3 20 144 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6743128b35122b4d5ceeaa8b36929812.pdf 569009a6b472a7b1abe83ab34e8cbc4f PDF Text Text These areas were also among the most significant research programs in Australian philosophy in the 80's (see my ‘Prospects for regional philosophy in Australasia’). To set out very briefly why these programs did not flourish. Essentially the power-strati lure in philosophy decided it did not care for the developments that appeared to be occuring in parts of Australian philosophy, and in ANU philosophy in particular. Among other things, a small campaign was run against my regional themes and research project ideas. I was blocked in advancement and Australian philosophy has been in any power acquisition and appropriate support lately turning back to a subservient empiricism, concentrating again on such established topics as philosophy of mind. In the main I d-repped-out of attempwg to organise philosophy and other projects at or through ANU. 3. Chief past research accomplishments:My past research divides into two broad categories: logic and metaphysics, and other, other comprising, to begin with, environmental philosophy and issues. In the 1960s my research fell almost entirely into the first category, whence I (or Routley at any rate) have been typed ever since as a logician. As the 1970s progressed my other research broadened from environmental ethics and issues (initially mainly forestry and nuclear topics) to include relevant social theory, environmental politics and economics, and naturally enough, the point of all the activity involved, that is almost to say, ultimate questions. A. Logic and metaphysics :• Object-theory: Development of the general theory of all items, with special emphasis upon nonexistent objects and among them impossible items. From an interdisciplinary viewpoint, important kinds of nonexistent items comprehended by the theory are fictional items generally and theoretical objects; but there are many other kinds: historic objects, mental and perceptual items, vague objects, variable items, processes, and so on. This work, which established the general theory, sistology, as a viable logical enterprise, began in early 1960s; investigations up to 1980 were collected in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. Investigations continue; an improved theory has been found, and further kinds of items better comprehended. • Relevant logics: Advances in intensional logic, especially modal logics and relevant logics, and their applications. Much of my work in the 1960s was devoted to studies of the properties of non-normal modal logics and implicational variants thereof, and their applications. This work was initiated independently of European and American work, which I only learnt about while I progressed in a somewhat different direction. More significant results include semantics and algebras for relevant logics, resolution of many open questions, as well as new ranges of systems, and interesting results concerning them. Many of the results reached up to 1982 are recorded in Relevant Logics and Their Rivals. In the 1980s more and more of my technical work went into syntheses of and applications of sociative (i.e. broadly relevant) logics, systems that matter both for critical notions in philosophy of science and for a satisfactory theory of reasoning. �• Discovery of universal semantics, for all logical systems. Corollaries include general theories of denotation and truth; applications include rehabilitation of several damaged or defunct metaphysical theories. • Paradoxes and dialethic logic: Investigation of paradoxes, and ensuing therefrom two broad lines of work: first, significance and context theories and a study of incompleteness, and second, paraconsistent and dialethic (i.e. explicitly inconsistent) theories and a study of inconsistency. Both lines lead to much work determining the extent and character of such theories, and establishing important results concerning them. Both lines of pursuit issued in large books (one with Leonard Goddard, the other with Graham Priest); but in both lines much unfinished business remains. My first research in Australia in the early 1960s focussed on paradoxes; perhaps I am at last in a position to outline main details of the theory. • Deep Plurallism: By the 1980s it had become difficult, in philosophy, to escape the fashionable issue of realism and its main rivals, anti-realism and relativism. I soon realised that I could (for object-theoretic reasons) be satisfied with none of the stock options, and so began investigation of a radical pluralism, which in due course deepened into deep plurallism. On the way I undertook investigations of limitations regarding realism, limits to knowledge, of ontological and alethic relativity, and of idealism and coherence. A* Other: from environmental ethics to ultimate questions. • Environmental ethics, and removal of human chauvinism. None of the prevailing ethical theories were satsifactory, all succumbed to environmental counter-examples (which is one reason why environmental ethics is not applied ethics); all were unduly chauvinistic. New theoretical investigation was required, and was undertaken through the 1970s (though the resulting theory has never been assembled in one source). This foundational work centered on value theory, was broadened in the 1980s to include, for instance, a new deontic theory accommodating moral dilemmas, a critique of rational decision theory and development of a satisizing alternative. • Environmental philosophy and related social topics, including nuclear energy and obligations to future generations, war and peace, population and immigration, predation and cannibilism, animal intentionality, environmental interference and management. One topic merits separate listing. • Studies concerning forests and forestry. While much of this investigatory work concentrated on plantation forestry and other intensive forestry such as clearfelling and woodchipping, it also included studies on forest practices in neighbouring countries, alternative forestry, forestry economics, forest typology, down to details of specific forests. • Environmental and philosophical metatheory. Topics, encroaching on theoretical sociology, included rival social paradigms, the bearings of culture on environmental attitudes, cultural and regional impacts on ideology, regional philosophy. The last topic led naturally into � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document These areas were also among the most significant research programs in Australian philosophy in the 80's (see my ‘Prospects for regional philosophy in Australasia’). To set out very briefly why these programs did not flourish. Essentially the power-strati lure in philosophy decided it did not care for the developments that appeared to be occuring in parts of Australian philosophy, and in ANU philosophy in particular. Among other things, a small campaign was run against my regional themes and research project ideas. I was blocked in advancement and Australian philosophy has been in any power acquisition and appropriate support lately turning back to a subservient empiricism, concentrating again on such established topics as philosophy of mind. In the main I d-repped-out of attempwg to organise philosophy and other projects at or through ANU. 3. Chief past research accomplishments:My past research divides into two broad categories: logic and metaphysics, and other, other comprising, to begin with, environmental philosophy and issues. In the 1960s my research fell almost entirely into the first category, whence I (or Routley at any rate) have been typed ever since as a logician. As the 1970s progressed my other research broadened from environmental ethics and issues (initially mainly forestry and nuclear topics) to include relevant social theory, environmental politics and economics, and naturally enough, the point of all the activity involved, that is almost to say, ultimate questions. A. Logic and metaphysics :• Object-theory: Development of the general theory of all items, with special emphasis upon nonexistent objects and among them impossible items. From an interdisciplinary viewpoint, important kinds of nonexistent items comprehended by the theory are fictional items generally and theoretical objects; but there are many other kinds: historic objects, mental and perceptual items, vague objects, variable items, processes, and so on. This work, which established the general theory, sistology, as a viable logical enterprise, began in early 1960s; investigations up to 1980 were collected in Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond. Investigations continue; an improved theory has been found, and further kinds of items better comprehended. • Relevant logics: Advances in intensional logic, especially modal logics and relevant logics, and their applications. Much of my work in the 1960s was devoted to studies of the properties of non-normal modal logics and implicational variants thereof, and their applications. This work was initiated independently of European and American work, which I only learnt about while I progressed in a somewhat different direction. More significant results include semantics and algebras for relevant logics, resolution of many open questions, as well as new ranges of systems, and interesting results concerning them. Many of the results reached up to 1982 are recorded in Relevant Logics and Their Rivals. In the 1980s more and more of my technical work went into syntheses of and applications of sociative (i.e. broadly relevant) logics, systems that matter both for critical notions in philosophy of science and for a satisfactory theory of reasoning. • Discovery of universal semantics, for all logical systems. Corollaries include general theories of denotation and truth; applications include rehabilitation of several damaged or defunct metaphysical theories. • Paradoxes and dialethic logic: Investigation of paradoxes, and ensuing therefrom two broad lines of work: first, significance and context theories and a study of incompleteness, and second, paraconsistent and dialethic (i.e. explicitly inconsistent) theories and a study of inconsistency. Both lines lead to much work determining the extent and character of such theories, and establishing important results concerning them. Both lines of pursuit issued in large books (one with Leonard Goddard, the other with Graham Priest); but in both lines much unfinished business remains. My first research in Australia in the early 1960s focussed on paradoxes; perhaps I am at last in a position to outline main details of the theory. • Deep Plurallism: By the 1980s it had become difficult, in philosophy, to escape the fashionable issue of realism and its main rivals, anti-realism and relativism. I soon realised that I could (for object-theoretic reasons) be satisfied with none of the stock options, and so began investigation of a radical pluralism, which in due course deepened into deep plurallism. On the way I undertook investigations of limitations regarding realism, limits to knowledge, of ontological and alethic relativity, and of idealism and coherence. A* Other: from environmental ethics to ultimate questions. • Environmental ethics, and removal of human chauvinism. None of the prevailing ethical theories were satsifactory, all succumbed to environmental counter-examples (which is one reason why environmental ethics is not applied ethics); all were unduly chauvinistic. New theoretical investigation was required, and was undertaken through the 1970s (though the resulting theory has never been assembled in one source). This foundational work centered on value theory, was broadened in the 1980s to include, for instance, a new deontic theory accommodating moral dilemmas, a critique of rational decision theory and development of a satisizing alternative. • Environmental philosophy and related social topics, including nuclear energy and obligations to future generations, war and peace, population and immigration, predation and cannibilism, animal intentionality, environmental interference and management. One topic merits separate listing. • Studies concerning forests and forestry. While much of this investigatory work concentrated on plantation forestry and other intensive forestry such as clearfelling and woodchipping, it also included studies on forest practices in neighbouring countries, alternative forestry, forestry economics, forest typology, down to details of specific forests. • Environmental and philosophical metatheory. Topics, encroaching on theoretical sociology, included rival social paradigms, the bearings of culture on environmental attitudes, cultural and regional impacts on ideology, regional philosophy. The last topic led naturally into Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 169, Item 414: Untitled document on significant research programs in Australian philosophy in the 1980s Subject The topic of the resource Typescript with handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Untitled ts 2p Marked ‘Re RLR start’ Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 169, Item 414 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [2] leaves. 1.82 MB. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:06b30f2">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:06b30f2</a> Box 169: From Dr Ross Brady Como House Como House > Floor > Large Carton https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b87130a29f9b52af42c4cef275532629.pdf b0bf742ca1521f0e62f99c840366ccf4 PDF Text Text I I 1 / I PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION 23 May 1983 Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor. Dear Professor Karmel, Publi .. Affairs Conference: The consequences of nuclear war. I have to advise you that I have serious concerns about several aspects of this conference, which takes place next Monday-Tuesday 30-31 May. Despit the unusual amount of time that it has taken in an attempt to establish and agree upon the programme, and an unprecedented level of involvement_ of the Assistant Vice-Chancellor in an attempt to enlist more senior authority to hold the programme to what is agreed, it has not proved possible for the Centre for Continuing Education effectively to be responsible for the programme, or indeed even to be sure what the programme is. I respect and personally happen to be in agreement with Dr Denborough in his commitment to the cause of peace and prevention of nuclear war. The large enrolment of the conference (well in excess of 300) is due to his very considerable efforts in publicising it as well as to its intrinsic contemporary interest and importance. His commitment however is such as to override all normal conventions of cooperative behaviour, and it leaves me unable to give assurances that the conference will be ah activity proper and appropriate to the University. The programme as it now appears to be is the result of a succession of compromises extracted through pressures of various kinds. Those involved in the Centre are by no means happy with the result, and fear that it has now become over-crowded, as we have been nbliged to honour agreements entered into, as I believe, illegitimately on behalf of the University. The likely high level of interest and energy among those taking part, and the frustration of a crowded programme and little opportunity till late on for floor contribution, may well make for an explosive situation. Much of this I have accepted, as I believe has the Assistant Vice-Chancellor, reluctantly and finding the alternatives still less attractive. As the programme now reads, my most serious concern is that Dr Denborough is to chair the final session. I believe that he is too dedicated to a point of view, and too embedded in the whole emotional side of the subject, the planning and the conference, to be able to take this part satisfactorily. I am also concerned that Dr Millar is apparently being limited in his participation to chairing the session at which Dr Ball is to speak. I consider that a strong chairperson and a well balanced panel are very important for the final session to be satisfactory from a University point of view. The various kinds of moral and other blackmail that have been employed may make this impossible, but in this and some other respects the conference remains, for all the efforts of CCE to retain balance and authoritative presentations, highly volatile. One reason for writing is to alert you to this, as even now it may not be too late to enhance the quality of what at any rate is certain to be a high profile event. The other is to anticipate and if possible avert a consequence of any embarrassment which might be caused by the conference: a natural reaction away from attempting any other important but controversial theme in public affairs and extension conferences. The cornmi ttee which was developing thi_s conference came to be replaced by one man, and the attempt of Mr Plowman and myself, with CCE colleagues, to fill the vacant place naturally proved less than satisfactory. The lesson should be not again to allow any member of the University with a particular personal commitment of this kind to capture � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document I I 1 / I PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL THE AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY CENTRE FOR CONTINUING EDUCATION 23 May 1983 Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor. Dear Professor Karmel, Publi .. Affairs Conference: The consequences of nuclear war. I have to advise you that I have serious concerns about several aspects of this conference, which takes place next Monday-Tuesday 30-31 May. Despit the unusual amount of time that it has taken in an attempt to establish and agree upon the programme, and an unprecedented level of involvement_ of the Assistant Vice-Chancellor in an attempt to enlist more senior authority to hold the programme to what is agreed, it has not proved possible for the Centre for Continuing Education effectively to be responsible for the programme, or indeed even to be sure what the programme is. I respect and personally happen to be in agreement with Dr Denborough in his commitment to the cause of peace and prevention of nuclear war. The large enrolment of the conference (well in excess of 300) is due to his very considerable efforts in publicising it as well as to its intrinsic contemporary interest and importance. His commitment however is such as to override all normal conventions of cooperative behaviour, and it leaves me unable to give assurances that the conference will be ah activity proper and appropriate to the University. The programme as it now appears to be is the result of a succession of compromises extracted through pressures of various kinds. Those involved in the Centre are by no means happy with the result, and fear that it has now become over-crowded, as we have been nbliged to honour agreements entered into, as I believe, illegitimately on behalf of the University. The likely high level of interest and energy among those taking part, and the frustration of a crowded programme and little opportunity till late on for floor contribution, may well make for an explosive situation. Much of this I have accepted, as I believe has the Assistant Vice-Chancellor, reluctantly and finding the alternatives still less attractive. As the programme now reads, my most serious concern is that Dr Denborough is to chair the final session. I believe that he is too dedicated to a point of view, and too embedded in the whole emotional side of the subject, the planning and the conference, to be able to take this part satisfactorily. I am also concerned that Dr Millar is apparently being limited in his participation to chairing the session at which Dr Ball is to speak. I consider that a strong chairperson and a well balanced panel are very important for the final session to be satisfactory from a University point of view. The various kinds of moral and other blackmail that have been employed may make this impossible, but in this and some other respects the conference remains, for all the efforts of CCE to retain balance and authoritative presentations, highly volatile. One reason for writing is to alert you to this, as even now it may not be too late to enhance the quality of what at any rate is certain to be a high profile event. The other is to anticipate and if possible avert a consequence of any embarrassment which might be caused by the conference: a natural reaction away from attempting any other important but controversial theme in public affairs and extension conferences. The cornmi ttee which was developing thi_s conference came to be replaced by one man, and the attempt of Mr Plowman and myself, with CCE colleagues, to fill the vacant place naturally proved less than satisfactory. The lesson should be not again to allow any member of the University with a particular personal commitment of this kind to capture Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 1: Richard Routley? to Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor, Australian National University, 23 May 1983 Subject The topic of the resource Letter missing pages. Possibly written by Richard Routley (later Sylvan). Routley writes to Professor Peter Karmel, Vice-Chancellor of ANU, about his concerns of the university's involvement in the Public Affairs Conference (30-31 May), in relation to the consequences of nuclear war and Dr Denborough, the conference chair. Typescript letter, written on Australian National University (ANU) Centre for Continuing Education letter head. Marked private and confidential. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered manuscript from collection, item number assigned by library staff. The rightsholder for this work cannot be identified, or is identifiable but cannot be found, after a reasonable good faith search. If you believe you have a valid claim to the rights in this work, please contact us by email copyright@library.uq.edu.au Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource May 23, 1993 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource Richard Sylvan Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource Letter, 1 leaf [962.77 KB] Type The nature or genre of the resource Correspondences Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7af99ef">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7af99ef</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/cee3998747324ca8cfafd9916c99b05c.pdf 694d7c85ceace8f227cc36d1f9729f33 PDF Text Text �J ��SHORT CONTENTS OF TOWARDS GREEN ANARKISM: EUCRATIC POLITICAL INVESTIGATION? ? 0. PROLOGUE 1. EXPLICATIONS 2. ELABORATIONS 3. ARGUMENTS I 4. ARGUMENTS II 5. VARIETIES AND OPTIONS TAKEN 6. ECONOMIC ELEMENTS: PROPERTY, CAPITAL, MARKETS, TAX 7. POLITICAL ELEMENTS: ORGANISATION, DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY 8. SOCIAL THEORY ELEMENTS: NATURE, CULTURE 8A LEGAL ELEMENTS 9. ECOREGIONAL STRUCTURES, EUTOPIAN MODELLING 10. ROUTES, TRANSITION 11. FURTHER CRITICISMS FOILED 12. PROBLEM RESOLUTION 13. EPILOGUE. BIBLIOGRAPHY (INCLUDING RESOURCES) by a minor marginaZi-s^J p/iiZo-yop/^r writing in 7. ? Richard Sylvan, Za^ At^nri^f/i c^nfary. ��PROLOGUE WHY GREEN ANARKISM? Green anarchism is not merely an intellectually attractive intersection of anarchism with genuine environmentalism; it is also a rational imperative. Modem states are not merely without justification; they are a major force driving and facilitating degradation and destruction of global environments, to points of no return for many natural species and environments, and even seriously threatening future human viability. Anarchism would, with full justification, remove these major problem sources. Green anarchism derives from anarchism coloured by a deeper environmentalism. Anarchism itself is said to be essentially a modem ideology, arising after, and in opposition to, the modem state. Though there may be significant anticipations of anarchism in earlier philosophy, and though there are many worthwhile examples of early anarchistic societies, the main intellectual work begins only in the late eighteenth century (with the eruption of the French Revolution). Since then there have been waves of anarchistic output of varying strength, the most recent initiated in Paris again in 1968^(immediately following a series of academic texts pronouncing that anarchism was dead)L In important respects this received picture, ever so lightly sketched, is misleading. Anarchist ideas were already advanced in those similar ancient ideologies, Taoism and Stoicism,** in opposition to ancient empires. Lao Tzu, shadowy founder of Taoism, was not merely a trenchant critic of the Empire, but advocated a society in which the ruler, the Prince, disappeared into a do-nothing exemplary and merely legendary figure. What Taoism asserted is virtually tantamount to Thoreau's small but crucial anarchist amendment to Jefferson, that the best government is the one that does not govern at all. In a similar vein, "Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, advocated a society without government. Laws should be abolished[!], since virtue and morality would only be achieved in liberty'.2 That common ancient tradition, spanning East and West, though often submerged, has never been lost. The Taoist tradition persisted (if often in degenerate form) in China, and heavily influenced west Asian adaptations of Buddhism. Stoicism survived, as (often degenerate) internal critic, for the duration of the western Roman Empire, and was directly incorporated into early Christianity. Although anti authoritarian features were subsequently suppressed in the Stoic-Christian tradition, elements survived even in the increasingly authoritarian climate of that religion, and the positive ideas have resurfaced again and again in religious freer-thinkers. 1 For details see Marshall pxi. Amusingly anarchism in Australia has more recently also been * Taoism and Stoicism can almost be seen as variants upon one another, back to the very names. It is tempting to conjecture that they may have both arisen from a proto-Toi-ism. Lehner, H of I, p.71. On Taoism as anarchist, see Clark, ch7, Marchall, ch4, and UT. 2 �2 The term * anarchism' was however introduced into English in a highly perjorative sense, signifying disorder, chaos, lawlessness and the likeA It is regularly displayed in this negative connotation, in politically unstable times in England, long before much theoretical work on anarchism began (nonetheless there were tracts, like that of Winstanley). As a result, the term 'anarchy' got away to a very bad start in English. It was used, from the early 16th century onwards, to mean confusion, disorder, lawlessness, licence, and absence or nonrecognition of authority. Similarly for most of its cognates 'anarch', 'anarchal', 'anarchial', 'anarchic', 'anarchical', 'anarchially', 'anarchism', 'anarchist' and 'anarchize', (see OED entries). 'Anarchism' itself had also acquired its re/evanf modem sense of 'the principles and practice of anarchy or anarchists', namely 'the Doctrine Position or Art of those that teach anarchy; also the being itself of people without a Prince or Ruler' by 1656 (in Blount GZo^^gr). As a political theory anarchism is standardly said, however, to have emerged much later (and there are stock, 'inconsistent' presentations: a state without a state, government without government, theory without doctrine, order without order, etc.) It is the interaction between popular longer-standing usage and later serious ideological use that helps account for the astonishing folkloric history of the term aKarc/n-yTK. It also reflects one facet of the pervading amateurism of anarchism, its lack of industrious research. Consider what certain encyclopaedias say, beginning with one that is not so much wrong as sloppy. Historically the word "anarchist", which derives from the Greek an arc/io-y, meaning "no government", appears first to have been used pejoratively to indicate one who denies all law and wishes to promote chaos. It was used in this sense against the Levelers during the English Civil War and during the French Revolution by most parties in criticizing those who stood to the left of them along the political spectrum. The first use of the world as an approbatory description of a positive philosophy appears to have been by Pierre Joseph Proudhon when, in his (W%<3/ Af property?, Paris, 1840), he described himself as an anarchist because he believed that political organization based on authority should be replaced by social and economic organisation based on voluntary contractual agreement (Woodcock p. 111). According to a rival encyclopaedia, however, The word "anarchy" describing a stateless society was used[?J for the first time by Louis Armand de Labortan in his voyage Z' (1703), describing the Indians living in a society without state, laws, prisons, priests, private property, in short "in anarchy" (Lehning p.71). A glance at the OED, such as we took above, along with a comparison of the stories, reveals the falsity of many of these interesting contentions. Much historical detail remains to be sorted out satisfactorily. Though there are many histories of anarchism, until very recently a 3 The pejorative sense was not contrived or imposed following some significant political incident, such as the pivotal Chicago events of 1886, which is what Jp^ies 86 implies. No doubt, however, following the Chicago events, stigmatisation and denigration of anarchism, and its automatically assumed association with violence and disorder, were deliberately orchestrated and propagated in USA. Such an outcome contributed further to development of an already established anti-anarchist mythology. �3 reasonably satisfactory one had yet to be written. Fortunately that has now changed (during the drafting of this text). Conveniently we are now absolved from lamenting the absence of such work and likewise from attempting more historical detail.^ For Marshall's massive text, has now appeared, it can be deferred to (by no means always uncritically) on many historical issues and for mad detail, to which it affords fine access. The concentrate on systematic and theoretical matters. Most of the seminal and interesting work on anarchism has come from outside present text can now universities and standard intellectual circles, and often from political amateurs. Academics have contributed histories, surveys and (usually not so sympathetic) criticisms, but, with a very few exceptions, little original thought. $ For typically they are ideologically stuck with the state, be it a pathetically minimal one. Intellectuals are so inured to the state that they are inclined to such pronouncements as that the idea of abolishing the state entirely must strike us as utopian .6 Yes, as eutopian. 'Most political philosophers in the past few generations have been unable to escape what the psychoanalysts might call a "state fixation". Even those those temper and reason caused them to distrust a nationalist philosophy could not deal with the state except as a rigid entity. They wished it large or small, isolated or cosmopolitan, but in any case a rounded unit which had to be taken as it was and maintained as such in any reconstruction of... society'7 It is easy to speculate on reasons for this, connected with academics being part of the expensive state scene. While anarchism has vanished from the mainstream academic scene, it is again becoming visible, if hardly prominent, in alternative (especially green) scenes and in work of disaffected academics associated with them. A surprising amount of the adventurous anarchist literature now appears, like the earlier utopian literature, in fiction, especially science fiction (and so, under prevailing division of labour, tends to become a subject for literary criticism, not political philosophy). But the ideas and plans appear there in quite insufficient detail. There, moreover, it can easily be dismissed as fantasy, as unrealistic, not a serious and proper contribution to political dialectic. The entire range of political discussion concerns whether there should be marginally more government intervention, or marginally less; marginally more public expenditure on welfare services is marginally less. Nobody [much] challenges the whole system, still less the existence of the state itself. The state's own socialisation processes see to that (Luard p.52). While virtually all political discussion undoubtedly traffics in such marginalia, powerful and warranted challenges there certainly have been: It is plain that on general principles of law and reason ... the Constitution is no contract; that it binds nobody, and never did bind anybody; and that all those who pretend to act by its authority, are really acting without any legitimate authority at all: that, on general principles of law and reason, 4 5 6 7 In contrast thus to James 186 who reiterates the familiar lament. Even the very occasional (here deliberately unspecified) exceptions are exceedingly cautious. Miller p.182. Mitrany p.98. �4 they are mere usurpers, and that everyone ... has the right... to treat them as such.s Given the United States is not contractually legitimated, what other state is? None appears to have superior credentials! None is rationally legitimated, so it will be argued in detail. The State in general and in abstract is not justified. So, whether it can be exploited for environmental and social purposes or not, its use is not justified. Environmentalism is still more modem than anarchism. Though it has ancient roots, and though the movement grew substantially in the 19th century, fusing there with an earlier romantic movement, environmentalism is an archetypically 20th century ideology. The more widely diffused green movement is essentially a contemporary phenomena, no doubt the most distinctive new political force of the late 20th century (the feminism movement is older). Green anarchism draws together elements from environmentalism and anarchism. While it can be seen as continuous with environmentally sensitive later 19th century social anarchism (of Morris, Kroprotkin, and others), environmental problems now appear in a new light and take on a new urgency. For we are now confronted by what is not inaccurately referred to as the envzronmenfa/ crAyZy, combining the cumulative efforts of rapid human population growth, rapid concomitant growth of vast industrial and human pollution threatening and undermining biological life support systems, rapid depletion of habitats species and nonrenewable resources, and very extensive and worsening environmental deterioration. In the present parlous environmental predicament those concerned to take some requisite action, active environmentalists, have two opposently diametrically opposed courses open;9 * Supporting, and working through, strengthened states to try to avert the crisis. Central to 'most environmental justifications of [expanded] state power", according to social individualists, is the argument that people will not voluntarily r&yfram themselves from doing those things of which the environmental crisis is the aggregate effect. They will not voluntarily refrain from hunting whales and other species threatened with extinction, from having "too many children"", from discharging untreated wastes into rivers and lakes, and so on (Taylor pp 1-2, quoted in Grofman p.108). As in collective action theory (advanced typically by individualists), it is concluded (invalidly as will be seen) that state power is required to compel restraint and to undertake compulsory rectification. * Working outside states in more direct efforts to avert elements of the crisis. The alternative, that is, is to abandon the state. Here lies the main chance, and the only genuine long term alternative for a deep, as opposed to merely reformist, environmentalism. For under state regimes, more and more of remaining environments are degraded or destroyed, in the march of 8 9 Spooner (M? Treason) pp 27-8. The omitted phrase asserts that everyone has not only the right but is wtoraZZy to treat them thus. But here Spooner goes further than data seems to warrant, converting supererogation to obligation. (The phrase following the quotation echoes Miller p.38). These choices are differently presented and explained in SM, a main intellectual ancestor of the present work. The approaches complement one another. �5 state growth and economic progress. In fact, there are several reasons for the extra-state anti state course. There are serious limits to what states can accomplish, especially in international issues in the interstrices of states, but also as regards individual environmentally-hostile action. Moreover, even when it appears that states can a^t, or contribute, there are sharp limits to what they are prepared to do or attempt. States of course explain their tardiness or reluctance to move in various ways: prior higher commitments (e.g. endless economic ones such as creating jobs, containing inflation, etc.), the need for balance (with a constituency after unparaxeded of any environmental crisis, or wanting, like comments operating with anarchist discount rates, to party now), etc. Concerned environmentalists should take both courses: use the state and exploit state power where opportunities offer (without thereby endorsing the state and its standard practices), but also, more important, they should work outside states and against states. For mam co/ifn&Mfmg coarse o/The anJ ov^ra/Z o/?^rafmg fa worsen if. Given this (no doubt jaundiced) sfa^-mfrz'car^ thesis, surely it is hypocritical also to work through them and use them. Not at all; for states acquire and hold, have expropriated to themselves, considerable social wealth, which arguably should be directed to social concerns, including environmental amelioration. However, while states may properly be used so long as they persist, still ultimately halting the new ubiquitous environmental rot, salvaging or conserving some of what remain of viable environments, will involve, if it can be done, dissolution of states. There are powerful environmental reasons for trying to terminate / the present era of states. States are ineluctably committed to economic growth, of almost any sort; indeed they are main proponents of such growth. This commitment, certainly highly conspicuous, is not merely accidental, and is bound to impact negatively on environments. Australia, for example, needs a growth rate (in GDP) of at least 3% just to provide employment for its school-leavers, more to cater for immigrants, more to allow for some politically acceptable redistribution, more to meet rising aspirations. More, more, more .... States cannot step off the growth treadmill. That growth in turn requires, to deliver essential exports, expanded raids on resources and biological capital (if not that held by the state, that of other states). These exercises in tum inevitably mean, given present technologies and cost structures, pollution in many dismaying forms and environmental degradation.^ So growth implies environmental degradation. Therefore, with contemporary states degradation is inevitable. Such states are inevitably environmental vandals, n 10 11 A prominent recent attempt to block this sort of argument features economic growth subject to con train ts of environmental sustainability. While such constrained economic growth is a feasible (and old) idea, contemporary states, given their commitments, cannot and cannot afford to deliver it. A recent example concerns Australian production of greenhouse gases, where Australia cannot, officials now say, meet the costs involved in attaining expected reduction targets. Sustainable development itself is critically examined in r The kind of practical necessity operating here will concern us in later chapters. Logically there could be benign "states"; but these would be far removed from contemporary state arrangements. ( �6 There is exceedingly little evidence that social and environmental prospects will ever improve under the contemporary regime of states; instead much evidence to contrary has accumulated. "... Reliance on the state or a global superstate for change will lead to a continuation of many of the patterns of domination that the state has done so much to develop and reinforce in the past" the anarchist strategy of change "from below" ... [and "from above" is] much more promising'. Indeed the claim is made that The anarchist vision ... of a fusion between a universal confederation and organic societal forms of a communal character lies at the very centre of the on/y hopeful prospect for the future world order'. 12 Some of the pressures to continued exponential growth, and their environmental and social consequences, themselves positively feeding back to fuel demands for more growth, are colourfully observed in the following passage: One of the most widely pursued common goals of recent times has been economic growth, which is generally regarded as the most important ambition of states. These pressures to high rate of growth not only endanger the world's resources but do not even procure the material satisfactions they are intended to provide. For the effect of competition is that high rates of growth can be achieved only by high rates of investment designed to secure higher productivity. This secures equivalent production with more equipment but less labour. Thus more and more people are displaced from their jobs who cannot necessarily find alternative employment in service industries or elsewhere. All over the Western world, in shipbuilding, in steel, in motor manufacture, in textiles, in fishing, in agriculture and other industries, employment rapidly declines. So the total number of those unemployed increases in all industrial countries and remains high even in those where a relatively high rate of growth is being achieved. And the very fact of high unemployment, by reducing total demand, lowers the level of investment and growth for the future. Periods of growth become shorter and those of recession become longer. The relatively simple devices for stimulating growth in earlier times - lower interest rates, budgetary deficits, fiscal expansion and public works — are either not attempted through fear of inflation, or if attempted do not achieve their effect. Despite persistent recession inflation remains strong, partly because of excessive increases in income obtained by those still at work, partly because of the large sections of the economy which are in public hands and are unaffected by antiinflationary measures. Modern industrial societies, therefore, in appearance so advanced, are yet characterised by the bizarre spectacle of large sections of the population being without work, while ever higher levels of investment are undertaken to reduce employment still further in the future, so ensuring that the benefits of high growth are enjoyed by fewer and fewer people (Laurd p.147). A main dynamic involved can be summarised: Both the State and those major corporations which set much of its agenda aim to increase productivity (for reasons of profit, profile, firm or party growth and survival, etc.). But productivity increase characteristically sheds labour. Restoration of employment requires growth. Hence one heavy pressure to growth: sustaining employment. That pressure is, furthermore, one of many. Another derives from internal dynamics of corporations and bureaucracies. Like the state and capitalism, they all must, as Marx argued, 12 Clark, also quoting Falk from 'Anarchism of world order* in FVo/noj, p.160). �7 grow or die. There are many reasons for the growth imperative, both broad ideological and business specific.^ For satisfactory survival, satisfaction of its executives and employees, its stock holders, and so on, a modem corporation has to grow. Cpntr^l here are such matters as laws of profit decline otherwise, and more general principles of organisational aging and decline. If any serious ecological conclusion is to be drawn from Vol I, it is from Marx's compelling demonstration that the very law of life of capitalist competition, of the fully developed market economy, is based on the maxim, "grow or die". Translated into ecological terms, this clearly means that a fully developed market economy must unrelentingly exploit nature to a point ... that is literally regressive geologically and biologically. Capitalism, in effect, is not only polluting the world on a historically unprecedented scale; it is simplifying all the ecosystems of the planet, turning soil into sand, the oceans into lifeless sewers, indeed, threatening the very integrity of our sources of atmospheric oxygen. If one were to follow the logic of this tendency to its very end, capitalist— and hierarchical— society are utterly incompatible with a viable biosphere. What limits the ecological validity of Marx's view is obviously not his revelation of capitalism's "law of life" but rather the "progressive" role he imparts to capitalism's "success" in supposedly achieving the technical domination of nature. This Janus-faced aspect of Marx's writings is what throw them into conflict with an authentic ecological sensibility. Gorz, by contrast, sides-steps exacfZy what we must learn in the contradictory position of Marx, namely, that the very technical achievements of capitalism, fat^ from a-y-MmzZafing "ecological necessities as technical restraints", are governed by a "law of life" that technologically lacks any TES p.293) form of "restraint' Prevailing political arrangements 'no longer offer us a hopeful prospect of resolving the vast social and ecological crises which now confront humanity ... these systems, with their deep commitment to such values as industrialism, high technology, centralism, urbanization and the state, have been instrumental in creating the social atomization and ecological imbalance which are at the core of these crises' (Clark pp. 141-2). Indeed these systems are bound to exacerbate the problems. While these statements should by now be motherhood statements, they are not. Hope springs eternal: more naive environmentalists regularly appeal to a state that sometimes makes appropriate responsive noises and puts out appealing propaganda, but meanwhile is thoroughly committed to economic growth of environmentally damaging forms. The normal dynamic of th^ "advanced" state is extremely environmentally hazardous. Centralised states support environmentally and socially damaging methods of production, in order to benefit from the surplus and exploitable technology thereby produced - which are important for purposes of state, in particular for spending to remain in power (job generation, pork barrelling, subsidization of large business), for positional enrichment of the bureaucracy, and for development of the forces of coercion, propaganda and authority which matter both for internal social objectives and in order to remain militarily competitive in the region and spheres of influence. Details of the dynamic at work have become familiar from socio-environmental studies of state operation. For example, technologies that facilitate centralized authoritarian 13 The broad and ancient ideological reasons are investigated elsewhere, e.g. MSS. �8 control are favoured (such as nuclear power, which also supplies material for nuclear weapons). Such technologies serve the interests of state actors and those who benefit particularly therefrom, namely economically dominant social strata. This dynamic, which does not require any arms race, only kinds of inter-state competition, encourages ever-increasing productivity, entailing high consumption of resources, high output of pollution, substantial environmental degeneration and destru( tion, and so on. Active aware environmentalists have, in the end, little choice but to attempt to ;abotage this dynamic. 14 Opposition to anarchism from gi een directions, and especially from green infiltrators, often derives from the assumption that under anarchism all environmental regulation would lapse, that it would be an open-go, fret -for-all for anti-environmental forces—the very ones that are already running rampant over the Earth, and perhaps others besides. It needs to be stressed that this opposition rests on a misconception of what green anarchism ^is all about. With a caring anarchism there may be a complete of the usually conceived situations of states and stateless societies, as regards environment regulation and social support. It should not have escaped notice that often states are the prime enemies of environmental regulation, improved environment practices, and the like. Even when there is very extensive community support for regulation, the state acts to block it, and aids and abets damaging practices! A central reason for this is that the state typically reflects a rather narrow range of vested interests, increasingJhese days those of dominant business, not community interests except very secondarily. Contrary then to received conceptions, the state is frequently not a means to, but an obstacle to, satisfactory regulation. Satisfactory green regulation can occur, can only occur, without the modern state. It will be argued that not only are there no intellectual or theoretical problems in dispensing with the state, but fuller there are no serious losses in disposing of it. There is no case for the state, and no need for it. But it is worse than that: it is predominantly bad in its impacts. Accordingly, it ought not to be in place. The practical upshot is that that we should endeavour to remove it. Among the incidental practical difficulties arising as a result, are that for complex societies there is a need for some structure to replace the state (not a intractable theoretical problem any longer). As well there is a need for a strategy to displace the state. That is where radical environmentalism enters again. A thoroughgoing environmentalism accordingly forces a significant type of anarchism, a social non-capitalist anarchism. The basic reason it forces anarchism is that the state, a prime anarchist enemy, not only fails to supply or retain environmental goods, but is frequently actively involved in their degradation or removal. The state is a major facilitator and powerful source of environmental degradation and destruction. Genuine greenness further substantially constrains the directions anarchism can take, the variety of admissible anarchisms. It serves to eliminate as a serious option total reliance on 14 This argument is adapted from A. Carter, Towards a green political theory*. While Carter's way out is not endorsed, his elaboration of the dynamic is, more or less. LL �market methods, as proposed for instance under anarcho-capitalism and libertarianism. While excessive reHance upon capitalist markets is rejected, primarily because of heavy externalities, more traditional markets are given a rather free role. The problems with market-capitalism is not so much markets, except as distorted in a capitalist setting, but capitalism.^ Capitalism, both in theory and as normally practised, is a major enemy of environmentalism, and a main source of environmental problems. Capitalism also encourages, what conspicuous capitalists conspicuously exhibit, environmentally unacceptable lifestyles. Greenness also sharply constrains meta-politics. For example, it counts heavily against standard game-theoretic approaches of analytic political philosophy, because these entirely discount environmental effects (except as reflected through human actors' self interests). This work concentrates upon the anarchist components of green anarchism (the green part is attempted in a companion text on green ideology). It is primarily a theoretical work; it concentrates upon what is sometimes usefully called "theoretical anarchism". Because the work does focus on anarchism, little will be said about present green politics (and what thin associated theory there is), because that generally involves politics within conventional state settings. Where this differs from past anarchism is not only its environmental depth, but in the level of detail of arguments, criticism, and organisational structure. The latter especially,jwhere IT- 1 a; thin and threadbare historical anarchism is particularly weak. It is not enough to gesture towards some federation of communities. Details of organisations at each level need to be provided, for a more convincing story. Most of the disappointingly slight contemporary academic literature on anarchism will not be addressed or, if it is, criticised in much detail. Life is too short for that sort of indulgence. However much will have been criticised obliquely or in passing; and enough critical detail is supplied for direct critiques to be produced (as exercises by energetic readers). While there is mMc/z scope for theoretical improvement of anarchism, there is little room for reinventing anarchism. There is a long and distinguished Hne of amateur anarchist thought form virtually every significant idea that will be which contains in seminal (if developed herein. Thus, like most of the academic literature^this text is not particularly original. Unlike much of that literature it does not pretend to be. Virtually everything in this book has been said before, if not in anarchist theory then elsewhere; scarcely anything is original. But it has never been put together quite like this before. Moreover, some of it needed and needs saying again, with a little new information and arguments a bit differently ordered. But no means all is repeated. Where something, perhaps important for the dialectic, is said at least as well I can reiterate it, I simply cross-refer. That has the effect of making the work visibly less contained (self-containment is ^bmething of an illusion), but it saves on labour and materials. For other purposes too, repetition, despite its extravagance, may be important. Significant 15 On the deliberately neglected, or papered over, major differences between marketism and capitalism, �10 ideas and books often get neglected, because for instance they were not published at the right times, in the right places, by the right authors; they did not get duly circulated, and so forth. I judge the time at least is more propitious for green anarchism than it has been, perhaps ever before. As well, there are many things that this book, which is pitched in a theoretical, rationalistic way, does not aim or attempt to do. It does not attempt to supply much background, historical or other information, a lot of which is easily found in better equipped libraries. Relevant background can all be tracked, however, through references in work referred to in this book. 16 It does not attempt a full account of substitutes for important current institutions and arrangements such as those connected with property, markets, law, and so on; nor does it offer, what is warranted, a sustained critique of prevailing arrangements, for which opposite substitutes are sought and indicated. Fortunately again, some of the critique, if not positive detail of substitutes, has been well accomplished in other texts. 17 What is attempted is however a scholarly and systematic work (though, as indicated, a far from exhaustive work), on theoretical anarchism. Accordingly the book is littered with notes, some of which merely cite references, but many of which elaborate points in the text, especially details hat lead off in different directions from the thrust of the text. I should like to thank Frances Redrup for processing reams of inelegant scribble, from which this text grew, and to acknowledge the continuing support the Australian National University gave during slow production. I want to thank Debbie Trew for proofing the typescript (no straightforward business) and organizing a bibliography. I should record my gratitude to Bob Goodin for a continuing supply of background books, and to him and to the publishers and editor of Anarc/iAyf 16 17 for encouraging me to work upon anarkism again. A major recent source, for history of Northern Hemispheric anarchism, is, as observed, Marshall, While Marshall concentrates, no doubt correctly upon Northern hemispheric activity, and within that heavily upon Anglo-American work, there is room for a supplementary production taking due account of anarchism elsewhere, Australia for one example. Although an anarchist club was formed in Melbourne only a century ago (and then upon an American model), an extraordinarily sustained period of "original anarchism" (coupled often with "original (or primitive) affluence") flourished in Australia before European settlement two centuries ago, with more than 500 centuries perhaps more than 10000 centuries, of continuous Aboriginal anarchist arrangements. Much of the story of post-settlement Australian anarchism (which included remarkable Queensland activity and a Paraguayan expedition organised by Lane, as well as extensive Victorian agitation) is recounted by James, in a series of local publication, add Burgmann and by Souter. The story of Australian Aboriginal anarchism has yet to be told. The story for the rest of the Southern Hemisphere, both before and after European conquests and political imposition, remains to be satisfactorily told. Thus, for instance, Carter on property, Bumheim on bureaurcracy, othe^on democracy. A �// 1. EXPLICATIONS OF ANARCHISM CHAPTER and of green subforms G 1. Initial explanation: fud and dilute forms, and corollaries. Anarchism is the theory, principles or practice of anarchy. As practised by engaged anarchists, who are naturally adherents, authors or promotors of anarchy, it includes the assertion of anarchy and rejection of nonanarchy, i.e. rejection of archy. Anarchy itself, in its norma/ political form, applies to societies or communities, territories or countries. It is, according to the dictionaries, the following sort of condition or state: lack of coercive government, absence of a political state, want of authoritarian political heads or leaders, institutions or organisations. Politically there are evidently fhr^ j^racrara/ aa^ar/(y, ca^rciaa, and normally comprehending both, the political .yraf^.i The anchoring notion of anarchy has recently been extended beyond political arrangements to apply to other institutional forms such as the Church, Science, and Law, to mean alternative forms lacking authoritarian structure and coercive methods. Thus appear, under transference, such varieties as epistemological anarchism and philosophical anarchism, instead of po/zfzcn/ anarchism upon which this text focuses. However the far-reaching analogies should not lost sight of; they matter. Anarchism is to political authority, as atheism is to religious authority, and rather as scepticism is to scientific authority. Although the conditions specified for anarchy are normally taken as conjoined, it is possible to construe them disjointly, yielding what could be called anarchisms. One diluted form which has obtained a little exposure is a /zzzzz^J anarchism appropriately opposed to the state but prepared to endorse carefully-controlled coercive authorities.^ A differently diluted form is a anarchism which is opposed to all prevailing states, because of some serious but in principle removable defect or other of each and every one of these states, but is not opposed to the very idea of an ideal state, or to a new wonderful order of states; that is it is, not, so to say, a principled anarchism. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether historic anarchists are j?rznczp/^r/ anarchists or merely de facto ones. There are limits to how far definitional dilution should be allowed to proceed: a theory (such as libertarianism) postulating a minimal coercive centralised state presumably exceeds acceptable diluted bounds, as n^key element is retained. Within such bounds, we shall operate both with full and dilute forms, accounting all anarchism (in a bro^d sense, qualifying as need be). Routes to full anarchism may well lead through dilute forms. Indeed these offer main paths towards anarchism proper. -t These three key elements are duly signposted in many, though not all, serious on anarchism. J- �12 It is evident that anarchy, and therewith anarchism, can be better characterised, negatively, through what it rejects, namely to sharpen the characterisation, centralised coercive forms, than in assertive formulation obtained through awkward locutions like 'absence' 'lack' 'want'. The simpler negative formulation (supplying the of anarchy), rejection of archy, makes it immediately evident that much of what vulgarly pass for meaning conditions upon or essential features of anarchism are not. Firstly, a variety of political arrangements and organisation, including of government, are entirely compatible with anarchy. It is enough for these arrangements not to include anarchy-violating features such as authoritarian or coercive elements. For example, a government without such elements, a government nonetheless in the dictionary sense of 'administration of public affairs', satisfies the principle of anarchy, and so is anarchistic. Such an anarchistic government can include normal components of organisation, regulation and control, so long as they conform to the principle. Certainly a territory without government, since therefore lacking an archist government, is anarchistic. But the popular converse fails. An anarchistic system may well, like several societies substantially destroyed by European conquest, have a small smooth-running public administration, free of authoritarian elements. Thus it would have a government, but not an authoritarian government. No doubt it would also be in a predominant modem, but narrow, use of 'government'. The term 'government', which is variably determinable, vacillates in particular between * administration of public affairs (including control, regulation, what it once meant) and its important and now dominant restriction, the enarchistically unacceptable determinate, * authoritative administration of public affairs (i.e. that exercising authority, and characteristically backed by coercion). Much confusion concerning anarchism has resulted through failure to separate the wider and narrower determinates^ It may well be true that, as dictionaries assert, an anarchist would 'oppose all existing systems of government'; but this is not a matter of meaning, it is contingent upon the character of prevailing state systems. Nor therefore are prevailing political forms everywhere so far removed from anarchistic alternatives: they may even overlap them. Make the following kind of thought-experiment concerning the government and operation of some modem freer, less violent, more peaceful society: the coercive and authoritarian elements are blacked out (both operational components and what they typically operate upon). For instance, there is a strike of relevant groups, judges �and accused, police and criminals, prison warders and prisoners, etc. (perhaps because the broad society had reduced the opportunities for crime and accordingly threatened their contra operative livelihoods). What may well happen, what we shall imagine happening, is that governmental affairs simply keep running for some time. Things work well enough. Partial examples of just this sort of phenomenon are not uncommon, as when police forces go slow or strike. For example, when traffic police stop work traffic keeps on going, much as before. It may be irrelevantly objected that such anarchistic periods are mere interludes, presupposing surrounding authoritarian structures (somewhat as anarchistic end-states of marxism are premissed on preceding super-productive authoritarian states). Such thought experiments were designed to remove a different intellectual blockage: the common assumption that anarchism is utterly remote from the political practice of complex modem states and impossible to realise at all. As a theory, anarchism tends to advance a stronger theme than the progressive particular claims that anarchistic systems are possible, realisable, and sometimes realised. After all, these arrangements may be realisable—as more than an interlude—only in restricted or anomalous circumstances (e.g. a few people on an isolated tropical island). The stronger theme, linked with the anarchist principle, is that there is no need at all for authoritarian or coercive regulation. So rejection can succeed universally. Universal anarchism encounters many problems which do not trouble less ambitious parfict/Zar anarchisms, such as those to be advanced here. For example, how to rectify especially degenerate or evil societies? An attempt is sometimes made to render all anarchism universal, through the connecting thesis that for anarchism to succeed anywhere it must succeed everywhere (else be destroyed by ruthless, expansionist or greedy states, or similar). Fortunately the fallacious connecting thesis, though popular with critics, is implausible.^ Although anarchism proper does exclude certain kinds of government, coercive and authoritarian forms, it does not automatically include, certainly not as a matter of semantics, specific positive kinds. Anarchism is not necessarily "a theory of government based on the free agreement of individuals rather than on submission to law and authority", despite what dictionaries assert (incompatibly incidentally with their definitions of 'anarchy'). Such positive accounts of anarchism, as offering a certain theory of government, both try to convert a particular variety, individualistic anarchism, into the more general object, and try to import a certain motivation for, or differently explanation of, or justification of, anarchism into the very essence of the object (this is the general fallacy of verificationism in operation). Anarchism, or at least its assertion, may well be regularly motivated by ideals of free arrangements, not imposed by narrow or incompetent authoritarian forces, but motivation is one thing, meaning �14 another, verification a third. Not only is the assumption that anarchism is incompatible with government, wellregulated government, mistaken. So also therefore are the assumptions that anarchism is incompatible with organisation, with regulation, with a positive noncoercive "law", with order. So mistaken therefore are the widespread assumptions that anarchism entails disorganisation, disorder, confusion, lawlessness, chaos. Yet all these negative associations have been incorporated into degenerate popular meanings of anarchism. It is similar with related assumptions that anarchism implies violence, paramilitary activity, or terrorism. A popular picture of the anarchist, encouraged by authors like Conrad and Dostoevsky, is the excitable fictional character with a bomb in his pocket (not a Tolstoy or a Thoreau).5 These too are assumptions and pictures, with little basis either in semantics or in general anarchist theory or practice, promulgated by an unsympathetic opposition generally comfortable in present poor to appalling political systems or unaware of alternatives. With anarchy, as with many other valuable terms, a concerted confusion or destruction effort has been made, part of an extensive terminological vandalism in human intellectual affairs. Rather than reconciling ourselves to sacrifice of the damaged term anorc/ug/n, let us salvage the term explicitly for the pristine notion, and isolate the conventional associations under the term anarchi-pm, shortened, if a single term is sought, to Most fictional anarchists of system-supportative authors are degenarchists; but they are far from representative of anarchists. There are many anarchists who are not terrorists, few who are; there are many who are not dangerous troublemakers bent upon violently upsetting local settled order; increasingly there are many anarchists within environmental and peace movements, many of them anarchists. Gentler anarchisms tend to be all of more pacific, more social and more rational than tougher or hardened anarchisms. 2. Rival, typically defective, definitions, and beyond. Much of what is taken as typical or even characteristic of anarchism, especially popularly and journalistically, consist of optional extras, not even typical of anarchism. They represent, like what gets written into degenarchism, attempts at easy smearing or dismissal of anarchism, for instance as an ideology unworthy of serious consideration. As regards violence, terrorism, disorder, disorganisation, confusion, these sorts of point ought to be well enough known. But they apply also to other more benign features widely taken to characterize anarchism, such as attempts to tie anarchism variously to individualism, capitalism, voluntarism, primitivism, spontaneity, or socialism. Thus such erroneous characterisations of anarchism as those of the selection that follows:- 5 �15 * One utterly appalling characterisation comes from a Russian DzcZzozzrzzy of PAz/o^op/zy. ^ "Azz^zrc/zz^zzz, a petty-bourgeois socio-political trend that is hostile to all authority and the state, and counterposes the interests of petty private ownership and small peasart economy to the progress of society based on large-scale production" * Another dismal, indeed wild, characterisation comes from an American political scientist, who audaciously asserts that "anarchism ... is anti-political—that is, it does not really offer political solutions" (p.l), rather "the primitive core of anarchism is not so very different from Christianity. That is, it rests on the notion that man has a need, not just a preference, to love" While this is wild, there are convergences and congruences between types of anarchism and early Christianity.? * It is "a political doctrine based on the value of individual freedom"? While this is not wild, it does erroneously convert what is a frequent powerful motive, and reason, for anarchism into part of it, confusing motivation and justification with essence. For it is by no means an invariant feature. A socialist or monastic community, placing no great emphasis upon or even discouraging individuality, can be organised anarchistically. * It is "a theory of government based on the free agreement of individuals rather than submission to law and authority" (Concz-y^ Eng/zj/z Dzcfzozzazy). But it also asserts that the same %7z#rc/zz.yAy "... are opposed to all forms of government". That inconsistent information should, as already seen, be discounted. Furthermore, there may be no free agreement; an anarchistic situation can, as already also seen, just happen. More likely, a sustained anarchism may emerge under favourable historical opportunities, again without any sort of contract or general agreement; it is then only zf there were free agreement. Certainly, there would no longer be "submission to authority", but there would likely be systems of rules, which people normally followed. * The very short characterisation of rzzzrzrc/zMzzz (and rendition of zzzMrc/zz?^) as "no government" is defective because of the elasticity, slippiness and determinability, of "government"? For example, to increase documentation, according to one dictionary ((/zzzv^r^zz/ Ezz^/z^/z), gove?7Z7?zenf means "... system of polity in a state; territory ruled by a governor ..." in which case it incompatible with anarchism; but it also means "... control; administration of public affairs" in which case it is certainly no? incompatible. Granted there have been attempts to represent anarchism as if it entailed no organisation or administration at all (state-of-nature arguments regular rely on this fallacy of false dichotomy), but it does not, and if it did there would be a gap for a near-identical relative (a/za&yrz^ for instance) to All. One of the rather better brief characterisations is the following: "a social philosophy that rejects authoritarian 6 7 8 9 Ed I. Frolov, 2nd revised ed, Progress, Moscow, 1989. Apter p.3. HI p.70. For such proposals see e.g. Carter,Websters' Dictionary (?), Marshall p.3. �16 government and maintains that voluntary institutions are best suited to express man's natural social tendencies'/ (Woodcock, Ency Phil, p.lll). While the first negative conjunct, which n governmental' right, might rate a pass (though anarchism is not always a philosophy, it is sometimes a practice), the second positive conjunct calls the whole account into doubt. Many humans naturally thrive in authoritarian settings. Defective definitions of anarchism abound, many regrettably supplied by high profile anarchists or well-regarded commentators (whereupon they assume a certain air of authority, a bogus air). A few examples will be considered, mostly drawn from a large list of similarly defective definitions included in Clark, who is out to show that any definition which attempts to do justice to anarchism through an essentialistic definition deploying one simple idea is bound to fail, abysmally, to does not 'mean literally "without government'" contrary to Carter, for one. It does however imply systems without governments of prevailing sorts, which is what she immediately proceeds to: 'and the lowest common demominator of anarchist thought is the conviction that existing forms of government are productive of wars, internal violence, repression and misery' (p.14). Right on! Kropotkin, for another, defines 'anarchism' in terms of 'society ... without government'. Like most of the brief definitions to be cited, this is neither necessary #)r sufficient. For 'government' has to be narrowed to its coercive and authoritarian determinate, and other archie arrangements also excluded. Many, Runkle for one, maintain that anarchism 'opposes authority in all its forms'; but elsewhere Runkle holds that its essence is individual liberty'. Others, Goodman for one, suggest anarchism is defined in terms of decentralization, still others, Bakunin for one, suggest characterisation in terms of 'organization from below upwards, by means of federation'. Again this is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not so easy to And an adequate characterisation of anarchism. (I have found none in the literature, despite some searching. That is reason why a certain amount of work has gone into such basics). There is a tendency to leap from the inadequate to the excessive—a tendency exemplified by Clark, who also cites Woodcock approvingly. Anarchism is first contracted to a rather elaborate doctrine, or political theory, thereby excluding practice. Then requirements are sharply inflated: For a political theory to be called "anarchism" it must contain: 1) a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society; 2) a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this anti-authoritarian ideal; 3) a view of human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal; and 4) a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of non-coercive, non authoritarian, and decentralist alternatives (p.127). As Clark indicates, this "minimum" "definition" is an elaboration of another account, briefer and 10 See Clark p. 118ff. Clark's attack on essentialistic definitions is in the style of Wittgenstein. �17 better, that Woodcock also offers: 'historically, anarchism is a doctrine which passes a criticism of existing society; a view of a desirable future society; and a means of passing from one to another" (cf. p.120). There is nothing here about human nature, which anarchism need have no particular views about, perhaps rejecting the notion altogether as part of archist propaganda or similar, n There is nothing about the ideal society, or any commitment to one. Anarchists are not seeking societies; that is an illusory, Enlightenment goal, have transformed to get another excessive condition of adequacy for anarchist societies. It would be quite enough to achieve satisfactory societies. 12 Realistic anarchists may even come to appreciate that there are no ideal societies, perhaps just various less unsatifactory and better justified societies than virtually all of the extraordinarily narrow range of modem societies presently exhibited or on offer. However Clark's discussion of "the ideal"" reveals that he does not really intend an ideal, but only one or other of the plurality of societies meeting certain adequacy conditions. It certainly does not intend a unique one, ideal. 'Some adequate" or similar should substitute" for 'an (the) ideal", and the definition should be duly pluralised. Outside explications of anarchism which answer back to dictionary accounts, there are various high redefinitions (e.g. Clark) and some weird redefinitions. One such weird redefinition is that proferred by Taylor, who—rightly enough contrasting anarchism with the presence of the state where there is a concentration of the means of deploying force—defines a as where 'force is perfectly dispersed, not concentrated at all" (82 p.6). But Taylor does advance from pure anarchy, of which there are no examples, to an illuminating discussion of the exercise of concentrated force in societies. In recognisably anarchistic societies there is but limited concentration of force (based on physical inequalities), which 'is /10c in use. There is no standing specialist group or organisation or centralised system of groups...' No doubt a /MZ/er anarchist f/t^ory has to accomplish much of what excessive characterisations of anarchism,^ list, and more. Any reasonably full theory should * include a critique of authoritarian and coercive features of present and past societies and their institutions; 11 12 13 The important matter of such "nature" is discussed later.. Presently we are very far removed from such societies, except for small communities mainly in rich countries. States have done extremely poorly in this regard. There is not one satisfactory state in all of Africa or the Americas. Even small European states that at least have avoided extensive poverty, homelessness, and violence are in doubt because of * virtually entire destruction of their natural environments * reliance for wealth on impoverished Third World countries * justified dissatisfaction of many of their inhabitants. those of Woodcock and Clark p.120, p.126. r �18 * outline features of noncoercive nonauthoritarian societies as alternatives to, and improvements upon present dominant social arrangements, for some regions at least; * suggest strategies for attempting to change from defective forms to improved alternatives. Clarke also tries to insist, what we shall subsequently reject, that for a 'theory to called "anarchism" it justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal' (p.127). As well as theory, there is practice. (Clarke also goes astray in excluding anarchism as a , "anarchism without doctrine", and so on.) The pracfice of anarchism, generously construed, naturally includes the state of being in anarchist conditions, of living under anarchism (though perhaps unaware of doing so). There is scope for wfr/toM? Many primitive societies thus qualify as anarchistic; they practice, or practiced, anarchism though unaware (somewhat as wild animals practice hygiene, knowing without knowing ;%af). Further, no doubt now stretching 'practice' beyond its assumed anthropic context, many animal communities practice anarchism, very successfully. Many attracted to anarchism, an anarchism without name even, long for analogous pure practice, many practicing environmentalists for instance. They hope that whatever it is will operate, perhaps even materialize, without any heavy-duty theory, without excess or even any intellectualizing, perhaps without even thought or much effort on their part. In contemporary circumstances they would have to be extraordinary lucky; a paternal state with caring elements, such as safe jobs and spoon-fed indoctrinal education for all citizens, does not relinquish its control voluntarily. While definitions can be defective or otherwise unsatisfactory, in m^y ways, one thing they are not is dogmatic (as suggested by Marshall, none too subtlely trying to evade critical details in delimiting his massive study, p.3). Though insisting upon^themes definitions yield upon substitution can be dogmatic, having or offering definitions is not. Significant criticism of definitions is logically different, belonging to different categories. As well as decking anarchism out with defective definitions, with all the scope for argumental malpractice that affords, there is a coupled practice of boxing anarchism in, by narrow and confining constraints, jf iZZ/czf/y ctrcMWMcri&ing (Whereas definitions characteristically yield necessary and sufficient, conditions, such circumscription concerns necessary, or possibly sufficient conditions). Many of the restrictions imposed are, however, quite inessential, and have rather the effect of excluding viable alternatives. Simple examples concern waAmg, which is sometimes taken as having always to be case by case, and elsewhere is seen as necessarily involving all parties, large assemblies, or even complete social participation. None of this is essential, often the restrictions would prove undesirable. Often the circumscription technique proceeds by presenting features of, or said to be of, �19 historic anarchism, then tacticly assuming that all anarchism must conform to those features.*4 That is one reason why definition and characterisation are important; so anarchism is not set in riged past forms, unable to adapt to new circumstances and ideas. Another example concerns the character of the anarchist revolution, onto which many restrictions are loaded, often resulting in gratuitous puzzles, which are removed with the impositions. For example, it is said that 'the revolution had to be a mass affair" (M p.94). But nothing in anarchism, or its general development, requires this. (As a result the dilemma Miller finds .p.99 ff., simply falls over.) A revolution could be carried out by an elite anarchist band, or, in some states, through a single governor or president. Again, it said that the revolution is bound to be authoritarian (which renders an anarchist revolution contradictory), violent, and so on. This we have on authority from Engels: 'a revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other by means of rifles [etc.] authoritarian means, if such there be at all', to which Miller adds approvingly that to say in power the party must rely on military means and 'terror of arms' (M p.92). None of this is so. A revolution could lag rapid change through mass conversion; for instance, there is a sign or appearance that is widely recognised, a new social movement which spreads like "wild fire", etc. 3. Anarchism and the state. While organisation and government are entirely compatible with anarchism, that most conspicuous modem institution, the state, is not: it is the paradigmatic archist form. Nor are ancient power formations such as the empire and the kingdom really compatible with anarchism. A prime reason is their authoritarian character and their extensive use of coercion and violence, but reasons als<4 includd^hein centralized organisation (such as power and hierarchical structure). Let us focus upon the state, against which a major and often virulent part of anarchistic political critique is directed; indeed such is the opposition to the state and its features that anarchism is sometimes distinguished in that way, in terms of 'hostility to the state ... [which] should be abolished and replaced by a new form of social organisation' (thus Miller p.5). But again these may be consequential, not characterising features of anarchism, which are derived from characterising features together with a standard theoretical characterisation of Under one such standard (though fairly strong^) characterisation, the state is a and 14 15 This is a much favoured tactic with critics of anarchism. For many examples, some only Quoted in the main text, see Miller. Although strong, in certain respects the characterisation is not strong enough. A state must not only be able to c/ai/n all these sorts of power, but sometimes to exercise them. Cf. Taylor's criticism of Weber's definition of the state (p.5). A �body ... it claims complete authority to define the rights of its subjects .... Second, the state is a body, in the sense that everyone bom into a given society is forced to recognise obligations to the state that govern that society. Third, the state is a body: it claims a monopoly of force in its territorial area, allowing no competitor to exist alongside it (Miller p.5). It also normally claims other monopolies, such as on legal tender. It is virtually immediate, powers. So it is that anarchism is often epitomized as directed at the dissolution of, what is widely seen then, that the state is a comprehensive as major political problem, the state. As to why it is such a problem, anarchist critiques of the state, sketched below, will reveal. With anarchism implemented in a place there is then an end there to any institution that is recognisably a state. The subsequent argument for anarchism does not depend upon a strong characterisation of .yfafe, such as that so far offered. Even fairly weak characterisations will serve. But inadequate characterisations, such as the following, will not: 'a collective object with territorial boundaries and political organisation throughout that territory". For that omits essential features of the state, such as sovereignty, authority, coercive control; it describes a possible anarchist society. 