its own project or set of projects. There would be enlightenmenty.^ But, for one thing, the alternatives did not appear historically all at once, but in dribs and drabs; for another, some have not yet been widely appreciated at all (e.g. alternative logics, alternative rules of evidence, alternative rational methods). So alternatives and diversity could be fought off or assimilated.is For yet another, some unwarranted reactions occurred, which both neglected and further information did little to justify These included for instance, outright rejection of the Project, and debilitating relativisation.^ Most philosophers, indeed most intellectuals of scientific disposition, are still caught up in the Enlightenment Project, in what should be a defunct Project. References M. Albert (ed.), I. Berlin, A. Gare, AWZAw?i 1(4), Oct-Dec 1992. , Hogarth Press, London, 1979. , Eco-Logical Press, Bungendore, 1994. K. Havas, "Differences in the unity", AnaZy^ 14(1986) 149-150. R. Routley, "Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths"; referred to as NL. R. Routley, ExpZormg Jt/ngZ^ #7izZ RryonJ, Australian National University 1980; referred to as JB. R. Sylvan, PZ^raZZ/^w, Bungendore, 1994; referred to as DP. 16 Detailed arguments are assembled in DP. 17 It seems a similar plural development should have occurred with oriental religions, such as Buddhism, advocating enlightenment. But religions tend to fossilize. 18 Consider? for instance the search for uniformity and commonality which is often implausible, as at more than a superficial level, in ethics or aesthetics. 19 Rival forms have evolved and developed. Thus what was Anti-Enlightenment became Post­ modernism, including both Nihilism and Egalitarian Relativism (see Gare). [Also "middle way" needs further explanations ] � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 9/5/95 IMPACT OF ALTERNATIVE SYSTEMS ON THE ENLIGHTENMENT PROJECT There is a recent debate, arising out of older debates, concerning logic, rationality, truth, science and, more sweepingly, the Enlightenment Project. It is a debate where the concentrated intellectual superpower formed from those substantially committed to the Project is matched against dispersed anti- or counter-Enlightenment forces, and so confronted with protracted guerilla activity. Historically furthermore, the scattered and diverse counter-movement has taken various different forms at different times. In the main respects the recent debate has crystallised into one between definite realism and an egalitarian relativism (as revealed in a useful working example, the debate in Z Papery Oct-Dec 1992). Let's call these sides rea/^m and re/af/VLym for short, though the divisions are more complex than that (for one reason, because "realism" comprehends an idealist "anti-realism", and "relativism" includes "constructive" forms). The contrast is invariably presented (as in the debate in Z Papery) as between f/te ane correct theory, that ultimately delivered by Science, on the one side, and many stories, many points of view perhaps equally good, on the other.i But, presented thus, it is almost obvious that what is offered affords a/a/.ye contrast. For omitted are alternatives with more than one correct account (some of these accounts perhaps better than others), but with many other stories faulted. For instance, neglected is my own preferred /mJiPe way, which recognises many correct accounts, none absolute, and many defective stories.2 Such further plurallistic alternatives are not glimpsed for several reasons: one is a false underlying absolute (one) verytAy relative (many) dichotomy^; another is a false (also absolute) character accredited to received 1 See Albert's Editorial, p.2, and the clearly stated position of 'the three defendents', namely Albert, Chomsky and Ehrenreich. It is both curious and revealing that the debate should have taken f/?A polarized course, given the question addressed to 'the six critics' (of the Enlightenment Project). Namely, 'Do we need to reject/transcend/escape an old way of thinking variously called Western Rationality/Science/Logic if we are to attain a better world? (quoted p.17). Put differently, what is role of received "enlightenment" in a/! Amelioration Project? Because of these <%/erenf issues there is much (loose) arguing at cross-purposes in Z Papers 2 Such a way is elaborated in DP. 2 logic and scientific methodology. Thus a longer subtitle for the present exercise might well run: the concerning logic, rationality, science, truth and all that: the Enlightenment Project and its Enemies, a pluralistic resolution. Realists take their stand on the basis of received logic and scientific methodology, typically as if that were an indisputable given, in great intellectual shape. A couple of statements will confirm this: ... we do not have to transcend science or rationality as a prerequisite to developing worthy vision and strategy... logic and the roles of evidence are here to stay. Moreover, they're on our side.4 Even some small criticism of science is justified; for instance 'science is sometimes narrow, mechanical, colonizing or hypocritical'.$ What lie beyond such critical reach are rationality, reason and logic; '... to critique reason or logic as being at the root of sciences many ills is wrong' 'and has no role in making the world better'. Despite extensive left political activity, 'I have not once criticized rationality or logic, and anti-intellectualism has always been anathema to me'.6 Others appear fractionally more cautious about reason and logic (not Science!): ...in a discussion...there are certain familiar ground rules: those of rational inquiry, ... what seems to be under discussion here is whether we should abide by these ground rules at all (trying to improve them as we proceed?). If the answer is that we are to abide by them, then the discussion is over: we've implicitly accepted the legitimacy of rational inquiry. If they are to be abandoned, then we cannot proceed until we learn what replaces the commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, and other out-dated notions.^ Before a final quoted sentence rounding off this passage notice the equations made: procedures in a discussion (ground rules) = methods of rational inquiry = commitment to consistency, responsibility to fact, etc. 3 Conspicuous in Albert's own efforts. Albert attempts to recast the multi-faceted debate in these elementary white and black terms: rationality and science 'real science' which is one and unified) versus anti-rationalism, which is utterly relativist. Anti-rationalism he can then jammer as abandoning truth as well as science, as giving away rational and intelligent (and effective) methods, and as accordingly self-defeating in arguing for ameliorating social change (see p.51). 4 Albert, Z Papery, p.51. 5 One sample from half a page of 'balancing criticism' in Albert, p.50. 6 Albert, p.56. 7 Like Neurath in his boat, a favourite image of the American intellectual establishment. 8 Chomsky, Z papery. 3 The last are variants upon (Albert's) methods of standard logic (consistency-based) and rules of evidence. Discussion or debate has accordingly been narrowed (in broad form): 1. by a rationality constraint 2. by explication of rationality through a standard system (by consistency, maximum expected utility, etc.). Pictorially: rational inquiry standard rational inquiry discussion/ inquiry Short of some instruction on this matter... new procedures or ideas to replace the old...we are reduced to primal screams.^ That is hardly so. Almost everyone is familiar with inquiries, debates, arguments and generally procedures that do not proceed rationally, by any means or standards, but which do not reduce to screams (though some no doubt do). Regrettably few, by contrast, are familiar with aZ^rnaf/ve systems of rationality and logic by which inquiry and so forth can proceed, quite rationally. These alternatives confound and upset realism and the Enlightenment Project.^ That impact of alternatives on the Enlightenment Project—an impact not recognised or acknowledged by realists—is a main topic to be pursued. But first the uniform, definite realist Project. The Project itself which persists. The Enlightenment Project can be drawn out of standard accounts of the Enlightenment and the world discerned under it. The Project involved proceeding in accord with Enlightenment practices and in bringing its vision to fruition. First, then, a revealing picture ot 9 Chomsky continuing Z Papery, p.52. 10 The useful term Project coalesces in the course of the debate. In the course of trying to shame and chastise left intellectuals and left counterparts for their neglect of human concerns, of emancipation, removal of oppresion and similar, Chomsky assigns a central place to the "project of the Enlightenment" in serving emancipation, in displacing oppressors, removing monopolies of the powerful, and supplying liberating information and technology. That expression which he has drawn from essays he is commenting upon, quickly contracts to "the Enlightenment project (same page, p.57). My own opinion is that Chomsky has grossly overestimated the positive role of the Enlightenment Project in achieving emancipation and social amelioration. Patently too, he similarly underrates environmental negativities and externalities of implementations of the Project. 4 the world discerned by the Enlightenment and the associated ideology (drawn from Berlin), and secondly the sort of accompanying Project which that yields. The world discerned was a rational scientific world conforming to 'materialism, utilitarianism, ethical naturalism and atheism': Whatever the differences that divided the French /z/zzZagop/z^g and their disciples in other countries...there existed nevertheless a wide ca/zg^zzgzzg: it rested on an acceptance of what was in effect, a secular version of the old natural law doctrine according to which the nature of things possessed a permanent unalterable structure, differences and changes in the world being subject to universal and immutable laws. These laws were discoverable in principle by the use of r^agozz and controlled observation, of which the methods of the natural gcz^zzc^g constituted the most successful application. The most powerful instrument in the acquisition of knowledge was held to be mathematics... f/ze /zaf/z fo ^nawZ^g^ wag f/zaf q/V/z^ na/araZ gcz^zzc^g; that is to say, all statements with claims to truth must be public, communicable, testable—capable of verification or falsification by methods open to and accepted by any rational investigator. From this it followed that aZZ ar/z^r %?^g q/aza/zarzZy w^re R? and in particular such foundations of faith as sacred texts, divine revelation and the dogmatic pronouncements of its authorised interpreters, tradition, prescription, immemorial wisdom, private intuition and all other forms of non-rational or transcendent sources of putative knowledge. This principle was held to apply to both the human and the non-human world: to abstract disciplines, such as logic or mathematics, to the applied sciences which established the laws of the behaviour of inanimate bodies, plants, animals and human beings, and to the normative disciplines which revealed the true nature of ultimate human goals, and the correct rules of conduct, public and private, social and political, moral and aesthetic. According to this doctrine, aZZ g^KZ/z/ig qz/^gaozzg were zzz qrznczqZe azzgweraZzZe.* rraf/z wag one, error multiple; the true answers must of necessity be universal and immutable, that is, true everywhere, at all times, for all men, and discoverable by the appropriate use of reason, by relevant experience, observation and the methods of experiment, logic, calculation. A logically connected structure of rules, laws, generalisations, susceptible of demonstration or, at least in practice, of a high degree of confirmation (and, where required, of application appropriate to differing circumstances) could, at least in principle, be constructed, and could replace the chaotic amalgam of ignorance, laziness, guesswork, superstition, prejudice, dogma, fantasy, and, above all, what Helvetius called 'interested error', which enabled the cunning and the strong to dominate and exploit the stupid, ignorant and weak, and had throughout human history been largely responsible for the vices, follies and miseries of mankind. Only knowledge, that is, the growth of the sciences, could rescue mankind from these largely self-induced evils. Some believed that certainty in empirical matters was attainable, others that no more than high probability could be achieved; some were pessimistic about progress towards virtue or happiness, others were more sanguine. But the majority of the q/zzZagaq/z^g were agreed that if irrational passions could be controlled, and ignorance, prejudice, fear and greed diminished, an end could be made to the worst confusions in 5 human thought and feelings, which led to blind fanaticism in thought and savage barbarism in practice. ** Though we should contest very many of those claims, it would be foolish to deny that there was that was enlightened, by comparison with what had gone before, in Enlightenment proposals. 12 In many respects, the proposals were socially and otherwise enlightened, though definitely not environmentally so. Proper affords a brief convenient way of alluding to the prime aims and objectives of the Enlightenment, which largely coincide with those of modern secular science broadly construed. Central among emphasized objectives were: pursuit of the truth; exact deployment of rational methods, including logical argumentation; reliance on science and especially rigorous empirical procedures. A suitable mnemonic would be TRASH, (short for truth and reason, and science and (atheistic) humanism). The Project also included these components: * as regards of rational and scientific practice and methods, and of other methods, such as those depending upon closed authority, private or organisational revelation, magic and so on. * bringing to^h/mon.* the intelligent inhabitants of the Earth (humans) in particular in their practice; corollaries are extensive, and include and programs (e.g. humans have to be in a position to use their intelligence, and not ill, disabled, enslaved, etc.); o&raMimg that accessible correct information. For all its apparent merits, the project had, and has, a large downside. For example, the Project underwrites monopolies and elites, namely those who held control of the correct methods, the right procedures. It brings in its train all those strait-jacketing features now so familiar in scientific and intellectual life: experts, technocracy, the peer group process, procedural correctness, scientific accountability, and so on. (Plurallistic criticism will pull the blocks from under all this familiar rigmarole.) What looks even worse (from outside), main oppositional groups assume a similar set of assumptions. Present monopolies and elites are simply mistaken about the truth, which they have no monopoly upon and do not even hold. Nonetheless truth will out (e.g. with enough publicity or disguised propaganda, when the public wake up or become informed, or whatever). Then that opposition, in possession of truth and rationality (or its relevant variants, 11 Berlin pp. 162-4. 12 See DP, final chapter. A critique of both the Enlightenment project and its Anti-Enlightenment alternatives is offered in this work. 6 facts and consistency, etc.) will triumph. These oppositional groups have premissed their opposition upon similar monistic illusions (but nor is pluralistic truth hidden away in the background). 13 Criticism of the Project: trashing TRASH. As a sidelight, the Project was in principle. It implied that there was a set of methods by which any sought piece of knowledge could be obtained. But given the logical systematization the Project presumed (with its consistency requirements, etc.), there are no such methods; there are inevitable limitations to knowledge.^ The problems with the Project are not restricted to knowledge and information. The idea that all genuine questions are in principle answerable is similarly flawed. As there are unknowable truths, so there are unanswerable questions. As a result, the Project has to withdraw, to retract some of its sweeping claims—else it fragments, admitting different logical theories which skirt the limitations, in different ways. Much as with naive set theory, where consistencizing repairs yield many competing alternatives, none intellectually decisive, so it is elsewhere. Paradoxes and puzzles produce a plurality or "solutions". Likewise, and in any case, the Project fragments, or rather plurallizes, so it can be argued. But, most important for present purposes the Project fragmented, and was to fragment. The Project breaks up into a plurality—of projects, frameworks, ideologies, and so forth— because of of one sort or another. Fundamental among these are alternative systems of logic, alternative correct systems, and therewith of alternative frameworks of reason and rationality. As von Wright has contended, "there is not one logic which is But from such a plurality of logics derives a plurality of reasoning and rational procedures, and therewith of all theoretical domains deploying logical methods. From 13 Most of my own experience confirms the contention (defended at the beginning of JB) that truth, even in fairly degenerate forms, win not out. Certainly not on its own; but I grant that we should be working and agitating to force truth (plural) out. Even then truth may not emerge and be recognised in time, before people are hanged, or species or cultures lost. The traditional tag is itself infected with falsity. The erroneous assumption that truth (similarly reason) will win out on its own, without agitation or political activity is also a prime reason, or excuse, for much academic and scientific inactivity and complacency. An associated illusion in that f/7^y have grasped the truth or, if not, have a better grasp upon it (now singular) than any others. It is an illusion shared with—what enjoys significantly less respectable evidence—monistic religion. 14 Details are given in NL. 15 Havas, agreeing with von Wright's thesis (presented in his 'Logic unified ), p.149. 7 these flow, directly or by analogous arguments, alternatives elsewhere, indeed everywhere in sciences and arts.*6 Alternative is intended to take in a wide sweep of alternatives: alternative logics, alternative mathematical systems, alternative theories or theoretical systems more generally, alternative cultural arrangements, and shifting definitely down to a semantical level, alternative actual worlds, alternative realities, and so on. An obvious reaction—had all the alternatives now (beginning to be) appreciated been systematically assembled at once, in an appropriate show of alternative strength—should have been pluralization of the Enlightenment Project. Each viable system of alternatives would have its own project or set of projects. There would be enlightenmenty.^ But, for one thing, the alternatives did not appear historically all at once, but in dribs and drabs; for another, some have not yet been widely appreciated at all (e.g. alternative logics, alternative rules of evidence, alternative rational methods). So alternatives and diversity could be fought off or assimilated.is For yet another, some unwarranted reactions occurred, which both neglected and further information did little to justify These included for instance, outright rejection of the Project, and debilitating relativisation.^ Most philosophers, indeed most intellectuals of scientific disposition, are still caught up in the Enlightenment Project, in what should be a defunct Project. References M. Albert (ed.), I. Berlin, A. Gare, AWZAw?i 1(4), Oct-Dec 1992. , Hogarth Press, London, 1979. , Eco-Logical Press, Bungendore, 1994. K. Havas, "Differences in the unity", AnaZy^ 14(1986) 149-150. R. Routley, "Necessary limits to knowledge: unknowable truths"; referred to as NL. R. Routley, ExpZormg Jt/ngZ^ #7izZ RryonJ, Australian National University 1980; referred to as JB. R. Sylvan, PZ^raZZ/^w, Bungendore, 1994; referred to as DP. 16 Detailed arguments are assembled in DP. 17 It seems a similar plural development should have occurred with oriental religions, such as Buddhism, advocating enlightenment. But religions tend to fossilize. 18 Consider? for instance the search for uniformity and commonality which is often implausible, as at more than a superficial level, in ethics or aesthetics. 19 Rival forms have evolved and developed. Thus what was Anti-Enlightenment became Post­ modernism, including both Nihilism and Egalitarian Relativism (see Gare). [Also "middle way" needs further explanations ]  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Impact of alternative systems on Enlightenment Project Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 9 May 1995. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-09 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [7] leaves. 19.4 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:103a4b1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:103a4b1</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8e5b1510f955e6e862f9f4addae6dad3.pdf ba86610d50f0253cdff1991f4702b3f3 PDF Text Text 3.7.95 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. �2 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS of ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Broaching focai questions, and searching for deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate (liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modern times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation. Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering; many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so on). Whence arises an increasingly broached question 1; Why is this happening? More explicitly, w/zy /zzzzzz^zzz cozzzzzzzzzzzyz^^ <27Z6^ zzzzpov^rz^/z ^zzvzwzzzzz^zzr^, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their owzz habitats? More sweepingly, w/zy fy r/zf w/zo/e now perhaps in y^o/7or^y r/zrozzg/z /znnzon ^ni^rprfs^? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this, because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, diverse paradigms but all displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or impoverish their own environments. Introduced "pest" species, such as rabbits and mynahs in the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well. �3 pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called "new forestry", and market ideology does economic practice, even so-called "environmental economics"^ An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choicest Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit, they also correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this even feasible, but of getting right paradigms. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.^ That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single 2 3 4 For more on this style of explanation, see further RP. It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies. What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies Jo have much to answer for in this regard. Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial explanation, of them. As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which paradigms are, serve in explanation, justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson. �4 role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural. As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned, those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes. Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics. What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are "A is source of B" and "A is a root of B" to be explicated? While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors of rooA? and introductory text, 7%^ . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful Although this text presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roofs metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, 'the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority' (p.193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for �5 roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above them, and so on. Both differ from another popular buried metaphor, that of foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely passively support, not sustain supported superstructure). So foundations, for all their importance in epistemology and elsewhere f/Toundationalism is correct, can be set aside.$ So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short listing for the/ig^ra/Mre use of 'root' runs: 'the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.' (Concise English Dictionary). Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained. Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source­ book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may have further sources (hence the search for "deeper", even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system, gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix of buried metaphors. Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning environmental problems. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere. 5 Despite a referee's suggestion that discussion of "roots" 'could be improved by a contrast of the "roots" metaphor with the "foundations" metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying interpretations ofan emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm. �6 Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. ^nv/ronw^nZoZ pro/?Z^wis omZso/o^ows. Definitions of 'environmental problem', and classifications of such problems, have already been ventured? What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, ones here taken as seri'oMS problems, are those of * sustaining biodiversity and * maintaining significant wilderness? Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There would be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little despite all the talk? Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to the questions are however tm/yorfoHf, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a difficult and deteriorating situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Afo%ZeZ-ZZ%e oZyecZs. * poro^ZZgozs, Z^ZeoZogZes, CMZZMr^s ,a?MZ so on. A can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense? See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and proximate solutions. As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see See e.g. 77^ eHvhwwwgnta/po/icy m OECD Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained. �7 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to be/hif/t/h/ to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, or whatever. A jocz#/ in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by "comprehensive" is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures, from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a -ytwHmh'ca/ object, an item like a complex universal 10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), W^/to/tsc/zoMMtzgs, total views (Naess), traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs,.... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas - system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation .n Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, through Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; "humanism" rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans 10 11 It resembles a universal; compare e.g. Plato's system of forms, Locke's of complex ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of paradigmatic sort. This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. �8 Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modern ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather consciousnesses) have to be changed, nor rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is wrong. TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages. D. answer? �9 DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage D3a When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory, or push it back to paradigmatic features. proposed (among others) single paradigm an.S3V^r.y Pl. Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism P2b Mechanism Organicism P3. P3a P3aa Substance metaphysics Possessive individualism Personalism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business P6. Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment Anti-materialism �10 P6a Materialism Spiritualism P8. P9 Patriarchy, andocentrism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies proposed tend to share defects of sources. of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject PS. Furfur specific or partial) include: Typical Platonism Leibnitzianism Kantianism Anglo-American philosophy^ Utilitarianism Economism (economic imperialism as suggested New metaphysics New metaphysics Consequentialism Continental philosophy Alternative ethics New social science; ethics contrasted with straight economic roots) -TO on. A very rough Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Human nature (esp. aggression) Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation runs as follows: draw up a potted list of mayor movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say mo^r—entries in that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e. reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard's challenging answer. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon 'mental maladaptation'). 12 The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism. �11 Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick —in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is somef/nng to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence. 13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: * region, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, The historical roots of our ecological crisis', are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in The Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature', was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. 14 One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be Tn harmony with larger intellectual patterns', namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, 13 14 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard's dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix . White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. �12 a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it 'bears the burden of guilt" for contemporary ecological disruption.^ What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.^ Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.^ * CZa-y-sica/ above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible, is More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. * /2/nZ(?.y6)/7/ry. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent contribution to the debate see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask, not merely what they say, but what they Jo, and woM/J do. For an outline of just such a telling criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato's attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove's claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. �13 denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned. 19 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modern ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. * While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a "natural resource" —and people become "human resources". The sources of anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of "authentic" experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a "new order". That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism. 20 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.21 For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson's exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of 'rejecting] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem' and instead basing my 'ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies' (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. �14 * The source of problems lies in The intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment' (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes' philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). * CapzfaZfym. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capZr^ZZym for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.22 But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: 'Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man'.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to MfZZZ/y, no doubt a relative of capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. * Zn6?M.yfrZaZ jocZ^fy or Z/t^My/rZ^ZZym. Modern ZwJMyZrZ^ZZ^m ('the smooth­ superhighway of industrial progress') is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: '... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm'.24 Similarly 'roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modern industrial society'.23 Again, 'the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed'26 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated meant thereby jpara^/gm or /yaraJt'gwM or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they tend to lose in confusion. p.409f. Aristotle, Po/Zf/cs, Book 1, ch.8. an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, 'How "attitudes and implements" have brought us to "the end of nature"', a paper presented at UNE Environment/ Poroe/igm^ Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: 'for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the "solution" derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modern problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case. For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution. Editorial in 7%^ Eco/ogMt, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. �15 less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers uses of industrial technique and practice. * Economic growf/t or economic JeveZopmenf. 'According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots'.27 One widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems. The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause, itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy, such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay for continuing employment). No doubt though, economic growth is intimately intricated with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations). Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that 'the Western model of economic development, far from being the solution to" environmental and social problems, is 'actually fuelling' them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the problems. 28 * nafMre. '... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature itself.'29 What such "nature" amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false 27 28 29 Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: 'the problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. A// r/mf fy too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals' (p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm. Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis. Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: 'Less luxury, less wastage. Otherwise it will be too late'. Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in For^f arx/ Fir;/ 273 (August 1994) pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that only economic growth will solve environmental problems. Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant problems. Callicott and Ames, 'Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action' p.282 (see also p.281), in a desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much improved treatment for natural and built environments, with 'the deplorable environmental conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia' (p.280). �16 hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems, including now environmental ones, is "man's fallen nature". That astonishing source also comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed. * Parriarc/ty. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. 'Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet'.30 'patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis'.31 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.32 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked themes: * 77MW6W JommarzoM q/ It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man's inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different formsrearly, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of wcz'a/ an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: 'ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems'.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the JornmoTzon anJ q/ man L? * q/ * man Z?y man. Thus, 'Both Kropotkin and q/ Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see the sequel to GE. See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3). Jo/zzr 7992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed's extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with 'nearly all present', e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from humans' domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. �17 —domination of nature thus following from human domination'. ... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a harmonious man-nature relationships Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in tum be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. *A * o/ Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualismsS * of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. ParAy of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.^ Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. A on, to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation. a J D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While "consequences" or outputs such things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without 'unintended' of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a joke, itself with serious consequences. Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE �18 foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.37 where they usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.38 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these "well established principles" is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like CAz/z'Wzon and AgrzcM/fMra/ Orzgz/M <2n<7 DAp^r^/) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances /tow beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not 37 38 Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. it is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like Comm/mA? Thus "industrial armies" are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; "migrants and rebels" are to have their property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). �19 deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. <?(% P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are no? for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy Thus subverted, in essentially Hume's way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another. operates. Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect appropriately with practice. 2. While several—not just —of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the rzg/tf (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on^9)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related virtual histories (concerning what Ponting's have happened)—enter decisively. For instance, Hilary of f/te WorM begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse,/hr from the influence of Western paradigms.^ An important example (much less speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to 39 40 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. Ponting's valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is Hillel's, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale, Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep enough, to paradigmatic roots. �20 do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively outside) the rise of modern Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non­ Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond. The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is "Western" is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Western. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 41 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna worldwide. �21 5. A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated, and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration concerns /?<2frz<2rc/zy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class, etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems. 5. Towards a more satisfactory expianation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a/wm'/y or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life­ forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less "advanced" and of third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Nor are major infiators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have environmental problems from �22 rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin­ off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run in less favourable settings. Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms. Even if the whole "West" went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war, through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in "Limits to Growth" scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by­ products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Western. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological "break throughs" were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises. The picture of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). �23 selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises conditions, include those now tabulated: TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Jainism Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians. Western philosophies: under certain favourable interpretations old Stoicism new Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology. Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class^ lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions. Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual, goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what would be done in certain other sorts of situations. Certainly a culture that manifests unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various "primitive" cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice. 43 In logical terms perhaps as well as another residue class, hot/!. �24 It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Certain /hmz/y c/zaracferMfi'c-y, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating: * illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism. More generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. 'Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.'44 The outside world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. 'The exception is [mznJ, or specifically] and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and "the beasts"'.4$ The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it, typically little or none. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it. It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans. Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were 'aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature'.46 Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link principles, reminiscent of "correspondence rules" used in explaining applications of scientific theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives, such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP. * com&z'nafzon illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz's fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population 46 Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan's investigations. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides—just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain. See Descartes, V7. �25 growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,^ in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz's metaphysics, his monadology, may have been—by contrast with Plato's or Descartes', both of which explicitly devalued much or all of the natural world—Leibnitz's wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to damaging effects. Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes, can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray .48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example, depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of "creation". Such extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread, under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change. As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a basically neutral world. All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness. Shallowness will work out satisfactorily environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such familiar features as For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel. As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also proferred in deep ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead to paradigmatic roots, to Naess's "total views". Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification. �26 * short-term framework. * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * appropriation of nature, its conversion to property. * maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size, coupled with grand projects. * technofix approach to environmental problems. Friendly paradigms will tend to mverf these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following samples: * an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. * a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms. * a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of "playing God" projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way. As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news. �27 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy. Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan * APPENDIX. On Shepard's approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s intriguing books. In his TVafi/re anJ he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,^... . He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that 'a history of ideas' similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it 'is not enough to explain human behaviour' (p.3), it 'seems too easy and academic' (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the 'dictum that nature should serve man' and 'insistence that animals feel no pain' should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended * ^0 An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms. A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that 'the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change' (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. �28 target: 'The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question' (p.3). it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, 'ideas are impotent' consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre ("crazy") 'turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used' (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard's own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans per-yfyf in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but 'the idea of a sick society (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though .yome may be), rather sickness has to be yo redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots^) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as "sickness". So it is that Shepard arrives at his of 'general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment' (p.ix). Succinctly, 'there are profound psychic dislocations at the root of modern society' (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: 'over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or] ... adolescence ...' (p.15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is 51 52 For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard's redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign 'relic tribal' societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), 'people who feel themselves to be rather than (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. 