16 Arguments/or the state (which anarchism is normally concerned to fault) are however sensitive to characterisation. Mostly these arguments reach little further than, justify no more than, some sort of "minimal state"", very different from anything the Earth has had on offer (e.g. a nice state guaranteeing basic rights rather than removing rights: but anarchism need hardly oppose such arrangements). So it will matter just how ^<2^ is characterized. But this is easier said than done: is a ^k cluster ( muqti-criterial) notion, explications of which are controversial and typically contested.i? In seeking a satisfactory working characterisation, a useful starting point is the following short definition: 'a collective item with territorial boundaries and political organisation exercising sovereign power".is As anarchism can comfortably accommodate the first parts, political organisation within a region, it is the last part, sovereign power (as spelt out, e.g., in Miller's account) that is the problematic distinguishing factor. In a way, the term ruling sui^ipreme, derived from la&Ctptein which reflects the Greek reigning or says it all, why anarchism is bound to oppose a state so empowered. Improved detailing will exhibit a similar division between acceptable and unacceptable. A state, which comprises a 16 A' 17 18 q/ Virtually all the key political terms that we shall encounter have a disconcerting multiplicity of meanings: so it is with state, sovereignty, democracy (422 senses in Naess p.30), ideology, and so on. Fortunately these terms are dealt with^ elsewhere in this work. For a useful attempt at a multi-criterial characterization,and discussion of controversies over characterisations see Dun^eary "The state * (in Goodin & Pettit). Reese, with 'item * substituted for 'entity * to evade reificative issues. �21 interconnected (their level of cohesion justifying a definite description), has domains consisting of a and of who form an associated society. The territory of a state consists of spatial regions, over which it normally exercises control. Subjects are generally those humans who regularly reside in the territory (citizens form a of subjects, singled out by possession of certain duties and rights). The state is not the only authoritarian body to be repudiated. Lesser authoritarian organisation, such as those proposed under terms of functionalism (military barracks, prisons, reform schools, etc.) are to be similarly repudiated. No doubt on occasion the ability to coerce makes an institution more "effective", much as childrens learning of uninviting material is sometimes rendered more effective by coercive means, e.g. heavy cannings, floggings. But the repugnant means, and their common chase outw^eight the gains, if any, in effectiveness achieved. Now, having thus arrived at regular anarchism, reputiating the state, we confess to the evident, to the refinement of the notion of anarchy away from widespread common usage where it functions primarily as a powerful directive away from disapproved anti-statist life. Given that anarchism is thereby rendered (as in many dictionaries which of course reflect usage) a contradictory notion, encompassing both disorder without the state and order alternative to the state, some refinement and some diversion of disorder is no doubt desirable. The trouble with this easy resolution is that the early uses of 'anarchism' in English operated precisely with the corrupt drunk-and-disorderly side of the contradiction—disorder as contrasted with spendid state order. That was what (in defiance of the original Greek meaning) 'anarchy' and 'anarchism' were introduced to mean (see OED citations from 16-17th C). Thus the early usage, which persists, contradicts the refined and now regular usage. In technical presentations this problem is easily sliced through, by coining a term to mean what anarchy as refined means (anaRyri'2 and anacracy are such terms). Here however we shall simply persist with the refinement of the prevailing term, and in the course of giving it etymological justification over the early corrupt uses, further refine. 19 But the justification for refinement is not only 19 Tempting as it may be to switch, alternatively to new, freeing terminology, that temptation has here been largely resisted. Anarchism is a term, and idea, worth retaining. Not that there is anything amiss with new terminology: quite the contrary, provided that it is well-indroduced and pointful. In the course of drafting this book, a variety of new terminology has been toyed with—including such nice terms as (signifying non-domination)—because, as is regularly emphasized, anarchism is now such a turn off for most people. No doubt in more pdular versions (written by someone else), anarchism will disappear from headings, displaced by new terminology with a hint of old such as ^ada^waacra^y, or, less scrupulously, its place usurped by ^car-vacuous terms in high popular favour such as d^/nocracy. In this less popular version, anarchism stays; but, in pa^t compensation, some pleasant absolute terms, and senses, have been revised. They offer acceptable alternatives. A more powerful consideration than negative connotations is perhaps this: The present text, though strictly / �22 etymological. Do we need yet another term for lawlessness, or for disorder? Don't we rather need a term to help break the false dichotomy between: the state or political disorder? As if there are no further alternatives, like stateless order of various kinds? Or (as much ill-informed literature suggests), no political theory without the state, merely untheorizable confusion? 4. A refined explication of anarchism. derives from the ancient Greek Etymologically meaning: without a chief or head, or without a top authority. Of course what the form derives from, though often indicative, does not determine what it now means. (Anarchism was not, after an ancient political theory, but is in fact, under familiar classifications, the most recent and novel of major political ideologies.) However it M worth drawing out the etymological meaning, because it is revealing. What it appears to exclude are political arrangements structured with a top element of any of the following authoritarian sorts: a monarch, a prince, a ruler, a leader, a president, a prime minister, and shifting from individual to group form, a party, a clique, a ruling elite, a central power such as a state, etc. There are, analysis reveals, two interacting foci: one, a top or centre, and two, control or dominance flowing from this top by what are adjudged inadmissible means, authoritarian or coercive means in particular. A chief both stands at the top of a power hierarchy and exercises authoritarian control from there. Under this anarchy entails double foci structure or organisation without inadmissible top-down or centralized means. Let us look at the foci in turn, beginning with the more independent one, the top. Topologically, wif/tonf % fop amounts to wzt/zoMt % cenfre, because by topological transformations (roughly&^nJzKg and stretching as what rubber objects will permit) what is a top transforms to a centre, and vice versa. Diagrams illustrate the transformations: top (of tree, semi lattice) o centre o investigating is so far removed from what normally enters under that denomination that different terminology is warranted, terminology which then has the advantage of shaking off all those negative associations of anarchy. The salient differences from run-of-the-mill anarchism will appear when preferred forms are detailed subsequently. �23 Volcano from top from sides * peak * peak Given such transformations, which will be taken for granted, anarchism also excludes arrangements structured with a controlling centre, such as a ruling central government. It implies decentralization in a precise sense. It does not thereby also remove all structure: it leaves intact a rich variety of structure including network arrangements with no centres (or with multiple "centres"), federation structures or similar. Yet another example is afforded by lateral structuring with central "centres" dispersed via function, as ilustrated;^ service "centres" The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Conci-ye Dzcfiofiuiy, 'structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something *. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of of elements and parts, among which order relations figure prominently, though not exclusively. That is, structure involves order, as a critical component. Remarkably, the same sort of <y%n/c%r&y occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, not just social and political theory, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R, 20 Insofar as there is a single centre, it is the bottom, the people. Major condinating issues are referred to people, for instance through referenda. So there a will be a referenda organising office, but it will be independent cooperative. �24 on item c in Q, i.e. R = Re- For example, where Q is a system of where R may itself worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Qis a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an orJer, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its ranged The system <Q, R> is a simple ordered structure, or ay%w%^. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of -yMpreyniow, and likewise woxiwMw, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.22) 77^oreTH. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 +2 „ = {=2,-l,-0, +0, +l,+2} +0 R - — is as shown by arrows. -0 -1 T = {+0, +1, +2} is a frufh component -2 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements to t. trans^ity required of order. 21 There are various cases, depending upon conditions 22 A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). �Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without "anarchy" or chaos, because there is order), structures. afford numerous examples. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy. 23 As immediate corollary is that inferences from anarchy (without a top or centre) to absence of order to disorder are fatally flawed. What lacks a top or centre may nonetheless enjy satisfactory order. Structures induced in anarchic arrangements can be far from chaotic (and may be modest and stable equivaien&s8i conditions). It is worth alluding to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, monarchs, patriarchs, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against <2^x9/%^ of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R 23 Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. More on this subsequently. �26 itself is relative to c), and of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerged centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The to be developed agam-yf takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically. For an added or infiltrated top or the centre to be troublesome, something anarchism need bother removing or shun where it figures, it has to have an role. Politically that presumably means exercising power in some way. That is, the head (the head that is lacking in %7i#rc%(?.y) is an operative head, not a mere figurehead. Anarchism need not exclude princes, monarchs, emperors, or "governors", such as some countries now maintain. If the people really like having such relics, royalty or "aristocracy", as is often said they do, then they can presumably have them if they are prepared to afford them. Indeed this figurehead role is just what is presumed for the prince under more plausible anarchist construals of Taoism.25 The ideal prince is a Taoist who takes no action, a sage who is rarely or never seen, whose existence may merely be known to the populace or even simply rumoured (that is almost to say, though Lao Tzu could not tactfully assert it, the ideal prince is a nonexistent inoperative sage). 24 For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10. 25 See Clark 84 p.165. Also UTD. �27 As indicated, the main features adduced are mirrored in logic, which can serve as a structural guide. It is striking, as well as technically advantageous, that logical and political predelictions converge. Mainstream irrelevant logics have algebraic structures with top elements, Boolean algebras in the case of classical logics. By contrast relevant logics, which now challenge the classical logical paradigm, do not. Their corresponding algebras, De Morgan monoids and such like need include no top element. The top element, T, is directly responsible for positive paradoxes, of the basic form A -* T (anything at all implies the True), of mainstream logics, paradoxes infecting much theory which relevant logic avoids.^ The logical structure shows that sub "centres" need not have such damaging effects; a plurality of local "centres", regional nodes, induces no paradox. The figurehead analogy also operates analogically, in logic. It does not matter if a semi lattice structure is extended to include a top element, so long as that addition provides only a conservative extension. (If T is added to top a relevant lattice, it has in stronger logics to be kept out of implication relations, else it will induce a non-conservative relevant extension with theses like A -* T.) But otherwise, as an inoperative top-piece it is admissible. Technical comparisons now reach much further than logic alone, as we leam more and more about decentralised structures, about decentralised cerebral organisation, decentralised Al and topless connectionism, and decentralised intelligent structure. Intelligent organisation without top or central elements may abound both in nature, for instance in insect cerebral organisation and in vertebrate brain structure, and in many future artificial intelligence applications. Logic and computing technology demonstrate, what is widely appreciated outside political theory, that topless is feasible.2? There is scope, and need, for twenty-first century anarchism to be highly techno-logically sophisticated. There is more to anarchism than political structure without an operative top, head or centre, than a lateral structuring. That more, the residue of the rejection of archy, is more difficult to characterize in a way non-prejudicial to types of anarchism. It is bound up with the operation of the active top, with the confroZ for example it exercises, the potter it exerts, or the like: non-prejudicially, it cannot operate As to what are unacceptable means, however there are different specifications. These many include—what can be summarized, under a single rubric, as —force, coercion, authoritarianism (and what implies any of those, such as totalitarianism); and, much more controversial, nonvoluntary, nonindividualistic, socialist and communist, means. As in dictionariess entries for "anarchism", only coercive and authoritarian elements will be ruled unacceptable (for 26 See WR. 27 The subsequently preferred variety of anarchism, while not at all opposed to slates losing their heads, is powerfully opposed to people literally loosing their heads (figuratively again, it may be alright). ��34 A Gramsci, 'The intellectuals * and 'The modem prison * in gcZccfzony /row ?7zc Prz'yon M?fc&ooRy (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971. D. Mannison and others (eds.), Environment?/ P/zz/oyopAy, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP. D. Miller, Aaarc/zzym, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M. D. Mitrany, 7%c Ennctona/ 77zcory o/PoEr/cy, Martm Robertson, London, 1975. A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /Jeo/ogy aaJ D/?/eciiviiy, Oslo University Press, Norway, 1956. R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism *, &?cza/AZfcrnaEvcy, R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems *, in EP; referred to as SM. R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology *, D/ycayyzoa Papery in EavzrozzmczzZaZ P/zz/oypp/zy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1990. R.P. Wolff, 7a De/ence o/Aaarc/zzym, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. ADDITIONAL SOURCES P. Nursey-Bray, an Aaaa/arcJ EzEZzagrap/zy a/Aaarc/zzym , Greenwood Press, 1992. END NOTES 2 Cf Clark p.ll8ff. The general methodological issue of multiple determinates of key political terms and their archist confinement is taken up in a later chapter. �*J^A /TrT^^<Z7 (y/^cA e.ncrcicj/ ^ A A' '< -' z? y // /yr *-^. C r^O V. J * /X o J* ,<^A<_ . ) *4 C^c/^ / /Xot^z &J> f A-w^ t^i^L to n > etA A jt? cj C rZ-?/T^T <*C Zt , <^<!"// , cx^d /7^/^'Cx �^9 /?. 3* f,. /A^t / TL^i- c— ^^4—UT^-? ^-7y47 /^" <-/ f' z' ^^L-J 7 �1 CHAPTER 2. ELABORATIONS OF ANARCHISMS There are wany anarchist theories. For an anarchist theory is any laterally structured theory which duly conforms to the anarchy principle, of rejecting political authority and coercion. While received anarchist theories restrict anarchism to certain more specific forms (the standard options of considered below), p/ara/ijtic anarchism does not; plural anarchism not only admits the plurality, but takes advantage of it any may revel in it. Not all of this variety, not all anarchisms in the sheaf of systems, are of equal merit. Some forms are decidedly undesirable — like anarchisms expanding on the violent or chaotic varieties of popular imagination — in much the way that the nasty states of modem history, that anarchism opposes, are undesirable. Such undesirability may devolve from external rather than internal political characters. Thus, for instance, regions committed to global power projection to retain their privileged way of life (most unlikely under anarchistic arrangements) or committed to transnational terrorist practices. While standard anarchisms have been located in the more desirable, or even eutopian, end-range of anarchist systems, they by no means exhaust the satisfactory forms or even the most promising forms (as explained in chapter 5). Indeed in important respects the desirable range is significantly open for further elaboration of newer (and greener) forms. As varieties of anarchy may diverge, widely, so correspondingly do motivations and justifications for various divergent forms. The motivations, for instance, range from entirely theoretical (conceding to the warranted force of political scepticism) to practical (changing the local world); from personal and perhaps selfish (getting the state off one's back, or out of one's business and one's till) to other directed (eliminating a state oppressing its people) to environmental (disestablishing another vandalistic state). Common motivations trace back to the common character of anarchism: repulsion by, or opposition to, oppression, perhaps generalised from the state to all analogous political and bureaucratic structures, or expanding on that again, to all gross power relations. Indeed it is appealingly suggested that what anarchy is really all about is gross power relations, their reduction and removal; state coercive and authoritarian power are but paradigmatic of such power and domination relations. But while such opposition to gross power does characterizer gentler anarchism, heavy power methods are acceptable to tougher anarchisms; gentler anarchisms tend, so it will be argued, to be all of more pacific, more liberal and more rational than tougher or hardened anarchism. There are other expansionary liberal democratic motives for anarchism, further varying this theme: a yearning for removal of constraints, and for more extensive freedom; or a desire for more extensive equality, which would of course diminish those inequalities power delivers. Such motivations too have illicitly worked their way into variant characterisations of anarchism. ? �2 While a popular image of anarchists remains that of hardened terrorists, exercising authority over hostages using state-manufactured guns, many anarchists are joined by opposition to all such naked authority or coercion. Indeed 'behind the anarchist attack on the state and other coercive institutions, there has often stood a fundamental critique of the idea of authority itself (M p.15). An important, though certainly not invariant, mofivafmg and r^<?n for anarchism derives from a more sweeping anti-authoritarianism: the theme that no person or organisation can ever rightfully exercise authority of (political cast) over another. Picturesquely it is the theme that no authority is justified, no one, state or other, has a right to push another around. Too briefly it is sloganised to assert, no bosses, no leaders, or similar. Such general opposition to the principle of authority has even been dubbed "philosophical anarchism". It is an unfortunate choice of terminology given Feyerabend's different anarchistic challenge to much in philosophical theory and practice. * But some further classification and labelling undoubtedly helps. A princZp/^J anarchism takes exception on principled, characteristically ethical, grounds to objectionable authority or to coercion, that is to prime target elements undiluted anarchism directly rejects. But irrespective of type of anarchism intricated, much in anarchist theory, including a fuller characterisation, turns upon the twin notions of anf/ion/y and coercion, what these terms mean and cash out to, and why it is considered important to avoid damaging features of this sort? Both authority and coercion fall into the general category of power relations, a category that has rightly featured large not merely in anarchist theory but in social theory more comprehensively. As Aristotelian definitions of 'authority and coercion , by gunus and differentia, will be offered, an essential preliminary consists in pinning down the genus, power. * Power gm/ reZevan? serfs. Defective definitions of power, authority and coercion abound. Despite the importance of the notions for political theory, not just for anarchism, it is rare to encounter satisfactory formulations. A defective formulation from recent relevant anarchist theory defines power as 'the ability to compel compliance, either through the use of force or the threat of force (Wolff p.4), a conspicuously high redefinition. Rather, a power reZofion is a relation where one of the relata, that having the power, can normally get the other relata to do something (down to entertaining a belief, considering an idea). Power is a can-do; it may not be exercised. But there need be no compulsion or compelling compliance; nor need its exercise always succeed. Further its exercise need not involve force or threat thereof; it may be effected by a range of other means. 1 By Wolff, and following him, Miler and others. Feyerabend's philosophical anarchism, his is sometimes better labelled anarc/h-yiH, a type of nihilism. But it stops short, excluding logical methods (irrationally scorned however) from variation^ .In fact without a sharp—unavailable—distinction between logical and other (empirical or pwidivist) methods, this methodological anarchism is incoherent. �3 on the one side, bribery, seduction, blackmail, and so on, and on the other, knowledge, prowess, charisma, and so on. It is no secret that major problems in human social and political affairs devolve upon power, its excessive or evil use, misuse, regulation and control. But by no means all power, not even all political power, is bad. Distangling the undesirable, negative forms is an essential exercise, often neglected. After observing the failure of radical social theory to provide an adequate investigation of power, Clark embarks on a critique of the "classical model"2 According to the received conception, power is depicted as a relation of domination in which the powerful subject the powerless to control in order to exploit the latter. In both classical Marxism and anarchism this exploitation is conceived as being essentially economic. Thus, for Marx, "political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another (p.231). It is evident that what we see here is an attempt to explain power through, and then reduce power to, certain of its determinate forms: domination, then control, exploitation, oppression, and then organised and economic forms of these. These determinates are all, though important, rather special and rather negative, black forms of power. Power may be short-term, just for a day for instance or once only (a creature requires power only for a short period, because of what it is, because it loses power thereafter, because it has access to short-term drugs, magic, hypnosis, contracts, etc.). Domination is a longer-term relation, a disposition, between recognised parties, with a decided bias in favour of one party the power-holder; exploitation and oppression increase that bias, in specifiable ways, control however removes it. Power may, furthermore, be applied for positive and libertary, purposes, to help powerless to achieve something or other, to survive, prosper, and so on. Briefly, the concerning power is not power itself, but certain of its forms, its negative forms, and its excessive use. This last can be assimilated, by taking excess as a negative form. The negative forms are, of course, though they can be independently specified, the bad, or undesirable forms, forms as was earlier said.3 These include, among other forms, closed authority and coercion. They also include such overlapping forms as oppression, exploitation, domination, and so on. Privilege goes with these latter forms; it is held by the power-holders and their circle. It is held moreover exclusively by this circle; others, at the other end of the power relation, the power-less, are excluded from its possession. That is, the domain and range of a given power relation are exclusive: no one is both an exploiter and exploited (though of course someone, a husband day labourer for example, may be both exploited in his labour and domineering over his wife). 2 3 A critique, p.231 ff. too quickly petering out in an inconclusive, discussion of Foucault on power, where power turns into what is not, something mystical and all-pervasive. In these respects, power is like other notions, of green political significance, for one, for another. �4 There are two separable kinds of undesirable power: excessive and malselective or illdirected. The two kinds are more or less replicated in other significant phenomena that have been, like power, too sweepingly condemned: economic growth and material consumption. The problematic concerning human consumption is not consumption itself, some level of which is essential to human societies and indeed survival. The problems derive basically from excessive consumption and from poorly selected consumption. Conspicuous consumption, insofar as it delivers a negative form, derives from these: it is either excessive and wasteful or malselective or a mix of these. But the kinds are distinctive. For example, a poor family that buys expensive junk food may spend its limited income poorly, but its consumption may well not be excessive. Similarly with power: the limited power an individual or group possesses, whether exercisable for evil or not, may be better or worse directed. In term of power and its gross exercise, much in more gentle anarchisms can be / synthesized, namely all that is otherwise packed into the rubric: unacceptable means. What is unacceptable is gross exercise of power, including types of political power exploited by tougher anarchisms, terrorist power, crude fire power from the barrels of guns, and so on. What correspondingly gentler anarchisms oppose are all institutions and arrangements, not just the state and those tied to it, that can exert gross power. The state mightly concentrates, and centralizes, such power/ Even so the state is merely paradigmatic among undesirable and excessive power structures — a power hungry one at that, since it looks for a surplus product in power, along with a monopolistic position. But militia posts, torture shops, and pirate ships are other more localized structures. Coercive and closed authoritarian arrangements (opposition to which helps define anarchism) are distinctive marks of such grossness. Dilute anarchisms tone down opposition certain types of power (typically authority); they admit exercise of power that gentler anarchism would regard as gross. From the problematicness and undesirability of excessive power, main objectives of ( anarchism for ameliorative change flow: decentralisation, division and separation of powers. Centralised powers are to be separated and decentralised; aggregated powers to be broken down into functional components; and so on. Tougher anarchism proposes more, rival power play, resisting and undermining power through power, to break down its excesses and reveal its limitations, fighting fire with fire. One trouble with this tough and morally dubious strategy, which can be spectacular, is that it easily overreaches, producing for instance inadmissible coercion of others. 4 Not all state power is undesirable. Some of state regulation and redistribution, effected through power is certainly desirable. The argument will be that these elements are completely outweighted by the undesirable components of state power, and that they can be independently effected without the state. �5 Gentler anarchism travels in the vanguard of the long retreat from barbarism in human practices and institutions. In more enlightened parts of the world we have witnessed the progressive removal of physical punishment, such as: maiming, blinding, executing, stoning, torturing, transporting, flogging, corporal punishing, starving, chaining, incarcerating, imprisoning, infecting, ...and extensions, such as: serious threats thereof and assistance or encouragement of these practices elsewhere. Such enlightenment has not penetrated many parts of the world to any extent, and has far to reach yet even in the most civilized regions. TTyugh the gentler anarchist theme of curtailment of power, we can tap into several rich connections. The excessive drive to power and strength, the "will to power", is a conspicuous feature of modernity. Interestingly Nietzsche went so far as to claim that the will to power was basic motive in human affairs. Fortunately such a socio-psychological claim, about prevailing human nature and institutions, has little to substantiate it. But undoubtedly power motivates much, much too much, in modernity; otherwise anarchism would lose much of its more sweeping point. It was not always so; the quest for power at all costs, the flaunting of power, was at least highly problematic (as drama revealed); it did not always gain the adulation it now widely commands. It did not win respect from early anarchism, as manifested in Stoicism and Taoism. It would not have won endorsement from Aristotelibnism; for power, of both institutions and individuals, like so many other attributes, is evidently similarly constrained to a While the rough bounds are evident enough for an instrumental object such as a vehicle, which wastes fuel and becomes dangerous when excessively powered, but cannot perform its tasks if underpowered, the bounds, especially ^e lower, may not be so conspicuous elsewhere (e.g. with military hardware, intelligence reserves, etc.). Organisations and institutions, which should be vehicles to serve social ends, enjoy once again a striking analogy with logical systems. Logical systems, when excessively strong in the fashion of modem mainstream systems, ensnarl users in a tangle of paradoxes and other troubles (for detailed discussion see RLR, p.240 ff.). On the other hand, if they are excessively weak they fail to meet reasonable conditions of adequacy, to afford satisfactory vehicles of inference and reasoning. Two species of gross power feature particularly in the definitional elaboration of anarchism: authority and coercion. While undesirable authority is characteristically tied into excessive power, coercion is different, is often once-off, and is malselective power. �6 * Authority, and warranted repugnance of closed forms. Authority is a type of power relation, a relation with the power or influence conferred or supported by other features of one of the relata, the bearer of authority, namely character, station, recognised control of coercive means, or the like. itself is the abstract of the relation : a has authority over or with respect to b. Authority is a proper subrelation of power. For evidently many power relations — those exerted by bullies, bandits, etc — are not authority relations, since the relation is not supported by suitable station. Again the following definition of authority (upon which Wolff founds his philosophical defence of anarchism) is far too narrow: "the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed" (p.4). Only some who hold authority may be (conventionally) conceded a right to command, or more broadly, to exercise their power. For evidently their power may be exercised in a variety of other ways than through command structures, such as blockages, delays, vetoes, withholdings, and so on, and on the other side, concessions, gifts, rewards, and so on. There are many types of authority relations, many inadmissibly excluded under narrow definitions, not all of which are objectionable, or objected to by anarchists. For an example of an unobjectionable sort, consider the relation of a student to an authority in some field of knowledge, who can in turn back up expert judgements by appeal to a further range of assessible evidence. Such an authority might be called frampar^if (or open), because those with time and some skill can proceed through the authority to assess claims made. Among op%n authorities are contemporary teachers, by contrast with old fashioned disciplinarians, and advanced parents, who can back up their orders with satisfactory reasons. Contrasted with such authorities are op&q%^ (or cZo<y^%f) authorities, who simply stand on their position or station, such authority is objectionable in part because of its dogmatic character.^ Closely allied to op^M^ authorities who can appeal to a conventional rule or procedure (that is how things are done, have been done) without being able to or prepared to opaque authorities are step beyond some rule book. Rule-book authorities are commonplace in bureaucracies, which often encourage such practice in lower level officials. In opaqM^ authorities the justificatory procedure stops a step further out; there is a set of rules, which has been enacted (for reasons not open to, or bearing, examination) by a further substantially opaque authority. Other authority relations are objectionable because of the way in which or the means by which they are backed. Unobjectionable is the authority figure which is exemplary, where what it exemplifies is in its tum satisfactory. Not so relations backed by coercive means, by violence or threats of violence: Big-stick authority relations. Such relations are condemned on moral 5 The impression is widely promoted that science reliably furnishes examples of transparent authorities, in the shape of experts. That impression is astray. Dominant Science frequently functions as a substantially closed authority, rather as the universal Church did, standing on received theory as gospel (for elaboration see DP, chapter 12). �7 grounds, for example by moral pacifists opposed to violence, who do not object to the carrot methods such as sanctions, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc. A diagram will summarise the position so far attained. o/'gMf/tonfy Confine##.? Methods carrot <- stick possibly benign Pacifist Back-up transparent T opposition A opaque Enlightenment Liberal opposition opposition It will be evident that the objections to nonbenign authoritarian relations—to what in clear cases may be presented as to — can be of significantly different sorts. To more opaque authority relations there are objections of enlightenment cast, that reason is lacking for what an authority requires, proposes or asserts, as it was lacking in authoritarian religious and political practice against which the Enlightenment was primarily targeted. (A significant strand of anarchism, more theoretical anarchism, is a descendant: undisclosed reasons of State are not adequate reasons.) To more coercive authority relations there are objections from non-violence devotees. To there may be a kind of liberal opposition, that the party subject to authority is being denied, in one way or another, for unacceptable reasons, a certain freedom, namely ' autonomy. Naturally, movements have been directed at breaking down authoritarian power relations: masters over slaves, humans over animals, men over women, adults over children, etc. States over citizens. A comprehensive civil liberties movement would merge with anarchist movements. Plainly then, these three convergences are linked to three interconnected forms of opposition to authoritarianism: namely * convergence of anarchism with an Enlightenment opposition to opaque authority, which anarchism takes to include state authority. (A response will contend, as religious groups did against Enlightenment charges, that State authority is justified, e.g. it represents the people's will, or some similar fairy tale. But that is what is at issue.) * convergence of anarchism with moral pacifism in opposition to violence and coercion as unmitigated evils which should always be avoided. Of course only some forms of anarchism are �8 involved. Some anarchists are not averse at all to the exercise of heavy power relations, for instance of violence or terror against others (no matter how this violates their free personal space). But observe that such uses of power are not supported by recognised authority but normally directed agnm-sf such authority; so they might be dubbed relations. * convergence of anarchism with forms of liberalism, deriving from solid commitment of normal forms of anarchism, particularly individual varieties to personal liberty. Libertarian ideals have served as a major motivation in historical anarchism. There is a vision of a free society, a 'vision of a society in which social fetters are replaced by social bonds and labour is freely undertaken'.6 ( There are of course other convergences as well, some of them much discussed, such as with marxism. When opposition to authority is broadened to opposition to domination, no doubt there are further convergences, with feminism, with deep environmentalism. A recent convergence, of initial promise, is with ecofeminism, which ought to highly sympathetic to environmentally sensitive anarchism. For both are opposed to domination in all its forms, to downward control lines and power hierarchies. There is an important argument against the state based on its authoritarian character. This argument, to be found is Proudhon and in embryonic form in Rousseau, is developed and given a Kantian tum in Wolff? What Proudhon portrayed as a conflict between the authority of the state and freedom, Wolff represents as 'the conflict between authority and autonomy' (p.18). In this conflict, where the state represents authority, autonomy takes precedence; anarchism is consistent with the supreme virtue of authonomy, but archist doctrines supporting the state are not, because of authoritarian character of the state. Because Wolffs argument has been subject to much criticism which an improved formulation would shed, because too Wolffs formulation leaves something to be desired (it is not sufficiently sharp or tight), the argument will be revamped. A crucial difference is this: whereas Wolff asserts that 'all authority is equally illegitimate', a judgement already rejected, it is now said that all authority is illegitimate, meaning thereby wtoraZ/y illegitimate, not 'having a binding moral force ? 6 7 8 Chomsky, in Guerin p.xii, As to Proudhon see Ritter p.13, pp. 15-16. According to Rousseau such undesirable restrictive features need not pertain for all forms of government; naturally they do not obtain for his favoured arrangements. Wolff tries to repeat this sort of point, less than successfully for unanimous direct democracy. Of course a state may proclaim, even legislate, that its authority is legitimate, and even have other states do the same. But that will not achieve moral, a de jt/re, legitimacy. It is similar when the state endeavours to enforce its authority; /noraf legitimacy is not thereby obtained. Nonetheless these sorts of features go far towards explaining why people acknowledge, rarely questioning, closed authorities like the state. There are other elements which enter into explaining this popular sheepishness, such as: The force of tradition, that is the way things have always been done, the �9 Nor is all closed authority equally objectionable. The unquestionable directives of a benevolent dictator (one whose authoritarian directives and regulations prove inductively to be well directed) can be seen as less objectionable than those of a malevolent dictator. Similarly for a dictatorial group, a junta, or a majority. That the dictator said so, or that the majority said so, does not offer a reason rendering the state less than a closed authority. A core theme, to be embroided and defended, is W1. An autonomous person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate. But W2. The state is a closed authority, of a certain of course. Hence WC1. An autonomous person does not recognise the state as legitimate. The core theme depends crucially on the notion of aMfonowy, on characterising features of the autonomous person. But before that task is addressed, observe that autonomy can be eliminated. First, the rafiona/ person, or a little less satisfactorily, the person, can carry the argument instead, using for instance W3. A rational person is autonomous. So results Wl' with 'rational' displacing 'autonomous', W1'. A rational person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate. That premiss at once suggests a direct argument devoid of the circuit through persons (or through agents). For what a rational, still more an enlightened, person does not recognise as legitimate presumably is not, and certainly vice versa. In any case, U1. A closed authority is not legitimate. Hence, by W2, UC1. The state is not legitimate. Since this conclusion is equivalent to UC2. The concept of a legitimate state is null, the result sharpens the tentative conclusion Wolff reaches: 'Hence, the concept of a jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous', to which he adds, thereby presuming other links already made explicit, 'and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man' (p.19). As observed, not too much hangs upon the notion of moral legitimacy deployed, thus far following Wolffs lead, throughout. Simple variations replace 'morally legitimate' or 'legitimate' by 'morally warranted', 'morally justified', 'justifiable', 'rightful' (the last, though a trifle old-fashioned, captures what is intended well). force of character of leaders; their occupation of official positions, which have heavy bureaucratic backing. �10 These arguments permit of much other interesting variation. Wolff s original argument, for instance, precedes from authority as The defining mark of the state', with authority defectively explicated as 'the right to rule' (p.18). Evidently then the middle term, authority, can drop out, and the argument can be formulated along the following lines: VI. The state has the right to rule (without question, its citizens, more or less as it pleases). V2. An autonomous person rejects any (sweeping) right to rule. Therefore VC1. An automonous person rejects the state. Further variations may be obtained by amending the middle term, "right to rule without question" (which effectively replaced "exercise of close authority") to reflect other features of the state, for instance that it can simply tell its citizens what to do, that is has a right to coerce its citizens, rights to institute state monopolies, and so on. Under some variations "autonomous person" should be correspondingly replaced. For instance, if VI is specialized from a right to command and control to the right to send citizens to war, then V2 may be adjusted to apply to the person of conscience, of peace, or similar. As Wolff seeks a grander conclusion than VC1, which might be merely taken to reveal that there are but few autonomous actors about, he invokes a further premiss V3. Autonomy is a (even the) primary obligation. From there, it is an analytic shuffle to the more impressive conclusion VC2. The state ought to be rejected. The arguments are as vulnerable as their premisses. What gets especially contested in the first argument is Wl, concerning the autonomous person. For all the surface reasonableness and even open-door aspects of a more liberal state, W2 holds; it swings into effect as soon as the going gets tough. As Dahl puts it, To obey the authority of the state ... means doing what the you do it'? While there may be a little scope for light and reson as regards more flexible minor officials, that scope is officials of the state tell you to do simply and soley ( t/z^y small; the wall of closed authority can be quickly encountered, particularly with judges and law enforcement officers. If W2 did not hold the state would risk sliding into a voluntary organisation, out of which citizens could opt. In the end citizens are expected to act in a variety of ways (fill in form, take out licences, pay taxes, etc.) because the state tells them to, just because, or else face punitive action. The argument to Wl depends heavily on the meaning of gMfono/ny. Here is one way it can be presented (following Dahl): An autonomous person is self determining. Such a person is not under the direction or choices of another item. While the person may do what another tells him 9 See p.92..Dahl's reconstruction of Wolff effectively applies W2, using Wolffs definition of HMf%<?r#y, to obtain VI. This produces a more complex, and defective, argument. G �11 or her, she does not she has been told to do it. Thus the autonomous person does not conform to closed authorities, and does not acknowledge them or assign them recognition (more than recognition that is). While autonomy is one thing, responsibility is quite another; still a critical reason for arriving at autonomy intricates responsibility. ... so long as we recognise our responsibility for our actions, and acknowledge the power to reason within us, we must acknowledge as well the continuing obligation to make ourselves authors of such commands as we may obey (Wolff p.17), i.e. to make ourselves autonomous. A primary moral demand, central to the moral condition, is, according to Kant and Wolff, to 'acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy whenever and whenever possible" (p.17). Assuming responsibility in a life is by means the only reason for striving for autonomy: achieving a certain personal freedom (within natural bounds) and operating a life rationally are other crifica/ reasons. A main argument to V3 indicated by Wolff does proceed from responsibility. It is simply that in order to take full responsibility (for one's actions, choices, etc.), which one should, one has to be autonomous. So one should be autonomous. At least as important philosophically as the argument from W1 and W2 is that from Wl' and W2. While the argument to Wl' may proceed through autonomy it may short-circuit it. The philosophical argument for Wl' is well-known, having been repeatedly emphasized from Socrates through to Russell: that a rational person does not accept anything for which there are not independent investigatible reasons and evidence. The pronouncements of a closed authority do not fall into this class. By revamping the arguments especially that from autonomy as directed against authority, many objections to Wolffs arguments are fairly autonomically voided. Firstly (contrary to Dahl p.47), the arguments are not (any longer, if they ever were) arguments against 'authority of any kind". Not merely was Wolff concerned with the authority of the state; further as Dahl points out next page, the type of authority concerned is that of 'doing what someone tells you to do fo ^Zo if, that is a closed form. A rational person can of course acknowledge an open authority who can offer reason and evidence for prono^cements. For similar reasons, experts, guides and guardians, of open character, are not excluded. Accordingly the arguments does not cut "too broad a swath""; while it properly cuts out closed authorities like absolute rulers, states and similar, it does not mow down open authorities. In like fashion, much of Miller's parallell criticism of philosophical anarchism is voided. Things go astray (in Miller's chapter 2) from the very outset, from the slack formulation of "the principle of authority"", which is chauvinistically formulated, 'no man can ever rightfully exercise political authority over another, that is have a right to issue directions which the other has an obligation to obey' (p.15), and which is then intended to apply to the relation of a state �12 and its officials to its citizens. The formulation has both to be expanded to include persons and organisations as subjects of the relation, and sharply contracted to delimit the kinds of authority and rights concerned. For the explanatory (that is) clause offered reaches far beyond (closed) political authority; it would wrongly rule out contractual relations such as those of freely arranged employment, parental relations, and so on. The counterexamples Miller designs to Wolffs arguments also depend upon shifting ground from closed authority like the state to more open arrangements, such as contracts an autonomous person may have entered into freely. Plainly there will be a limited range of such contracts that a rational person will enter into; long-term future bondage or slavery will not be among them, and Miller's examples may border on the rationality dubious. In any case, in one, an agent morally concerned to relieve poverty enters into authoritarian arrangements, imagined unavoidable for successful action, in which it becomes obligatory for the agent to act under authoritative instruction (p.28). Firstly, the authorities are not closed, they have to be pursuing means directed to poverty relief, else an autonomous agent will not enter into such ". * arrangements Secondly, while contractual obligations, and therewith certain directives of open authoritarian cast, may constitute reasons for action, the situation with the state is very different. There is no contract, and no reasons of contract (also lacking are spotless reasons justifying entering into such a contract). Examples like Miller's arrangements and contracts can be inflated into stock flawed arguments, from consent to the state. Unremarably, Dahl attempts to patch up again these well- worn arguments, but in two mutually inconsistent ways. Second, he proposes that To opt for a democratic state' is The most responsible way of exercising our moral autonomy', and reasonable and rational as ways of maximizing our autonomy (p.49). Insofar as there are any arguments for such wishful conclusions, they depend upon familiar fantasy-world assumptions about the blackness of nonstate arrangements presumed to impact utterly unfavourably on autonomy and the contrasting whiteness of democratic states. That those states are at best a pretty dirty gray, Dahl's first more honest considerations suggest. There he asks, What is so great about autonomy? 'Why not sacrifice some moral autonomy?' As 'unlimited autonomy is impossible', why not settle for autonomy within reasonable state limits? (cf p.48). Compare: why not sacrifice some resistance to homocide and settle for reasonable killing of humans for reasons of state? The moral importance of autonomy Wolff has already explained nicely (pp 14- 17). Autonomy is a primary oM/ganon of rational persons, a constraint, not what Dahl converts it utilitarian-fashion into, a supreme value, to be questioned then traded off against other values. Because of its importance for rational practice the obligation should not be weakened; nor is there good reason to do so. There appear no grounds for forfeiting autonomy to closed 10 Compare Wolffs discussion (on p.15) of relations with one's doctor. �13 authorities, such as the state. It is doubtful that there are even grounds for what Wolff allows, forfeiture of some autonomy to one s doctor, hopefully no longer a closed authority, rather than retaining autonomy and freely following the doctor's advice. Autonomy is not like freedom in limitations; it can in principle always be exercised by a rational person. Submission to the state is a gross forfeiture of that autonomy. While an autonomous agent may place itself under guidance of leadership of another for limited purposes, and may indeed enter into certain sorts of contracts, it will not surrender its whole future life or extensive parts of it to a directorate that may well proceed in suboptimal, subliminal or even irrational ways. Yet that latter is what expected acceptance of the state implies. Accordingly an autonomous person cannot recognise the state; nor can a fully rational one, as it is irrational to place oneself indefinitely under a closed authority. It may be objected that it is unfair to treat Dahl, Miller and others in the preceding fashion, which changes the dialectical playing field. They were attacking Wolff and his over-extended arguments, not a refinement of Wolff which singles out the philosophical nasty elements in authority, and accordingly destroys their counter-examples which operated at the rational open end of authority relations. But that was not all that they were doing. They were using Wolff as a vehicle to draw quite conclusions about the unviability of principled anarchism (e.g. Dahl p.50, Miller p.29), and accordingly should have taken account of simple revampings of arguments like those of Wolff. Nor is this the only respect in which their practice is methodologically unsound. A principle—like that of closed authority, that such authority is legitimate—does not stand because someone's attack (e.g. Wolff s) against it is unsuccessful. Yet this is Miller's methodological procedure against philosophical anarchism (p.26, p.29). This is Popperian falsificationism gone rampant and badly astray. For Popper at least required sustained and strenuous testing and adequate variation; not a few select and easy examples. But of course a Popperian approach by archists is unsatisfactory; the onus of argument is the other way around. An archist has to establish that political authority, such as that the claims and exercises, is rightful. That Wolff intended to work with something like closed authority should have emerged both from Wolffs emphasis on the place of 'grounds and sources' in legitimate authority (p.9), and his flirtation with unanimous direct democracy. What Wolff is exercised about is not compliance with a authority or obedience where there are good or independent reasons for it, but blind, or closed obedience: doing what you are told because you are told to do it (p.9). (Yours not to reason why, yours but to do ....) While these points exonerate Wolff from some overzealous criticisms, they immerse him in others, namely his attempt to combine authority with autonomy under unanimous direct democracy. A major problem is that this combination, �14 so far as it is workable^, appeals not to the closed authority of the state, but to open autonomous arrangements which do not conform to requirements of the state (as Dahl remarks on p.48, the "authority" here is not the "authority" of his earlier definition'; and as Miller observes on p.27, *it is ... arguable whether this state of affairs [under unaminous direct democracy] involves the recognition of Autonomy and freedom tell not merely against the exercise of opaque authority, but against use of coercion. This connection affords the basis for a parallel argument to that against closed authority, to the desirability of a sharp decline in deployment of coercive methods. But parallels between coercion and closed authority do not proceed very far. * Coercion, an impermissible activity. Coercion is very different from exercise of authority. All four places, 1 to 4, in a cross classificatory matrix are regularly occu Died: actions coercive authoritative 1 non-authoritive 2 non 4 coercive 3 Place 1 is well occupied given the State, and is widely exemplified in not only state-citizen relations, but also in authorized domination relations. Place 2 is illustrated in a range of operations which the state often tries to repress such as banditry, piracy, protection rackets, but also in a variety of interpersonal relations. Place 4, that clear indicator of unqualified anarchism, is well exemplified through voluntary cooperation and mutual aid. Place 3, characteristic of many work-place and educational situations, can be easily illustrated through advanced ( education. Coercion, unlike authority, is action. That is why comparisons are with .... of authority; authority may sit, like power, unused, but coercion cannot. Like all action it is a process, a state to state transition, but actively changing or maintaining state. It is a transitive action relation having both a doer, a coercer, and done-tos, coerced, all normally creatures. The transitions include a wide range of more determinate actions such as constraining, restraining, securing, moving, pushing, pulling and so on; and thus coercion (the abstract) includes forcible constraint and compulsion. An essential feature of coercion is that state transitions are effected A/<Z or attempted by coercers through force or genuine threats of force. No such force, no coercion. NY- Defective definitions of coercion are liable particularly to neglect this feature. Thus e.g. Fridman 11 Wolff himself concludes it is not except under highly improbable conditions. Indeed the conditions are more onerous those Wolff allows: required are humans who having consented do not change their minds, etc. _________ /e �/6 L < s _ _ z^<^4^-f ___' / ^ry^- /i, <^___ . �15 p.xviii, according to whom being coerced is 'not being left alone'. Perhaps in one special sense, but a person who chooses to have a constant companion is not being thereby coerced. Pressuring someone to do something without attempts or threats to apply force is not coercion. Similarly persuasion is not coercion; censuring, withholding support, applying peaceable sanctions, are so on, are not. All this proves important in meeting objections to anarchist methods. Coercion is not a success notion; a coercer may well not succeed in obtaining what was sought through coercion. This will prove important in explaining why appeal to the state does not automatically resolve political dilemmas. To coerce is maintain or change states, normally of another creature, by implied force (i.e. force or accepted threat thereof). The state transition or statis includes the full range of relevant actions such as constraining, restraining, securing, moving, pushing, pulling aa so on, and thus coercion (the abstract) includes forcible constraint and compulsion. Coercion, by contrast with * exercise of authority, entails potential use of force, force furthermore which will characteristically tum into violence if resistance is attempted. Therein lies a main reason why coercion is so objectionable; its intrication with force and immediate potential for violence. For violence is generally undesirable.^. It follows therefrom that coercive arrangements are generally undesirable and, devolving therefrom, If social organisation can be achieved without them, usually so much the better, certainly the more ethical. A main onus to show that coercive arrangements, such as the state characteristically incorporates, are inevitable, unavoidable or the like, thereupon falls upon archists. 'Since coercive power is self-defeating' and worse, a general theory of 'non-coercive authority' is presented as a 'pressing problem of this stage of history'.13 Unfortunately, the general theory has obtained but little development. But functionalism, in such forms as demarchy (to be transformed below), has gained some elaboration, by some in the peace movement. 14 Worse, Merrifield arrives at the "pressing problem" on the strength of the need for Rt/M? of solution to the authority problem': thesources, methods, and ends of authority (p.724). This "problem" is presumed by way of the following large (anarchist) assumptions: Authority is a requisite of all social life, since in its absence it is both psychologically and physically impossible to coordinate human behaviours so that the ordinary social processes can continue to operate and flourish (p.729). The main claim is an important part of what is at issue between anarchists and archists and is at best highly dubious. Moreover the reason offered in its support is false and should be rejected (a range of counter models and counter examples have been indicated or will be). Furthermore, Merrifield goes on (on the next page) to adduce information on organisations of a sort which 12 13 14 Sec wp in. Merrifield p.724 alluding to the wording Notably B. Martin A/Z&) -sy-Mezn of political functionalism. �16 serve to cast severe doubt upon his claim and its supporting reason. There are various nongovernmental organisation (NGOs), and some intergovernmental organisation (IGOs), which rely upon voluntary, permissive or non-coercive motivations ... to accomplish their functional purposes. ... They may explain, demonstrate, justify and argue, but they cannot usually coerce. The role of functional NGO's is even more pronounced. Lacking any coercive power, they must rely on the validity and demonstrability (p.725). Some of the organisation rely, or need rely, not at all on closed authority. Like the voluntary support and participation basis, so too the organisational structure is voluntarily maintained. There is no hard authority, and no conspicuous authority problem. Coercion, in this respect authority, is also open to objection on rational grounds. Namely, ways of controlling, governing, or getting rational creatures coercive methods are not to do things. Rationality—not the undesirability and demeanment of force not, or not just, freedom—is the ground of this objection. The analysis of coercion admits of immediate fruitful application to (internal) criticisms of anarchism. In the first place, it has been argued that anarchism does not avoid coercion but incorporates coercive elements—which would render it inconsistent (as normally characterised). Further, because of these coercive elements anarchism is incompatible with liberty, thereby multiplying inconsistency, as liberty constitutes one of its main goals. These alleged problems derive from the reliance of anarchism on public censure, and like methods, to control social behaviour. According to Ritter, for example, who makes much of the second problem^, anarchists have the following goals: an (admirable) commitment to liberty, and a heavy reliance on public censure. But these goals are incompatible. For such a 'social scheme relies so much on coercive public * censure (p.10, also p.l). However, the argument to incompatibility is invalid; it makes an illicit insertion of 'coercive * * 'coercive (as the quote above illustrates; in fact the prejudicial slipping in of and 'coercion * occurs right through Ritter's discussions; see e.g. p.25 top and bottom). The social scheme as described involves only public censure in a free setting; such censure does not imply coercion, as no use of force need be involved or even contemplated. Secondly, connectedly, there is a widely exploited false dichotomy between voluntary and coerced activity, under which it supposed that all activity which is not purely voluntary is coerced. To the contrary, the range of actions is more satisfactorily diagrammed as follows: Voluntary vs coerced activity In a first chapter short-tided 'Liberty and pubiic censure', particularly on a muddled p.2. ,u„ ZL.. �17 hard pressured ! soft pressured ) ! (entirely) free ) influenced encouraged (fully) coerced <Actions -* In most standard arguments for the state only the outer bounds are considered.^ But noncoercive methods can include a wide range of influenced or pressured actions, which are less than entirely free. The interesting argument that Dahl draws from anarchism, directed against the state, turns upon on the undesirability, indeed the intrinsic badness, of coercion. In essence (leaving out support offered for the premiss as) the argument is as follows: Pl. M? one Zs obZZg#R?6? to -report or o&ey a sfafe. P2. A// sfafes ore coercive. P3. Coercion Zs intrin-nca/Zy bnJ. P4. A society wit/iont a state is a yeasi&Ze aitemative to a society with a state. This conclusion derives fiom these premisses ('assumptions' as he calls them) Dahl draws Ave conclusions' (p.41). As these are not the most direct or pointed conclusions, let us sharpen the conclusions: Cl. AZZ states are necessariiy &aJ. ^rom P2 and P3 (equivalently recast as: all coercive items are intrinsically bad items), given that intrinsicaZZy so implies necessariZy so. Dahl prefixes Cl by the conjunct, 'because all states are necessarily coercive'. Not only does Cl not require that support; we do not have it (e.g. in P2). While coercion may be taken as defining of the state, or an essential characteristic of it, as Dahl does, however states are defined it is continently true that all of them are coercive. C2 No one has an o&ZZgahon fo, Zs o&ZZgafed to, to support or obey any state. From Pl and Cl. Again Dahl unnecessarily prefixes his analogue of C2 (as for Cl above). Insofar as political obligation is obligation to the state, C2'. 77iere Zs no poZZtZcaZ obZZgatZon; political obligation lapses. Conclusions Cl and C2 specialize, because democratic states are states, to democratic states (that is effectively Dahl's fourth conclusion, p42). Dahl, like Wolff, senses a democratic escape through unaminity procedures, and reaches towards a fifth conclusion, which we will subvert. P5. Unanimity decision practices (can) escape coercion. 16 See for instance Taylor's presentation of game-theoretic arguments. 2^ �18 P6. Democracy can operate through unanimity procedures. These procedures and democracy are presumed to apply to some society, community or association. C51. prac/zc&y (can) escape -yfafcF. C52. Democracy can operate wif/zoaf any .sfafe. This last conclusion is interesting because Dahl regularly assumes, as against anarchism, that democracy must operate through the state, and that democracy is therefore in compatible with anarchism. As conclusion C52 reveals, these assumptions are astray, on grounds Dahl himself supplies (the inadequacy of these assumptions will be independently investigated subsequently). It is worth noting that, irrespective of the merit of premisses P5 and P6 (e.g. because unanimity wears off, because of the rareness of unanimity), the conclusions do not follow without other lesser presumptions. For C52 the transitivity of opcrafc wifAoMf (doubtfully a universal linkage) is presumed, and perhaps some modal shuffles as well. For derivation of C51 from P5 what is presumed is that what escapes coercion escapes the state, which requires a strengthened P2 (already encountered), that states necessitate coercion (as well as a little of the logic of escapism). Dahl's third conclusion, after detachment of (three) because-clauses, is C3D. A// PMg/tf a? A minimal inference scheme enabling derivation of C3D from previously derived statements is this: P3D. where an item is necessarily bad and there is a feasible (less bad) alternative to that item, the bad item ought to be abolished. Then C3D follow from (strengthened) P3D. These are important arguments, both for principled anarchists and for archists, and Dahl rightly invests detailed study to certain of the premisses, those he imagines he can dispose of, most notably P2 concerning the coerciveness of states. It is not that other premisses and steps are not highly controversial; they are. The very first, Pl, yields at least the stock debate as to whether one is obliged to support or obey a bad law; for a state can be viewed as a structure of laws. Instead of an argument for Pl, Dahl offers a thumbnail history of its status, a genetic '^justification". Other justifications there are, rendered easier if P2 is strengthened (as it may be without upsetting the arguments dependent upon it) by replacing 'bad' by 'evil' or 'immoral'. Then initial support for strengthened Pl is that political obligation, likewise legal obligation, is a type of obligation, justified by considerations of obligation generally, and accordinging triumphed by ethical obligation. The detailed arguments for these themes gets down to fundamentals, to the justification of obligations through values. Briefly, obligations obtain only towards items which normally exhibit a sufficient level of positive value. An item like an evil state that condition. So no obligation obtains towards such a state. �19 To escape such an outcome, archists contend that certain states are not evil, for instance Dahl will claim that 'a democratic state is not an evil state" (p.40). Anarchists will by contrast assemble a great deal of evidence that democratic states, like others, are evil (see next chapter). The immediate issue is, however, whether states are evil in principle, by virtue of their coercive features. Now Dahl does not contest 'so elementary a proposition" as P2, the universal coerciveness of states. 'Like any state, a democratic state would use coercion to enforce democratically enacted laws ..." Accordingly, to make his escape, Dahl is bound to dispute P3, and does; coercion is instrumentally justified as a means 'essential to a good purpose , a democratic state (p.40). * As to supposed (second-rate) justifiability of coercion. A conionplace claim, which Dahl advances, is DI. Even though coercion is intrinsically bad, its use is sometimes (reasonably) justified (p.44). Which times?, on which occasions? will turn out to be a critical issue. As against Dahl, it will be contended that its use is never woraZZy justified. However in moral dilemma situations, where all other feasible alternatives have been exhausted, its use can be given a "secondary"" secondrate justification. Such a secondary justification, in very limited circumstances, gives no succour to the state, which depends upon and makes widespread use of much more coercion. That is, DI itself does not justify the sfaR?'.? use of coercion. The first argument Dahl offers is overtly dilemmatic. There is a 'recalcitrant wrongdoer , ( who simply will not refrain from doing serious harm to others. Despite the best efforts of his associates, neither reason, argument, persuasion, public opinion, nor the final sanction of social octricism dissuades him from doing harm. His associates finally conclude that he will persist in harming others unless he is forcibly restrained or threatened with severe harm (that is, coerced) (p.44). Why should that stop him, threats in particular (it does not deter young alienated men in contemporary states)? With ali due respect^the gentle best efforts cited by no means exhaust nocoercive methods available. But let us grant not merely that there are situations where coercion occurs (plainly it is presently a frequent occurrence), but that there are dilemmatic situations where a person may have no alternative in preventing violence but to resort to coercion, for instance in preventing or limiting assault upon another, in self-defence, and so on. In such circumstances, 'coercion would be employed—either by the wrongdoers or by those who restrained them" (p.44). Granted, it is employed. The issues however are whether it is morally permissible, and who may be justified. Certainly the wrongdoers are not justified, and what they do is impermissible. More controversially, what the restrainers do is also morally impermissible; even so their actions may be justified. Given the fixes they were in, where all alternatives were forbidden, still what �20 they did may be situationally justified, as a satisfactory actions in the dilemmatic circumstances.*7 Such situational justification is not what Dahl and other consequentialists are seeking; they want coercion justified without impermissibility strings attached. There is no reason, or need, to accede to their desires. Such a reasonable, and practiced, approach to moral dilemmas (which Dahl himself subsequently takes in his discussion of whether to always obey laws of a democratic state p.4950) here escapes notice. And Dahl introduces two difficulties he incorrectly presumes fatal to 'alternative position ... [that] violence and coercion are absolutely forbidden" (p.45). Firstly, given that coercion is employed, 'the position in self-contradictory". Wrong. For that coercion occurs, whether perpetrated by wrongdoers or by those trying to prevent wrongdoers, does no? imply that coercion is morally permissible (i.e. p -f Pp). Nor does the impermissibility of incompatibles imply self-contradiction, for the covering deontic functors cannot be deleted (i.e. -Pp & -P-p is no contradiction; of course given, what gets rejected, -Pq -* -q, contradiction would ensure). Also wrong, then, is what Dahl takes to emerge from such self-contradiction, no 'guidance for the most elementary choices", said to be an 'indefensible" position (p.95). For coupled with the story concerning moral dilemmas are suggested procedures for making choices (often far from elementary choices) from within the dilemmas. Secondly, Dahl wrongly supposes that so rendering coercion absolute makes it 'a supreme value that eliminates all other ends" including justice, freedom, etc. It does not. No hierarchy of principles (or values), this or another, is adopted, which is one reason why dilemmas occur. As in ordinary ethical practice, ^he principles stand, they are not simply prima they are not ranked, there are no 'trade-offs". It may have become apparent, what requires only a little between-lines interpretation, that Dahl is playing a rather familiar utilitarian game underneath the surface moral concern. Render 'the objection to coercion as a means ... not absolute but contingent on consequences". So weaken absolutist prohibitions on coercion and violence that generous room can be made for an institution which routinely practices them, and to which we can trade up with consequential advantage. Given that coercion occurs without the state, indeed may be quite widespread in the absence of the state, then there might be gains in installing a coercive imitation 'to restrict [!] and regulate coercion". Moreover, if 'on balance the gains from creating a state are likely to exceed the costs, then from a utilitarian perspective it would be reasonable to opt for a state" (p.45). There are two critical gaps in this utilitarian state-pleading. Firstly, impressive evidence for the conditional antecedent that the gains from the state exceed the costs has never been assembled, but rather evidence points in the opposite direction (as we shall see in the next 17 This controversial story has been told before, that for coercion resembles that already related for violence. The general theory of moral dilemmas (in MD) is applied to the issue of violence, control of pacifism (in WP TV). �21 chapter), so detachment from the antecedent is not warranted. Secondly, the performance even of better states in coercion is utterly unimpressive; these states foo amplify coercive practices, do not regulate basic cases, and so on. The state appears to exacerbate the levels, both in extent and intensity, of coercion, over the low levels genuine moral dilemmas would yield. It is unnecessary to contend, however, as Dahl asserts anarchists contend, "that if states did not exist coercion would soon disappear or decline to a tolerable level' (p.45). That judgement, which is not exactly an 'empirical' one, depends very much on the character of alternative societies. An individualistic society might enjoy high levels of coercion owing to the activities of its public-like protective agencies. By contrast, a well-organised society may be afflicted with comparatively little coercive behaviour, rendering Dahl's uncompleted utilitarian argument extremely difficult to complete, ever. Interlarded with the dulcet utilitarian approach, under which they beneficent, ^states will provide us with all those promised superior values many millions are still awaiting — freedom, justice, equality, and so on — lies a more sinister argument; that to the gangster state. That evil state is not so far removed, some may think, from many states that are presently recognised. Without the strong state, the gangster state looms, so Dahl insinuates. So adopt the state, or worse will eventuate. That sort of decision theory argument (itself unpleasantly coercive and out of the same big stable as utilitarianism) depends on some (derived) principle such as choose a least bad alternative, and accordingly fails unless another independent argument to the state succeeds. For otherwise superior stateless choices remain on offer. Yet nothing more than the po&H&iZi/y that a small gang of wrongdoers may pool resources, andwhat results may evolve into a "gangster state" is floated (similarly for claim 2, p47, that some group wng/tf manage to create a highly oppressive state, which is as true in many a state as in stateless conditions). There is a complex evolutionary path, with many obstacles and hitches, from a small gang, through growing rival gangs and protection rackets, to a single one, and thence to a state. It is moreover a path that is rather easily blocked at early stages in an organised society, as simple counter examples show (one such example, that of the Inuit, Dahl introduces on the very next page). Apart from the inconclusive utilitarian considerations, Dahl offers a further page, under the boldface heading 'On the Need for the State' (a strikingly minimal effort in a book of about 400 pages most of which are premised on the assumption that the state is a needed item). He concedes, what seems to put a large dent in his bold claim, that preliterate societies, like those of the Inuit, have subsisted, over long periods, without the state. But that is past history, the world has advanced, the state is here, there, and everywhere. Granted it is; that does not show it is needed. Many gadgets that are now produced are not needed. Consider Dahl s reasons why a return to societies without states is 'if not impossible, highly undesirable (p.46). First, the world is already too densely populated to provide much space for autonomy (p.46, less than a �22 page after the utilitarian promise of a satisfactory state maximizing 'freedom and justice'; similarly p.51 etc.) But there are many regions where autonomy could undoubtedly be increased by expansionary or imperial states backing off (not merely in East Timor, on the West Bank, etc., but in the lands of the Inuit, the Micronesians, etc.). Further, the denseness of human population, hardly affords a reason. For one thing, the excessive human population is highly concentrated; most parts of the Earth carry, by comparison, sparse populations. For another, autonomy does not depend, so directly, on available space. 'Thirdly, virtually the entire globe is now already occupied by states'. Similar points apply: for instance, such an accomplished fact does not establish a need, or the impossibility of change. While not true 'throughout recorded history', but a very modem phenomenon, it is no doubt recently confingenfZy true that 'small autonomous groups of people have been extraordinarily vulnerable to conquest and absorption by larger states', and that it is presently doubtful that 'states would permit any small, independent group to exist anywhere [much] on earth'. Such present yizcfo political power relations do not demonstrate a need, still less impossibility of alternative, still less undesirability of changes. Consciousness change could come very rapidly, furthermore, with a welcome change in popular attitudes in large democratic states to oppression of minorities elsewhere (in Europe this seems to be happening). These points also serve to destroy Dahl's second reason, that 'a multiplicity of interdependencies cannot be snapped apart without enormous costs that few people would accept.' The break-up of states in Eastern Europe shows that substantial changes can occur very rapidly; the costs involved were much higher than they should have been because of the attitudes of states, not attitudes of their peoples by and large. In sum, then, all Dahl has accumulated is evidence of the repressive grip of the present regime of states, rendering local change pragmatically very difficult. Such evidence does nothing to establish a need for states, nothing at all to establish the undesirability of stateless societies. Accordingly the main assumptions fail with which Dahl claims support his 'conclusion that if woM/J &^ff^r fo fry fo cr^afg a mfz^/acfory jfafe f/ian f/y io ^xAff in a .soci^fy wif%OMf o sfaf^' (p.47). As it happens, the failed assumptions also fail to support such a conclusion—without suppressed material, of the utilitarian cast already criticised. All the assumptions would indicate, werf they granted, is the practical undesirability of trying to set up small stateless associations in a regime of states like mot prevailing today exc^pf that the states are satisfactory. But the assumptions should be scuttled. * Aggfnsf Jowfnaffon Domination is an important type of power relation. It is a comprehensive relation: persistent over a period, not simply once-off or occasional, pervasive, extending over a range of action and behaviour. It offers confro/ in a spread of cases. In such cases, if the dominator exercises control (e.g. adjusts the appropriate controls, pulls requisite levers) then the dominated normally responds. A significant form of control within extended human affairs is that of A �23 command or ability to command. Of course the creature commanded, the servant, the domesticated animal, the subdued or subjugated person, has to be able to understand what is commanded. But domination operates in significant spheres where such conditions for commanding do not obtain: in particular, but not only, in the domination of nature, its parts and elements, such as animals that do not understand commands, biota that do not recognise manipulation, and so on. Domination originated with (what the etymology of the term reflects) lord-subjects and master-servant relations, which remain paradigmatic for this power relation. It was soon and easily extended to cover owner-slave relations, where control was much more extensive, God human relations, human-working animal relations, and so on. It has long covered parent children and husband-wife relations, as well as certain class relations; and as classes have changed with political restructuring, industralisation and the rise of cities, so have domination relations. Those of higher classes or castes tend to dominate those of lower ranking, similarly for those higher in new hierarchies. Domination of nature and its parts is a relatively recent addition to the varieties of domination, since the acclaimed success of "the war against Nature" (still going on last century) before which technological humans (lacked the considerable level of power they have now acquired over natural systems.^ An aim of softening or removing forms of domination links social and environmental objectiv&with anarchism. These aims are united in green social anarchism. Opposition to all forms of domination, is yet another extension of certain types of anarchism, perhaps incompatible with other types of anarchism (e.g. communal anarchisms which assume that affairs should be organised along strict patriarchal lines, which accordingly not altogether coherently oppose social archy only to retain or even reinforce a tribal or familial archy). There may by now be some confusion concerning the variety of extensions of anarchism encountered. More exactly these "extensions" are subextensions, which isolate the principle of some type or ( key feature of anarchism and generalize it. generalisation of principled subtype with distinguishing principle. 18 Intellectual vandals have been at work on dondnahon also, stretching it from a relation from ensembles of actors, the dominators, to whole structures, systems or institutions (what might be called by partial analogy with the vandalism worked on .sTrHctund domination). Stretched dominators include the capitalist economy, market forces, the economy, the state, and so on. Under the stretching, /to (structural) dondnadon is said to imply, what straightforwardly is right enough, no subordination of the people to market forces, or even, what is impossible to avoid in a sophisticated society, no influences on members through the operation of its economy. A �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document J SHORT CONTENTS OF TOWARDS GREEN ANARKISM: EUCRATIC POLITICAL INVESTIGATION? ? 0. PROLOGUE 1. EXPLICATIONS 2. ELABORATIONS 3. ARGUMENTS I 4. ARGUMENTS II 5. VARIETIES AND OPTIONS TAKEN 6. ECONOMIC ELEMENTS: PROPERTY, CAPITAL, MARKETS, TAX 7. POLITICAL ELEMENTS: ORGANISATION, DEMOCRACY, BUREAUCRACY 8. SOCIAL THEORY ELEMENTS: NATURE, CULTURE 8A LEGAL ELEMENTS 9. ECOREGIONAL STRUCTURES, EUTOPIAN MODELLING 10. ROUTES, TRANSITION 11. FURTHER CRITICISMS FOILED 12. PROBLEM RESOLUTION 13. EPILOGUE. BIBLIOGRAPHY (INCLUDING RESOURCES) by a minor marginaZi-s^J p/iiZo-yop/^r writing in 7. ? Richard Sylvan, Za^ At^nri^f/i c^nfary. PROLOGUE WHY GREEN ANARKISM? Green anarchism is not merely an intellectually attractive intersection of anarchism with genuine environmentalism; it is also a rational imperative. Modem states are not merely without justification; they are a major force driving and facilitating degradation and destruction of global environments, to points of no return for many natural species and environments, and even seriously threatening future human viability. Anarchism would, with full justification, remove these major problem sources. Green anarchism derives from anarchism coloured by a deeper environmentalism. Anarchism itself is said to be essentially a modem ideology, arising after, and in opposition to, the modem state. Though there may be significant anticipations of anarchism in earlier philosophy, and though there are many worthwhile examples of early anarchistic societies, the main intellectual work begins only in the late eighteenth century (with the eruption of the French Revolution). Since then there have been waves of anarchistic output of varying strength, the most recent initiated in Paris again in 1968^(immediately following a series of academic texts pronouncing that anarchism was dead)L In important respects this received picture, ever so lightly sketched, is misleading. Anarchist ideas were already advanced in those similar ancient ideologies, Taoism and Stoicism,** in opposition to ancient empires. Lao Tzu, shadowy founder of Taoism, was not merely a trenchant critic of the Empire, but advocated a society in which the ruler, the Prince, disappeared into a do-nothing exemplary and merely legendary figure. What Taoism asserted is virtually tantamount to Thoreau's small but crucial anarchist amendment to Jefferson, that the best government is the one that does not govern at all. In a similar vein, "Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, advocated a society without government. Laws should be abolished[!], since virtue and morality would only be achieved in liberty'.2 That common ancient tradition, spanning East and West, though often submerged, has never been lost. The Taoist tradition persisted (if often in degenerate form) in China, and heavily influenced west Asian adaptations of Buddhism. Stoicism survived, as (often degenerate) internal critic, for the duration of the western Roman Empire, and was directly incorporated into early Christianity. Although anti authoritarian features were subsequently suppressed in the Stoic-Christian tradition, elements survived even in the increasingly authoritarian climate of that religion, and the positive ideas have resurfaced again and again in religious freer-thinkers. 1 For details see Marshall pxi. Amusingly anarchism in Australia has more recently also been * Taoism and Stoicism can almost be seen as variants upon one another, back to the very names. It is tempting to conjecture that they may have both arisen from a proto-Toi-ism. Lehner, H of I, p.71. On Taoism as anarchist, see Clark, ch7, Marchall, ch4, and UT. 2 2 The term * anarchism' was however introduced into English in a highly perjorative sense, signifying disorder, chaos, lawlessness and the likeA It is regularly displayed in this negative connotation, in politically unstable times in England, long before much theoretical work on anarchism began (nonetheless there were tracts, like that of Winstanley). As a result, the term 'anarchy' got away to a very bad start in English. It was used, from the early 16th century onwards, to mean confusion, disorder, lawlessness, licence, and absence or nonrecognition of authority. Similarly for most of its cognates 'anarch', 'anarchal', 'anarchial', 'anarchic', 'anarchical', 'anarchially', 'anarchism', 'anarchist' and 'anarchize', (see OED entries). 'Anarchism' itself had also acquired its re/evanf modem sense of 'the principles and practice of anarchy or anarchists', namely 'the Doctrine Position or Art of those that teach anarchy; also the being itself of people without a Prince or Ruler' by 1656 (in Blount GZo^^gr). As a political theory anarchism is standardly said, however, to have emerged much later (and there are stock, 'inconsistent' presentations: a state without a state, government without government, theory without doctrine, order without order, etc.) It is the interaction between popular longer-standing usage and later serious ideological use that helps account for the astonishing folkloric history of the term aKarc/n-yTK. It also reflects one facet of the pervading amateurism of anarchism, its lack of industrious research. Consider what certain encyclopaedias say, beginning with one that is not so much wrong as sloppy. Historically the word "anarchist", which derives from the Greek an arc/io-y, meaning "no government", appears first to have been used pejoratively to indicate one who denies all law and wishes to promote chaos. It was used in this sense against the Levelers during the English Civil War and during the French Revolution by most parties in criticizing those who stood to the left of them along the political spectrum. The first use of the world as an approbatory description of a positive philosophy appears to have been by Pierre Joseph Proudhon when, in his (W%<3/ Af property?, Paris, 1840), he described himself as an anarchist because he believed that political organization based on authority should be replaced by social and economic organisation based on voluntary contractual agreement (Woodcock p. 111). According to a rival encyclopaedia, however, The word "anarchy" describing a stateless society was used[?J for the first time by Louis Armand de Labortan in his voyage Z' (1703), describing the Indians living in a society without state, laws, prisons, priests, private property, in short "in anarchy" (Lehning p.71). A glance at the OED, such as we took above, along with a comparison of the stories, reveals the falsity of many of these interesting contentions. Much historical detail remains to be sorted out satisfactorily. Though there are many histories of anarchism, until very recently a 3 The pejorative sense was not contrived or imposed following some significant political incident, such as the pivotal Chicago events of 1886, which is what Jp^ies 86 implies. No doubt, however, following the Chicago events, stigmatisation and denigration of anarchism, and its automatically assumed association with violence and disorder, were deliberately orchestrated and propagated in USA. Such an outcome contributed further to development of an already established anti-anarchist mythology. 3 reasonably satisfactory one had yet to be written. Fortunately that has now changed (during the drafting of this text). Conveniently we are now absolved from lamenting the absence of such work and likewise from attempting more historical detail.^ For Marshall's massive text, has now appeared, it can be deferred to (by no means always uncritically) on many historical issues and for mad detail, to which it affords fine access. The concentrate on systematic and theoretical matters. Most of the seminal and interesting work on anarchism has come from outside present text can now universities and standard intellectual circles, and often from political amateurs. Academics have contributed histories, surveys and (usually not so sympathetic) criticisms, but, with a very few exceptions, little original thought. $ For typically they are ideologically stuck with the state, be it a pathetically minimal one. Intellectuals are so inured to the state that they are inclined to such pronouncements as that the idea of abolishing the state entirely must strike us as utopian .6 Yes, as eutopian. 'Most political philosophers in the past few generations have been unable to escape what the psychoanalysts might call a "state fixation". Even those those temper and reason caused them to distrust a nationalist philosophy could not deal with the state except as a rigid entity. They wished it large or small, isolated or cosmopolitan, but in any case a rounded unit which had to be taken as it was and maintained as such in any reconstruction of... society'7 It is easy to speculate on reasons for this, connected with academics being part of the expensive state scene. While anarchism has vanished from the mainstream academic scene, it is again becoming visible, if hardly prominent, in alternative (especially green) scenes and in work of disaffected academics associated with them. A surprising amount of the adventurous anarchist literature now appears, like the earlier utopian literature, in fiction, especially science fiction (and so, under prevailing division of labour, tends to become a subject for literary criticism, not political philosophy). But the ideas and plans appear there in quite insufficient detail. There, moreover, it can easily be dismissed as fantasy, as unrealistic, not a serious and proper contribution to political dialectic. The entire range of political discussion concerns whether there should be marginally more government intervention, or marginally less; marginally more public expenditure on welfare services is marginally less. Nobody [much] challenges the whole system, still less the existence of the state itself. The state's own socialisation processes see to that (Luard p.52). While virtually all political discussion undoubtedly traffics in such marginalia, powerful and warranted challenges there certainly have been: It is plain that on general principles of law and reason ... the Constitution is no contract; that it binds nobody, and never did bind anybody; and that all those who pretend to act by its authority, are really acting without any legitimate authority at all: that, on general principles of law and reason, 4 5 6 7 In contrast thus to James 186 who reiterates the familiar lament. Even the very occasional (here deliberately unspecified) exceptions are exceedingly cautious. Miller p.182. Mitrany p.98. 4 they are mere usurpers, and that everyone ... has the right... to treat them as such.s Given the United States is not contractually legitimated, what other state is? None appears to have superior credentials! None is rationally legitimated, so it will be argued in detail. The State in general and in abstract is not justified. So, whether it can be exploited for environmental and social purposes or not, its use is not justified. Environmentalism is still more modem than anarchism. Though it has ancient roots, and though the movement grew substantially in the 19th century, fusing there with an earlier romantic movement, environmentalism is an archetypically 20th century ideology. The more widely diffused green movement is essentially a contemporary phenomena, no doubt the most distinctive new political force of the late 20th century (the feminism movement is older). Green anarchism draws together elements from environmentalism and anarchism. While it can be seen as continuous with environmentally sensitive later 19th century social anarchism (of Morris, Kroprotkin, and others), environmental problems now appear in a new light and take on a new urgency. For we are now confronted by what is not inaccurately referred to as the envzronmenfa/ crAyZy, combining the cumulative efforts of rapid human population growth, rapid concomitant growth of vast industrial and human pollution threatening and undermining biological life support systems, rapid depletion of habitats species and nonrenewable resources, and very extensive and worsening environmental deterioration. In the present parlous environmental predicament those concerned to take some requisite action, active environmentalists, have two opposently diametrically opposed courses open;9 * Supporting, and working through, strengthened states to try to avert the crisis. Central to 'most environmental justifications of [expanded] state power", according to social individualists, is the argument that people will not voluntarily r&yfram themselves from doing those things of which the environmental crisis is the aggregate effect. They will not voluntarily refrain from hunting whales and other species threatened with extinction, from having "too many children"", from discharging untreated wastes into rivers and lakes, and so on (Taylor pp 1-2, quoted in Grofman p.108). As in collective action theory (advanced typically by individualists), it is concluded (invalidly as will be seen) that state power is required to compel restraint and to undertake compulsory rectification. * Working outside states in more direct efforts to avert elements of the crisis. The alternative, that is, is to abandon the state. Here lies the main chance, and the only genuine long term alternative for a deep, as opposed to merely reformist, environmentalism. For under state regimes, more and more of remaining environments are degraded or destroyed, in the march of 8 9 Spooner (M? Treason) pp 27-8. The omitted phrase asserts that everyone has not only the right but is wtoraZZy to treat them thus. But here Spooner goes further than data seems to warrant, converting supererogation to obligation. (The phrase following the quotation echoes Miller p.38). These choices are differently presented and explained in SM, a main intellectual ancestor of the present work. The approaches complement one another. 5 state growth and economic progress. In fact, there are several reasons for the extra-state anti state course. There are serious limits to what states can accomplish, especially in international issues in the interstrices of states, but also as regards individual environmentally-hostile action. Moreover, even when it appears that states can a^t, or contribute, there are sharp limits to what they are prepared to do or attempt. States of course explain their tardiness or reluctance to move in various ways: prior higher commitments (e.g. endless economic ones such as creating jobs, containing inflation, etc.), the need for balance (with a constituency after unparaxeded of any environmental crisis, or wanting, like comments operating with anarchist discount rates, to party now), etc. Concerned environmentalists should take both courses: use the state and exploit state power where opportunities offer (without thereby endorsing the state and its standard practices), but also, more important, they should work outside states and against states. For mam co/ifn&Mfmg coarse o/The anJ ov^ra/Z o/?^rafmg fa worsen if. Given this (no doubt jaundiced) sfa^-mfrz'car^ thesis, surely it is hypocritical also to work through them and use them. Not at all; for states acquire and hold, have expropriated to themselves, considerable social wealth, which arguably should be directed to social concerns, including environmental amelioration. However, while states may properly be used so long as they persist, still ultimately halting the new ubiquitous environmental rot, salvaging or conserving some of what remain of viable environments, will involve, if it can be done, dissolution of states. There are powerful environmental reasons for trying to terminate / the present era of states. States are ineluctably committed to economic growth, of almost any sort; indeed they are main proponents of such growth. This commitment, certainly highly conspicuous, is not merely accidental, and is bound to impact negatively on environments. Australia, for example, needs a growth rate (in GDP) of at least 3% just to provide employment for its school-leavers, more to cater for immigrants, more to allow for some politically acceptable redistribution, more to meet rising aspirations. More, more, more .... States cannot step off the growth treadmill. That growth in turn requires, to deliver essential exports, expanded raids on resources and biological capital (if not that held by the state, that of other states). These exercises in tum inevitably mean, given present technologies and cost structures, pollution in many dismaying forms and environmental degradation.^ So growth implies environmental degradation. Therefore, with contemporary states degradation is inevitable. Such states are inevitably environmental vandals, n 10 11 A prominent recent attempt to block this sort of argument features economic growth subject to con train ts of environmental sustainability. While such constrained economic growth is a feasible (and old) idea, contemporary states, given their commitments, cannot and cannot afford to deliver it. A recent example concerns Australian production of greenhouse gases, where Australia cannot, officials now say, meet the costs involved in attaining expected reduction targets. Sustainable development itself is critically examined in r The kind of practical necessity operating here will concern us in later chapters. Logically there could be benign "states"; but these would be far removed from contemporary state arrangements. ( 6 There is exceedingly little evidence that social and environmental prospects will ever improve under the contemporary regime of states; instead much evidence to contrary has accumulated. "... Reliance on the state or a global superstate for change will lead to a continuation of many of the patterns of domination that the state has done so much to develop and reinforce in the past" the anarchist strategy of change "from below" ... [and "from above" is] much more promising'. Indeed the claim is made that The anarchist vision ... of a fusion between a universal confederation and organic societal forms of a communal character lies at the very centre of the on/y hopeful prospect for the future world order'. 12 Some of the pressures to continued exponential growth, and their environmental and social consequences, themselves positively feeding back to fuel demands for more growth, are colourfully observed in the following passage: One of the most widely pursued common goals of recent times has been economic growth, which is generally regarded as the most important ambition of states. These pressures to high rate of growth not only endanger the world's resources but do not even procure the material satisfactions they are intended to provide. For the effect of competition is that high rates of growth can be achieved only by high rates of investment designed to secure higher productivity. This secures equivalent production with more equipment but less labour. Thus more and more people are displaced from their jobs who cannot necessarily find alternative employment in service industries or elsewhere. All over the Western world, in shipbuilding, in steel, in motor manufacture, in textiles, in fishing, in agriculture and other industries, employment rapidly declines. So the total number of those unemployed increases in all industrial countries and remains high even in those where a relatively high rate of growth is being achieved. And the very fact of high unemployment, by reducing total demand, lowers the level of investment and growth for the future. Periods of growth become shorter and those of recession become longer. The relatively simple devices for stimulating growth in earlier times - lower interest rates, budgetary deficits, fiscal expansion and public works — are either not attempted through fear of inflation, or if attempted do not achieve their effect. Despite persistent recession inflation remains strong, partly because of excessive increases in income obtained by those still at work, partly because of the large sections of the economy which are in public hands and are unaffected by antiinflationary measures. Modern industrial societies, therefore, in appearance so advanced, are yet characterised by the bizarre spectacle of large sections of the population being without work, while ever higher levels of investment are undertaken to reduce employment still further in the future, so ensuring that the benefits of high growth are enjoyed by fewer and fewer people (Laurd p.147). A main dynamic involved can be summarised: Both the State and those major corporations which set much of its agenda aim to increase productivity (for reasons of profit, profile, firm or party growth and survival, etc.). But productivity increase characteristically sheds labour. Restoration of employment requires growth. Hence one heavy pressure to growth: sustaining employment. That pressure is, furthermore, one of many. Another derives from internal dynamics of corporations and bureaucracies. Like the state and capitalism, they all must, as Marx argued, 12 Clark, also quoting Falk from 'Anarchism of world order* in FVo/noj, p.160). 7 grow or die. There are many reasons for the growth imperative, both broad ideological and business specific.^ For satisfactory survival, satisfaction of its executives and employees, its stock holders, and so on, a modem corporation has to grow. Cpntr^l here are such matters as laws of profit decline otherwise, and more general principles of organisational aging and decline. If any serious ecological conclusion is to be drawn from Vol I, it is from Marx's compelling demonstration that the very law of life of capitalist competition, of the fully developed market economy, is based on the maxim, "grow or die". Translated into ecological terms, this clearly means that a fully developed market economy must unrelentingly exploit nature to a point ... that is literally regressive geologically and biologically. Capitalism, in effect, is not only polluting the world on a historically unprecedented scale; it is simplifying all the ecosystems of the planet, turning soil into sand, the oceans into lifeless sewers, indeed, threatening the very integrity of our sources of atmospheric oxygen. If one were to follow the logic of this tendency to its very end, capitalist— and hierarchical— society are utterly incompatible with a viable biosphere. What limits the ecological validity of Marx's view is obviously not his revelation of capitalism's "law of life" but rather the "progressive" role he imparts to capitalism's "success" in supposedly achieving the technical domination of nature. This Janus-faced aspect of Marx's writings is what throw them into conflict with an authentic ecological sensibility. Gorz, by contrast, sides-steps exacfZy what we must learn in the contradictory position of Marx, namely, that the very technical achievements of capitalism, fat^ from a-y-MmzZafing "ecological necessities as technical restraints", are governed by a "law of life" that technologically lacks any TES p.293) form of "restraint' Prevailing political arrangements 'no longer offer us a hopeful prospect of resolving the vast social and ecological crises which now confront humanity ... these systems, with their deep commitment to such values as industrialism, high technology, centralism, urbanization and the state, have been instrumental in creating the social atomization and ecological imbalance which are at the core of these crises' (Clark pp. 141-2). Indeed these systems are bound to exacerbate the problems. While these statements should by now be motherhood statements, they are not. Hope springs eternal: more naive environmentalists regularly appeal to a state that sometimes makes appropriate responsive noises and puts out appealing propaganda, but meanwhile is thoroughly committed to economic growth of environmentally damaging forms. The normal dynamic of th^ "advanced" state is extremely environmentally hazardous. Centralised states support environmentally and socially damaging methods of production, in order to benefit from the surplus and exploitable technology thereby produced - which are important for purposes of state, in particular for spending to remain in power (job generation, pork barrelling, subsidization of large business), for positional enrichment of the bureaucracy, and for development of the forces of coercion, propaganda and authority which matter both for internal social objectives and in order to remain militarily competitive in the region and spheres of influence. Details of the dynamic at work have become familiar from socio-environmental studies of state operation. For example, technologies that facilitate centralized authoritarian 13 The broad and ancient ideological reasons are investigated elsewhere, e.g. MSS. 8 control are favoured (such as nuclear power, which also supplies material for nuclear weapons). Such technologies serve the interests of state actors and those who benefit particularly therefrom, namely economically dominant social strata. This dynamic, which does not require any arms race, only kinds of inter-state competition, encourages ever-increasing productivity, entailing high consumption of resources, high output of pollution, substantial environmental degeneration and destru( tion, and so on. Active aware environmentalists have, in the end, little choice but to attempt to ;abotage this dynamic. 14 Opposition to anarchism from gi een directions, and especially from green infiltrators, often derives from the assumption that under anarchism all environmental regulation would lapse, that it would be an open-go, fret -for-all for anti-environmental forces—the very ones that are already running rampant over the Earth, and perhaps others besides. It needs to be stressed that this opposition rests on a misconception of what green anarchism ^is all about. With a caring anarchism there may be a complete of the usually conceived situations of states and stateless societies, as regards environment regulation and social support. It should not have escaped notice that often states are the prime enemies of environmental regulation, improved environment practices, and the like. Even when there is very extensive community support for regulation, the state acts to block it, and aids and abets damaging practices! A central reason for this is that the state typically reflects a rather narrow range of vested interests, increasingJhese days those of dominant business, not community interests except very secondarily. Contrary then to received conceptions, the state is frequently not a means to, but an obstacle to, satisfactory regulation. Satisfactory green regulation can occur, can only occur, without the modern state. It will be argued that not only are there no intellectual or theoretical problems in dispensing with the state, but fuller there are no serious losses in disposing of it. There is no case for the state, and no need for it. But it is worse than that: it is predominantly bad in its impacts. Accordingly, it ought not to be in place. The practical upshot is that that we should endeavour to remove it. Among the incidental practical difficulties arising as a result, are that for complex societies there is a need for some structure to replace the state (not a intractable theoretical problem any longer). As well there is a need for a strategy to displace the state. That is where radical environmentalism enters again. A thoroughgoing environmentalism accordingly forces a significant type of anarchism, a social non-capitalist anarchism. The basic reason it forces anarchism is that the state, a prime anarchist enemy, not only fails to supply or retain environmental goods, but is frequently actively involved in their degradation or removal. The state is a major facilitator and powerful source of environmental degradation and destruction. Genuine greenness further substantially constrains the directions anarchism can take, the variety of admissible anarchisms. It serves to eliminate as a serious option total reliance on 14 This argument is adapted from A. Carter, Towards a green political theory*. While Carter's way out is not endorsed, his elaboration of the dynamic is, more or less. LL market methods, as proposed for instance under anarcho-capitalism and libertarianism. While excessive reHance upon capitalist markets is rejected, primarily because of heavy externalities, more traditional markets are given a rather free role. The problems with market-capitalism is not so much markets, except as distorted in a capitalist setting, but capitalism.^ Capitalism, both in theory and as normally practised, is a major enemy of environmentalism, and a main source of environmental problems. Capitalism also encourages, what conspicuous capitalists conspicuously exhibit, environmentally unacceptable lifestyles. Greenness also sharply constrains meta-politics. For example, it counts heavily against standard game-theoretic approaches of analytic political philosophy, because these entirely discount environmental effects (except as reflected through human actors' self interests). This work concentrates upon the anarchist components of green anarchism (the green part is attempted in a companion text on green ideology). It is primarily a theoretical work; it concentrates upon what is sometimes usefully called "theoretical anarchism". Because the work does focus on anarchism, little will be said about present green politics (and what thin associated theory there is), because that generally involves politics within conventional state settings. Where this differs from past anarchism is not only its environmental depth, but in the level of detail of arguments, criticism, and organisational structure. The latter especially,jwhere IT- 1 a; thin and threadbare historical anarchism is particularly weak. It is not enough to gesture towards some federation of communities. Details of organisations at each level need to be provided, for a more convincing story. Most of the disappointingly slight contemporary academic literature on anarchism will not be addressed or, if it is, criticised in much detail. Life is too short for that sort of indulgence. However much will have been criticised obliquely or in passing; and enough critical detail is supplied for direct critiques to be produced (as exercises by energetic readers). While there is mMc/z scope for theoretical improvement of anarchism, there is little room for reinventing anarchism. There is a long and distinguished Hne of amateur anarchist thought form virtually every significant idea that will be which contains in seminal (if developed herein. Thus, like most of the academic literature^this text is not particularly original. Unlike much of that literature it does not pretend to be. Virtually everything in this book has been said before, if not in anarchist theory then elsewhere; scarcely anything is original. But it has never been put together quite like this before. Moreover, some of it needed and needs saying again, with a little new information and arguments a bit differently ordered. But no means all is repeated. Where something, perhaps important for the dialectic, is said at least as well I can reiterate it, I simply cross-refer. That has the effect of making the work visibly less contained (self-containment is ^bmething of an illusion), but it saves on labour and materials. For other purposes too, repetition, despite its extravagance, may be important. Significant 15 On the deliberately neglected, or papered over, major differences between marketism and capitalism, 10 ideas and books often get neglected, because for instance they were not published at the right times, in the right places, by the right authors; they did not get duly circulated, and so forth. I judge the time at least is more propitious for green anarchism than it has been, perhaps ever before. As well, there are many things that this book, which is pitched in a theoretical, rationalistic way, does not aim or attempt to do. It does not attempt to supply much background, historical or other information, a lot of which is easily found in better equipped libraries. Relevant background can all be tracked, however, through references in work referred to in this book. 16 It does not attempt a full account of substitutes for important current institutions and arrangements such as those connected with property, markets, law, and so on; nor does it offer, what is warranted, a sustained critique of prevailing arrangements, for which opposite substitutes are sought and indicated. Fortunately again, some of the critique, if not positive detail of substitutes, has been well accomplished in other texts. 17 What is attempted is however a scholarly and systematic work (though, as indicated, a far from exhaustive work), on theoretical anarchism. Accordingly the book is littered with notes, some of which merely cite references, but many of which elaborate points in the text, especially details hat lead off in different directions from the thrust of the text. I should like to thank Frances Redrup for processing reams of inelegant scribble, from which this text grew, and to acknowledge the continuing support the Australian National University gave during slow production. I want to thank Debbie Trew for proofing the typescript (no straightforward business) and organizing a bibliography. I should record my gratitude to Bob Goodin for a continuing supply of background books, and to him and to the publishers and editor of Anarc/iAyf 16 17 for encouraging me to work upon anarkism again. A major recent source, for history of Northern Hemispheric anarchism, is, as observed, Marshall, While Marshall concentrates, no doubt correctly upon Northern hemispheric activity, and within that heavily upon Anglo-American work, there is room for a supplementary production taking due account of anarchism elsewhere, Australia for one example. Although an anarchist club was formed in Melbourne only a century ago (and then upon an American model), an extraordinarily sustained period of "original anarchism" (coupled often with "original (or primitive) affluence") flourished in Australia before European settlement two centuries ago, with more than 500 centuries perhaps more than 10000 centuries, of continuous Aboriginal anarchist arrangements. Much of the story of post-settlement Australian anarchism (which included remarkable Queensland activity and a Paraguayan expedition organised by Lane, as well as extensive Victorian agitation) is recounted by James, in a series of local publication, add Burgmann and by Souter. The story of Australian Aboriginal anarchism has yet to be told. The story for the rest of the Southern Hemisphere, both before and after European conquests and political imposition, remains to be satisfactorily told. Thus, for instance, Carter on property, Bumheim on bureaurcracy, othe^on democracy. A // 1. EXPLICATIONS OF ANARCHISM CHAPTER and of green subforms G 1. Initial explanation: fud and dilute forms, and corollaries. Anarchism is the theory, principles or practice of anarchy. As practised by engaged anarchists, who are naturally adherents, authors or promotors of anarchy, it includes the assertion of anarchy and rejection of nonanarchy, i.e. rejection of archy. Anarchy itself, in its norma/ political form, applies to societies or communities, territories or countries. It is, according to the dictionaries, the following sort of condition or state: lack of coercive government, absence of a political state, want of authoritarian political heads or leaders, institutions or organisations. Politically there are evidently fhr^ j^racrara/ aa^ar/(y, ca^rciaa, and normally comprehending both, the political .yraf^.i The anchoring notion of anarchy has recently been extended beyond political arrangements to apply to other institutional forms such as the Church, Science, and Law, to mean alternative forms lacking authoritarian structure and coercive methods. Thus appear, under transference, such varieties as epistemological anarchism and philosophical anarchism, instead of po/zfzcn/ anarchism upon which this text focuses. However the far-reaching analogies should not lost sight of; they matter. Anarchism is to political authority, as atheism is to religious authority, and rather as scepticism is to scientific authority. Although the conditions specified for anarchy are normally taken as conjoined, it is possible to construe them disjointly, yielding what could be called anarchisms. One diluted form which has obtained a little exposure is a /zzzzz^J anarchism appropriately opposed to the state but prepared to endorse carefully-controlled coercive authorities.^ A differently diluted form is a anarchism which is opposed to all prevailing states, because of some serious but in principle removable defect or other of each and every one of these states, but is not opposed to the very idea of an ideal state, or to a new wonderful order of states; that is it is, not, so to say, a principled anarchism. It is sometimes difficult to ascertain whether historic anarchists are j?rznczp/^r/ anarchists or merely de facto ones. There are limits to how far definitional dilution should be allowed to proceed: a theory (such as libertarianism) postulating a minimal coercive centralised state presumably exceeds acceptable diluted bounds, as n^key element is retained. Within such bounds, we shall operate both with full and dilute forms, accounting all anarchism (in a bro^d sense, qualifying as need be). Routes to full anarchism may well lead through dilute forms. Indeed these offer main paths towards anarchism proper. -t These three key elements are duly signposted in many, though not all, serious on anarchism. J- 12 It is evident that anarchy, and therewith anarchism, can be better characterised, negatively, through what it rejects, namely to sharpen the characterisation, centralised coercive forms, than in assertive formulation obtained through awkward locutions like 'absence' 'lack' 'want'. The simpler negative formulation (supplying the of anarchy), rejection of archy, makes it immediately evident that much of what vulgarly pass for meaning conditions upon or essential features of anarchism are not. Firstly, a variety of political arrangements and organisation, including of government, are entirely compatible with anarchy. It is enough for these arrangements not to include anarchy-violating features such as authoritarian or coercive elements. For example, a government without such elements, a government nonetheless in the dictionary sense of 'administration of public affairs', satisfies the principle of anarchy, and so is anarchistic. Such an anarchistic government can include normal components of organisation, regulation and control, so long as they conform to the principle. Certainly a territory without government, since therefore lacking an archist government, is anarchistic. But the popular converse fails. An anarchistic system may well, like several societies substantially destroyed by European conquest, have a small smooth-running public administration, free of authoritarian elements. Thus it would have a government, but not an authoritarian government. No doubt it would also be in a predominant modem, but narrow, use of 'government'. The term 'government', which is variably determinable, vacillates in particular between * administration of public affairs (including control, regulation, what it once meant) and its important and now dominant restriction, the enarchistically unacceptable determinate, * authoritative administration of public affairs (i.e. that exercising authority, and characteristically backed by coercion). Much confusion concerning anarchism has resulted through failure to separate the wider and narrower determinates^ It may well be true that, as dictionaries assert, an anarchist would 'oppose all existing systems of government'; but this is not a matter of meaning, it is contingent upon the character of prevailing state systems. Nor therefore are prevailing political forms everywhere so far removed from anarchistic alternatives: they may even overlap them. Make the following kind of thought-experiment concerning the government and operation of some modem freer, less violent, more peaceful society: the coercive and authoritarian elements are blacked out (both operational components and what they typically operate upon). For instance, there is a strike of relevant groups, judges and accused, police and criminals, prison warders and prisoners, etc. (perhaps because the broad society had reduced the opportunities for crime and accordingly threatened their contra operative livelihoods). What may well happen, what we shall imagine happening, is that governmental affairs simply keep running for some time. Things work well enough. Partial examples of just this sort of phenomenon are not uncommon, as when police forces go slow or strike. For example, when traffic police stop work traffic keeps on going, much as before. It may be irrelevantly objected that such anarchistic periods are mere interludes, presupposing surrounding authoritarian structures (somewhat as anarchistic end-states of marxism are premissed on preceding super-productive authoritarian states). Such thought experiments were designed to remove a different intellectual blockage: the common assumption that anarchism is utterly remote from the political practice of complex modem states and impossible to realise at all. As a theory, anarchism tends to advance a stronger theme than the progressive particular claims that anarchistic systems are possible, realisable, and sometimes realised. After all, these arrangements may be realisable—as more than an interlude—only in restricted or anomalous circumstances (e.g. a few people on an isolated tropical island). The stronger theme, linked with the anarchist principle, is that there is no need at all for authoritarian or coercive regulation. So rejection can succeed universally. Universal anarchism encounters many problems which do not trouble less ambitious parfict/Zar anarchisms, such as those to be advanced here. For example, how to rectify especially degenerate or evil societies? An attempt is sometimes made to render all anarchism universal, through the connecting thesis that for anarchism to succeed anywhere it must succeed everywhere (else be destroyed by ruthless, expansionist or greedy states, or similar). Fortunately the fallacious connecting thesis, though popular with critics, is implausible.^ Although anarchism proper does exclude certain kinds of government, coercive and authoritarian forms, it does not automatically include, certainly not as a matter of semantics, specific positive kinds. Anarchism is not necessarily "a theory of government based on the free agreement of individuals rather than on submission to law and authority", despite what dictionaries assert (incompatibly incidentally with their definitions of 'anarchy'). Such positive accounts of anarchism, as offering a certain theory of government, both try to convert a particular variety, individualistic anarchism, into the more general object, and try to import a certain motivation for, or differently explanation of, or justification of, anarchism into the very essence of the object (this is the general fallacy of verificationism in operation). Anarchism, or at least its assertion, may well be regularly motivated by ideals of free arrangements, not imposed by narrow or incompetent authoritarian forces, but motivation is one thing, meaning 14 another, verification a third. Not only is the assumption that anarchism is incompatible with government, wellregulated government, mistaken. So also therefore are the assumptions that anarchism is incompatible with organisation, with regulation, with a positive noncoercive "law", with order. So mistaken therefore are the widespread assumptions that anarchism entails disorganisation, disorder, confusion, lawlessness, chaos. Yet all these negative associations have been incorporated into degenerate popular meanings of anarchism. It is similar with related assumptions that anarchism implies violence, paramilitary activity, or terrorism. A popular picture of the anarchist, encouraged by authors like Conrad and Dostoevsky, is the excitable fictional character with a bomb in his pocket (not a Tolstoy or a Thoreau).5 These too are assumptions and pictures, with little basis either in semantics or in general anarchist theory or practice, promulgated by an unsympathetic opposition generally comfortable in present poor to appalling political systems or unaware of alternatives. With anarchy, as with many other valuable terms, a concerted confusion or destruction effort has been made, part of an extensive terminological vandalism in human intellectual affairs. Rather than reconciling ourselves to sacrifice of the damaged term anorc/ug/n, let us salvage the term explicitly for the pristine notion, and isolate the conventional associations under the term anarchi-pm, shortened, if a single term is sought, to Most fictional anarchists of system-supportative authors are degenarchists; but they are far from representative of anarchists. There are many anarchists who are not terrorists, few who are; there are many who are not dangerous troublemakers bent upon violently upsetting local settled order; increasingly there are many anarchists within environmental and peace movements, many of them anarchists. Gentler anarchisms tend to be all of more pacific, more social and more rational than tougher or hardened anarchisms. 2. Rival, typically defective, definitions, and beyond. Much of what is taken as typical or even characteristic of anarchism, especially popularly and journalistically, consist of optional extras, not even typical of anarchism. They represent, like what gets written into degenarchism, attempts at easy smearing or dismissal of anarchism, for instance as an ideology unworthy of serious consideration. As regards violence, terrorism, disorder, disorganisation, confusion, these sorts of point ought to be well enough known. But they apply also to other more benign features widely taken to characterize anarchism, such as attempts to tie anarchism variously to individualism, capitalism, voluntarism, primitivism, spontaneity, or socialism. Thus such erroneous characterisations of anarchism as those of the selection that follows:- 5 15 * One utterly appalling characterisation comes from a Russian DzcZzozzrzzy of PAz/o^op/zy. ^ "Azz^zrc/zz^zzz, a petty-bourgeois socio-political trend that is hostile to all authority and the state, and counterposes the interests of petty private ownership and small peasart economy to the progress of society based on large-scale production" * Another dismal, indeed wild, characterisation comes from an American political scientist, who audaciously asserts that "anarchism ... is anti-political—that is, it does not really offer political solutions" (p.l), rather "the primitive core of anarchism is not so very different from Christianity. That is, it rests on the notion that man has a need, not just a preference, to love" While this is wild, there are convergences and congruences between types of anarchism and early Christianity.? * It is "a political doctrine based on the value of individual freedom"? While this is not wild, it does erroneously convert what is a frequent powerful motive, and reason, for anarchism into part of it, confusing motivation and justification with essence. For it is by no means an invariant feature. A socialist or monastic community, placing no great emphasis upon or even discouraging individuality, can be organised anarchistically. * It is "a theory of government based on the free agreement of individuals rather than submission to law and authority" (Concz-y^ Eng/zj/z Dzcfzozzazy). But it also asserts that the same %7z#rc/zz.yAy "... are opposed to all forms of government". That inconsistent information should, as already seen, be discounted. Furthermore, there may be no free agreement; an anarchistic situation can, as already also seen, just happen. More likely, a sustained anarchism may emerge under favourable historical opportunities, again without any sort of contract or general agreement; it is then only zf there were free agreement. Certainly, there would no longer be "submission to authority", but there would likely be systems of rules, which people normally followed. * The very short characterisation of rzzzrzrc/zMzzz (and rendition of zzzMrc/zz?^) as "no government" is defective because of the elasticity, slippiness and determinability, of "government"? For example, to increase documentation, according to one dictionary ((/zzzv^r^zz/ Ezz^/z^/z), gove?7Z7?zenf means "... system of polity in a state; territory ruled by a governor ..." in which case it incompatible with anarchism; but it also means "... control; administration of public affairs" in which case it is certainly no? incompatible. Granted there have been attempts to represent anarchism as if it entailed no organisation or administration at all (state-of-nature arguments regular rely on this fallacy of false dichotomy), but it does not, and if it did there would be a gap for a near-identical relative (a/za&yrz^ for instance) to All. One of the rather better brief characterisations is the following: "a social philosophy that rejects authoritarian 6 7 8 9 Ed I. Frolov, 2nd revised ed, Progress, Moscow, 1989. Apter p.3. HI p.70. For such proposals see e.g. Carter,Websters' Dictionary (?), Marshall p.3. 16 government and maintains that voluntary institutions are best suited to express man's natural social tendencies'/ (Woodcock, Ency Phil, p.lll). While the first negative conjunct, which n governmental' right, might rate a pass (though anarchism is not always a philosophy, it is sometimes a practice), the second positive conjunct calls the whole account into doubt. Many humans naturally thrive in authoritarian settings. Defective definitions of anarchism abound, many regrettably supplied by high profile anarchists or well-regarded commentators (whereupon they assume a certain air of authority, a bogus air). A few examples will be considered, mostly drawn from a large list of similarly defective definitions included in Clark, who is out to show that any definition which attempts to do justice to anarchism through an essentialistic definition deploying one simple idea is bound to fail, abysmally, to does not 'mean literally "without government'" contrary to Carter, for one. It does however imply systems without governments of prevailing sorts, which is what she immediately proceeds to: 'and the lowest common demominator of anarchist thought is the conviction that existing forms of government are productive of wars, internal violence, repression and misery' (p.14). Right on! Kropotkin, for another, defines 'anarchism' in terms of 'society ... without government'. Like most of the brief definitions to be cited, this is neither necessary #)r sufficient. For 'government' has to be narrowed to its coercive and authoritarian determinate, and other archie arrangements also excluded. Many, Runkle for one, maintain that anarchism 'opposes authority in all its forms'; but elsewhere Runkle holds that its essence is individual liberty'. Others, Goodman for one, suggest anarchism is defined in terms of decentralization, still others, Bakunin for one, suggest characterisation in terms of 'organization from below upwards, by means of federation'. Again this is neither necessary nor sufficient. It is not so easy to And an adequate characterisation of anarchism. (I have found none in the literature, despite some searching. That is reason why a certain amount of work has gone into such basics). There is a tendency to leap from the inadequate to the excessive—a tendency exemplified by Clark, who also cites Woodcock approvingly. Anarchism is first contracted to a rather elaborate doctrine, or political theory, thereby excluding practice. Then requirements are sharply inflated: For a political theory to be called "anarchism" it must contain: 1) a view of an ideal, non-coercive, non-authoritarian society; 2) a criticism of existing society and its institutions, based on this anti-authoritarian ideal; 3) a view of human nature that justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal; and 4) a strategy for change, involving immediate institution of non-coercive, non authoritarian, and decentralist alternatives (p.127). As Clark indicates, this "minimum" "definition" is an elaboration of another account, briefer and 10 See Clark p. 118ff. Clark's attack on essentialistic definitions is in the style of Wittgenstein. 17 better, that Woodcock also offers: 'historically, anarchism is a doctrine which passes a criticism of existing society; a view of a desirable future society; and a means of passing from one to another" (cf. p.120). There is nothing here about human nature, which anarchism need have no particular views about, perhaps rejecting the notion altogether as part of archist propaganda or similar, n There is nothing about the ideal society, or any commitment to one. Anarchists are not seeking societies; that is an illusory, Enlightenment goal, have transformed to get another excessive condition of adequacy for anarchist societies. It would be quite enough to achieve satisfactory societies. 12 Realistic anarchists may even come to appreciate that there are no ideal societies, perhaps just various less unsatifactory and better justified societies than virtually all of the extraordinarily narrow range of modem societies presently exhibited or on offer. However Clark's discussion of "the ideal"" reveals that he does not really intend an ideal, but only one or other of the plurality of societies meeting certain adequacy conditions. It certainly does not intend a unique one, ideal. 'Some adequate" or similar should substitute" for 'an (the) ideal", and the definition should be duly pluralised. Outside explications of anarchism which answer back to dictionary accounts, there are various high redefinitions (e.g. Clark) and some weird redefinitions. One such weird redefinition is that proferred by Taylor, who—rightly enough contrasting anarchism with the presence of the state where there is a concentration of the means of deploying force—defines a as where 'force is perfectly dispersed, not concentrated at all" (82 p.6). But Taylor does advance from pure anarchy, of which there are no examples, to an illuminating discussion of the exercise of concentrated force in societies. In recognisably anarchistic societies there is but limited concentration of force (based on physical inequalities), which 'is /10c in use. There is no standing specialist group or organisation or centralised system of groups...' No doubt a /MZ/er anarchist f/t^ory has to accomplish much of what excessive characterisations of anarchism,^ list, and more. Any reasonably full theory should * include a critique of authoritarian and coercive features of present and past societies and their institutions; 11 12 13 The important matter of such "nature" is discussed later.. Presently we are very far removed from such societies, except for small communities mainly in rich countries. States have done extremely poorly in this regard. There is not one satisfactory state in all of Africa or the Americas. Even small European states that at least have avoided extensive poverty, homelessness, and violence are in doubt because of * virtually entire destruction of their natural environments * reliance for wealth on impoverished Third World countries * justified dissatisfaction of many of their inhabitants. those of Woodcock and Clark p.120, p.126. r 18 * outline features of noncoercive nonauthoritarian societies as alternatives to, and improvements upon present dominant social arrangements, for some regions at least; * suggest strategies for attempting to change from defective forms to improved alternatives. Clarke also tries to insist, what we shall subsequently reject, that for a 'theory to called "anarchism" it justifies the hope for significant progress towards the ideal' (p.127). As well as theory, there is practice. (Clarke also goes astray in excluding anarchism as a , "anarchism without doctrine", and so on.) The pracfice of anarchism, generously construed, naturally includes the state of being in anarchist conditions, of living under anarchism (though perhaps unaware of doing so). There is scope for wfr/toM? Many primitive societies thus qualify as anarchistic; they practice, or practiced, anarchism though unaware (somewhat as wild animals practice hygiene, knowing without knowing ;%af). Further, no doubt now stretching 'practice' beyond its assumed anthropic context, many animal communities practice anarchism, very successfully. Many attracted to anarchism, an anarchism without name even, long for analogous pure practice, many practicing environmentalists for instance. They hope that whatever it is will operate, perhaps even materialize, without any heavy-duty theory, without excess or even any intellectualizing, perhaps without even thought or much effort on their part. In contemporary circumstances they would have to be extraordinary lucky; a paternal state with caring elements, such as safe jobs and spoon-fed indoctrinal education for all citizens, does not relinquish its control voluntarily. While definitions can be defective or otherwise unsatisfactory, in m^y ways, one thing they are not is dogmatic (as suggested by Marshall, none too subtlely trying to evade critical details in delimiting his massive study, p.3). Though insisting upon^themes definitions yield upon substitution can be dogmatic, having or offering definitions is not. Significant criticism of definitions is logically different, belonging to different categories. As well as decking anarchism out with defective definitions, with all the scope for argumental malpractice that affords, there is a coupled practice of boxing anarchism in, by narrow and confining constraints, jf iZZ/czf/y ctrcMWMcri&ing (Whereas definitions characteristically yield necessary and sufficient, conditions, such circumscription concerns necessary, or possibly sufficient conditions). Many of the restrictions imposed are, however, quite inessential, and have rather the effect of excluding viable alternatives. Simple examples concern waAmg, which is sometimes taken as having always to be case by case, and elsewhere is seen as necessarily involving all parties, large assemblies, or even complete social participation. None of this is essential, often the restrictions would prove undesirable. Often the circumscription technique proceeds by presenting features of, or said to be of, 19 historic anarchism, then tacticly assuming that all anarchism must conform to those features.*4 That is one reason why definition and characterisation are important; so anarchism is not set in riged past forms, unable to adapt to new circumstances and ideas. Another example concerns the character of the anarchist revolution, onto which many restrictions are loaded, often resulting in gratuitous puzzles, which are removed with the impositions. For example, it is said that 'the revolution had to be a mass affair" (M p.94). But nothing in anarchism, or its general development, requires this. (As a result the dilemma Miller finds .p.99 ff., simply falls over.) A revolution could be carried out by an elite anarchist band, or, in some states, through a single governor or president. Again, it said that the revolution is bound to be authoritarian (which renders an anarchist revolution contradictory), violent, and so on. This we have on authority from Engels: 'a revolution is certainly the most authoritarian thing there is; it is the act whereby one part of the population imposes its will upon the other by means of rifles [etc.] authoritarian means, if such there be at all', to which Miller adds approvingly that to say in power the party must rely on military means and 'terror of arms' (M p.92). None of this is so. A revolution could lag rapid change through mass conversion; for instance, there is a sign or appearance that is widely recognised, a new social movement which spreads like "wild fire", etc. 3. Anarchism and the state. While organisation and government are entirely compatible with anarchism, that most conspicuous modem institution, the state, is not: it is the paradigmatic archist form. Nor are ancient power formations such as the empire and the kingdom really compatible with anarchism. A prime reason is their authoritarian character and their extensive use of coercion and violence, but reasons als<4 includd^hein centralized organisation (such as power and hierarchical structure). Let us focus upon the state, against which a major and often virulent part of anarchistic political critique is directed; indeed such is the opposition to the state and its features that anarchism is sometimes distinguished in that way, in terms of 'hostility to the state ... [which] should be abolished and replaced by a new form of social organisation' (thus Miller p.5). But again these may be consequential, not characterising features of anarchism, which are derived from characterising features together with a standard theoretical characterisation of Under one such standard (though fairly strong^) characterisation, the state is a and 14 15 This is a much favoured tactic with critics of anarchism. For many examples, some only Quoted in the main text, see Miller. Although strong, in certain respects the characterisation is not strong enough. A state must not only be able to c/ai/n all these sorts of power, but sometimes to exercise them. Cf. Taylor's criticism of Weber's definition of the state (p.5). A body ... it claims complete authority to define the rights of its subjects .... Second, the state is a body, in the sense that everyone bom into a given society is forced to recognise obligations to the state that govern that society. Third, the state is a body: it claims a monopoly of force in its territorial area, allowing no competitor to exist alongside it (Miller p.5). It also normally claims other monopolies, such as on legal tender. It is virtually immediate, powers. So it is that anarchism is often epitomized as directed at the dissolution of, what is widely seen then, that the state is a comprehensive as major political problem, the state. As to why it is such a problem, anarchist critiques of the state, sketched below, will reveal. With anarchism implemented in a place there is then an end there to any institution that is recognisably a state. The subsequent argument for anarchism does not depend upon a strong characterisation of .yfafe, such as that so far offered. Even fairly weak characterisations will serve. But inadequate characterisations, such as the following, will not: 'a collective object with territorial boundaries and political organisation throughout that territory". For that omits essential features of the state, such as sovereignty, authority, coercive control; it describes a possible anarchist society. 16 Arguments/or the state (which anarchism is normally concerned to fault) are however sensitive to characterisation. Mostly these arguments reach little further than, justify no more than, some sort of "minimal state"", very different from anything the Earth has had on offer (e.g. a nice state guaranteeing basic rights rather than removing rights: but anarchism need hardly oppose such arrangements). So it will matter just how ^<2^ is characterized. But this is easier said than done: is a ^k cluster ( muqti-criterial) notion, explications of which are controversial and typically contested.i? In seeking a satisfactory working characterisation, a useful starting point is the following short definition: 'a collective item with territorial boundaries and political organisation exercising sovereign power".is As anarchism can comfortably accommodate the first parts, political organisation within a region, it is the last part, sovereign power (as spelt out, e.g., in Miller's account) that is the problematic distinguishing factor. In a way, the term ruling sui^ipreme, derived from la&Ctptein which reflects the Greek reigning or says it all, why anarchism is bound to oppose a state so empowered. Improved detailing will exhibit a similar division between acceptable and unacceptable. A state, which comprises a 16 A' 17 18 q/ Virtually all the key political terms that we shall encounter have a disconcerting multiplicity of meanings: so it is with state, sovereignty, democracy (422 senses in Naess p.30), ideology, and so on. Fortunately these terms are dealt with^ elsewhere in this work. For a useful attempt at a multi-criterial characterization,and discussion of controversies over characterisations see Dun^eary "The state * (in Goodin & Pettit). Reese, with 'item * substituted for 'entity * to evade reificative issues. 21 interconnected (their level of cohesion justifying a definite description), has domains consisting of a and of who form an associated society. The territory of a state consists of spatial regions, over which it normally exercises control. Subjects are generally those humans who regularly reside in the territory (citizens form a of subjects, singled out by possession of certain duties and rights). The state is not the only authoritarian body to be repudiated. Lesser authoritarian organisation, such as those proposed under terms of functionalism (military barracks, prisons, reform schools, etc.) are to be similarly repudiated. No doubt on occasion the ability to coerce makes an institution more "effective", much as childrens learning of uninviting material is sometimes rendered more effective by coercive means, e.g. heavy cannings, floggings. But the repugnant means, and their common chase outw^eight the gains, if any, in effectiveness achieved. Now, having thus arrived at regular anarchism, reputiating the state, we confess to the evident, to the refinement of the notion of anarchy away from widespread common usage where it functions primarily as a powerful directive away from disapproved anti-statist life. Given that anarchism is thereby rendered (as in many dictionaries which of course reflect usage) a contradictory notion, encompassing both disorder without the state and order alternative to the state, some refinement and some diversion of disorder is no doubt desirable. The trouble with this easy resolution is that the early uses of 'anarchism' in English operated precisely with the corrupt drunk-and-disorderly side of the contradiction—disorder as contrasted with spendid state order. That was what (in defiance of the original Greek meaning) 'anarchy' and 'anarchism' were introduced to mean (see OED citations from 16-17th C). Thus the early usage, which persists, contradicts the refined and now regular usage. In technical presentations this problem is easily sliced through, by coining a term to mean what anarchy as refined means (anaRyri'2 and anacracy are such terms). Here however we shall simply persist with the refinement of the prevailing term, and in the course of giving it etymological justification over the early corrupt uses, further refine. 19 But the justification for refinement is not only 19 Tempting as it may be to switch, alternatively to new, freeing terminology, that temptation has here been largely resisted. Anarchism is a term, and idea, worth retaining. Not that there is anything amiss with new terminology: quite the contrary, provided that it is well-indroduced and pointful. In the course of drafting this book, a variety of new terminology has been toyed with—including such nice terms as (signifying non-domination)—because, as is regularly emphasized, anarchism is now such a turn off for most people. No doubt in more pdular versions (written by someone else), anarchism will disappear from headings, displaced by new terminology with a hint of old such as ^ada^waacra^y, or, less scrupulously, its place usurped by ^car-vacuous terms in high popular favour such as d^/nocracy. In this less popular version, anarchism stays; but, in pa^t compensation, some pleasant absolute terms, and senses, have been revised. They offer acceptable alternatives. A more powerful consideration than negative connotations is perhaps this: The present text, though strictly / 22 etymological. Do we need yet another term for lawlessness, or for disorder? Don't we rather need a term to help break the false dichotomy between: the state or political disorder? As if there are no further alternatives, like stateless order of various kinds? Or (as much ill-informed literature suggests), no political theory without the state, merely untheorizable confusion? 4. A refined explication of anarchism. derives from the ancient Greek Etymologically meaning: without a chief or head, or without a top authority. Of course what the form derives from, though often indicative, does not determine what it now means. (Anarchism was not, after an ancient political theory, but is in fact, under familiar classifications, the most recent and novel of major political ideologies.) However it M worth drawing out the etymological meaning, because it is revealing. What it appears to exclude are political arrangements structured with a top element of any of the following authoritarian sorts: a monarch, a prince, a ruler, a leader, a president, a prime minister, and shifting from individual to group form, a party, a clique, a ruling elite, a central power such as a state, etc. There are, analysis reveals, two interacting foci: one, a top or centre, and two, control or dominance flowing from this top by what are adjudged inadmissible means, authoritarian or coercive means in particular. A chief both stands at the top of a power hierarchy and exercises authoritarian control from there. Under this anarchy entails double foci structure or organisation without inadmissible top-down or centralized means. Let us look at the foci in turn, beginning with the more independent one, the top. Topologically, wif/tonf % fop amounts to wzt/zoMt % cenfre, because by topological transformations (roughly&^nJzKg and stretching as what rubber objects will permit) what is a top transforms to a centre, and vice versa. Diagrams illustrate the transformations: top (of tree, semi lattice) o centre o investigating is so far removed from what normally enters under that denomination that different terminology is warranted, terminology which then has the advantage of shaking off all those negative associations of anarchy. The salient differences from run-of-the-mill anarchism will appear when preferred forms are detailed subsequently. 23 Volcano from top from sides * peak * peak Given such transformations, which will be taken for granted, anarchism also excludes arrangements structured with a controlling centre, such as a ruling central government. It implies decentralization in a precise sense. It does not thereby also remove all structure: it leaves intact a rich variety of structure including network arrangements with no centres (or with multiple "centres"), federation structures or similar. Yet another example is afforded by lateral structuring with central "centres" dispersed via function, as ilustrated;^ service "centres" The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Conci-ye Dzcfiofiuiy, 'structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something *. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of of elements and parts, among which order relations figure prominently, though not exclusively. That is, structure involves order, as a critical component. Remarkably, the same sort of <y%n/c%r&y occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, not just social and political theory, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem-dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R, 20 Insofar as there is a single centre, it is the bottom, the people. Major condinating issues are referred to people, for instance through referenda. So there a will be a referenda organising office, but it will be independent cooperative. 24 on item c in Q, i.e. R = Re- For example, where Q is a system of where R may itself worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Qis a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an orJer, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its ranged The system <Q, R> is a simple ordered structure, or ay%w%^. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of -yMpreyniow, and likewise woxiwMw, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.22) 77^oreTH. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 +2 „ = {=2,-l,-0, +0, +l,+2} +0 R - — is as shown by arrows. -0 -1 T = {+0, +1, +2} is a frufh component -2 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements to t. trans^ity required of order. 21 There are various cases, depending upon conditions 22 A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without "anarchy" or chaos, because there is order), structures. afford numerous examples. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy. 23 As immediate corollary is that inferences from anarchy (without a top or centre) to absence of order to disorder are fatally flawed. What lacks a top or centre may nonetheless enjy satisfactory order. Structures induced in anarchic arrangements can be far from chaotic (and may be modest and stable equivaien&s8i conditions). It is worth alluding to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, monarchs, patriarchs, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against <2^x9/%^ of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R 23 Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. More on this subsequently. 26 itself is relative to c), and of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerged centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The to be developed agam-yf takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically. For an added or infiltrated top or the centre to be troublesome, something anarchism need bother removing or shun where it figures, it has to have an role. Politically that presumably means exercising power in some way. That is, the head (the head that is lacking in %7i#rc%(?.y) is an operative head, not a mere figurehead. Anarchism need not exclude princes, monarchs, emperors, or "governors", such as some countries now maintain. If the people really like having such relics, royalty or "aristocracy", as is often said they do, then they can presumably have them if they are prepared to afford them. Indeed this figurehead role is just what is presumed for the prince under more plausible anarchist construals of Taoism.25 The ideal prince is a Taoist who takes no action, a sage who is rarely or never seen, whose existence may merely be known to the populace or even simply rumoured (that is almost to say, though Lao Tzu could not tactfully assert it, the ideal prince is a nonexistent inoperative sage). 24 For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10. 25 See Clark 84 p.165. Also UTD. 27 As indicated, the main features adduced are mirrored in logic, which can serve as a structural guide. It is striking, as well as technically advantageous, that logical and political predelictions converge. Mainstream irrelevant logics have algebraic structures with top elements, Boolean algebras in the case of classical logics. By contrast relevant logics, which now challenge the classical logical paradigm, do not. Their corresponding algebras, De Morgan monoids and such like need include no top element. The top element, T, is directly responsible for positive paradoxes, of the basic form A -* T (anything at all implies the True), of mainstream logics, paradoxes infecting much theory which relevant logic avoids.^ The logical structure shows that sub "centres" need not have such damaging effects; a plurality of local "centres", regional nodes, induces no paradox. The figurehead analogy also operates analogically, in logic. It does not matter if a semi lattice structure is extended to include a top element, so long as that addition provides only a conservative extension. (If T is added to top a relevant lattice, it has in stronger logics to be kept out of implication relations, else it will induce a non-conservative relevant extension with theses like A -* T.) But otherwise, as an inoperative top-piece it is admissible. Technical comparisons now reach much further than logic alone, as we leam more and more about decentralised structures, about decentralised cerebral organisation, decentralised Al and topless connectionism, and decentralised intelligent structure. Intelligent organisation without top or central elements may abound both in nature, for instance in insect cerebral organisation and in vertebrate brain structure, and in many future artificial intelligence applications. Logic and computing technology demonstrate, what is widely appreciated outside political theory, that topless is feasible.2? There is scope, and need, for twenty-first century anarchism to be highly techno-logically sophisticated. There is more to anarchism than political structure without an operative top, head or centre, than a lateral structuring. That more, the residue of the rejection of archy, is more difficult to characterize in a way non-prejudicial to types of anarchism. It is bound up with the operation of the active top, with the confroZ for example it exercises, the potter it exerts, or the like: non-prejudicially, it cannot operate As to what are unacceptable means, however there are different specifications. These many include—what can be summarized, under a single rubric, as —force, coercion, authoritarianism (and what implies any of those, such as totalitarianism); and, much more controversial, nonvoluntary, nonindividualistic, socialist and communist, means. As in dictionariess entries for "anarchism", only coercive and authoritarian elements will be ruled unacceptable (for 26 See WR. 27 The subsequently preferred variety of anarchism, while not at all opposed to slates losing their heads, is powerfully opposed to people literally loosing their heads (figuratively again, it may be alright). 34 A Gramsci, 'The intellectuals * and 'The modem prison * in gcZccfzony /row ?7zc Prz'yon M?fc&ooRy (ed. Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith), International Publishers, New York, 1971. D. Mannison and others (eds.), Environment?/ P/zz/oyopAy, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EP. D. Miller, Aaarc/zzym, J.M. Dent and Sons, London, 1984; referred to as M. D. Mitrany, 7%c Ennctona/ 77zcory o/PoEr/cy, Martm Robertson, London, 1975. A. Naess and associates, Democracy, /Jeo/ogy aaJ D/?/eciiviiy, Oslo University Press, Norway, 1956. R. and V. Routley, 'The irrefutability of anarchism *, &?cza/AZfcrnaEvcy, R. and V. Routley, 'Social theories, self-management and environmental problems *, in EP; referred to as SM. R. Sylvan, and D. Bennett, 'On Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology *, D/ycayyzoa Papery in EavzrozzmczzZaZ P/zz/oypp/zy, #19, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1990. R.P. Wolff, 7a De/ence o/Aaarc/zzym, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. ADDITIONAL SOURCES P. Nursey-Bray, an Aaaa/arcJ EzEZzagrap/zy a/Aaarc/zzym , Greenwood Press, 1992. END NOTES 2 Cf Clark p.ll8ff. The general methodological issue of multiple determinates of key political terms and their archist confinement is taken up in a later chapter. *J^A /TrT^^<Z7 (y/^cA e.ncrcicj/ ^ A A' '< -' z? y // /yr *-^. C r^O V. J * /X o J* ,<^A<_ . ) *4 C^c/^ / /Xot^z &J> f A-w^ t^i^L to n > etA A jt? cj C rZ-?/T^T <*C Zt , <^<!"// , cx^d /7^/^'Cx ^9 /?. 3* f,. /A^t / TL^i- c— ^^4—UT^-? ^-7y47 /^" <-/ f' z' ^^L-J 7 1 CHAPTER 2. ELABORATIONS OF ANARCHISMS There are wany anarchist theories. For an anarchist theory is any laterally structured theory which duly conforms to the anarchy principle, of rejecting political authority and coercion. While received anarchist theories restrict anarchism to certain more specific forms (the standard options of considered below), p/ara/ijtic anarchism does not; plural anarchism not only admits the plurality, but takes advantage of it any may revel in it. Not all of this variety, not all anarchisms in the sheaf of systems, are of equal merit. Some forms are decidedly undesirable — like anarchisms expanding on the violent or chaotic varieties of popular imagination — in much the way that the nasty states of modem history, that anarchism opposes, are undesirable. Such undesirability may devolve from external rather than internal political characters. Thus, for instance, regions committed to global power projection to retain their privileged way of life (most unlikely under anarchistic arrangements) or committed to transnational terrorist practices. While standard anarchisms have been located in the more desirable, or even eutopian, end-range of anarchist systems, they by no means exhaust the satisfactory forms or even the most promising forms (as explained in chapter 5). Indeed in important respects the desirable range is significantly open for further elaboration of newer (and greener) forms. As varieties of anarchy may diverge, widely, so correspondingly do motivations and justifications for various divergent forms. The motivations, for instance, range from entirely theoretical (conceding to the warranted force of political scepticism) to practical (changing the local world); from personal and perhaps selfish (getting the state off one's back, or out of one's business and one's till) to other directed (eliminating a state oppressing its people) to environmental (disestablishing another vandalistic state). Common motivations trace back to the common character of anarchism: repulsion by, or opposition to, oppression, perhaps generalised from the state to all analogous political and bureaucratic structures, or expanding on that again, to all gross power relations. Indeed it is appealingly suggested that what anarchy is really all about is gross power relations, their reduction and removal; state coercive and authoritarian power are but paradigmatic of such power and domination relations. But while such opposition to gross power does characterizer gentler anarchism, heavy power methods are acceptable to tougher anarchisms; gentler anarchisms tend, so it will be argued, to be all of more pacific, more liberal and more rational than tougher or hardened anarchism. There are other expansionary liberal democratic motives for anarchism, further varying this theme: a yearning for removal of constraints, and for more extensive freedom; or a desire for more extensive equality, which would of course diminish those inequalities power delivers. Such motivations too have illicitly worked their way into variant characterisations of anarchism. ? 