'The idea of a sick society', which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. �29 manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the 'private demons' and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in "new world" societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.^^ A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The 'portraits of maturity' alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.$4 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness 'smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists' (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. 53 54 A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: 'The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery' (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on 'one particular mother' (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in 'taking mothers off to work' (p.15)! �30 REFERENCES J. Alton, L^z'Zzzzz'fz A EzogzYz/z/zy, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. E. R. Attfield, 'Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?' Ezzvz'rozzzzz^zz^Z Ef/zzcs 13(1991)127-137. R. Attfield, 77z^ ERzzc.y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zztzzZ Cozzc^z *zz, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. A. Bellett, 'The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability', FMzztEzzzz^zzfaZ QM^rzozz^ Pap^, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Mzfz/z^ in A^zzzzz 7zYZ<7zfz<?zz.y o/ * P/zoz/g/zr, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1989. J. Callicott, 'Genesis and John Muir' R^Vfyzozz 12(3) (1990) 31-41. R. Chisholm, 77z^ FozzzzzEzfzozM o/ *Rzzowzzzg, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982. J. Cottingham, 77z<? Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, Po/zwzZ ^zzzzZ CzvzZzzzzhozz, Revised edition by V.G. Carter, University of Oklahama Press, Norman, 1974. A Dobson (ed.), Gz^zz R^zzzZ^r, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, 'Ecosophy', Po^z'tzw Vz'Zzz-zzhozzj, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Ezzvzrozzzzz^zztaZz^zzz azzzZ PoZztzc^zZ 77z^ozy, UCL Press, London, 1992. W. Fox, 7bwnr^ a Przzzzjp^z'^ozzzzZ EcoZogy, Shambala, Boston, 1990. A. Gare, E^yozz^ Ez/rop^^zzz CzvzZz'znhozz, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore, 1993. C. J. Glacken, ozz r/z^ R/zoiE'azz 5/zoz *^, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. R. Goodin, 'Selling environmental indulgences', RyEZo^ 47(1994) 573-596. N. R. Hanson, Pat^zT?.? o/ * Jz^cov^zy; zzzz zzz^z/zry zzz/o cozzc^ptzz^zZ ybMzzJzzrzozz^ o/ ^cz^zzc^, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. E. C. Hargrove, FozzzzzEzhozz-y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zzfaZ Et/zzc^, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. D Hillel, G%? o/T/z^ Ezzz *r/zr CzvzZz^hozz zzzzzZ /Zze Ez/^ o/r/z^ 5*ozZ., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991. M. Jacobs, 77ze Gzr^zz Ecozzozzzy, Pluto, London, 1991. K. Marx, zGz *MM^.' zzzZz FozzzzzZatzozz^ o/ t/z^ cz *ztz^zz^ o/ /zoZztzc^Z ^cozzozzzy, Harmondsworth, England 1973. F. Mathews, 77ze EcoZogzc^Z ^Z/^ Routledge, London, 1991. A. McLaughlin, R^gaz-<7zzzg M2fMz-^: 7zzzZzz^/z *z6zZz^zzz N. Y., 1993. P. Marshall, azz^Z EcoZogy , SUNY Press, Albany W^Z?, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993. A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, EcoZogy, cozzzz/zMzzzTy zzzzz/ Lz/^y/yZf, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. J. Passmore, Afazz\y R^pozz^zZ?z'Zz/y/br Azz^z/z *^, Duckworth, London, 1974. D. Pearce and others, EZz/^przzzf/br <x Gz-^^zz Ecozzozzzy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, 77z^ R<?oAy o/MozZ^z-zz Ezzvzrozzzzz^zzr^Zz^z/z, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. �31 V. Plumwood, F^mz'az^m azz6? r/z<? Ma^r^zy a/Aaraz *^, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Gz-^zz Wzsfazy a/ *r/z^ Waz-M, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action', Dz.ycM.y.yzazz *^/zap^z zzz ^zzvzz *azzz?z^zzra/ modified, in Ezzvzz *azzz?z^zzra/ p/zz/a^a/?/zy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982, also, P/zz/a-yap/zy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP. C. O. Sauer, Agz-z'czJfaz-aZ Oz7gzzz.y azz;/ Dzs/z^a/, American Geographical Society, New York, 1952. P. Singer, Prachca/ Er/zzc-y, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. P. Shepard, Aamr^ am/ Ma^/af^, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 77z<? Gz-^azag a/Er/zz^, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994; referred to as GE. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, O/ * Ufa/aa-y, Paa am/ Z)^p Eca/agy, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. 77z^ WWZaa<py Pra/'^cZ, War/<7 EarZ/z, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. Y.F. Tuan, 'Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from Europe and China', 77z^ Caaa<7zaa G^agz-ap/z^z * 12(1968) 176-91. S. Toulmin, 77ze ReZazvz Za Ca^aza/agy, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. L. White Jr., 'Historic roots of our ecologic crisis', 5czaaca 155(1967) 1203-7. J. Wisdom, P/zz/awp/zy am/ P^yc/zaaaa/y^z^, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Eavzzwzza^aZa/ P/zz/a.yap/zy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred to as EP3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 3.7.95 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 2 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS of ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Broaching focai questions, and searching for deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate (liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modern times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation. Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering; many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so on). Whence arises an increasingly broached question 1; Why is this happening? More explicitly, w/zy /zzzzzz^zzz cozzzzzzzzzzzyz^^ <27Z6^ zzzzpov^rz^/z ^zzvzwzzzzz^zzr^, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their owzz habitats? More sweepingly, w/zy fy r/zf w/zo/e now perhaps in y^o/7or^y r/zrozzg/z /znnzon ^ni^rprfs^? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this, because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, diverse paradigms but all displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or impoverish their own environments. Introduced "pest" species, such as rabbits and mynahs in the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well. 3 pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called "new forestry", and market ideology does economic practice, even so-called "environmental economics"^ An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choicest Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit, they also correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this even feasible, but of getting right paradigms. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.^ That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single 2 3 4 For more on this style of explanation, see further RP. It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies. What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies Jo have much to answer for in this regard. Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial explanation, of them. As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which paradigms are, serve in explanation, justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson. 4 role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural. As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned, those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes. Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics. What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are "A is source of B" and "A is a root of B" to be explicated? While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors of rooA? and introductory text, 7%^ . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful Although this text presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roofs metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, 'the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority' (p.193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for 5 roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above them, and so on. Both differ from another popular buried metaphor, that of foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely passively support, not sustain supported superstructure). So foundations, for all their importance in epistemology and elsewhere f/Toundationalism is correct, can be set aside.$ So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short listing for the/ig^ra/Mre use of 'root' runs: 'the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.' (Concise English Dictionary). Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained. Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source­ book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may have further sources (hence the search for "deeper", even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system, gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix of buried metaphors. Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning environmental problems. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere. 5 Despite a referee's suggestion that discussion of "roots" 'could be improved by a contrast of the "roots" metaphor with the "foundations" metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying interpretations ofan emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm. 6 Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. ^nv/ronw^nZoZ pro/?Z^wis omZso/o^ows. Definitions of 'environmental problem', and classifications of such problems, have already been ventured? What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, ones here taken as seri'oMS problems, are those of * sustaining biodiversity and * maintaining significant wilderness? Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There would be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little despite all the talk? Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to the questions are however tm/yorfoHf, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a difficult and deteriorating situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Afo%ZeZ-ZZ%e oZyecZs. * poro^ZZgozs, Z^ZeoZogZes, CMZZMr^s ,a?MZ so on. A can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense? See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and proximate solutions. As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see See e.g. 77^ eHvhwwwgnta/po/icy m OECD Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained. 7 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to be/hif/t/h/ to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, or whatever. A jocz#/ in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by "comprehensive" is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures, from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a -ytwHmh'ca/ object, an item like a complex universal 10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), W^/to/tsc/zoMMtzgs, total views (Naess), traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs,.... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas - system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation .n Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, through Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; "humanism" rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans 10 11 It resembles a universal; compare e.g. Plato's system of forms, Locke's of complex ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of paradigmatic sort. This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. 8 Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modern ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather consciousnesses) have to be changed, nor rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is wrong. TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages. D. answer? 9 DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage D3a When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory, or push it back to paradigmatic features. proposed (among others) single paradigm an.S3V^r.y Pl. Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism P2b Mechanism Organicism P3. P3a P3aa Substance metaphysics Possessive individualism Personalism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business P6. Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment Anti-materialism 10 P6a Materialism Spiritualism P8. P9 Patriarchy, andocentrism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies proposed tend to share defects of sources. of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject PS. Furfur specific or partial) include: Typical Platonism Leibnitzianism Kantianism Anglo-American philosophy^ Utilitarianism Economism (economic imperialism as suggested New metaphysics New metaphysics Consequentialism Continental philosophy Alternative ethics New social science; ethics contrasted with straight economic roots) -TO on. A very rough Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Human nature (esp. aggression) Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation runs as follows: draw up a potted list of mayor movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say mo^r—entries in that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e. reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard's challenging answer. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon 'mental maladaptation'). 12 The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism. 11 Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick —in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is somef/nng to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence. 13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: * region, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, The historical roots of our ecological crisis', are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in The Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature', was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. 14 One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be Tn harmony with larger intellectual patterns', namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, 13 14 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard's dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix . White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. 12 a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it 'bears the burden of guilt" for contemporary ecological disruption.^ What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.^ Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.^ * CZa-y-sica/ above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible, is More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. * /2/nZ(?.y6)/7/ry. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent contribution to the debate see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask, not merely what they say, but what they Jo, and woM/J do. For an outline of just such a telling criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato's attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove's claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. 13 denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned. 19 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modern ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. * While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a "natural resource" —and people become "human resources". The sources of anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of "authentic" experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a "new order". That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism. 20 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.21 For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson's exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of 'rejecting] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem' and instead basing my 'ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies' (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. 14 * The source of problems lies in The intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment' (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes' philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). * CapzfaZfym. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capZr^ZZym for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.22 But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: 'Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man'.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to MfZZZ/y, no doubt a relative of capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. * Zn6?M.yfrZaZ jocZ^fy or Z/t^My/rZ^ZZym. Modern ZwJMyZrZ^ZZ^m ('the smooth­ superhighway of industrial progress') is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: '... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm'.24 Similarly 'roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modern industrial society'.23 Again, 'the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed'26 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated meant thereby jpara^/gm or /yaraJt'gwM or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they tend to lose in confusion. p.409f. Aristotle, Po/Zf/cs, Book 1, ch.8. an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, 'How "attitudes and implements" have brought us to "the end of nature"', a paper presented at UNE Environment/ Poroe/igm^ Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: 'for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the "solution" derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modern problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case. For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution. Editorial in 7%^ Eco/ogMt, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. 15 less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers uses of industrial technique and practice. * Economic growf/t or economic JeveZopmenf. 'According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots'.27 One widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems. The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause, itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy, such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay for continuing employment). No doubt though, economic growth is intimately intricated with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations). Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that 'the Western model of economic development, far from being the solution to" environmental and social problems, is 'actually fuelling' them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the problems. 28 * nafMre. '... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature itself.'29 What such "nature" amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false 27 28 29 Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: 'the problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. A// r/mf fy too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals' (p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm. Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis. Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: 'Less luxury, less wastage. Otherwise it will be too late'. Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in For^f arx/ Fir;/ 273 (August 1994) pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that only economic growth will solve environmental problems. Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant problems. Callicott and Ames, 'Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action' p.282 (see also p.281), in a desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much improved treatment for natural and built environments, with 'the deplorable environmental conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia' (p.280). 16 hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems, including now environmental ones, is "man's fallen nature". That astonishing source also comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed. * Parriarc/ty. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. 'Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet'.30 'patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis'.31 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.32 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked themes: * 77MW6W JommarzoM q/ It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man's inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different formsrearly, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of wcz'a/ an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: 'ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems'.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the JornmoTzon anJ q/ man L? * q/ * man Z?y man. Thus, 'Both Kropotkin and q/ Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see the sequel to GE. See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3). Jo/zzr 7992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed's extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with 'nearly all present', e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from humans' domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. 17 —domination of nature thus following from human domination'. ... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a harmonious man-nature relationships Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in tum be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. *A * o/ Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualismsS * of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. ParAy of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.^ Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. A on, to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation. a J D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While "consequences" or outputs such things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without 'unintended' of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a joke, itself with serious consequences. Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE 18 foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.37 where they usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.38 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these "well established principles" is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like CAz/z'Wzon and AgrzcM/fMra/ Orzgz/M <2n<7 DAp^r^/) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances /tow beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not 37 38 Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. it is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like Comm/mA? Thus "industrial armies" are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; "migrants and rebels" are to have their property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). 19 deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. <?(% P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are no? for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy Thus subverted, in essentially Hume's way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another. operates. Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect appropriately with practice. 2. While several—not just —of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the rzg/tf (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on^9)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related virtual histories (concerning what Ponting's have happened)—enter decisively. For instance, Hilary of f/te WorM begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse,/hr from the influence of Western paradigms.^ An important example (much less speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to 39 40 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. Ponting's valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is Hillel's, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale, Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep enough, to paradigmatic roots. 20 do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively outside) the rise of modern Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non­ Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond. The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is "Western" is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Western. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 41 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna worldwide. 21 5. A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated, and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration concerns /?<2frz<2rc/zy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class, etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems. 5. Towards a more satisfactory expianation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a/wm'/y or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life­ forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less "advanced" and of third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Nor are major infiators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have environmental problems from 22 rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin­ off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run in less favourable settings. Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms. Even if the whole "West" went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war, through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in "Limits to Growth" scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by­ products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Western. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological "break throughs" were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises. The picture of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). 23 selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises conditions, include those now tabulated: TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Jainism Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians. Western philosophies: under certain favourable interpretations old Stoicism new Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology. Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class^ lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions. Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual, goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what would be done in certain other sorts of situations. Certainly a culture that manifests unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various "primitive" cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice. 43 In logical terms perhaps as well as another residue class, hot/!. 24 It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Certain /hmz/y c/zaracferMfi'c-y, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating: * illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism. More generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. 'Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.'44 The outside world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. 'The exception is [mznJ, or specifically] and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and "the beasts"'.4$ The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it, typically little or none. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it. It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans. Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were 'aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature'.46 Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link principles, reminiscent of "correspondence rules" used in explaining applications of scientific theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives, such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP. * com&z'nafzon illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called in honour of Leibnitz's fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population 46 Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan's investigations. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides—just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain. See Descartes, V7. 25 growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,^ in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz's metaphysics, his monadology, may have been—by contrast with Plato's or Descartes', both of which explicitly devalued much or all of the natural world—Leibnitz's wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to damaging effects. Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes, can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray .48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example, depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of "creation". Such extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread, under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change. As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a basically neutral world. All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness. Shallowness will work out satisfactorily environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such familiar features as For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel. As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also proferred in deep ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead to paradigmatic roots, to Naess's "total views". Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification. 26 * short-term framework. * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * appropriation of nature, its conversion to property. * maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size, coupled with grand projects. * technofix approach to environmental problems. Friendly paradigms will tend to mverf these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following samples: * an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. * a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms. * a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of "playing God" projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way. As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news. 27 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy. Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan * APPENDIX. On Shepard's approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s intriguing books. In his TVafi/re anJ he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,^... . He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that 'a history of ideas' similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it 'is not enough to explain human behaviour' (p.3), it 'seems too easy and academic' (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the 'dictum that nature should serve man' and 'insistence that animals feel no pain' should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended * ^0 An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms. A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that 'the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change' (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. 28 target: 'The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question' (p.3). it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, 'ideas are impotent' consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre ("crazy") 'turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used' (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard's own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans per-yfyf in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but 'the idea of a sick society (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though .yome may be), rather sickness has to be yo redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots^) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as "sickness". So it is that Shepard arrives at his of 'general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment' (p.ix). Succinctly, 'there are profound psychic dislocations at the root of modern society' (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: 'over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or] ... adolescence ...' (p.15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is 51 52 For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard's redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign 'relic tribal' societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), 'people who feel themselves to be rather than (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. 'The idea of a sick society', which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. 29 manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the 'private demons' and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in "new world" societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.^^ A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The 'portraits of maturity' alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.$4 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness 'smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists' (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. 53 54 A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: 'The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery' (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on 'one particular mother' (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in 'taking mothers off to work' (p.15)! 30 REFERENCES J. Alton, L^z'Zzzzz'fz A EzogzYz/z/zy, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. E. R. Attfield, 'Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?' Ezzvz'rozzzzz^zz^Z Ef/zzcs 13(1991)127-137. R. Attfield, 77z^ ERzzc.y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zztzzZ Cozzc^z *zz, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. A. Bellett, 'The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability', FMzztEzzzz^zzfaZ QM^rzozz^ Pap^, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Mzfz/z^ in A^zzzzz 7zYZ<7zfz<?zz.y o/ * P/zoz/g/zr, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1989. J. Callicott, 'Genesis and John Muir' R^Vfyzozz 12(3) (1990) 31-41. R. Chisholm, 77z^ FozzzzzEzfzozM o/ *Rzzowzzzg, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982. J. Cottingham, 77z<? Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, Po/zwzZ ^zzzzZ CzvzZzzzzhozz, Revised edition by V.G. Carter, University of Oklahama Press, Norman, 1974. A Dobson (ed.), Gz^zz R^zzzZ^r, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, 'Ecosophy', Po^z'tzw Vz'Zzz-zzhozzj, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Ezzvzrozzzzz^zztaZz^zzz azzzZ PoZztzc^zZ 77z^ozy, UCL Press, London, 1992. W. Fox, 7bwnr^ a Przzzzjp^z'^ozzzzZ EcoZogy, Shambala, Boston, 1990. A. Gare, E^yozz^ Ez/rop^^zzz CzvzZz'znhozz, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore, 1993. C. J. Glacken, ozz r/z^ R/zoiE'azz 5/zoz *^, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. R. Goodin, 'Selling environmental indulgences', RyEZo^ 47(1994) 573-596. N. R. Hanson, Pat^zT?.? o/ * Jz^cov^zy; zzzz zzz^z/zry zzz/o cozzc^ptzz^zZ ybMzzJzzrzozz^ o/ ^cz^zzc^, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. E. C. Hargrove, FozzzzzEzhozz-y o/'Ezzvzzwzzzz^zzfaZ Et/zzc^, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. D Hillel, G%? o/T/z^ Ezzz *r/zr CzvzZz^hozz zzzzzZ /Zze Ez/^ o/r/z^ 5*ozZ., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991. M. Jacobs, 77ze Gzr^zz Ecozzozzzy, Pluto, London, 1991. K. Marx, zGz *MM^.' zzzZz FozzzzzZatzozz^ o/ t/z^ cz *ztz^zz^ o/ /zoZztzc^Z ^cozzozzzy, Harmondsworth, England 1973. F. Mathews, 77ze EcoZogzc^Z ^Z/^ Routledge, London, 1991. A. McLaughlin, R^gaz-<7zzzg M2fMz-^: 7zzzZzz^/z *z6zZz^zzz N. Y., 1993. P. Marshall, azz^Z EcoZogy , SUNY Press, Albany W^Z?, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993. A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, EcoZogy, cozzzz/zMzzzTy zzzzz/ Lz/^y/yZf, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. J. Passmore, Afazz\y R^pozz^zZ?z'Zz/y/br Azz^z/z *^, Duckworth, London, 1974. D. Pearce and others, EZz/^przzzf/br <x Gz-^^zz Ecozzozzzy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, 77z^ R<?oAy o/MozZ^z-zz Ezzvzrozzzzz^zzr^Zz^z/z, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. 31 V. Plumwood, F^mz'az^m azz6? r/z<? Ma^r^zy a/Aaraz *^, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Gz-^zz Wzsfazy a/ *r/z^ Waz-M, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. R. Routley, 'Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action', Dz.ycM.y.yzazz *^/zap^z zzz ^zzvzz *azzz?z^zzra/ modified, in Ezzvzz *azzz?z^zzra/ p/zz/a^a/?/zy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982, also, P/zz/a-yap/zy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP. C. O. Sauer, Agz-z'czJfaz-aZ Oz7gzzz.y azz;/ Dzs/z^a/, American Geographical Society, New York, 1952. P. Singer, Prachca/ Er/zzc-y, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. P. Shepard, Aamr^ am/ Ma^/af^, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 77z<? Gz-^azag a/Er/zz^, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994; referred to as GE. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, O/ * Ufa/aa-y, Paa am/ Z)^p Eca/agy, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. 77z^ WWZaa<py Pra/'^cZ, War/<7 EarZ/z, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. Y.F. Tuan, 'Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from Europe and China', 77z^ Caaa<7zaa G^agz-ap/z^z * 12(1968) 176-91. S. Toulmin, 77ze ReZazvz Za Ca^aza/agy, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. L. White Jr., 'Historic roots of our ecologic crisis', 5czaaca 155(1967) 1203-7. J. Wisdom, P/zz/awp/zy am/ P^yc/zaaaa/y^z^, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Eavzzwzza^aZa/ P/zz/a.yap/zy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred to as EP3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Draft of Paradigmatic roots of environmental problems Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 3 July 1995. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-07-03 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves. 92.75 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:906b49d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:906b49d</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0f964b943768a0b550c989048b28bcf7.pdf bf3a54c81853242a2b1e5c72b5d37d2f PDF Text Text 7 ^**---------- — X <- 7/ r/ / * * /e^<9 '^c � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 7 ^**---------- — X <- 7/ r/ / * * /e^<9 '^c  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Environmental ethics essays notes on tables of contents Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Env Essays - tables of contents. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. 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Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document /^H^'J;^/ /%37%H/ /W^ ___ C^—/^rn/^ /^K'/lr-^,^ /c/tL<y^C^^ ! J <^> 7c7^,^,U-.V y^/V^o, />-l.X /p.y . /t/CC °^7" , / 7T* /zv /v y ^77J /f/7/^^' ^7 /Zy Z7+9(.. , ) 77Z t f  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Green book structure notes Subject The topic of the resource Green book structure notes Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Green Book/Structure ms notes. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [3] leaves. 4.25 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:64d7a14">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:64d7a14</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/7bef76c19973550743e6a466433569dd.pdf aa9aa1d56900cd8d26174d6c9d500b3e PDF Text Text /^<?a^r Ct/ f<y^c^'^ e c c^-V^ / 9*. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document /^<?a^r Ct/ f<y^c^'^ e c c^-V^ / 9*.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Notes on Collected essays on environmental philosophy Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes, dated 1992. Title top of page: Collected essays on environmental philosophy. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1992 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 1.36 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:770c422">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:770c422</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0122aea0d6ab5ff6e503045efd0a8414.pdf 79cfdeff421a2cbf59a9f6aa80d048fd PDF Text Text � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 705: Notes on Environmental essays Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes, undated. Title top of page: ENV Essays 89 EE89. Description An account of the resource One of ten papers digitised from item 705. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 705 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 1.98 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f83eb35">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f83eb35</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/390ffa1bb15fead94d0f2ceb672bf51a.pdf 8ecd75d0f66607f59f52395a8fd68e7a PDF Text Text TAOISM AND DEEP (ECOLOGICAL) THEORY: a preliminary object-theoretic investigation. There is a remarkable, and remarked, convergence of themes of deeper ecological positions, such-as Deep Ecology, with those ot Taoism, i Given that Deep Theory has not received adequate elaboration in important directions, particularly metaphysical and political directions, the older wisdom of Tao can be profitably drawn upon to elaborate and enrich deeper positions. Where Taoism does diverge from Deep Ecology (our working example since it is presently the best known deep environmental theory) concerns some of the weakest and most controversial parts of the Deep Ecology platform, such as the theme of Biospheric Egalitarianism, the equality of all (living) beings.2 Thus Taoism can also provide a base for 1 The connections are remarked in some of the prime texts for Deep Ecology, for which see Devall and Sessions (and therein p.100), and also CD. Not all the connections assumed in Deep Ecology sources are correct however; in parucular Taoism does not deductively deliver the platform of Deep Ecology. At most it informs the platform, which it would, if taken seriously, after. 2 A critical exposition of Deep Ecology, which surveys the main themes, is ventured in Sylvan CD. In several significant respects, Taoism offers a (retrospective) improvement on Deep Ecology, being free of the excessive junk Deep Ecology has quickly accumulated. Fortunately for those averse to intellectual junk such as environmental thought tends to collect (though no doubt for later building or recycling), Deep Ecology is but one deep ecological position. Another, presently being worked out in some detail, is Deep Green Theory, the ecological part of a more comprehensive Deep Theory, which is intended to cover a much broader region of philosophical ideas. Deep Theory includes, for instance, what adds to the depth, depth relevant logic, intenzional object theory, and deep pluralism. As will begin to become evident, Taoism proves to be a very congenial position for Deep Theory, and for Deep Green Theory in particular. Thus it can most usefully be applied to illuminate Deep Theory, as well as adding to its historical depth. But in this preliminary investigation, we become ^o caught up in interpreting and explaining authentic Taoism, that we do not get to much explicit elaboration of Deep Green Theory. A corollary we want to draw from our investigations (preliminary though they are) bears upon, and when developed may help to eradicate, a commonplace Western complacency and smug superiority. A widespread, though usually subterranean, view in philosophy is that the East really has little or nothing to offer. This view even extends far into environmental philosophy (cf. Rolston's put-down). It is often part of cultural chauvinism; Western scientific industrial culture doesn't have much to learn from other, generally more backward or primitive or scientifically crude, cultures. The West is the cultural pace-setter, with the information, resources, etc. Observe however that a nothing-new-to-offer position need not reject old theories as worthless and not worth bothering with; in less brash form it can allow �51 correction and adjustment of Deep Ecology, and an impressionistic guide to a more satisfactory and richer deep theory. Taoism is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow Mxmrg as the basis of practice. It is also, so it transpires, a very congenial philosophic way­ station for ecologically-concerned intellectual travellers weary of mainstream Anglo-American and Continental philosophies which inform and reinforce the dominant Western social paradigm. Both for background, and in order to arrive immediately in the thick of the comparison, we outline a main part of the Deep Ecology platform in (typical) slogan form and contrast it on the one side with predominant Western attitudes and platitudes and on the other side with Taoism. TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND WITH TAOISM DOMINANT (WESTERN) PARADIGM DEEP ECOLOGY (DE) TAOISM Domination over nature Harmony with nature Elaboration of DE Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Natural environment valued for itself Much for DE; "humanism" rejected Humane supremacy Biocentric egalitarianism Differs from DE; wide impartiality Ample resources/substitutes Earth supplies limited Supplies ample Material economic growth a predominant goal Non-material goals, especially self-realization Following Tao-te that there is interest and merit in historical and reconstruction exercises. What it cannot allow is news, such as News from Tao. Thus it does clash with what we argue, that such deep theories as Deep Ecology can benefit and learn from Taoism. Taoism offers a striking timetested theory upon which Deep Theory can draw, an ongoing source of inspiration and wisdom. Taoism texts may lack the detail of prime Western (non-industrial) sources such as the texts of Aristotle or Plato; but they offer a much more congenial source for Deep Theory. �52 Consumerism Doing with enough/ recycling Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Competitive lifestyle Cooperative lifeway Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity Centralized/urban centred/ national focus Decentralized/bioregional /neighbourhood focus As for DE Power structure hierarchical Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Hierarchy without power structure High technology Appropriate technology Limited technology The contrasts tabulated are of limited accuracy, because condensed to slogans, and also limited because much of importance is omitted, especially from Taoism (which as so far portrayed only reflects themes of Deep Ecology). In what follows several of the contrasts will be expanded, and main omissions rectified. The richness of Taoism, the philosophical topics traversed to which nothing corresponds in Deep Ecology, will mean that Deep Ecology is often left far behind? Deep Ecology offers however a different perspective on Taoism than has been arrived at before. Not only can Taoism further Deep Ecology, then, but the compliment can be returned. A comparison of Taoism with deep ecological theory can hardly be our only objective; as an essential preliminary, much effort is directed at systematising Taoism. In the course of this outside endeavour, we succumbed to a rather too familiar taunting challenge: to draw something philosophically solid, of contemporary relevance, from the ancient Taoist tests. A key element in our attempt to pull off something mind-expanding has been an object- theoretic interpretation of perhaps the most vexing part of elusive Taoist theory, the "metaphysics". Taoism lends itself to natural systematisation in terms of noneism (the brand 3 We have not attempted anything approaching a fuii coverage of features of Taoism of contemporary philosophical interest; but a coverage is an eventual eco-theoretic objective. The main works repay repeated fossicking. There is, for instance, a significant doctrine of opposites in Taoism, iikely /tot the same as that in the main Chinese tradition, which needs fathoming, and linking with common ancient themes of balance and dynamic equilibrium of healthy systems. Every sort of thing, every category has an opposite, which furthermore interacts with its dual. In theory, the opposition appears to be tied to a (questionable) contrast theory of meaning. In practice, the opposites tend to be reconciled or harmonized, but /tor in a Hegelian fashion by ascent, but through taking a middle way (natural compromise rather than dialectic confrontation). �53 of object-theory developed in JB). For not only is the theory woven around certain striking objects - Tao, Te, Tzu-jan, and others - not only does the theory cleverly exploit an objecttheoretic cosmology; but also important, the theory, though remarkedly free of the type of religious trappings and claptrap that ontologically weigh down most older or traditional ideologies, is opposed to and is highly resistant to reductionistic practices. That is, like noneism, Taoism takes a no-rubbish non-reductionist stance. It is in part for such reasons especially that most everything in what it is and neither some other (approved) item nor reducible to such other item - that Taoism avoids the common-sense implausibility and scientific naivety of many a position, old and new: that for instance everything reduces to water or air or fire or matter or energy or superstrings Evidently, in advancing such noneist claims and other claims about what Taoists say or imply, an interpretation is adopted, when often enough other rival interpretations of the central texts are supportable. Indeed such a small body of theoretical work as the basic Taoist tests comprise is far from categorical and is bound to admit of a plurality of non-isomorphic interpretations.^ The main arguments we should offer for the selection we make from the basket of admissible interpretations are these: the interpretation we offer is very straightforward and is mostly an "obvious reading"; for the most part such an interpretation has already been offered, in other connections, by others much better informed than we are about the Chinese texts; and that it is a relevant and important one for deep ecological purposes. Finally we should remark that we are essentially concerned with the systematisation of only the Erst two Taoist texts (LT and CT) and focus upon LT. In brasher moments we are inclined to think that the framework supplied (brushstrokes behind the old master's impressionistic brushstrokes) will enable us to take philosophical account of almost everything in the compact LT; we are not nearly so confident as regards CT. 1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology while Deep Ecology does not. The cosmology is interestingly at variance with dominant - Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first. 4 There are significant pluralistic lessons for hermeneutics to be drawn from the logical investigations of categoricalness of postulate systems and the typical /a/Zare of categoricalness. �54 All things in the world come from being And being comes from nonbeing (LT 40). The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing (SB p.202). DIAGRAM 1. TAOIST CYCLE OF RETURN (cf. Chan p.173 fn 2). flourishing growth cycle of generated entity reversion NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal (FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness all that comes to pass, that is. "All things flourish, but each one returns to its root' (LT 16). The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is 5 For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan CS. In Neo-Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB, p.335) A serious complication is induced in the Taoist cosmological story by variations on the traditional interpretation of the later verses of LT 1. (On the variations, see Chan p.99 note 5; the linkage of Nonbeing with "no desires" is not however so remote as Chan tries to make out; see LT 37.) The variations (which replace having desires and having no desires by Being and Nonbeing) lead to dialethic complications of a Hegelian cast. For they make Being and Nonbeing ultimately the no doubt because of the becoming and reversion of each generated being to nonbeing. (Becoming is seen by the modem translators Hegelian-style, as the product of Being and Nonbeing.) Of course there is bound to be some dialethic elaboration of Taoism in any case; e.g. Tao itself is both nameless (LT 1) and named (LT 14), though in a slack sense. Thus Tao is both nameless because nonexistent and not fully conceptualisable or describable; and also named, because called "Tao', "the Subtle', etc., and theorisable about. �55 much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium (cf. Chan p.20, also SB p.177). Overall, it is correct to say, if not highly informative, that Tao is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense both of and of The novel cosmology — the emergence of what exists from nothing — is made feasible through adoption of rudiments of a theory of objects (in the style much later elaborated by Reid, Meinong and others). Nonbeing, what does not exist, is not formless or empty, an indescribable nullity, as previous Chinese schools had apparently invariably thought (Chan, p.8). On the contrary, it is not devoid of characteristics, but has definite features. Perhaps wisely (if unfortunately from an analytic angle) authentic Taoism is largely silent on such questions as to exactly which features nonexistent items have. But enough is said to reveal how what does not exist — above all Tao — may yet have very distinctive features, while yet lacking other properties (such as existence). Main examples, some repeatedly alluded to, are those of gaps, lacunae, vacant spaces, as with a hollow bowl (LT 4), or empty utensil or window space or lightweight wheel (LT 11), or valley. The unoccupied space of a room for example has definite dimensions, location, and so forth; and its function and utility depends upon its not being occupied (LT 11). Rudiments of object-theory are however coupled with a curiously narrow doctrine of names, perhaps as a concession to rival Chinese schools and with a view to making its nonstandard position devastatingly clear. (This would parallel then the contemporary concession of to mainstream schools, in virtue of which nonexistent objects are not referents; there are no referring terms, "referential names", which signify them.) According to this doctrine of names, only what is a concrete individual and partly at least describable in quite particular ostensive terms is nameable (nor at least nameable). As Wang Pi, an early commentator, indicated, names have a restricted role, naming requiring circumscription, 'the name that can be named point[s] to a particular affair' (p.l). Thus, for example, the main - transcendental notions are not nameable, Tao in particular. Tao, though-a great form , though at least apparently "named" honorifically in several ways, is not named thereby, but is nameless, because not suitably circumscribed, because not a particular (affair). Similarly for the other central notions of Taoism, such as Te; though they can be described, in approximate fashion, they cannot be named. 'Tao', Te' and the like are not (ptimary) 77#/%?.?, but rather (like 'God' and 'Vulcan' on contemporary theories) condensed descriptions. They could be said to be 'Name' has been contracted, perhaps unduly, to 'primary name'. There is another very important reason for eschewing names, or at least treating them - �56 and descriptions - with due caution. Names come with classification, with conceptualisation, with carving the whole block, with imposition of a theoretical grid on the seamless Whole.6 Usual metaphysical theories presuppose one or another of standard, narrow and limiting, conceptualisations and classifications, some perspective already carving up the Whole. Names, basic to the linguistics of such carving operations, have a major role in the worldification, in breaking up the One, which is simple and undifferentated, and typically a major role in imposing a single impoverishing theoretical grid (e.g. recent empiricist perspectives eliminate intensional and evaluative richness from the presented stuff). Part of the point of the "uncarved block" image - which symbolises the One (among other things, it is also a symbol for simplicity, and naturalness, for things not spoiled by artifice), the One simple and undifferentiated, the unity behind all multiplicity - is to get at the purity and unity of Tao before conceptualisation, before naming, before the differentiating and perhaps distorting conferring of names. Though Tao is so nameless, that is, it is not an existent concrete thing (e.g. a particular), nonetheless a lot can be said a&oM? the Tao, by way of description (see the excellent summary of Taoist descriptions in Chan pp.6-7). Though Tao is a single item, One, unity behind multiplicity, under conceptualisations it is "complex', many things: source of everything, great form regulating both nature and conduct, Way of satisfactory conduct and proper lives, and derivatively it is "invisible', "inaudible', "vague and elusive'. Nothing important conceptualised in Taoism comes in neat single form. All the main features and notions of Taoism - principles, models, examples, etc. - appear in such multiple form: metaphysical, ethical, etc. The artificial boundaries between these areas are broken down. Tao itself exhibits this plural conceptual character: it combines both a complex of natural principles and methods and of guiding ethical forms, with no imposed separation of fact and value; but it is also an inexhaustible source, and so on. But the Tao is not beyond the reach of reason (necessarily), even though it is inexpressible (adequately). Other things, such as infinity, are also of this sort. (If Tao were Nothing, which in a sense it Ay, many of the puzzling descriptions would be entirely apt.) Tao is perhaps best explained by going going back to fundamentals. "The word fao 6 This appropriate image was popularised by James. Under deep pluralism, different determinations of the Whole, different grids, yield different worlds, a pZuraf/ry of worlds, with different domains of objects named or different classes of designated propositions (and so derivatively perhaps widi different logics). �57 consists of one element meaning a head and another meaning to run. It means that on which something or someone goes [that by which a thing becomes what it is], a path or road, later extended to mean "method", "principle"../ (Chan p.6, insert from p.7). DIAGRAM 2. FUNDAMENTALS OF TAO head running stvlised source course program path § source directed path To the apt Taoist images of Tao as "storehouse", "mother" and "ancestor", may be added others, such as that of a programmed or guided projectile. Each image helps peel off unwanted associations of others; thus Tao is a great mother without male input; an ancestor without predecessor, a missile without maker, an outputing program without input. Like a program projectile or delivering storehouse, it integrates a complex source, an initial operating program, with a planned course, a natural (and ideal) path. The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it encapsulates a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving ""laws"") of nature <37%/ axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms, appropriately neutralised (in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: see JB), or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the pre-Socratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao is a ""great form"", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other t (unhypostatized) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not feature large in the CTn/ig. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the final chapter (LT 81). Other less Platonically emphasized (or available) forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component. Tao as form is part of Tao as in/bT*???//?^ source, which comprehends the class of characterisations of objects e.g. subjectized and individualized forms, taos (these no doubt �58 relate to forms, ideals or principles, rather as particular essences relate to Platonic forms). Tao as informing source is summed up in such phrases as "The original of everything and out of which all arises." Tao as combined governing principle and source is summed up in such phrases as "the ancestor and mother of all things". The Mother-image provides both a source, and for the form of an object without being that object? Under the ancestral-image, Tao supplies both the material source and the form, the genetic coding, for existence. It is evident that Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked with and not above the everyday. But what is the relationship between nature and Tao? Is Tao supra- or super-natural? Tao is certainly not supernatural, and it does not transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this sense is a process and the container and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, allembracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so simple. The persistent Mother image in Lao Tzu has suggested several tancifui interpretations, such as that of a mother-goddess, which are not textualiy supported. The latest in this fanciful line is a Gaia story. �59 DIAGRAM 3. SUPER-TAO, OR GREAT TAO, WITH COMPONENTS INTEGRATED SUPER-TAO Overarching forms, principles, Way of Nature '§ '§ Nature, with taos in world unrealised objectified forms natural system '§ '§ '§ '§ § '§ '§ Deviation line Defective (or fallen) fl' from Natural taos As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self- governing. Nor is it quite accurate to say that "the Tao is immanent and expressed through the �60 fe = r^Zoj, ideal direction) of things'.s The transcendent/immanent dichotomy fails (as on object-theory), because it presupposes that principles and the Tao exist, either externally or internally; but they do not exist. What is nearer right is that "Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all' (Kuo Hsiang, p.328). But ZJooZZy they proceed according to the Tao- te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously. DIAGRAM 4. TAO-TE PATHS, AND GOING WITH THE NATURAL FLOW (cf. LT 53). Tao (source) Te(los) Flow Ideal Way: Way of Virtue § Deviations from Flow Deviant Ways tao '§.....................>-Ote Laws persist, and perhaps evolve, under the guidance of overarching Tao, while the universe in its rich diversity comes into and goes out of being. Tao thus offers a kind of unity in, or above, diversity. In this regard too, Taoism can be applied to clarify the value scheme of Deep Ecology. For Deep Ecology also values diversity and organic unity in diversity, but lacks the cosmology from which the features derive. The unity lies in a unified tier of principle (matched in part at an upper level of the Deep Ecology pyramid) above the diversity of life processes. The Taoist metaphor of a single block, variously composed of many things, can likewise be applied to fill out Deep Ecology's picture of the ecosphere. However, 8 As Hall claims. a fundamental notion in Taoism, is often translated as wrfa%, sometimes power; but often reZo^y gets the intended item and objective better, as the subsequent text tries to explain. Te is not the same as Tao. And it is a mistake to t?Ze?uZ/y tao, or individualised Tao, with te (as sometimes suggested; e.g. Chan SB p.178), though they are evidendy closely connected, and to a restricted extent (as e.g. in a missile example) one can be derived from the other. While tao gives the source and route ' §, te supplies die virtuous direction and focus or goal (telos) §-O. �61 the block metaphor has some drawbacks; it tends to suggest a static picture, which is unwarranted. For both Tao and Deep Ecology, universes and ecospheres are, when appropriately stable, in dynamic equilibrium. Tao is a natural order. Though the phrase "natural order'* may seem strange, even contradictory, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perception of the world is the reverse of the modern Hobbes-Locke perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of- nature, is thus undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and should, follow nature. Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value. Nature presumes value. Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are. According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), the world is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts, computer substitutes for the lost "universal men**). The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe or Form or whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos - within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a which comprises a normative directive. For both Aristotle and Tao there is, in effect, �62 an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namraZ order come about? That is Tao; another, old and compatible answer is: It evolved.) When things are running properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 3). If each individual runs according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced. This picture of order invites comparison with the modem market theory, which claims that maximum effect or benefit is obtained without regulation (other than extensive framework legislation!), and that once regulation is imposed the result is inferior. In principle, the market operates on a set of understood (partly conventional) rules. The rules are known and it is merely a matter of following them. But the market enables dominance by the rich and powerful, and thereby discrimination and the like. Tao, however, is opposed to such dominance; those who follow Tao attempt to refrain from dominating others. But like the market, the rules of conduct are built into the system and any attempt to impose them is counterproductive. As a result, spontaneity and order are not opposites, but result from the same thing. A strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in the good sense) enters. Like Buddhism, Tao assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying organization. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutioning sort or of a supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternates, and points (in CT) towards an evolutionary explanation. 2. The extend of Tao as agency: non-religion and (non-)moraiity. God does not occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an example. "But there is no indication of his existence" (CT 2). As in the socio-political sphere, direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only examplary. In paiticular, God is not required to start or wind the universe up. "Everything in the world creates itself without the �63 direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the norm of the universe.'9 The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". It the Tao includes all-encompassing natural order — a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at disequilibrium — an interesting, but tricky, position. Then too, in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged. In politics, as in morals, it is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought of the Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state; by contrast with mainstream thought, nineteenth century European anarchism adopts a position very similar to Taoism. 10 It is revealing to compare the Taoist picture of deviation from a natural state with Aristotelian model of deviation from the mean, which provides the norm (cf. diagram 4). On the Aristotelian model, the end of all things is seeking well-being, to be achieved by following the Mean. This involves adhering to the Mean in an active rational fashion. Rationality is tied to seeking, to the means. Tao does not require rationality. Tao is sought passively, by letting happen, not actively, by forced efficiency, whereas on the Aristotelian account, the search and aim for the good is active. 9 Kao Hsiang, on Tyu, 330-7. When Hall and others try to argue (like Neo-Taoists) that the Taoist totality is without a beginning - contrary to Hall's other material about Being coming from Nonbeing - what they actually present, and mean, is. without a creative beginning. And that is right: there is no Creano m/h/o as per Genesis. But it is false that there is no cosmogony. There is; and while there is no creation, a making by someone, there is a beginning; see e.g. SB, p.202. 10 In this respect, Hall is right off track (in the last sentence of his paragraph 1). The Taoist point is that naturalness is not such a prominent feature of human affairs, because of the imposition of excess laws, regulation, etc. Taoist sensibility is only bizarre from an erroneous dominant paradigm perspective. �64 DIAGRAM 5. TAOIST MIDDLE/CENTRAL/LITTLE-ACTION WAYS 1. 2. Aristotelian/Confucian/Taoist Taoist contrasting ways mean path, in fuzzy sufficiency cone hard or extreme mountain ways a middle way valley, ravine or river way; easy, natural way Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in Lao 7h/ (e.g. 77, also 29), that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the general account of following Tao and living and faring well. Tao supplies a set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well, as well as a parallel (and controlling) set of propositions about how things happen and proceed ideally. Of course there is a moral purpose in Lao Tzu; the moral purpose is a central one alongside, and inseparable from, the metaphysical purpose, the acquiring of an account of ultimate reality". To what extent then is Taoism open to the accusation of amorality? Since axiology is a crucial part of the world view — evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in the texts — it is not amoral in a generous sense. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of conduct generally is very different. Deontics get into the picture only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a t course), 'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose' (LT 18). It depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and implicitly recommended life-styles, though there are few "oughts' and no (ConfucianKantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless the preferred Taoist lifestyle merely recommended, not required, Taoism would tall down as insufficiently pluralistic. 3. On the Taoist styie of iife; an environmental hfestyie. According to Lao Tzu, there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures' (LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19). �65 1. Deep love - which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical for Taoism, as it is for Deep Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). 2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation or excess. 3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies. Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, it is assumed, from these three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack/And to be firm in the case of defence" (LT 67). Earlier (LT 19) it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures"", are adduced: 'Manifest plainness/ embrace simplicity/ reduce selfishness/have few desires" (LT 19). Another element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is adaptability or sponanteity. This complements the further desiderata. Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound life-style are highly commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing an introduction for Callenbach's environmental handbook, Living Poor wifL or even for Pausacker and Andrews' Living Rener wifL L^^. In Chang Tzu, the pure person is a deep environmentalist:- She is a 'companion' of Nature and 'does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man upon it". Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace" and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of transformation" and thus to the environment (Chan SB p.177). �66 In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental life-styles are condemmed. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both, thus fitting neatly with Deep Ecology's prescription for environmental lifestyle and (supposedly derived) policy of non-violence . In place of the Enlightenment and mainstream economic virtue of competition appears the 'virtue of non-competition' (LT 68). Arguments against competition can be developed from other doctrines of Taoism. For example, competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of (non-action), competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from one's tao. The penality for such deviation from the path is not spelled out in Deep Ecology, but it is in Taoism. Another way of putting it (suggested by Clark) is that in competition external rival standards are imposed on Tao, presumably with electrifying results. In any case, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place oneself above another. So there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the world cannot compete with him. A way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought, and excess avoided. This includes, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. In Deep Ecology the same idea appears, partly sloganised as "simple in means; rich in ends". Simplicity is not the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not. It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.^ 11 As Elgin's very profuse account reveals. Strictly much further detail is called for here: namely, a set of conditions is needed, and also elaboration of the Taoist form of frugality, and then connection of the conditions with die three basic elements of Tao - frugality, deep relatedness, and not daring to be ahead in die world. �67 Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity' (Chan p.14). As to voluntariness, people have a of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. nonrelatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's way onto the correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. It is deontic to speak of a to find the correct path. 4. Following Tao, non-action, Te and Self-realization. Part of the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and to "self-realization" consists in acquiring the practice of non­ action, in terms of non-assertion, non-aggression, non-destruction, etc. commonly translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, wzz-w^z is sometimes rendered 'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'.^ Construed in this fashion, wM-wez is not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non­ action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so arrows in diagram 3 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances, pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other *No-nos; the "no 12 An illuminating philological comparison of activity with anarc/zz.wi is developed by Ames, pp.342-3. The sympathy between [them] lies in their common reference to activity performed in the absence of coercively determined constraints ...'. As Ames observes, the comparison operates not only at the political and ethical levels, but bears upon cosmology also, negating a coercive boss or planner in the beginning of things. For an integrated treatment of wzz-principles, which generally reject forms of imposition and control, see Hall pp.59-60. �68 desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorthand for 'no impure desires' (Chan p.13), i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of /yoznAy in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not Tao, however, is a source which only all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature­ destroying activities are all too common.^ Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be, as Deep Ecologists would say, with basically "hands off' practice and management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow (cf. diagram 4). One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. In Tao these qualities are associated with life; the inflexible and the rigid are associated with the dead. This can be visualized as a range of activities associated with the process of coming into being and passing out of being, in which the pre-life and the post-life are dead. The central time, like the centre, is flexible and supple; not hard, stiff and inflexible. All this carries a social message as well as an individual one. After things reach their prime they grow old, which means they become contrary to Tao. What is contrary to Tao soon perishes. After prime a thing moves towards rigidity. 13 When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature' (SB p.202); deviation from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature' (SB p.207). �69 But Taoism does not accept Western cultural notions of primeness. Primeness is not a matter of a certain juvenile physical or sporting prowess or peak. It takes a long time to reach a practice approximating Tao. Socrates died in his prime, although by Western standards he was an old man. An important, but retrograde, cultural shift has occurred in modern Western culture. The doyens of Deep Ecology are old(er) men by Western standards. A supreme goal in Deep Ecology, both for individuals and systems, societies and such like, is self-realisation (again capitalised in the overall case). Self-realisation is a modem European idea, not found in Taoism, and indeed incompatible with it and all older non­ maximizing wisdoms which incorporate theories of adhering to the Mean. For Self­ realisation, as understood and explained (of course the account could ahistorically be amended to a satisizing one), is a maximizing prescription applied to the aggregated interests of separate self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although Deep Ecology's ideal of Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there is a group of associated goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, cultivation of parallels that between cultivation of virtue or and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation and %, great Since The main objective of the (Chan p.ll), it is is the that displaces self-realisation on the Taoist scheme. Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a thing, te is the matching or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and (in principle favourably) developing, perfecting; hence the standard translation of as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force ybr good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally appears individualised. As self-realisation in Deep Ecology is not restricted to individuals, so te and tao are not. The society as well as the individual has a tao and a matching te. Taoism is neither individualistic nor atomistic, but systemic and holistic. Thus groups or societies have their own taos and the collection is related to the overall Tao. Social insects perhaps provide a conspicuous example of the social tao. The example transfers to overly rigid social forms, such as bureaucracies, and also to military societies which are obsessed with security. (Taoism is fairly lateralist in its thinking, with much inferential movement by association.) �70 But security is not obtained by being secure as in military security, which is characteristically a fortified security. In peace people are open to danger but secure in another sense. The materialist world, excessively propped up by possessions, Taoism treats with disdain; it does not equate security with material security. Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self­ development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal-directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self-development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter-organisation, my proper self­ development cannot impede your proper self-development. Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mutual adjustment and harmonious integration, but certain it happens naturally - as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.^ So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between individualistic and relational paths. Perhaps in Taoism the modem problems are skirted rather than solved. But the Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination of plans, without domination, whereas the pattern of Western relations operates (as in Hegel) through hierarchical ordering and domination. 5. Anti-patriarchal aspects: feminism, powerlessness, peace. Taoism advances other models, than those concerning age, which are strange by entrenched Western standards - such as demotion of strength and power, and the place and importance ascribed to characteristically feminine and child-like elements in living well and achieving Taoist self­ realisation, te. It was prepared for ecofeminism in a way that Deep Ecology was not. Taoism is highly critical of patriarchy, accepting in effect main anti-chauvinistic themes of ecofeminism. By contrast, there has been continuing conflict between Deep Ecology and ecofeminism. In its formative programmatic days Deep Ecology did not recognise legitimate feminine aspirations or sexual domination, and it took no due account of the organising theme 14 resolution of this problem can now make a good start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving cooperation. Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177). �71 of ecofeminism, the striking parallel between the domination of women and the domination of nature. But Taoism even incorporates an interesting early form of affirmative action. In Taoism, the traditional Chinese balance between ya/rg and ym swings, when in disequilibrium it does, towards the y/n. Quite in contrast with the Western paradigm, one properly aims at yzn (which represents the complex of supposedly feminine features) rather than at yang (symbolising, among other things, the masculine complex). There is an emphasis on female and child-like, features, and, as in ym-yang dovetailing, integration of gender features. There is, nonetheless, some stereotyping of male and female features in Tao (as there is generally in feminism itself), with males allegedly active and female weaker and more passive. It is in this way that the emphasis on yin is reached, from desiderata such as humility and weakness. Still, though historic Taoism hardly admits of degendering, rigidly defined sex roles are alien to Tao sensibilities. People develop according to their own tao. They can develop typically male, or female, features or features of both. One who rigidly accounts these masculine and feminine features, speaks from without the framework of Tao. Historically, where it began to be put into practice, Taoism worked for sexual freedom and liberation of women. The Child also serves as a model (LT 55), and there are certain components of Childhood liberation in Taoism: in the emphasis on freedom, in the attack on learning and schooling, and so on. The reason the child is a model is because it has spontaneity, it is direct and natural, and lacks power or strength. Tao rejects institutions and societies based on power. Infants are not ruled by a longing for power, instead all actions are spontaneous. Active force, like power, is in general castigated. To force growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop growth is deviant. "For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence" (replacing "mind" with intentionality would give a better picture of what is meant). There is a significant difference between force and violence. To employ intentionally destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are excluded. Not only is the Taoist opposition to violence well-known, but there is a blistering attack on militarism and warfare in 7zM (e.g. LT 31, 30, 46); "war is a symptom of the decline of man' (Chan p.5). Given the hostility to war, it has been regarded as passing strange, not to say puzzling, that Lao Tzu sketches military tactics and other allegedly devious political strategies. The strategies are however but application of Taoist principles and techniques to �72 warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. The legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT 36), is said to involve 'an element of deceit' 'undeniably', and 'worse' is 'morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand' (LT 36). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. 6. Environmental theory and practice, and environmental problems and difficulties, such as quietism and security. As on deeper ecological theories, traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models are also undercut There is no greater boss or purpose for humans to serve or act as steward to; besides stewardship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist views fall along with domination and dominion. Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be approach, with "hands off' management and associated lifestyles, several features of which we have already glimpsed. A most stoking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism. Heaven and earth are not humane They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects]. The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist]. He regards all people as straw dogs (LT.5). Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu (e.g. CT. 2), Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing �73 philosophy", it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion of what is good or true. The traditional idea that a supreme supernatural being ... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are imparm?/, but in a broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to g&m&izTZy ... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards ot things and replaces them with Nature (Chan p.10, italics added; also p.107). What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism. For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man" (SB p.207). In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way" (SB p.206). He who is enlightened 'is impartial" (LT 6); 'he has no partial love for anyone" (SB p.201) he does not bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature. Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the CTxmg 'the equality of all things" (the literal 'levelling all things" is nearer the mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured - nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the same stress on /i/i? in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking natural objects.) What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like deeper ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality , and counter chauvinism. Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification reveals that interests, desires, values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are developed, e.g. with a butterfly, by dream access (SB p.190), with rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty world/ This is called profound identification" (LT 56, also 4) - and perhaps wider yet, and �74 ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao (e.g. LT 16). No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processor, such as those encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of a power group. But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not rarified into a commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Knowledge is power; such power is removed from the hands of a few by making it a community good. This goes beyond Deep Ecology, in that it questions and rejects experts. Indeed in its criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the position taken by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The move against informational power also points to the difference between wisdom (not unequivocally approved) and knowledge, a difference recorded in Taoism as in most older wisdom. However one of the indicated Taoist arguments against mere knowledge illustrates an a//-to-any fallacy. We can't reasonably (or possibly) aim for all knowledge - by the unlimited objective or limited beings argument (see CT 2) - so we can't reasonably aim for any, and shouldn't, so it appears to be suggested. Another line of argument looks more promising. Life has a limit, but knowledge is without limit. For the limited to pursue the unlimited is futile. However the argument only reveals limits to the accumulation of knowledge, not its pointlessness or undesirability. In any case, in the end the superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism shifts ground; it is directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against slickness and cleverness, against devious and crafty uses of knowledge (LT 3), against counter-productive acquiring of knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The messy situation is tidied up a bit in the CTnxng where an apposite distinction is made between knowledge, the castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and knowledge, which is "leisurely and at ease", comprehensive, extensive, and synthetic (cf. Chan p.20). Even so, original Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) igornance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives. The critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. (Hence, png of the complex reasons for the delayed development of technology in China.) Certain forms �75 of technology were, if not rejected outright (as Clark contends), at least strongly discouraged. Thus, 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT 80).15 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognized clearly that even low impact technology may destroy human practices and conventions constructive to a community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a laboursaving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. There is enjoined an avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and correspondingly a shunning of replacing labour with nothing at all. Taoism exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving technology, than recent positions like Deep Ecology.^ The Taoist approach also demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress, whatever the merits of the "Law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such social laws are highly paradigm-dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant Western paradigm everywhere else. Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends and not a resource, but something of great value in and for itself. Nature is something to be cherished, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant view is reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by 15 Some verses of LT, of which this one example, support a rival, sinister, interpretation. According to this sinister interpretation (pointed out to us by David Garrett, a student at the University of Auckland), the LT represents not what it has been taken to be, but a work addressed, like Machiavelli's 77%? Prince, to a Prince, on how to pacify and control the people. Thus weapons, though held and sharpened, will not be displayed; wealth, though inequitably distributed, will not be shown; the people will be kept ignorant, through lack of information and education; and so on. Fortunately many other verses tell decisively enough against this interpretation. In particular, Taoism denies the need for a Ruler. While under satisfactory arrangements there will be those who are much better attuned to Tao, even sages, they are in position to rule as to impose upon others. Moreover should they endeavour to do so, thay would jeopardise or negate their own accord with Tao. Authoritarian rule Machiavelli-style is decidedly politically counterproductive. 16 The claim promoted recently that Taoism is an evident home for alternative technology, and prescribes as much, is rather naive in the light of Taoist texts. �76 following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non­ intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such concepts as bioregionalism is not to be encountered in explicit forms in Taoism, their bases and many other recently fashionable environmental ideas are: living in place is certainly present (LT 80); doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the universe and retaining global connections, is certainly advocated, underwriting the Deep Ecology maxim of "think globally, act locally . While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper environmental theories, Taoism also leaves puzzles or points to residual problems. Not all the supposed problems are however genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action. How would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment go, and fare, given its strong (alleged) emphasis on "don't bother'? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a don t bother attitude to environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature. Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer. How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply, Taoism holds that there is no genuine problem of plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the t requirements of Tao (rather as some claim there is food scarcity even now, with present gigantic human populations, only because of politico-economic mismanagement). Tao will serve to restore plentitude (LT 77). Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. 17 Use of the power of water affords a prime exampie; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese martiai arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance. �77 Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao?is No doubt in those times, and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still operated on human species, there wasn't more than a hypothetical or remote future problem. It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too many people and incremental resource degradation. The texts say little about soil degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China. By contrast, in the West, Plato was properly concerned about deforestation of Greece. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so forth, though some of the problems are hardly new. Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems. 7. The extent of political anarchism: hierarchy, domination, and rulers in Taoism. In looking to Taoism for political illumination, an early query is likely to be: To what (damaging) extent is Taoism, and the work of Lao Tzu in particular, anarchistic? It explicitly addresses a ruler, and takes for granted the existence of a state. But the format of the Lao 7zM may have been obligatory; for Taoism also hopes for "the absence of princes". Nonetheless, overtly, Taoism is not anarchistic. But although literally archist, almost everything in the work corresponds to anarchist sentiments, and it has struck responsive chords in anarchists. Not surprisingly then, some have argued that, despite appearances, the work is anarchistic, and disposes of the state and the ruler "when taken in a political sense (thus Clark). What has happened here is that anarchism is confused with an important Taoism sketches an early version of monarchically organised anakyrism; Clark (in his book) a late version of variant, meaning practice, policy and so on ecological anakyrism. If Taoism assumes a ruler then it is open to the charge of not being a suitably natural - way - unless there is a no-hands ruler. But a satisfactory ruler does not coerce, and in fact does no regulation. It seems clear that Lao Tzu assumes a monarchical style of society without coercion. The basic idea is that it is alright (if maybe costly) to have or inherit a perhaps superfluous ruler, so long as there is no coercion. The "ruler" is merely a planner, a 18 It is tempting to speculate that the greater Tao would serve to limit the number of actual individual taos, as certainly happened in most historic times. On a market model, supply and demand would be on a natural parity. �78 guide, an example. "Laws" are not backed up with coercion. Carving the block coercively is seen as counterproductively breaking up the community. Control or domination breaks the natural order of society, coercion removes the basic elements of voluntary simplicity; they are appropriately met with resistance. Government is said to be a sort of disorder. Government is indeed a main source of disorder, where government means coercive government. People are difficult to keep in order because those above interfere. Indeed this is the only reason they are difficult to keep in order (LT 57 and 58). The more laws there are, the more disorder is possible, the more disorder there is. The more ways order is attempted, and more ways there are to have disorder. Natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is given on social and political organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well. Even so, rather more needs to be said about how society accommodates "deviants" of various sorts, as to how unsocial and unenvironmental activities are curtailed, what support structures natural arrangements afford, and so on. Of course these things are attended to locally by society, not by a remote and mostly indifferent state. As in modem anarchism, an important distinction is taken for granted between (local) society and the state or empire. (By contrast, in contemporary texts, especially those of economic orientation, the state is often conflated with society, social roles are transferred to the state, and it is even claimed that what society wants is what the state does!) In Taoism, as in nineteenth century social anarchism, society functions along natural lines; the state is essentially otiose. Society is self-regulating. No doubt small markets that do not yield excess profits flourish, no doubt craftspeople - abound and live well but not extravagantly, no doubt local people make inputs to the arrangements of their social affairs. Most of these sorts of background details go largely unstated. But some significant features of social practice are revealed; for example (LT 3), the worthy are not exalted or rewarded, competition is not promoted, there is no unnecessary accumulation of possessions, consumerism and the manufacturing ot wants is discouraged. In short, all the main approved features of modern economic behaviour - the sources of greed, discrimination and strife according to Taoism (Chan p. 103) - are gently set aside, they do not represent natural, or satisfactory, ways. �79 Just as nature can operate by itself without a director or boss, so a confederation can run itself without an emperor or president. True, there may be one or more rulers. However a Taoist ruler/sage "exercises" non-dominating authority. But obviously, since he exercises no authority, some of the stuffing has been removed from notion of authority. The ruler/sage has no personal power. He imposes nothing on others. He transmits worthwhile tradition but does not impose it. He is said to transmit it through eternal edicts, but these are principles proferred or advice at best. He does not attempt to legislate or require the good. Society is like the individual, it cannot be coerced into doing right things. And it should not be! At work is a teleological model of "transcendent" good, a bit like a natural law theory, but even more like recent deep environmental theory. No more than co-operating individuals in a social matrix are required for the good. A ruler, or organiser, does not attempt to require it for society. He takes no action and the people are transformed by an exemplar ruler. He is a ruler on a rather more Gandhian model, but even so not a visible charismatic leader. Unlike contemporary models, the ruler is not a jet-setter or super-consumer; he is not usually seen on television, and perhaps not seen at all, but only known about, or his or her existence merely rumoured. As with "authority", but even more so, other social and political terms thus get drastically turned around, and even subverted. The "empire ceases to be coercive power, but turns into a natural super-regional order under general guidance of the Tao. Possessing the empire" even comes to mean something like attunement to Te. The "power" of a ruler is not coercive. It is exemplary. The best rulers are those whose existence is merely known by the people. Thus they are not rulers or leaders, but models for personal development. (For Deep Ecology the corresponding roles would be those oi eco-saints.) They are not apart from society, but central to society's ideals. Society could have a lot of "rulers" (kingly people) or could consist entirely of "kingly people". Like Christ, a taoist ruler leads from within or behind. The people seeing the life of the sage choose to do likewise. An ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler. The people bec&me, if you like, ruler-groupies. The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly. So Taoism reinterprets the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage. The meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler is one who deviates little from the Tao. This is his "power"". Someone who deviates little from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an allembracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of an ideal life. A more general model is also sketched (notably in LT 8) ot the best type of person — a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth", but also loves humanity, and order, and �80 competence, and profundity. While Taoism is decidedly short on structural details for organising large human populations, which are no longer self-regulating (by contrast with large dense populations of modem penguins), it nonetheless transmits significant political messages, which deep theory needs to assimilate. Taoism has been attacked, like other similar alternative political forms (e.g. Morris's social anarchism and Illich's convivial society), as being conservative, as seeking anachronistically to turn the clock back to some ancient village communal life-style, better left far behind. Such attacks do not cohere. Such considerable changes, as Taoism envisages, from the status quo, can hardly be represented as conservative. To be sure, there are conservative elements in Taoism, as in the most radical environmental movements, for instance the desire to conserve elements of the natural environment that the "conservatives" wish to exploit or destroy. ('Conservative', like many a political terms in heavy popular use, breaks down under conceptual overload.) While backward-looking glances at an idealised past is a conservative tendency, anathema to forward-looking progressives who prefer to leave the past obscured in a heavy cloud of dust, nonetheless, the past, with its actual features, its blocked possibilities, and its paths not taken, remains important to all main political persuasions. Against anarchistic positions, progressives like to lodge the charges that the past never was ideal, that virtually everything that matters (not, surely, forests inhabited by wild creatures) was far worse than the enlightened present, #776? that anarchism has never really been achieved in the past. Again the charges do not cohere. (Proof is left as an exercise; but for hints, see EE). It should be evident that Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on mainstream civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm. It discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers a very mean path, simple and modest, between insufficiency and excess- APPENDIX. Doctrines of Four: the four great things and the fourfold way. Running in a striking way through the history of thought are certain related doctrines of four — of four great, important or valuable, things, whose basic interrelations are fundamental to the whole doctrine involved. Consider first three, plainly related, fourfolds, of much interest in deeper ecological thinking:- theWay/Tao I God(s) I Whole/Gaia � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document TAOISM AND DEEP (ECOLOGICAL) THEORY: a preliminary object-theoretic investigation. There is a remarkable, and remarked, convergence of themes of deeper ecological positions, such-as Deep Ecology, with those ot Taoism, i Given that Deep Theory has not received adequate elaboration in important directions, particularly metaphysical and political directions, the older wisdom of Tao can be profitably drawn upon to elaborate and enrich deeper positions. Where Taoism does diverge from Deep Ecology (our working example since it is presently the best known deep environmental theory) concerns some of the weakest and most controversial parts of the Deep Ecology platform, such as the theme of Biospheric Egalitarianism, the equality of all (living) beings.2 Thus Taoism can also provide a base for 1 The connections are remarked in some of the prime texts for Deep Ecology, for which see Devall and Sessions (and therein p.100), and also CD. Not all the connections assumed in Deep Ecology sources are correct however; in parucular Taoism does not deductively deliver the platform of Deep Ecology. At most it informs the platform, which it would, if taken seriously, after. 2 A critical exposition of Deep Ecology, which surveys the main themes, is ventured in Sylvan CD. In several significant respects, Taoism offers a (retrospective) improvement on Deep Ecology, being free of the excessive junk Deep Ecology has quickly accumulated. Fortunately for those averse to intellectual junk such as environmental thought tends to collect (though no doubt for later building or recycling), Deep Ecology is but one deep ecological position. Another, presently being worked out in some detail, is Deep Green Theory, the ecological part of a more comprehensive Deep Theory, which is intended to cover a much broader region of philosophical ideas. Deep Theory includes, for instance, what adds to the depth, depth relevant logic, intenzional object theory, and deep pluralism. As will begin to become evident, Taoism proves to be a very congenial position for Deep Theory, and for Deep Green Theory in particular. Thus it can most usefully be applied to illuminate Deep Theory, as well as adding to its historical depth. But in this preliminary investigation, we become ^o caught up in interpreting and explaining authentic Taoism, that we do not get to much explicit elaboration of Deep Green Theory. A corollary we want to draw from our investigations (preliminary though they are) bears upon, and when developed may help to eradicate, a commonplace Western complacency and smug superiority. A widespread, though usually subterranean, view in philosophy is that the East really has little or nothing to offer. This view even extends far into environmental philosophy (cf. Rolston's put-down). It is often part of cultural chauvinism; Western scientific industrial culture doesn't have much to learn from other, generally more backward or primitive or scientifically crude, cultures. The West is the cultural pace-setter, with the information, resources, etc. Observe however that a nothing-new-to-offer position need not reject old theories as worthless and not worth bothering with; in less brash form it can allow 51 correction and adjustment of Deep Ecology, and an impressionistic guide to a more satisfactory and richer deep theory. Taoism is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow Mxmrg as the basis of practice. It is also, so it transpires, a very congenial philosophic way­ station for ecologically-concerned intellectual travellers weary of mainstream Anglo-American and Continental philosophies which inform and reinforce the dominant Western social paradigm. Both for background, and in order to arrive immediately in the thick of the comparison, we outline a main part of the Deep Ecology platform in (typical) slogan form and contrast it on the one side with predominant Western attitudes and platitudes and on the other side with Taoism. TABLE 1. DEEP ECOLOGY CONTRASTED WITH THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND WITH TAOISM DOMINANT (WESTERN) PARADIGM DEEP ECOLOGY (DE) TAOISM Domination over nature Harmony with nature Elaboration of DE Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Natural environment valued for itself Much for DE; "humanism" rejected Humane supremacy Biocentric egalitarianism Differs from DE; wide impartiality Ample resources/substitutes Earth supplies limited Supplies ample Material economic growth a predominant goal Non-material goals, especially self-realization Following Tao-te that there is interest and merit in historical and reconstruction exercises. What it cannot allow is news, such as News from Tao. Thus it does clash with what we argue, that such deep theories as Deep Ecology can benefit and learn from Taoism. Taoism offers a striking timetested theory upon which Deep Theory can draw, an ongoing source of inspiration and wisdom. Taoism texts may lack the detail of prime Western (non-industrial) sources such as the texts of Aristotle or Plato; but they offer a much more congenial source for Deep Theory. 52 Consumerism Doing with enough/ recycling Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Competitive lifestyle Cooperative lifeway Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity Centralized/urban centred/ national focus Decentralized/bioregional /neighbourhood focus As for DE Power structure hierarchical Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Hierarchy without power structure High technology Appropriate technology Limited technology The contrasts tabulated are of limited accuracy, because condensed to slogans, and also limited because much of importance is omitted, especially from Taoism (which as so far portrayed only reflects themes of Deep Ecology). In what follows several of the contrasts will be expanded, and main omissions rectified. The richness of Taoism, the philosophical topics traversed to which nothing corresponds in Deep Ecology, will mean that Deep Ecology is often left far behind? Deep Ecology offers however a different perspective on Taoism than has been arrived at before. Not only can Taoism further Deep Ecology, then, but the compliment can be returned. A comparison of Taoism with deep ecological theory can hardly be our only objective; as an essential preliminary, much effort is directed at systematising Taoism. In the course of this outside endeavour, we succumbed to a rather too familiar taunting challenge: to draw something philosophically solid, of contemporary relevance, from the ancient Taoist tests. A key element in our attempt to pull off something mind-expanding has been an object- theoretic interpretation of perhaps the most vexing part of elusive Taoist theory, the "metaphysics". Taoism lends itself to natural systematisation in terms of noneism (the brand 3 We have not attempted anything approaching a fuii coverage of features of Taoism of contemporary philosophical interest; but a coverage is an eventual eco-theoretic objective. The main works repay repeated fossicking. There is, for instance, a significant doctrine of opposites in Taoism, iikely /tot the same as that in the main Chinese tradition, which needs fathoming, and linking with common ancient themes of balance and dynamic equilibrium of healthy systems. Every sort of thing, every category has an opposite, which furthermore interacts with its dual. In theory, the opposition appears to be tied to a (questionable) contrast theory of meaning. In practice, the opposites tend to be reconciled or harmonized, but /tor in a Hegelian fashion by ascent, but through taking a middle way (natural compromise rather than dialectic confrontation). 53 of object-theory developed in JB). For not only is the theory woven around certain striking objects - Tao, Te, Tzu-jan, and others - not only does the theory cleverly exploit an objecttheoretic cosmology; but also important, the theory, though remarkedly free of the type of religious trappings and claptrap that ontologically weigh down most older or traditional ideologies, is opposed to and is highly resistant to reductionistic practices. That is, like noneism, Taoism takes a no-rubbish non-reductionist stance. It is in part for such reasons especially that most everything in what it is and neither some other (approved) item nor reducible to such other item - that Taoism avoids the common-sense implausibility and scientific naivety of many a position, old and new: that for instance everything reduces to water or air or fire or matter or energy or superstrings Evidently, in advancing such noneist claims and other claims about what Taoists say or imply, an interpretation is adopted, when often enough other rival interpretations of the central texts are supportable. Indeed such a small body of theoretical work as the basic Taoist tests comprise is far from categorical and is bound to admit of a plurality of non-isomorphic interpretations.^ The main arguments we should offer for the selection we make from the basket of admissible interpretations are these: the interpretation we offer is very straightforward and is mostly an "obvious reading"; for the most part such an interpretation has already been offered, in other connections, by others much better informed than we are about the Chinese texts; and that it is a relevant and important one for deep ecological purposes. Finally we should remark that we are essentially concerned with the systematisation of only the Erst two Taoist texts (LT and CT) and focus upon LT. In brasher moments we are inclined to think that the framework supplied (brushstrokes behind the old master's impressionistic brushstrokes) will enable us to take philosophical account of almost everything in the compact LT; we are not nearly so confident as regards CT. 1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology while Deep Ecology does not. The cosmology is interestingly at variance with dominant - Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first. 4 There are significant pluralistic lessons for hermeneutics to be drawn from the logical investigations of categoricalness of postulate systems and the typical /a/Zare of categoricalness. 54 All things in the world come from being And being comes from nonbeing (LT 40). The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing (SB p.202). DIAGRAM 1. TAOIST CYCLE OF RETURN (cf. Chan p.173 fn 2). flourishing growth cycle of generated entity reversion NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal (FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness all that comes to pass, that is. "All things flourish, but each one returns to its root' (LT 16). The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is 5 For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan CS. In Neo-Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB, p.335) A serious complication is induced in the Taoist cosmological story by variations on the traditional interpretation of the later verses of LT 1. (On the variations, see Chan p.99 note 5; the linkage of Nonbeing with "no desires" is not however so remote as Chan tries to make out; see LT 37.) The variations (which replace having desires and having no desires by Being and Nonbeing) lead to dialethic complications of a Hegelian cast. For they make Being and Nonbeing ultimately the no doubt because of the becoming and reversion of each generated being to nonbeing. (Becoming is seen by the modem translators Hegelian-style, as the product of Being and Nonbeing.) Of course there is bound to be some dialethic elaboration of Taoism in any case; e.g. Tao itself is both nameless (LT 1) and named (LT 14), though in a slack sense. Thus Tao is both nameless because nonexistent and not fully conceptualisable or describable; and also named, because called "Tao', "the Subtle', etc., and theorisable about. 55 much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium (cf. Chan p.20, also SB p.177). Overall, it is correct to say, if not highly informative, that Tao is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense both of and of The novel cosmology — the emergence of what exists from nothing — is made feasible through adoption of rudiments of a theory of objects (in the style much later elaborated by Reid, Meinong and others). Nonbeing, what does not exist, is not formless or empty, an indescribable nullity, as previous Chinese schools had apparently invariably thought (Chan, p.8). On the contrary, it is not devoid of characteristics, but has definite features. Perhaps wisely (if unfortunately from an analytic angle) authentic Taoism is largely silent on such questions as to exactly which features nonexistent items have. But enough is said to reveal how what does not exist — above all Tao — may yet have very distinctive features, while yet lacking other properties (such as existence). Main examples, some repeatedly alluded to, are those of gaps, lacunae, vacant spaces, as with a hollow bowl (LT 4), or empty utensil or window space or lightweight wheel (LT 11), or valley. The unoccupied space of a room for example has definite dimensions, location, and so forth; and its function and utility depends upon its not being occupied (LT 11). Rudiments of object-theory are however coupled with a curiously narrow doctrine of names, perhaps as a concession to rival Chinese schools and with a view to making its nonstandard position devastatingly clear. (This would parallel then the contemporary concession of to mainstream schools, in virtue of which nonexistent objects are not referents; there are no referring terms, "referential names", which signify them.) According to this doctrine of names, only what is a concrete individual and partly at least describable in quite particular ostensive terms is nameable (nor at least nameable). As Wang Pi, an early commentator, indicated, names have a restricted role, naming requiring circumscription, 'the name that can be named point[s] to a particular affair' (p.l). Thus, for example, the main - transcendental notions are not nameable, Tao in particular. Tao, though-a great form , though at least apparently "named" honorifically in several ways, is not named thereby, but is nameless, because not suitably circumscribed, because not a particular (affair). Similarly for the other central notions of Taoism, such as Te; though they can be described, in approximate fashion, they cannot be named. 'Tao', Te' and the like are not (ptimary) 77#/%?.?, but rather (like 'God' and 'Vulcan' on contemporary theories) condensed descriptions. They could be said to be 'Name' has been contracted, perhaps unduly, to 'primary name'. There is another very important reason for eschewing names, or at least treating them - 56 and descriptions - with due caution. Names come with classification, with conceptualisation, with carving the whole block, with imposition of a theoretical grid on the seamless Whole.6 Usual metaphysical theories presuppose one or another of standard, narrow and limiting, conceptualisations and classifications, some perspective already carving up the Whole. Names, basic to the linguistics of such carving operations, have a major role in the worldification, in breaking up the One, which is simple and undifferentated, and typically a major role in imposing a single impoverishing theoretical grid (e.g. recent empiricist perspectives eliminate intensional and evaluative richness from the presented stuff). Part of the point of the "uncarved block" image - which symbolises the One (among other things, it is also a symbol for simplicity, and naturalness, for things not spoiled by artifice), the One simple and undifferentiated, the unity behind all multiplicity - is to get at the purity and unity of Tao before conceptualisation, before naming, before the differentiating and perhaps distorting conferring of names. Though Tao is so nameless, that is, it is not an existent concrete thing (e.g. a particular), nonetheless a lot can be said a&oM? the Tao, by way of description (see the excellent summary of Taoist descriptions in Chan pp.6-7). Though Tao is a single item, One, unity behind multiplicity, under conceptualisations it is "complex', many things: source of everything, great form regulating both nature and conduct, Way of satisfactory conduct and proper lives, and derivatively it is "invisible', "inaudible', "vague and elusive'. Nothing important conceptualised in Taoism comes in neat single form. All the main features and notions of Taoism - principles, models, examples, etc. - appear in such multiple form: metaphysical, ethical, etc. The artificial boundaries between these areas are broken down. Tao itself exhibits this plural conceptual character: it combines both a complex of natural principles and methods and of guiding ethical forms, with no imposed separation of fact and value; but it is also an inexhaustible source, and so on. But the Tao is not beyond the reach of reason (necessarily), even though it is inexpressible (adequately). Other things, such as infinity, are also of this sort. (If Tao were Nothing, which in a sense it Ay, many of the puzzling descriptions would be entirely apt.) Tao is perhaps best explained by going going back to fundamentals. "The word fao 6 This appropriate image was popularised by James. Under deep pluralism, different determinations of the Whole, different grids, yield different worlds, a pZuraf/ry of worlds, with different domains of objects named or different classes of designated propositions (and so derivatively perhaps widi different logics). 57 consists of one element meaning a head and another meaning to run. It means that on which something or someone goes [that by which a thing becomes what it is], a path or road, later extended to mean "method", "principle"../ (Chan p.6, insert from p.7). DIAGRAM 2. FUNDAMENTALS OF TAO head running stvlised source course program path § source directed path To the apt Taoist images of Tao as "storehouse", "mother" and "ancestor", may be added others, such as that of a programmed or guided projectile. Each image helps peel off unwanted associations of others; thus Tao is a great mother without male input; an ancestor without predecessor, a missile without maker, an outputing program without input. Like a program projectile or delivering storehouse, it integrates a complex source, an initial operating program, with a planned course, a natural (and ideal) path. The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it encapsulates a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving ""laws"") of nature <37%/ axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms, appropriately neutralised (in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: see JB), or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the pre-Socratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao is a ""great form"", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other t (unhypostatized) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not feature large in the CTn/ig. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the final chapter (LT 81). Other less Platonically emphasized (or available) forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component. Tao as form is part of Tao as in/bT*???//?^ source, which comprehends the class of characterisations of objects e.g. subjectized and individualized forms, taos (these no doubt 58 relate to forms, ideals or principles, rather as particular essences relate to Platonic forms). Tao as informing source is summed up in such phrases as "The original of everything and out of which all arises." Tao as combined governing principle and source is summed up in such phrases as "the ancestor and mother of all things". The Mother-image provides both a source, and for the form of an object without being that object? Under the ancestral-image, Tao supplies both the material source and the form, the genetic coding, for existence. It is evident that Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked with and not above the everyday. But what is the relationship between nature and Tao? Is Tao supra- or super-natural? Tao is certainly not supernatural, and it does not transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this sense is a process and the container and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, allembracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so simple. The persistent Mother image in Lao Tzu has suggested several tancifui interpretations, such as that of a mother-goddess, which are not textualiy supported. The latest in this fanciful line is a Gaia story. 59 DIAGRAM 3. SUPER-TAO, OR GREAT TAO, WITH COMPONENTS INTEGRATED SUPER-TAO Overarching forms, principles, Way of Nature '§ '§ Nature, with taos in world unrealised objectified forms natural system '§ '§ '§ '§ § '§ '§ Deviation line Defective (or fallen) fl' from Natural taos As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self- governing. Nor is it quite accurate to say that "the Tao is immanent and expressed through the 60 fe = r^Zoj, ideal direction) of things'.s The transcendent/immanent dichotomy fails (as on object-theory), because it presupposes that principles and the Tao exist, either externally or internally; but they do not exist. What is nearer right is that "Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all' (Kuo Hsiang, p.328). But ZJooZZy they proceed according to the Tao- te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously. DIAGRAM 4. TAO-TE PATHS, AND GOING WITH THE NATURAL FLOW (cf. LT 53). Tao (source) Te(los) Flow Ideal Way: Way of Virtue § Deviations from Flow Deviant Ways tao '§.....................>-Ote Laws persist, and perhaps evolve, under the guidance of overarching Tao, while the universe in its rich diversity comes into and goes out of being. Tao thus offers a kind of unity in, or above, diversity. In this regard too, Taoism can be applied to clarify the value scheme of Deep Ecology. For Deep Ecology also values diversity and organic unity in diversity, but lacks the cosmology from which the features derive. The unity lies in a unified tier of principle (matched in part at an upper level of the Deep Ecology pyramid) above the diversity of life processes. The Taoist metaphor of a single block, variously composed of many things, can likewise be applied to fill out Deep Ecology's picture of the ecosphere. However, 8 As Hall claims. a fundamental notion in Taoism, is often translated as wrfa%, sometimes power; but often reZo^y gets the intended item and objective better, as the subsequent text tries to explain. Te is not the same as Tao. And it is a mistake to t?Ze?uZ/y tao, or individualised Tao, with te (as sometimes suggested; e.g. Chan SB p.178), though they are evidendy closely connected, and to a restricted extent (as e.g. in a missile example) one can be derived from the other. While tao gives the source and route ' §, te supplies die virtuous direction and focus or goal (telos) §-O. 61 the block metaphor has some drawbacks; it tends to suggest a static picture, which is unwarranted. For both Tao and Deep Ecology, universes and ecospheres are, when appropriately stable, in dynamic equilibrium. Tao is a natural order. Though the phrase "natural order'* may seem strange, even contradictory, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perception of the world is the reverse of the modern Hobbes-Locke perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of- nature, is thus undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and should, follow nature. Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value. Nature presumes value. Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are. According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), the world is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts, computer substitutes for the lost "universal men**). The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe or Form or whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos - within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a which comprises a normative directive. For both Aristotle and Tao there is, in effect, 62 an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namraZ order come about? That is Tao; another, old and compatible answer is: It evolved.) When things are running properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 3). If each individual runs according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced. This picture of order invites comparison with the modem market theory, which claims that maximum effect or benefit is obtained without regulation (other than extensive framework legislation!), and that once regulation is imposed the result is inferior. In principle, the market operates on a set of understood (partly conventional) rules. The rules are known and it is merely a matter of following them. But the market enables dominance by the rich and powerful, and thereby discrimination and the like. Tao, however, is opposed to such dominance; those who follow Tao attempt to refrain from dominating others. But like the market, the rules of conduct are built into the system and any attempt to impose them is counterproductive. As a result, spontaneity and order are not opposites, but result from the same thing. A strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in the good sense) enters. Like Buddhism, Tao assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying organization. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutioning sort or of a supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternates, and points (in CT) towards an evolutionary explanation. 2. The extend of Tao as agency: non-religion and (non-)moraiity. God does not occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an example. "But there is no indication of his existence" (CT 2). As in the socio-political sphere, direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only examplary. In paiticular, God is not required to start or wind the universe up. "Everything in the world creates itself without the 63 direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the norm of the universe.'9 The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". It the Tao includes all-encompassing natural order — a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at disequilibrium — an interesting, but tricky, position. Then too, in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged. In politics, as in morals, it is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought of the Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state; by contrast with mainstream thought, nineteenth century European anarchism adopts a position very similar to Taoism. 10 It is revealing to compare the Taoist picture of deviation from a natural state with Aristotelian model of deviation from the mean, which provides the norm (cf. diagram 4). On the Aristotelian model, the end of all things is seeking well-being, to be achieved by following the Mean. This involves adhering to the Mean in an active rational fashion. Rationality is tied to seeking, to the means. Tao does not require rationality. Tao is sought passively, by letting happen, not actively, by forced efficiency, whereas on the Aristotelian account, the search and aim for the good is active. 9 Kao Hsiang, on Tyu, 330-7. When Hall and others try to argue (like Neo-Taoists) that the Taoist totality is without a beginning - contrary to Hall's other material about Being coming from Nonbeing - what they actually present, and mean, is. without a creative beginning. And that is right: there is no Creano m/h/o as per Genesis. But it is false that there is no cosmogony. There is; and while there is no creation, a making by someone, there is a beginning; see e.g. SB, p.202. 10 In this respect, Hall is right off track (in the last sentence of his paragraph 1). The Taoist point is that naturalness is not such a prominent feature of human affairs, because of the imposition of excess laws, regulation, etc. Taoist sensibility is only bizarre from an erroneous dominant paradigm perspective. 64 DIAGRAM 5. TAOIST MIDDLE/CENTRAL/LITTLE-ACTION WAYS 1. 2. Aristotelian/Confucian/Taoist Taoist contrasting ways mean path, in fuzzy sufficiency cone hard or extreme mountain ways a middle way valley, ravine or river way; easy, natural way Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in Lao 7h/ (e.g. 77, also 29), that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the general account of following Tao and living and faring well. Tao supplies a set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well, as well as a parallel (and controlling) set of propositions about how things happen and proceed ideally. Of course there is a moral purpose in Lao Tzu; the moral purpose is a central one alongside, and inseparable from, the metaphysical purpose, the acquiring of an account of ultimate reality". To what extent then is Taoism open to the accusation of amorality? Since axiology is a crucial part of the world view — evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in the texts — it is not amoral in a generous sense. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of conduct generally is very different. Deontics get into the picture only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a t course), 'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose' (LT 18). It depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and implicitly recommended life-styles, though there are few "oughts' and no (ConfucianKantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless the preferred Taoist lifestyle merely recommended, not required, Taoism would tall down as insufficiently pluralistic. 3. On the Taoist styie of iife; an environmental hfestyie. According to Lao Tzu, there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures' (LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19). 65 1. Deep love - which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical for Taoism, as it is for Deep Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). 2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation or excess. 3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies. Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, it is assumed, from these three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack/And to be firm in the case of defence" (LT 67). Earlier (LT 19) it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures"", are adduced: 'Manifest plainness/ embrace simplicity/ reduce selfishness/have few desires" (LT 19). Another element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is adaptability or sponanteity. This complements the further desiderata. Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound life-style are highly commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing an introduction for Callenbach's environmental handbook, Living Poor wifL or even for Pausacker and Andrews' Living Rener wifL L^^. In Chang Tzu, the pure person is a deep environmentalist:- She is a 'companion' of Nature and 'does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man upon it". Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace" and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of transformation" and thus to the environment (Chan SB p.177). 66 In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental life-styles are condemmed. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both, thus fitting neatly with Deep Ecology's prescription for environmental lifestyle and (supposedly derived) policy of non-violence . In place of the Enlightenment and mainstream economic virtue of competition appears the 'virtue of non-competition' (LT 68). Arguments against competition can be developed from other doctrines of Taoism. For example, competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of (non-action), competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from one's tao. The penality for such deviation from the path is not spelled out in Deep Ecology, but it is in Taoism. Another way of putting it (suggested by Clark) is that in competition external rival standards are imposed on Tao, presumably with electrifying results. In any case, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place oneself above another. So there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the world cannot compete with him. A way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought, and excess avoided. This includes, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. In Deep Ecology the same idea appears, partly sloganised as "simple in means; rich in ends". Simplicity is not the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not. It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.^ 11 As Elgin's very profuse account reveals. Strictly much further detail is called for here: namely, a set of conditions is needed, and also elaboration of the Taoist form of frugality, and then connection of the conditions with die three basic elements of Tao - frugality, deep relatedness, and not daring to be ahead in die world. 67 Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity' (Chan p.14). As to voluntariness, people have a of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. nonrelatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's way onto the correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. It is deontic to speak of a to find the correct path. 4. Following Tao, non-action, Te and Self-realization. Part of the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and to "self-realization" consists in acquiring the practice of non­ action, in terms of non-assertion, non-aggression, non-destruction, etc. commonly translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, wzz-w^z is sometimes rendered 'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'.^ Construed in this fashion, wM-wez is not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non­ action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so arrows in diagram 3 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances, pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other *No-nos; the "no 12 An illuminating philological comparison of activity with anarc/zz.wi is developed by Ames, pp.342-3. The sympathy between [them] lies in their common reference to activity performed in the absence of coercively determined constraints ...'. As Ames observes, the comparison operates not only at the political and ethical levels, but bears upon cosmology also, negating a coercive boss or planner in the beginning of things. For an integrated treatment of wzz-principles, which generally reject forms of imposition and control, see Hall pp.59-60. 68 desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorthand for 'no impure desires' (Chan p.13), i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of /yoznAy in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not Tao, however, is a source which only all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature­ destroying activities are all too common.^ Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be, as Deep Ecologists would say, with basically "hands off' practice and management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow (cf. diagram 4). One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. In Tao these qualities are associated with life; the inflexible and the rigid are associated with the dead. This can be visualized as a range of activities associated with the process of coming into being and passing out of being, in which the pre-life and the post-life are dead. The central time, like the centre, is flexible and supple; not hard, stiff and inflexible. All this carries a social message as well as an individual one. After things reach their prime they grow old, which means they become contrary to Tao. What is contrary to Tao soon perishes. After prime a thing moves towards rigidity. 13 When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature' (SB p.202); deviation from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature' (SB p.207). 69 But Taoism does not accept Western cultural notions of primeness. Primeness is not a matter of a certain juvenile physical or sporting prowess or peak. It takes a long time to reach a practice approximating Tao. Socrates died in his prime, although by Western standards he was an old man. An important, but retrograde, cultural shift has occurred in modern Western culture. The doyens of Deep Ecology are old(er) men by Western standards. A supreme goal in Deep Ecology, both for individuals and systems, societies and such like, is self-realisation (again capitalised in the overall case). Self-realisation is a modem European idea, not found in Taoism, and indeed incompatible with it and all older non­ maximizing wisdoms which incorporate theories of adhering to the Mean. For Self­ realisation, as understood and explained (of course the account could ahistorically be amended to a satisizing one), is a maximizing prescription applied to the aggregated interests of separate self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although Deep Ecology's ideal of Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there is a group of associated goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, cultivation of parallels that between cultivation of virtue or and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation and %, great Since The main objective of the (Chan p.ll), it is is the that displaces self-realisation on the Taoist scheme. Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a thing, te is the matching or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and (in principle favourably) developing, perfecting; hence the standard translation of as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force ybr good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally appears individualised. As self-realisation in Deep Ecology is not restricted to individuals, so te and tao are not. The society as well as the individual has a tao and a matching te. Taoism is neither individualistic nor atomistic, but systemic and holistic. Thus groups or societies have their own taos and the collection is related to the overall Tao. Social insects perhaps provide a conspicuous example of the social tao. The example transfers to overly rigid social forms, such as bureaucracies, and also to military societies which are obsessed with security. (Taoism is fairly lateralist in its thinking, with much inferential movement by association.) 70 But security is not obtained by being secure as in military security, which is characteristically a fortified security. In peace people are open to danger but secure in another sense. The materialist world, excessively propped up by possessions, Taoism treats with disdain; it does not equate security with material security. Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self­ development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal-directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self-development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter-organisation, my proper self­ development cannot impede your proper self-development. Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mutual adjustment and harmonious integration, but certain it happens naturally - as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.^ So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between individualistic and relational paths. Perhaps in Taoism the modem problems are skirted rather than solved. But the Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination of plans, without domination, whereas the pattern of Western relations operates (as in Hegel) through hierarchical ordering and domination. 5. Anti-patriarchal aspects: feminism, powerlessness, peace. Taoism advances other models, than those concerning age, which are strange by entrenched Western standards - such as demotion of strength and power, and the place and importance ascribed to characteristically feminine and child-like elements in living well and achieving Taoist self­ realisation, te. It was prepared for ecofeminism in a way that Deep Ecology was not. Taoism is highly critical of patriarchy, accepting in effect main anti-chauvinistic themes of ecofeminism. By contrast, there has been continuing conflict between Deep Ecology and ecofeminism. In its formative programmatic days Deep Ecology did not recognise legitimate feminine aspirations or sexual domination, and it took no due account of the organising theme 14 resolution of this problem can now make a good start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving cooperation. Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177). 71 of ecofeminism, the striking parallel between the domination of women and the domination of nature. But Taoism even incorporates an interesting early form of affirmative action. In Taoism, the traditional Chinese balance between ya/rg and ym swings, when in disequilibrium it does, towards the y/n. Quite in contrast with the Western paradigm, one properly aims at yzn (which represents the complex of supposedly feminine features) rather than at yang (symbolising, among other things, the masculine complex). There is an emphasis on female and child-like, features, and, as in ym-yang dovetailing, integration of gender features. There is, nonetheless, some stereotyping of male and female features in Tao (as there is generally in feminism itself), with males allegedly active and female weaker and more passive. It is in this way that the emphasis on yin is reached, from desiderata such as humility and weakness. Still, though historic Taoism hardly admits of degendering, rigidly defined sex roles are alien to Tao sensibilities. People develop according to their own tao. They can develop typically male, or female, features or features of both. One who rigidly accounts these masculine and feminine features, speaks from without the framework of Tao. Historically, where it began to be put into practice, Taoism worked for sexual freedom and liberation of women. The Child also serves as a model (LT 55), and there are certain components of Childhood liberation in Taoism: in the emphasis on freedom, in the attack on learning and schooling, and so on. The reason the child is a model is because it has spontaneity, it is direct and natural, and lacks power or strength. Tao rejects institutions and societies based on power. Infants are not ruled by a longing for power, instead all actions are spontaneous. Active force, like power, is in general castigated. To force growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop growth is deviant. "For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence" (replacing "mind" with intentionality would give a better picture of what is meant). There is a significant difference between force and violence. To employ intentionally destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non-interference that are excluded. Not only is the Taoist opposition to violence well-known, but there is a blistering attack on militarism and warfare in 7zM (e.g. LT 31, 30, 46); "war is a symptom of the decline of man' (Chan p.5). Given the hostility to war, it has been regarded as passing strange, not to say puzzling, that Lao Tzu sketches military tactics and other allegedly devious political strategies. The strategies are however but application of Taoist principles and techniques to 72 warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. The legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT 36), is said to involve 'an element of deceit' 'undeniably', and 'worse' is 'morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand' (LT 36). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. 6. Environmental theory and practice, and environmental problems and difficulties, such as quietism and security. As on deeper ecological theories, traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models are also undercut There is no greater boss or purpose for humans to serve or act as steward to; besides stewardship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist views fall along with domination and dominion. Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be approach, with "hands off' management and associated lifestyles, several features of which we have already glimpsed. A most stoking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism. Heaven and earth are not humane They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects]. The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist]. He regards all people as straw dogs (LT.5). Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu (e.g. CT. 2), Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing 73 philosophy", it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion of what is good or true. The traditional idea that a supreme supernatural being ... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are imparm?/, but in a broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to g&m&izTZy ... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards ot things and replaces them with Nature (Chan p.10, italics added; also p.107). What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism. For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man" (SB p.207). In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way" (SB p.206). He who is enlightened 'is impartial" (LT 6); 'he has no partial love for anyone" (SB p.201) he does not bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature. Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the CTxmg 'the equality of all things" (the literal 'levelling all things" is nearer the mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured - nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the same stress on /i/i? in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking natural objects.) What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like deeper ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality , and counter chauvinism. Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification reveals that interests, desires, values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are developed, e.g. with a butterfly, by dream access (SB p.190), with rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty world/ This is called profound identification" (LT 56, also 4) - and perhaps wider yet, and 74 ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao (e.g. LT 16). No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processor, such as those encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of a power group. But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not rarified into a commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Knowledge is power; such power is removed from the hands of a few by making it a community good. This goes beyond Deep Ecology, in that it questions and rejects experts. Indeed in its criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the position taken by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The move against informational power also points to the difference between wisdom (not unequivocally approved) and knowledge, a difference recorded in Taoism as in most older wisdom. However one of the indicated Taoist arguments against mere knowledge illustrates an a//-to-any fallacy. We can't reasonably (or possibly) aim for all knowledge - by the unlimited objective or limited beings argument (see CT 2) - so we can't reasonably aim for any, and shouldn't, so it appears to be suggested. Another line of argument looks more promising. Life has a limit, but knowledge is without limit. For the limited to pursue the unlimited is futile. However the argument only reveals limits to the accumulation of knowledge, not its pointlessness or undesirability. In any case, in the end the superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism shifts ground; it is directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against slickness and cleverness, against devious and crafty uses of knowledge (LT 3), against counter-productive acquiring of knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The messy situation is tidied up a bit in the CTnxng where an apposite distinction is made between knowledge, the castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and knowledge, which is "leisurely and at ease", comprehensive, extensive, and synthetic (cf. Chan p.20). Even so, original Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) igornance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives. The critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. (Hence, png of the complex reasons for the delayed development of technology in China.) Certain forms 75 of technology were, if not rejected outright (as Clark contends), at least strongly discouraged. Thus, 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT 80).15 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognized clearly that even low impact technology may destroy human practices and conventions constructive to a community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a laboursaving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. There is enjoined an avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and correspondingly a shunning of replacing labour with nothing at all. Taoism exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving technology, than recent positions like Deep Ecology.^ The Taoist approach also demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress, whatever the merits of the "Law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such social laws are highly paradigm-dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant Western paradigm everywhere else. Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends and not a resource, but something of great value in and for itself. Nature is something to be cherished, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant view is reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by 15 Some verses of LT, of which this one example, support a rival, sinister, interpretation. According to this sinister interpretation (pointed out to us by David Garrett, a student at the University of Auckland), the LT represents not what it has been taken to be, but a work addressed, like Machiavelli's 77%? Prince, to a Prince, on how to pacify and control the people. Thus weapons, though held and sharpened, will not be displayed; wealth, though inequitably distributed, will not be shown; the people will be kept ignorant, through lack of information and education; and so on. Fortunately many other verses tell decisively enough against this interpretation. In particular, Taoism denies the need for a Ruler. While under satisfactory arrangements there will be those who are much better attuned to Tao, even sages, they are in position to rule as to impose upon others. Moreover should they endeavour to do so, thay would jeopardise or negate their own accord with Tao. Authoritarian rule Machiavelli-style is decidedly politically counterproductive. 16 The claim promoted recently that Taoism is an evident home for alternative technology, and prescribes as much, is rather naive in the light of Taoist texts. 76 following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non­ intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such concepts as bioregionalism is not to be encountered in explicit forms in Taoism, their bases and many other recently fashionable environmental ideas are: living in place is certainly present (LT 80); doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the universe and retaining global connections, is certainly advocated, underwriting the Deep Ecology maxim of "think globally, act locally . While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper environmental theories, Taoism also leaves puzzles or points to residual problems. Not all the supposed problems are however genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action. How would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment go, and fare, given its strong (alleged) emphasis on "don't bother'? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a don t bother attitude to environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature. Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer. How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply, Taoism holds that there is no genuine problem of plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the t requirements of Tao (rather as some claim there is food scarcity even now, with present gigantic human populations, only because of politico-economic mismanagement). Tao will serve to restore plentitude (LT 77). Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. 17 Use of the power of water affords a prime exampie; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese martiai arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance. 77 Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao?is No doubt in those times, and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still operated on human species, there wasn't more than a hypothetical or remote future problem. It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too many people and incremental resource degradation. The texts say little about soil degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China. By contrast, in the West, Plato was properly concerned about deforestation of Greece. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so forth, though some of the problems are hardly new. Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems. 7. The extent of political anarchism: hierarchy, domination, and rulers in Taoism. In looking to Taoism for political illumination, an early query is likely to be: To what (damaging) extent is Taoism, and the work of Lao Tzu in particular, anarchistic? It explicitly addresses a ruler, and takes for granted the existence of a state. But the format of the Lao 7zM may have been obligatory; for Taoism also hopes for "the absence of princes". Nonetheless, overtly, Taoism is not anarchistic. But although literally archist, almost everything in the work corresponds to anarchist sentiments, and it has struck responsive chords in anarchists. Not surprisingly then, some have argued that, despite appearances, the work is anarchistic, and disposes of the state and the ruler "when taken in a political sense (thus Clark). What has happened here is that anarchism is confused with an important Taoism sketches an early version of monarchically organised anakyrism; Clark (in his book) a late version of variant, meaning practice, policy and so on ecological anakyrism. If Taoism assumes a ruler then it is open to the charge of not being a suitably natural - way - unless there is a no-hands ruler. But a satisfactory ruler does not coerce, and in fact does no regulation. It seems clear that Lao Tzu assumes a monarchical style of society without coercion. The basic idea is that it is alright (if maybe costly) to have or inherit a perhaps superfluous ruler, so long as there is no coercion. The "ruler" is merely a planner, a 18 It is tempting to speculate that the greater Tao would serve to limit the number of actual individual taos, as certainly happened in most historic times. On a market model, supply and demand would be on a natural parity. 78 guide, an example. "Laws" are not backed up with coercion. Carving the block coercively is seen as counterproductively breaking up the community. Control or domination breaks the natural order of society, coercion removes the basic elements of voluntary simplicity; they are appropriately met with resistance. Government is said to be a sort of disorder. Government is indeed a main source of disorder, where government means coercive government. People are difficult to keep in order because those above interfere. Indeed this is the only reason they are difficult to keep in order (LT 57 and 58). The more laws there are, the more disorder is possible, the more disorder there is. The more ways order is attempted, and more ways there are to have disorder. Natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is given on social and political organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well. Even so, rather more needs to be said about how society accommodates "deviants" of various sorts, as to how unsocial and unenvironmental activities are curtailed, what support structures natural arrangements afford, and so on. Of course these things are attended to locally by society, not by a remote and mostly indifferent state. As in modem anarchism, an important distinction is taken for granted between (local) society and the state or empire. (By contrast, in contemporary texts, especially those of economic orientation, the state is often conflated with society, social roles are transferred to the state, and it is even claimed that what society wants is what the state does!) In Taoism, as in nineteenth century social anarchism, society functions along natural lines; the state is essentially otiose. Society is self-regulating. No doubt small markets that do not yield excess profits flourish, no doubt craftspeople - abound and live well but not extravagantly, no doubt local people make inputs to the arrangements of their social affairs. Most of these sorts of background details go largely unstated. But some significant features of social practice are revealed; for example (LT 3), the worthy are not exalted or rewarded, competition is not promoted, there is no unnecessary accumulation of possessions, consumerism and the manufacturing ot wants is discouraged. In short, all the main approved features of modern economic behaviour - the sources of greed, discrimination and strife according to Taoism (Chan p. 103) - are gently set aside, they do not represent natural, or satisfactory, ways. 79 Just as nature can operate by itself without a director or boss, so a confederation can run itself without an emperor or president. True, there may be one or more rulers. However a Taoist ruler/sage "exercises" non-dominating authority. But obviously, since he exercises no authority, some of the stuffing has been removed from notion of authority. The ruler/sage has no personal power. He imposes nothing on others. He transmits worthwhile tradition but does not impose it. He is said to transmit it through eternal edicts, but these are principles proferred or advice at best. He does not attempt to legislate or require the good. Society is like the individual, it cannot be coerced into doing right things. And it should not be! At work is a teleological model of "transcendent" good, a bit like a natural law theory, but even more like recent deep environmental theory. No more than co-operating individuals in a social matrix are required for the good. A ruler, or organiser, does not attempt to require it for society. He takes no action and the people are transformed by an exemplar ruler. He is a ruler on a rather more Gandhian model, but even so not a visible charismatic leader. Unlike contemporary models, the ruler is not a jet-setter or super-consumer; he is not usually seen on television, and perhaps not seen at all, but only known about, or his or her existence merely rumoured. As with "authority", but even more so, other social and political terms thus get drastically turned around, and even subverted. The "empire ceases to be coercive power, but turns into a natural super-regional order under general guidance of the Tao. Possessing the empire" even comes to mean something like attunement to Te. The "power" of a ruler is not coercive. It is exemplary. The best rulers are those whose existence is merely known by the people. Thus they are not rulers or leaders, but models for personal development. (For Deep Ecology the corresponding roles would be those oi eco-saints.) They are not apart from society, but central to society's ideals. Society could have a lot of "rulers" (kingly people) or could consist entirely of "kingly people". Like Christ, a taoist ruler leads from within or behind. The people seeing the life of the sage choose to do likewise. An ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler. The people bec&me, if you like, ruler-groupies. The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly. So Taoism reinterprets the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage. The meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler is one who deviates little from the Tao. This is his "power"". Someone who deviates little from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an allembracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of an ideal life. A more general model is also sketched (notably in LT 8) ot the best type of person — a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth", but also loves humanity, and order, and 80 competence, and profundity. While Taoism is decidedly short on structural details for organising large human populations, which are no longer self-regulating (by contrast with large dense populations of modem penguins), it nonetheless transmits significant political messages, which deep theory needs to assimilate. Taoism has been attacked, like other similar alternative political forms (e.g. Morris's social anarchism and Illich's convivial society), as being conservative, as seeking anachronistically to turn the clock back to some ancient village communal life-style, better left far behind. Such attacks do not cohere. Such considerable changes, as Taoism envisages, from the status quo, can hardly be represented as conservative. To be sure, there are conservative elements in Taoism, as in the most radical environmental movements, for instance the desire to conserve elements of the natural environment that the "conservatives" wish to exploit or destroy. ('Conservative', like many a political terms in heavy popular use, breaks down under conceptual overload.) While backward-looking glances at an idealised past is a conservative tendency, anathema to forward-looking progressives who prefer to leave the past obscured in a heavy cloud of dust, nonetheless, the past, with its actual features, its blocked possibilities, and its paths not taken, remains important to all main political persuasions. Against anarchistic positions, progressives like to lodge the charges that the past never was ideal, that virtually everything that matters (not, surely, forests inhabited by wild creatures) was far worse than the enlightened present, #776? that anarchism has never really been achieved in the past. Again the charges do not cohere. (Proof is left as an exercise; but for hints, see EE). It should be evident that Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on mainstream civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm. It discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers a very mean path, simple and modest, between insufficiency and excess- APPENDIX. Doctrines of Four: the four great things and the fourfold way. Running in a striking way through the history of thought are certain related doctrines of four — of four great, important or valuable, things, whose basic interrelations are fundamental to the whole doctrine involved. Consider first three, plainly related, fourfolds, of much interest in deeper ecological thinking:- theWay/Tao I God(s) I Whole/Gaia  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Draft of Taoism and deep (ecology) theory: a preliminary object-theoretic investigation Subject The topic of the resource Printout (photocopy) of draft, undated. Pages also numbered 50-80. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Taoism and Deep (Ecological) Theory Ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves. 67.21 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49545e5">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49545e5</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/eda41b7e99ab429778e36fdfc2dc6228.pdf e09714a43059bcfdd5e1a4ce9841c246 PDF Text Text ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, whilp acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. FeaZi/res o/ a Tacts/ o/ war antZ wn#tarfs?n. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius itnposed very demanding conditions: for example, "when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,' Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war — on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); "he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; "none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the L<3<9 TzM (Chan, p.154, p.17.) / But, after that splendid the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not id build-up, bu assert outright that war is ann abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military teclhhology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does/not s/n< recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed teqhi to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works ^f Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tza because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as The most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, To life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special �WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. o/ a Taofsf endive o/ War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzz/ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as ewA. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lap Tztv because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much �2 more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves /nare explaining to be done. There are rwo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A? taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by a/M/ogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is &<2<7, because evil, also doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element' in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). 'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Digrams . r/zg q/^zzrzc 6Zz7gw/?z^ r/z^zr ^zrg "r&wZvg^". Z)gg/?-grggzz c/^rr; Arguments to dilemmii ' incompatible input/^^ prescriptions -* Processing of dilemma, situational procedures directive output C(?rrgjpgzz<7z7zg TzzcAr c/z^rr: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be gxfgn^M; information can be put into the Black BoR rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is /i<9 resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always arg generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders a// actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even (/"that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b^ unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders End convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?! In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to 'just war /hr party d'.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then i/*it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirm ity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 2. On //ze Jtrergence o/ yrow T^o/yw. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, <2 roMgA and preliminary %?<9/<9gy is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) para&y. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as ana/agma/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, yfafgy. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wTongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow rot? violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however ^VHrion rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents" (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped" (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified" violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape" (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence" which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is 0/7/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat" (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle", his appeal to 'lesser evil" generates some instances. The 'basic principle", itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle", since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not Among wars, an important distinction is that between strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggr&yxor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.l52).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely 'For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can cow/?a.y.yz'<9/i be appropriate unless this attack is wn/u'/i a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war': a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a 'rule of law', not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A referred to as ST. Paa/: on C7zzm?yg P/zz7a.ya/?/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77za Way a/Lao 7za(Taa-m C/zzrzg), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, U/zraarz'/zg War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eca/agy, cam/Mmzz'zy a/zb /z/byzy/g, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pzgy/ar z7z^ Anc^yrary : rima/ zn r/zg eca/agy a/* a University Press, New Haven, 1967. Gamoa P^a/z/e, Yale R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Dz'yczzyyzan /za/z^ry zzz g/zvzrazzm^zzra/ jz/zz/aya/z/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Ezz/zzzzy ); referred to as AL R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Dzycayyza/z ^a/z^ry z/z oma'ronmoma/ p/zz/aya/z/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracazzyz'y^mLagz'c); referred to as AID. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Dz'yczzyyz'a/z pa/z^ry z/z e/zvzra/z/?z^/zfa/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Sacz'a/ Pavt^r am/ Pa/z'aca/ Priborn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77zg War/?zy af zTzg H^arf a/T/zz'/zgy , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', Sacz'a/ P/zz7aya/z/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dz'yczzyyza/z /za/z^ry z/z a/zvz'ra/z/?z^/zra/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. �9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...}. When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society A 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state w;7/ have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to ^<7 war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /a// distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. �11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf �12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an gco/og/c^Z/y war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. PMzzZes sfrafegy and /Zs o/ fec/tno/ogy an;? woZence Tt is surprising how much of the E<2<? TzM is devoted to military strategy". Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists" strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. * The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222) �13 * and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, 'smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people" (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fpeT the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: 'The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be" (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). * advance from flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. / The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT p.164), is cited as involving 'an element of deceit" 'undeniably", and 'worse" it is 'morally questionable" (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand" (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, 'smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state" would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: 'Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the CA&ig is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as vzo/^zzc^, which is more generally w/zz'c/z i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �second premiss. 4. anJ nioraZ jz^cf/zy/T!. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed zVz /?rzzzcz/?/g to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, z^ own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. /^cz/zym, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what is, in Amauld's word, it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), .... In brief ^a/z^ar^ /zacz/Aw is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. �17 to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various! they can certainly be as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative Plainly the components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Eng/fy/? definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Eng/7y/z tends to force pacifism into what the Eng/fy/i Efcfforza/y lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, p<2c(/Ts7??.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive", "fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as might have been better. pacifism: �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wifAi/r the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of <2// that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes pacifism' (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acfzvz.S7?z which holds that while violence is a/wayy wrong one is justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet -- pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism'' is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is /?r?/?zz/d:rz\y^(/, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: "what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of modves), to design situations where modves, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa3 deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), /tor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally ofAer procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that on/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow r<9<9 mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however <7;7Mh<9H rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The 'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to �22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just fa/Aing a&oMf and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/tg Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever hanaged (o glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come^ 'out of ihe horror of war': a new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a; 'rule law', not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the bther, & not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the'mosLpart, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A -Source Poo/: on Chines P/zi/osop/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/* Tao Tza(Tao-re C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eco/ogy, commtziry and /i/esfy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs/or r/ze Anchors : rita/ in r/ze eco/ogy o/*a New Guinea Pcop/e, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Di-srn.y.s'ion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /notary ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsz'srenr Logic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Socia/ Power and Po/irica/ Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J W. Smith, 77ze Worms ar r/ze /Vearr o/T/zings , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', -Socia/ P/zi/osop/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ON EXTIRPATING WAR: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN PACIFISM Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, whilp acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. FeaZi/res o/ a Tacts/ o/ war antZ wn#tarfs?n. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius itnposed very demanding conditions: for example, "when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,' Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war — on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); "he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; "none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the L<3<9 TzM (Chan, p.154, p.17.) / But, after that splendid the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not id build-up, bu assert outright that war is ann abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military teclhhology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does/not s/n< recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed teqhi to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works ^f Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tza because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as The most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, To life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. o/ a Taofsf endive o/ War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzz/ (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as ewA. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lap Tztv because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much 2 more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves /nare explaining to be done. There are rwo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A? taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them. ... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by a/M/ogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is &<2<7, because evil, also doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element' in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). 'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Digrams . r/zg q/^zzrzc 6Zz7gw/?z^ r/z^zr ^zrg "r&wZvg^". Z)gg/?-grggzz c/^rr; Arguments to dilemmii ' incompatible input/^^ prescriptions -* Processing of dilemma, situational procedures directive output C(?rrgjpgzz<7z7zg TzzcAr c/z^rr: Black directive Box output It is evident that Taoism can be gxfgn^M; information can be put into the Black BoR rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is /i<9 resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always arg generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders a// actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even (/"that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may b^ unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders End convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?! In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to 'just war /hr party d'.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then i/*it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirm ity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 2. On //ze Jtrergence o/ yrow T^o/yw. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, <2 roMgA and preliminary %?<9/<9gy is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) para&y. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as ana/agma/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, yfafgy. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wTongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow rot? violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however ^VHrion rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents" (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped" (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified" violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape" (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence" which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is 0/7/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat" (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle", his appeal to 'lesser evil" generates some instances. The 'basic principle", itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle", since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not Among wars, an important distinction is that between strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggr&yxor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.l52).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market 3 There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely 'For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can cow/?a.y.yz'<9/i be appropriate unless this attack is wn/u'/i a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 23 followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war': a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a 'rule of law', not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A referred to as ST. Paa/: on C7zzm?yg P/zz7a.ya/?/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77za Way a/Lao 7za(Taa-m C/zzrzg), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, U/zraarz'/zg War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eca/agy, cam/Mmzz'zy a/zb /z/byzy/g, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pzgy/ar z7z^ Anc^yrary : rima/ zn r/zg eca/agy a/* a University Press, New Haven, 1967. Gamoa P^a/z/e, Yale R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Dz'yczzyyzan /za/z^ry zzz g/zvzrazzm^zzra/ jz/zz/aya/z/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in Ezz/zzzzy ); referred to as AL R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Dzycayyza/z ^a/z^ry z/z oma'ronmoma/ p/zz/aya/z/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracazzyz'y^mLagz'c); referred to as AID. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Dz'yczzyyz'a/z pa/z^ry z/z e/zvzra/z/?z^/zfa/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Sacz'a/ Pavt^r am/ Pa/z'aca/ Priborn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77zg War/?zy af zTzg H^arf a/T/zz'/zgy , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', Sacz'a/ P/zz7aya/z/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Dz'yczzyyza/z /za/z^ry z/z a/zvz'ra/z/?z^/zra/ /z/zz/aya/z/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. 9 capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...}. When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society A 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state w;7/ have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to ^<7 war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /a// distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. 11 Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf 12 Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an gco/og/c^Z/y war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. PMzzZes sfrafegy and /Zs o/ fec/tno/ogy an;? woZence Tt is surprising how much of the E<2<? TzM is devoted to military strategy". Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists" strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. * The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222) 13 * and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, 'smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people" (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fpeT the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: 'The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be" (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). * advance from flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. / The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give" (LT p.164), is cited as involving 'an element of deceit" 'undeniably", and 'worse" it is 'morally questionable" (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand" (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, 'smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state" would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: 'Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them" (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).5 The powerful critique of militarism in the CA&ig is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as vzo/^zzc^, which is more generally w/zz'c/z i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. second premiss. 4. anJ nioraZ jz^cf/zy/T!. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed zVz /?rzzzcz/?/g to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, z^ own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. /^cz/zym, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what is, in Amauld's word, it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration, ... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures), .... In brief ^a/z^ar^ /zacz/Aw is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. 17 to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various! they can certainly be as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative Plainly the components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Eng/fy/? definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Eng/7y/z tends to force pacifism into what the Eng/fy/i Efcfforza/y lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, p<2c(/Ts7??.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive", "fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as might have been better. pacifism: 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wifAi/r the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of <2// that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes pacifism' (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acfzvz.S7?z which holds that while violence is a/wayy wrong one is justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet -- pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism'' is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is /?r?