2 While a popular image of anarchists remains that of hardened terrorists, exercising authority over hostages using state-manufactured guns, many anarchists are joined by opposition to all such naked authority or coercion. Indeed 'behind the anarchist attack on the state and other coercive institutions, there has often stood a fundamental critique of the idea of authority itself (M p.15). An important, though certainly not invariant, mofivafmg and r^<?n for anarchism derives from a more sweeping anti-authoritarianism: the theme that no person or organisation can ever rightfully exercise authority of (political cast) over another. Picturesquely it is the theme that no authority is justified, no one, state or other, has a right to push another around. Too briefly it is sloganised to assert, no bosses, no leaders, or similar. Such general opposition to the principle of authority has even been dubbed "philosophical anarchism". It is an unfortunate choice of terminology given Feyerabend's different anarchistic challenge to much in philosophical theory and practice. * But some further classification and labelling undoubtedly helps. A princZp/^J anarchism takes exception on principled, characteristically ethical, grounds to objectionable authority or to coercion, that is to prime target elements undiluted anarchism directly rejects. But irrespective of type of anarchism intricated, much in anarchist theory, including a fuller characterisation, turns upon the twin notions of anf/ion/y and coercion, what these terms mean and cash out to, and why it is considered important to avoid damaging features of this sort? Both authority and coercion fall into the general category of power relations, a category that has rightly featured large not merely in anarchist theory but in social theory more comprehensively. As Aristotelian definitions of 'authority and coercion , by gunus and differentia, will be offered, an essential preliminary consists in pinning down the genus, power. * Power gm/ reZevan? serfs. Defective definitions of power, authority and coercion abound. Despite the importance of the notions for political theory, not just for anarchism, it is rare to encounter satisfactory formulations. A defective formulation from recent relevant anarchist theory defines power as 'the ability to compel compliance, either through the use of force or the threat of force (Wolff p.4), a conspicuously high redefinition. Rather, a power reZofion is a relation where one of the relata, that having the power, can normally get the other relata to do something (down to entertaining a belief, considering an idea). Power is a can-do; it may not be exercised. But there need be no compulsion or compelling compliance; nor need its exercise always succeed. Further its exercise need not involve force or threat thereof; it may be effected by a range of other means. 1 By Wolff, and following him, Miler and others. Feyerabend's philosophical anarchism, his is sometimes better labelled anarc/h-yiH, a type of nihilism. But it stops short, excluding logical methods (irrationally scorned however) from variation^ .In fact without a sharp—unavailable—distinction between logical and other (empirical or pwidivist) methods, this methodological anarchism is incoherent. 3 on the one side, bribery, seduction, blackmail, and so on, and on the other, knowledge, prowess, charisma, and so on. It is no secret that major problems in human social and political affairs devolve upon power, its excessive or evil use, misuse, regulation and control. But by no means all power, not even all political power, is bad. Distangling the undesirable, negative forms is an essential exercise, often neglected. After observing the failure of radical social theory to provide an adequate investigation of power, Clark embarks on a critique of the "classical model"2 According to the received conception, power is depicted as a relation of domination in which the powerful subject the powerless to control in order to exploit the latter. In both classical Marxism and anarchism this exploitation is conceived as being essentially economic. Thus, for Marx, "political power, properly so called, is merely the organised power of one class for oppressing another (p.231). It is evident that what we see here is an attempt to explain power through, and then reduce power to, certain of its determinate forms: domination, then control, exploitation, oppression, and then organised and economic forms of these. These determinates are all, though important, rather special and rather negative, black forms of power. Power may be short-term, just for a day for instance or once only (a creature requires power only for a short period, because of what it is, because it loses power thereafter, because it has access to short-term drugs, magic, hypnosis, contracts, etc.). Domination is a longer-term relation, a disposition, between recognised parties, with a decided bias in favour of one party the power-holder; exploitation and oppression increase that bias, in specifiable ways, control however removes it. Power may, furthermore, be applied for positive and libertary, purposes, to help powerless to achieve something or other, to survive, prosper, and so on. Briefly, the concerning power is not power itself, but certain of its forms, its negative forms, and its excessive use. This last can be assimilated, by taking excess as a negative form. The negative forms are, of course, though they can be independently specified, the bad, or undesirable forms, forms as was earlier said.3 These include, among other forms, closed authority and coercion. They also include such overlapping forms as oppression, exploitation, domination, and so on. Privilege goes with these latter forms; it is held by the power-holders and their circle. It is held moreover exclusively by this circle; others, at the other end of the power relation, the power-less, are excluded from its possession. That is, the domain and range of a given power relation are exclusive: no one is both an exploiter and exploited (though of course someone, a husband day labourer for example, may be both exploited in his labour and domineering over his wife). 2 3 A critique, p.231 ff. too quickly petering out in an inconclusive, discussion of Foucault on power, where power turns into what is not, something mystical and all-pervasive. In these respects, power is like other notions, of green political significance, for one, for another. 4 There are two separable kinds of undesirable power: excessive and malselective or illdirected. The two kinds are more or less replicated in other significant phenomena that have been, like power, too sweepingly condemned: economic growth and material consumption. The problematic concerning human consumption is not consumption itself, some level of which is essential to human societies and indeed survival. The problems derive basically from excessive consumption and from poorly selected consumption. Conspicuous consumption, insofar as it delivers a negative form, derives from these: it is either excessive and wasteful or malselective or a mix of these. But the kinds are distinctive. For example, a poor family that buys expensive junk food may spend its limited income poorly, but its consumption may well not be excessive. Similarly with power: the limited power an individual or group possesses, whether exercisable for evil or not, may be better or worse directed. In term of power and its gross exercise, much in more gentle anarchisms can be / synthesized, namely all that is otherwise packed into the rubric: unacceptable means. What is unacceptable is gross exercise of power, including types of political power exploited by tougher anarchisms, terrorist power, crude fire power from the barrels of guns, and so on. What correspondingly gentler anarchisms oppose are all institutions and arrangements, not just the state and those tied to it, that can exert gross power. The state mightly concentrates, and centralizes, such power/ Even so the state is merely paradigmatic among undesirable and excessive power structures — a power hungry one at that, since it looks for a surplus product in power, along with a monopolistic position. But militia posts, torture shops, and pirate ships are other more localized structures. Coercive and closed authoritarian arrangements (opposition to which helps define anarchism) are distinctive marks of such grossness. Dilute anarchisms tone down opposition certain types of power (typically authority); they admit exercise of power that gentler anarchism would regard as gross. From the problematicness and undesirability of excessive power, main objectives of ( anarchism for ameliorative change flow: decentralisation, division and separation of powers. Centralised powers are to be separated and decentralised; aggregated powers to be broken down into functional components; and so on. Tougher anarchism proposes more, rival power play, resisting and undermining power through power, to break down its excesses and reveal its limitations, fighting fire with fire. One trouble with this tough and morally dubious strategy, which can be spectacular, is that it easily overreaches, producing for instance inadmissible coercion of others. 4 Not all state power is undesirable. Some of state regulation and redistribution, effected through power is certainly desirable. The argument will be that these elements are completely outweighted by the undesirable components of state power, and that they can be independently effected without the state. 5 Gentler anarchism travels in the vanguard of the long retreat from barbarism in human practices and institutions. In more enlightened parts of the world we have witnessed the progressive removal of physical punishment, such as: maiming, blinding, executing, stoning, torturing, transporting, flogging, corporal punishing, starving, chaining, incarcerating, imprisoning, infecting, ...and extensions, such as: serious threats thereof and assistance or encouragement of these practices elsewhere. Such enlightenment has not penetrated many parts of the world to any extent, and has far to reach yet even in the most civilized regions. TTyugh the gentler anarchist theme of curtailment of power, we can tap into several rich connections. The excessive drive to power and strength, the "will to power", is a conspicuous feature of modernity. Interestingly Nietzsche went so far as to claim that the will to power was basic motive in human affairs. Fortunately such a socio-psychological claim, about prevailing human nature and institutions, has little to substantiate it. But undoubtedly power motivates much, much too much, in modernity; otherwise anarchism would lose much of its more sweeping point. It was not always so; the quest for power at all costs, the flaunting of power, was at least highly problematic (as drama revealed); it did not always gain the adulation it now widely commands. It did not win respect from early anarchism, as manifested in Stoicism and Taoism. It would not have won endorsement from Aristotelibnism; for power, of both institutions and individuals, like so many other attributes, is evidently similarly constrained to a While the rough bounds are evident enough for an instrumental object such as a vehicle, which wastes fuel and becomes dangerous when excessively powered, but cannot perform its tasks if underpowered, the bounds, especially ^e lower, may not be so conspicuous elsewhere (e.g. with military hardware, intelligence reserves, etc.). Organisations and institutions, which should be vehicles to serve social ends, enjoy once again a striking analogy with logical systems. Logical systems, when excessively strong in the fashion of modem mainstream systems, ensnarl users in a tangle of paradoxes and other troubles (for detailed discussion see RLR, p.240 ff.). On the other hand, if they are excessively weak they fail to meet reasonable conditions of adequacy, to afford satisfactory vehicles of inference and reasoning. Two species of gross power feature particularly in the definitional elaboration of anarchism: authority and coercion. While undesirable authority is characteristically tied into excessive power, coercion is different, is often once-off, and is malselective power. 6 * Authority, and warranted repugnance of closed forms. Authority is a type of power relation, a relation with the power or influence conferred or supported by other features of one of the relata, the bearer of authority, namely character, station, recognised control of coercive means, or the like. itself is the abstract of the relation : a has authority over or with respect to b. Authority is a proper subrelation of power. For evidently many power relations — those exerted by bullies, bandits, etc — are not authority relations, since the relation is not supported by suitable station. Again the following definition of authority (upon which Wolff founds his philosophical defence of anarchism) is far too narrow: "the right to command, and correlatively, the right to be obeyed" (p.4). Only some who hold authority may be (conventionally) conceded a right to command, or more broadly, to exercise their power. For evidently their power may be exercised in a variety of other ways than through command structures, such as blockages, delays, vetoes, withholdings, and so on, and on the other side, concessions, gifts, rewards, and so on. There are many types of authority relations, many inadmissibly excluded under narrow definitions, not all of which are objectionable, or objected to by anarchists. For an example of an unobjectionable sort, consider the relation of a student to an authority in some field of knowledge, who can in turn back up expert judgements by appeal to a further range of assessible evidence. Such an authority might be called frampar^if (or open), because those with time and some skill can proceed through the authority to assess claims made. Among op%n authorities are contemporary teachers, by contrast with old fashioned disciplinarians, and advanced parents, who can back up their orders with satisfactory reasons. Contrasted with such authorities are op&q%^ (or cZo<y^%f) authorities, who simply stand on their position or station, such authority is objectionable in part because of its dogmatic character.^ Closely allied to op^M^ authorities who can appeal to a conventional rule or procedure (that is how things are done, have been done) without being able to or prepared to opaque authorities are step beyond some rule book. Rule-book authorities are commonplace in bureaucracies, which often encourage such practice in lower level officials. In opaqM^ authorities the justificatory procedure stops a step further out; there is a set of rules, which has been enacted (for reasons not open to, or bearing, examination) by a further substantially opaque authority. Other authority relations are objectionable because of the way in which or the means by which they are backed. Unobjectionable is the authority figure which is exemplary, where what it exemplifies is in its tum satisfactory. Not so relations backed by coercive means, by violence or threats of violence: Big-stick authority relations. Such relations are condemned on moral 5 The impression is widely promoted that science reliably furnishes examples of transparent authorities, in the shape of experts. That impression is astray. Dominant Science frequently functions as a substantially closed authority, rather as the universal Church did, standing on received theory as gospel (for elaboration see DP, chapter 12). 7 grounds, for example by moral pacifists opposed to violence, who do not object to the carrot methods such as sanctions, boycotts, civil disobedience, etc. A diagram will summarise the position so far attained. o/'gMf/tonfy Confine##.? Methods carrot <- stick possibly benign Pacifist Back-up transparent T opposition A opaque Enlightenment Liberal opposition opposition It will be evident that the objections to nonbenign authoritarian relations—to what in clear cases may be presented as to — can be of significantly different sorts. To more opaque authority relations there are objections of enlightenment cast, that reason is lacking for what an authority requires, proposes or asserts, as it was lacking in authoritarian religious and political practice against which the Enlightenment was primarily targeted. (A significant strand of anarchism, more theoretical anarchism, is a descendant: undisclosed reasons of State are not adequate reasons.) To more coercive authority relations there are objections from non-violence devotees. To there may be a kind of liberal opposition, that the party subject to authority is being denied, in one way or another, for unacceptable reasons, a certain freedom, namely ' autonomy. Naturally, movements have been directed at breaking down authoritarian power relations: masters over slaves, humans over animals, men over women, adults over children, etc. States over citizens. A comprehensive civil liberties movement would merge with anarchist movements. Plainly then, these three convergences are linked to three interconnected forms of opposition to authoritarianism: namely * convergence of anarchism with an Enlightenment opposition to opaque authority, which anarchism takes to include state authority. (A response will contend, as religious groups did against Enlightenment charges, that State authority is justified, e.g. it represents the people's will, or some similar fairy tale. But that is what is at issue.) * convergence of anarchism with moral pacifism in opposition to violence and coercion as unmitigated evils which should always be avoided. Of course only some forms of anarchism are 8 involved. Some anarchists are not averse at all to the exercise of heavy power relations, for instance of violence or terror against others (no matter how this violates their free personal space). But observe that such uses of power are not supported by recognised authority but normally directed agnm-sf such authority; so they might be dubbed relations. * convergence of anarchism with forms of liberalism, deriving from solid commitment of normal forms of anarchism, particularly individual varieties to personal liberty. Libertarian ideals have served as a major motivation in historical anarchism. There is a vision of a free society, a 'vision of a society in which social fetters are replaced by social bonds and labour is freely undertaken'.6 ( There are of course other convergences as well, some of them much discussed, such as with marxism. When opposition to authority is broadened to opposition to domination, no doubt there are further convergences, with feminism, with deep environmentalism. A recent convergence, of initial promise, is with ecofeminism, which ought to highly sympathetic to environmentally sensitive anarchism. For both are opposed to domination in all its forms, to downward control lines and power hierarchies. There is an important argument against the state based on its authoritarian character. This argument, to be found is Proudhon and in embryonic form in Rousseau, is developed and given a Kantian tum in Wolff? What Proudhon portrayed as a conflict between the authority of the state and freedom, Wolff represents as 'the conflict between authority and autonomy' (p.18). In this conflict, where the state represents authority, autonomy takes precedence; anarchism is consistent with the supreme virtue of authonomy, but archist doctrines supporting the state are not, because of authoritarian character of the state. Because Wolffs argument has been subject to much criticism which an improved formulation would shed, because too Wolffs formulation leaves something to be desired (it is not sufficiently sharp or tight), the argument will be revamped. A crucial difference is this: whereas Wolff asserts that 'all authority is equally illegitimate', a judgement already rejected, it is now said that all authority is illegitimate, meaning thereby wtoraZ/y illegitimate, not 'having a binding moral force ? 6 7 8 Chomsky, in Guerin p.xii, As to Proudhon see Ritter p.13, pp. 15-16. According to Rousseau such undesirable restrictive features need not pertain for all forms of government; naturally they do not obtain for his favoured arrangements. Wolff tries to repeat this sort of point, less than successfully for unanimous direct democracy. Of course a state may proclaim, even legislate, that its authority is legitimate, and even have other states do the same. But that will not achieve moral, a de jt/re, legitimacy. It is similar when the state endeavours to enforce its authority; /noraf legitimacy is not thereby obtained. Nonetheless these sorts of features go far towards explaining why people acknowledge, rarely questioning, closed authorities like the state. There are other elements which enter into explaining this popular sheepishness, such as: The force of tradition, that is the way things have always been done, the 9 Nor is all closed authority equally objectionable. The unquestionable directives of a benevolent dictator (one whose authoritarian directives and regulations prove inductively to be well directed) can be seen as less objectionable than those of a malevolent dictator. Similarly for a dictatorial group, a junta, or a majority. That the dictator said so, or that the majority said so, does not offer a reason rendering the state less than a closed authority. A core theme, to be embroided and defended, is W1. An autonomous person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate. But W2. The state is a closed authority, of a certain of course. Hence WC1. An autonomous person does not recognise the state as legitimate. The core theme depends crucially on the notion of aMfonowy, on characterising features of the autonomous person. But before that task is addressed, observe that autonomy can be eliminated. First, the rafiona/ person, or a little less satisfactorily, the person, can carry the argument instead, using for instance W3. A rational person is autonomous. So results Wl' with 'rational' displacing 'autonomous', W1'. A rational person does not recognise a closed authority as legitimate. That premiss at once suggests a direct argument devoid of the circuit through persons (or through agents). For what a rational, still more an enlightened, person does not recognise as legitimate presumably is not, and certainly vice versa. In any case, U1. A closed authority is not legitimate. Hence, by W2, UC1. The state is not legitimate. Since this conclusion is equivalent to UC2. The concept of a legitimate state is null, the result sharpens the tentative conclusion Wolff reaches: 'Hence, the concept of a jure legitimate state would appear to be vacuous', to which he adds, thereby presuming other links already made explicit, 'and philosophical anarchism would seem to be the only reasonable political belief for an enlightened man' (p.19). As observed, not too much hangs upon the notion of moral legitimacy deployed, thus far following Wolffs lead, throughout. Simple variations replace 'morally legitimate' or 'legitimate' by 'morally warranted', 'morally justified', 'justifiable', 'rightful' (the last, though a trifle old-fashioned, captures what is intended well). force of character of leaders; their occupation of official positions, which have heavy bureaucratic backing. 10 These arguments permit of much other interesting variation. Wolff s original argument, for instance, precedes from authority as The defining mark of the state', with authority defectively explicated as 'the right to rule' (p.18). Evidently then the middle term, authority, can drop out, and the argument can be formulated along the following lines: VI. The state has the right to rule (without question, its citizens, more or less as it pleases). V2. An autonomous person rejects any (sweeping) right to rule. Therefore VC1. An automonous person rejects the state. Further variations may be obtained by amending the middle term, "right to rule without question" (which effectively replaced "exercise of close authority") to reflect other features of the state, for instance that it can simply tell its citizens what to do, that is has a right to coerce its citizens, rights to institute state monopolies, and so on. Under some variations "autonomous person" should be correspondingly replaced. For instance, if VI is specialized from a right to command and control to the right to send citizens to war, then V2 may be adjusted to apply to the person of conscience, of peace, or similar. As Wolff seeks a grander conclusion than VC1, which might be merely taken to reveal that there are but few autonomous actors about, he invokes a further premiss V3. Autonomy is a (even the) primary obligation. From there, it is an analytic shuffle to the more impressive conclusion VC2. The state ought to be rejected. The arguments are as vulnerable as their premisses. What gets especially contested in the first argument is Wl, concerning the autonomous person. For all the surface reasonableness and even open-door aspects of a more liberal state, W2 holds; it swings into effect as soon as the going gets tough. As Dahl puts it, To obey the authority of the state ... means doing what the you do it'? While there may be a little scope for light and reson as regards more flexible minor officials, that scope is officials of the state tell you to do simply and soley ( t/z^y small; the wall of closed authority can be quickly encountered, particularly with judges and law enforcement officers. If W2 did not hold the state would risk sliding into a voluntary organisation, out of which citizens could opt. In the end citizens are expected to act in a variety of ways (fill in form, take out licences, pay taxes, etc.) because the state tells them to, just because, or else face punitive action. The argument to Wl depends heavily on the meaning of gMfono/ny. Here is one way it can be presented (following Dahl): An autonomous person is self determining. Such a person is not under the direction or choices of another item. While the person may do what another tells him 9 See p.92..Dahl's reconstruction of Wolff effectively applies W2, using Wolffs definition of HMf%<?r#y, to obtain VI. This produces a more complex, and defective, argument. G 11 or her, she does not she has been told to do it. Thus the autonomous person does not conform to closed authorities, and does not acknowledge them or assign them recognition (more than recognition that is). While autonomy is one thing, responsibility is quite another; still a critical reason for arriving at autonomy intricates responsibility. ... so long as we recognise our responsibility for our actions, and acknowledge the power to reason within us, we must acknowledge as well the continuing obligation to make ourselves authors of such commands as we may obey (Wolff p.17), i.e. to make ourselves autonomous. A primary moral demand, central to the moral condition, is, according to Kant and Wolff, to 'acknowledge responsibility and achieve autonomy whenever and whenever possible" (p.17). Assuming responsibility in a life is by means the only reason for striving for autonomy: achieving a certain personal freedom (within natural bounds) and operating a life rationally are other crifica/ reasons. A main argument to V3 indicated by Wolff does proceed from responsibility. It is simply that in order to take full responsibility (for one's actions, choices, etc.), which one should, one has to be autonomous. So one should be autonomous. At least as important philosophically as the argument from W1 and W2 is that from Wl' and W2. While the argument to Wl' may proceed through autonomy it may short-circuit it. The philosophical argument for Wl' is well-known, having been repeatedly emphasized from Socrates through to Russell: that a rational person does not accept anything for which there are not independent investigatible reasons and evidence. The pronouncements of a closed authority do not fall into this class. By revamping the arguments especially that from autonomy as directed against authority, many objections to Wolffs arguments are fairly autonomically voided. Firstly (contrary to Dahl p.47), the arguments are not (any longer, if they ever were) arguments against 'authority of any kind". Not merely was Wolff concerned with the authority of the state; further as Dahl points out next page, the type of authority concerned is that of 'doing what someone tells you to do fo ^Zo if, that is a closed form. A rational person can of course acknowledge an open authority who can offer reason and evidence for prono^cements. For similar reasons, experts, guides and guardians, of open character, are not excluded. Accordingly the arguments does not cut "too broad a swath""; while it properly cuts out closed authorities like absolute rulers, states and similar, it does not mow down open authorities. In like fashion, much of Miller's parallell criticism of philosophical anarchism is voided. Things go astray (in Miller's chapter 2) from the very outset, from the slack formulation of "the principle of authority"", which is chauvinistically formulated, 'no man can ever rightfully exercise political authority over another, that is have a right to issue directions which the other has an obligation to obey' (p.15), and which is then intended to apply to the relation of a state 12 and its officials to its citizens. The formulation has both to be expanded to include persons and organisations as subjects of the relation, and sharply contracted to delimit the kinds of authority and rights concerned. For the explanatory (that is) clause offered reaches far beyond (closed) political authority; it would wrongly rule out contractual relations such as those of freely arranged employment, parental relations, and so on. The counterexamples Miller designs to Wolffs arguments also depend upon shifting ground from closed authority like the state to more open arrangements, such as contracts an autonomous person may have entered into freely. Plainly there will be a limited range of such contracts that a rational person will enter into; long-term future bondage or slavery will not be among them, and Miller's examples may border on the rationality dubious. In any case, in one, an agent morally concerned to relieve poverty enters into authoritarian arrangements, imagined unavoidable for successful action, in which it becomes obligatory for the agent to act under authoritative instruction (p.28). Firstly, the authorities are not closed, they have to be pursuing means directed to poverty relief, else an autonomous agent will not enter into such ". * arrangements Secondly, while contractual obligations, and therewith certain directives of open authoritarian cast, may constitute reasons for action, the situation with the state is very different. There is no contract, and no reasons of contract (also lacking are spotless reasons justifying entering into such a contract). Examples like Miller's arrangements and contracts can be inflated into stock flawed arguments, from consent to the state. Unremarably, Dahl attempts to patch up again these well- worn arguments, but in two mutually inconsistent ways. Second, he proposes that To opt for a democratic state' is The most responsible way of exercising our moral autonomy', and reasonable and rational as ways of maximizing our autonomy (p.49). Insofar as there are any arguments for such wishful conclusions, they depend upon familiar fantasy-world assumptions about the blackness of nonstate arrangements presumed to impact utterly unfavourably on autonomy and the contrasting whiteness of democratic states. That those states are at best a pretty dirty gray, Dahl's first more honest considerations suggest. There he asks, What is so great about autonomy? 'Why not sacrifice some moral autonomy?' As 'unlimited autonomy is impossible', why not settle for autonomy within reasonable state limits? (cf p.48). Compare: why not sacrifice some resistance to homocide and settle for reasonable killing of humans for reasons of state? The moral importance of autonomy Wolff has already explained nicely (pp 14- 17). Autonomy is a primary oM/ganon of rational persons, a constraint, not what Dahl converts it utilitarian-fashion into, a supreme value, to be questioned then traded off against other values. Because of its importance for rational practice the obligation should not be weakened; nor is there good reason to do so. There appear no grounds for forfeiting autonomy to closed 10 Compare Wolffs discussion (on p.15) of relations with one's doctor. 13 authorities, such as the state. It is doubtful that there are even grounds for what Wolff allows, forfeiture of some autonomy to one s doctor, hopefully no longer a closed authority, rather than retaining autonomy and freely following the doctor's advice. Autonomy is not like freedom in limitations; it can in principle always be exercised by a rational person. Submission to the state is a gross forfeiture of that autonomy. While an autonomous agent may place itself under guidance of leadership of another for limited purposes, and may indeed enter into certain sorts of contracts, it will not surrender its whole future life or extensive parts of it to a directorate that may well proceed in suboptimal, subliminal or even irrational ways. Yet that latter is what expected acceptance of the state implies. Accordingly an autonomous person cannot recognise the state; nor can a fully rational one, as it is irrational to place oneself indefinitely under a closed authority. It may be objected that it is unfair to treat Dahl, Miller and others in the preceding fashion, which changes the dialectical playing field. They were attacking Wolff and his over-extended arguments, not a refinement of Wolff which singles out the philosophical nasty elements in authority, and accordingly destroys their counter-examples which operated at the rational open end of authority relations. But that was not all that they were doing. They were using Wolff as a vehicle to draw quite conclusions about the unviability of principled anarchism (e.g. Dahl p.50, Miller p.29), and accordingly should have taken account of simple revampings of arguments like those of Wolff. Nor is this the only respect in which their practice is methodologically unsound. A principle—like that of closed authority, that such authority is legitimate—does not stand because someone's attack (e.g. Wolff s) against it is unsuccessful. Yet this is Miller's methodological procedure against philosophical anarchism (p.26, p.29). This is Popperian falsificationism gone rampant and badly astray. For Popper at least required sustained and strenuous testing and adequate variation; not a few select and easy examples. But of course a Popperian approach by archists is unsatisfactory; the onus of argument is the other way around. An archist has to establish that political authority, such as that the claims and exercises, is rightful. That Wolff intended to work with something like closed authority should have emerged both from Wolffs emphasis on the place of 'grounds and sources' in legitimate authority (p.9), and his flirtation with unanimous direct democracy. What Wolff is exercised about is not compliance with a authority or obedience where there are good or independent reasons for it, but blind, or closed obedience: doing what you are told because you are told to do it (p.9). (Yours not to reason why, yours but to do ....) While these points exonerate Wolff from some overzealous criticisms, they immerse him in others, namely his attempt to combine authority with autonomy under unanimous direct democracy. A major problem is that this combination, 14 so far as it is workable^, appeals not to the closed authority of the state, but to open autonomous arrangements which do not conform to requirements of the state (as Dahl remarks on p.48, the "authority" here is not the "authority" of his earlier definition'; and as Miller observes on p.27, *it is ... arguable whether this state of affairs [under unaminous direct democracy] involves the recognition of Autonomy and freedom tell not merely against the exercise of opaque authority, but against use of coercion. This connection affords the basis for a parallel argument to that against closed authority, to the desirability of a sharp decline in deployment of coercive methods. But parallels between coercion and closed authority do not proceed very far. * Coercion, an impermissible activity. Coercion is very different from exercise of authority. All four places, 1 to 4, in a cross classificatory matrix are regularly occu Died: actions coercive authoritative 1 non-authoritive 2 non 4 coercive 3 Place 1 is well occupied given the State, and is widely exemplified in not only state-citizen relations, but also in authorized domination relations. Place 2 is illustrated in a range of operations which the state often tries to repress such as banditry, piracy, protection rackets, but also in a variety of interpersonal relations. Place 4, that clear indicator of unqualified anarchism, is well exemplified through voluntary cooperation and mutual aid. Place 3, characteristic of many work-place and educational situations, can be easily illustrated through advanced ( education. Coercion, unlike authority, is action. That is why comparisons are with .... of authority; authority may sit, like power, unused, but coercion cannot. Like all action it is a process, a state to state transition, but actively changing or maintaining state. It is a transitive action relation having both a doer, a coercer, and done-tos, coerced, all normally creatures. The transitions include a wide range of more determinate actions such as constraining, restraining, securing, moving, pushing, pulling and so on; and thus coercion (the abstract) includes forcible constraint and compulsion. An essential feature of coercion is that state transitions are effected A/<Z or attempted by coercers through force or genuine threats of force. No such force, no coercion. NY- Defective definitions of coercion are liable particularly to neglect this feature. Thus e.g. Fridman 11 Wolff himself concludes it is not except under highly improbable conditions. Indeed the conditions are more onerous those Wolff allows: required are humans who having consented do not change their minds, etc. _________ /e /6 L < s _ _ z^<^4^-f ___' / ^ry^- /i, <^___ . 15 p.xviii, according to whom being coerced is 'not being left alone'. Perhaps in one special sense, but a person who chooses to have a constant companion is not being thereby coerced. Pressuring someone to do something without attempts or threats to apply force is not coercion. Similarly persuasion is not coercion; censuring, withholding support, applying peaceable sanctions, are so on, are not. All this proves important in meeting objections to anarchist methods. Coercion is not a success notion; a coercer may well not succeed in obtaining what was sought through coercion. This will prove important in explaining why appeal to the state does not automatically resolve political dilemmas. To coerce is maintain or change states, normally of another creature, by implied force (i.e. force or accepted threat thereof). The state transition or statis includes the full range of relevant actions such as constraining, restraining, securing, moving, pushing, pulling aa so on, and thus coercion (the abstract) includes forcible constraint and compulsion. Coercion, by contrast with * exercise of authority, entails potential use of force, force furthermore which will characteristically tum into violence if resistance is attempted. Therein lies a main reason why coercion is so objectionable; its intrication with force and immediate potential for violence. For violence is generally undesirable.^. It follows therefrom that coercive arrangements are generally undesirable and, devolving therefrom, If social organisation can be achieved without them, usually so much the better, certainly the more ethical. A main onus to show that coercive arrangements, such as the state characteristically incorporates, are inevitable, unavoidable or the like, thereupon falls upon archists. 'Since coercive power is self-defeating' and worse, a general theory of 'non-coercive authority' is presented as a 'pressing problem of this stage of history'.13 Unfortunately, the general theory has obtained but little development. But functionalism, in such forms as demarchy (to be transformed below), has gained some elaboration, by some in the peace movement. 14 Worse, Merrifield arrives at the "pressing problem" on the strength of the need for Rt/M? of solution to the authority problem': thesources, methods, and ends of authority (p.724). This "problem" is presumed by way of the following large (anarchist) assumptions: Authority is a requisite of all social life, since in its absence it is both psychologically and physically impossible to coordinate human behaviours so that the ordinary social processes can continue to operate and flourish (p.729). The main claim is an important part of what is at issue between anarchists and archists and is at best highly dubious. Moreover the reason offered in its support is false and should be rejected (a range of counter models and counter examples have been indicated or will be). Furthermore, Merrifield goes on (on the next page) to adduce information on organisations of a sort which 12 13 14 Sec wp in. Merrifield p.724 alluding to the wording Notably B. Martin A/Z&) -sy-Mezn of political functionalism. 16 serve to cast severe doubt upon his claim and its supporting reason. There are various nongovernmental organisation (NGOs), and some intergovernmental organisation (IGOs), which rely upon voluntary, permissive or non-coercive motivations ... to accomplish their functional purposes. ... They may explain, demonstrate, justify and argue, but they cannot usually coerce. The role of functional NGO's is even more pronounced. Lacking any coercive power, they must rely on the validity and demonstrability (p.725). Some of the organisation rely, or need rely, not at all on closed authority. Like the voluntary support and participation basis, so too the organisational structure is voluntarily maintained. There is no hard authority, and no conspicuous authority problem. Coercion, in this respect authority, is also open to objection on rational grounds. Namely, ways of controlling, governing, or getting rational creatures coercive methods are not to do things. Rationality—not the undesirability and demeanment of force not, or not just, freedom—is the ground of this objection. The analysis of coercion admits of immediate fruitful application to (internal) criticisms of anarchism. In the first place, it has been argued that anarchism does not avoid coercion but incorporates coercive elements—which would render it inconsistent (as normally characterised). Further, because of these coercive elements anarchism is incompatible with liberty, thereby multiplying inconsistency, as liberty constitutes one of its main goals. These alleged problems derive from the reliance of anarchism on public censure, and like methods, to control social behaviour. According to Ritter, for example, who makes much of the second problem^, anarchists have the following goals: an (admirable) commitment to liberty, and a heavy reliance on public censure. But these goals are incompatible. For such a 'social scheme relies so much on coercive public * censure (p.10, also p.l). However, the argument to incompatibility is invalid; it makes an illicit insertion of 'coercive * * 'coercive (as the quote above illustrates; in fact the prejudicial slipping in of and 'coercion * occurs right through Ritter's discussions; see e.g. p.25 top and bottom). The social scheme as described involves only public censure in a free setting; such censure does not imply coercion, as no use of force need be involved or even contemplated. Secondly, connectedly, there is a widely exploited false dichotomy between voluntary and coerced activity, under which it supposed that all activity which is not purely voluntary is coerced. To the contrary, the range of actions is more satisfactorily diagrammed as follows: Voluntary vs coerced activity In a first chapter short-tided 'Liberty and pubiic censure', particularly on a muddled p.2. ,u„ ZL.. 17 hard pressured ! soft pressured ) ! (entirely) free ) influenced encouraged (fully) coerced <Actions -* In most standard arguments for the state only the outer bounds are considered.^ But noncoercive methods can include a wide range of influenced or pressured actions, which are less than entirely free. The interesting argument that Dahl draws from anarchism, directed against the state, turns upon on the undesirability, indeed the intrinsic badness, of coercion. In essence (leaving out support offered for the premiss as) the argument is as follows: Pl. M? one Zs obZZg#R?6? to -report or o&ey a sfafe. P2. A// sfafes ore coercive. P3. Coercion Zs intrin-nca/Zy bnJ. P4. A society wit/iont a state is a yeasi&Ze aitemative to a society with a state. This conclusion derives fiom these premisses ('assumptions' as he calls them) Dahl draws Ave conclusions' (p.41). As these are not the most direct or pointed conclusions, let us sharpen the conclusions: Cl. AZZ states are necessariiy &aJ. ^rom P2 and P3 (equivalently recast as: all coercive items are intrinsically bad items), given that intrinsicaZZy so implies necessariZy so. Dahl prefixes Cl by the conjunct, 'because all states are necessarily coercive'. Not only does Cl not require that support; we do not have it (e.g. in P2). While coercion may be taken as defining of the state, or an essential characteristic of it, as Dahl does, however states are defined it is continently true that all of them are coercive. C2 No one has an o&ZZgahon fo, Zs o&ZZgafed to, to support or obey any state. From Pl and Cl. Again Dahl unnecessarily prefixes his analogue of C2 (as for Cl above). Insofar as political obligation is obligation to the state, C2'. 77iere Zs no poZZtZcaZ obZZgatZon; political obligation lapses. Conclusions Cl and C2 specialize, because democratic states are states, to democratic states (that is effectively Dahl's fourth conclusion, p42). Dahl, like Wolff, senses a democratic escape through unaminity procedures, and reaches towards a fifth conclusion, which we will subvert. P5. Unanimity decision practices (can) escape coercion. 16 See for instance Taylor's presentation of game-theoretic arguments. 2^ 18 P6. Democracy can operate through unanimity procedures. These procedures and democracy are presumed to apply to some society, community or association. C51. prac/zc&y (can) escape -yfafcF. C52. Democracy can operate wif/zoaf any .sfafe. This last conclusion is interesting because Dahl regularly assumes, as against anarchism, that democracy must operate through the state, and that democracy is therefore in compatible with anarchism. As conclusion C52 reveals, these assumptions are astray, on grounds Dahl himself supplies (the inadequacy of these assumptions will be independently investigated subsequently). It is worth noting that, irrespective of the merit of premisses P5 and P6 (e.g. because unanimity wears off, because of the rareness of unanimity), the conclusions do not follow without other lesser presumptions. For C52 the transitivity of opcrafc wifAoMf (doubtfully a universal linkage) is presumed, and perhaps some modal shuffles as well. For derivation of C51 from P5 what is presumed is that what escapes coercion escapes the state, which requires a strengthened P2 (already encountered), that states necessitate coercion (as well as a little of the logic of escapism). Dahl's third conclusion, after detachment of (three) because-clauses, is C3D. A// PMg/tf a? A minimal inference scheme enabling derivation of C3D from previously derived statements is this: P3D. where an item is necessarily bad and there is a feasible (less bad) alternative to that item, the bad item ought to be abolished. Then C3D follow from (strengthened) P3D. These are important arguments, both for principled anarchists and for archists, and Dahl rightly invests detailed study to certain of the premisses, those he imagines he can dispose of, most notably P2 concerning the coerciveness of states. It is not that other premisses and steps are not highly controversial; they are. The very first, Pl, yields at least the stock debate as to whether one is obliged to support or obey a bad law; for a state can be viewed as a structure of laws. Instead of an argument for Pl, Dahl offers a thumbnail history of its status, a genetic '^justification". Other justifications there are, rendered easier if P2 is strengthened (as it may be without upsetting the arguments dependent upon it) by replacing 'bad' by 'evil' or 'immoral'. Then initial support for strengthened Pl is that political obligation, likewise legal obligation, is a type of obligation, justified by considerations of obligation generally, and accordinging triumphed by ethical obligation. The detailed arguments for these themes gets down to fundamentals, to the justification of obligations through values. Briefly, obligations obtain only towards items which normally exhibit a sufficient level of positive value. An item like an evil state that condition. So no obligation obtains towards such a state. 19 To escape such an outcome, archists contend that certain states are not evil, for instance Dahl will claim that 'a democratic state is not an evil state" (p.40). Anarchists will by contrast assemble a great deal of evidence that democratic states, like others, are evil (see next chapter). The immediate issue is, however, whether states are evil in principle, by virtue of their coercive features. Now Dahl does not contest 'so elementary a proposition" as P2, the universal coerciveness of states. 'Like any state, a democratic state would use coercion to enforce democratically enacted laws ..." Accordingly, to make his escape, Dahl is bound to dispute P3, and does; coercion is instrumentally justified as a means 'essential to a good purpose , a democratic state (p.40). * As to supposed (second-rate) justifiability of coercion. A conionplace claim, which Dahl advances, is DI. Even though coercion is intrinsically bad, its use is sometimes (reasonably) justified (p.44). Which times?, on which occasions? will turn out to be a critical issue. As against Dahl, it will be contended that its use is never woraZZy justified. However in moral dilemma situations, where all other feasible alternatives have been exhausted, its use can be given a "secondary"" secondrate justification. Such a secondary justification, in very limited circumstances, gives no succour to the state, which depends upon and makes widespread use of much more coercion. That is, DI itself does not justify the sfaR?'.? use of coercion. The first argument Dahl offers is overtly dilemmatic. There is a 'recalcitrant wrongdoer , ( who simply will not refrain from doing serious harm to others. Despite the best efforts of his associates, neither reason, argument, persuasion, public opinion, nor the final sanction of social octricism dissuades him from doing harm. His associates finally conclude that he will persist in harming others unless he is forcibly restrained or threatened with severe harm (that is, coerced) (p.44). Why should that stop him, threats in particular (it does not deter young alienated men in contemporary states)? With ali due respect^the gentle best efforts cited by no means exhaust nocoercive methods available. But let us grant not merely that there are situations where coercion occurs (plainly it is presently a frequent occurrence), but that there are dilemmatic situations where a person may have no alternative in preventing violence but to resort to coercion, for instance in preventing or limiting assault upon another, in self-defence, and so on. In such circumstances, 'coercion would be employed—either by the wrongdoers or by those who restrained them" (p.44). Granted, it is employed. The issues however are whether it is morally permissible, and who may be justified. Certainly the wrongdoers are not justified, and what they do is impermissible. More controversially, what the restrainers do is also morally impermissible; even so their actions may be justified. Given the fixes they were in, where all alternatives were forbidden, still what 20 they did may be situationally justified, as a satisfactory actions in the dilemmatic circumstances.*7 Such situational justification is not what Dahl and other consequentialists are seeking; they want coercion justified without impermissibility strings attached. There is no reason, or need, to accede to their desires. Such a reasonable, and practiced, approach to moral dilemmas (which Dahl himself subsequently takes in his discussion of whether to always obey laws of a democratic state p.4950) here escapes notice. And Dahl introduces two difficulties he incorrectly presumes fatal to 'alternative position ... [that] violence and coercion are absolutely forbidden" (p.45). Firstly, given that coercion is employed, 'the position in self-contradictory". Wrong. For that coercion occurs, whether perpetrated by wrongdoers or by those trying to prevent wrongdoers, does no? imply that coercion is morally permissible (i.e. p -f Pp). Nor does the impermissibility of incompatibles imply self-contradiction, for the covering deontic functors cannot be deleted (i.e. -Pp & -P-p is no contradiction; of course given, what gets rejected, -Pq -* -q, contradiction would ensure). Also wrong, then, is what Dahl takes to emerge from such self-contradiction, no 'guidance for the most elementary choices", said to be an 'indefensible" position (p.95). For coupled with the story concerning moral dilemmas are suggested procedures for making choices (often far from elementary choices) from within the dilemmas. Secondly, Dahl wrongly supposes that so rendering coercion absolute makes it 'a supreme value that eliminates all other ends" including justice, freedom, etc. It does not. No hierarchy of principles (or values), this or another, is adopted, which is one reason why dilemmas occur. As in ordinary ethical practice, ^he principles stand, they are not simply prima they are not ranked, there are no 'trade-offs". It may have become apparent, what requires only a little between-lines interpretation, that Dahl is playing a rather familiar utilitarian game underneath the surface moral concern. Render 'the objection to coercion as a means ... not absolute but contingent on consequences". So weaken absolutist prohibitions on coercion and violence that generous room can be made for an institution which routinely practices them, and to which we can trade up with consequential advantage. Given that coercion occurs without the state, indeed may be quite widespread in the absence of the state, then there might be gains in installing a coercive imitation 'to restrict [!] and regulate coercion". Moreover, if 'on balance the gains from creating a state are likely to exceed the costs, then from a utilitarian perspective it would be reasonable to opt for a state" (p.45). There are two critical gaps in this utilitarian state-pleading. Firstly, impressive evidence for the conditional antecedent that the gains from the state exceed the costs has never been assembled, but rather evidence points in the opposite direction (as we shall see in the next 17 This controversial story has been told before, that for coercion resembles that already related for violence. The general theory of moral dilemmas (in MD) is applied to the issue of violence, control of pacifism (in WP TV). 21 chapter), so detachment from the antecedent is not warranted. Secondly, the performance even of better states in coercion is utterly unimpressive; these states foo amplify coercive practices, do not regulate basic cases, and so on. The state appears to exacerbate the levels, both in extent and intensity, of coercion, over the low levels genuine moral dilemmas would yield. It is unnecessary to contend, however, as Dahl asserts anarchists contend, "that if states did not exist coercion would soon disappear or decline to a tolerable level' (p.45). That judgement, which is not exactly an 'empirical' one, depends very much on the character of alternative societies. An individualistic society might enjoy high levels of coercion owing to the activities of its public-like protective agencies. By contrast, a well-organised society may be afflicted with comparatively little coercive behaviour, rendering Dahl's uncompleted utilitarian argument extremely difficult to complete, ever. Interlarded with the dulcet utilitarian approach, under which they beneficent, ^states will provide us with all those promised superior values many millions are still awaiting — freedom, justice, equality, and so on — lies a more sinister argument; that to the gangster state. That evil state is not so far removed, some may think, from many states that are presently recognised. Without the strong state, the gangster state looms, so Dahl insinuates. So adopt the state, or worse will eventuate. That sort of decision theory argument (itself unpleasantly coercive and out of the same big stable as utilitarianism) depends on some (derived) principle such as choose a least bad alternative, and accordingly fails unless another independent argument to the state succeeds. For otherwise superior stateless choices remain on offer. Yet nothing more than the po&H&iZi/y that a small gang of wrongdoers may pool resources, andwhat results may evolve into a "gangster state" is floated (similarly for claim 2, p47, that some group wng/tf manage to create a highly oppressive state, which is as true in many a state as in stateless conditions). There is a complex evolutionary path, with many obstacles and hitches, from a small gang, through growing rival gangs and protection rackets, to a single one, and thence to a state. It is moreover a path that is rather easily blocked at early stages in an organised society, as simple counter examples show (one such example, that of the Inuit, Dahl introduces on the very next page). Apart from the inconclusive utilitarian considerations, Dahl offers a further page, under the boldface heading 'On the Need for the State' (a strikingly minimal effort in a book of about 400 pages most of which are premised on the assumption that the state is a needed item). He concedes, what seems to put a large dent in his bold claim, that preliterate societies, like those of the Inuit, have subsisted, over long periods, without the state. But that is past history, the world has advanced, the state is here, there, and everywhere. Granted it is; that does not show it is needed. Many gadgets that are now produced are not needed. Consider Dahl s reasons why a return to societies without states is 'if not impossible, highly undesirable (p.46). First, the world is already too densely populated to provide much space for autonomy (p.46, less than a 22 page after the utilitarian promise of a satisfactory state maximizing 'freedom and justice'; similarly p.51 etc.) But there are many regions where autonomy could undoubtedly be increased by expansionary or imperial states backing off (not merely in East Timor, on the West Bank, etc., but in the lands of the Inuit, the Micronesians, etc.). Further, the denseness of human population, hardly affords a reason. For one thing, the excessive human population is highly concentrated; most parts of the Earth carry, by comparison, sparse populations. For another, autonomy does not depend, so directly, on available space. 'Thirdly, virtually the entire globe is now already occupied by states'. Similar points apply: for instance, such an accomplished fact does not establish a need, or the impossibility of change. While not true 'throughout recorded history', but a very modem phenomenon, it is no doubt recently confingenfZy true that 'small autonomous groups of people have been extraordinarily vulnerable to conquest and absorption by larger states', and that it is presently doubtful that 'states would permit any small, independent group to exist anywhere [much] on earth'. Such present yizcfo political power relations do not demonstrate a need, still less impossibility of alternative, still less undesirability of changes. Consciousness change could come very rapidly, furthermore, with a welcome change in popular attitudes in large democratic states to oppression of minorities elsewhere (in Europe this seems to be happening). These points also serve to destroy Dahl's second reason, that 'a multiplicity of interdependencies cannot be snapped apart without enormous costs that few people would accept.' The break-up of states in Eastern Europe shows that substantial changes can occur very rapidly; the costs involved were much higher than they should have been because of the attitudes of states, not attitudes of their peoples by and large. In sum, then, all Dahl has accumulated is evidence of the repressive grip of the present regime of states, rendering local change pragmatically very difficult. Such evidence does nothing to establish a need for states, nothing at all to establish the undesirability of stateless societies. Accordingly the main assumptions fail with which Dahl claims support his 'conclusion that if woM/J &^ff^r fo fry fo cr^afg a mfz^/acfory jfafe f/ian f/y io ^xAff in a .soci^fy wif%OMf o sfaf^' (p.47). As it happens, the failed assumptions also fail to support such a conclusion—without suppressed material, of the utilitarian cast already criticised. All the assumptions would indicate, werf they granted, is the practical undesirability of trying to set up small stateless associations in a regime of states like mot prevailing today exc^pf that the states are satisfactory. But the assumptions should be scuttled. * Aggfnsf Jowfnaffon Domination is an important type of power relation. It is a comprehensive relation: persistent over a period, not simply once-off or occasional, pervasive, extending over a range of action and behaviour. It offers confro/ in a spread of cases. In such cases, if the dominator exercises control (e.g. adjusts the appropriate controls, pulls requisite levers) then the dominated normally responds. A significant form of control within extended human affairs is that of A 23 command or ability to command. Of course the creature commanded, the servant, the domesticated animal, the subdued or subjugated person, has to be able to understand what is commanded. But domination operates in significant spheres where such conditions for commanding do not obtain: in particular, but not only, in the domination of nature, its parts and elements, such as animals that do not understand commands, biota that do not recognise manipulation, and so on. Domination originated with (what the etymology of the term reflects) lord-subjects and master-servant relations, which remain paradigmatic for this power relation. It was soon and easily extended to cover owner-slave relations, where control was much more extensive, God human relations, human-working animal relations, and so on. It has long covered parent children and husband-wife relations, as well as certain class relations; and as classes have changed with political restructuring, industralisation and the rise of cities, so have domination relations. Those of higher classes or castes tend to dominate those of lower ranking, similarly for those higher in new hierarchies. Domination of nature and its parts is a relatively recent addition to the varieties of domination, since the acclaimed success of "the war against Nature" (still going on last century) before which technological humans (lacked the considerable level of power they have now acquired over natural systems.^ An aim of softening or removing forms of domination links social and environmental objectiv&with anarchism. These aims are united in green social anarchism. Opposition to all forms of domination, is yet another extension of certain types of anarchism, perhaps incompatible with other types of anarchism (e.g. communal anarchisms which assume that affairs should be organised along strict patriarchal lines, which accordingly not altogether coherently oppose social archy only to retain or even reinforce a tribal or familial archy). There may by now be some confusion concerning the variety of extensions of anarchism encountered. More exactly these "extensions" are subextensions, which isolate the principle of some type or ( key feature of anarchism and generalize it. generalisation of principled subtype with distinguishing principle. 18 Intellectual vandals have been at work on dondnahon also, stretching it from a relation from ensembles of actors, the dominators, to whole structures, systems or institutions (what might be called by partial analogy with the vandalism worked on .sTrHctund domination). Stretched dominators include the capitalist economy, market forces, the economy, the state, and so on. Under the stretching, /to (structural) dondnadon is said to imply, what straightforwardly is right enough, no subordination of the people to market forces, or even, what is impossible to avoid in a sophisticated society, no influences on members through the operation of its economy. A Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 1005: Draft chapters of Towards green anakism: eucratic political investigations Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations and annotations, and handwritten notes. Description An account of the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 1005 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [61] leaves. 143.55 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:818a421">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:818a421</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 8 Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 8 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5cb229c3d9affba38077a07c721b6799.pdf 864475d38dc9bafca72f1f6da54ba711 PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 1264: Characterizing anarchism Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 1264 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [8] leaves. 4.58 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:709ee89">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:709ee89</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Bookcase - 1st on Right - 3rd Shelf Down - First Pile Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Bookcase > 1st on Right > 3rd Shelf Down > First Pile Box 17: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b93abb21a29ee71974224581d593625d.pdf 4187cb7771143c0b41355dc81b004208 PDF Text Text , II / I I I I, / 1265 )/>\cl/ ) ,8e,rUJ/ t>/4µ..,,,. (Q. n: lf4,,u)Y ,,_ P I ;{d / , IJJC.;( f: ~ ( vt.1 < c,;;. L ;J7~d. rj / ~/,"'h c.c\ / K..12 {~rt.I J?. . 7 .,_, f4.J...',,,,..f , . ro~I) A Q,-1· ~ , ?' ft- Jc~Ul ) I /t'lt.TL rlf r"t.:>~<'.L,;,.~ 1.'j/,-,,,JI,; ~_1 /n ,~;.d.. t /'cl..'"- °£uJ (1~ ' -..-/.,:,":" I lc-tw- a.,..4 .1~.7 /2 1 M-(),d..-,. o,,,.d., r~t.l.r(L lL1 JI/(~ ~ J2e 1 ~, cJ/ //L~-7/~a/ o:-..art1'c-p~ /:-... 'L -.~e. .. -.i#,4,h.. I ~ ✓J/ /-r-€.fl n ~ • Y'll__, P-"'7'h ,~_,,__~ ~tYI'- 6-l..-f .,7~·~Y· ~ l'~t.'A-:✓ ~P;>-\,7 ~ ~ to ,rl.7·~ ~~ .#~~,v-t-/ /.1 . ~~ .e,#e..;- .,_:. r ~ -~ .~;, / h , .... l4 ~-~ ,.4L~ /4£~~7.i a"'?'L~ e•~ ~vll-<Cp-· -vCLr( ~"1 / onnJ ~//~c\l--c;e /~ ~,I- ~ C....,;,._ t; o,/_ h,..._,_,.. & / /;,,,,/i-J ..~ A aiJU/<4I 1 -1 ,,_,. r;-,r Q,.;yc7G-#'\--.a..- I;;::; . ~ JQ..t/i C O ,w' 1" ~~·~·7' r ~ ·~ - Pll"~~dYt/ ,,/ I r-b.. ;ri¥'-~~rr G./"ZU,fh,,... I ~~ ~ ~/~""- /llrL'il / _,, ~.'.J c,,.._rf--.t. ,.c__('J--./ ,A,R.,....:,.M q ,l,.. ~ -uAfrollrt✓ 11.,_: . (tp. I,:,,.. ., t 'l' '/iY(IA... ,,,(, I ,I.-8 , . ff 'ff "'- -~ _.,__ , i'- ,;/ ' ~ ~ ~ r-- .I.'/.,/-...,_,,/ * ~ i9f;./ ✓-: . -4 ~ 6-A~P"'f'~ ~~ .,Ad11.. l•l /'~,,.; k- .--..~,n,_ .,.,,_,_~- 6'f> rt ➔ ~ ~ ;;;..;,--f:f k /1#4 ~,,j- o/ ~ r . ,d:I,. f..,.;... d'~ ~~ /1' re n-. l!L.-c/_ c~., t ¼ . ~ ' /t.,~~c.c.• -4j ,...._ {J ,.t!~7 ...,~ /4¥1. ;'1o,-µ,1 ;.. ~ """,.,::4-J Y f - < ~ / ~ , . 7.r...,~ J • ;4Co, e : e ,,_,,,:l;< /_,::, - ~ I ~~~ ~ r~-.. f <L k ~~~ d.:/j,u/_ hv ~ .rlf o-//,.,,.e.-ttf <--V~uu-e. ✓#L- r-<> / ~ uL : /:n '-,~ 01 c>-- ~~~h , r---.. ��3. R~ ,'/'~~ 1/ -· (W~u,~ ~€, r ~ ~6-4... fo -1/fY/'lA:/4)...j /' il/zJc ~/ ~ j ' ff ;At.:? ,..."'? 0#".t.. IJ'V' v'7' /i~. d~~~Hr;;__ ~1~.)#~t c:~7 ' : I / ~ ~ T/71..T-P.Xl''-r-~ ~ ,tftL/?'\,---..E ..-.J ~ l,n,,e ,-,-,n(Jl.h,,/,,...u-, ~ ,,,,,p~,, ·. y I ~;~~---1 l6°t.d-t: $e._ l ~ Ct)~L ~~ c,.t/-,.,,u(~ ~&d:W d'llr ( h d ~h~cil c-vy~ ---~ J d . ' 71•~ ~ / ~ }, F~ ~,~~, #ft.rt! rl et.. /k~/Jt ol ~ /- • /Ii>/,~ e,......f ~ - M r ,,-c, / 1A/'/I);:-,.. ~ . 4 r 1 ~ /rv.t.~ A (A~~ rJ.;,, a,.re., ~(~-/-rr, de- ~ ~ ~ lfAe{,:.!~). /~ 7--.J1 Au;i .;(~ -rJ,.,,...«-cJ C!A-,.A~__:.,,1~ ~.d 1 ~~ -;3~ ~~ /e-1-h,'f .y~ ~j,'j ~ t:cv/ )'r.H....r>. 71.i.L ,1. ./~ 14~~ p /tl ,r. /ubv«.. l " , ~ ,. .,. ,wi~ h-,, ~7,.c,_ , ,,/4_ />->/'r / .,{:. o/ fy,_.,? /7J ~ ;cr--.7 ~ ~ /4-yr:i.re... • # --7 ~L -,-/_; /vlr ; - -4--? /~e--, ~ /,rirld7 /7/v- , ~ ~ _/ ~ o/'a-,, '-"'/ , ~ KL!.- ~1.--,/2.-~~ / ~ ://ruJ.f-~~cl ?;4J' ~ -fll--7)A~? I 1 ~(l..A " ,;f- ;~ 0-- w_._.____, ) Aj _,.,.,(~ '2 o/11~ C , I ~~-~ ~ ~~N ~ ~•iu--:c,,/4 #vl- J~ O.J'- ~ I/~/~ /~1 ~ ( 1~ I .vl- ea.--, Cl-A VV"~A.:c_ / ~ r.17 ,Z~ 0-- ~ tl- r M v-/"L-~___; f. 2.. 4-? o.>e ~t-✓,X ;/ _,--__ /'~u~ t71fV"'/I~"'~~ ~._:t)v-...,/~ , ~ ) . /.-L ~71c 7 ~ ~ -~~ ro (h-(., ~ t _ . , / - ~ ~ {,iAt I"" ,,-.'.t_n--.. 1~ e~II~ ~~ / ~ {~ ~ ~~ l~~ ~L ~ ~-,/.._~' ~ ~ 1 .CL p-. ,M.n J!jt ~ ntL ~ ~ . ~ , ,◄~Le-,, J~ $ 7~~//l.f T rl~d /,,.~ 7/c__ / ~~ • •-- ....-. 41/J . ~ ~ 4--- ~L-/-W'4.-;,' --- ~ , : _ , . , - ~ r 1 r~ .e.. ,(,w_ /tJ /ul~, ~I 1 ~h./ /' o r ,.,i/L , c-1- l>-f'~~- ,#'-~ ~ c- c_/,.._4-I~ ,1-5' .-_ 6 ._ ,,.,..,,~ , I l, ~-1!J~ -r'~ «d e✓ ~// ~ c.a- /kcct!UJ..,d ,,. . • ~ 7 ...,~ 1 • ~ /'A,/-4...-,. ~ J.--.~-r4..tf /;&,.,L-/-. ;q/o-,r /2., ~ ~~ J~ /2 ~ .,.,JL-r' ,,L_ ~ t . r y l _ , ~ - - 'ii< L / ? /J,-. •#7,/-,.j ~J~I!. ~.::, ,,~1- ~ /2 5-e_. ~ ~ ~ .,..,,,- ,-. ~ ';f;;;t .Pd' ~t~~-./, o/4, i-r✓~C.::,~z-.. /4 pt:r~- ~y~~ ---·------ ~ ~~ ~ ~~- c1L4- I~-<} ""'7 --r-~ d ~~-;~ ,u;l.,,,._.,e,,.,/ / ' - c. ~ V-J /~ r~.r-c ,-,<.}-/ ~ c<J-a-,--~ u4' ~ /7 c..r/'7-l,,e ""- . . .____ ft':;-/~ l!..J}J r l1tl~e..r✓ /~t,,~ J / ~ 1 GA/ ~ ~~ ~~v(j_.,I ~4,f~A"~.,(,J-- ~ ~ 4 "4- /1 t:-~d,eJ,.y-- /f~ ,J A~-ul / ~ ~ t._ c--r-~ J /7~ ~ (/ r/t / ;-71 v->-t.r~{ ~ Jtifc-, /r1 #f. Ctj//T"-/rl.... ~~(Ille-~~ /P/4.JCk,c;;L: ~~(\ft-./-· '3.-ri/ ~ - ef -,--. • I~~ ~4 ~ '-v?! ;C ~_;/-~<..U.,,/ £✓~ 7_ ~... {i/2L ,( ri!u...:, ~ ~67w47 �/"'<ft'/,_._, o.r c ..-.i ,_ L ?r<--'-7 ;-,I'c--; --f • ;'.::;.-/ c i) -<.-<,vL J ,,,,j,,_,,. • /, ,_,, t;, , ..1" ;__ .,:._ j I V6'<I',;;.. ;n.,/4""" ef........ =• • ,,_,, /2....:.. ~~ (q ,Y •- I ,tr,). /a.r ~., /w,;f;:v,,. I I eA' ......, < 7"" r _ • <:H-/4 ;.___ 1 I ~J i ~~ r 6,__ , ,._,,./- 6/ ~ /. "-' , ,7 ,, _ d "7 ~ ,N , - ,-._,,_,1- • 1 .~ f :... ,/~v.d✓ }/ ..(pJI' ,:_'..,t__ •• ~,),r ~"'3/~/i~, Aj7J: #~;. ~~/~.rp'-arco ½ I ~H~ / /f-/ cc / c./4. /er rL a..-,',/-,...,.._.;,____ r ,'.._,.,,,. ' ........,( Pl,;fw,,,~" uTJ~t- ( ~ ~~ /' / ',r-' 1/ I ) . tf,14Fh /L-Av-L a-- ~_._::._ _, ,7,/o.,;: Ch-T, cJ ; d ~,.. '?'L 7 , , ,r ,r,.,,,.._, 4 - zt:c ,,_, t,,,.-(~ J ,:,.,_..._ . 7i, r ffe-~f f) ;-ri,,./'.,, ,,u fl' //'f,'7-C_/~ .-;;,; ~ //L /j/4<._~ /J,,, ,v-c,i:J ,.. ,.::., ,,. vr ~ ,1,r • 1 l u--,:-,_,,,.__~ 1-- e)_,-,_ /,.;__, ,..,., o-,,-_,,,l .. A._ , 7' • ,{ r t'.. / -,,/ / 1 #rt:7 ( , ,_, .,. j'~ ry,,~'T,_7 rt£.Le,--, ). I ...,._ • -y d ~d u- ) 7? tht- ::rL ~ 6"#'-r,:p re ,./~..;&;/,:C... W, ./ •r' ., ~ 7 ~ /,,I"- ,-, ' L~ ' C"- ,r~ ~ 7:,-,r lj - / ~ /?J-,"a-n, _/,.,;, - ~ I.:. /4 , <~-~ , .cl_ 7 ~ 'f ;/'J(e '1-'"" C dV/ < ~ , ' ,.,r~ K• , "'7 •~ ( )X"'' ~ >'L, ) ,_ ._,,,, 1/ ' 11 ~ f ~, " ~rvn-. ~--- ,,;: ~,.,. ~ ) ., /4 ,,.,J..,.;,.., , ~/ - ~ ,;z..,, ~ ,_J.,,___,, , "''7 ..,.._,« ~ 7- ~ ,__ -1...:,,,,,t.,t.J ~ f , e0r,:,..,,_,.C.. ,.__, ,-~/~ f ,..;_ / . , _ U -- ~ 1 /'Vf'.A~ /,,-v._ O;-f/~ , 0..,, ff~~ <>-,t..<>1l!,,_,_, I r e<--;, ff A , 7 orthi 7 /' fij ,....,. ,z,,. ~/,-........ 7,~-,!::;___ '- '/'__(.~ ' ,vr,,-, ___, c---<- vY' ----7 , .,.,,( �(/? /4.., ;. J -d t- /J/✓.r~ ~;.,_, ,,7crv1/,,--, :o.>r-, hi,i/4./~ I ,,.,, A--,"n._,.._..., ~A' f, . h cr tl77i life~ .. , MJ/·,-~J. ~ ,.,..--r/ / /n<v71.1~._ ~ ~.,( /J,-,., // a IJc,,yJ;-.o"'f d«J~ _ 7 .;.,,7/4 1~ ,11/c./w-~ , y ,,, . _.L ~~ /'7' •. /.,J-J ,.,~c..7f f Cl J(J -~ /J!';i-/ ? 0-. ~ .. ,,, ,{,--,,,...i ,___,;, ff ~ /.,;, / =')' "/" d eltl.--@ 12 /,'{e/ ?/ <rT ~ ~ f ~eH J ¥ ,; T ~ ·u- 4,4/l...c.~l-7 /v-1 r~'Tk>:,._rv1 //;~1;::;...J, f I cl7~~t,..;_,f-J ; ~ i c .. ~ l'LtefL. At;.-/ o.r-L /v>t. 177 /11 f/V ~ e~ f .J I: tC.t r7/4 h- / ~ h~I/.,.;C~ ~c;_e_ < L I ~« )f /:?-- r I'£., 1 i "" 'IL'c-.1 u/ ft-,~ "->, /F~ ~~ ~ ~ N4t H e1~ t'l-J' 11-./ ( / ~/ k-t"- v/ v CA-Jlc-t~ lKt>,<.. ~ " ~ 'h a{ ~ ort. ?ir/- 7.1~~ k~·.... c,.-, .,,__.~ I c,,,E eh ,. ,~-:/_;,__ ~,? t.1-~ I /; ~cl f tl--, I, r7'€'47i... ~d~~ _ > § ;( S"'c.../~ L ?t.t. 7k_ olt f ~ 2 &.,.,... o.._rcL,;;, ~ ,----- al ~ I o-r<- 7~-M-ht ~ 1 ~ -rL AIJ(-c!' /;i....1 ~~~ . #fcn/- /~//-, h ,pv- ft>-,,..~.,. -rt-<o-,,.. c.;/~)' ~J-77)./c,H A:- ~~__:,,,,.., 1 ~ fo_lL /V; ~ ~ / d/ -'1.L 'l ~ ,~f:.., -- r-~/,7 ;:' ' ~ j~ If~ t/c-y ~~ ~tl/L t/ 4-r-- 1 /n,n-~~r;,J ('(71/u-?~ /~f.:_t. """'~ ~ ~ , 6J.. v? fZL.n,>--t,,L..:.-,,,' tr .. ,;/(~~{IJ~.,.A~ • 1,/ '/I~ - 77a---,,c~\~ ~<'-r't~;~!J JZ rt., 1 c.~4.-~ri_ C\ 1 111// a-t(~~J u //?A ~ 1' ,..-~ rl~ 7 f .· j ',I ... 6. 1----J,. h J ~ CJJ-,,.../,,...,..t:.,6/L ,,,,,.d,I~ 1 . .~e.- l Jo ~t;_.._cc.. , /?C~f?<_.-~/,~ ~~ /4 t'lf"'L ~~rrl "!v~1 /2lA -rtl-.n ~ ·- 4/lec~~t ~~ , J;tt /,._ -~ r--...>l&,,.J _, .--.,I~ . /d· .;,If/' d v...e ~/i._..__~~ /,,4 To 1;,£7 """ ~ ~) . ~NJ7 f/"Tlk.d'£./4z ~ ) <'ftiL. : / ,.,p/~ri ~Ji'.r;--.. e.c. v/ ;~ ;t---;.h / .-,,. t:.71c--rc ~ /,£- 1 tt;;f ,:;.,.- .--,.< ,.,,r,._ ..__.. k l r 1 ~.a~ .,--,-/UIC <,~,;.,d,ri/ /'-~ o/,_,I,,,,.. ,. clT~., I ,,...,_IL /''4, <.... /~ cv?17 #~1 ~ .,{ / k r ~ ~ r ,,.,u /J/. /i:rp vlr1-r/ ~c.A,.r<- /', •1 .z{ /z~.6~.,.. ( 11--n ,r,;-,,/ (_½-,.___ On 7 ~,{ c./V-~ <- ~ ~ , lr>->r/,, w" ~ I • I / ~v--e. ~ Ter-n,-n..i~ , d....,,, ✓ t),,,~ ~~L~,..."" J 1 /1 d 4 IL • 07-.:.f, c,. / ' • J ;_/-, .;, I!. ~~r-,~ c,dl ()-J-!v?'vf,--v,.. ,/ ¥ dL ... __',.,·, .A.. 7 ~' ,:/, j t,-. -j~ . d ,,, ,,,£ /4.e.,, l;t:;, ,.. , a ~t ~ c;;..--r ~ r , , - . ~y._,--,_ , .,-,_ . ,h(_,,_ . 1•1... ,r ~ ~ $r..f t:~/~ LF2---M 1 d--#'1~-£; , 1 /b>v ~ ~~ ~:/lt&J ~tL--r ,· .:r-,.-l....1-4,,,,,,,....c;o,,... llli"II!::~/ ry,. /--0-n,rc- ~ c-._..//'()~ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document , II / I I I I, / 1265 )/>\cl/ ) ,8e,rUJ/ t>/4µ..,,,. (Q. n: lf4,,u)Y ,,_ P I ;{d / , IJJC.;( f: ~ ( vt.1 < c,;;. L ;J7~d. rj / ~/,"'h c.c\ / K..12 {~rt.I J?. . 7 .,_, f4.J...',,,,..f , . ro~I) A Q,-1· ~ , ?' ft- Jc~Ul ) I /t'lt.TL rlf r"t.:>~<'.L,;,.~ 1.'j/,-,,,JI,; ~_1 /n ,~;.d.. t /'cl..'"- °£uJ (1~ ' -..-/.,:,":" I lc-tw- a.,..4 .1~.7 /2 1 M-(),d..-,. o,,,.d., r~t.l.r(L lL1 JI/(~ ~ J2e 1 ~, cJ/ //L~-7/~a/ o:-..art1'c-p~ /:-... 'L -.~e. .. -.i#,4,h.. I ~ ✓J/ /-r-€.fl n ~ • Y'll__, P-"'7'h ,~_,,__~ ~tYI'- 6-l..-f .,7~·~Y· ~ l'~t.'A-:✓ ~P;>-\,7 ~ ~ to ,rl.7·~ ~~ .#~~,v-t-/ /.1 . ~~ .e,#e..;- .,_:. r ~ -~ .~;, / h , .... l4 ~-~ ,.4L~ /4£~~7.i a"'?'L~ e•~ ~vll-<Cp-· -vCLr( ~"1 / onnJ ~//~c\l--c;e /~ ~,I- ~ C....,;,._ t; o,/_ h,..._,_,.. & / /;,,,,/i-J ..~ A aiJU/<4I 1 -1 ,,_,. r;-,r Q,.;yc7G-#'\--.a..- I;;::; . ~ JQ..t/i C O ,w' 1" ~~·~·7' r ~ ·~ - Pll"~~dYt/ ,,/ I r-b.. ;ri¥'-~~rr G./"ZU,fh,,... I ~~ ~ ~/~""- /llrL'il / _,, ~.'.J c,,.._rf--.t. ,.c__('J--./ ,A,R.,....:,.M q ,l,.. ~ -uAfrollrt✓ 11.,_: . (tp. I,:,,.. ., t 'l' '/iY(IA... ,,,(, I ,I.-8 , . ff 'ff "'- -~ _.,__ , i'- ,;/ ' ~ ~ ~ r-- .I.'/.,/-...,_,,/ * ~ i9f;./ ✓-: . -4 ~ 6-A~P"'f'~ ~~ .,Ad11.. l•l /'~,,.; k- .--..~,n,_ .,.,,_,_~- 6'f> rt ➔ ~ ~ ;;;..;,--f:f k /1#4 ~,,j- o/ ~ r . ,d:I,. f..,.;... d'~ ~~ /1' re n-. l!L.-c/_ c~., t ¼ . ~ ' /t.,~~c.c.• -4j ,...._ {J ,.t!~7 ...,~ /4¥1. ;'1o,-µ,1 ;.. ~ """,.,::4-J Y f - < ~ / ~ , . 7.r...,~ J • ;4Co, e : e ,,_,,,:l;< /_,::, - ~ I ~~~ ~ r~-.. f <L k ~~~ d.:/j,u/_ hv ~ .rlf o-//,.,,.e.-ttf <--V~uu-e. ✓#L- r-<> / ~ uL : /:n '-,~ 01 c>-- ~~~h , r---.. 3. R~ ,'/'~~ 1/ -· (W~u,~ ~€, r ~ ~6-4... fo -1/fY/'lA:/4)...j /' il/zJc ~/ ~ j ' ff ;At.:? ,..."'? 0#".t.. IJ'V' v'7' /i~. d~~~Hr;;__ ~1~.)#~t c:~7 ' : I / ~ ~ T/71..T-P.Xl''-r-~ ~ ,tftL/?'\,---..E ..-.J ~ l,n,,e ,-,-,n(Jl.h,,/,,...u-, ~ ,,,,,p~,, ·. y I ~;~~---1 l6°t.d-t: $e._ l ~ Ct)~L ~~ c,.t/-,.,,u(~ ~&d:W d'llr ( h d ~h~cil c-vy~ ---~ J d . ' 71•~ ~ / ~ }, F~ ~,~~, #ft.rt! rl et.. /k~/Jt ol ~ /- • /Ii>/,~ e,......f ~ - M r ,,-c, / 1A/'/I);:-,.. ~ . 4 r 1 ~ /rv.t.~ A (A~~ rJ.;,, a,.re., ~(~-/-rr, de- ~ ~ ~ lfAe{,:.!~). /~ 7--.J1 Au;i .;(~ -rJ,.,,...«-cJ C!A-,.A~__:.,,1~ ~.d 1 ~~ -;3~ ~~ /e-1-h,'f .y~ ~j,'j ~ t:cv/ )'r.H....r>. 71.i.L ,1. ./~ 14~~ p /tl ,r. /ubv«.. l " , ~ ,. .,. ,wi~ h-,, ~7,.c,_ , ,,/4_ />->/'r / .,{:. o/ fy,_.,? /7J ~ ;cr--.7 ~ ~ /4-yr:i.re... • # --7 ~L -,-/_; /vlr ; - -4--? /~e--, ~ /,rirld7 /7/v- , ~ ~ _/ ~ o/'a-,, '-"'/ , ~ KL!.- ~1.--,/2.-~~ / ~ ://ruJ.f-~~cl ?;4J' ~ -fll--7)A~? I 1 ~(l..A " ,;f- ;~ 0-- w_._.____, ) Aj _,.,.,(~ '2 o/11~ C , I ~~-~ ~ ~~N ~ ~•iu--:c,,/4 #vl- J~ O.J'- ~ I/~/~ /~1 ~ ( 1~ I .vl- ea.--, Cl-A VV"~A.:c_ / ~ r.17 ,Z~ 0-- ~ tl- r M v-/"L-~___; f. 2.. 4-? o.>e ~t-✓,X ;/ _,--__ /'~u~ t71fV"'/I~"'~~ ~._:t)v-...,/~ , ~ ) . /.-L ~71c 7 ~ ~ -~~ ro (h-(., ~ t _ . , / - ~ ~ {,iAt I"" ,,-.'.t_n--.. 1~ e~II~ ~~ / ~ {~ ~ ~~ l~~ ~L ~ ~-,/.._~' ~ ~ 1 .CL p-. ,M.n J!jt ~ ntL ~ ~ . ~ , ,◄~Le-,, J~ $ 7~~//l.f T rl~d /,,.~ 7/c__ / ~~ • •-- ....-. 41/J . ~ ~ 4--- ~L-/-W'4.-;,' --- ~ , : _ , . , - ~ r 1 r~ .e.. ,(,w_ /tJ /ul~, ~I 1 ~h./ /' o r ,.,i/L , c-1- l>-f'~~- ,#'-~ ~ c- c_/,.._4-I~ ,1-5' .-_ 6 ._ ,,.,..,,~ , I l, ~-1!J~ -r'~ «d e✓ ~// ~ c.a- /kcct!UJ..,d ,,. . • ~ 7 ...,~ 1 • ~ /'A,/-4...-,. ~ J.--.~-r4..tf /;&,.,L-/-. ;q/o-,r /2., ~ ~~ J~ /2 ~ .,.,JL-r' ,,L_ ~ t . r y l _ , ~ - - 'ii< L / ? /J,-. •#7,/-,.j ~J~I!. ~.::, ,,~1- ~ /2 5-e_. ~ ~ ~ .,..,,,- ,-. ~ ';f;;;t .Pd' ~t~~-./, o/4, i-r✓~C.::,~z-.. /4 pt:r~- ~y~~ ---·------ ~ ~~ ~ ~~- c1L4- I~-<} ""'7 --r-~ d ~~-;~ ,u;l.,,,._.,e,,.,/ / ' - c. ~ V-J /~ r~.r-c ,-,<.}-/ ~ c<J-a-,--~ u4' ~ /7 c..r/'7-l,,e ""- . . .____ ft':;-/~ l!..J}J r l1tl~e..r✓ /~t,,~ J / ~ 1 GA/ ~ ~~ ~~v(j_.,I ~4,f~A"~.,(,J-- ~ ~ 4 "4- /1 t:-~d,eJ,.y-- /f~ ,J A~-ul / ~ ~ t._ c--r-~ J /7~ ~ (/ r/t / ;-71 v->-t.r~{ ~ Jtifc-, /r1 #f. Ctj//T"-/rl.... ~~(Ille-~~ /P/4.JCk,c;;L: ~~(\ft-./-· '3.-ri/ ~ - ef -,--. • I~~ ~4 ~ '-v?! ;C ~_;/-~<..U.,,/ £✓~ 7_ ~... {i/2L ,( ri!u...:, ~ ~67w47 /"'<ft'/,_._, o.r c ..-.i ,_ L ?r<--'-7 ;-,I'c--; --f • ;'.::;.-/ c i) -<.-<,vL J ,,,,j,,_,,. • /, ,_,, t;, , ..1" ;__ .,:._ j I V6'<I',;;.. ;n.,/4""" ef........ =• • ,,_,, /2....:.. ~~ (q ,Y •- I ,tr,). /a.r ~., /w,;f;:v,,. I I eA' ......, < 7"" r _ • <:H-/4 ;.___ 1 I ~J i ~~ r 6,__ , ,._,,./- 6/ ~ /. "-' , ,7 ,, _ d "7 ~ ,N , - ,-._,,_,1- • 1 .~ f :... ,/~v.d✓ }/ ..(pJI' ,:_'..,t__ •• ~,),r ~"'3/~/i~, Aj7J: #~;. ~~/~.rp'-arco ½ I ~H~ / /f-/ cc / c./4. /er rL a..-,',/-,...,.._.;,____ r ,'.._,.,,,. ' ........,( Pl,;fw,,,~" uTJ~t- ( ~ ~~ /' / ',r-' 1/ I ) . tf,14Fh /L-Av-L a-- ~_._::._ _, ,7,/o.,;: Ch-T, cJ ; d ~,.. '?'L 7 , , ,r ,r,.,,,.._, 4 - zt:c ,,_, t,,,.-(~ J ,:,.,_..._ . 7i, r ffe-~f f) ;-ri,,./'.,, ,,u fl' //'f,'7-C_/~ .-;;,; ~ //L /j/4<._~ /J,,, ,v-c,i:J ,.. ,.::., ,,. vr ~ ,1,r • 1 l u--,:-,_,,,.__~ 1-- e)_,-,_ /,.;__, ,..,., o-,,-_,,,l .. A._ , 7' • ,{ r t'.. / -,,/ / 1 #rt:7 ( , ,_, .,. j'~ ry,,~'T,_7 rt£.Le,--, ). I ...,._ • -y d ~d u- ) 7? tht- ::rL ~ 6"#'-r,:p re ,./~..;&;/,:C... W, ./ •r' ., ~ 7 ~ /,,I"- ,-, ' L~ ' C"- ,r~ ~ 7:,-,r lj - / ~ /?J-,"a-n, _/,.,;, - ~ I.:. /4 , <~-~ , .cl_ 7 ~ 'f ;/'J(e '1-'"" C dV/ < ~ , ' ,.,r~ K• , "'7 •~ ( )X"'' ~ >'L, ) ,_ ._,,,, 1/ ' 11 ~ f ~, " ~rvn-. ~--- ,,;: ~,.,. ~ ) ., /4 ,,.,J..,.;,.., , ~/ - ~ ,;z..,, ~ ,_J.,,___,, , "''7 ..,.._,« ~ 7- ~ ,__ -1...:,,,,,t.,t.J ~ f , e0r,:,..,,_,.C.. ,.__, ,-~/~ f ,..;_ / . , _ U -- ~ 1 /'Vf'.A~ /,,-v._ O;-f/~ , 0..,, ff~~ <>-,t..<>1l!,,_,_, I r e<--;, ff A , 7 orthi 7 /' fij ,....,. ,z,,. ~/,-........ 7,~-,!::;___ '- '/'__(.~ ' ,vr,,-, ___, c---<- vY' ----7 , .,.,,( (/? /4.., ;. J -d t- /J/✓.r~ ~;.,_, ,,7crv1/,,--, :o.>r-, hi,i/4./~ I ,,.,, A--,"n._,.._..., ~A' f, . h cr tl77i life~ .. , MJ/·,-~J. ~ ,.,..--r/ / /n<v71.1~._ ~ ~.,( /J,-,., // a IJc,,yJ;-.o"'f d«J~ _ 7 .;.,,7/4 1~ ,11/c./w-~ , y ,,, . _.L ~~ /'7' •. /.,J-J ,.,~c..7f f Cl J(J -~ /J!';i-/ ? 0-. ~ .. ,,, ,{,--,,,...i ,___,;, ff ~ /.,;, / =')' "/" d eltl.--@ 12 /,'{e/ ?/ <rT ~ ~ f ~eH J ¥ ,; T ~ ·u- 4,4/l...c.~l-7 /v-1 r~'Tk>:,._rv1 //;~1;::;...J, f I cl7~~t,..;_,f-J ; ~ i c .. ~ l'LtefL. At;.-/ o.r-L /v>t. 177 /11 f/V ~ e~ f .J I: tC.t r7/4 h- / ~ h~I/.,.;C~ ~c;_e_ < L I ~« )f /:?-- r I'£., 1 i "" 'IL'c-.1 u/ ft-,~ "->, /F~ ~~ ~ ~ N4t H e1~ t'l-J' 11-./ ( / ~/ k-t"- v/ v CA-Jlc-t~ lKt>,<.. ~ " ~ 'h a{ ~ ort. ?ir/- 7.1~~ k~·.... c,.-, .,,__.~ I c,,,E eh ,. ,~-:/_;,__ ~,? t.1-~ I /; ~cl f tl--, I, r7'€'47i... ~d~~ _ > § ;( S"'c.../~ L ?t.t. 7k_ olt f ~ 2 &.,.,... o.._rcL,;;, ~ ,----- al ~ I o-r<- 7~-M-ht ~ 1 ~ -rL AIJ(-c!' /;i....1 ~~~ . #fcn/- /~//-, h ,pv- ft>-,,..~.,. -rt-<o-,,.. c.;/~)' ~J-77)./c,H A:- ~~__:,,,,.., 1 ~ fo_lL /V; ~ ~ / d/ -'1.L 'l ~ ,~f:.., -- r-~/,7 ;:' ' ~ j~ If~ t/c-y ~~ ~tl/L t/ 4-r-- 1 /n,n-~~r;,J ('(71/u-?~ /~f.:_t. """'~ ~ ~ , 6J.. v? fZL.n,>--t,,L..:.-,,,' tr .. ,;/(~~{IJ~.,.A~ • 1,/ '/I~ - 77a---,,c~\~ ~<'-r't~;~!J JZ rt., 1 c.~4.-~ri_ C\ 1 111// a-t(~~J u //?A ~ 1' ,..-~ rl~ 7 f .· j ',I ... 6. 1----J,. h J ~ CJJ-,,.../,,...,..t:.,6/L ,,,,,.d,I~ 1 . .~e.- l Jo ~t;_.._cc.. , /?C~f?<_.-~/,~ ~~ /4 t'lf"'L ~~rrl "!v~1 /2lA -rtl-.n ~ ·- 4/lec~~t ~~ , J;tt /,._ -~ r--...>l&,,.J _, .--.,I~ . /d· .;,If/' d v...e ~/i._..__~~ /,,4 To 1;,£7 """ ~ ~) . ~NJ7 f/"Tlk.d'£./4z ~ ) <'ftiL. : / ,.,p/~ri ~Ji'.r;--.. e.c. v/ ;~ ;t---;.h / .-,,. t:.71c--rc ~ /,£- 1 tt;;f ,:;.,.- .--,.< ,.,,r,._ ..__.. k l r 1 ~.a~ .,--,-/UIC <,~,;.,d,ri/ /'-~ o/,_,I,,,,.. ,. clT~., I ,,...,_IL /''4, <.... /~ cv?17 #~1 ~ .,{ / k r ~ ~ r ,,.,u /J/. /i:rp vlr1-r/ ~c.A,.r<- /', •1 .z{ /z~.6~.,.. ( 11--n ,r,;-,,/ (_½-,.___ On 7 ~,{ c./V-~ <- ~ ~ , lr>->r/,, w" ~ I • I / ~v--e. ~ Ter-n,-n..i~ , d....,,, ✓ t),,,~ ~~L~,..."" J 1 /1 d 4 IL • 07-.:.f, c,. / ' • J ;_/-, .;, I!. ~~r-,~ c,dl ()-J-!v?'vf,--v,.. ,/ ¥ dL ... __',.,·, .A.. 7 ~' ,:/, j t,-. -j~ . d ,,, ,,,£ /4.e.,, l;t:;, ,.. , a ~t ~ c;;..--r ~ r , , - . ~y._,--,_ , .,-,_ . ,h(_,,_ . 1•1... ,r ~ ~ $r..f t:~/~ LF2---M 1 d--#'1~-£; , 1 /b>v ~ ~~ ~:/lt&J ~tL--r ,· .:r-,.-l....1-4,,,,,,,....c;o,,... llli"II!::~/ ry,. /--0-n,rc- ~ c-._..//'()~ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 1265: Draft of Anarchism Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten draft of paper on scrap paper, undated. Handwritten at top of first page: Old script. Description An account of the resource Verso of scrap papers not digitised. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 1265 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [5] leaves. 3.19 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7a5fde4">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7a5fde4</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Bookcase - 1st on Right - 3rd Shelf Down - First Pile Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Bookcase > 1st on Right > 3rd Shelf Down > First Pile Box 17: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b1f4840cd64571bcf1bf92d1568e0c8d.pdf 1b39fb24b6986433a2d2ec7d4699c241 PDF Text Text ·*' . ~":'" mw 10.4.95 PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION THEORY: an Australi an perspective on radical institutio nal change . .. . people are ready for change and the impending debate will result m constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options .... 