/?zz/d:rz\y^(/, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: "what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally or/zgr procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of modves), to design situations where modves, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 19 accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory wa3 deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing' (Al p.13), /tor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances' (JWS p.152). Situationally ofAer procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned' (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that on/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight' (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow r<9<9 mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however <7;7Mh<9H rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The 'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to 22 peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just fa/Aing a&oMf and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/tg Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever hanaged (o glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come^ 'out of ihe horror of war': a new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations'; a; 'rule law', not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the bther, & not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the'mosLpart, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A -Source Poo/: on Chines P/zi/osop/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/* Tao Tza(Tao-re C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eco/ogy, commtziry and /i/esfy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs/or r/ze Anchors : rita/ in r/ze eco/ogy o/*a New Guinea Pcop/e, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Di-srn.y.s'ion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /notary ); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsz'srenr Logic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Socia/ Power and Po/irica/ Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J W. Smith, 77ze Worms ar r/ze /Vearr o/T/zings , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', -Socia/ P/zi/osop/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discussion papers in environment/ p/zi/osop/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. First page is page 1 of later title of paper, On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Some pages printed on verso of duplicate printouts of same paper. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [27] leaves. 63.7 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:88ed71">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:88ed71</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/3044e76f70e17f7d2314623237b7068b.pdf c7a4c55216b6f35b0e87ed23b8e75926 PDF Text Text WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. Fca/ar^y o/ % Tao/s/ q/ war an<? War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoi<7a&/e gvfAy. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much �2 more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is no? tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves * PMzz/ay/br explaining to be done. and wars as M/tavafda&Ze evf/s There are fwa puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the zm/ffary-pracac^s paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /Z/g-prac^c^s paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all tight - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the 7%oLyf-ZZ/&y?y/e paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coA^nfZy take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or cleaver weapons. Instead the points are made by what the possesser of Tao �3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by awa/ogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is bof/i because evil, also no? doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element* in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain irom killing (p. 17). 'Just as*? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT bn examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: �4 Diagrams . C/%zr%Kg "r&w/v^". procawmg Dggp-grgg/Y c/Mrr Arguments to incompatible prescriptions Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output CorrasppMJing 7%<9i\f c/M!rr: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensi^s of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- �5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders aZZ actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important (ype of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But",to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to 'just warybr party d'.) �6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then i/* it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of Wept-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military illness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing - of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. ; �7 2. On divergence of deej?-green fron: Taoisn!. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a roMg/t and preliminary ryp<?/<9gy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a gawc - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parfzay. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as a/za/ogfca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, -yfafe.y. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contents. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the �8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggray-yor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p. 152)3, The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining "defensive* to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include ""defence** of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is ""defensive**). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; Marxist and market capitalism, for 3 There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can c<?wpa.y.Hon be appropriate unless this attack is wif/un a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years -the (pulf war liquidated some ^1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wz'Z/ 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the Anal stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /%// distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the nation in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive �11 perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in assendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modem war is of course a war that deploys modem technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf thlaess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow �12 a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, environments were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an eco/ogica/Zy son/M? war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. PuzzZes Tao/sf s/ra/egy anJ f/s endues o/ fec/tnoZogy an*/ woZence Tt is surprising how much of the Lao Tza is devoted to military strategy'. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists' strong opposition to the use of force' (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include * * not 'making light of the enemy' (p.222) and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: �13 marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people* (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be* (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). * advance from weaATt&M, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and noncompetition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give* (LT p.164), is cited as invoking "an element of deceit* "undeniably*, and "worse* it is "morally questionable* (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand* (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, "smart weapons* as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state* would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them* (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices �14 paradox)^ The powerful critique of militarism in the C/wng is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMwef, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice oLtechnology that appropr^/zg^, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion^ 3ize, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technology are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult^ ease of repair, capital cgeapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental^ benignness, and meeting sound social needs. /-C ^7^^7*// / �right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as which is more generally /orcg w/zzc/z vzo/af&y, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs and enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. ; /1 �16 second premiss. and worn/ /zacz/zszn. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: * It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2, It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed zn prznczp/e to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, zr^ own use, of destructive force, and. inveighed against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacz/z^nz, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, a/zzz-IVar-z^nz, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief ^Zazzdard ^acz/z^nz is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. /, �17 Plainly the oppojzfzon to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be acfzve, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concz'-ye Ezzg/z^/z definition of the negative component: "the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Cozzcz^ E/zg/zj/z tends to force pacifism into what the Eng/zs/z Dzcfz'onafy lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, .yfrefc/z^ /?acz/z.M?z.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called mora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive", "fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times sketched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as cowigrghgn.yzvg pacifism: ovcrcomprgAe/MAe might have been better. �18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wif/nn the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of a// that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes pacifism" (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acf/vw?! which holds that while violence is wrong one is -yowefwtay justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism"" is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movement:and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nof 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS p.152). Situationally procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) �20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the "strategy will allow foe violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can "justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist "is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially "justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains "a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with "the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is "appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his "basic principle', his appeal to "lesser evil' generates some instances. The "basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the "basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage �21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent ^depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which bschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the convendonal setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that o supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive �22 agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the prevous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious cjuic^ to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan Append?* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just fa/Amg aAoaf peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/ig Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox 9 The generalization^ P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes^MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. �23 hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that "peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A 5*oarce 2?oo% on C/zz'ae^e P/zZZo^op/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), T/ze Way a/* Lao Tza(Tao-re C/zZag), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, UproorZag War, Freedom press, London, 1984. A. Naess, EcoZogy, coazazaaZry aa<% ZZ/e.yfy^, Cambridge University press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, PZg.y /or r/ze Anc&yfory : rituaLin the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, "War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', DZjca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzeafaZ p/zZZojop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /apaZry); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, "Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca&yZoa papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/aZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracoa^z\yrearLogZc); referred to as MD. R. Routley, "War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, 6*acZaZ Power aad PoZZrZcaZ Free&wi, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77ze Woraz^ ar r/ze 7/earr o/T/zZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, "War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZaZ P/zZZo^op/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, "Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. �22 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: paci/Ly/H (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The 3ptly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even — in what was effectively a declaration of war — reiteration of the modem quest for "a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. "War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin s paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �23 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A on C%Zn^.y^ P/zZZo-yopZEy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 7%^ Way 0/L00 7za (7ao-z^ C/nng), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, EcoZogy, co/wmonZy an%Z ZZ/f^ZyZ^, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, PZg^ybr z/^^ Anc^^ror^ : rZzaaZ Zn Z/^^ ^coZogy o/ a ZV^w GnZn^a P^opZ^, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', DZ^cn^Zon papery Zn ^nvZronm^nfaZ p/zZZo-yop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /npaZry); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca-MZoK papery Zn ^nvZronw^HZaZ p/nZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraco/MZ-yZ^/iZ LfgZc); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', DZ-ycas-yZon papers Zn ^nvZron/M^nZaZp/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, &?cZ%Z Potter aA!^Z PoZZzZcaZ Fr^fJow, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 7%^ Wor^ty %Z z/z^ 7/^arZ p/77iZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZ#Z P%ZZo.yopZ!y, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^-yZan papers Zn ^HvZronm^nZaZ p/uZo-yop^y #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. �23 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A 6*az/rce Z3aa& on C/zinese P/ziZasap/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/Eaa 7za (7aa-te C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eco/ogy, canznznnify aneZ Zi/esfyZe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs^ar r/ze Ancesfars : rifzzaZ in f/ze ecaZagy a/a Aew Gzzinea PeapZe, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Discassian papery in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /n^aizy); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discassian papers in enviranzzzenfaZ p/tiZo.yop/ty #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracon.yi.y^nf Lagic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZp/ziZasap/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, .SaciaZ Patter anJ PaZificaZ FreeJazn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77ze Warzzzs af f/ze Pfearf a/77zings, Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989, h 7^)5, R. Sylvan, War and Peace IIL Australian defence philosophy', P/ziZasap/zy 3 Zw) R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. /-//TirZcVf Z^9/ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. Fca/ar^y o/ % Tao/s/ q/ war an<? War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoi<7a&/e gvfAy. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much 2 more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special dispensation? Why should what is no? tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves * PMzz/ay/br explaining to be done. and wars as M/tavafda&Ze evf/s There are fwa puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the zm/ffary-pracac^s paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /Z/g-prac^c^s paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, 'the most bitter attack on militarism', the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all tight - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the 7%oLyf-ZZ/&y?y/e paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coA^nfZy take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or cleaver weapons. Instead the points are made by what the possesser of Tao 3 does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by awa/ogy, of victory in war with death. Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is bof/i because evil, also no? doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that "most troublesome element* in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain irom killing (p. 17). 'Just as*? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT bn examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: 4 Diagrams . C/%zr%Kg "r&w/v^". procawmg Dggp-grgg/Y c/Mrr Arguments to incompatible prescriptions Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output CorrasppMJing 7%<9i\f c/M!rr: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensi^s of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:- 5 Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders aZZ actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important (ype of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But",to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to 'just warybr party d'.) 6 unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then i/* it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of Wept-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military illness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing - of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. ; 7 2. On divergence of deej?-green fron: Taoisn!. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a roMg/t and preliminary ryp<?/<9gy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a 'contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a gawc - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parfzay. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as a/za/ogfca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, -yfafe.y. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While "nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of 'force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contents. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the 8 technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggray-yor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p. 152)3, The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining "defensive* to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include ""defence** of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is ""defensive**). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; Marxist and market capitalism, for 3 There is one line in LT that way suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can c<?wpa.y.Hon be appropriate unless this attack is wif/un a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years -the (pulf war liquidated some ^1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wz'Z/ 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the Anal stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /%// distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the nation in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive 11 perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in assendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modem war is of course a war that deploys modem technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf thlaess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow 12 a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, environments were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an eco/ogica/Zy son/M? war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modem environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. PuzzZes Tao/sf s/ra/egy anJ f/s endues o/ fec/tnoZogy an*/ woZence Tt is surprising how much of the Lao Tza is devoted to military strategy'. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? 'Do they not contradict the Taoists' strong opposition to the use of force' (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include * * not 'making light of the enemy' (p.222) and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: 13 marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people* (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be* (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p. 194). * advance from weaATt&M, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and noncompetition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give* (LT p.164), is cited as invoking "an element of deceit* "undeniably*, and "worse* it is "morally questionable* (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand* (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, "smart weapons* as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state* would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them* (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices 14 paradox)^ The powerful critique of militarism in the C/wng is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMwef, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice oLtechnology that appropr^/zg^, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion^ 3ize, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technology are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult^ ease of repair, capital cgeapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental^ benignness, and meeting sound social needs. /-C ^7^^7*// / right. 'Vital force without restraint', intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as which is more generally /orcg w/zzc/z vzo/af&y, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs and enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.^ This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the 'therefore' is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. ; /1 16 second premiss. and worn/ /zacz/zszn. Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacz/zc position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons: * It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2, It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed zn prznczp/e to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, zr^ own use, of destructive force, and. inveighed against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of 'pacifism'. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacz/z^nz, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, a/zzz-IVar-z^nz, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),.... In brief ^Zazzdard ^acz/z^nz is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. /, 17 Plainly the oppojzfzon to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be acfzve, as with nonviolent demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concz'-ye Ezzg/z^/z definition of the negative component: "the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare'. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Cozzcz^ E/zg/zj/z tends to force pacifism into what the Eng/zs/z Dzcfz'onafy lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price', 'in any circumstance'. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, .yfrefc/z^ /?acz/z.M?z.7 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called mora/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent", "inconsistent", "insensitive", "fanatical". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times sketched pacifism 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as cowigrghgn.yzvg pacifism: ovcrcomprgAe/MAe might have been better. 18 could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p. 10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wif/nn the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of a// that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a 'failure because it trivializes pacifism" (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acf/vw?! which holds that while violence is wrong one is -yowefwtay justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS "activism"" is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movement:and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nof 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS p.152). Situationally procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that <?n/y consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) 20 There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the "strategy will allow foe violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist' (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however rather than populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can "justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist "is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially "justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains "a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with "the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is "appropriate, in response is on/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his "basic principle', his appeal to "lesser evil' generates some instances. The "basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the "basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage 21 routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent ^depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which bschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the convendonal setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that o supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive 22 agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ To recover what amounts, in the prevous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modem humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious cjuic^ to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan Append?* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for 'a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. 'War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just fa/Amg aAoaf peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace,/ig Ar for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox 9 The generalization^ P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes^MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use vandolence. 23 hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that "peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A 5*oarce 2?oo% on C/zz'ae^e P/zZZo^op/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), T/ze Way a/* Lao Tza(Tao-re C/zZag), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, UproorZag War, Freedom press, London, 1984. A. Naess, EcoZogy, coazazaaZry aa<% ZZ/e.yfy^, Cambridge University press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, PZg.y /or r/ze Anc&yfory : rituaLin the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, "War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', DZjca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzeafaZ p/zZZojop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /apaZry); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, "Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca&yZoa papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/aZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracoa^z\yrearLogZc); referred to as MD. R. Routley, "War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroawzearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, 6*acZaZ Power aad PoZZrZcaZ Free&wi, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77ze Woraz^ ar r/ze 7/earr o/T/zZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, "War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZaZ P/zZZo^op/zy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, "Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^Zoa papery Za eavZroaazearaZ p/zZZo^op/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. 22 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: paci/Ly/H (as modified) is While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The 3ptly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even — in what was effectively a declaration of war — reiteration of the modem quest for "a new world order of peace". Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. "War must be for the sake of peace" (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he 'preferred to think of peace, not war". But now 'only force will prevail", as 'all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted". 'What must be done" must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come 'out of the horror of war": a 'new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations"; a 'rule of law", not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin s paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) 23 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A on C%Zn^.y^ P/zZZo-yopZEy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 7%^ Way 0/L00 7za (7ao-z^ C/nng), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, EcoZogy, co/wmonZy an%Z ZZ/f^ZyZ^, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, PZg^ybr z/^^ Anc^^ror^ : rZzaaZ Zn Z/^^ ^coZogy o/ a ZV^w GnZn^a P^opZ^, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', DZ^cn^Zon papery Zn ^nvZronm^nfaZ p/zZZo-yop/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /npaZry); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', DZ-yca-MZoK papery Zn ^nvZronw^HZaZ p/nZo-yopAy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraco/MZ-yZ^/iZ LfgZc); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', DZ-ycas-yZon papers Zn ^nvZron/M^nZaZp/zZZo^op/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, &?cZ%Z Potter aA!^Z PoZZzZcaZ Fr^fJow, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 7%^ Wor^ty %Z z/z^ 7/^arZ p/77iZag^ , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, 'War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy', 5*ocZ#Z P%ZZo.yopZ!y, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', DZ^ca^-yZan papers Zn ^HvZronm^nZaZ p/uZo-yop^y #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. 23 'peace is a great good, war a great evil'. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A 6*az/rce Z3aa& on C/zinese P/ziZasap/zy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), 77ze Way a/Eaa 7za (7aa-te C/zing), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, (/proofing War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Eco/ogy, canznznnify aneZ Zi/esfyZe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs^ar r/ze Ancesfars : rifzzaZ in f/ze ecaZagy a/a Aew Gzzinea PeapZe, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, 'War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism', Discassian papery in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in /n^aizy); referred to as Al. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discassian papers in enviranzzzenfaZ p/tiZo.yop/ty #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paracon.yi.y^nf Lagic); referred to as MD. R. Routley, 'War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZp/ziZasap/zy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, .SaciaZ Patter anJ PaZificaZ FreeJazn, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, 77ze Warzzzs af f/ze Pfearf a/77zings, Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989, h 7^)5, R. Sylvan, War and Peace IIL Australian defence philosophy', P/ziZasap/zy 3 Zw) R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology', Discassian papers in enviranznenfaZ p/ziZasap/zy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. /-//TirZcVf Z^9/  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, with emendations and annotation, dated 1992. Handwritten above title: Old. Diagrams. Draft includes multiple versions of page 22 (2 versions ) and 23 (3 versions). Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1992 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [26] leaves. 61.54 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c7af66">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:0c7af66</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/c2e6632d96cd9731bb185e500740e78e.pdf ba53f5b39bc28242d44e3586fc9c8987 PDF Text Text / / * WAR AND TAO AND DEE Taoism and deep-green environmental theory nanism, is not a pacific issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast foi doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. o/ a o/ war wnZz/arMw. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Zzzo (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as ^vz'Ay. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special �/ / 46""WAR AND PEACE )V: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN \ Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. J. of a Tao:s; of war anJ wn/%ar:syn. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ 'If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed" (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war" (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu". '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za" (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoMfa&Zt? evz'A. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element" in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, 'to life in general" (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special ��2 dispensation? Why should what is no/ tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. * Pnzz^/br 7hofym, on J wary a.y nnavo^^/e evi/.y There are /wo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the miP/ary-prac/fce^ paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /{/e-^racOce^ paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, The most bitter attack on militarism", the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coZ^r^n/Zy take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position Ay taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circMw/ocM/Zon, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by ana/ogy, of victory in war with death. �3 Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is because evil, J also no/ doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that 'most troublesome element' in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). 'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: DMgrawy . C/tar/ing �4 It is evident that Taoism can be information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may .yfonJ, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, �5 every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders %/Z actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even i/that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important fype of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to Just war Jbr party d'.) �6 excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then /fit can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). 2. On q/ /row Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in continuity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. �7 generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a roMg/t and preliminary %?<?Zogy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a "contest earned on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) /?ar%&?. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as aaa/a^/ca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, graf^. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While ""nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of "force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to �8 this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.l52).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can compa^fo/i be appropriate unless this attack is a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: 1 dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society/ It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wi// have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised socia/ defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /aZZ distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also �11 facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war — finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modem wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of �12 value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ^co/og/ca/Zy goMnJ war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modem wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modem wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Fuzzes Tao/s/ sZra/fgy of Z^cAnoZogy an<Z woZ^ncF Tt is surprising how much of the Loo 7zM is devoted to military strategy". Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? "Do they not contradict the Taoists strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include * -yenoMyn&M, not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222) * and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting �13 enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people' (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be' (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). * advance from flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give' (LT p.164), is cited as involving "an element of deceit' "undeniably', and "worse' it is "morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand' (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, "smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state' would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them' (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).^ 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and �14 The powerful critique of militarism in the 7ho-^ CTnng is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p.197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite right. 'Vital force without restraint", intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as vZoZence, which is more generally w/tZc/t vZo/aZ^^, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that approprZaf^n^&f, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6 This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the "therefore" is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. 4. 6 am/ Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �16 Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially /xzcf/ic position — it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed m to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, /A? own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of pacifism". Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Paci/Mwi, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, a/ifi-War-M/M, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief .yfa/iJarJ paci/Mwi is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be as with nonviolent �17 demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Eng/fy/t definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare". Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Eng/is/t tends to force pacifism into what the Ox/brd Dictionary lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price", 'in any circumstance". Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, -yfrefcM While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wior#/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent ", "inconsistent"", "insensitive , "fanatical"". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as <9v^rc<9m/?r^H.S7Vg might have been better. pacifism: �18 The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives z/* the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wzf/zzzz the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a "failure because it trivializes pacifism" (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acfzvLf/M which holds that while violence is a/wayj wrong one is justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS ""activism"" is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as % only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS p.152). Situationally or%er procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that onZy consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow ?<%) mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however J/ZMfzon rather than �20 populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is <?n/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The 'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be �21 somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document / / * WAR AND TAO AND DEE Taoism and deep-green environmental theory nanism, is not a pacific issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast foi doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 7. o/ a o/ war wnZz/arMw. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ Tf a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed' (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war' (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu'. '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Zzzo (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as ^vz'Ay. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element' in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, 'to life in general' (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special / / 46""WAR AND PEACE )V: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN \ Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. sBy contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. J. of a Tao:s; of war anJ wn/%ar:syn. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, 'when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they way be allowed to bear arms/ 'If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed" (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); 'he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war" (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war,,as Lao Tzu; 'none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu". '[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao 7za" (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as tmavoMfa&Zt? evz'A. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao 7za because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as 'the most troublesome element" in his philosophy (Chan p.17) — not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much more widely, 'to life in general" (p.17). But why should military activity obtain some special 2 dispensation? Why should what is no/ tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. * Pnzz^/br 7hofym, on J wary a.y nnavo^^/e evi/.y There are /wo puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the miP/ary-prac/fce^ paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are /{/e-^racOce^ paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, The most bitter attack on militarism", the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p.17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coZ^r^n/Zy take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position Ay taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p.152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circMw/ocM/Zon, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by ana/ogy, of victory in war with death. 3 Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is because evil, J also no/ doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that 'most troublesome element' in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p.17). 'Just as'? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: DMgrawy . C/tar/ing 4 It is evident that Taoism can be information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may .yfonJ, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, 5 every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders %/Z actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even i/that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable z/ unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is "unavoidable" cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important fype of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?* In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to Just war Jbr party d'.) 6 excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then /fit can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.^ Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving "Greenwar"). 2. On q/ /row Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in continuity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p.160). On neo-Daoism, see UT. 7 generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a roMg/t and preliminary %?<?Zogy of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a "contest earned on by force of arms, typically between nations or states'. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) /?ar%&?. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as aaa/a^/ca/ wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, graf^. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While ""nonviolent wars" are excluded by definition, by virtue of "force of arms', token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modem times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to 8 this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between and wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, "invading" that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LT p.l52).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining 'defensive' to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include "defence" of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is "defensive"). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely Tor deep love helps one to win in the case of attack' (p.219). But how can compa^fo/i be appropriate unless this attack is a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: 1 dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. "Small" contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p.181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between * conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and * social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society/ It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state wi// have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised socia/ defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include * elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and * force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in * contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in * elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the /aZZ distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also 11 facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war — finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars — though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars - the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modem wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely "conventional" wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just war, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of 12 value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, "environments" were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ^co/og/ca/Zy goMnJ war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modem wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through "collateral" activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modem wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modem wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Fuzzes Tao/s/ sZra/fgy of Z^cAnoZogy an<Z woZ^ncF Tt is surprising how much of the Loo 7zM is devoted to military strategy". Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? "Do they not contradict the Taoists strong opposition to the use of force" (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really ///-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include * -yenoMyn&M, not 'making light of the enemy" (p.222) * and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting 13 enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, "smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people' (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: "The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be' (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). * advance from flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). * coolness and (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, "In order to grasp, it is necessary first to give' (LT p.164), is cited as involving "an element of deceit' "undeniably', and "worse' it is "morally questionable' (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, "In order to contract, it is necessary first to expand' (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, "smart weapons' as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state' would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: "Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them' (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).^ 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and 14 The powerful critique of militarism in the 7ho-^ CTnng is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p.197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of WMno forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite right. 'Vital force without restraint", intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as vZoZence, which is more generally w/tZc/t vZo/aZ^^, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, "winning the war against wars", is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that approprZaf^n^&f, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: * War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. * Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. ° But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished. 6 This "paradox" has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the "last war" be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the "therefore" is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. 4. 6 am/ Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: * capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. * capitalism cannot be removed without repression. * repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the "last capitalist" action the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. 16 Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially /xzcf/ic position — it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:* It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. * It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed m to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in "justificatory" exercises in favour of controlled use, /A? own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of pacifism". Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Paci/Mwi, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, a/ifi-War-M/M, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief .yfa/iJarJ paci/Mwi is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be as with nonviolent 17 demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Eng/fy/t definition of the negative component: 'the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare". Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Eng/is/t tends to force pacifism into what the Ox/brd Dictionary lists as its final item: 'often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price", 'in any circumstance". Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, -yfrefcM While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called wior#/ pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as "incoherent ", "inconsistent"", "insensitive , "fanatical"". However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as <9v^rc<9m/?r^H.S7Vg might have been better. pacifism: 18 The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W -B, because -B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives z/* the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, wzf/zzzz the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a "failure because it trivializes pacifism" (p.153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of acfzvLf/M which holds that while violence is a/wayj wrong one is justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).^ Par? of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS ""activism"" is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as % only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: 'what is done is a very consequentialist thing" (Al p.13), nor 'one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances" (JWS p.152). Situationally or%er procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal 'to "second best"" consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned" (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, 'that onZy consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight" (quoted on p.152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p.152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the 'strategy will allow ?<%) mMc/z violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist" (p.153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however J/ZMfzon rather than 20 populatization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can 'justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents' (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist 'is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped' (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially 'justified' violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains 'a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape' (p.153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with 'the basic principle of self-defence' which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is 'appropriate, in response is <?n/y that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat' (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his 'basic principle', his appeal to 'lesser evil' generates some instances. The 'basic principle', itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p.150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the 'basic principle', since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be 21 somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the "natural order" is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral - in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably modified P2 results: MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.^ 9 The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Draft of War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated, with correction notes (1 leaf). Later title: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: War & Peace IV: Tao and Deep Green corrected ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [21] leaves + [1] leaf. 53.46 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f28769f">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f28769f</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5cf3fa7566f03bef6d23380d6f744d0b.pdf 8d655745ec6e4e2226f9a9158360a8c5 PDF Text Text �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 re feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett’s paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Letter is signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. (1 leaf) �/V / 7 7 . �TAOISM and DEEPER ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS Let concern spread to aH the myriad things^ Among accredited religions, Taoism appears exceptionally environmentally friendly. Whereas the main terrestial religions, particularly those that have gained significant political influence, are heavily anthropocentric (indeed human chauvinistic), Taoism, certainly as propounded in the classical texts, is not.2 It is genuinely ecocentric; in it nature has a preeminent and fundamental place. It is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow TVamre as the basis of practice. Thus it can provide sources for, and inspiration for, genuine environmentalism in a way that no Western religion can (outside some deviant minority sects), and in a way that few other Eastern religions can. It can assume just such a source and inspirational role for contemporary deeper environmental positions, a place it has been assigned for the most prominent of these, Deep Ecology. Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on mainstream materialist civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm (as the following table shows). Like Deep Ecology, it discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers an environmental path, simple and modest, a middle way between insufficiency and excess. 1 The tenth thesis of Hui Shih, cited in CT. 2 Classical Taoism, or philosophical Taoism as it is sometimes distinguished, consists essentially of two primary texts, LT and CT, and early creative commentaries upon them. The primary texts were probably both assembled in the intellectually prolific period of the Warring States (from 403 to 221 BC), before the deadening cover of an empire descended. The classic works were only subsequently brought together as texts for a loosely associated religion, Daoism, that then proceeded to diverge from them, especially as regards natural world emphases and concerns. Very many details of the cultural and physical contexts in which the texts were written, and of those who wrote them, have vanished with passage of time. For an outline of what is known or reasonably conjectured, see e.g. Graham. Of course in such respects Taoism resembles other religions with shrouded origins. Daoism radically transformed philosophical Taoism, for the worse environmentally (and intellectually). %<? became the means to happiness, wealth, and long life, human life; and (neo-)Daoism became mired in human chauvinism. Coupled to it under Daoism were - what were no part of classical Taoism - belief in spirit survival, use of magical charms for the cure of illness, confession of sin and absolution on the basis of good work, a priestly caste, and the trappings of ritual, ceremonies, and so on. For an account of these features of Daoism, see Lagcrwey. The present essay considers only classical Taoism, and that under a certain straightforward interpretation. �3 1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology, which is interestingly at variance with Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first. All things in the world come from being And being comes from nonbeing^ The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing? Diagram 1: Taoist cycie of return^ flourishing growth reversion cycle of generated entity NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or\ ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal (FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal 7 Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness; all that comes to pass, that is. All things flourish, but each one returns to its root'? The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium? Overall, it is correct to say, if not so far highly informative, that Taoism is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense both of c/ta/ige and of Zz'mi'Ay. 4 LT 40. 5 SB p.202. 6 Cf. Chan, p.173, fn.2. 7 LT 16. For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan cs. In Neo­ Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB, p.335). 8 Cf. Chan, p.20, also SB p.177. �4 Tao itself is a complex item, comprising both an initial source, or program, and a coupled direction; a planned course, with a natural (and ideal) path. (So it is appropriately symbolised O—*-) The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it encapsulates, in its program, a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving "laws") of nature an<% axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms,9 or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the preSocratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao is a "great form", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other (unhypostatised) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not feature large in the CTi/ng. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the final chapter. 10 Other less Platonically emphasised (or available) environmentally friendly forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component. Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked with and not above the everyday. It is certainly not supernatural, and it does not transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this is a process and the container and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, all-embracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so simple. The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe of Form or whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what it is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of 9 Though appropriately neutralised, in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: for details see JB. 10 LT 81. �5 Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a which comprises a normative directive. For both Artistotle and Tao there is, in effect, an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namra/ order come about? That is Tao. But another, old, compatible, and more satisfactory answer is: It evolved.) When things are running properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 2). If each individual runs according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a Diagram 2: Super-Tao, or Great Tao, with components integrated SUPER-TAO O-> D-> unrealised Nature, with taos in world objectified natural forms system / E-> a-> —Deviation line— Defective (or fallen) taos from Natural Ways �6 less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced. As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self-governing. 'Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all'.n But they proceed according to the Tao-te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously. Diagram 3: Tao-te paths, and going with the natura! fiow^ Te(los) Tao (source) EH----------- ?----------- + * Ideal Way: Way of Virtue 2. Natural order, and the extent of Tao as agency. Tao supplies a spontaneous natural order. Though the phrase "natural order" may seem strange, even perverse, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perspective is the reverse of the modern perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-nature, is accordingly undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and ideally should, follow nature. Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value. 11 Kao Hsiang, p.328. 12 Cf. LT 53. �7 According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), nature is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts). Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are. Since it is normally regulated by Tao, natural order is decidedly benign, and definitely worth emulating. As a result, natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is offered as to social and political organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well. It is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (lives are nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state-of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state, which is one of satisfactory order. A strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in a positive sense), flows from classical Taoism. Like Buddhism, Taoism assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying organisation. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutionary sort or of a supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternatives, and points^ towards an evolutionary explanation. 13 In CT. �8 Order occurs naturally, spontaneously (as the inertial state), without agency. Super-agents do not feature, and would be otoise. God does not occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an example. 'But there is no indication of his existence'.^ As in the socio-political sphere, direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only exemplary. In particular, God is not required to start or wind the universe up. 'Everything in the world creates itself without the direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the norm of the universe.'15 The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". If the Tao includes all- encompassing natural order - a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at disequilibrium - an interesting, if awkward, position. Then too, in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged. There is a concealed moral purpose in Lao Tzu; a moral purpose that is central, alongside, and inseparable from, the evident metaphysical purpose. Since axiology is a crucial part of it - evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in the texts - Taoism is not amoral. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of conduct generally, is very different. Deontics enter only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a proper course). 'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose'. 16 Much depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and implicitly recommended lifestyles, though there are few "oughts", and no (Confucian-Kantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless preferred Taoist lifestyles merely recommended, not required, Taoism would fall down as insufficiently pluralistic. 3. On Taoist styles of life: an environmental lifestyle. As well as a set of regulative propositions about how things happen, and proceed ideally, Taoism supplies a parallel 14 CT 2. 15 Kao Hsiang, CTwwze/i/ary 16 LT 18. pp.330-331. �set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well. According to Lao Tzu, there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures'.^ 1. Deep love — which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care, concern, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical and too circumscribed for Taoism, as it is for Deep Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). It is certainly not confined to fellow humans, but reaches through, around and beyond them to the myriad things; 2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. That implies a renunciation of consumerism. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation or excess. As in Deep Ecology too, richness in ends is compatible with modesty of material means; 3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies. Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, so it is assumed, from these three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack / And to be firm in the case of defence'. 18 Earlier^ it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures" are adduced: 'Manifest plainness / embrace simplicity / reduce selfishness / have few desires'. 20 Another element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is 17 LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19. 18 LT 67. 19 LT 19. 20 LT 19. �10 adaptability or spontaneity. This "fourth treasure" (which can be read off natural order) complements the further desiderata. Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound lifestyle are highly commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing another introduction for Callenbach's environmental handbook, LM/ig Poor or even for Pausacker and Andrews' Lfwzg Po^r wft/z In Chang Tzu, the /?Mr^ person is a deep environmentalist:— She is a companion' of Nature and does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man upon it'. Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace' and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of transformation' and thus to the environmental In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental lifestyles are condemned. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both. In place of the mainstream economic virtue of competition, inherited from the Enlightenment and reinforced by Darwinianism, appears the 'virtue of non­ competition'.^ Competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of wM-wef (non-action). In competition external rival standards are imposed on Tao. Competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from tao, and from te, virtue. In any event, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place onself above another. So there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the world cannot compete with him. A broad way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought, and excess and competition avoided. This involves, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. Simplicity is not however the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not. 21 Chan SB p.177. 22 LT 68. �11 It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.23 Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity'.24 As to voluntariness, people have a c/iozce of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. non- relatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's way onto a correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. Within the broad way of life depicted fall a plurality of particular lifestyles, appropriate to various different social roles. Among more specialised lifeways on which Taoist attention is lavished are those of the sage and the ideal ruler. A sage is naturally one who follows Tao, who has acquired great knowledge, and so on (ideality is built into the notion of The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly. Likewise an ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler, who observes voluntary Ideally the people become emulators of this ruler. Effectively Taoism redefines the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage, whereupon the meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler simplicity. is one who deviates little from the Tao; this is his "power". Someone who deviates little from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an all-embracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of kinds of ideal lifes. Another kind is also sketched,2$ that of the best type of person (effectively an ideal Deep Ecologist), a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth', but also loves humanity, and order, and competence, and profundity. 23 As its fullest elaboration, Elgin's very profuse account, reveals. 24 Chan, p.14. 25 Notably in LT 8. �12 4. Following Tao: non-action, cultivating Te and seeking Enlightenment. Part of the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and towards enlightenment consists in acquiring the practice of non-action, exemplified through non-assertion, non­ aggression, non-destruction, and the like. commonly translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, is sometimes rendered 'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'. Construed in this fashion, is not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non- action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so arrows in Diagram 2 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances, pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other No-nos; the "no desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorhand for 'no impure desires',26 i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of Tao, however, is a source which only in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature-destroying activities are all too common. When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature';27 deviation from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature'.28 Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be, as Deep Ecology has it, with basically "hands off practice and management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow. One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete 26 Chan, p.13. 27 SB p.202. 28 SB p.207. �13 does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in La<9 TzM,29 that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a non-maximising path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the broad account of living and faring well. Taoism, like other older non-maximising wisdoms enjoining adherence to the Mean, is incompatible with modem maximising ideologies. Taoism is thus incompatible with Deep Ecology, whose supreme directive is self-realisation (again capitalised for wider "selves"). Such Self-realisation is a European idea, a maximising prescription applied to the aggregated interests of a separate self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although such directives to Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there are parallel non-maximising goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, and cultivation of and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation parallels that between and %, great re. Since a 'main objective of the [Lao Tza] is the cultivation of virtue or fe',3O can be seen as displacing self-realisation on the Taoist scheme. As it works out then, Self-realisation is nicely displaced by Enlightenment. Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a thing, te is the matching goaZ-bZfrc^Z or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and standard translation of (in principle favourably) developing, value-adding; hence the as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force/br good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally appears invididualised. Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self­ development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal29 E.g. 77, also 29. 39 Chan, p.ll. �14 directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self­ development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter­ organisation, my proper self-development cannot impede your proper self-development. While Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mututal adjustment and harmonious integration, it is certain that it happens naturally — as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.3i So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between individualistic and relational paths. The Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination of plans, without domination, by contrast with the dominant pattern of Western relations, operating through hierarchical ordering and domination. 5. Environmental theory and practice; environmental problems and difficulties, such as quietism and security. As on deeper environmental theories, traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models, such as stewardship and perfectionism, are also undercut. There is no superior or greater purpose for humans to serve, or lord to supplicate as steward. Besides stewardship, a kind of servant-master relationship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist alternatives fall along with domination and dominion. Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be approach, with "hands off" environmental management and associated lifestyles. A most striking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism. 31 Ong resolution of this problem can now make a useful start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving cooperation. Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177). �15 Heaven and earth are not humane They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects]. The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist]. He regards all people as straw dogs.32 Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu,33 Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing philosophy', it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion of what is good or true. The traditonal idea that a supreme supernatural being ... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are but in a broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to ... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards of things and replaces them with Nature.34 What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism. For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man'.35 In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way'. 36 He who is enlightened 'is impartial';37 'he has no partial love for anyone'38 he does not bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature. Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the TzM, 'the equality of all things' (the literal 'levelling all things' is nearer the mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured — nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the same stress on in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like Deeper Ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide natural objects.) identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality and counter chauvinism. 32 LT 5. 33 E.g. CT 2. 34 Chan, p.10, italics added; also p.107. 35 SB p.207. 36 SB p.206. 37 LT 6. 38 SB p.201. �16 Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification reveals that interests and desires, concerns and values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are developed, for example with a butterfly, by dream access,39 with rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty world / This is called profound identification'40 - and perhaps wider yet, and ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao .41 No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processes, in place of those excessively encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of power and professional groups. But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not ratified into a commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Insofar as knowledge is power, such power is removed from the control of a few by making it a community good. In these respects Taoism goes beyond Deep Ecology, for instance in questioning and rejecting experts. Indeed in its criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the stance adopted by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism is really directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against power through knowledge and control of knowledge, against slickness and cleverness, against devious and crafty uses of knowledge ,42 against counter-productive acquiring of knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The puzzling situation is tidied up somewhat in the C%<2Kg TzM, where an apposite distinction is made between knowledge, the castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and greaf knowledge, which is 'leisurely and at ease', comprehensive, extensive, and 39 SB p.190. 40 LT 56, also 4. 41 E.g. LT 16. 4^ LT 3. �17 synthetic .43 Even so, classical Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) ignorance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives. What is environmentally significant is that the critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. Certain forms of technology were, if not rejected outright, at least strongly discouraged. 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them'.44 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognised clearly that even low impact technology may destroy conventions and practices constitutive of a community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a labour-saving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. What is enjoined is avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and therewith of unnecessary consumption, and correspondingly on the production side, shunning of a work void, of efficiently replacing labour with nothing at all. In these sorts of respects Taoism exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving technology, than a spread of recent positions. Likewise a Taoist approach demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress. Whatever the merits of the "law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such social laws are culture and community dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant social paradigm everywhere else. Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in classical Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends, and not merely a resource, but something of great value in itself. Nature is something to be cherished in its own right, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant instrumental perspective is interestingly reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non-intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such 43 CfChan, p.20. 44 LT 80. �18 recently fashionable ideas as bioregionalism are not encountered in explicit form in Taoism, their bases are, as are other associated environmental ideas: living in place is certainly present;^ doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the universe, is certainly advocated, giving some sustenance to the maxim Deep Ecology happily borrowed, "think globally, act locally". While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper environmental theories, Taoism also induces puzzles or generates residual problems. While some of the problems are genuine enough, that of material scarcity for example, not all the supposed problems are genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action. How, for instance, would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment proceed, and fare, given its apparent emphasis on not bothering, "don't bother"? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a "don't bother" attitude to environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature.^ Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer (an oppositional, not a Taoist tag). How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply, Taoism optimistically holds that there is no genuine problem concerning plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the requirements of Tao (with excessive desires, excessive consumer demand, excessive hoarding, political mismanagement, and so on). Tao will serve to restore plentitude/s Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. Nor was there a looming problem of limits to growth, because growth (in key parameters, such as populations) would not proceed exponentially. Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if 45 LT 80. 46 See CT. 47 Use of the power of water affords a prime example; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese martial arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance. 48 LT 77. �19 those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao? No doubt in those times, and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still operated overtly on human species, there was little more than a hypothetical or remote future problem concerning population. It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too many people and incremental resource and ecosystem degradation. While the texts do address, forcefully, two of the three main components of the standard environmental impact equation, namely consumption and technology, the important third, human population, is not considered at all, still less statisfactorily therefore. It is much the same for other significant environmental issues. The prime texts say little about soil degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China, as in other centres of civilisation. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so forth, though several of the problems are hardly new (and some are recognised in early commentaries). Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems. There is no reason at all, however, why classical Taoism should not be updated, more than two millenia, to take account of contemporary environmental problems. Because of its compatibility with deeper environmentalism, Taoism admits such an extension in a way that main modem religions do not.49 49 Such an extension of Taoism, entitled Neo-Daoism, is brashly sketched in UTD, from which much of the present exercise is adapted. Such Neo-Daoism diverges sharply from contemporary Daoism. But it is very congenial to contemporary deep environmental theory. �20 REFERENCES Ames, R.T. (1986), 'Taoism and the nature of nature', E/zvzronm^nfaZ P/zz7o^op/zy 8:317350. Axelrod, R. (1984), T/ze Evo/zmon of Cooperarzo/z, Basic Books, New York. Chan, W.T. (1963), A .Source BooZr zTz C/zzzz^ E/zzZosop/zy, Princeton University Press, Princeton [referred to as SB]. Chan, W.T. (1963), 77ze 1Toy of Loo Tza (Too-re c/zzzzg), Bobbs-Merill, New York [introduction referred to as Chan, translation referred to as LT]. Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985), Deep EcoZogy: Lzvzng os y zzomre Moffered, Gibbs M. Smith, Layton, Utah. Elgin, D. (1981), VoZa/zfary .SzmpZzczzy, Murrow, New York [for a better briefer account, see D. Elgin and A. Mitchell, 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZafz'on gzzorrerZy 14 (Summer 1977)]. Elgin, D. and Mitchell, A. (1977), 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZaaozz QaarferZy 14 (Summer 1977). Fox, W. (1990), Toward o TroHspersoKo/ EcoZogy, Shambhala, Boston. Graham, A.C. (1989), Dz'sporers ofr/ze Too, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois. Illicit, I. (1974), 7oo/sfor CozzvzvzaZzzy, Calder and Boyars, London. Lagerwey, J. (1987), 7oozsrEz'rooZ z'/z C/zz/zese ^ocze/y, Macmillan, New York. Naess, A. (with D. Rothenberg) (1989), EcoZogy, Co/w/za/zzZy ozzzZLz/esZy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Routley, R. (1980), ExpZorzzzg Mez/zozzg's Jzz/zgZe a/z^Z BeyornZ, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as JB]. Routley, V. and Routley, R. (1980), 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems', in D. Mannison cf aZ. (eds), Ezzvz'rozzmc/zro/ E^/zzc^, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as EE]. Sylvan, R. (1985-86), 'Towards an improved cosmological synthesis', Grazer P/zzZo^op/zz'jc/zg 57a<7z^/z 25/26:135-178 [referred to as CS]. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D. (1990), Df Ufopza.?, Tao azzefDeep EcoZogy, Green Series No. 19, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as UTD]. Wang Pi (1979), 'Commentary on the Lao Tzu', transl. A. Rump and W.J. Chan, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Watson, B. (1964), T/zc Co/zzpZcrc WorE? of C/za/zg Tza, Columbia University Press, New York [referred to as CT]. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 re feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett’s paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Letter is signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. (1 leaf) /V / 7 7 . TAOISM and DEEPER ENVIRONMENTAL CONCERNS Let concern spread to aH the myriad things^ Among accredited religions, Taoism appears exceptionally environmentally friendly. Whereas the main terrestial religions, particularly those that have gained significant political influence, are heavily anthropocentric (indeed human chauvinistic), Taoism, certainly as propounded in the classical texts, is not.2 It is genuinely ecocentric; in it nature has a preeminent and fundamental place. It is throughout decidedly ecologically oriented; a high level of ecological consciousness is built into it, a main recipe amounting to FoZZow TVamre as the basis of practice. Thus it can provide sources for, and inspiration for, genuine environmentalism in a way that no Western religion can (outside some deviant minority sects), and in a way that few other Eastern religions can. It can assume just such a source and inspirational role for contemporary deeper environmental positions, a place it has been assigned for the most prominent of these, Deep Ecology. Taoism was, and remains, a radical position. It represents a severe attack on mainstream materialist civilization, on themes of the dominant social paradigm (as the following table shows). Like Deep Ecology, it discards or upsets many mainstream values, and most mainstream ways of organising and doing things. It holds up instead examples of very different lifestyles as much preferable, and offers an environmental path, simple and modest, a middle way between insufficiency and excess. 1 The tenth thesis of Hui Shih, cited in CT. 2 Classical Taoism, or philosophical Taoism as it is sometimes distinguished, consists essentially of two primary texts, LT and CT, and early creative commentaries upon them. The primary texts were probably both assembled in the intellectually prolific period of the Warring States (from 403 to 221 BC), before the deadening cover of an empire descended. The classic works were only subsequently brought together as texts for a loosely associated religion, Daoism, that then proceeded to diverge from them, especially as regards natural world emphases and concerns. Very many details of the cultural and physical contexts in which the texts were written, and of those who wrote them, have vanished with passage of time. For an outline of what is known or reasonably conjectured, see e.g. Graham. Of course in such respects Taoism resembles other religions with shrouded origins. Daoism radically transformed philosophical Taoism, for the worse environmentally (and intellectually). %<? became the means to happiness, wealth, and long life, human life; and (neo-)Daoism became mired in human chauvinism. Coupled to it under Daoism were - what were no part of classical Taoism - belief in spirit survival, use of magical charms for the cure of illness, confession of sin and absolution on the basis of good work, a priestly caste, and the trappings of ritual, ceremonies, and so on. For an account of these features of Daoism, see Lagcrwey. The present essay considers only classical Taoism, and that under a certain straightforward interpretation. 3 1. Nature, cosmology, and the character of Tao. Taoism sketches a cosmology, which is interestingly at variance with Western cosmologies. For the universe arises out of nothing. Being arises in accordance with Tao, which precedes existence. Nonbeing precedes Being. Nonbeing is ultimate (according to Chang Tzu) and comes first. All things in the world come from being And being comes from nonbeing^ The universe had a primeval beginning, coming into existence from nothing? Diagram 1: Taoist cycie of return^ flourishing growth reversion cycle of generated entity NATURE (HEAVEN AND EARTH, or\ ACTUAL UNIVERSE): Existent, Named, Temporal (FORMING) SOURCE: Nonexistent, Nameless, Eternal 7 Every entity arises out of (material) nothingness and eventually falls back into nothingness; all that comes to pass, that is. All things flourish, but each one returns to its root'? The whole, the integrated natural system, is a process of becoming and decay. But the emphasis upon process, evolution and change, upon Nature as flux and transformation, is much enhanced in Chang Tzu, over the work of Lao Tzu, where more stress is put upon stability, constancy and equilibrium? Overall, it is correct to say, if not so far highly informative, that Taoism is a natural process philosophy, with a keen sense both of c/ta/ige and of Zz'mi'Ay. 4 LT 40. 5 SB p.202. 6 Cf. Chan, p.173, fn.2. 7 LT 16. For a detailed contemporary presentation of such a cosmological cycle, see Sylvan cs. In Neo­ Taoism, e.g. Kao Hsiang, such a cycle is disputed, on standard ontological grounds (see e.g. Chan SB, p.335). 8 Cf. Chan, p.20, also SB p.177. 4 Tao itself is a complex item, comprising both an initial source, or program, and a coupled direction; a planned course, with a natural (and ideal) path. (So it is appropriately symbolised O—*-) The great or overarching Tao is a comprehensive source of natural activity; it encapsulates, in its program, a framework of forms or principles, principles of natural order, both metaphysical and moral. It comprises both dynamic principles (or evolving "laws") of nature an<% axiological principles guiding conduct. In this representation it invites comparison with Plato's structure of Forms,9 or still better, though again neglecting the dynamism of Tao, comparison with the preSocratic Logos. But to see overarching Tao as an axiological ontology, after the pattern of Plato's Form theory, would be to import unwarranted Western assumptions. Though Tao is a "great form", and there is no doubt room in the generous object framework for other (unhypostatised) forms, main Platonic forms such as Beauty, Truth and Goodness, do not feature large in the CTi/ng. They are distinguished, and set rather to the side, in the final chapter. 10 Other less Platonically emphasised (or available) environmentally friendly forms are more important, such as Simplicity, Frugality and Non-competition, as well as Tao itself, the supreme form, also the One, which supplants the static Good of Plato's scheme and is coupled with a dynamic path component. Tao is intimately linked with, and concerned with, the natural, and indeed linked with and not above the everyday. It is certainly not supernatural, and it does not transcend natural things in the fashion of Western supernatural religions; rather Tao both orders and reflects nature. Tao supplies the physical laws that provide physical idealisations (i.e. ideal models) of processes. Tao in this is a process and the container and origin of process and the laws of process. Tao is the natural way of the universe (of Heaven and Earth), and super-Tao, also signified as Tao, is the way of the universe and the universe. (Under a computer analogy, Tao is the program of the whole system; it is also, as super-Tao, the program combined with the system, everything). As Great Tao it is certainly simple, all-embracing and one. Getting the hang of its components and their connections is not quite so simple. The overarching Tao - grand or capital Tao, the program or recipe of Form or whole genetic code - combines many individual ones - lesser or /ow^r-case taos within it. Such a lesser tao, of an individual, system or whatever, is what makes a thing what it is properly, a coursed or informed source, a program directed path, a processed output. A tao is a sourced directed object; it is thus a type of object, a dynamic item, which can be represented by a pair comprising a recipe, program or form and a direction or goal-orientation. Accordingly, an individual or local tao (or form) resembles one of 9 Though appropriately neutralised, in the object-theory fashion Reid urged: for details see JB. 10 LT 81. 5 Aristotle's individual forms as coupled with a which comprises a normative directive. For both Artistotle and Tao there is, in effect, an "invisible hand" at work. (How did this, such convenient namra/ order come about? That is Tao. But another, old, compatible, and more satisfactory answer is: It evolved.) When things are running properly, the lesser, individual, taos (most conveniently) fit together and operate in accord under the overarching program (cf. diagram 2). If each individual runs according to the program, then the overall program succeeds fully. However, it works even if each individual does not run according to the overarching program, but it has a Diagram 2: Super-Tao, or Great Tao, with components integrated SUPER-TAO O-> D-> unrealised Nature, with taos in world objectified natural forms system / E-> a-> —Deviation line— Defective (or fallen) taos from Natural Ways 6 less ideal result. If each person acts in a correct way a massive net good and great order result. Yet, any attempt to impose order does not bring it about, but is counterproductive. The invisible (natural) hand guides, but the hand cannot be forced. As to the status of principles (laws, rules), standard Western categorisations are again exceeded. These principles are not transcendent, governing things externally, but are, so to say, self-supplied, with things self-regulated. Undominated things are naturally self-governing. 'Everything has its own nature and each nature is its own ultimate ... then by whom are things produced? They produce themselves, that is all'.n But they proceed according to the Tao-te, the goal directed way of virtue, autonomously. Diagram 3: Tao-te paths, and going with the natura! fiow^ Te(los) Tao (source) EH----------- ?----------- + * Ideal Way: Way of Virtue 2. Natural order, and the extent of Tao as agency. Tao supplies a spontaneous natural order. Though the phrase "natural order" may seem strange, even perverse, it is not. The reason is, in part, that the Taoist perspective is the reverse of the modern perception of the world. In contrast to European political thought of the mainstream Hobbes-Locke strain, where the state-of-nature is one of chaos or extreme disorder, the Taoist state-of-nature is one of order. A main assumption of Western thought, that political order must be imposed by regulation on an unruly state-of-nature, is accordingly undercut. A separate imposed political order is not required; the idea that it is rests on mistaken assumptions. Politics can, and ideally should, follow nature. Science and politics can be blended, not sharply separated in the typical Western fashion, where nature is taken to exclude value. 11 Kao Hsiang, p.328. 12 Cf. LT 53. 7 According to Taoism then, by contrast with dominant Western thought which sees the world as extensional, mechanistic and value-neutral (except for its human cargo), nature is both intensional and value-infused. These features extend not merely to the whole, but to components which go into composing the greater whole. These have their programs, or ways, which are integrated into the greater way (somewhat as, but artificially, expert system programs may be organised into grander programs representing super-experts). Nature is already in order as it normally is, through a unity in diversity which involves a normative component - a principle or recipe for how things "should" be as well as how they are integrally. Values are build into the environment, an integral part of the way of things. By following the values of Tao one enters and comes into contact with the whole environment and into unity with the environment. Tao is a description of how things are and a prescription of how to act in accord with the way they are. Since it is normally regulated by Tao, natural order is decidedly benign, and definitely worth emulating. As a result, natural order is the way, the recommended way. Imposed order is counterproductive. There is reciprocal resistance to the imposition of deviant order. This would hold even if social organisers tried to impose Tao itself. To attempt to impose it would be to go astray. Such points help to explain why little satisfactory detail is offered as to social and political organisation. For the requisite organisation, such as it is, follows natural patterns and natural social structures (whichever they are). No doubt details would be (in the style of Aristotelian ethics) largely descriptive of what happens in cases where social affairs were functioning well. It is deviation from the natural state that represents the problem, quite in contrast again to European political thought, where the state-of-nature is one of extreme disorder (lives are nasty, brutish, short, etc.). Such a state-of-nature is not at all a Taoist natural state, which is one of satisfactory order. A strong sense of natural order, of self organisation, of anarchy (in a positive sense), flows from classical Taoism. Like Buddhism, Taoism assents to the maxim, "Do nothing and from unforced order greater order results". If each being is permitted to follow its tao, then the needs of all will be met without coercion. Following the way of Tao, nature emerges as a self-supplying organisation. Such convenient natural organisation stands (so far as it occurs!) in need of some further explanation, whether of an internal, evolutionary sort or of a supernatural sort, as in Neoplatonism where God or the One accomplishes the organisational task. Taoism undermines such latter alternatives, and points^ towards an evolutionary explanation. 13 In CT. 8 Order occurs naturally, spontaneously (as the inertial state), without agency. Super-agents do not feature, and would be otoise. God does not occur, and is not needed, in the cosmology, either as an agent, to make things in the universe happen, or as an authority, to regulate things or set moral or legal standards. If He did occur, He would, like other directors and rulers, not be needed, though He could serve as an example. 'But there is no indication of his existence'.^ As in the socio-political sphere, direction by a overseer or ruler is otoise, and only exemplary. In particular, God is not required to start or wind the universe up. 'Everything in the world creates itself without the direction of any creator. Since things create themselves they are unconditioned. This is the norm of the universe.'15 The Tao is not a supernatural personal agency; it is not supernatural, it is certainly not personal, and it is only in a stretched sense "agency". If the Tao includes all- encompassing natural order - a unity in diversity — in which the tao of each is ideally in harmony with the whole, then there is no need to posit a super-Being. Each being follows its course in the whole. Moreover, the appeal to a superpersonal authority, exalted example, or the like, on the one side, or to ethics, on the other, is needed only when people have moved away from the Tao. Everything will work well if a community lives according to the Tao. Thus deontic features are brought in only at disequilibrium - an interesting, if awkward, position. Then too, in formulating norms, appeal is back to framework from which people have diverged. There is a concealed moral purpose in Lao Tzu; a moral purpose that is central, alongside, and inseparable from, the evident metaphysical purpose. Since axiology is a crucial part of it - evaluations and commendations are freely and extensively offered in the texts - Taoism is not amoral. But the treatment of deontic principles, and of rules of conduct generally, is very different. Deontics enter only when there is a lapse or deviation from an ideal natural state (from a proper course). 'When the Great Tao declined, the doctrine of humanity and righteousness arose'. 16 Much depends then, on what counts as "moral" and "amoral". Certainly there are approved and implicitly recommended lifestyles, though there are few "oughts", and no (Confucian-Kantian) lists of duties. Moreover, unless preferred Taoist lifestyles merely recommended, not required, Taoism would fall down as insufficiently pluralistic. 3. On Taoist styles of life: an environmental lifestyle. As well as a set of regulative propositions about how things happen, and proceed ideally, Taoism supplies a parallel 14 CT 2. 15 Kao Hsiang, CTwwze/i/ary 16 LT 18. pp.330-331. set of suggestions and prescriptions for how to live well. According to Lao Tzu, there are some basic elements to living well, for instance 'three treasures'.^ 1. Deep love — which can also be taken to involve compassion, pity, commiseration, care, concern, respect and regard, and which includes something close to empathy, deep-penetrating empathy. Sympathy, a main linkage of the European "Enlightenment", does not however capture what is involved: sympathy alone would be too egoistical and too circumscribed for Taoism, as it is for Deep Ecology. Deep love is part of the notion of genuine relatedness, not a one-sided "relatedness" or possessiveness (which Taoism rejects). It is certainly not confined to fellow humans, but reaches through, around and beyond them to the myriad things; 2. Frugality - a renunciation of excess. That implies a renunciation of consumerism. But frugality is not impoverishment. Needs are met adequately without deprivation or excess. As in Deep Ecology too, richness in ends is compatible with modesty of material means; 3. Modesty or humility - not to dare to be ahead of the world, not to take the lead. In Taoism there is no competitive requirement, but the opposite; such Western desiderata lapse. Rather, one gives up trying to be on top of the pile, or even being in a faster lane. In a Taoist society there are no conspicuous tall poppies. Much else connects with or follows in a loose way, so it is assumed, from these three virtues; for instance, courage from deep love, generosity from frugality, a kind of leadership from humility. The arguments for those surprising derivations go like this: 'deep love helps one to aim in the case of attack / And to be firm in the case of defence'. 18 Earlier^ it is taken that proper abandonment of humanistic ethics will mean a return to (what the ethics inadmissibly substitutes for) deep love, a basic valuational relation. But in place of frugality, goes a discarding of profit, and in place of humility an abandonment of conscious sageliness and discarding of immodest (or conventional) wisdom. These changes are, astonishingly, said to be rather superficial and inadequate; so further desiderata, commonly read out of the "treasures" are adduced: 'Manifest plainness / embrace simplicity / reduce selfishness / have few desires'. 20 Another element, beyond the three of relatedness, frugality, and not daring to be ahead, is 17 LT 67; but different overlapping lists are presented, e.g. LT 19. 18 LT 67. 19 LT 19. 20 LT 19. 10 adaptability or spontaneity. This "fourth treasure" (which can be read off natural order) complements the further desiderata. Evidently main ingredients for a simple environmentally sound lifestyle are highly commended. Lao Tzu might almost have been writing another introduction for Callenbach's environmental handbook, LM/ig Poor or even for Pausacker and Andrews' Lfwzg Po^r wft/z In Chang Tzu, the /?Mr^ person is a deep environmentalist:— She is a companion' of Nature and does not attempt to interfere with it by imposing the way of man upon it'. Her goal is 'spiritual emancipation and peace' and derivatively freedom; and her route is 'through knowing the capacity and limitations of one's own nature and adapting it to the universal process of transformation' and thus to the environmental In complementary fashion, opposite "virtues", common in anti-environmental lifestyles are condemned. The Western drives to power, fame, competition, possessions, excess commodities, useless (small) knowledge are rejected by Taoism (along with "Mans Affairs"). Thus entrepreneurial activity in business, and also in professional and academic affairs (as well as busyness itself), gets decidedly discouraged. The good life naturally reduces ambitions and desires and avoids competition. Competition is connected with self-assertion and aggressive action. Taoism, while not neglecting limited natural competition, passes aspersions on both. In place of the mainstream economic virtue of competition, inherited from the Enlightenment and reinforced by Darwinianism, appears the 'virtue of non­ competition'.^ Competition often requires forced or artificial action; thus it violates the doctrine of wM-wef (non-action). In competition external rival standards are imposed on Tao. Competition is deviant, evidencing deviation from tao, and from te, virtue. In any event, according to Taoism, there is no merit in trying to place onself above another. So there is no value in competition. Fortunately competition can be reduced. If a person does not compete then the world cannot compete with him. A broad way of life is depicted, based on love, respect and compassion for all things, attuned to what is essential, shedding what is unnecessary, where simplicity and frugality are sought, and excess and competition avoided. This involves, in a nutshell, voluntary simplicity of a deep sort. Simplicity is not however the impoverished life of one who seeks escape. Taoism goes much further in disparaging scarce material means. Do not exact the worth, so that people compete. Do not value rare treasure, so that people do not steal. Gross wealth and prestige are rejected; they are vanities and vexations. But not all is vanity: living well is not. 21 Chan SB p.177. 22 LT 68. 11 It is a very natural inference, then, from the account of living well to the suggestion that Tao offers a deep form of voluntary simplicity. Voluntary simplicity is a fuzzy notion.23 Voluntary simplicity can initially be explained through its two obvious components, simplicity and its voluntary adoption. Simplicity connects with, and is often equated with frugality, as elaborated in Taoism. But whether or not simplicity is obtained from frugality or other Taoist virtues, it plays a direct and important part in the theory, and is in fact modelled, like its metaphysical counterpart, the unconceptualised Whole, by the uncarved block, a central Gestalt of the theory. The block symbolises unity, simplicity and naturalness not spoiled by artifice, metaphysically the wholeness and unity of Tao before conceptual carving, and ethically the wholesome straightforward non-devious life under Te, the 'simple life that is free from cunning and cleverness, is not devoted to the pursuit of profit or marked by hypocritical humanity and righteousness, but is characterised by plainness, tranquility, and purity'.24 As to voluntariness, people have a c/iozce of selecting the way of Tao rather than one of the deviant ways. It is a choice of recipes - frugal vs. excess, relatedness vs. non- relatedness, tall poppies vs. not daring to be ahead. But one does not attempt to force one's way onto a correct path. To hyperactively seek the path is a deviation in itself. Within the broad way of life depicted fall a plurality of particular lifestyles, appropriate to various different social roles. Among more specialised lifeways on which Taoist attention is lavished are those of the sage and the ideal ruler. A sage is naturally one who follows Tao, who has acquired great knowledge, and so on (ideality is built into the notion of The sage understands the fundamentals of Tao, and practices accordingly. Likewise an ideal ruler is a non-interfering exemplar ruler, who observes voluntary Ideally the people become emulators of this ruler. Effectively Taoism redefines the notion of "ruler", equating ruler with supreme exemplar, such as the sage, whereupon the meaning attributed to "ruler" becomes that of following Tao. The ruler simplicity. is one who deviates little from the Tao; this is his "power". Someone who deviates little from the Tao is kingly, that is, to observe another subversion of terminology, he shows an all-embracing impartiality. The sage and the "ruler" are but two important examples of kinds of ideal lifes. Another kind is also sketched,2$ that of the best type of person (effectively an ideal Deep Ecologist), a person 'who in his dwelling loves the earth', but also loves humanity, and order, and competence, and profundity. 23 As its fullest elaboration, Elgin's very profuse account, reveals. 24 Chan, p.14. 25 Notably in LT 8. 12 4. Following Tao: non-action, cultivating Te and seeking Enlightenment. Part of the Taoist route to an environmental lifestyle and towards enlightenment consists in acquiring the practice of non-action, exemplified through non-assertion, non­ aggression, non-destruction, and the like. commonly translated as 'non-action', is thereby rendered a dialectic notion, for it does not exclude action and in a sense is action. To avoid such dialectical overtones, is sometimes rendered 'not acting wilfully' or 'not acting artificially' or 'acting naturally'; it is better transcribed as 'without forcing' or 'no forced (or coercive) action'. Construed in this fashion, is not an extraneous awkward addition to Taoism, but an integral part, which emerges from other features of the theory, namely those of following natural low-action ways. For non- action is the "activity" of letting one's tao drift or flow into line with the overall Tao (so arrows in Diagram 2 are aligned). What is commended is, in the correct circumstances, pacific action, of letting happen (e.g. letting die), as opposed to aggressive, extraverted action (e.g. killing), forced action upsetting natural ways. Similarly for other No-nos; the "no desires" directive, for instance, is a piquant shorhand for 'no impure desires',26 i.e. for no unsatisfactory or anti-te desires. Non-action accordingly does not require literally no action, but only actions in accord with ideal nature, so ruling out actions contrary to undisturbed Tao. It may appear that perennial problems, alleged to haunt Taoism (and intensified in Stoicism), are induced. For example, if all is Tao, and Tao is natural, how can there be unnatural activity? Or differently, if nothing can depart from Tao, how can there be unspontaneous actions, or any violation of Tao, however, is a source which only in an ideal, natural, direction. It does not all individual paths, which can deviate from ideal or natural paths. Thus deviant activity is not excluded, unspontaneous and ill-organised activity by individuals is in no way ruled out; and forced, coercive and nature-destroying activities are all too common. When 'all activities follow their specific principles, that is nature';27 deviation from Nature accordingly occurs, namely when some activities do not follow their principles. As for destruction, 'Do not let man destroy Nature'.28 Non-action as policy generally implies non-interference, when things have not been damagingly disturbed. It implies letting things take their own natural course; letting Being be, as Deep Ecology has it, with basically "hands off practice and management. Unforced action in practice is well illustrated by examples of going with the flow. One main example of going with the flow is cutting meat. The Chef does not encounter bones. He takes the meat apart effortlessly in the same way that an athlete 26 Chan, p.13. 27 SB p.202. 28 SB p.207. 13 does things effortlessly, with little waste action. Going with the flow can however involve a lot of activity, as with the man swimming easily in a raging torrent below the waterfall, or as in sailing and trimming to the wind. At a personal level, non-action lies in such things as not striving to put oneself above others, in foregoing competition, in simplicity, frugality, and adherence to the mean. Evidently this removes a range of normally accepted social activities. Flexibility, and suppleness, and even weakness, belong to the centre (or mean), to the valley way. Though the ancient transcultural doctrine of the mean, of a middle way, appears explicitly in La<9 TzM,29 that middle path is arrived at, and taken, differently. The Taoist route is an easy no-action route, a valley way, a non-maximising path of weakness and little resistance, in line with the broad account of living and faring well. Taoism, like other older non-maximising wisdoms enjoining adherence to the Mean, is incompatible with modem maximising ideologies. Taoism is thus incompatible with Deep Ecology, whose supreme directive is self-realisation (again capitalised for wider "selves"). Such Self-realisation is a European idea, a maximising prescription applied to the aggregated interests of a separate self, inflation of a typically egoistic concept not found in Taoism. But although such directives to Self-realisation would be rightly queried in Taoism, there are parallel non-maximising goals to be found in Taoism: namely, attaining enlightenment and tranquility, following Tao, and cultivation of and the contrast between self-realisation and Self-realisation parallels that between and %, great re. Since a 'main objective of the [Lao Tza] is the cultivation of virtue or fe',3O can be seen as displacing self-realisation on the Taoist scheme. As it works out then, Self-realisation is nicely displaced by Enlightenment. Complementary to Tao is Te, and to tao is te. Whereas tao is the directed source of a thing, te is the matching goaZ-bZfrc^Z or unfolding of a thing. It is a directed and standard translation of (in principle favourably) developing, value-adding; hence the as 'virtue'. Because of its potentiality to reach a (good) goal, a rival translation as 'power' has some currency; it is a directed force/br good (or evil). The program of tao supplies the direction of matching te. So a thing can follow its tao (and thereby follow Tao) by cultivating te, by practising positive virtue, by choosing a lifestyle of deep simplicity. The directives for a good individual life are accordingly commonly given in terms of individual te, and it is te (rather than Tao) that generally appears invididualised. Each being has its own tao, its own ideal naturally-programmed path of self­ development or unfolding. Correspondingly, there is an immanent telos, a te, a goal29 E.g. 77, also 29. 39 Chan, p.ll. 14 directed virtuous developing, for each thing. By each following its own nature, all follow nature. Our self-development does not then interfere damagingly with your self­ development. How does this happen? Through natural (again invisible) inter­ organisation, my proper self-development cannot impede your proper self-development. While Taoism is decidedly short on details of such mututal adjustment and harmonious integration, it is certain that it happens naturally — as it may, for instance, through the evolution of co-operation.3i So there is, or need be, no vacillation between following one's own path and taking care not to interfere with the paths of others, between individualistic and relational paths. The Taoist result is integration, a harmonious combination of plans, without domination, by contrast with the dominant pattern of Western relations, operating through hierarchical ordering and domination. 5. Environmental theory and practice; environmental problems and difficulties, such as quietism and security. As on deeper environmental theories, traditional Western models for human relations to the natural world are one and all rejected. The dominant view, of domination, of human dominion over the earth and its other inhabitants, is not merely roundly and soundly rejected; the metaphysical creationist base and the superiority myths upon which it is regularly founded are also removed. Therewith also the bases for the lesser, and rather more benign, Western models, such as stewardship and perfectionism, are also undercut. There is no superior or greater purpose for humans to serve, or lord to supplicate as steward. Besides stewardship, a kind of servant-master relationship, which is both hierarchical and implicitly patriarchical in cast, typically involves active interference in producing products. The idea of perfecting nature also implies active interference, when however nature is more or less in order as it is, and requires no "perfecting". Thus stewardship and perfectionist alternatives fall along with domination and dominion. Taoism offers instead a non-interference model for relations to nature, a letting-be approach, with "hands off" environmental management and associated lifestyles. A most striking feature of Taoism is its environmental depth, its strong opposition to then prevailing (and still prevailing) humanism and human chauvinism. 31 Ong resolution of this problem can now make a useful start with Axelrod's investigations of evolving cooperation. Cooperation can begin with small clusters. It can thrive with rules that are nice, provocable, and somewhat forgiving. And once established in a population, individuals using such discriminating strategies can protect themselves from invasion. The overall level of cooperation tends to go up and not down. In other words, the machinery for the evolution of cooperation contains a ratchet (Axelrod p.177). 15 Heaven and earth are not humane They regard all things as straw dogs [i.e. rather worthless strict ritual objects]. The sage is not humane [or human chauvinist]. He regards all people as straw dogs.32 Because of such tough pronouncements, reiterated and reinforced in Chang Tzu,33 Taoism is sometimes said to be predicated on anti-humanism. But it is not 'a dehumanizing philosophy', it does not deny compassion; what transpires is that concern and value are not confined to humans or their affairs, but include the natural and the metaphysical. The human is no longer the criterion of what is good or true. The traditonal idea that a supreme supernatural being ... is the ruler of the universe is replaced by the doctrine that the universe exists and operates by itself. When [Lao Tzu] says that "Heaven and Earth are not humane", he means in a narrow sense that they are but in a broader sense that Nature is no longer governed according to ... In one stroke he removes Heaven [or God] and man as the standards of things and replaces them with Nature.34 What is rejected with the rejection of humanism and humanistic ethics is human chauvinism. For being "humane" means accepting the chauvinistic assumptions of conventional society and remaining within the narrow sphere of interests of the human species. There is no unbridgeable gulf between humans and other creatures such as Western thought has tried to manufacture. 'Put a halter around the horse's head and put a string through the cow's nose, that is man'.35 In place of humanism, Taoism adopts a doctrine of impartiality. 'Embrace all things without inclining to this way or that way'. 36 He who is enlightened 'is impartial';37 'he has no partial love for anyone'38 he does not bestow undue or special favours upon humans; he aims to be one with Nature. Impartiality does not imply equality. Despite the received heading of chapter 2 of the TzM, 'the equality of all things' (the literal 'levelling all things' is nearer the mark), and the standard inference to some Taoist doctrine of parity, no simplistic and difficult theme of equal value of all things is ventured — nor any theme of parity for some favoured subclass thereof such as living things. (Though there is some accent on prime life, there is not the same stress on in Taoism that there is in Deep Ecology, nor the bizarre extension of "life" to include waterfalls, mountains and other striking What is offered, instead of much in the way elucidation of impartiality, is (again like Deeper Ecological theory) a doctrine of identification. Wide natural objects.) identification and wide solidarity does promote impartiality and counter chauvinism. 32 LT 5. 33 E.g. CT 2. 34 Chan, p.10, italics added; also p.107. 35 SB p.207. 36 SB p.206. 37 LT 6. 38 SB p.201. 16 Egoism, for instance, involves discounting all but oneself, humanism all but humans, and requires a species solidarity with human things. But wider identification puts a stop to such discounting (e.g. in favour of one's own or species's interests, as exhausting value) and to such class-restricted solidarity. For wider identification reveals that interests and desires, concerns and values and so forth, are not so individual or class restricted. Many exquisite examples of identification, and the processes by which it may be achieved, are developed, for example with a butterfly, by dream access,39 with rivers and seas, and wider again, by the proper meditative process, with the dusty world - 'Become one with the dusty world / This is called profound identification'40 - and perhaps wider yet, and ultimate, with ideal Nature, and thus in complete accord with Tao .41 No less striking than the criticism of humanism, Taoism makes similar sort of attack on traditional education and on the accumulation of knowledge. The case against traditional education, especially rote "learning", is straightforward; it reinforces entrenched practices and prejudices, e.g. those of humanism. The criticism does not of course imply that there would be no regular learning or habituation processes, in place of those excessively encouraged traditional indoctrination methods. More perplexing is the attack on knowledge acquisition, though in part it is of the same sort, against an entrenched knowledge in the hands of power and professional groups. But, in an organic society, knowledge is integrated into the community and not ratified into a commodity held or controlled by a priesthood or a class of intellectuals or literati. Insofar as knowledge is power, such power is removed from the control of a few by making it a community good. In these respects Taoism goes beyond Deep Ecology, for instance in questioning and rejecting experts. Indeed in its criticism of schooling, narrow expertise, and the like, Taoism resembles and anticipates the stance adopted by Illich rather than features of Deep Ecology. The superficially anti-intellectual trend of Taoism is really directed against other targets than pure knowledge: against power through knowledge and control of knowledge, against slickness and cleverness, against devious and crafty uses of knowledge ,42 against counter-productive acquiring of knowledge or cunning, and its teaching. The puzzling situation is tidied up somewhat in the C%<2Kg TzM, where an apposite distinction is made between knowledge, the castigated sorts, which is inquisitive, partial, discriminative or merely analytic, and greaf knowledge, which is 'leisurely and at ease', comprehensive, extensive, and 39 SB p.190. 40 LT 56, also 4. 41 E.g. LT 16. 4^ LT 3. 17 synthetic .43 Even so, classical Taoism hardly seems to cater for adequate access of information, and the removal of (perhaps debilitating) ignorance, concerning health and welfare, careful and damaging practices, choices and alternatives. What is environmentally significant is that the critique of small knowledge and narrow expertise extends to encompass a critique of technology. In Taoism, technology was assigned a very limited role at best. Certain forms of technology were, if not rejected outright, at least strongly discouraged. 'Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them'.44 More generally, while high and dangerous technology is set aside, even more appropriate technology cannot be accepted uncritically. Lao Tzu recognised clearly that even low impact technology may destroy conventions and practices constitutive of a community. Nor was the connection of technology with population neglected. Given a small country and few inhabitants, if provided with a labour-saving device he would not use it. There are dominating and non-dominating forms of technology. What is enjoined is avoidance of artificial wants and desires, and therewith of unnecessary consumption, and correspondingly on the production side, shunning of a work void, of efficiently replacing labour with nothing at all. In these sorts of respects Taoism exhibits a firmer grasp of some of the problems of technology, even more appropriate labour-saving technology, than a spread of recent positions. Likewise a Taoist approach demolishes the so-called iron law of technology, that there is no stopping technology or its progress. Whatever the merits of the "law" (they are not so conspicuous), Taoism reveals that such social laws are culture and community dependent, and do not withstand transfer from the dominant social paradigm everywhere else. Many other elements of a sensitive and sophisticated ecological position feature in classical Taoism. There is an elaborate and sensitive account of Nature, from which it emerges plainly that Nature is not a mere instrument or means for other ends, and not merely a resource, but something of great value in itself. Nature is something to be cherished in its own right, allowed to take its own course, not to be interfered with or destroyed by humans. Indeed the dominant instrumental perspective is interestingly reversed; value for humans is achieved above all by identification with Nature, and by following natural ways. (Paradoxical reversal is a feature of Taoism; even castigated Western aims, such as leadership, fame and so on, are in fact achieved, when they are, not by direct aim, but by letting the reverse happen. So it is with what control of Nature is required; non-intervention and non-action is the approach. Sufficient control is gained, it is said, when assertive attempts to impose it are abandoned.) While such 43 CfChan, p.20. 44 LT 80. 18 recently fashionable ideas as bioregionalism are not encountered in explicit form in Taoism, their bases are, as are other associated environmental ideas: living in place is certainly present;^ doing things locally and remaining local, while being attuned to the universe, is certainly advocated, giving some sustenance to the maxim Deep Ecology happily borrowed, "think globally, act locally". While there is then very much in Taoism that fits easily and revealingly with deeper environmental theories, Taoism also induces puzzles or generates residual problems. While some of the problems are genuine enough, that of material scarcity for example, not all the supposed problems are genuine; and not all the puzzles are bequeathed to contemporary theory. Illustrating both is the problem of quietism, which is at bottom the issue of reconciling "non-action" with environmental and social improvement and action. How, for instance, would a Taoist resistance against depredation, a Taoist defence of environment proceed, and fare, given its apparent emphasis on not bothering, "don't bother"? In-built harmony and quietism do not allow sufficiently for conflict. In part there is only a problem because of misrepresentation of Taoism, which is not committed to a "don't bother" attitude to environmental destruction: quite to the contrary, humans should not be allowed to destroy nature.^ Furthermore, there are many Taoist tactics and techniques, using weakness to overcome strength, letting the flow of nature demolish the forces of environmental destruction, and the like, which can be applied in environmental resistance.^ Quietism is accordingly a misrepresentation of the practice, and something of a misnomer (an oppositional, not a Taoist tag). How can Tao work in a world where there is scarcity almost everywhere? Very simply, Taoism optimistically holds that there is no genuine problem concerning plentitude; things are not scarce, there is an abundant outpouring from nature. There is scarcity only because of violations of the requirements of Tao (with excessive desires, excessive consumer demand, excessive hoarding, political mismanagement, and so on). Tao will serve to restore plentitude/s Rather than a collection of scarce resources, Nature is represented as an virtually infinite storehouse of boundless wealth. Nor was there a looming problem of limits to growth, because growth (in key parameters, such as populations) would not proceed exponentially. Does Tao allow for the prospect and problems of too many people? Can the greater Tao keep pace with the requirements of many too many individual taos, even if 45 LT 80. 46 See CT. 47 Use of the power of water affords a prime example; cf LT 15. No-action adaptations of old Chinese martial arts and strategies presumably offer more direct methods of defence and resistance. 48 LT 77. 19 those individual requirements are in line with the greater Tao? No doubt in those times, and most historical times when epidemics and plagues were almost as regular as droughts, when evolution still operated overtly on human species, there was little more than a hypothetical or remote future problem concerning population. It seems plain however that Taoism did not face the environmental problems such as those of too many people and incremental resource and ecosystem degradation. While the texts do address, forcefully, two of the three main components of the standard environmental impact equation, namely consumption and technology, the important third, human population, is not considered at all, still less statisfactorily therefore. It is much the same for other significant environmental issues. The prime texts say little about soil degradation and deforestation, long major environmental problems in China, as in other centres of civilisation. Nor does Taoism have much to offer directly on main contemporary issues of animal liberation, species loss, urban disgustification, and so forth, though several of the problems are hardly new (and some are recognised in early commentaries). Historic Taoism too was a product of its times, adjusted to what were seen as problems. There is no reason at all, however, why classical Taoism should not be updated, more than two millenia, to take account of contemporary environmental problems. Because of its compatibility with deeper environmentalism, Taoism admits such an extension in a way that main modem religions do not.49 49 Such an extension of Taoism, entitled Neo-Daoism, is brashly sketched in UTD, from which much of the present exercise is adapted. Such Neo-Daoism diverges sharply from contemporary Daoism. But it is very congenial to contemporary deep environmental theory. 20 REFERENCES Ames, R.T. (1986), 'Taoism and the nature of nature', E/zvzronm^nfaZ P/zz7o^op/zy 8:317350. Axelrod, R. (1984), T/ze Evo/zmon of Cooperarzo/z, Basic Books, New York. Chan, W.T. (1963), A .Source BooZr zTz C/zzzz^ E/zzZosop/zy, Princeton University Press, Princeton [referred to as SB]. Chan, W.T. (1963), 77ze 1Toy of Loo Tza (Too-re c/zzzzg), Bobbs-Merill, New York [introduction referred to as Chan, translation referred to as LT]. Devall, B. and Sessions, G. (1985), Deep EcoZogy: Lzvzng os y zzomre Moffered, Gibbs M. Smith, Layton, Utah. Elgin, D. (1981), VoZa/zfary .SzmpZzczzy, Murrow, New York [for a better briefer account, see D. Elgin and A. Mitchell, 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZafz'on gzzorrerZy 14 (Summer 1977)]. Elgin, D. and Mitchell, A. (1977), 'Voluntary Simplicity', Co-EvoZaaozz QaarferZy 14 (Summer 1977). Fox, W. (1990), Toward o TroHspersoKo/ EcoZogy, Shambhala, Boston. Graham, A.C. (1989), Dz'sporers ofr/ze Too, Open Court, La Salle, Illinois. Illicit, I. (1974), 7oo/sfor CozzvzvzaZzzy, Calder and Boyars, London. Lagerwey, J. (1987), 7oozsrEz'rooZ z'/z C/zz/zese ^ocze/y, Macmillan, New York. Naess, A. (with D. Rothenberg) (1989), EcoZogy, Co/w/za/zzZy ozzzZLz/esZy/e, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Routley, R. (1980), ExpZorzzzg Mez/zozzg's Jzz/zgZe a/z^Z BeyornZ, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as JB]. Routley, V. and Routley, R. (1980), 'Social theories, self management and environmental problems', in D. Mannison cf aZ. (eds), Ezzvz'rozzmc/zro/ E^/zzc^, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as EE]. Sylvan, R. (1985-86), 'Towards an improved cosmological synthesis', Grazer P/zzZo^op/zz'jc/zg 57a<7z^/z 25/26:135-178 [referred to as CS]. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D. (1990), Df Ufopza.?, Tao azzefDeep EcoZogy, Green Series No. 19, Research School of Social Sciences, The Australian National University, Canberra [referred to as UTD]. Wang Pi (1979), 'Commentary on the Lao Tzu', transl. A. Rump and W.J. Chan, University of Hawaii Press, Honolulu. Watson, B. (1964), T/zc Co/zzpZcrc WorE? of C/za/zg Tza, Columbia University Press, New York [referred to as CT].  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Letter, Arne Næss to Richard Sylvan, 19 Jul 1991 ; Draft of Taoism and deep environmental concerns: let concern spread to all the myriad things Subject The topic of the resource Typed letter, handwritten notes and printout of draft. Letter on University of Oslo Centre for Development and Environment letter head and addressed to Richard Sylvan from Arne Næss, signed by Kit Fai on behalf of Næss. Næss sends feedback on Sylvan and David Bennett's paper, Utopias, Tao, and deep ecology. Description An account of the resource Letter and paper original housed together with a paper clip. Letter redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Taoism & Deeper Env. Concers - uncorrected ts + Ms notes. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1991 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Letter, [1] leaf + [21] leaves. 44.08 MB. Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/1537483602872e63b62a5bd262f2039a.pdf f130a216eb4a497358aaa800dc744fc4 PDF Text Text �z%' ; Z?acr^/A/a" ^4—/ 7 <7%^ -/^ /Zc 'J ^4^ ^7^ 4^L r. /Z?^ 4r?^ 4 Z/1/ /y^*7^* y&<^,*.<^ ^x/4 Z ^T3-' y^. Z ^3^4? 7)^ 7* C^ G,4^4 ^/c^r? /^ /€4^y\ZjZcL /4\ <y. ^ ^7 7 7^4 A/7 J g__^*—^ 4? ** / <-r u-y^. ^-C- ^7^ <^4 <7 4 X--4- — ^**t—-7 <* <^Z 4 /j L—^L / j^/ ^4J4 /^C— ^-' 77^ ^*- <* 4 4L-Z 7^<- y Zv T?^ /44^-y Z / . /S^- e^/Ll 2Zc^-, Z* ^7^-V /^tv^?)y<y** Lj ^/c f<tj / 7 /^^t/cC^Ai^ 7^4 '4j^—eK^tP 4^17 * ^7?^Ly^-<,A-^ /4/\ /X— 4V ^2,^/7c /f^ </cv *^c ) , ^ZLL ^Zc '^*^4 ,/^^4 / /4-- /^X^ajcZ^ <* /<^4.^/ , ����AUM A most interesting 4-some is the Aum, comprising the symbols AU MA the last for silence, before and after each Aum. Thus each full sequence is AAUMA An Aum represents the zoom of life, or, what takes the same pattern, the hum of this universe. Part of that hum has now been identified, in the back-ground radiation of this universe. The pattern the process of this universe follows is in grand outline as follows: Nothing Aris^l U Big Bang, achieved by massive borrowing of energy in vacuum state Maturity Decline and Decay, perhaps through heat death, and through return of borrowed energy Nothing The hum emanates from the Big Ban , and terminates with return of borrowings. The zoom of life follows a similar simple pattern, into which much detail again needs to be inserted. But for each life the borrowing is from outside material in the environment, not from nothing. The broad pattern of a life (with several sub-patterns of the same form not represented) looks like this: ��j/6^^ / 7^rr'^^ < / oT^* To ? �X 44-7^ 7^*^ ��/7 '^^(P^TTT^^L / y^ ) y O ^/' z? J /" /4rr /^c /J y^c Jx7 *^ '^3 ,7^CL ' /I y//^(-C /// *^-^-c^L. '-** V— / ^ "' t^-3^ ,Ci^ <,^77 / /I /T^vj^V ^y, X^*\ A^^ r^ -^ ^c--y 4^' // /4<c y<^6 C <* 4^ �/%// /&7?z7f7^7'j /^2^-^V . ��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Photocopy of two pages (pp, 510-511) from publication or chapter Strengths and weakness of physico-theology. (1 leaf) ��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Photocopy of six pages from unidentified publications. (3 leaves) �HIL050PHY COOMBS BUILDING �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf) �<^Z p< —/^* ^'^" / /^-* ^/c A<L ? /f-*.*' yLV-^-, r-. 4 /CP^A/.^ , e A ./^e ---- y/ y 4< ( (^/ yc " * ' y^<^4y' ? */ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document z%' ; Z?acr^/A/a" ^4—/ 7 <7%^ -/^ /Zc 'J ^4^ ^7^ 4^L r. /Z?^ 4r?^ 4 Z/1/ /y^*7^* y&<^,*.<^ ^x/4 Z ^T3-' y^. Z ^3^4? 7)^ 7* C^ G,4^4 ^/c^r? /^ /€4^y\ZjZcL /4\ <y. ^ ^7 7 7^4 A/7 J g__^*—^ 4? ** / <-r u-y^. ^-C- ^7^ <^4 <7 4 X--4- — ^**t—-7 <* <^Z 4 /j L—^L / j^/ ^4J4 /^C— ^-' 77^ ^*- <* 4 4L-Z 7^<- y Zv T?^ /44^-y Z / . /S^- e^/Ll 2Zc^-, Z* ^7^-V /^tv^?)y<y** Lj ^/c f<tj / 7 /^^t/cC^Ai^ 7^4 '4j^—eK^tP 4^17 * ^7?^Ly^-<,A-^ /4/\ /X— 4V ^2,^/7c /f^ </cv *^c ) , ^ZLL ^Zc '^*^4 ,/^^4 / /4-- /^X^ajcZ^ <* /<^4.^/ , AUM A most interesting 4-some is the Aum, comprising the symbols AU MA the last for silence, before and after each Aum. Thus each full sequence is AAUMA An Aum represents the zoom of life, or, what takes the same pattern, the hum of this universe. Part of that hum has now been identified, in the back-ground radiation of this universe. The pattern the process of this universe follows is in grand outline as follows: Nothing Aris^l U Big Bang, achieved by massive borrowing of energy in vacuum state Maturity Decline and Decay, perhaps through heat death, and through return of borrowed energy Nothing The hum emanates from the Big Ban , and terminates with return of borrowings. The zoom of life follows a similar simple pattern, into which much detail again needs to be inserted. But for each life the borrowing is from outside material in the environment, not from nothing. The broad pattern of a life (with several sub-patterns of the same form not represented) looks like this: j/6^^ / 7^rr'^^ < / oT^* To ? X 44-7^ 7^*^ /7 '^^(P^TTT^^L / y^ ) y O ^/' z? J /" /4rr /^c /J y^c Jx7 *^ '^3 ,7^CL ' /I y//^(-C /// *^-^-c^L. '-** V— / ^ "' t^-3^ ,Ci^ <,^77 / /I /T^vj^V ^y, X^*\ A^^ r^ -^ ^c--y 4^' // /4<c y<^6 C <* 4^ /%// /&7?z7f7^7'j /^2^-^V . The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Photocopy of two pages (pp, 510-511) from publication or chapter Strengths and weakness of physico-theology. (1 leaf) The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Photocopy of six pages from unidentified publications. (3 leaves) HIL050PHY COOMBS BUILDING The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Photocopy of two pages from unidentified publication. (1 leaf) <^Z p< —/^* ^'^" / /^-* ^/c A<L ? /f-*.*' yLV-^-, r-. 4 /CP^A/.^ , e A ./^e ---- y/ y 4< ( (^/ yc " * ' y^<^4y' ? */  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Notes and cuttings on investigations in numerology Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes, undated, and cuttings from unidentified publications. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Investigations in Numerology I - clipped bundle of notes + some strays on same topic. Published works redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [21] leaves. 26.77 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ced267e">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ced267e</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Shelves - Top - Pile 3 Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6b4b577a786501afaafd82e859e98104.pdf 44ba4cefb5aacc03ad709d0007755408 PDF Text Text 'r / **< C^K, / Z?^t' /*?^ <y /?cr/)4re r^z? 7 6 Z-CT,//I^C V ' /'^ /*4i. z .4. <^<.?1^ ^<2-. / ^*'-wwttr. e 4 C- ^ - ����_V/.** . �J'C,/? � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 'r / **< C^K, / Z?^t' /*?^ <y /?cr/)4re r^z? 7 6 Z-CT,//I^C V ' /'^ /*4i. z .4. <^<.?1^ ^<2-. / ^*'-wwttr. e 4 C- ^ - _V/.** . J'C,/?  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 21, Item 708: Notes on utopia Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes, undated. Description An account of the resource One of eight papers digitised from item 708. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Utopia: Outopia or Eutopia Ms. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 21, Item 708 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [4] leaves + 2 cards. 10.67 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:c5d535a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:c5d535a</a> Box 21: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Top > Pile 3