1 As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchant ment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window therefore no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. Disenchan tment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics-a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the Australian situation: . anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. . .. Widesprea d anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ... 2 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting. (though voting is legally compulsory). Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions .3 1. Hon . Ian Macphee, ' A new constitution? '. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutiona l options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey's data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. 2 Mackay pp.174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Plain findings are replicated by other socialogists. 3 Ibid. p.178 �2 In a recent survey, '62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community' .4 Australian loss of faith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanator y factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ' ... the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view' .5 A complex 'second factor ... concerns the adversaria l nature of two-party politics' .6 How can this 'two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define'? But 'reµefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself . Why 'when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more cooperative and harmonious spirit' ?7 'Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when .. . distinction s between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable .... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic' .8 'The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ... , or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it' .9 Unless there is marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, 'the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum ' .10 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. pp.178-179. 6 Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordabili ty of adversarial systems. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. p. 180. 9 Ibid. p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. lO Ibid . p. 181 . �3 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that 'they are overgoverned ' 11 , with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments - and between the various State parliaments themselves - are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal · governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable ... . The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for _some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed. 12 Such diseffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia's political arrangements owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantme nt with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentator s , and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutiona l monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless , as a result , republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while 11 Ibid. p. 181 , itals added. 12 Ibid. p.181 -2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time . But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. �4 academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as changing geopolitica l circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemploym ent, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangeme nts making the newly-fashioned .Commonw ealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region (and the money-ma king opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directi<;ms, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronis m, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other manageme nt powers, inappropriate 'powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.' Another effect of inapposite state-federal 13 Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a con stitution , so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc . even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. �5 arrangements, especially 'funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities . ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ... '; the opportunity 'to design and provide the services which are needed locally.' 14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors. .. Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ... 15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small /) ·liberal management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangemen t of anachronistic state partitions. But that regionalizatio n should be greened, as reform should be radicalized. More generally, opportunites now present themselves to inset more radical ideas throughout the debate about Australia's future directions. For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of,justificatio n for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. 14 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as "unrealistic" by some practicing politicians , appeared to gain a good deal of support. I5 McPhee ibid. �6 Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-lon g project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001. 16 One. small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to 'provide major input into evaluation and refonn of Australia's institutions'; indeed it is explicitly 'aimed at contributing to Australian constitutio nal reform'. 17 Nothing however precludes considerat ion of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions - those of the whole ecological region - in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way. Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock. boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparative small adjustments leaving it substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing 16 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory , arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions, held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994. 17 ' Reshaping Australian institutions : towards and beyond 200 l' in Tynan , p.17, italics added. �7 demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously, through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments. Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions, as through taxation advantages, subsidies, expert incentives, etc.). Further, the role of exploitation and plunder of remaining natural "resources'', and depletion of "biological capital", by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has increased many-fold in the last two decades. How destructively second world states of eastern Europe treated their own (and also other regions') environment, how they over-expoited and polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and their wild inhabitants in the past and have heavily polluted and exported their urban and industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example, those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or degrading most what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly focussed narrowly upon shallow economic agendas, will or can deliver satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation.18 Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental) strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, 18 This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially . Sylvan 96 . On the dismal environmental records of particular states see Punting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental exploitation of third world states, see Bolla, pp57-65 . �8 but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not so readily brought to practical use. 19 In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concetration of power, hierarchical authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian rationality, and sundry other evils. 20) As 1ndicated, present states are incompatible with stock ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their . . own expensive runnmg. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to point towards a partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. To point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, 'the State is a social institution', always 'within', Marxists continue, 'a ,concrete historic setting' .21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is 'a society or association for the [organisation or] promotion of some particular object [or 19 To adapt a referee's trenchant summary . For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons , see Bumheim and above all Marshall. 20 Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote as is generally supposed. 21 Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way 'but as an abstraction and aberration'. �9 function]'. 22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in tum dismantling corporate capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else, often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables to flourish. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for g_reen design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something ofthe sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory. 23 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory-itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's "deep ecology" for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical tum. 24 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued-increme ntal change, social engineering, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutionswith but few so far having much impact on practice. 25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance of making a difference than radical redesigns, regularly smartly dismissed as "unrealistic" or "utopian".26 No doubt the 22 Oxford English Dictionary, adapted. An institution is an organitution. 23 On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory , see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80. 24 As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. 25 There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. 26 Too smartly, as we argue elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan and Bennett 90). �normal "reshaping institutions" investigations are rightly focussed upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. Under present incremental reform and regression, for all th_e spasmodic environmental rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example, will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely noi arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation. There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done; otherewise let things alone, let Being be. 27 On this non.:. managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially 27 The non -prejudical term 'anarchoid' is deployed, not because what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence .. �11 more. Organisationa l oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmenta lly destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisatior,,. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure: to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised , hierarchical, largescale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchic al, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious dilemma for concerned green theorists. 28 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one horn, the pull ( or push) to localisation and regionalisatio n, to non-anonymo us smallscale low-impactin g environmenta lly-friendly arrangements , to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmenta l reliance upon and use of the central state. 29 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmenta l regulation and welfare measures ... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized , steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions. 30 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation , but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchistically -inclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialistically -inclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsore d nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highway s, on the one horn; and, on the 28 As by Michael Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). 29 Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter I 0. 30 Fox, Ecopolitics III. �12 other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on .31 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation , as usually explained, does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmenta l and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmenta lly unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmenta l regulation. Relevant continent-wid e functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation of powers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmenta l regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each 3I Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or affluent ways, and so on . �13 such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democraticall y-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendat ions and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions . There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmenta l and consumer organizations.32 4. Selecting satisfactory political arrangemen ts within the span of anarchoid options. Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right leaning individualisti c or capitalistic varieties, and lef-leaning social or communitaria n varieties.33 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these form, while not encouraging all, <:lS they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in these coino-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not, on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be striven for, that adequate design are sought and adequate selections inadmissible forms rapidly perish. Those forms that are admissible can be ranked, for instance according to defeasible criteria based upon "pillars" of German green movement such as environmenta l sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices. While right leaning anarchoid arrangements could in theory work (e.g. under what is improbable, benevolent capitalists), they are unlikey to succeed in practice, for several reasons. Consider to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or "liberal" 32 This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive location system, is also breached in these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration , much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land and resources), use charges, and fines . 33 There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede . For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism , market-organiza tion and capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism (characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism with free mar1cet arrangements. And so on . Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory has tended inadmissilby to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of different elements drawn from both "left" and "right". �14 capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reasons an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with standing state controlled and funded military and police forces to defend capitalist interests and accommod ation, to protect private property, to uphold social in equalities, and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation system to fund these forces and a correspond ing bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilites are limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) free and competitive. Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green socities. In normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modem history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other modern statist systems). Furthermor e, given the sorts of humans and practices (including extravagen t consumptio n for all that can afford it) these systems tend to elevate, exalt, encourage and some times even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected, and liable to persist-wi thout further state interventio n to distort "natural" capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit practices on private property (thereby altering the institution 34 ), to establish new mitoument s and commoditi es such as pollution licences, green investment s and futures, and so forth. Even though a shallow greenness could be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism (factoiries in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, etc.) and some green chowcase exhibits tacked on, environme ntal depth cannot. Shallownes s is both an inevitable consequenc e of the justifying socio-econ omic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice. Accordingl y in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic leftleaning directions. It would be rash to gamble upon any bright new clause of environme ntally and socially benign market capitalism, which could in any event easily revert back to dark industrial ages. Similar arguments to those sketched could be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic procedures. While island communiti es of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded under anarchoida l pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design. Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like department s and corporation s). For direct accountability downwards , and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), would be democratic ally selected (from a relevant lower level constituenc y, and 34 Infiltrated too is much mythology, including acclaimed environmenta l virtues of private property and privatization generally . �15 from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation, particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those froms can function in favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as mob actions, selection of tryants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several thorny problems remain for any deeper green political theory. 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where 'power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them\ but 'often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege' 35 . It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship-though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what get left out , outcasts of even perfect democratic control:- 35 Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for "democracy", notably in Asia, are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the "right to know" ). �16 • spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into--what is part of what it is about-such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way.36 Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democraticall y excludes. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human "bottom lines" as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. As observed, there is really no organisationa l alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger constituencies do decision-mak ing agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings 36 See Sylvan and Bennett 93. �17 of alternatives, was: by representative means-only "representation" was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed-wh ere representation has, in any case, to be expanded -also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-mak ing bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does. 37 Of course, however good the selection processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may remain. Nonetheless prejudice and mal-treatment may be much reduced. As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value. 38 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there <;1re severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In present oligarchical circumstance s, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. A fundamenta l dilemma for (deeper)-gre en organization democratic or authoritaria n procedures? There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation antidemocratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically sponsors, is put in sharper form as follows :39 Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can 37 No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. 38 For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 93 and its sequel. 39 Goodin, condensing Saward, p.168 . �18 there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that masitonous forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself capiously illustrates that. But ti can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must view (owing to finite lifetimes, etc.), and in occasional transitions deterioration can occur; there are no effective mechanisms that an exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most other available, but even they afford no cast as on guantees of adequacy, and are beset by paradoxes of their own. In inadequate democratic structure plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a "paradox of democracy" where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant. 40 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls 'dark green'). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep green theory . In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the 'intrinsic value' of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or 'direct democracy' in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents. 41 40 Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can much reduce the likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overturns. 41 Saward, paper version p.3 .; repeated p.5 . �19 As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is "implied" and what supersedes consistency .42 As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, e.g. as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens. 43 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperative_s with types of democratic procedures-none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. A first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ' local production for local need', 'low consumption', 'labour-intensive production' , and ' voluntary simplicity' (other items from Porritt's list). 44 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and ~argets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g . irt ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition), goals, programs , and principles-through 'imperative goals' and the like-into 'imperatives', 'prescribed outcomes' , undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ' Grassroots democracy' is one of the four 'basic principles' of the party's 'global conception' . Another is the 'ecological': 'Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature'. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be_thoroughly compatible.4 5 42 See Priest and others. 43 Cf.p.12 essay. 44 [Reference] 45 [Reference] �20 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that 'certain outcomes are proscribed' . A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ' principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] "laws of nature", against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board'. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like). To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers). Frankel accuses Bahro of an 'anti-democratic' vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of 'givens'. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists-de eming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. · The basic question about politics, he writes, is 'Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives' 46 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places) . Principles, and ecological "givens", stand, they remain 'desirable in an ultimate sense', but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no 'antidemocratic vision', but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Sayward's important conclusions ... : that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism-a nd ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things-like democracy-t hat can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.47 · 46 47 �.. ·- ·----------- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - -- ------ 21 What Saward proposes instead is depressing ly familiar: pragmatism , jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions . ... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives . Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperative s based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiabl e.48 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no internal or latent contradicti on between (deep-)gree n policy objectives and democratic procedures . Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without welldisposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any "will" of the demos. A logical requiremen t on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstan ces where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsisten t. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community , as variously represented , can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees) , enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousn ess raising; and so on. In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby removing himself his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspectiv e [and others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that 'political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking' . By abandoning foundation alist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory. 49 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with 'only ... the case'. People can be politically led (retardation , however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is a familiar phenomena ); they could just elect a green governmen t which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non48 Of course it is now put in terms of "imperatives "; it would be better expressed in terms of principles, policy objectives or the like. Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a underlying shallow utilitarianism . The differences concern not only depth, but the rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism in deeper approaches. 49 [Ref. and page] There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one, admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of merit, which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to Christianity, need caary no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may yield a certain humbleness. �22 sequitur. Attitudinal change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans. 7. Ecoregio nal demanar choid reshaping of Australi an political institutio ns: one beginni ng. Is such a radical restructur ing as that suggested feasible? Initial investiga tions hold out the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations according ly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australia n Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia. 50 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against "the blueprint ", a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangem ents). Among the many designs, some few, conformi ng to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropria tely through systems modelling s, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined , many variations would be feasible. Not only is systems modelling particular ly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for computin g simulatio n and impleme ntation, and even some simulate d political experime ntation. Furtherm ore, such modelling s begin to give some grasp on the size and complexi ty of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going "Limits to Growth" project 51 , or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifica tions and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classifica tion would be hierarchi cal, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumula tion of power or wealth) . Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classifica tion (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account of political organisat ional principle s and objective s. Fortunate ly some of the prelimina ry classifica tory work has already been accompli shed in Environm ental Regional isations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generatin g many more 50 Such design, well accomplish ed, would help considerab ly in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. 5I See e.g. Meadows. �23 given. 52 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demog raphic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked admin istrativ e and comm unity units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smalle r-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance . Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primar y educat ion would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planni ng propo sals. (It is said to have been applie d by the Catho lic Churc h in admin istratio n of the Holy Roman Empire, whenc e the not altoge ther apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation , united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficie nt, of duplic ation, and so on. But, the object ive is not maxim ization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisiz e on a wider framework of values , including holistic social arrangements. Presum ably, howev er, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to region al constituencies. This contra sts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwar ds, throug h some indirect and tenuou s , centra lized circui ting chain. Natura lly much more gets compr ehend ed under accountability , for instance openness of environmental accounting. There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre down) principles. Among these will be • repres entatio n of smalle r regions in relevant planni ng institutions of more compr ehensi ve region s . Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replac e anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental contro l. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification prefer red, nor about social functio ns to be addres sed. At a theore tical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practi ce-wi th different regions and continents trying different arrangements, 52 See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classific ation begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation . �24 with much less of the sort of cosmopo litan political monocult ure that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political forms (includin g stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (includin g present state examples) are inaccepta ble. So there are bounds open diversity. Moreove r, what suits one communi ty or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there are limits open successful transfer of organisational structure; what works .in one region may require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer. Structural diagram : Schematic diagram of organisation structur e (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed) statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional inflow control materials selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigratio n sup_erreg10ns (a to k) interregional transport, etc. upper levels arbitration bureau resources income office ground level (local) regions (1 ton) water systems rental entitlements office hospital systems region 1 sewer systems reg10n n �25 • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisa tion at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephon e directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australi an Bureau of Statistic s will assume a new significance and indepen dent role, and so on. But which instituti ons are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social organisa tional features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramid al structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power hierarchy. While some requisite research has been undertaken .upon how the various functional bodies and decision -making committees can be selected and can operate 53, insuffic ient investig ation has been made of the interrelations and adequate fundings of the bodies and institutions involve d - whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modellin g has apparen tly been attempt ed for any region anywhere. Evident ly there is much to be done theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing , problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected. Noneth eless compar atively little is likely to be done, unless requisit e support is forthcom ing, support in the shape of researchers (researc h volunte ers and students ) and research infrastr ucture (from research, donatio ns and the like). For such support, for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its establish ed research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accompl ished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent universi ty projects. (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are now other structure s, such as internet and radio channels, that can facilitate interconnections and interchanges of researches, both regionally and internationally. On these sorts anarcho id communicationa l bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice , could be formed. Given the dismal state of present politica l arrange ments, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great need, as a very minimu m, for networks of innovative researchers who chose such goals. 54 53 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim 's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. 54 To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demandin g referees for several helpful suggestio ns and many improvem ents. �26 Richard Sylvan* Refer ences . Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, Londo n, 1994. Bookc hin, M., Remaking Society: Pathw ays to a Green Futur e, South End Press, Boston , 1990. Bumh eim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambr idge, 1985. Burnh eim, J., 'Demo cracy, nation states and the world system Democracy. (ed. D. Held and C. Pollit t) Londo n, Sage, 1986, pp.218 ', New Form s of -239. Ul.rh2r) A Fox, W. , in Ecopolitics III, Hamil ton, New Zealan d. Goodi n, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambr idge, 1992. Green , G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, Intern ationa l Publis hers, New York, 1971. Jacobs , M., The Green Economy: enviro nmen t, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Conco rd, Mass, 1991. Macka y, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Macka y, Pymbl e, NSW, Angus & Rober tson, 1993. Macph ee, I., 'A new constitution?' (excer pts from an openin g addres s) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith Unive rsity Schoo l of Law, June 1993. Marsh all, P., Dema nding the Impossible: a history of anarc hism, Londo n, Harpe r Collins 1992. Mc Laugh lin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Alban y NY., 1993. Meado ws D., and others , Beyond the Limits, Chesle y Green, Vermo nt, 1992. Naess , A., Ecolo gy, comm unity and lifesty le (trans. and ed. D. Rothe nberg ), Cambr idge Unive rsity Press, Cambridge, 1989. Pontin g, C., A Green History of the World, Sincla ir-Stev enson, Londo n, 1991. Priest, G., Routle y, R. and Norma n, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic , Philos ophia Verlag , Munic h, 1989. Routle y, V. and R., 'Socia l theorie s, self manag ement and enviro nment al proble ms', in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mann ison and others ), RSSS, Austra lian Nation al University, 1980. * where is it �" . \)ot:;::,o 27 ~\)--:, \\-' Saward, M., 'Green. Democ racy', in Politics f Natur~ op cit, pp. ~~~ J..-.'->~f\, l(; ~ '5:> r 1\J ' ' . b3 - 'S/J L , £_? ~ J?_ \._\J.. cfr \~~ 2 ~"\,o (')roN CrlL~ rv fbltf ~~L, H-iof2 v- Sylvan, R. and Bennet t, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennet t, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., 'Anarc hism\ in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996. Thackw ay, R. and Cressw ell, I.D., Enviro nment al Regionalisations of Austra lia, Enviro nmenta l Resour ces Information Network, Australian Nation al Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National Univer sity, May 1993. �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Thomas V. Cahill, Editor, Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University to Richard Sylvan, 18 May 1994 re feedback from referees on paper by Sylvan for Anarchist Studies (1 page) �ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions" project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present "best practice" democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 f0J.._/ ,C. #--0/'...__~,_,k_J ver.r~ ~ -;- I c}~J ,h,,z'7 -?< �ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions" project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present ."best practice" democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ·*' . ~":'" mw 10.4.95 PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION THEORY: an Australi an perspective on radical institutio nal change . .. . people are ready for change and the impending debate will result m constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options .... 1 As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchant ment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window therefore no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. Disenchan tment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics-a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the Australian situation: . anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. . .. Widesprea d anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ... 2 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting. (though voting is legally compulsory). Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions .3 1. Hon . Ian Macphee, ' A new constitution? '. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutiona l options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey's data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. 2 Mackay pp.174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Plain findings are replicated by other socialogists. 3 Ibid. p.178 2 In a recent survey, '62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community' .4 Australian loss of faith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanator y factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ' ... the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view' .5 A complex 'second factor ... concerns the adversaria l nature of two-party politics' .6 How can this 'two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define'? But 'reµefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself . Why 'when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more cooperative and harmonious spirit' ?7 'Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when .. . distinction s between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable .... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic' .8 'The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ... , or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it' .9 Unless there is marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, 'the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum ' .10 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid. pp.178-179. 6 Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordabili ty of adversarial systems. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid. p. 180. 9 Ibid. p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. lO Ibid . p. 181 . 3 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that 'they are overgoverned ' 11 , with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments - and between the various State parliaments themselves - are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal · governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable ... . The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for _some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed. 12 Such diseffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia's political arrangements owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantme nt with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentator s , and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutiona l monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless , as a result , republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while 11 Ibid. p. 181 , itals added. 12 Ibid. p.181 -2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time . But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. 4 academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as changing geopolitica l circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemploym ent, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangeme nts making the newly-fashioned .Commonw ealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region (and the money-ma king opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directi<;ms, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronis m, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other manageme nt powers, inappropriate 'powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.' Another effect of inapposite state-federal 13 Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a con stitution , so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc . even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. 5 arrangements, especially 'funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities . ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ... '; the opportunity 'to design and provide the services which are needed locally.' 14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors. .. Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ... 15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small /) ·liberal management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangemen t of anachronistic state partitions. But that regionalizatio n should be greened, as reform should be radicalized. More generally, opportunites now present themselves to inset more radical ideas throughout the debate about Australia's future directions. For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of,justificatio n for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. 14 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as "unrealistic" by some practicing politicians , appeared to gain a good deal of support. I5 McPhee ibid. 6 Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-lon g project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001. 16 One. small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to 'provide major input into evaluation and refonn of Australia's institutions'; indeed it is explicitly 'aimed at contributing to Australian constitutio nal reform'. 17 Nothing however precludes considerat ion of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions - those of the whole ecological region - in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way. Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock. boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparative small adjustments leaving it substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing 16 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory , arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions, held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994. 17 ' Reshaping Australian institutions : towards and beyond 200 l' in Tynan , p.17, italics added. 7 demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously, through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments. Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions, as through taxation advantages, subsidies, expert incentives, etc.). Further, the role of exploitation and plunder of remaining natural "resources'', and depletion of "biological capital", by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has increased many-fold in the last two decades. How destructively second world states of eastern Europe treated their own (and also other regions') environment, how they over-expoited and polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and their wild inhabitants in the past and have heavily polluted and exported their urban and industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example, those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or degrading most what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly focussed narrowly upon shallow economic agendas, will or can deliver satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation.18 Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental) strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, 18 This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially . Sylvan 96 . On the dismal environmental records of particular states see Punting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental exploitation of third world states, see Bolla, pp57-65 . 8 but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not so readily brought to practical use. 19 In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concetration of power, hierarchical authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian rationality, and sundry other evils. 20) As 1ndicated, present states are incompatible with stock ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their . . own expensive runnmg. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to point towards a partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. To point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, 'the State is a social institution', always 'within', Marxists continue, 'a ,concrete historic setting' .21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is 'a society or association for the [organisation or] promotion of some particular object [or 19 To adapt a referee's trenchant summary . For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons , see Bumheim and above all Marshall. 20 Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote as is generally supposed. 21 Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way 'but as an abstraction and aberration'. 9 function]'. 22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in tum dismantling corporate capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else, often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables to flourish. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for g_reen design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something ofthe sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory. 23 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory-itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's "deep ecology" for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical tum. 24 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued-increme ntal change, social engineering, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutionswith but few so far having much impact on practice. 25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance of making a difference than radical redesigns, regularly smartly dismissed as "unrealistic" or "utopian".26 No doubt the 22 Oxford English Dictionary, adapted. An institution is an organitution. 23 On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory , see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80. 24 As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. 25 There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. 26 Too smartly, as we argue elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan and Bennett 90). normal "reshaping institutions" investigations are rightly focussed upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. Under present incremental reform and regression, for all th_e spasmodic environmental rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example, will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely noi arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation. There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done; otherewise let things alone, let Being be. 27 On this non.:. managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially 27 The non -prejudical term 'anarchoid' is deployed, not because what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence .. 11 more. Organisationa l oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmenta lly destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisatior,,. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure: to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised , hierarchical, largescale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchic al, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious dilemma for concerned green theorists. 28 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one horn, the pull ( or push) to localisation and regionalisatio n, to non-anonymo us smallscale low-impactin g environmenta lly-friendly arrangements , to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmenta l reliance upon and use of the central state. 29 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmenta l regulation and welfare measures ... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized , steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions. 30 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation , but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchistically -inclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialistically -inclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsore d nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highway s, on the one horn; and, on the 28 As by Michael Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). 29 Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter I 0. 30 Fox, Ecopolitics III. 12 other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on .31 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation , as usually explained, does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmenta l and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmenta lly unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmenta l regulation. Relevant continent-wid e functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation of powers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmenta l regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each 3I Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or affluent ways, and so on . 13 such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democraticall y-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendat ions and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions . There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmenta l and consumer organizations.32 4. Selecting satisfactory political arrangemen ts within the span of anarchoid options. Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right leaning individualisti c or capitalistic varieties, and lef-leaning social or communitaria n varieties.33 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these form, while not encouraging all, <:lS they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in these coino-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not, on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be striven for, that adequate design are sought and adequate selections inadmissible forms rapidly perish. Those forms that are admissible can be ranked, for instance according to defeasible criteria based upon "pillars" of German green movement such as environmenta l sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices. While right leaning anarchoid arrangements could in theory work (e.g. under what is improbable, benevolent capitalists), they are unlikey to succeed in practice, for several reasons. Consider to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or "liberal" 32 This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive location system, is also breached in these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration , much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land and resources), use charges, and fines . 33 There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede . For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism , market-organiza tion and capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism (characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism with free mar1cet arrangements. And so on . Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory has tended inadmissilby to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of different elements drawn from both "left" and "right". 14 capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reasons an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with standing state controlled and funded military and police forces to defend capitalist interests and accommod ation, to protect private property, to uphold social in equalities, and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation system to fund these forces and a correspond ing bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilites are limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) free and competitive. Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green socities. In normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modem history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other modern statist systems). Furthermor e, given the sorts of humans and practices (including extravagen t consumptio n for all that can afford it) these systems tend to elevate, exalt, encourage and some times even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected, and liable to persist-wi thout further state interventio n to distort "natural" capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit practices on private property (thereby altering the institution 34 ), to establish new mitoument s and commoditi es such as pollution licences, green investment s and futures, and so forth. Even though a shallow greenness could be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism (factoiries in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, etc.) and some green chowcase exhibits tacked on, environme ntal depth cannot. Shallownes s is both an inevitable consequenc e of the justifying socio-econ omic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice. Accordingl y in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic leftleaning directions. It would be rash to gamble upon any bright new clause of environme ntally and socially benign market capitalism, which could in any event easily revert back to dark industrial ages. Similar arguments to those sketched could be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic procedures. While island communiti es of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded under anarchoida l pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design. Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like department s and corporation s). For direct accountability downwards , and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), would be democratic ally selected (from a relevant lower level constituenc y, and 34 Infiltrated too is much mythology, including acclaimed environmenta l virtues of private property and privatization generally . 15 from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation, particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those froms can function in favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as mob actions, selection of tryants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several thorny problems remain for any deeper green political theory. 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where 'power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them\ but 'often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege' 35 . It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship-though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what get left out , outcasts of even perfect democratic control:- 35 Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for "democracy", notably in Asia, are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the "right to know" ). 16 • spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into--what is part of what it is about-such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way.36 Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democraticall y excludes. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human "bottom lines" as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. As observed, there is really no organisationa l alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger constituencies do decision-mak ing agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings 36 See Sylvan and Bennett 93. 17 of alternatives, was: by representative means-only "representation" was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed-wh ere representation has, in any case, to be expanded -also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-mak ing bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does. 37 Of course, however good the selection processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may remain. Nonetheless prejudice and mal-treatment may be much reduced. As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value. 38 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there <;1re severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In present oligarchical circumstance s, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. A fundamenta l dilemma for (deeper)-gre en organization democratic or authoritaria n procedures? There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation antidemocratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically sponsors, is put in sharper form as follows :39 Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can 37 No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. 38 For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 93 and its sequel. 39 Goodin, condensing Saward, p.168 . 18 there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that masitonous forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself capiously illustrates that. But ti can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must view (owing to finite lifetimes, etc.), and in occasional transitions deterioration can occur; there are no effective mechanisms that an exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most other available, but even they afford no cast as on guantees of adequacy, and are beset by paradoxes of their own. In inadequate democratic structure plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a "paradox of democracy" where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant. 40 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls 'dark green'). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep green theory . In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the 'intrinsic value' of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or 'direct democracy' in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents. 41 40 Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can much reduce the likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overturns. 41 Saward, paper version p.3 .; repeated p.5 . 19 As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is "implied" and what supersedes consistency .42 As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, e.g. as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens. 43 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperative_s with types of democratic procedures-none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. A first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ' local production for local need', 'low consumption', 'labour-intensive production' , and ' voluntary simplicity' (other items from Porritt's list). 44 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and ~argets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g . irt ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition), goals, programs , and principles-through 'imperative goals' and the like-into 'imperatives', 'prescribed outcomes' , undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ' Grassroots democracy' is one of the four 'basic principles' of the party's 'global conception' . Another is the 'ecological': 'Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature'. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be_thoroughly compatible.4 5 42 See Priest and others. 43 Cf.p.12 essay. 44 [Reference] 45 [Reference] 20 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that 'certain outcomes are proscribed' . A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ' principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] "laws of nature", against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board'. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like). To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers). Frankel accuses Bahro of an 'anti-democratic' vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of 'givens'. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists-de eming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. · The basic question about politics, he writes, is 'Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives' 46 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places) . Principles, and ecological "givens", stand, they remain 'desirable in an ultimate sense', but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no 'antidemocratic vision', but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Sayward's important conclusions ... : that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism-a nd ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things-like democracy-t hat can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.47 · 46 47 .. ·- ·----------- ------ - - - - - - - - - - - -- ------ 21 What Saward proposes instead is depressing ly familiar: pragmatism , jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions . ... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives . Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperative s based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiabl e.48 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no internal or latent contradicti on between (deep-)gree n policy objectives and democratic procedures . Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without welldisposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any "will" of the demos. A logical requiremen t on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstan ces where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsisten t. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community , as variously represented , can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees) , enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousn ess raising; and so on. In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby removing himself his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspectiv e [and others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that 'political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking' . By abandoning foundation alist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory. 49 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with 'only ... the case'. People can be politically led (retardation , however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is a familiar phenomena ); they could just elect a green governmen t which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non48 Of course it is now put in terms of "imperatives "; it would be better expressed in terms of principles, policy objectives or the like. Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a underlying shallow utilitarianism . The differences concern not only depth, but the rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism in deeper approaches. 49 [Ref. and page] There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one, admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of merit, which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to Christianity, need caary no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may yield a certain humbleness. 22 sequitur. Attitudinal change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans. 7. Ecoregio nal demanar choid reshaping of Australi an political institutio ns: one beginni ng. Is such a radical restructur ing as that suggested feasible? Initial investiga tions hold out the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations according ly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australia n Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia. 50 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against "the blueprint ", a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangem ents). Among the many designs, some few, conformi ng to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropria tely through systems modelling s, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined , many variations would be feasible. Not only is systems modelling particular ly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for computin g simulatio n and impleme ntation, and even some simulate d political experime ntation. Furtherm ore, such modelling s begin to give some grasp on the size and complexi ty of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going "Limits to Growth" project 51 , or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifica tions and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classifica tion would be hierarchi cal, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumula tion of power or wealth) . Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classifica tion (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account of political organisat ional principle s and objective s. Fortunate ly some of the prelimina ry classifica tory work has already been accompli shed in Environm ental Regional isations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generatin g many more 50 Such design, well accomplish ed, would help considerab ly in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. 5I See e.g. Meadows. 23 given. 52 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demog raphic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked admin istrativ e and comm unity units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smalle r-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance . Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primar y educat ion would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planni ng propo sals. (It is said to have been applie d by the Catho lic Churc h in admin istratio n of the Holy Roman Empire, whenc e the not altoge ther apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation , united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficie nt, of duplic ation, and so on. But, the object ive is not maxim ization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisiz e on a wider framework of values , including holistic social arrangements. Presum ably, howev er, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to region al constituencies. This contra sts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwar ds, throug h some indirect and tenuou s , centra lized circui ting chain. Natura lly much more gets compr ehend ed under accountability , for instance openness of environmental accounting. There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre down) principles. Among these will be • repres entatio n of smalle r regions in relevant planni ng institutions of more compr ehensi ve region s . Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replac e anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental contro l. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification prefer red, nor about social functio ns to be addres sed. At a theore tical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practi ce-wi th different regions and continents trying different arrangements, 52 See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classific ation begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation . 24 with much less of the sort of cosmopo litan political monocult ure that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political forms (includin g stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (includin g present state examples) are inaccepta ble. So there are bounds open diversity. Moreove r, what suits one communi ty or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there are limits open successful transfer of organisational structure; what works .in one region may require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer. Structural diagram : Schematic diagram of organisation structur e (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed) statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional inflow control materials selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigratio n sup_erreg10ns (a to k) interregional transport, etc. upper levels arbitration bureau resources income office ground level (local) regions (1 ton) water systems rental entitlements office hospital systems region 1 sewer systems reg10n n 25 • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisa tion at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephon e directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australi an Bureau of Statistic s will assume a new significance and indepen dent role, and so on. But which instituti ons are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social organisa tional features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramid al structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power hierarchy. While some requisite research has been undertaken .upon how the various functional bodies and decision -making committees can be selected and can operate 53, insuffic ient investig ation has been made of the interrelations and adequate fundings of the bodies and institutions involve d - whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modellin g has apparen tly been attempt ed for any region anywhere. Evident ly there is much to be done theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing , problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected. Noneth eless compar atively little is likely to be done, unless requisit e support is forthcom ing, support in the shape of researchers (researc h volunte ers and students ) and research infrastr ucture (from research, donatio ns and the like). For such support, for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its establish ed research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accompl ished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent universi ty projects. (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are now other structure s, such as internet and radio channels, that can facilitate interconnections and interchanges of researches, both regionally and internationally. On these sorts anarcho id communicationa l bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice , could be formed. Given the dismal state of present politica l arrange ments, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great need, as a very minimu m, for networks of innovative researchers who chose such goals. 54 53 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim 's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. 54 To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demandin g referees for several helpful suggestio ns and many improvem ents. 26 Richard Sylvan* Refer ences . Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, Londo n, 1994. Bookc hin, M., Remaking Society: Pathw ays to a Green Futur e, South End Press, Boston , 1990. Bumh eim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambr idge, 1985. Burnh eim, J., 'Demo cracy, nation states and the world system Democracy. (ed. D. Held and C. Pollit t) Londo n, Sage, 1986, pp.218 ', New Form s of -239. Ul.rh2r) A Fox, W. , in Ecopolitics III, Hamil ton, New Zealan d. Goodi n, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambr idge, 1992. Green , G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, Intern ationa l Publis hers, New York, 1971. Jacobs , M., The Green Economy: enviro nmen t, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Conco rd, Mass, 1991. Macka y, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Macka y, Pymbl e, NSW, Angus & Rober tson, 1993. Macph ee, I., 'A new constitution?' (excer pts from an openin g addres s) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith Unive rsity Schoo l of Law, June 1993. Marsh all, P., Dema nding the Impossible: a history of anarc hism, Londo n, Harpe r Collins 1992. Mc Laugh lin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Alban y NY., 1993. Meado ws D., and others , Beyond the Limits, Chesle y Green, Vermo nt, 1992. Naess , A., Ecolo gy, comm unity and lifesty le (trans. and ed. D. Rothe nberg ), Cambr idge Unive rsity Press, Cambridge, 1989. Pontin g, C., A Green History of the World, Sincla ir-Stev enson, Londo n, 1991. Priest, G., Routle y, R. and Norma n, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic , Philos ophia Verlag , Munic h, 1989. Routle y, V. and R., 'Socia l theorie s, self manag ement and enviro nment al proble ms', in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mann ison and others ), RSSS, Austra lian Nation al University, 1980. * where is it " . \)ot:;::,o 27 ~\)--:, \\-' Saward, M., 'Green. Democ racy', in Politics f Natur~ op cit, pp. ~~~ J..-.'->~f\, l(; ~ '5:> r 1\J ' ' . b3 - 'S/J L , £_? ~ J?_ \._\J.. cfr \~~ 2 ~"\,o (')roN CrlL~ rv fbltf ~~L, H-iof2 v- Sylvan, R. and Bennet t, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennet t, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., 'Anarc hism\ in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996. Thackw ay, R. and Cressw ell, I.D., Enviro nment al Regionalisations of Austra lia, Enviro nmenta l Resour ces Information Network, Australian Nation al Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National Univer sity, May 1993. The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Thomas V. Cahill, Editor, Department of Politics and International Relations, Lancaster University to Richard Sylvan, 18 May 1994 re feedback from referees on paper by Sylvan for Anarchist Studies (1 page) ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions" project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present "best practice" democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 f0J.._/ ,C. #--0/'...__~,_,k_J ver.r~ ~ -;- I c}~J ,h,,z'7 -?< ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions" project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present ."best practice" democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 971: Draft of Problems in deeper green political organization theory: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change, with letter from Thomas Cahill, Editor of Anarchist Studies to Richard Sylvan, 18 May 1994 Subject The topic of the resource Typescript (photocopy) draft, with handwritten emendations. Paper dated 10.4.95. Includes two copies of abstract of paper, with handwritten annotations. Description An account of the resource Letter redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 971 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [30] leaves + 1 letter (1 leaf). 29.02 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14e81ee">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14e81ee</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 7 Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/47290a949d35cf80426b62ad11ea2f02.pdf 4bf0c098455f06e841302b4c0e11fc65 PDF Text Text ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions” project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts Anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of an encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present best-practice democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions” project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts Anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of an encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present best-practice democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 984: Abstract of Problems and solutions in deep ecopolitical theory Subject The topic of the resource Typescript Description An account of the resource Note, one item digitised from item 984. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 539.65 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1281ef1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:1281ef1</a> Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d238dd79bb3f1ee48d89a9ee1eaafa0d.pdf e2faa9a5b7a1df99c3768418e2d7768c PDF Text Text �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 984: Miscellaneous notes on anark Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes on scrap paper. Description An account of the resource Verso of leaves not digitised. Note, one item digitised from item 984. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [4] leaves. 1.84 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5c3aeec">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5c3aeec</a> Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/11628f2bcbc3662efac3cdfbd36f91f2.pdf 14d16e4188eb5909aab1b95fe48f8953 PDF Text Text ,x» REMARKS ON ‘COMMUNITARIAN ANARCHISM AND HUMAN NATURE’. This article makes a worthwhile historial contribution concerning communitarian anarchism, in helping to remove a familiar criticism. It needs considerable redrafting, in my opinion, before it is published. Necessary redrafting concerns both structure and several points of detail. In what follows some points are sketched and some suggestions made, in no particular order of importance. (It should not be simply assumed that what I have not commented upon, e.g. historical interpretation, I generally find more or less satisfactory.) • The naivety thesis is not satisfactorily specified. (It is said to be an inference, and then what is offered is a poorly structured argument, not strictly a thesis). In fact, most of the argument and discursion concerns thesis (i), better restated (cf. pl7) as the following target thesis (ti) Anarchists believe that egoism is a product of (contemporary) social organisation, not an inherent part of human nature. The main work is devo ted to trying to rebut such a thesis, at least as regards three classical anarchists. (The success of this main work is partially assessed below.) Part of the trouble with the “naivety thesis” arises because of apparent errors concerning the interrelations of propositions (i) and (ii) on the one side and propositions (iii) and (iv) on the other (as also as to (v) and its consequent). Showing (i) and (ii) are false does not show (iii) and (iv) and the back of (v) are all false (contrary to p.3 middle, and to p.20 end also). For the most part, as here, a believes that p is independent of p. (Note too that (iii) and (iv) look rather more plausible than what (ii) and (ti) cover.) As it happens, I suspect our author intended to cover all propositions, not just (iii) and (ti), by ‘anarchists believe that’. However such covering will not effect a repair. In sum, the naivety thesis should be better characterised, the associated argument should be clarified and rectified, and the interrelation of theses should be worked out properly. This affects the total structure of the article. • It may seem to be a minor matter that feature f is innate says something different from feature fis an inherent part of human nature, for features such as egoism, sociability, etc.. (E.g. the feature may be bom in, but fade out or be educated out, or it may not be “innate” but invariably develop.) However this comes to assume a larger role because of the emphasis put upon nativism (from p.4 on), nativism getting linked to innateness, when it is inherentness that matters. There is also an historical problem, that nativism is characterised in late 20th century terms, not in terms that automatically apply in a 19th century setting. A less metaphorical explication is required, which connects nativism with apparatus of the target thesis. • As regards elaborating and establishing the main thesis of the article, namely (ci) communitarian anarchism, as manifested in three major espositors, is not dependent upon a �2 naive account of human nature (that of (ti)), much in the article is strictly irrelevant. The article could be substantially cut in length and sharpened. Much space is devoted to trying to show that (li) ‘only in their later writings’ do ‘Proudhon and Bakunin adopt a clearly defined nativism’— ‘subsequent to their repudiation of Hegelian metaphysics’. This involves considerable perusal of their early writings, material that does not assist in supporting (ci). If historical exegesis directed towards (li) is to take up such a large part of the article, then the early part (e.g. p.l) should be reoriented to indicate what much of it is really about. Otherwise much of pp.5-9, for instance, can be chopped. Without such restructuring, but a. fraction of what appears on pp.5-19 is needed (a few critical points). A much sharper less circuitous defence of (ci) could be provided. And even with radical restructuring much diffuse material on “the intellectual voyages” of the expositors could be profitably deleted. • There is a serious difficulty as regards Proudhon; so much so that there is real doubt that he can be regarded as furnishing positive support for (ci). The problem is that, by the time Proudhon abandons ‘too ideal a conception of man’, he appears also prepared to abandon (or at least indirectly erode) communiitarian anarchism: for instance ‘it is unlikely... that all trace of government and authority will disappear—’ (both quotes from p.l 1). • The historical argument developed is not entirely decisive in shoring up communitarian anarchism (contrary to the impression given). For a critic could contend that the historical figures were either deluded about their continuing commitment to communitarian anarchism or else mistaken about the coherence and viability of their theory in this regard. In short, the historical examples are not genuine counter-examples to the naivety of such anarchism. Something should be added to offset this sort of objection. Richard Sylvan � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ,x» REMARKS ON ‘COMMUNITARIAN ANARCHISM AND HUMAN NATURE’. This article makes a worthwhile historial contribution concerning communitarian anarchism, in helping to remove a familiar criticism. It needs considerable redrafting, in my opinion, before it is published. Necessary redrafting concerns both structure and several points of detail. In what follows some points are sketched and some suggestions made, in no particular order of importance. (It should not be simply assumed that what I have not commented upon, e.g. historical interpretation, I generally find more or less satisfactory.) • The naivety thesis is not satisfactorily specified. (It is said to be an inference, and then what is offered is a poorly structured argument, not strictly a thesis). In fact, most of the argument and discursion concerns thesis (i), better restated (cf. pl7) as the following target thesis (ti) Anarchists believe that egoism is a product of (contemporary) social organisation, not an inherent part of human nature. The main work is devo ted to trying to rebut such a thesis, at least as regards three classical anarchists. (The success of this main work is partially assessed below.) Part of the trouble with the “naivety thesis” arises because of apparent errors concerning the interrelations of propositions (i) and (ii) on the one side and propositions (iii) and (iv) on the other (as also as to (v) and its consequent). Showing (i) and (ii) are false does not show (iii) and (iv) and the back of (v) are all false (contrary to p.3 middle, and to p.20 end also). For the most part, as here, a believes that p is independent of p. (Note too that (iii) and (iv) look rather more plausible than what (ii) and (ti) cover.) As it happens, I suspect our author intended to cover all propositions, not just (iii) and (ti), by ‘anarchists believe that’. However such covering will not effect a repair. In sum, the naivety thesis should be better characterised, the associated argument should be clarified and rectified, and the interrelation of theses should be worked out properly. This affects the total structure of the article. • It may seem to be a minor matter that feature f is innate says something different from feature fis an inherent part of human nature, for features such as egoism, sociability, etc.. (E.g. the feature may be bom in, but fade out or be educated out, or it may not be “innate” but invariably develop.) However this comes to assume a larger role because of the emphasis put upon nativism (from p.4 on), nativism getting linked to innateness, when it is inherentness that matters. There is also an historical problem, that nativism is characterised in late 20th century terms, not in terms that automatically apply in a 19th century setting. A less metaphorical explication is required, which connects nativism with apparatus of the target thesis. • As regards elaborating and establishing the main thesis of the article, namely (ci) communitarian anarchism, as manifested in three major espositors, is not dependent upon a 2 naive account of human nature (that of (ti)), much in the article is strictly irrelevant. The article could be substantially cut in length and sharpened. Much space is devoted to trying to show that (li) ‘only in their later writings’ do ‘Proudhon and Bakunin adopt a clearly defined nativism’— ‘subsequent to their repudiation of Hegelian metaphysics’. This involves considerable perusal of their early writings, material that does not assist in supporting (ci). If historical exegesis directed towards (li) is to take up such a large part of the article, then the early part (e.g. p.l) should be reoriented to indicate what much of it is really about. Otherwise much of pp.5-9, for instance, can be chopped. Without such restructuring, but a. fraction of what appears on pp.5-19 is needed (a few critical points). A much sharper less circuitous defence of (ci) could be provided. And even with radical restructuring much diffuse material on “the intellectual voyages” of the expositors could be profitably deleted. • There is a serious difficulty as regards Proudhon; so much so that there is real doubt that he can be regarded as furnishing positive support for (ci). The problem is that, by the time Proudhon abandons ‘too ideal a conception of man’, he appears also prepared to abandon (or at least indirectly erode) communiitarian anarchism: for instance ‘it is unlikely... that all trace of government and authority will disappear—’ (both quotes from p.l 1). • The historical argument developed is not entirely decisive in shoring up communitarian anarchism (contrary to the impression given). For a critic could contend that the historical figures were either deluded about their continuing commitment to communitarian anarchism or else mistaken about the coherence and viability of their theory in this regard. In short, the historical examples are not genuine counter-examples to the naivety of such anarchism. Something should be added to offset this sort of objection. Richard Sylvan Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 984: Remarks on 'Communitarian anarchism and human nature' Subject The topic of the resource Typescript. Description An account of the resource Note, one item digitised from item 984. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 984 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [2] leaves. 1.53 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fa8761a">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fa8761a</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 7 Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ead82de895e579a8e06b9cd889bf5470.pdf 33e8c3b195bf1de721f623ec3ef5dab1 PDF Text Text <L^ 80993 �o/ Methods reZ#Z:ons carrot <- -> stick Back-up possibly Transparent BENIGN PaciEst opposition T ^2---------------------------- --- 4, opaque Enlightenment opposition Liberal \ opposition ��PREFACE. A roc/ </'<:/' This text is written in deep anger, anger not just at what humans have done to so much of the face of the Earth, but still more at what they continue to do. ar Much of the Earth is now a mess.,) Mess is due to humans, some humans. Worse, much of the Earth's environment continues to be destroyed or seriously degraded. Again the main direct or indirect cause is human activity. Humans continue to foul, degrade, or destroy not only their own habitats but the environments of most other forms of life as well. That did not need to happen. It does not have to go on happening. There were paths not taken. There were significant options not even properly considered. In some cases, there still are such options, not being seriously considered, not being taken. 1 ( That should be changed. But present socio-political arrangements, throughout entire complex or states that covers the Earth, depend upon, are premiss^ upon, features that lead to precisely such destruction^ and degradation^. For many states such resully are both ^4 occurring in their own territories, and spilling over into those of others. Present socio political arrangements accordingly have to be changed, changed radically. But here we encounter an evident obstacle. It is unlikely that those in power, or with privilege, will go qui^ly, will let their class subside from its materially advantages position, or wither away environmentally. An appropriate revolution may be needed in certain key places to affect due changes. But that is a very controversial idea. There is no need to recite yet again the litany of environmental disasters that have ^co occurred or the even more calamitous stack thafare already activated. Almost every day there A is something new or still news. Another oil spill, wiping out the lives ojf present habitats of birds and fish. Through deforestation,^landslides here, flooding there. More whales taken by the Japanese, Ozone holes grow. And so it goes on, with much more in store. But now nearly every sizeable introductory textbook in biology or geography includes a large and largely depressing section on environmental "problems" (at least too some of the devastation and depredation is at last seen as constituting a "problem"). So do many other books; an excellent easy high ted introduction is Ear?Asropg. And more and more popular periodicals and newspapers^/e on environmental disasters and problems or run feature articles.' With new threats to the collective human future the environment has become highly fashionable. , Now, with some appreciation of the inconvenience to business and businessmen of a nuclear winter, runaway greenhouse, or like catastrophe even cautious conservatives are beginning 1 The intellectual who does most to bring this out, the arbitrariness even of present institutional arrangements, is no doubt I^acault. /<M J? �^7/ ^7W/ , 7 ^*/ , ., 7^ ^,/ , „ y^j. ^7 /. -^M_ y.-y </? ^7' '"^ , r.A-/^-. ^. ^1 /<A—, , l-"^- '—^-/^7 ��2 to recognise that there may be ^ome problems, that }a major nuclear exchange will have among its plausible efforts, the greatest biological and physical disruptions of this planet in the last 65 million years'. But the apparent fact is that the very course we are 3a, any further catastrophe, without a nuclear exchange, will cause the greatest biological Z) 6 Ar. disruption of the planet in the last 65 million years. It is enough to and compare data for species loss. It is now a relatively easy matter to .... the considerable array of environmental problems and outrages that we so far know something about. It is another, much more difficult, matter to do something worthwhile about them. While many environmental problems may now be sufficiently clear, and stark, how to react to them, what to do, what practice and theory to pursue are seldom so clear. [Nor is there any very grave difficulty about some of what needs to be done in order to avert or reduce some of the worst problems, and some of the major disasters in store. What is lacking is sufficient motivation, or opportunity among main power brokers (political will, .<............... ..... ................................................ .................... .................................................................... ——— ----------------------- - — political blockages,<etc)] Th& text aims to develop the assemble requisite theory and indicate resultant practices Ensuing political theory^ which will lead to relevant change. But) There is much theoretical work to be accomplished, both critical and constructive. Critical work criticizing present and prevailing assumptions and practices, and the acclaimed justification and alleged reasonableness of these practices. Constructive activity outlining ernative idea-< idea-e^clicism, alternative practices and way of reaching alternative structures, alternative ' . The present exercise aims to be a part of that endeavors. It is a them from where we—— are. .. ______________ —— -------------- A/ philosophical, theoretical book^ It concentrates on the theory, especially the theory, of / .. ...................................................................................................... I..... ....... . ^4—environmentalisin.\ While it offers a purework for environmental action, it says little directly Ar no c . on such action. Those are one practical details zmd recipes for saving a forest froim . _ eismAiSSUfi / hen? destructive logging interests, for example, ways to proceed abouTihal are forever become increasingly appreciated. What is still lacking is the wider p^lifactory structure which explains and justifies opposition and resistance. The run of environmental ethics text do little of what is required. They contain insufficient criticism, little analysis of depth, no vision or elaboration of alternatives. They are so sweetly, eminently reasonable^ fiddling while environmental Rome bums. Too many seek "blame" and all that sort of crap. Or, where they would shake " with ........ - development r r near ihA present predatory arrangements, it is only in one respect, and that not getting to bottom of the troubles, reat^ meat eating. For, while some problems work be ^t-&ough^(^ ----- other generals thereby), it is evident that the rape of most of the Earth could construe vegetarian way. ace in a , . �Environmental ethics texts have no anger, no outrage at what is Being being done to the Earth. Put crudely, they lack guts. Indeed some suggest that things are proceeding rather well, as it not so well, as well as could be expected. (If the latter it coop very little for managing humans competent as managers/organisers). Al! is vary/ivr from well. There is cause not merely for concern, but for deep anger. (Such anger may be un-American.) The dominant way, re^our^ism, if not successfully opposed, will ultimately destroy the ecosphere and then humans among other species Intellectuals, philosophers especially, lately economists even more,2 deal to answer for, socially and environmentally. They encouraged permit of present damaging practices; they proceeded to provide the intellectual and attitudinal underpinnings that helped motivate and continue^ to justify the practices. Nor, with the evidence of environmental crisis so manifest, have things changed much. Most intellectuals continue as if nothing had happened apart from the beneficial advancement of science and technology. Most economists continue to produce or partificate upon various growth (or maximal equilibrium) pmf^tonals. Most philosophers - most are AngloAmerican in background - continue in their hopeless efforts to prop up or impede upon what is fundamentally anfhdi d awedy^basicaiiyv Humean empiricism (thus recently in the on-going display of Humean fashions, evolutionary epistemology, belief as reduced to desire, causal reductions, etc). Most have said, or done, very little about the^..^./ environmental situations; those who have, like Naess, are often ridiculed by the comfortable professionals. 4 This book tries to retell, in a more organised and coherent way what deep-green theory, an environmental theory that has emerged in a sporadic and scattered way over the last couple of decades, is all about. But not everything is told; only the predominantly ethical pa^ts. Later parts of this series on deep-green theory will cover political and economics theory and social theory more generally. Untila century ago philosophy and economics were not separate disciplines. The significant economists were almost invariably philosophers (neeerds may be the one main^,...). �X\^7c-vr/ ?^7<!k^< /7,^ -7^ . r^/ 7^r^7 c)/-^^ //^A^-. ; / C/ A A' �Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic' issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness. The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of (acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory and relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and „--------- -—-sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory moBe^gen^ahy can A avoid them„ (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast m a more classical Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form^ Nor will these background advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices. LA^to d^ep theory-— Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deep-green theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly with the intertwining of truth and value t&at it is worth giving an example. Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) e �exist in "suitable" determinate form in the second. Deep object-theory slices straight through these issues, removing the problem-generating ontological assumptions. is a grander theory lying in the background, which significantly influences the philosophical approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The background theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc.) With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehensive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehensiveness as regards present philosophical problems would come a certain completeness; but I've come to thinkjhat a total philosophy is an illusion, like at it Deep theory is no doubt a presumptuous title (there are worse about, e.g. Total philosophy", 'ecosophy'^, ^o( it is altogether satisfactory, given the problems and obscurities, .to be encountered, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did not exactly good to refuse. It emerged from a terminological confluence of several e&eas in which I'd thought, or environmental philosophy^with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory). To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelations, and some of their revolutionary potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been assumed or presupposed in Western philosophy, and particularly in Enlightenmented contemporary philosophy. For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:* the Ontological Assumption, that truth, and also/ meaning, are functions of reference, and thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectlv well talk and think trulv aboutS items that do not exist, and' also about items that are impossible. ^Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionally favoured full-back from enttcalism, namely possibilism, which assumes �* the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals# there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away. Bound up with possibilism are * the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate requirement of consistency. under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs. Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that * entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts to a modal function of material implication^. The rejection of such themes and their jeourses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic. While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to ependent development and analysis. //yyy- 1 Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B. ,. A, �/ re/ �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document <L^ 80993 o/ Methods reZ#Z:ons carrot <- -> stick Back-up possibly Transparent BENIGN PaciEst opposition T ^2---------------------------- --- 4, opaque Enlightenment opposition Liberal \ opposition PREFACE. A roc/ </'<:/' This text is written in deep anger, anger not just at what humans have done to so much of the face of the Earth, but still more at what they continue to do. ar Much of the Earth is now a mess.,) Mess is due to humans, some humans. Worse, much of the Earth's environment continues to be destroyed or seriously degraded. Again the main direct or indirect cause is human activity. Humans continue to foul, degrade, or destroy not only their own habitats but the environments of most other forms of life as well. That did not need to happen. It does not have to go on happening. There were paths not taken. There were significant options not even properly considered. In some cases, there still are such options, not being seriously considered, not being taken. 1 ( That should be changed. But present socio-political arrangements, throughout entire complex or states that covers the Earth, depend upon, are premiss^ upon, features that lead to precisely such destruction^ and degradation^. For many states such resully are both ^4 occurring in their own territories, and spilling over into those of others. Present socio political arrangements accordingly have to be changed, changed radically. But here we encounter an evident obstacle. It is unlikely that those in power, or with privilege, will go qui^ly, will let their class subside from its materially advantages position, or wither away environmentally. An appropriate revolution may be needed in certain key places to affect due changes. But that is a very controversial idea. There is no need to recite yet again the litany of environmental disasters that have ^co occurred or the even more calamitous stack thafare already activated. Almost every day there A is something new or still news. Another oil spill, wiping out the lives ojf present habitats of birds and fish. Through deforestation,^landslides here, flooding there. More whales taken by the Japanese, Ozone holes grow. And so it goes on, with much more in store. But now nearly every sizeable introductory textbook in biology or geography includes a large and largely depressing section on environmental "problems" (at least too some of the devastation and depredation is at last seen as constituting a "problem"). So do many other books; an excellent easy high ted introduction is Ear?Asropg. And more and more popular periodicals and newspapers^/e on environmental disasters and problems or run feature articles.' With new threats to the collective human future the environment has become highly fashionable. , Now, with some appreciation of the inconvenience to business and businessmen of a nuclear winter, runaway greenhouse, or like catastrophe even cautious conservatives are beginning 1 The intellectual who does most to bring this out, the arbitrariness even of present institutional arrangements, is no doubt I^acault. /<M J? ^7/ ^7W/ , 7 ^*/ , ., 7^ ^,/ , „ y^j. ^7 /. -^M_ y.-y </? ^7' '"^ , r.A-/^-. ^. ^1 /<A—, , l-"^- '—^-/^7 2 to recognise that there may be ^ome problems, that }a major nuclear exchange will have among its plausible efforts, the greatest biological and physical disruptions of this planet in the last 65 million years'. But the apparent fact is that the very course we are 3a, any further catastrophe, without a nuclear exchange, will cause the greatest biological Z) 6 Ar. disruption of the planet in the last 65 million years. It is enough to and compare data for species loss. It is now a relatively easy matter to .... the considerable array of environmental problems and outrages that we so far know something about. It is another, much more difficult, matter to do something worthwhile about them. While many environmental problems may now be sufficiently clear, and stark, how to react to them, what to do, what practice and theory to pursue are seldom so clear. [Nor is there any very grave difficulty about some of what needs to be done in order to avert or reduce some of the worst problems, and some of the major disasters in store. What is lacking is sufficient motivation, or opportunity among main power brokers (political will, .<............... ..... ................................................ .................... .................................................................... ——— ----------------------- - — political blockages,<etc)] Th& text aims to develop the assemble requisite theory and indicate resultant practices Ensuing political theory^ which will lead to relevant change. But) There is much theoretical work to be accomplished, both critical and constructive. Critical work criticizing present and prevailing assumptions and practices, and the acclaimed justification and alleged reasonableness of these practices. Constructive activity outlining ernative idea-< idea-e^clicism, alternative practices and way of reaching alternative structures, alternative ' . The present exercise aims to be a part of that endeavors. It is a them from where we—— are. .. ______________ —— -------------- A/ philosophical, theoretical book^ It concentrates on the theory, especially the theory, of / .. ...................................................................................................... I..... ....... . ^4—environmentalisin.\ While it offers a purework for environmental action, it says little directly Ar no c . on such action. Those are one practical details zmd recipes for saving a forest froim . _ eismAiSSUfi / hen? destructive logging interests, for example, ways to proceed abouTihal are forever become increasingly appreciated. What is still lacking is the wider p^lifactory structure which explains and justifies opposition and resistance. The run of environmental ethics text do little of what is required. They contain insufficient criticism, little analysis of depth, no vision or elaboration of alternatives. They are so sweetly, eminently reasonable^ fiddling while environmental Rome bums. Too many seek "blame" and all that sort of crap. Or, where they would shake " with ........ - development r r near ihA present predatory arrangements, it is only in one respect, and that not getting to bottom of the troubles, reat^ meat eating. For, while some problems work be ^t-&ough^(^ ----- other generals thereby), it is evident that the rape of most of the Earth could construe vegetarian way. ace in a , . Environmental ethics texts have no anger, no outrage at what is Being being done to the Earth. Put crudely, they lack guts. Indeed some suggest that things are proceeding rather well, as it not so well, as well as could be expected. (If the latter it coop very little for managing humans competent as managers/organisers). Al! is vary/ivr from well. There is cause not merely for concern, but for deep anger. (Such anger may be un-American.) The dominant way, re^our^ism, if not successfully opposed, will ultimately destroy the ecosphere and then humans among other species Intellectuals, philosophers especially, lately economists even more,2 deal to answer for, socially and environmentally. They encouraged permit of present damaging practices; they proceeded to provide the intellectual and attitudinal underpinnings that helped motivate and continue^ to justify the practices. Nor, with the evidence of environmental crisis so manifest, have things changed much. Most intellectuals continue as if nothing had happened apart from the beneficial advancement of science and technology. Most economists continue to produce or partificate upon various growth (or maximal equilibrium) pmf^tonals. Most philosophers - most are AngloAmerican in background - continue in their hopeless efforts to prop up or impede upon what is fundamentally anfhdi d awedy^basicaiiyv Humean empiricism (thus recently in the on-going display of Humean fashions, evolutionary epistemology, belief as reduced to desire, causal reductions, etc). Most have said, or done, very little about the^..^./ environmental situations; those who have, like Naess, are often ridiculed by the comfortable professionals. 4 This book tries to retell, in a more organised and coherent way what deep-green theory, an environmental theory that has emerged in a sporadic and scattered way over the last couple of decades, is all about. But not everything is told; only the predominantly ethical pa^ts. Later parts of this series on deep-green theory will cover political and economics theory and social theory more generally. Untila century ago philosophy and economics were not separate disciplines. The significant economists were almost invariably philosophers (neeerds may be the one main^,...). X\^7c-vr/ ?^7<!k^< /7,^ -7^ . r^/ 7^r^7 c)/-^^ //^A^-. ; / C/ A A' Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic' issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness. The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of (acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory and relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and „--------- -—-sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory moBe^gen^ahy can A avoid them„ (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast m a more classical Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form^ Nor will these background advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices. LA^to d^ep theory-— Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deep-green theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly with the intertwining of truth and value t&at it is worth giving an example. Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) e exist in "suitable" determinate form in the second. Deep object-theory slices straight through these issues, removing the problem-generating ontological assumptions. is a grander theory lying in the background, which significantly influences the philosophical approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The background theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc.) With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehensive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehensiveness as regards present philosophical problems would come a certain completeness; but I've come to thinkjhat a total philosophy is an illusion, like at it Deep theory is no doubt a presumptuous title (there are worse about, e.g. Total philosophy", 'ecosophy'^, ^o( it is altogether satisfactory, given the problems and obscurities, .to be encountered, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did not exactly good to refuse. It emerged from a terminological confluence of several e&eas in which I'd thought, or environmental philosophy^with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory). To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelations, and some of their revolutionary potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been assumed or presupposed in Western philosophy, and particularly in Enlightenmented contemporary philosophy. For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:* the Ontological Assumption, that truth, and also/ meaning, are functions of reference, and thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectlv well talk and think trulv aboutS items that do not exist, and' also about items that are impossible. ^Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionally favoured full-back from enttcalism, namely possibilism, which assumes * the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals# there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away. Bound up with possibilism are * the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate requirement of consistency. under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs. Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that * entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts to a modal function of material implication^. The rejection of such themes and their jeourses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic. While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to ependent development and analysis. //yyy- 1 Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B. ,. A, / re/ Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 17, Item 993: Revision of Green anarkism, notes, possibilities Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten and typescript drafts, with handwritten emendations, and handwritten notes. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 17, Item 993 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [14] leaves. 28.28 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a82519e">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:a82519e</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 7 Box 17: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5db24f9062978c3cb3ac367788f0837b.pdf 5499c94435baef11855853b3b0cd8ab9 PDF Text Text ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions^^ project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present t4best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar "Reshaping Australian Institutions^^ project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present t4best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB 683 Bungendore Australia 2621 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Abstract of Problems in deep ecopolitical theory Subject The topic of the resource Printout, undated. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [1] leaf. 492.07 KB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7537d8b">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:7537d8b</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Typing Table at End of Desk Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/d75844da363477e0a040dc1548e6e077.pdf 6e902a860ae1f5d903cbe328de2a2e37 PDF Text Text A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory Conspectus: The rough working idea is this: These paradoxes get treated in the same way as moral dilemmas in deontic theory. Namely they are accepted, so theory and assumptions do not require revision and excision. Rather is required is elaboration, additions to say what do when a dilemma is encounter (e.g. proceed to fall back on rational decision theory, as modified). Thus it is with voters paradoxes, inconsistent preferences, Arrow’s theorem, and so on: STET! let them stand. If they are encountered head-on, then work through them using alternative methods. It is an important point that methods do not give out, as things do not go haywire when consistency is encountered. Let us start with desires and preferences, which are the basic items in much theory (eg. stock economics). Although standard theory smooths out—removes—inconsistencies in agents’ desires and preferences, it is widely appreciated that they can both be inconsistent. A person can both want something for one set of reasons or urges and not want it perhaps for another (e.g. because moral constraints enter). The so-called empirical “problem” of nontransitive preferences is, turned around, simply a case of inconsistency. A simple case (like that of voting paradoxes) is where an agent has circular preferences. Over some loop, which may be quite large an agent prefers a to bi, bi to b2, ... bn-i to bn and bn to a. So by transitivity this agent prefers a to bi and bi to a, and similar, which preferences are inconsistent. Given the usual assumption that a Pb implies ~bPa, these circular preferences are explicitly inconsistent. Yet such preference ordering are frequently observed, especially in children (who are often keen to exhibit preferences). A theory admitting explictly inconsistent preferences has to be paraconsistent, on pain of triviality otherwise. Certainly a theory where inconsistency was not exposed, but is to say locked up in preference relations need not be paraconsistent, but such a theory would be only partial, not a sufficiently full theory revealing what was transpiring. A normal modal theory would, for instance, be worthless in the presence of inconsistent preferences or desires, because it would yield such results as that any such agent desires everything. (For instance, by virtue of systematic requirements for D, desire, it follows that Dp & D~p -» DB. The system requirements are A -* B/DA -» DB and DA & DB -> D(A & B).) The state of an agent with inconsistent preferences or desires need not run out of control. Consistency is not the only constraint, the only limit on logical licence, but a special, often excessively powerful one. In these cases control can be provided by agents not processing trivial preferences or desiresi, by some, sufficiently many, things not being preferred or desired. More comprehensively, a rather minimally adequate agent will have both a logically organised set of inclusions, preferences that obtain or are held, etc., and of exclusions, items that are not desired etc. Thus a more satisfactory logic for this sort of area will exhibit both acceptances and rejections. For example: i- DA & DB -> D(A & B) usual coounterexamples to �which assume inconsistent desire cannot obtain explicitly. Normally where h DA then i- D(A& B); but of course an agent may not desire something on its own, which would be differently formulated. Most important, h Dp. That is necessary, though far from sufficient for a coherent agent (and it as with coherents agents, as distinct from consistent agents, that we are now primarily concerned). Now it is not difficult to show that there are paraconsistent logical theories that can combine all these sorts of features with inconsistency in desires or preferences, e.g. with i- D (qo & ~qo) for some qo (for some agent). If individual agents can have inconsistent motivational states, so, still more, can groups of agents. Broadly, many sorts of pooling induce inconsistency: of information, knowledge, and so on, as is now well appreciated. But if of beliefs why not of desires, if of information why not of preferences, which, for one thing, are based on information? Such inconsistency induced by aggregation is what manifests itself in voting paradoxes. Now we can adapt an argument from what do in case of individual agent situation to apply to what do in group case. Namely, not revise and elide, but proceed on through an inconsistency; proceed by further available methods, e.g. further voting differently arranged. (Compare perhaps a football match which results in a draw or stalemate. Do not go back and try to start over. Play on into extra time, with new rules to give a more rapid outcome.) To the extent that it can be carried out on the basis of received preference theory, standard economic theory can be simulated on the basis of paraconsistent preference theory. For there are, in general, simply more preferences to start with, for instance in extending to utility functions, expanding typically in complete preference orderings. Indifference curves can be constructed in the standard way, the only difference being that there will be some singularities, as regards where items are both preferred and not. A conundrum for green theory over democracy, which it typically supports, is put in a sharp form as follows1: Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? That democracy will yield a way of protesting environments? First greens are not seeking guarantees, which they could not in general expect. 1 Goodin under way So-wind p.168. �a ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions” project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present “best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB683 Bungendore Australia 2621 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory Conspectus: The rough working idea is this: These paradoxes get treated in the same way as moral dilemmas in deontic theory. Namely they are accepted, so theory and assumptions do not require revision and excision. Rather is required is elaboration, additions to say what do when a dilemma is encounter (e.g. proceed to fall back on rational decision theory, as modified). Thus it is with voters paradoxes, inconsistent preferences, Arrow’s theorem, and so on: STET! let them stand. If they are encountered head-on, then work through them using alternative methods. It is an important point that methods do not give out, as things do not go haywire when consistency is encountered. Let us start with desires and preferences, which are the basic items in much theory (eg. stock economics). Although standard theory smooths out—removes—inconsistencies in agents’ desires and preferences, it is widely appreciated that they can both be inconsistent. A person can both want something for one set of reasons or urges and not want it perhaps for another (e.g. because moral constraints enter). The so-called empirical “problem” of nontransitive preferences is, turned around, simply a case of inconsistency. A simple case (like that of voting paradoxes) is where an agent has circular preferences. Over some loop, which may be quite large an agent prefers a to bi, bi to b2, ... bn-i to bn and bn to a. So by transitivity this agent prefers a to bi and bi to a, and similar, which preferences are inconsistent. Given the usual assumption that a Pb implies ~bPa, these circular preferences are explicitly inconsistent. Yet such preference ordering are frequently observed, especially in children (who are often keen to exhibit preferences). A theory admitting explictly inconsistent preferences has to be paraconsistent, on pain of triviality otherwise. Certainly a theory where inconsistency was not exposed, but is to say locked up in preference relations need not be paraconsistent, but such a theory would be only partial, not a sufficiently full theory revealing what was transpiring. A normal modal theory would, for instance, be worthless in the presence of inconsistent preferences or desires, because it would yield such results as that any such agent desires everything. (For instance, by virtue of systematic requirements for D, desire, it follows that Dp & D~p -» DB. The system requirements are A -* B/DA -» DB and DA & DB -> D(A & B).) The state of an agent with inconsistent preferences or desires need not run out of control. Consistency is not the only constraint, the only limit on logical licence, but a special, often excessively powerful one. In these cases control can be provided by agents not processing trivial preferences or desiresi, by some, sufficiently many, things not being preferred or desired. More comprehensively, a rather minimally adequate agent will have both a logically organised set of inclusions, preferences that obtain or are held, etc., and of exclusions, items that are not desired etc. Thus a more satisfactory logic for this sort of area will exhibit both acceptances and rejections. For example: i- DA & DB -> D(A & B) usual coounterexamples to which assume inconsistent desire cannot obtain explicitly. Normally where h DA then i- D(A& B); but of course an agent may not desire something on its own, which would be differently formulated. Most important, h Dp. That is necessary, though far from sufficient for a coherent agent (and it as with coherents agents, as distinct from consistent agents, that we are now primarily concerned). Now it is not difficult to show that there are paraconsistent logical theories that can combine all these sorts of features with inconsistency in desires or preferences, e.g. with i- D (qo & ~qo) for some qo (for some agent). If individual agents can have inconsistent motivational states, so, still more, can groups of agents. Broadly, many sorts of pooling induce inconsistency: of information, knowledge, and so on, as is now well appreciated. But if of beliefs why not of desires, if of information why not of preferences, which, for one thing, are based on information? Such inconsistency induced by aggregation is what manifests itself in voting paradoxes. Now we can adapt an argument from what do in case of individual agent situation to apply to what do in group case. Namely, not revise and elide, but proceed on through an inconsistency; proceed by further available methods, e.g. further voting differently arranged. (Compare perhaps a football match which results in a draw or stalemate. Do not go back and try to start over. Play on into extra time, with new rules to give a more rapid outcome.) To the extent that it can be carried out on the basis of received preference theory, standard economic theory can be simulated on the basis of paraconsistent preference theory. For there are, in general, simply more preferences to start with, for instance in extending to utility functions, expanding typically in complete preference orderings. Indifference curves can be constructed in the standard way, the only difference being that there will be some singularities, as regards where items are both preferred and not. A conundrum for green theory over democracy, which it typically supports, is put in a sharp form as follows1: Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? That democracy will yield a way of protesting environments? First greens are not seeking guarantees, which they could not in general expect. 1 Goodin under way So-wind p.168. a ABSTRACT OF PROBLEMS and SOLUTIONS in DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY A reshaping of social and political institutions, which are often outmoded or suboptimal and certainly commonly anti-environmental, is now prominent on theoretical agendas, at least in Australia. One such project is the multi-million dollar “Reshaping Australian Institutions” project at the Australian National University. At the same time there is widespread disenchantment with prevailing politics in Australia. Accordingly there is an opportunity to put radical green themes on agendas for real political and institutional change. A deep change, however, which is what deep green theories require, encounters several problems. For one, there appears to be a contradiction between demands for, on the one side, increasing environmental regulations and welfare arrangements, characteristically dependent upon bureaurcratic centralisation and economic growth, and on the other, decentralized lower impact organisation, which halts anti-environmentally industry and economic growth. A functional resolution, partially dissolving a central state, is outlined, along with a theory of encephaletic organisation. Further problems to surmount include human chauvinism and present-time bias, even in present “best practice” democratic institutions. Deep demarchoidal resolutions of these problems are sketched and defended. R. Sylvan RMB683 Bungendore Australia 2621 Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of A dialethic approach to paradoxes of social and political theory ; Abstract of Problems in deep ecopolitical theory Subject The topic of the resource Printouts of draft paper and abstract, undated. Description An account of the resource Papers original housed together with a paper clip. One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [3] leaves. 2.02 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3409b4">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f3409b4</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/1b9f49b772fc52be8bd76afae0dd73a7.pdf a87f09d687c26e038cbebfae6678172f PDF Text Text 13.6.96 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY: a different account Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul according to Caesar, into three parts: —a green theory of value, —a subordinate green theory of agency, and —a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle recommendations. While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination. That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action, no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical matters can be subsumed under these.2 In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral 1 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book worth criticizing. 2 See the appendix. �2 success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human goodness and dominance, and so on.3 The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4 Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation will not yield a lode of green gold. As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles, (as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be 3 For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM. 4 In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate). Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable. And they tend to be very light on argument. 5 Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves. 6 They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers' work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they �3 tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on. Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book, which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages, and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel. It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens. But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on greens that is the trouble. For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment). At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there behind the Green Man's work*. 7 P. viii - p.vii, itals added. �4 fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose. The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided. At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized. Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine. [Simple enumerative induction is not reliable in such settings.] On this-here green theory of value. Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing 4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they know what is good for them. A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset. Not so, unless the rest of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing, 8 P.viii. 9 See the beginning of the main text p.l. 10 This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87. �5 considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to effect a reduction). It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not. The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central, value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at that. There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular, does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking. Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray, because of pluralistic alternatives. According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value, naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness). How does Goodin arrive at this identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value" from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure" theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them. 11 P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions. 12 Ibid. p.30. �6 The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e. good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13 In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument, along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak, each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15 Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory, reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it 13 find quote 14 Ibid p.3& 15 An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore. It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6): For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called 'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is indeed a great deal more than that. �7 were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”， a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails, to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear. As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some, greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16 Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value, but various different, sometimes competing, positions. Nor could a single essence be satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist grounding of value. Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified. But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident, damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens. A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection, valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic, some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way, 16 It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to say, or says. �8 are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural) variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event, because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of 4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events. Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs. It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist 17 It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]): [1] [2] A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system. Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has (presumptively) value. I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption. �9 who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory. Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19 There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers, excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like. The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that [3] I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life, somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures. Anyway, more on that some other time. [4] I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life, while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it. A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory, again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the counterexamples. 18 Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting. 19 See e.g. EE or FF. �10 is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural. Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable, not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests, that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects: naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor. It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of that different green account alluded to above. On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism. Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all the rest of its demands as well.20 The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to proceed 'more impressionistically *. 20 p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92. Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision. �11 Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below, that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively, the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22 Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses. Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value, because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel. All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic. Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what is required. Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly 'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really, a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new- age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is 21 Ibid p.87. 22 Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88. 23 Note & p.8& �12 no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of the early Values party in New Zealand. 'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible. Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument. The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing basis5.26 On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・ The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation, notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally, 'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and 'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep and generality. The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote 24 p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme. 25 p.168? [check, locate] 26 Back cover. �13 referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account, furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens: roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability. The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then, that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29 Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness. These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however 27 See e.g. p.l 14 top. 28 To cite Goodin p.179. 29 Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled. �14 even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that emphases and contrasts are different. Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak. Consider what is offered: • living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals and Churches, ritual and practice. • to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily living. • Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its 30 Thus p.81ff. 31 pp.78-81. �15 practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32 • local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very important. Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous. To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are extremely valuable. APPENDIX: a defective setting. Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests. It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of arguments, both that —the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove effective —the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.). It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged 32 This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay. 33 Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800. �16 in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously compromised human interests\34 Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail. As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests). The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin himself has provided it in susequent work. A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales they have seemed able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate power in business, government, and even universities. But this rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by everyone, including economists themselves.35 34 Ibid p.8 (check). 35 Brennan p.807. �17 The reasons are now entirely familiar ones. References Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994). Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5 Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster), Pluto Press, London, 1987. Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994. McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x. Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2. Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5, typsescript, 1996. Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 13.6.96 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY: a different account Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul according to Caesar, into three parts: —a green theory of value, —a subordinate green theory of agency, and —a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle recommendations. While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination. That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action, no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical matters can be subsumed under these.2 In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral 1 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book worth criticizing. 2 See the appendix. 2 success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human goodness and dominance, and so on.3 The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4 Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation will not yield a lode of green gold. As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles, (as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be 3 For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM. 4 In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate). Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable. And they tend to be very light on argument. 5 Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves. 6 They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers' work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they 3 tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on. Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book, which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages, and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel. It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens. But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on greens that is the trouble. For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment). At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there behind the Green Man's work*. 7 P. viii - p.vii, itals added. 4 fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose. The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided. At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized. Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine. [Simple enumerative induction is not reliable in such settings.] On this-here green theory of value. Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing 4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they know what is good for them. A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset. Not so, unless the rest of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing, 8 P.viii. 9 See the beginning of the main text p.l. 10 This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87. 5 considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to effect a reduction). It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not. The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central, value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at that. There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular, does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking. Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray, because of pluralistic alternatives. According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value, naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness). How does Goodin arrive at this identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value" from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure" theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them. 11 P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions. 12 Ibid. p.30. 6 The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e. good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13 In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument, along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak, each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15 Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory, reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it 13 find quote 14 Ibid p.3& 15 An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore. It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6): For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called 'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is indeed a great deal more than that. 7 were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”， a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails, to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear. As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some, greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16 Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value, but various different, sometimes competing, positions. Nor could a single essence be satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist grounding of value. Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified. But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident, damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens. A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection, valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic, some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way, 16 It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to say, or says. 8 are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural) variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event, because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of 4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events. Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs. It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist 17 It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]): [1] [2] A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system. Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has (presumptively) value. I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption. 9 who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory. Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19 There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers, excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like. The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that [3] I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life, somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures. Anyway, more on that some other time. [4] I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life, while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it. A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory, again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the counterexamples. 18 Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting. 19 See e.g. EE or FF. 10 is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural. Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable, not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests, that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects: naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor. It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of that different green account alluded to above. On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism. Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all the rest of its demands as well.20 The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to proceed 'more impressionistically *. 20 p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92. Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision. 11 Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below, that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively, the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22 Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses. Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value, because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel. All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic. Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what is required. Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly 'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really, a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new- age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is 21 Ibid p.87. 22 Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88. 23 Note & p.8& 12 no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of the early Values party in New Zealand. 'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible. Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument. The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing basis5.26 On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・ The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation, notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally, 'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and 'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep and generality. The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote 24 p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme. 25 p.168? [check, locate] 26 Back cover. 13 referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account, furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens: roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability. The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then, that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29 Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness. These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however 27 See e.g. p.l 14 top. 28 To cite Goodin p.179. 29 Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled. 14 even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that emphases and contrasts are different. Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak. Consider what is offered: • living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals and Churches, ritual and practice. • to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily living. • Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its 30 Thus p.81ff. 31 pp.78-81. 15 practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32 • local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very important. Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous. To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are extremely valuable. APPENDIX: a defective setting. Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests. It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of arguments, both that —the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove effective —the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.). It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged 32 This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay. 33 Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800. 16 in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously compromised human interests\34 Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail. As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests). The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin himself has provided it in susequent work. A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales they have seemed able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate power in business, government, and even universities. But this rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by everyone, including economists themselves.35 34 Ibid p.8 (check). 35 Brennan p.807. 17 The reasons are now entirely familiar ones. References Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994). Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5 Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster), Pluto Press, London, 1987. Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994. McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x. Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2. Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5, typsescript, 1996. Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Green political theory: a different account Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 13 Jun 1996. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1996-06-13 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [17] leaves. 11.63 MB Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:960c201">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:960c201</a> Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/ba75dba8d0f6535e9a8ad23c06661759.pdf a87f09d687c26e038cbebfae6678172f PDF Text Text 13.6.96 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY: a different account Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul according to Caesar, into three parts: —a green theory of value, —a subordinate green theory of agency, and —a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle recommendations. While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination. That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action, no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical matters can be subsumed under these.2 In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral 1 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book worth criticizing. 2 See the appendix. �2 success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human goodness and dominance, and so on.3 The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4 Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation will not yield a lode of green gold. As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles, (as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be 3 For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM. 4 In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate). Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable. And they tend to be very light on argument. 5 Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves. 6 They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers' work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they �3 tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on. Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book, which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages, and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel. It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens. But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on greens that is the trouble. For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment). At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there behind the Green Man's work*. 7 P. viii - p.vii, itals added. �4 fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose. The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided. At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized. Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine. [Simple enumerative induction is not reliable in such settings.] On this-here green theory of value. Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing 4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they know what is good for them. A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset. Not so, unless the rest of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing, 8 P.viii. 9 See the beginning of the main text p.l. 10 This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87. �5 considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to effect a reduction). It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not. The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central, value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at that. There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular, does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking. Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray, because of pluralistic alternatives. According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value, naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness). How does Goodin arrive at this identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value" from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure" theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them. 11 P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions. 12 Ibid. p.30. �6 The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e. good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13 In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument, along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak, each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15 Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory, reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it 13 find quote 14 Ibid p.3& 15 An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore. It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6): For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called 'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is indeed a great deal more than that. �7 were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”， a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails, to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear. As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some, greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16 Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value, but various different, sometimes competing, positions. Nor could a single essence be satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist grounding of value. Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified. But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident, damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens. A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection, valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic, some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way, 16 It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to say, or says. �8 are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural) variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event, because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of 4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events. Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs. It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist 17 It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]): [1] [2] A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system. Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has (presumptively) value. I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption. �9 who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory. Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19 There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers, excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like. The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that [3] I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life, somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures. Anyway, more on that some other time. [4] I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life, while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it. A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory, again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the counterexamples. 18 Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting. 19 See e.g. EE or FF. �10 is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural. Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable, not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests, that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects: naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor. It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of that different green account alluded to above. On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism. Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all the rest of its demands as well.20 The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to proceed 'more impressionistically *. 20 p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92. Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision. �11 Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below, that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively, the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22 Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses. Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value, because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel. All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic. Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what is required. Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly 'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really, a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new- age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is 21 Ibid p.87. 22 Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88. 23 Note & p.8& �12 no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of the early Values party in New Zealand. 'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible. Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument. The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing basis5.26 On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・ The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation, notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally, 'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and 'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep and generality. The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote 24 p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme. 25 p.168? [check, locate] 26 Back cover. �13 referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account, furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens: roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability. The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then, that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29 Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness. These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however 27 See e.g. p.l 14 top. 28 To cite Goodin p.179. 29 Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled. �14 even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that emphases and contrasts are different. Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak. Consider what is offered: • living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals and Churches, ritual and practice. • to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily living. • Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its 30 Thus p.81ff. 31 pp.78-81. �15 practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32 • local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very important. Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous. To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are extremely valuable. APPENDIX: a defective setting. Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests. It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of arguments, both that —the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove effective —the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.). It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged 32 This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay. 33 Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800. �16 in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously compromised human interests\34 Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail. As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests). The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin himself has provided it in susequent work. A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales they have seemed able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate power in business, government, and even universities. But this rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by everyone, including economists themselves.35 34 Ibid p.8 (check). 35 Brennan p.807. �17 The reasons are now entirely familiar ones. References Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994). Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5 Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster), Pluto Press, London, 1987. Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994. McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x. Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2. Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5, typsescript, 1996. Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 13.6.96 GREEN POLITICAL THEORY: a different account Green political theory is divided according to one of our guides1, rather like Gaul according to Caesar, into three parts: —a green theory of value, —a subordinate green theory of agency, and —a green lifestyle program, portrayed as a set of altogether dispensible lifestyle recommendations. While it is the high-handed insistent dismissal of green lifestyles by this guide, Goodin, that has captured the attention of critics and been highlighted, the brash partitioning of green political theory, and the surreptitious dismissal therewith of significant parts of it, should not pass unnoticed. To the contrary, virtually the whole of what political theory is taken to treat comes up for reassessment once green lights are played upon it, certainly under deeper green illumination. That bogus exhaustiveness taken for granted, that all there is to it amounts to value and action, no doubt derives largely from an underlying utilitarianism, according to which other theoretical matters can be subsumed under these.2 In short, partly through dispensing with lifestyle considerations, primarily by virtue of a background utilitarianism operating within a conventional state-setting, Goodin can suppose that green political theory reduces to these two parts: a theory of value and a subordinate theory of agency. Such a reduction is however much too simple, leaving out, as it does, much of ethics of political relevance, as well as a large slab of politics. For example, ethical omissions include the fields of deontology (environmental permissions, prescriptives, directives; environmental justice, rights and so on), of virtue theory, and of accountability. Among political omissions most striking is the absence of any due consideration of institutional and ideological alternatives to what now prevails. Prevailing Western political arrangements—with staged elections, urban bureaucratic control, incremental reformism (often environmentally regressive), and so on—are simply taken for granted. Above all, there is no critique of the state, an increasingly important part of radical green politics. One reason for this gross omission— f radical green theory from what is presented as green political theory—is that Goodin does not question the conventional political assumption that the appropriate objective of green political activity consists in gaining power or influence within established statist arrangements, for example at best through electoral 1 R. Goodin Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge 1992. This was undoubtedly a book worth criticizing. 2 See the appendix. 2 success enabling control of some of the administrative and executive functions of state (we shall encounter this conventional “political realism^^ again later). However significant strands of green political theory no longer accept this assumption. A related reason, reaching deeper, is that Goodin likewise does not question, as strands of green theory now do, what helps undergird the conventional political assumption and reformist utilitarianism, an Enlightenment ideology with its faith in reason and science, technologically-based progress, overall human goodness and dominance, and so on.3 The bold overstatement of claims, along with misrepresentation as to what green political theory comprises, is symptomatic of much of the book: overstatement and undersubstantiation.4 Virtually all main themes of the book are false, indeed rather patently so once exhibited unadorned, because limited truths are overextended; and they are undersupplied with cogent support. So it is with the green theory of value, which inflates what is a significant factor in green evaluation into the supposed total green theory. So it is with the green package, which is presented as having an absolutely tight integration, which it in fact lacks. And so on, as will appear. Not only are main themes seriously defective; more disappointing, a salvage operation will not yield a lode of green gold. As troubling is the anti-subversive character of the work. Goodin has wheeled another Trojan horse into green territory, a horse bringing a number of anti-green academic warriors armed with anti-green ideas and sentiments, and engaged in and advocating anti-green lifestyles, (as will emerge).5 Of course, 'Green political theory' is a clever title, which is complemented by a politically clever introduction on the crises which are not minimized or marginalised but given considerable weight—all of which suggest that the text might be of much more interest to politically inclined greens than the usual academic fare. But the title does not say how the green theory is to be treated, explained and encouraged, exposed and condemned. Neither really. The text is not written for greens (though the publishers obviously hope they may buy it,6 or be 3 For an exposition and criticism of Enlightenment Ideology, see Sylvan TM. 4 In part because these sorts of deficiencies have not been addressed in reviews of the book, I decided to persevere with this less charitable critique (a tiresome exercise bound to alienate). Regrettably most of the reviews appear to derive from a political science orientation. They trip lightly by philosophical fundamentals, where the book is noticeably weak, and vulnerable. And they tend to be very light on argument. 5 Trojan horses are in extensive use by academics, particularly in green regions. We will encounter a number of these horses. They are evident from sociology to biogeography and climatology, and particularly prominent around economic enslaves. 6 They form part of the intended audience for the book according to accompanying publishers' work and flyers. Indeed the publishers have participated in the deception, supplying a cover featuring a boss of the Green Man from the cloisters of Norwich cathedral, which sends, as they 3 tricked into buying it), but for a cohert of academic colleagues—for colleagues who form part of the prevailing system, of politics-more-or-less-as-usual and so on. Deapite its character, there are several useful and attractive features of Goodin's book, which do make it worthwhile reading for awake greens of theoretical bent (one of these features is an Appendix, putting together succinctly a green political program). It is a smoothly written book, encouraging readers to glide along, glossing over the underlying content and messages, and not grasping the enormity of some of what is presented, for instance even as green gospel. It may be just the style that is attractive (the cut of the book, the easy flow, an appealingly simple structure, and other stylish features), rather than details of the real content. If the book has a weakness from the PR angle, it may lie in its flippancy, and failure to take several green issues seriously, both of which sometimes enter irritatingly and will turn off some committed greens. But, by and large, it is a splendidly packaged work; it is what is packaged and what is pushed on greens that is the trouble. For a book purportedly on green theory, treatment of greens is extraordinary condescending. Not much notice is going to be taken of 'what self-styled greens... happen to believe', 'what positions greens actually do take' (p.vii). (How then does he justify the green attributions he proceeds to make, e.g. 'green theory of value5? Evidently his procedure is methodologically unsound). No, it is 'an attempt to saves greens from themselves5 (p.viii). To rescue them,4to tidy up' their slovenly positions—while throwing away critical features of green approaches, such as green lifestyles—Goodin is particularly concerned that green lifestyles should not be seen as part of a rectified green political package. Green lifestyle recommendations are entirely dispensible (so he and others can look and indeed be green without deffort, without making any green contribution; they are conveniently absolved from any relevant action, or lifestyle adjustment). At one stage Goodin claims that the theory is 'moderately deep'. But elsewhere he has more accurately said that it is a pale green theory, very pale green given the attitude taken to green lifestyles. Green Political Theory it may be called: deeper green political theory, at least, it certainly is not, even genuine green it but dubiously is. However Goodin's aim, he regularly informs us, is once again not 4to describe what positions greens actually do take5. His project is a normative one, aimed instead to show what positions greens should take, given their core concerns... what they have to say given their core values'?. In this attempt he should be seen to remarks, 'precisely the contrary signal concerning the nature of the author's project in there behind the Green Man's work*. 7 P. viii - p.vii, itals added. 4 fail entirely. He is astray not merely on the core concerns of many of them (which concerns are far from uniform), but also in loosely coupled resultant positions. Greens are under no such obligations as Goodin would load them with; they are not boxed in as he would suppose. The approach is not only condescending towards greens; it is a touch arrogant. The aim is said to be 'to show greens how to cast their position in the strongest possible form\8 This will turn out to be not a strong theoretical form, by any means, but merely a strong form pragmatically, given a raft of assumptions about prevailing electoral arrangements, an interests theory of voting and human behaviour, and so on. According to many a green however, thereby made are some of the assumptions that have to be turned around if humanly undesirable features are to be avoided, if social collapse of one sort or another is to be avoided. At the very outset, Goodin does something to offset such concerns, as those concerning limits of growth.9 He rolls out a familiar quasi-inductive argument, beloved of economists, that past predictions of limits have been riotously astray (e.g. Jeavons on coal, Meadows and others in Limits of Growth on tin). Granted some predictions have, those regularly offered as illustrations; though others have not, naturally such examples are not emphasized. Not only is the inductive base for the quasi-inductive argument defective, the argument itself exhibits some flaws. That it has been claimed before and shown wrong is hardly decisive evidence that it will not be right a next time. Recall not only the boy who cried "wolf' too often and was eventually consumed, but also the turkeys who every week approaching Christmas triumphantly announced that everything was proceeding just fine. [Simple enumerative induction is not reliable in such settings.] On this-here green theory of value. Much of Goodin's text, that segment that is not pleasant enough "ecopolitical fiir5 (stock descriptions of ecological problems, green movement and their platforms, and so on), is occupied in one way or another with what he is pleased call to 'a green theory of value', quickly to become 'the green theory of value'. Most of the remainder develops from a complementing 4green theory of action5.10 This green theory of value is pushed in a surprisingly deontological fashion, likely to arouse immediate suspicions: as what greens should adopt and wear, if they know what is good for them. A theory of value is just a theory of the good, so it is engagingly asserted at the outset. Not so, unless the rest of what is considered to belong to value theory (standing, 8 P.viii. 9 See the beginning of the main text p.l. 10 This theory of value is also presented in a much published paper, 'A green theory of value'. As to the definite formulation, the green theory, see many places in the text, e.g. p.87. 5 considerability, worth, rating, and so on) reduces. It does not (and Goodin makes no effort to effect a reduction). It will become plain that Goodin is rather good at presenting topics as what they are not. The practice goes beyond introductory and presentational matters to what is taken to be central, value theory. 'A theory of value is, quite simply, a theory of the good', so we are engagingly informed.11 A theory of value is much more comprehensive than a theory of the good (as a perusal of Austrian value theory will quickly confirm), and does not contract, without extensive and dubious reductions (there is the 'quite simply5), to a theory of the good. Do not anticipate then what is promised: a green theory of value. As it turns out, not only are greens short changed on value, they get a very small serve of theory, and again a very pale green offering at that. There are certain peripheral obstacles to this purported green theory of value. In particular, does it even measure up to admittedly lax standards for a theory as to value? As is readily ascertained, the "theory” does not even say what a value is like and is, what kind of object, what identity criteria it satisfies, what postulates it conforms to. Let us call what is presented a pseudo-theory. Perhaps it can be upgraded to a theory, but requisite work is so far lacking. Is this "green pseudo-theory" green? This sort of challenge Goodin is aware of and aims to deflect. Granted the pseudo-theory is admittedly shallow, all politically acceptable theories have to be, he suggests, for instance to seize wide common ground, etc. But this too is astray, because of pluralistic alternatives. According to this green pseudo-theory, not only is naturalness a source of green value, naturalness is the source of value (i.e. goodness). How does Goodin arrive at this identification? By various unsound moves. Most simply, he invalidly concludes, from a consideration of 'naturalness as a source of (green) value', that it is the source of value.12 Such an inference from an indefinite to a definite description is invalid unless uniqueness conditions are independently ensured. Less simply, there is a simplistic derivation of "theories of value" from the three conventional factors of economic production: land (or resources), labour, and capital, each of which is schematically linked to corresponding theories of value. No doubt the land ethic and the labour theory of value just could suggest as much, but it is dubious that anyone much, green or otherwise disposed, would rest content for long with such a “pure" theory, as the factors operate together, not separately. Moreover, the economic “derivations" of these theories should be enough to raise serious green doubts about them. 11 P.19. This claim is also made in several other overlapping Goodin productions. 12 Ibid. p.30. 6 The core theme resulting from the identification is that natural objects are valuable, i.e. good, because they are the result of natural processes and not artificial or human ones. What gives natural objects their value is precisely their naturalness.13 In support of his green theory, Goodin produces a rather nauseating sociological argument, along the following lines: 'humans' have a deeply felt need to find meaning in their lives, i.e. to see their lives as set within a larger context with which they can feel linked. Such a context is provided by nature. In fuller presentation, it is claimed that people want coherence 'between their inner worlds and the external world'; that 'whatever makes people strive for harmony within their own lives would also lead them to strive to lead their lives in harmony with the external world'; and that 'natural processes provide just such a larger context... within which we can set out our own life plans and projects5.14 The argument is entirely shallow, appealing to what some humans want (if they do, not even to what might be good for them); it is utterly instrumental, with nature an instrument for human wants and needs; it is extraordinarily weak, each step being highly contestable; and it does not lead to the intended conclusion, uniqueness of naturalness not being shown. Moreover, for what it is worth, the argument also commits the naturalistic fallacy, purportedly arriving at an identification of value, as what is natural, on the basis of "natural" human wants and needs.15 Observe that this is Goodin's theory as to green theory, an ultimately shallow theory, reached in a shallow economic way, defended in a shallow sociological way, hardly likely to be reflective of deeper green thought. However, it is made to look in some places as if it were some sort of descriptive account; while at other places it appears as a normative account, as if it 13 find quote 14 Ibid p.3& 15 An identification of that Moorean nonnatural feature as natural furthermore. It is worth appending a relevant point from Brennan (pp.805-6): For theorists like Goodin, the status of environmental systems, species and non-human animals appears to be problematic. Although he regards them as proivind a large, independent context within which human life makes sense, it seems that he at the same time regards them as akin to consumer goods, to be displayed, consumed or prozed according to our informed preferences. For those influenced by the resource economists, it can be hard to understand the challenge posed by environmental ethics»>. Once nature is thought of as a resource, a standing reserve, a set of processes and objects that have the potential to satisfy human desires, it is easy to think of it as a nothing more than that. And the challenge posed by any ethic which is properly called 'environmental' is to find a way of articulating the attitude that nature is indeed a great deal more than that. 7 were a very reasonable thing for greens to expouse. But really it is of neither sort; it is neither descriptive of green positions, nor something they should, or would reasonably, adopt; rather it is a theory foisted on greens. It might be pretended that Goodin has offered a "reconstruction”， a rational reconstruction even, of green theory; but such a pretence fails as the construction fails, to meet even basic adequacy conditions, as will appear. As regards descriptive elements, no solid evidence is assembled that most, or even some, greens adopt this green theory, with naturalness as the sole source. Indeed Goodin offers no evidence that any do, and perhaps none of any standing do.16 Furthermore, as but little investigation reveals, there is not a single green "theory" of value, but various different, sometimes competing, positions. Nor could a single essence be satisfactorily distilled from those positions, and even what could be distilled would not resemble Goodin's construction. For some conspicuous green positions, such as ecofeminism or deep ecology, would in no way underwrite naturalness as the source of value, or for that matter a single source of value. More generally, the principles and arguments advanced within green critiques of reductionist science—including that central lesson of ecology, that meaning is to be found in connections, in patterns, in relations—similarly militate against any reductionist grounding of value. Conveniently Goodin appears to absolve us from more detailed fieldwork on green positions. His intention, he boldly announces, is to make it clear to greens and others not what greens in fact think, but what they should think. Indeed he pushes this normative tack to amazing length; only if greens change in the direction he indicates will they be able to make any practical difference to public policies! That rash claim has already been resoundingly falsified. But as regards prescriptive aspects, no intellectually alert greens would adopt Goodin's theory, either. It is not simply because they have other objectives on their agendas, than directly influencing party politics. It is because the theory is seriously defective, and open to evident, damaging objections. So it should not be sought by greens. A central reason why no aware greens should adopt the theory, and why it should be rejected is that it is open to a range of fairly decisive counterexamples. There are many natural items, natural objects or processes, that are not, either on the face of it or after reflection, valuable, as they are or were or where they are. Much that is natural is at least very problematic, some is downright bad. A first class of problematic examples, not involving life in a direct way, 16 It is suggested, by Achtenberg, that McKibben may, but a reading of The End of Nature does not support such a suggestion. As it happens, the situation with McKibben is more than a little curious. For what McKibben want to insist upon—adopting an inadmissibly high redefinition of natural—is that realy nothing is natural any more (hence The End) whence courtesy of Goodin, nothing is valuable any more. But that is not what McKibben wants to say, or says. 8 are those occurrences clustered together as natural disasters, catastrophes, and the like. Included therewith are earthquakes, landslides, soil erosion, meteorite collisions, volcanic eruptions, tidal waves, cyclones, ice ages, and so on. These examples include dramatic and damaging (natural) variations in the natural more stable course of events, variations with climatic or geophysical origins. Consider the devastating Lisbon earthquake of 1775 which so shocked European intellectuals (and was construed by Voltaire as evidence that Gthe natural world is farm from the best of all possible). By contrast, Goodin would be obliged to maintain that it was a good event, because natural (just as good as the new arrival of a passenger pigeon on a splendid autumnal morning) and presumably not at all shocking because of the natural beneficence of the whole disaster. No doubt the problems with global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth, that so exercise Goodin at the outset of his text, are that these are not natural (being induced by human activity which falls outside what is natural, under one conventional ruling); no doubt these would be valuable, and unproblematic, processes were they to proceed naturally without human intervention or assistance. So it was with the volcanic eruptions that demolished the splendid pink and white terraces and laid waste much beautiful New Zealand forest last century; so it was with the earlier ice-age which much reduced the richness of New Zealand flora, eliminating 3 of 4 groups of palms; these were good, even admirable, events. Similar ridiculous outcomes issue when we turn to life (life forms somehow still achieve a privileged role in Goodin, though they are no more natural). Consider the wide range of monsters, cripples, sports, freaks, and so on that natural processes, such as birth, regularly deliver: deformities, malignant mutations, and so on, outcomes that are still generally hidden away, put out of general sight, or quietly removed, at least in the case of more hideous outputs. It is very difficult to see that all these objects are good, even just as good as the most splendid products of nature.17 Roughly Goodin has landed in a similar awkward position to the theist 17 It seems admissible to record that I put several such counterexamples to Goodin well before he undertook final revision of his working typescript. Here is his response on these and connected issues (Goodin, personal communication, numbered and reordered with [1] now proceeding [2]): [1] [2] A somatic organism in a natural environment is a (nonmoral) normative system. Whatever has that much complexity, richness, self-organization, telos has (presumptively) value. I think I still incline to say (despite your chastening) that a sponaneous biological life is always of prima facie value (intrinsic). Though I recognize at once that such value can sometimes be overridden and become in some environmental contexts a new disvalue. And here I just hold in abeyance what the overlay of moral agency with the moral (past biological) life in humans does to the presumption. 9 who announces that all the natural works of God are good, and is then confronted by awful work such as monstrosities or catastrophes. He can try, like the theist, to fall back to some larger valuable setting of which these prima facie nonvaluable components are an integral part; in Goodin's case there is a wider encompassing theory available, namely evolutionary theory (with variation required for natural selection).18 But already this means significant qualification and modification of Goodin's original theory, and shift to a different and so far undeveloped theory. Better to abandon the original theory, given that superior alternatives are on offer namely multiple factor theories, with naturalness one factor in the mix.19 There remain many other lesser difficulties for theories like Goodin's which try to reduce value-making factors to one, such as naturalness (or biological life, richness, or whatever). For naturalness, difficulties arise with pests and weeds, which may be quite natural objects, but objects which are located in the wrong places, notably outside their natural range. No doubt Goodin's theory can be elaborated to take account of such exceptions, but elaborated it needs to be. Other difficulties arise with natural objects which are in natural places, but which are in some way out of balance with their natural environment, for instance through excess numbers, excessive predation (leading to population collapses, etc.). Consider, for example, members of a natural herd of elephants, grown too large for their natural environment, who become destroyers, demolishing significant forests in their range. Again this is natural enough in the circumstances, but the outcomes are certainly not good, nor praiseworthy or the like. The deficiencies of the approach as offering a “theory” of value are accentuated by the specific narrow recipe Goodin tries to impose on greens. In particular, it appears to supply only an on-off qualitative assessment. An item is either good or not according as it is natural, and that [3] I will have to interpet monstrosities, mutation, deformities as struggling life, somehow a necessary part of the process, even though they are in some respects failures. Anyway, more on that some other time. [4] I also hold that (geo) physical nature can sometimes have intrinsic value, so that life, while sufficient for value prima facie, is not necessary for it. A few comments:- Paragraph [1] already points to a more satisfactory, sophisticated theory than greens are saddled with, with a mix of factors (of which naturalness is surely one) yielding presumptive value. Paragraphs [2] and [3] also indicate elements of a more sensitive theory, again at substantial odds with that presented in the book. Paragraph [3] suggest the sort of theological or evolutionary escape discussed in the text below; it does nothing to counter the counterexamples. 18 Also the theist's problems concerning maximization are perhaps reduced in this setting. 19 See e.g. EE or FF. 10 is all. But not all items are of the same value, which is all this allows: valuable because natural. Some, while not being “more natural”，are much more valuable than others. It is well known that comparative assessments, such as bettemess, and likewise quantitative assessments cannot be directly defined in terms of mere quantitative assessments, and it is sufficiently appreciated that a satisfactory axiological theory should account at least for comparative assessments. In this respect too, Goodin's pseudo-theory falls far short of adequacy. On the other side of the qualitative divide, even the best art museums and the best painings within them are not valuable, not good, because not natural. Even if Goodin should say, what his text sometimes suggests, that his green "theory" applies only to natural objects, artifacts are left out, then the theory is at best seriously incomplete. Greens will have some more comprehensive theory of value which covers all items, and integrates a range of assessments of artifacts with natural objects: naturalness will properly disappear as sole criterion, becoming but one factor. It is noteworthy that much of the subsequent development of green political theory in Goodin's text does not depend upon the excessively strong value theory he tries to load upon greens; it does not require—r always, for that matter, use—naturalness as sole criterion. Much of what comes later, all that appears right enough, will "go through" will naturalness as a critical factor. Where appropriate call this the alternate scheme, according to which naturalness is only one critical, but not always decisive, factor in a mix. The alternate scheme is an integral part of that different green account alluded to above. On the touted tightly-integrated Green package, and strong holism. Certain extraordinarily bold claims are advanced, under the banner of 'a unified moral vision5 in the chapter advertised as 4the unity of the green programme\ Notably the green theory of value...[as] elaborated... is what underlies and unifies the entire green political programme .... It is what makes it illogical and inconsistent for other, more established parties to try picking and choosing some bits off that agenda, without accepting all the rest of its demands as well.20 The claims are never established, would not be established by what is suggested, and indeed cannot be satisfactorily established, because the claims do not stand up. The arguments outlined are seriously wanting. Even what is said would make good the claims would not (traces are not enough for "making good^^); but in any case Goodin does not attempt these things, opting to proceed 'more impressionistically *. 20 p.87. The same sort of theme is reiterated (with but minor variations) subsequently, e.g. p.92. Note the ascent from an everyday theory of the good to a unified moral vision. 11 Even impressionistically little works satisfactorily. For 'the green theory of value' of Goodin is not 'uniquely able to account for the coherence of the green public-policy proposals\2122Apart from the critical features, to be considered below, that green proposals do not enjoy the sort of coherence alleged, and that established parties can, and do, pick over green programs selectively, the uniqueness claim, the special position of Goodin's theory, is quietly dropped in the impressionistic "argument". All that is used is the alternate scheme, that a concern for nature informs, directly or indirectly, all the connected 'plants in the green programme'.22 Evidently a variety of concerns for nature can motivate and justify attitudes and procedures regarding pollution, waste, environmental destruction, and so forth. Uniqueness lapses. Worse, the more remote, less directly environmental parts of the green agenda do not fall out eith of Goodin's theory or from the alternate scheme. In a note, Goodin concedes as much; but these (decentralization, grass roots democracy, nonviolence, and much else) derive so he claims, from the subsidiary, but logically separate, green theory of agency.23 Whether they do so derive or not (they do not), they do not derive indirectly from a green theory of value, because of the separation of agency from value. For similar reasons, the "integrated" green programme (outlined in an Appendix) begins to unravel. All that Goodin tries to make out, then only suggestively, is that the alternative scheme helps in explaining certain green attitudes that appear anomalous or otherwise problematic. Even should this exercise succeed (and its success is at best mixed), it would not achieve what is required. Interestingly, the Appendix, 'The Green Political Programme5—far from demonstrating that the narrow green theory of value runs through all green policy, not just the overly 'environmental5 parts—helps in revealing what a patchwork the presented programme is really, a patchwork from which separate patches can be unsewn. A basic problem with the whole approach is this: that there is not a single green program, different green groups have different programms. Witness the many internal disputes, the very public conflicts between social and deep ecology, between animal liberationists and nature greens, between luddites and smart new- age technologists, between spiritual and secular greens, and son. Granted various loose conalitions may be stitched together; but they are various, not unique, and the stitching is very loose, and may easily be undone, for different repackaging. In short, there are many green packages, corresponding to different green theories of value and agency and so on. As there is 21 Ibid p.87. 22 Ibid. p.87. Goodin himself slides back to the indefinite, to a green theory of value, e.g. p.88. 23 Note & p.8& 12 no single green theory, so there is no such tightly unified single package, which is what empirical evidence also seems to show. Moreover, established parties have drawn very selectively upon these sorts of packages, and filched elements selectively. Witness the fate of the early Values party in New Zealand. 'The prima facie wrongness of ... piecemeal borrowing from the greens is easily explicated. It derives straight forwardly from the logic of consistency. It would be simply wrong to embrace a theory of value... for some purposes while shunning it for others. The truth status of value theories just does not flicker on and off like that/2425Embedded therein, in this strong holism, is one basic confusion that pervades the book, a confusion between a theory and what derives from it, between a source and its outputs. Nothing in logic stops selective borrowing from what derives from a program, however tightly integrated. Strong holism is far too strong; it would imply that we cannot adopt, or even toy with, one part of some value theory, or ethical theory on Goodin's account of the matter, without embracing the lot. We cannot accept some on Moore's claims, some of Spinoza's analyses, part of Aristotle without being stuck with the whole. Eclecticism, at least as regards a theory of value, is impossible. Which is absurd, and a reductio thereto of a seriously defective argument. The conclusion has to be that yet another of Goodin's main themes is seriously astray and should be rejected: that 'greens make (radical) demands on an all-or-nothing basis525, that greens 'might reasonably demand that we implement their political program on an all-or-nothing basis5.26 On the misadvertised green theory of agency: green collective organization・ The title 'The Green Theory of Agency5 is something of a misnomer. Most of the chapter consemed (chapter 4) is taken up with what is inaccurately headed 'Principles of green political structures*, which treats not agency but certain elements of macro-political organisation, notably decentralization and policy coordination (itself headed, misleadingly, 'think globally, act locally5). Most of the remainder of the chapter is occupied with what is headed, generally, 'Principles of green political action', but reduces to 'democratic participation5 and 'nonviolence5, and with 'Principles of green party organisation', cut down to 'grassroots democracy5 and 'nrotation in office*, both something of travesties, given the indicated sweep and generality. The theory of "agency" is itself rather a part of a theory of collective action. Virtually nothing on agency in the usual sense of individual action theory enters, except a footnote 24 p.92, partly reiterating the integrated package theme. 25 p.168? [check, locate] 26 Back cover. 13 referring to some work on the topic, and no theory at all of green individual agents (their lifestyles, etc.). The relevant part of collective action theory looks not so much at the roles of operative agents and their individual instrumentality, as at the character and corodinating mechanisms of collective action, namely that needed or designed to realize green values. And really, what is considered is green collective organization, which comprises not only action and practices, but also associated political procedures and structures. Into this expanded account, furthermore, some large assumptions are written, assumptions not accepted by many greens: roughly, reduction of the political to the collective, and of the collective to aggregated individuals, i.e. themes of individualism.2728These reductive assumptions, which are inserted and infiltrated unargued, come to matter in the material on policy coordination, which adopts a standard game-theory approach drawn from the received reductive theory of collective action, a theory unlikely to gain much green applause, for all its academic fashionability. The case for green engagement in coalitions is less straightforward than depicted. No doubt greens who opt for this course of action—what Goodin tries to insist upon, involvement in the politics of the established system—do not then have the option of spuming power-sharing opportunities when those opportunities present themselves. Our guide is, however, too optimistic about how often such opportunies are like to occur, and too sanguine about how they are likely to operate to green advantage. For one thing, greens are not the only political forces within conventional politics who have a theory of value. Furthermore, just as greens seeking to enter into a coalition with a party of the electoral left (at present the only plausible option) must look askance at the likely ttincohe^ence^^ of the compromise reached, so too must the other coalescing party. If, under such circumstances, 'the blame for the logical incoherence would lie with the parties that insisted on adulterating the green programme528, so too, from the perspective of the party of the left, must *the blame for the logical incoherence lie with the greens who insisted on adulterating the pink programme'. It should come as little surprise then, that the evidence suggests that parties of the moderate left are every bit as reluctant to enter into coalitions with the greens as the greens are with them.29 Green agents: their lifestyles, their commitments, their changed consciousness. These matters feature large in American deep ecology; they are neglected or dismissed in Goodin. His rejection of green personal lifestyles is indicative, in these terms, of personal green consciousness and commitment, and of but subdued or diminished green values. It seems fair to remark that only weak environmental commitments are displayed in the book (however 27 See e.g. p.l 14 top. 28 To cite Goodin p.179. 29 Hay op.cit., where various examples confirming the final claim are assembled. 14 even weak commitments, typical of much academic literature, are better than none, typical of former academic literature); or, more provocatively, to infer that Goodin has not really absorbed genuine green values (else he would act personally). What does come through from the book is that Goodin remains something of an outsider to green activism. That he is not together at the cutting edge of things green is betrayed by occasional telling slips, as with what greens worry about in different places (esp. pp. 180-1). It is not that what he asserts is wrong; it is that emphases and contrasts are different. Reasons offered for rejection of green lifestyles are, where clear, extraordinarily weak. Consider what is offered: • living too close to nature, too much in harmony with it, might cause it to lose its valued role for us30一which is (remember) to provide us with a larger context in which we can see our lives as being set! Test the force of the argument by comparing living in the vicinity of other valued items: worthy lives, art, music, intellectual accomplishments. Moreover, there are counter arguments and considerations: that closeness brings respect and awe, and can enhance appreciation of value. Consider the idea of Christians distancing themselves from Cathedrals and Churches, ritual and practice. • to achieve political change, greens should make every effort to minimise the perceived distance between themselves and the “orthodox” community一whereas the association of 'alternative lifestyling5 with 'green' has exactly the opposite effect. Such a claim reveals much as regards subcontests, such as: claimants commitments and seriousness, type and extent of change envisaged, and so on. Christians, feminists, revolutionaries and others would not be too impressed. As in other reaches where orthodoxy may be morally or otherwise amiss, so with regard to green lifestyles: There is a case for a politics of “exemplary practice”； for whilst some people will treat those who so engage as objects of scorn and ridicule, it is evident that many people have been recruited to green values through positive contact with experiments in "right living”，or with elements of green lifestyles. It is important too that at least some people endeavour to demonstrate how green principles might be put into practice at the level of daily living. • Bizarre examples, selective unfavourable examples, advanced under the heading 'green heresies5.31 Granted 'some of this “exemplary practice” might be so outlandish that it reflects negatively on larger green projects. But the influence of this can be overstated; this sort of game can be played with many things that have features to recommend parts of them. After all, every social movement and every tradition of political philosophy, has its fringe-dwellers, even its 30 Thus p.81ff. 31 pp.78-81. 15 practitioners of a particular reductio ad absurdum extracted from a larger coherency.32 • local lifestyle set the focus astray. It should be on grander issues, on global environmental problems, fate of earth, etc. But plainly more regional and local problems also matter, esp. for preservation of habitats, creatures, etc. And here personal and local things can be very important. Finally, there are other reasons for green lifestyles. For example, for the structural changes necessary for environmentally satisfactory societies of one sort or another, something like internalization of green values and adoption of a green lifestyle proves highly advantageous. To this end and others, committed green subcultures and inspiring individual examples are extremely valuable. APPENDIX: a defective setting. Many productions that may look new and interesting in fact prove conservative, brushing off and wheeling out old ideas as if they would accomplish all requisite work. That is, it is implicitly claimed, under conservative approaches, that prevailing paradigms offer all necessary resources for capturing what has (wrongly) been presented as radically new.33 In environmental philosophy a classical exercise of this sort, well received by an environmentally conservative or reactionary establishment, was Passmore's text. Passmore's (and was followed, in a slightly expanded and apparently more liberal setting by Attfield, in a series of broadly consequentialist productions. Now the exercise repeated in environmental political theory by Goodin, who simply imports utilitarianism as supplying a unique and unquestionable rationality, in place of Passmore's vague utilitarianism of humans interests. It does not bode well for a genuinely green theory that its presentation lies virtually entirely within a shallow utilitarian setting, the setting of the dominant economic and public policy paradigm. For just such a setting is what has assisted significantly in getting the Earth into the present environmental mess. Consider what Goodin tries to insist upon in his section (s.1.3) on the arguments (and also elsewhere):- He assumes, in so trying to preempt the range of arguments, both that —the case for environmental protection has to be made in utilitarian terms if it is to prove effective —the most telling arguments concern the ways environmental protection measures are required to further human interests (and intertwined items: people, profits, property, resources, etc.). It is worth commencing erosion of these commonplace assumptions immediately. As for what arguments "work”，are telling or effective, that depends heavily on the context, who is engaged 32 This paragraph borrows heavily from Hay. 33 Brennan's third reductive trend(p.800. 16 in a dialogue, and so on. Those with deep green sympathies are not going to be vastly impressed by a sheaf of utilitarian and human interests (first and only) arguments, any more than by other privileged class arguments. Goodin seems to have rather assumed that, in effect, we are always paired with our political masters, who are and will remain shallow utilitarians. Even now this is by no means uniformly so, and there are grounds for hope that things could be much ameliorated in the future. Accordingly there is little reason to accept Goodin's further excessive claim that the 'essence' of the arguments (all satisfactory arguments he really wants to have us concede) remains the same: 'inadequate protection of the human environment, seriously compromised human interests\34 Pretty much the same problematic ethos is likewise taken for granted for proposed remedies: a standard economic public policy framework, with the essence of the remedy consisting in correcting market failure. From deeper green perspectives this is extraordinarily tired stuff, with "remedies" that have been tried and tried and continue to fail. As part of his case, he tries the stock shallow strategy of rubbishing the idea of admitting interests beyond humans (to grant animals interests is hardly to ''widen'' or ttextend^^ interests). The arguments are all very cheap, and the counter-case is not properly addressed. Regrettably, a shallow utilitarianism raises its ugly head all over the place. A few examples: 'it is more important that the right things be done than that they be done in any particular way or through any particular agency * (p.120). But it is unnecessary to document utilitarian imput as Goodin himself has provided it in susequent work. A main orientation of Goodin's work一which help explain several of its features一 is towards policy-makers or would-be policy-makers. Among such audiences utilitarian and economic rationales contue to be greeted enthusistically. For one reason, such rationales seem made to order when policy makers, or "bureaucratic rationality,5, require 'a means of justifying decisions that may be unpopular with large members of people5. For through these rationales they have seemed able to give principled reasons for action. The policy-maker can claim to have weighed up all the relevant considerations for and against a course of action; each consideration was in some way commensurable with every other—perhaps because each had a dollar value associated with it—and so it was possible to reach a determinate conclusion, by fair and objective means. The appearance of determinacy, fairness and objectivity is an important tool for those who wield and manipulate power in business, government, and even universities. But this rationalizing use of economic approaches should be resisted by everyone, including economists themselves.35 34 Ibid p.8 (check). 35 Brennan p.807. 17 The reasons are now entirely familiar ones. References Achtenberg, W., Review of Goodin, Environmental Values, (1994). Foucault, M., 'What is Enlightenment5 Goodin, R., Green political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Habermus, J., 'Modernity—an incomplete project*, in Postmodern Culture (ed. H. Foster), Pluto Press, London, 1987. Hay, P., Review of Goodin typescript, University of Tasmania, 1994. McGowan, J., Postmodernism and Its Critics, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 199x. Osborne, P, 'Modernity is a qualitative, not a stromological, category: notes on the dialectics of differential historical time', in Postmodernism and the re-reading of modernity (ed. F. Barker and others) Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1991/2. Priest, G., 'On alternative geometries, arithmetics, and logics; a tribute to Lukasiewicz5, typsescript, 1996. Routley, R. and V., “Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' referred to as EE Routley, R. and V., The Fight for the Forests，referred to as FF. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Green political theory: a different account Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 13 Jun 1996. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1996-06-13 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [17] leaves. 11.63 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:960c201">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:960c201</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/7ae32c51780962eac9b5d1373ff2ba05.pdf c78446efbe931846b95a3997f6c0e659 PDF Text Text PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY: an Australian perspective. ... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ...T There is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window therefore no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. 1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. Recently anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased.... Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...2 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting. Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3 In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4 Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘... Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Ibid, p.178 ZbztZ. �2 the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’.5 A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6 How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’. Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co-operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ... distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable. ... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic’.8 ‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’ .9 Unless there is marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that ‘they are overgovemed ’n, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable .... The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Ibid. pp. 178-179. Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of adversarial systems. Ibid. Ibid, p.180. Ibid. p. 179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. Ibid. p. 181. lbid. p. 181, itals added. �3 Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed.12 Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not normal. Elements for a political paradigm shift are already present, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless, as a result, republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up as: changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. �4 Indian-Pacific region (and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite statefederal arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and provide the services which are needed locally.’14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic idea]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ...15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small /) liberal management assumptions. The basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologically-rational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions. But that regionalization should be Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good deal of support. McPhee ibid. �5 greened, as reform should be radicalized. Much has been left off these political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose consititutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, by indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modern adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian constitutional reform’.17 Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparative small adjustments leaving it substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, of the 16 17 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. ‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added. �6 sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be suggested) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing demand from green direction for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths.18 A prime reason is this: a central state is ineluctably committed to high levels of economic activity which impact heavily environmentally, characteristically to economic growth of sorts which impact very adversely environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation. Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to the green (or environmental) strand of the restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not readily brought to practical use. In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states; the undesirability and severe disutility of states, and so on.19) As indicated, present states are incompatible with ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their own expensive running. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to point towards a 18 19 This theme, merely stated here, is argued in detail elsewhere; see esp. Sylvan 95. For a summary of these familiar reasons, see Sylvan 93, and for detail on some, see Burnheim 85 and above all Marshall. �7 resolution) without certain functions that they serve. To point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a concrete historic setting’.20 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is ‘a society or association for the [organisation or] promotion of some particular object [or function]’.21 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.22 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory — itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.23 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued - incremental change, social engineering, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better to cut through all such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutions — with but few so far having much impact on practice.24 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance of making a difference than radical redesigns, regularly smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”.25 No doubt the Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way ‘but as an abstraction and aberration’. Oxford English Dictionary, adapted. An institution is an organitution. On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routley 80. As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. Too smartly, as we argue elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan and Bennett 90). �8 normal “reshaping institutions” investigations are rightly focussed upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. For all the spasmodic environmental rhetoric, under present incremental reform comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently towards meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic difficulties, that present systematic problems confronting Australia will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems not least. Furthermore, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deep green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So do imagine that a rather free hand for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. Also, once it is seen where to go organisationally, it is much easier to discover how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation. There are large and immediate advantages in taking a problem-oriented way. That way, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done, let things alone let Being be.26 On this non-managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmental destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deep ecopolitical theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for putative green society concerns structure: to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large-scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious 26 In vulgar parlance: if it doesn't itch don't scratch (and even if it does, resist). �9 dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one horn, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re-)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon and use of the central state.28 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions.29 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchistically-inclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialistically-inclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania’s Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on.30 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. 31 But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other 27 28 29 30 31 As by Michael Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter 10. Fox, Ecopolitics III. Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their getrich-quick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or affluent ways, and so on. In the immediately generated simple picture there are four options (familiar from relevant logic): predominantly top-down T both B N neither (e.g. populist anarchy) 1 predominantly bottom-up �10 problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. Standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as standardly explained, does not concede sufficient power to representatives, for instance to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to the dilemma lies through a combinational stragegy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. It is a major illusion of modern political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions. There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies and international academies and clubs.32 32 This passage borrows from the summary in Bumheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. �11 4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures. The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts. Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items £1 given by one order relation R, where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <Q, R> is a simple ordered structure, or aframe. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.33) Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 +2 „ - {-2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2} +0 R = — is as shown by arrows. -0 T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component -1 -2 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. 33 Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). �12 central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t. t c Cl C4 a C2 c3 b a3 ai b2 a2 bi Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of 34 35 Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10. �13 actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.36 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. Under decentralized social organization, each requisite function will be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For direct accountability downwards, and to ensure separation of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), will be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but ‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’37. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship — though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Burnheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of relevance is explained) and Sylvan 95. Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are not the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy” are Asian calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”). �14 voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what get left out , outcasts of even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who will be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into - what is part of what it is about - such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way.38 Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically excludes. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modern sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human “bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. There is no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger 38 See Sylvan and Bennett 93. �15 <r constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded —also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.39 As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value.40 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In present oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one beginning. Is such a radical restructuring feasible? Initial investigations hold out the hope that major problems for deep ecopolitical theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia.41 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only is systems modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 93. Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. �16 computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits to Growth” project42, or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classification will be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) will have to be made, taking due account of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more given.43 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planning proposals. (It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficient, of duplication, and so on. But, the objective is not maximization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and tenuous, centralized circuiting chain. 42 43 Naturally much more gets comprehended under See e.g. Meadows. See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation. �17 accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting. Schematic diagram of organisation structure Structural diagram: (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed) statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigration inflow control materials super regions (a to k) interregional transport, etc. (local) regions (1 to n) upper levels arbitration bureau rental entitlements office resources income office ground level water systems sewer systems hospital systems region 1 region n There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and top-down (or centre down) principles. Among these will be • representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, will often replace anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed. At a theoretical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and �18 can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements, with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation will, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus will vanish; the Australian Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, will depend on further social organisational features, not yet considered here. The result will be a levelled pyramidal structure, a flat-untopped network, not a power hierarchy. While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate44, insufficient investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate fundings of the bodies and institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done theoretically. Detailed modellings would bring issues down to earth, without concretizing them; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing, problems to which anarchoid solutions can reasonably be expected. But comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers) and research infrastructure (from research gifts). For such support, for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent university projects. Richard Sylvan References. Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press, Boston, 1990. Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239. 44 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. �19 Fox, W., in Ecopolitics III, Hamilton, New Zealand. Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New York, 1971. Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991. Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993. Macphee, I., ‘A new constitution?' (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith University School of Law, June 1993. Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper Collins 1992. Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993. Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992. Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994. Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May 1993. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN DEEP ECOPOLITICAL THEORY: an Australian perspective. ... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ...T There is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window therefore no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. 1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. Recently anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased.... Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...2 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting. Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3 In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4 Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘... Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Ibid, p.178 ZbztZ. 2 the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’.5 A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6 How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’. Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co-operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ... distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable. ... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic’.8 ‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’ .9 Unless there is marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that ‘they are overgovemed ’n, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable .... The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 Ibid. pp. 178-179. Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of adversarial systems. Ibid. Ibid, p.180. Ibid. p. 179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. Ibid. p. 181. lbid. p. 181, itals added. 3 Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed.12 Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not normal. Elements for a political paradigm shift are already present, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless, as a result, republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up as: changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. 4 Indian-Pacific region (and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite statefederal arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and provide the services which are needed locally.’14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic idea]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ...15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small /) liberal management assumptions. The basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologically-rational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions. But that regionalization should be Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good deal of support. McPhee ibid. 5 greened, as reform should be radicalized. Much has been left off these political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose consititutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, by indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modern adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian constitutional reform’.17 Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparative small adjustments leaving it substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, of the 16 17 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. ‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added. 6 sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be suggested) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing demand from green direction for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths.18 A prime reason is this: a central state is ineluctably committed to high levels of economic activity which impact heavily environmentally, characteristically to economic growth of sorts which impact very adversely environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation. Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to the green (or environmental) strand of the restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not readily brought to practical use. In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states; the undesirability and severe disutility of states, and so on.19) As indicated, present states are incompatible with ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their own expensive running. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to point towards a 18 19 This theme, merely stated here, is argued in detail elsewhere; see esp. Sylvan 95. For a summary of these familiar reasons, see Sylvan 93, and for detail on some, see Burnheim 85 and above all Marshall. 7 resolution) without certain functions that they serve. To point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a concrete historic setting’.20 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is ‘a society or association for the [organisation or] promotion of some particular object [or function]’.21 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.22 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory — itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.23 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued - incremental change, social engineering, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better to cut through all such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutions — with but few so far having much impact on practice.24 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance of making a difference than radical redesigns, regularly smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”.25 No doubt the Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way ‘but as an abstraction and aberration’. Oxford English Dictionary, adapted. An institution is an organitution. On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routley 80. As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. Too smartly, as we argue elsewhere (e.g. Sylvan and Bennett 90). 8 normal “reshaping institutions” investigations are rightly focussed upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. For all the spasmodic environmental rhetoric, under present incremental reform comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently towards meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic difficulties, that present systematic problems confronting Australia will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems not least. Furthermore, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deep green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So do imagine that a rather free hand for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. Also, once it is seen where to go organisationally, it is much easier to discover how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation. There are large and immediate advantages in taking a problem-oriented way. That way, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done, let things alone let Being be.26 On this non-managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmental destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deep ecopolitical theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for putative green society concerns structure: to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large-scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious 26 In vulgar parlance: if it doesn't itch don't scratch (and even if it does, resist). 9 dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one horn, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re-)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon and use of the central state.28 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions.29 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchistically-inclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialistically-inclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania’s Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on.30 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. 31 But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other 27 28 29 30 31 As by Michael Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter 10. Fox, Ecopolitics III. Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their getrich-quick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or affluent ways, and so on. In the immediately generated simple picture there are four options (familiar from relevant logic): predominantly top-down T both B N neither (e.g. populist anarchy) 1 predominantly bottom-up 10 problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. Standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as standardly explained, does not concede sufficient power to representatives, for instance to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to the dilemma lies through a combinational stragegy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. It is a major illusion of modern political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions. There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies and international academies and clubs.32 32 This passage borrows from the summary in Bumheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. 11 4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures. The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts. Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items £1 given by one order relation R, where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <Q, R> is a simple ordered structure, or aframe. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.33) Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 +2 „ - {-2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2} +0 R = — is as shown by arrows. -0 T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component -1 -2 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. 33 Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). 12 central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t. t c Cl C4 a C2 c3 b a3 ai b2 a2 bi Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of 34 35 Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10. 13 actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.36 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. Under decentralized social organization, each requisite function will be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For direct accountability downwards, and to ensure separation of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), will be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but ‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’37. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship — though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Burnheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of relevance is explained) and Sylvan 95. Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are not the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy” are Asian calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”). 14 voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what get left out , outcasts of even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who will be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into - what is part of what it is about - such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way.38 Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically excludes. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modern sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human “bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. There is no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger 38 See Sylvan and Bennett 93. 15 <r constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded —also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.39 As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value.40 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In present oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one beginning. Is such a radical restructuring feasible? Initial investigations hold out the hope that major problems for deep ecopolitical theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia.41 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only is systems modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 93. Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. 16 computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits to Growth” project42, or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classification will be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) will have to be made, taking due account of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more given.43 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planning proposals. (It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficient, of duplication, and so on. But, the objective is not maximization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and tenuous, centralized circuiting chain. 42 43 Naturally much more gets comprehended under See e.g. Meadows. See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation. 17 accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting. Schematic diagram of organisation structure Structural diagram: (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed) statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigration inflow control materials super regions (a to k) interregional transport, etc. (local) regions (1 to n) upper levels arbitration bureau rental entitlements office resources income office ground level water systems sewer systems hospital systems region 1 region n There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and top-down (or centre down) principles. Among these will be • representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, will often replace anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed. At a theoretical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and 18 can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements, with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation will, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus will vanish; the Australian Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, will depend on further social organisational features, not yet considered here. The result will be a levelled pyramidal structure, a flat-untopped network, not a power hierarchy. While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate44, insufficient investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate fundings of the bodies and institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done theoretically. Detailed modellings would bring issues down to earth, without concretizing them; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing, problems to which anarchoid solutions can reasonably be expected. But comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers) and research infrastructure (from research gifts). For such support, for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent university projects. Richard Sylvan References. Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press, Boston, 1990. Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239. 44 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. 19 Fox, W., in Ecopolitics III, Hamilton, New Zealand. Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New York, 1971. Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991. Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993. Macphee, I., ‘A new constitution?' (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith University School of Law, June 1993. Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper Collins 1992. Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993. Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992. Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994. Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May 1993. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Problems in deeper green political organization: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [19] leaves. 15.08 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:aacfac4">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:aacfac4</a> https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2f6dabd2b76b0e39c93150be86c837bf.pdf 3b6452d1e3793a5073876a489e21484a PDF Text Text 29.5.95 PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change. ... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ... J As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. 1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the Australian situation: anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. ... Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...12 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting (though voting is legally compulsory). 1 Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. 2 Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Main findings are replicated by other sociologists. �2 ♦> Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3 In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4 Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘... the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’ .5 A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6 How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’. Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ... distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable.... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic’.8 ‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’.9 Unless there is 3 Ibid, p.178 4 Ibid. The figure is the more surprising inasmuch as such disillusioning factors as corruption and graft are not features of overt political life in Austral-asia by comparison with elsewhere in the hemispherical region. 5 Ibid. pp. 178-179. 6 Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of adversarial systems. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, p.180. 9 Ibid, p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. �3 marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that ‘they are overgoverned ’H, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable .... The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed.12 Such disaffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia’s political arrangements owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; 10 Ibid, p.181. 11 Ibid, p.181, itals added. The problem has now surfaced strikingly in the heavily indebted Australian Capital Territory (“toy town” as its is facetiously called locally) which is swamped by bureaucracy, where it has been discovered that there is one expensive bureaucrat for every fifteen persons. 12 Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. �4 academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless, as a result, republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region (and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, 13 Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. �5 ♦> then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite state-federal arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and provide the services which are needed locally.’14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ...15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small Z) liberal management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions. regionalization should be greened, as reform should be radicalized. But that More generally, opportunites now present themselves to insert more radical ideas throughout the debate about Australia’s future directions. For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by 14 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good deal of support. 15 McPhee ibid. �6 indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian constitutional reform’.17 Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way. Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparatively small adjustments leaving the state substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, 16 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions, held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994. 17 ‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added. �7 of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously, through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments. Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions, as through taxation advantages, subsidies, export incentives, etc.). Further, the role of exploitation and plunder of remaining natural “resources”, and depletion of “biological capital”, by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has increased many-fold in the last two decades. How destructively second world states of eastern Europe treated their own (and also other regions’) environment, how they over-expoited and polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and their wild inhabitants in the past, and have heavily polluted and congested their urban and industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example, those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or degrading most of what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly focussed narrowly upon shallow and short-term economic agendas, will or can deliver satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to �0 economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation.18 Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental) strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not so readily brought into practical operation.19 In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concentration of power, hierarchical authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian rationality, and sundry other evils.20) As indicated, present states are incompatible with stock ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their own expensive running. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to indicate thereby a partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. Indeed to point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not 18 This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially Sylvan 96. On the dismal environmental records of particular states see Ponting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental exploitation in third world states, see Bello, pp. 57-65. 19 Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote, or difficult, as is generally supposed. 20 To adapt a referee’s trenchant summary. For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons, see Burnheim and above all Marshall. �9 an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a concrete historic setting’.21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is ‘a society or association for the organisation or promotion of some particular object or function’.22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in turn dismantling corporate capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else, often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables to flourish. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.23 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory—itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.24 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued—incremental change, social engineering, “ecologizing” economics, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutions—with but few so far having much impact on 21 Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way ‘but as an abstraction and aberration’. 22 Adaptation of the Oxford English Dictionary. An institution is, so to say, an organitution. 23 On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80. 24 As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. �practice.25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance, within the prevailing paradigm, of making a difference than radical redesigns, too smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”. No doubt the normal “reshaping institutions” investigations are rightly focussed then upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. Under present incremental reform and regression, for all the spasmodic environmental rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example, will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation? There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done; otherwise let things alone, let Being be.26 On this non 25 There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. 26 To echo also Heideggerian wisdom. The non-prejudicial term ‘anarchoid’ is deployed, not because what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it �11 managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmentally destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure', to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large- scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one hom, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon and use of the central state.28 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions.29 departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence. 27 As by Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). 28 Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter 10. 29 Unknown source. �12 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchisticallyinclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialisticallyinclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on.30 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as usually explained, does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. 30 Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or superficially affluent ways, and so on. �13 It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions. There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmental and consumer organizations.31 4. Selecting satisfactory political arrangements within the span of anarchoid options. Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right leaning individualistic or capitalistic varieties, and left-leaning social or communitarian varieties.32 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these forms, while not encouraging all, as they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in 31 This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive taxation system, is also broached in these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration, much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land and resources), use charges, and fines. 32 There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede. For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism, market-organization and capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism (characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism without free market arrangements. And so on. Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory has tended inadmissibly to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of different elements drawn from both “left” and “right”. �14 these socio-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not, on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be striven for, that adequate designs are sought and adequate selections made, that inadmissible forms rapidly perish. Those remaining forms that are admissible can be ranked; for instance, they might be graded according to defeasible criteria based upon “pillars” of German green movement such as environmental sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices. While right-leaning anarchoid arrangements could work in theory (e.g. under what is improbable, benevolent capitalism), they are unlikely to succeed in practice, for several reasons. Consider, to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or “liberal”) capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reason, an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with state controlled and state funded standing military and police forces, needed to defend capitalist interests and accumulation, to protect private property, to uphold endemic social inequalities, and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation system to fund these forces and a corresponding bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilities are strictly limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) unclogged, “free” and competitive. Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green societies. In normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modern history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other modem statist systems). Furthermore, given the sorts of humans these systems tend to elevate, and exalt, and the sorts of practices (including extravagant consumption for all that can afford it) they encourage and sometimes even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected and liable to persist. At least that is so without, what is thereupon required in a self-reinforcing spiral, further state intervention to distort “natural” capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit practices on private property (thereby effectively altering the institution), to establish new instruments and commodities such as pollution licences, green investments and futures, and so forth.33 Even though a shallow greenness can also be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism (factories in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, and so on), and some green showcase exhibits tacked on, environmental depth cannot. Shallowness is both an inevitable consequence of the justifying socio-economic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice. Accordingly in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic left leaning directions. For, as argued, it would be rash to gamble upon any bright new dawn of environmentally and socially benign market capitalism, which in any event could easily revert back towards dark industrial times. However, very similar arguments to those sketched could 33 Infiltrated, along with propaganda on behalf of such instruments, is much mythology, including acclaimed environmental virtues of private property and privatization generally. �15 be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic procedures. While island communities of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded under anarchoidal pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design. Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For direct accountability downwards, and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), would be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation, particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those forms can function in favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as mob actions, selection of tyrants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several thorny problems remain for any deeper green political reorganization. 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but ‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’34. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit 34 Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy”, notably in Asia, are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”). �16 of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship—though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what gets left out, outcasts of even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into—what is part of what it is about—such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way. Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically excludeds. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human “bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. �17 As observed, there is really no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded —also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.35 Of course, however good the selection processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may remain. Nonetheless prejudice and maltreatment can be much reduced. As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value.36 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In prevailing oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. A fundamental dilemma for deeper green organization: democratic or authoritarian procedures? 35 No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. 36 For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and its sequel. �18 There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically sponsors, is put in sharper form as follows:37 Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantees, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Anarchism especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that meritorious forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself copiously illustrates that. But it can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must occur (owing to finite lifetimes of power-holders, etc.), and in successional transitions deterioration can occur; nor are there effective mechanisms that can exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most others available, but even they afford no cast-iron guarantees of adequacy, and they are beset by paradoxes of their own. With inadequate democratic structures plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant.38 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deeper green theory. In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: 37 Goodin, condensing Saward, p. 168. 38 Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and presumed nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can undoubtedly much reduce the likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overthrows. �19 [The green imperative] usually contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value of nature. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens. [These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents]39 * As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum, and not to be insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency.40 As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, for instance as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.41 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. A first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ‘local production for local need’, ‘low consumption’, ‘labour-intensive production’, and ‘voluntary simplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).42 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe too the oppositional attempt to convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition) goals and programs and principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged 39 G. Saward, p.65; square bracketed sections are taken from an earlier circulated version of this article. 40 See Priest and others. 41 G. Saward, p.63 42 Saward, p.66. �20 contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’: ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Such proscribed outcomes must surely go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.43 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ‘principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] “laws of nature”, against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like.) To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers). Boris Frankel accuses Rudolf Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic ’ vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’44 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givens”, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and 43 Saward, p.66. 44 Saward, p.67. Note that only a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. �21 implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti democratic vision’, but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy[, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy,] can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with core green values which, if taken on board, limit the range of acceptable policy outcomes beyond these self-binding constraints that democracy logically requires.45 What Saward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions. ... greens should not think in terms of overriding principles or [green] imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.46 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no internal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without well- disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on. In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby himself removing his previous imposition of authoritarian means upon greens. There 45 Saward, p.68. The lead-in to Saward’s proposal was clearer in the earlier circulated version, which ended in more precise (and dubious) form: A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force. 46 Saward, p.75. Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it would be better expressed simply in terms of (what did not figure in the earlier version) principles, policy objectives or the like. Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a underlying shallow utilitarianism. The differences concern not only depth; they also concern the rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism of deeper approaches. �22 * needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that ‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’. By abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.47 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led (retardation, however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is more familiar); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may include coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans, and seeing through pragmatic utilitarianism. 7. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one beginning. Is such a radical restructuring as that suggested feasible? Initial investigations hold out the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia.48 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only .is systems modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and 47 Saward, p.77. There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one, admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of merit—which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to Christianity—need carry no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may yield a certain humbleness. 48 Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. �23 complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits to Growth” project49, or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classification would be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more given.50 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planning proposals. (It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficient, of duplication, and so on. But, the objective is not maximization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subsidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This 49 See e.g. Meadows. 50 See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation. �* 24 .contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and tenuous, centralized circuiting chain. Naturally much more gets comprehended under accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting. There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre-down) principles. Among these will be • representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replace anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed. At a theoretical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements, with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political forms (including stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (including present state examples) are unacceptable. So there are bounds upon diversity. Moreover, what suits one community or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there are limits upon successful transfer of organisational structure; what works in one region may require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer. • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australian Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social organisational features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramidal structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power hierarchy. �25 Structural diagram: a schematic depiction of organisational structure (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed). statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigration control of materials inflow super regions (a to k) interregional transport (local) regions (1 to n) arbitration bureau upper levels rental entitlements office resources income office ground level water systems sewer systems hospital systems region 1 region n While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate51, insufficient investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate funding of the bodies and institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done 51 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. �26 theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing, problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected. Nonetheless comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers and students) and research infrastructure (from research gifts, donations and the like). For such support, support for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent university projects (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are now other structures, such as internet and radio communicational channels, that can facilitate interconnections and interchanges of researchers, both regionally and internationally. On these sorts of anarchoid communicational bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice, could be formed. Given the dismal state of present political arrangements, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great need, as a very minimum, for networks of innovative researchers who share such goals.52 Richard Sylvan References. Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, London, 1994. Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press, Boston, 1990. Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239. Carter, A., ‘Towards a green political theory’, in The Politics of Nature. Explorations in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie), Routledge, London, 1993, pp.39-62. Goodin, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New York, 1971. 52 To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demanding referees for several helpful suggestions and many improvements. �27 Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991. Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993. Macphee, I., A new constitution?’ (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith University School of Law, June 1993. Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper Collins 1992. Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993. Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992. Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Ponting, C., A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989. Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. Saward, M., ‘Green Democracy’, in The Politics of Nature: Explorations in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie) Routledge, London, 1993 pp. 63-80. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996. Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May 1993. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 29.5.95 PROBLEMS IN DEEPER GREEN POLITICAL ORGANIZATION: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change. ... people are ready for change and the impending debate will result in constitutional change. We should, therefore, explore all options ... J As elsewhere, there is growing dissatisfaction with Australia's political institutions, and increasing demand to change them. This demand, hiding co-optative elements, has been initiated and fostered in a conspicuously top-down fashion, by politicians and by academics. There is so far little surge of political enterprise at grass-roots levels, little pressure for the usually very limited changes proposed. Nonetheless, along with apathy, there is widespread popular disenchantment with present political arrangements. There is now an opportunity (although still only a small window no doubt) to put green and radical themes on the agenda for real political change in Australia. That opportunity should not be missed, within Australia, or elsewhere. While the exposition that follows concentrates upon Australia, as a convenient advanced example, much of what is argued and urged applies or adapts elsewhere. 1. Disenchantment with politics, and political proposals for change. There is now evident in Australia, what is variously described as disillusionment and anxiety, cynicism and pessimism about the state of politics—a loss of confidence in it, and a retreat from commitment. As much and more, Mackay has nicely exposed in a survey of the Australian situation: anxiety about the nature and quality of Australian politics [has] increased. ... Widespread anxiety about the state of politics is based [in part] on an uneasy feeling that, if the parties are not going to stand for some identifiable philosophy, and the leaders are going to be chosen on the basis of their potential as television performers or even as head-kickers, then the only appropriate response is cynicism. That cynicism is reflected in a turning away from support for the major parties ... and revealed in the attitudes of young Australians ...12 who often cannot be bothered registering to vote, or voting (though voting is legally compulsory). 1 Hon. Ian Macphee, ‘A new constitution?’. Of course Macphee did not really mean all options, nor even all constitutional options. Furthermore, his claim about preparedness of people for change is incompatible with Mackey’s data (mentioned below) on exhaustion with change. 2 Mackay pp. 174-177. For all the Australian casualness of Mackay's presentation, his sociological findings are nonetheless fairly solidly survey and interview based (if occasionally stretching the data). Main findings are replicated by other sociologists. 2 ♦> Lack of confidence is beginning to show not only as cynicism about politicians, but also as doubt about the integrity of Australia's political institutions.3 In a recent survey, ‘62 percent of [Australians] expressed either little or no confidence in the political system. Such a figure accurately reflects the mood of the Australian community’.4 Australian loss offaith in conventional politics is attributed to a mix of factors. A first explanatory factor as regards this disenchantment comes from the changes in politics already remarked (ranging from policy issues to media performers) and from resultant uncertainty. ‘... the Australian electorate is confused about which party stands for what, and about whether any party has a long-term commitment to any particular point of view’ .5 A complex ‘second factor ... concerns the adversarial nature of two-party politics’.6 How can this ‘two party, adversarial approach ... continue to be appropriate when the distinctions between the two parties themselves are so hard to define’? But ‘redefinition of party politics implies the possibility of a redefinition of the whole parliamentary process itself’. Why ‘when parties seem quite capable of stealing each other's policies or of invading each other's traditional philosophical territory, [can not] politicians work together in a more co operative and harmonious spirit’?7 ‘Adversarial politics may have made sense ... when ... distinctions between the parties were stark and when arguments about principle could be justified; today, the idea that politicians would be arguing over a point of principle or philosophy is almost unthinkable.... [They] are much more likely to be arguing over matters of personality, prejudice and power than over issues which effect the long-term health of the body politic’.8 ‘The quality of parliamentary debate is regarded not only as a symptom of the adversarial nature of the institution, but also as a symptom either of the poor quality of politicians ..., or of the effect of the system on those who are enmeshed in it’.9 Unless there is 3 Ibid, p.178 4 Ibid. The figure is the more surprising inasmuch as such disillusioning factors as corruption and graft are not features of overt political life in Austral-asia by comparison with elsewhere in the hemispherical region. 5 Ibid. pp. 178-179. 6 Ibid. The adversarial character of dominant State legal systems is also becoming subject to more and more criticism. It appears likely that significant movement towards different inquiratorial systems will occur, not least because of the huge expense and growing unaffordability of adversarial systems. 7 Ibid. 8 Ibid, p.180. 9 Ibid, p.179. It is a symptom of both, the latter especially. 3 marked improvement in party philosophies, programs and performance, ‘the call to re-examine the nature of the parliamentary process will gather momentum’.1011 A third relevant factor contributing to loss of faith is the impression of Australians that ‘they are overgoverned ’H, with too many expensive bureaucracies and too many houses of parliament. Conflicts between State and Federal parliaments — and between the various State parliaments themselves — are regarded as a particularly unproductive expenditure of political energy, and Australians question whether 15 houses of parliament may be too many for the efficient government of 18 million people. The sheer number of parliaments is often blamed for the problem of too many bureaucracies and for many duplications of bureaucratic and political activity between State and Federal governments. ... Whilst there is little love felt in the Australian community for Canberra and for the idea of more centralised government even that is beginning to appear preferable .... The widespread support for the idea of a republic which emerged during 1992 is closely related to the underlying sense that Australia is overdue for some kind of reexamination of its political institutions, and even the notion of Federation itself. ... As debate about the idea of a republic proceeds ... it has begun to incorporate the idea that Australian's political structures and systems might be quite significantly reformed.12 Such disaffection reflects too a growing awareness that Australia’s political arrangements owe more to historical accident than to rational design. Even though the main proposals for change no doubt remain reformist in character and could lead in unfortunate directions, some of them are far-reaching by normal standards. Both the extensive disenchantment with present political arrangements and the felt need for significant change further suggest political times are not altogether normal. Elements underpinning a political paradigm shift are already present, as are features supporting rational redesign, to which radical additions are now feasible. So far there have been, along with normal inertial resistance to change, two main responses to growing pressure for change: political, from politicians, ex-politicians and political commentators, and academic from intellectuals, academic entrepreneurs and academic journalists. By and large, political responses have been grander, more sweeping and vaguer; 10 Ibid, p.181. 11 Ibid, p.181, itals added. The problem has now surfaced strikingly in the heavily indebted Australian Capital Territory (“toy town” as its is facetiously called locally) which is swamped by bureaucracy, where it has been discovered that there is one expensive bureaucrat for every fifteen persons. 12 Ibid. p. 181-2. Republican proposals have been circulating for some time. But the cause was finally taken up by prominent politicians, who made it their own, after which it became a popular issue. Mackay's accurate presentation of popular support for political change contrasts drolly with the first part of his book which depicts an Australian populace exhausted by change and longing for the old ease and somnolence. 4 academic responses more theoretical and cautious, piecemeal and detailed. But there are no grand detailed plans. Under the leading proposal so far for political change, Australia's constitutional monarchy will be displaced by a constitutional republic with its own head of state displacing the monarch, but with perhaps minimal adjustments otherwise. Nonetheless, as a result, republicanism is in the air. Politicians have begun to contemplate other practical reforms, while academics have begun to embroider theories around republicanism and institutional reform. What happens to the Australian federation of states is one of the many unresolved issues presently being debated. The main reason for reform offered by the political camp can be summed up simply as changing geopolitical circumstances. The camp tends not to acknowledge what would reflect adversely upon it, the poorness of federal political practice. Rather it tends to attribute popular dissatisfaction to economic circumstances and uncertainties: declining real standards of living, extensive unemployment, persistent recession until recently, problems to be surmounted by full-steam ahead untrammelled economic growth, to be attained by recoupling Australia to the Asian economic express. Meanwhile an orchestrated republican movement can help divert popular political attention from poor political management and a gloomy economic predicament. Much has changed in the century since present antiquated political arrangements were hammered out, arrangements making the newly-fashioned Commonwealth of Australia, politically a federation of states, into a constitutional monarchy coupled to Britain, arrangements of convenience fashioned for very different circumstances. Most non-symbolic linkages with Britain, which has been inching towards a place in a united Europe, have already been severed. Australia has gradually begun to appreciate its geo-political position in the Indian-Pacific region (and the money-making opportunities for a sagging resource-based economy in allegedly booming parts of Asia). Whence the main idealistic proposal: for an independent republic, decoupled from Europe, assuming its own (prominent) place in its geo-political regions. In principle at least, place and region begin to assume, or resume, some of their neglected, but historic, significance (however that is not how it is yet seen). Most proposals for constitutional and federal reform fit within that limited idealistic conception. One important proposal, advanced by established political players, their most radical proposal so far, includes abolition of the present states. Such a proposal would clearly represent a welcome step in anarchist directions, were it not regularly offset by the idea of a strengthened central state.13 Supposing this latter unfortunate idea is bracketed for the moment, 13 Anarchists can even rest (if uneasily) with a constitution, so long as it provides for an organisation, Australia Inc. even, sufficiently different from a state and its authoritarian trappings. 5 ♦> then what is being seriously considered already starts to look like a much more rational regionalism than what presently prevails. The present states of Australia are undoubtedly an anachronism, based on accidental boundaries of a contingent colonial history. They are ecologically irrational management units, utterly failing to reflect ecological regions. Yet the states possess extensive environmental and other management powers, inappropriate ‘powers which derive from what was largely a political bargaining process conducted a century ago.’ Another effect of inapposite state-federal arrangements, especially ‘funding arrangements, has been to lock out local government and, more importantly, local communities. ... local communities must be given greater control over those decisions of government which effect their lives ...’; the opportunity ‘to design and provide the services which are needed locally.’14 At this stage of the dialectic McPhee slides easily and naturally from localism to regionalism. A glance at the map reveals natural regions for local government on a viable scale [an optimistic contention]. Some cross State boundaries, and I would envisage that State governments would be replaced with regional governments. These would be more akin to larger local governments and would certainly not have the trappings of the States. They should not have parliaments and the expensive, unwieldy and inefficient bureaucracies which characterise our States. They should have a small number of full-time councillors ... Regional governments should be solely accountable to their ratepayers ...15 . So far so good: however McPhee thereupon begins to infiltrate stock (small Z) liberal management assumptions. Nonetheless the basic idea to retain is simple: that of ecologicallyrational local and regional rearrangement of anachronistic state partitions. regionalization should be greened, as reform should be radicalized. But that More generally, opportunites now present themselves to insert more radical ideas throughout the debate about Australia’s future directions. For much has been left off political agendas for change, not merely environments and habitats of their less prominent or noisy inhabitants, but also such issues as rights and liberties, transformation of antiquated legal and executive frameworks, and so on. Omission of (human) rights is especially remarkable in states such as Australia, whose constitutions astonishingly do not mention at all (what is however often supposed to justify states) individual rights, such rights only being ensured, so far as they are, assumptions from uncodified common law, by 14 All quotes in this paragraph are drawn from McPhee. An address along similar lines to the Hon. Ian McPhee, also proposing abolition of the states, was delivered by the former Prime Minister R.G. Hawke. Hawke's speech, by contrast with McPhee's, attracted much media attention, and though facilely dismissed as “unrealistic” by some practicing politicians, appeared to gain a good deal of support. 15 McPhee ibid. 6 indirect routes (statutes regarding treatment of minorities and the like). Nor do the political camps pushing limited change speak of rights or liberties; a very limited conception of adjustments required prevails (though without rights and liberties and a generous public sphere there is little, and little prospect of, justification for a state at all). Accordingly political agendas for change need to be conspicuously broadened, to accommodate a decidedly more ambitious range of constitutional and institutional redesign. 2. A project within a project: radically reshaping Australian institutions. Academic entrepreneurs have also responded quickly to proposals for constitutional and institutional changes. Early to scramble on the bandwagon was the institution to which I am affiliated, the Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, with its ambitious decade-long project, Reshaping Australian Institutions: Towards and Beyond 2001.16 One small part of this project does connect with the republican push, which no doubt helped inspire it and gain its funding. The academic version of republicanism furnishes an institutional and historic setting, tracing its roots back to ancient Rome, and thereby linking in, what admits much modem adaptation, notions of citizenship and civic virtues. But most of the project is independent of any republican reorganisation. The Reshaping Australian Institutions project is presented in predominantly reformist fashion, unsurprisingly. It is supposed, for instance, to ‘provide major input into evaluation and reform of Australia's institutions’; indeed it is explicitly ‘aimed at contributing to Australian constitutional reform’.17 Nothing however precludes consideration of reshaping or transforming Australian institutions — those of the whole ecological region — in a unreformist and possibly unconstitutional way, in a radical way. Admittedly, the rough boundary between reformist and radical routes becomes even more blurred when the constitution of a country is open for possible major reconsideration and much political infrastructure may be altered. Nonetheless, from the perspective of a strong central state, the stock boundary stands intact. For reformist changes would amount to comparatively small adjustments leaving the state substantially intact. For example, a minimal transformation, 16 A recent brief description of this two million dollar project, now outlined in several places, is given in Tynan, pp.17-19. Fuller descriptions are available from a main coordinator of the project, J. Braithwaite, Law, RSSS, ANU. One of the many strands (17 at last count) of this project is an environmental (or green) strand. The immediate predecessor of this article was presented in a workshop at RSSS on green political theory, arranged under the project. That accounts for some of the otherwise puzzling structure of what has eventuated. Another earlier version was tried out at Ecopolitics VIII, Pacific Visions, held at Lincoln University, Christchurch, New Zealand, in July 1994. 17 ‘Reshaping Australian institutions: towards and beyond 2001’ in Tynan , p.17, italics added. 7 of the sort presently much favoured, from constitutional monarchy to Australian republic, though entailing non-negligible constitutional redrafting, need only amend the roles of a few elite power- and position-holders. By contrast, radical changes would substantially alter that strong central state, perhaps (as will be proposed) eliminating it altogether. There are appealing reasons for attempting wider, more radical investigations. For, firstly, there may be more satisfactory institutional structures not accessible, or even visible, along normal constitutional reform routes. Secondly, there is a demand, a small but growing demand from green directions for instance, for radical institutional change. It would be prudent, then, to make some investigation of the options, to assess their prospects. Thirdly, reflection on such structures would certainly be part of a more comprehensive study of and theory of institutional design, which the Reshaping project also presents as an objective. Fourthly, much more controversially, major environmental problems cannot be satisfactorily solved along merely reformist paths. For states, what are reformed, states themselves are ecologically dysfunctional. In practice this appears obvious enough. Simply reflect upon their environmental records; these are even worse than those abysmal records compiled for human rights. But the practical case can be argued in detail in a state by state way, or less laboriously, through the familiar rough classification of states into first, second and third world states. In main third world regions, the rise of the state has seen the serious decline of environments. Those third world states that have not largely destroyed their natural environments are in rapid process of doing so. The activities involved are, furthermore, not merely tolerated by these states but are usually actively encouraged (e.g. with state participation or by state concessions, as through taxation advantages, subsidies, export incentives, etc.). Further, the role of exploitation and plunder of remaining natural “resources”, and depletion of “biological capital”, by third world states, most of which are now trapped in debt and structural adjustment, has increased many-fold in the last two decades. How destructively second world states of eastern Europe treated their own (and also other regions’) environment, how they over-expoited and polluted them, has recently been much publicized. While the recent record in first world states is no doubt marginally better, many of these states dominated their natural environments and their wild inhabitants in the past, and have heavily polluted and congested their urban and industrial regions. Nor does their present record gain an environmental pass. For example, those that have any natural forests (similarly fisheries) left are in the process of eliminating or degrading most of what remains; most are failing seriously in meeting (their own) targets on greenhouse emissions, and so on. More theoretically, it is unlikely that states, increasingly focussed narrowly upon shallow and short-term economic agendas, will or can deliver satisfactorily environmentally. A prime reason is this: states are ineluctably committed, more and more as their populations expand, to high levels of economic activity characteristically to 0 economic growth of sorts which impact heavily environmentally, inducing inevitable degradation.18 Accordingly, there are then, or should be, two bands to any green (or environmental) strand of a restructuring Australian institutions project: not merely an important reformist side, but as well a radical spread. It is part of this underfunded and undersupported radical spread which forms the main object of investigation in what follows, that part that relinquishes present state structures, in favour of more environmentally benign institutions - which no doubt can be designed, even if not so readily brought into practical operation.19 In order to reach radical redesign ideas quickly, let us touch only lightly upon some of the more distinctively green reasons for this anarchoid quest (familiar anarchist reasons stand: the illegitimacy of present states, the undesirability and severe disutility of states, which typically are highly destructive and corrosive institutions based on concentration of power, hierarchical authority, massive coercion, manipulation by economic elites, technobureaucracy, utilitarian rationality, and sundry other evils.20) As indicated, present states are incompatible with stock ecologically sustainable practices, because of their heavy unrelenting commitments to shallow economic growth. More generally, standard states and their practices comprise very significant parts of environmental problems, but quite insufficient parts of any solutions. Moreover, states constitute an enormous and destructive drain on regional environments, a feature particularly evident in smaller states which are always looking out for revenue-raising expedients for their own expensive running. Apart from those greens who have recognised the excessive environmental costs of states and their heavy demands on environments, and thus or otherwise have come to recognise the desirability of their withering away, there are many more who have become ambivalent about states, who appreciate their very problematic character and very questionable legitimacy, but do not see yet how to get along altogether without them, or more exactly (to indicate thereby a partial resolution) without certain functions that they serve. Indeed to point immediately towards a resolution of this crucial problem, the functional dissolution idea advocated is this: that the functioning parts may be separately utilized without the colossal whole. The state is not 18 This theme, that states are normally ecologically dysfunctional, is documented and argued in detail elsewhere; see e.g. Carter and especially Sylvan 96. On the dismal environmental records of particular states see Ponting. For shocking figures and illustrations as regards environmental exploitation in third world states, see Bello, pp. 57-65. 19 Nonetheless practical revolutionary displacement of the state is not so remote, or difficult, as is generally supposed. 20 To adapt a referee’s trenchant summary. For detail on some familiar anarchist reasons, see Burnheim and above all Marshall. 9 an organism the functioning parts of which must fail without the whole. So it may well be the enormous fat of state can simply be shed, to great advantage. In any event, ‘the State is a social institution’, always ‘within’, Marxists continue, ‘a concrete historic setting’.21 Granted, it is an institution. For an institution in the relevant sense is ‘a society or association for the organisation or promotion of some particular object or function’.22 Institutions include therefore the state, the central state. So it too is up for reshaping, radical slimming, and possible removal in a concrete historical setting, such as late twentieth century Australia. Whittling away the state means in turn dismantling corporate capitalism, which now dwells in symbiosis with the bureaucratic state, and also much else, often environmentally undesirable, that the state affords a supportive framework for and enables to flourish. Ideas and schemes for radical redesign are already available from rich anarchist and socialist sources, those for green design and reshaping from growing and diverse environmental sources. In main part, then, radical ecoredesign is a matter of convivially meeting (not joining) the two, an intersection that favours anarchist inputs. Something of the sort has already been attempted, in an environmentally shallower way, in eco-anarchism, alias social ecology, and in a deeper way, in deep-green social theory.23 Moreover, it could be attempted in other kinds of deeper green theory—itself really a plurality of theories, which however does not itself force radical ecoredesign, though most variants would support it. Thus Naess's “deep ecology” for example, which is not so far politically radical, only strongly reformist, could (and should) be given a radical turn.24 Concentrating upon the radical spread of deeper green theory does not preclude concomitant reformist investigation and activity. Both sides of the green street should be played. Reformist opportunities should of course be pursued—incremental change, social engineering, “ecologizing” economics, greening bureaucrats, lobbying politicians, and like activity (but better really to cut through much such pleading and obiesance and be rid of politicians and bureaucrats). There are many reformist proposals being advanced for the greening of Australian federal institutions—with but few so far having much impact on 21 Thus, Green p.61, who adds quite wrongly that Proudhon and his disciples do not see it that way ‘but as an abstraction and aberration’. 22 Adaptation of the Oxford English Dictionary. An institution is, so to say, an organitution. 23 On social ecology, see Bookchin 90, and for information on deep-green social theory, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and Routleys 80. 24 As to the political character of deep ecology, and why it should be turned, see Sylvan and Bennett 94, where an expose of the political theory of Naess's ecosophy is presented. practice.25 Nonetheless, more limited, more constrained, proposals of this sort certainly have a better chance, within the prevailing paradigm, of making a difference than radical redesigns, too smartly dismissed as “unrealistic” or “utopian”. No doubt the normal “reshaping institutions” investigations are rightly focussed then upon institutional reform, not upon revolutionary reshaping, where much freer scope for redesign is offered. However the real possibility of radical change should not be excluded; green radicals should be prepared. There have been various opportunities for revolutionary change in Australian history, the last occurring, according to some historians, with the ignominious fall of the Whitlam government. There may well be opportunities again both in the near and intermediate future, especially should some solid work be put into propagating the prospect. In the near term there is economic disarray, social fragmentation, and constitutional destabilization; in the longer term increasing ecological problems and expanding eco-catastrophes loom. Under present incremental reform and regression, for all the spasmodic environmental rhetoric, comparatively little in the way of radical green change occurs or can be expected. Witness, for comparison, the snail pace of the establishment movement towards a rather minimal grey republicanism in Australia, or differently away from meeting carbon-reduction commitments. It is increasingly doubtful, given prevailing responses to economic and other difficulties, that present structural and systematic problems confronting Australia, for example, will be satisfactorily addressed, environmental problems such as extensive and expanding land and water degradation not least. Furthermore, under more incremental reform, the sorts of problems concerning reorganising society in deeper green ways, problems that provide subsequent topics, would likely not arise. So in getting beyond more muddling along, do imagine fairly free scope for institutional eco-redesign is somehow dispensed. One nice corollary is that once it is worked out where to go organisationally, it is much easier to ascertain how to arrive there. 3. A basic problem of structure: central or decentralised organisation? There are large and immediate advantages in pursuing a problem-oriented approach to redesign. That approach, which will tend towards anarchoid outcomes, will be anarchistically guided in this respect: Unless there is a genuine problem, already causing difficulties or developing, nothing need be done; otherwise let things alone, let Being be.26 On this non 25 There are many many narrower economic and technological proposals. One of the more interesting wider proposals comes from an Opposition not noted for its green initiatives and commitments, for an overseeing Department of Sustainable Development, a Department that could see to the greening of all federal institutions. 26 To echo also Heideggerian wisdom. The non-prejudicial term ‘anarchoid’ is deployed, not because what emerges will not be anarchistic (as characterized in Marshall and in Sylvan 94), but because it 11 managerial low-work approach a good deal of structure presently inoperational, and of idle regulation presently enacted, can be removed; organisational arrangements can be very significantly down-sized. The leading methodological idea is that enough relevant (biodegradable) structure is introduced to resolve organisational problems, but not substantially more. Organisational oversupply and waste is thus avoided. Moreover, much structure that keeps so much environmentally destructive industry in business is likewise shed. Among basic problems for deeper green theory are those of political reorganisation and so of organisation. Evidently institutions, and their types, are critical to such organisation. And a major organisational problem for any putative green society concerns structure', to take a critical case, whether society is centrally organised (concentrated, bureaucratised, hierarchical, large- scale and so on) or decentralised (dispersed, non-hierarchical, small-scale and supposedly beautiful, and so on). This focal problem, to centralise or not to centralise, is sometimes presented as a serious dilemma for concerned green theorists.27 The binary horns of this dilemma are respectively: on the one hom, the pull (or push) to localisation and regionalisation, to non-anonymous smallscale low-impacting environmentally-friendly arrangements, to diffusion of power and dismantling of the incubus of a central state with its crippling costs and unfriendly practices; and on the other horn, the need for continuing and further central income generation and welfare (re)distribution, central regulation and control, and the pressures to environmental reliance upon and use of the central state.28 The dilemma has been trenchantly posed as follows: ... the demands of the Greens sometimes appear contradictory, in seeking increasing environmental regulation and welfare measures... alongside a halt to industrial expansion, the very source of income for the welfare state. Yet the expansion and further centralization of the bureaucratic state apparatus is neither their overt goal nor covert motivation. Quite the contrary. Their genuine long term vision is of a decentralized, steady state society of self-sufficient, relationally autonomous (albeit interlinked) regions.29 departs from standard forms of anarchism in significant respects, not least in planned political organization. In this exercise organization is of the essence. 27 As by Jacobs of The Green Economy, who has posed the problem sharply, as part of an argument however for retaining the central state (and much of present status quo arrangements). 28 Environmental reasons for favouring small-scale bioregional organisation are nicely gathered in McLaughlin, chapter 10. 29 Unknown source. 12 As it happens, not only does the theoretical and utopian literature run both ways, towards and away from centralisation, but so does practice and experience. As to theory, anarchisticallyinclined presentations tend to favour decentralisation, perhaps with some central compensation through federation (thus recent Blueprints, ecotopias, and so on), whereas socialisticallyinclined presentations invariably opt for powerful central states (to control and redistribute grander social programs, etc.). As to practice, there are local councils, community organisations, residents' groups aiming to keep out, or to remove, the state-sponsored nuclear plants, toxic waste incinerators, waste dumps or super-highways, on the one horn; and, on the other, central states blocking, modifying, or regulating local or regionally promoted schemes for large dams (e.g. Tasmania's Franklin), forest exploitation, pulp mills, strip mining, and so on.30 To some extent, the way the problem has often been re-presented, in terms of a dilemma between top-down and bottom-up structure and power transmission, already points towards a theoretical resolution: namely, both, or rather enough of both. But how is this combination to be achieved? An answer does not fall out by pure reason, operating in isolation from other problems. By taking advantage of information gathered from other connected problems, a promising answer can be teased out. Neither standard socialism nor anarchism afford answers, socialism because it leaves the central institution of state intact. But standard anarchism, much more promising, does not resolve the problem either, because federation, as usually explained, does not leave enough structure; it may not even concede sufficient power to delegates to constrain exploitative local communities. A solution to such dilemma lies through a combinational strategy, which includes partial dissolution of the central state, into its actual organisational functions in each region. While removing the state, itself source of several environmental and social problems, and its concentration of power, invariably under environmentally unfriendly control, functional dissolution nonetheless retains its apparently essential services, including (where necessary) those of environmental regulation. Relevant continent-wide functions would persist or be introduced: for example, services controlling inflow into Australia of damaging forms and materials such as toxic wastes and exotic pest species, or regulating outflow from Australia of native wildlife and flora. In part, ecoregional functionalism offers a radical continuation of the separation ofpowers of recent historical process, of church and state, legislature and executive, and so forth. As these functions come to operate separately while remaining coordinated, so would those functional arrangements and institutions dissolving the state. 30 Much turns on the exploitative character of certain local and regional communities, their get-richquick schemes, what they are prepared to do to survive in old or superficially affluent ways, and so on. 13 It is a major illusion of modem political theory that a central state, ceded monopolies on coercion, currency, taxation and so on, is necessary in order to secure adequate supply of public goods, including public order and environmental regulation. To the contrary, the most that appears required, the most that arguments would support, is some network of specific organisations functioning to look after specific kinds of goods and services, those necessary for this or that, that are not otherwise supplied. There is no inherent reason why communities should not institute and regulate specialised bodies coordinated among themselves (by negotiations or, failing that, through recognised arbitrators) to ensure the adequate maintenance or production of various types of public goods, including control of damaging crime. Each such institution could gain community standing from its support base, for instance through achieving democratically-generated recognition. Such an institution would aim to secure execution of its recommendations and decisions by sanctions and like admissible means, and in doing this it could mobilize in co-operation with communities and with other recognised institutions. There are many examples of such institutions operating successfully both regionally and internationally; for instance, those for postal and communicational arrangements, international sporting bodies, international academies and clubs, environmental and consumer organizations.31 4. Selecting satisfactory political arrangements within the span of anarchoid options. Anarchoid options come in a wide variety of forms, including, among others, both right leaning individualistic or capitalistic varieties, and left-leaning social or communitarian varieties.32 A suitably generous political pluralism will allow for all these forms, while not encouraging all, as they are of very different merit. For example, some may be neglectful or repressive of some of their inhabitants, or destructive of their environments; others, superior in 31 This passage borrows from the summary in Burnheim 86 p.221 of Burnheim 85. For much fuller elaboration see Burnheim 85 and Sylvan 94. The critical issue of funding administration, without a coercive taxation system, is also broached in these places (and developed in Sylvan 96). The broad proposal is that low-cost administration, much of which would be volunteer, could be funded by rents (there would be no property in land and resources), use charges, and fines. 32 There are many more varieties of political systems than much recent theory has cared to concede. For example, to take right-leaning dimensions, all of individualism, market-organization and capitalism function substantially independently. There can be markets without capitalism (characterised through opportunities to accumulate capital), and conversely, capitalism without free market arrangements. And so on. Most historic and modern systems, upon which political theory has tended inadmissibly to concentrate almost exclusively, are hybrid arrangements with mixes of different elements drawn from both “left” and “right”. 14 these socio-environmental regards, may not be. Dismantling or deconstructing a state does not, on its own, make a sharp selection between alternatives. No doubt the hope is, what can be striven for, that adequate designs are sought and adequate selections made, that inadmissible forms rapidly perish. Those remaining forms that are admissible can be ranked; for instance, they might be graded according to defeasible criteria based upon “pillars” of German green movement such as environmental sensitivity, democratic institutions, and nonviolent practices. While right-leaning anarchoid arrangements could work in theory (e.g. under what is improbable, benevolent capitalism), they are unlikely to succeed in practice, for several reasons. Consider, to illustrate in outline, why that much promoted rightist form, market (or “liberal”) capitalism is unlikely to serve. For one reason, an intrusive state is likely to emerge, with state controlled and state funded standing military and police forces, needed to defend capitalist interests and accumulation, to protect private property, to uphold endemic social inequalities, and to enforce particular market and trade structures, with a substantial and heavy taxation system to fund these forces and a corresponding bureaucracy needed to administer and regulate these and other institutions, such as those required to guarantee that capitalist liabilities are strictly limited and to keep markets (far from self-regulating) unclogged, “free” and competitive. Not only are anarchoid conditions thus violated, so are those for benign green societies. In normal practice, market capitalism tends to be highly environmental exploitative, as modern history demonstrates all too plainly (plainly too it is not alone in this propensity, so are other modem statist systems). Furthermore, given the sorts of humans these systems tend to elevate, and exalt, and the sorts of practices (including extravagant consumption for all that can afford it) they encourage and sometimes even enforce, extensive exploitation is to be expected and liable to persist. At least that is so without, what is thereupon required in a self-reinforcing spiral, further state intervention to distort “natural” capitalistic incentives and institutions, to limit practices on private property (thereby effectively altering the institution), to establish new instruments and commodities such as pollution licences, green investments and futures, and so forth.33 Even though a shallow greenness can also be sprayed upon parts of market capitalism (factories in fields, forest reserves retained for tourists, and so on), and some green showcase exhibits tacked on, environmental depth cannot. Shallowness is both an inevitable consequence of the justifying socio-economic theory, and also an expected best outcome of practice. Accordingly in institutional design it is much more promising to look in democratic left leaning directions. For, as argued, it would be rash to gamble upon any bright new dawn of environmentally and socially benign market capitalism, which in any event could easily revert back towards dark industrial times. However, very similar arguments to those sketched could 33 Infiltrated, along with propaganda on behalf of such instruments, is much mythology, including acclaimed environmental virtues of private property and privatization generally. 15 be developed as regards centralised socialism, especially as untempered by democratic procedures. While island communities of a wide range of varieties are naturally not excluded under anarchoidal pluralism, brighter continental prospects lie through modifications of democratic sociality, which appears to permit much of what is sought in design. Under duly decentralized social organization, each requisite function would be carried out by some association of agents comprising operative and support staff (that is, as regards bare formal structure, more or less as now, in institutions like departments and corporations). For direct accountability downwards, and also to ensure desirable separation and dilution of power, upper operatives, those of a directing or steering committee (the nervous system of the organisation), would be democratically selected (from a relevant lower level constituency, and from the whole people of an ecoregion in case of a typical bottom level institution). Note well that selection is not election: election is but one method of democratic selection, and often enough not an altogether satisfactory method. The point of some sort of democratic selection, as a guiding though not invariant rule, is manifold: it is in part to ensure due accountability, in part to prevent unethical accumulation of power in special classes, and in part for reasons that devolve from the very notion of democracy itself. In brief, certain forms of democracy offer promising prospects for green reorganisation, particularly within complementing left-leaning settings where those forms can function in favour of sustainability. However even with an informed democracy in place, there are few guarantees. Some structure, such as limited executive power separated from judicial and administrative functions, needs to be set in place to block or retard worse eventualities (such as mob actions, selection of tyrants, mistreatment of noncitizens and so on). Even then several thorny problems remain for any deeper green political reorganization. 5. Problems of chauvinism and present-time bias in democratic political institutions. In modem usage of the motherhood term democracy, two main lines are visible: included are not only forms of political organisation where ‘power [is presumed to] reside in the people as a whole, and is exercised either directly by them ... or by officers [selected] by them’, but ‘often more vaguely denoting a social state in which all have equal rights, without hereditary or arbitrary differences of rank or privilege’34. It is on the basis of this second line that the call for democracy has operated to remove chauvinism and discrimination of a range of forms: against unpropertied minorities, nonconformists, women, blacks, tribals, and so on. Even so pursuit 34 Oxford English Dictionary entry 1, main entry. These two lines are by no means the only distinctive lines now visible: increasingly conspicuous in calls for “democracy”, notably in Asia, are calls to freedom and rights: not merely for basic legal freedoms such as free assembly, fair process and so on, but for freedom to access information (the “right to know”). 16 of the line, where successful, has not generally conferred adequate representation and rights on several of these groups; but, more important, pursuit has stopped short in its inclusions at certain humans, such as those granted citizenship—though relevant interests of many other creatures and welfare of many of other items may be affected by what those citizens elect to do. While democratic voters can perhaps be entrusted to take some account of those near and dear (within remarkably sharp limits, as the situation of women in many regions still shows), such as those deemed incompetent to vote: the young, deranged, and so on, much evidence reveals that they cannot be relied for what is less near or dear (and indeed are easily herded into casting their votes in accord with a shallow mercantilism). Consider what gets left out, outcasts of even perfect democratic control:• spatially distant agents. For example, the interests of many humans outside USA are much affected by practices of the US government, which however is outside their democratic reach. • temporally distant agents. Since the past is past, it is future agents who would be affected, often drastically affected, by present practices, that matter. Some way of taking due account of future agents, their interests and welfare, is required, even under shallow long-term ecology, that is under lighter green positions. Sustainable development has been regularly diverted into—what is part of what it is about—such a way, an indirect and so far utterly ineffectual way. Much more of importance is also excluded according to deep-green theory: • creatures with interests, other than present human citizens, and • items with welfare, but perhaps lacking interests. The category includes items with intrinsic value, whose value can be effected, made to fare worse or better. A major problem, little addressed, is how to take due account of such democratically excludeds. It is a problem especially for deeper green theories: that deep problem is, so to say, how to obtain satisfactory representation of all that is of value in the natural world? That way of putting it, while a little misleading, does point to a particular type of resolution. Problems special to deep ecopolitical theory, include, that is, issues as to adequacy of representation of items of value outside those humans that are represented, representation of their interests, where they have them, of their welfare otherwise, of favourable conditions for their sustenance, continuation and retention of value. Democracy of discussed modem sorts, whether representative or participative, will not serve these purposes at all satisfactorily. For instance, insofar as party-political representative democracies represent anything (even human “bottom lines” as is sometimes erroneously supposed), they appear to represent primarily interests of certain business-allied elites. Among the issues are of course those as to adequacy of retention and protection of nonhuman items of intrinsic value, tropical forests and their inhabitants and elements for instance. 17 As observed, there is really no organisational alternative to proceeding with and through agents, preferably well-disposed and quality agents. It is hard to guarantee either politically. As agents are but a subclass of what requires democratic representation and what should have its welfare or interests considered, how are the rest to be taken care of satisfactorily? There are significant older responses to like problems, through totems and taboos, guardians and constraints. Looked at one way the problem repeats, more or less, a familiar problem: namely, how in larger constituencies do decision-making agents represent the whole mass of agents and others in the constituency? A main democratic answer, designed to avoid many shortcomings of alternatives, was: by representative means—only “representation” was almost never taken seriously or literally enough. The sorts of considerations that made representation a promising resolution make what is to be proposed—where representation has, in any case, to be expanded —also promising. A key principle is this: all relevant items are to be represented. Relevance criteria enter importantly. Steering committees of lower level institutions among the main decision-making bodies should be appropriately representative of all items whose welfare is affected by their decisions (principle of deepened demanarchy). Under more equitable arrangements, then, some decision-engaged agents will have to be selected as representative of relevant classes of excludeds. Electoral arrangements do not so readily allow for such; sortition, well-designed selection by lot, does.35 Of course, however good the selection processes, however disinterested and well-intentioned the agents selected, some bias may remain. Nonetheless prejudice and maltreatment can be much reduced. As already hinted, deepened representation is not the only promising resolution of the present problem that might be tried. Another, which could be attempted either separately or concurrently, operates through the directive of ecologically sustainable development, requiring as a constraint, not only intergenerational equity but also preservation of items of ecological value.36 It might be suggested that such a directive be made mandatory, applying to all relevant steering committees. But, as already evident, there are severe obstacles to getting such a directive properly implemented. (In prevailing oligarchical circumstances, even very dilute versions are worth pressing for however, as they would offer definite improvements upon what presently happens.) 6. A fundamental dilemma for deeper green organization: democratic or authoritarian procedures? 35 No doubt there are electoral approximations; e.g. candidates in separate classes for each category to be represented. 36 For elaboration of this option, see Sylvan and Bennett 94 and its sequel. 18 There is strictly no logical space for a deeper green democracy, according to Saward for one. For there is a clash, an essential tension, between democratic procedures and deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which the theory typically sponsors, is put in sharper form as follows:37 Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy would yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantees, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect. (For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Anarchism especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic outcomes. Unfortunately there are few or no guarantees that meritorious forms will eventuate or persist. Political history itself copiously illustrates that. But it can be argued theoretically. For example, succession of regimes must occur (owing to finite lifetimes of power-holders, etc.), and in successional transitions deterioration can occur; nor are there effective mechanisms that can exclude decline absolutely. Democratic procedures of certain sorts offer better controls, and better prospects of satisfactory transition than most others available, but even they afford no cast-iron guarantees of adequacy, and they are beset by paradoxes of their own. With inadequate democratic structures plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes occur, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an anti-democratic tyrant.38 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a destructive version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he darkly calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon holism and intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deeper green theory. In clearest form, the version runs as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: 37 Goodin, condensing Saward, p. 168. 38 Such paradoxes of democracy, and variants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and presumed nullified in Sylvan and Bennett 90. Improved structures can undoubtedly much reduce the likelihood and problematicness of paradoxical overthrows. 19 [The green imperative] usually contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value of nature. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens. [These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents]39 * As should now be plain, and is becoming plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratum, and not to be insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency.40 As more than a century of Hegelian theory should have revealed, there can be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejected, for instance as incorporating an offensive false dichotomy) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.41 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. A first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ‘local production for local need’, ‘low consumption’, ‘labour-intensive production’, and ‘voluntary simplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).42 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets; goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe too the oppositional attempt to convert or to twist (since it is an up-grading by high redefinition) goals and programs and principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable principles, ultimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged 39 G. Saward, p.65; square bracketed sections are taken from an earlier circulated version of this article. 40 See Priest and others. 41 G. Saward, p.63 42 Saward, p.66. 20 contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’: ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Such proscribed outcomes must surely go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.43 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however spendid, overridden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. There is a misconception too about principles (especially higher level principles) and their roles: ‘principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] “laws of nature”, against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate and the like.) To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims (it is like appealing for confirmation of a newspaper report to other newspapers). Boris Frankel accuses Rudolf Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic ’ vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’44 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote or select accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givens”, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and 43 Saward, p.66. 44 Saward, p.67. Note that only a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. 21 implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti democratic vision’, but rather an unecological praxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy[, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy,] can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with core green values which, if taken on board, limit the range of acceptable policy outcomes beyond these self-binding constraints that democracy logically requires.45 What Saward proposes instead is depressingly familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. Out therewith go deep-green positions. ... greens should not think in terms of overriding principles or [green] imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.46 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to iterate a central point, no internal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives would fail to be achieved without well- disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole would obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no absolute guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on. In the end Saward too recognises the popular power of attitudinal change, thereby himself removing his previous imposition of authoritarian means upon greens. There 45 Saward, p.68. The lead-in to Saward’s proposal was clearer in the earlier circulated version, which ended in more precise (and dubious) form: A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force. 46 Saward, p.75. Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it would be better expressed simply in terms of (what did not figure in the earlier version) principles, policy objectives or the like. Opposition to deeper green political approaches often derives, as in Saward and in Goodin, from a underlying shallow utilitarianism. The differences concern not only depth; they also concern the rejection of individual interest bases, in favour of welfare bases and holism of deeper approaches. 22 * needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that ‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’. By abandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.47 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led (retardation, however, as distinct from genuine advancement, is more familiar); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under permissible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. Worse still, his final ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may include coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans, and seeing through pragmatic utilitarianism. 7. Ecoregional demanarchoid reshaping of Australian political institutions: one beginning. Is such a radical restructuring as that suggested feasible? Initial investigations hold out the hope that major problems for deeper green theory can be solved, at least in theory. Investigations accordingly suggest that the project within the Reshaping Australian Institutions project is viable and worth pursuing. A logical next stage offers sketches for a radical political reorganisation of Australia.48 Evidently there would be many designs (thereby removing facile jeers against “the blueprint”, a part of co-optative strategy for persistence with prevailing statist arrangements). Among the many designs, some few, conforming to favoured principles, would be selected for detailed study. If the study were attempted, most appropriately through systems modellings, then flexibility could be built into modellings, so that even though only a few basic designs were examined, many variations would be feasible. Not only .is systems modelling particularly well suited to modelling network designs; it also further offers prospects for computing simulation and implementation, and even some simulated political experimentation. Furthermore, such modellings begin to give some grasp on the size and 47 Saward, p.77. There are further defects in this passage than those noted in the text. For one, admission of intrinsic merit does not entail foundationalism. For another, such recognition of merit—which is less liable to disturb democracy, or render it tenuous, than adherence to Christianity—need carry no tinges of arrogance; to the contrary, by contrast with humanism it may yield a certain humbleness. 48 Such design, well accomplished, would help considerably in revealing what is possible, thereby providing a seriously neglected contribution to politics, itself sometimes presented, with undue licence, as the art of the possible. 23 complexity of the task (a useful comparison is with World 3 modelling of the on-going “Limits to Growth” project49, or, better, with a regionalized version of it). To get started on such ecoregional design, for Australia, two broad classifications and associated maps and charts are required: • 1. an ecoregional classification, with partitions and overlays, for Australia and its continental shelf. Observe that this classification would be hierarchical, as smaller regions merge into larger regions; but it is a benign hierarchy of levels (it facilitates no accumulation of power or wealth). Observe too that any such classification is far from unique. Plurality has already set in, and a choice of classification (or a few choices) would have to be made, taking due account of political organisational principles and objectives. Fortunately some of the preliminary classificatory work has already been accomplished in Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, where 3 broad classifications are presented and procedures for generating many more given.50 For political purposes further classification attributes (e.g. demographic features) need to be included. Ecoregions provide the basis for spatially linked administrative and community units. (Not all units need be of this sort; many contemporary arrangements are spatially unlinked). At this stage a basic principle of decentralization and distributed and smaller-scale organization can be invoked, namely • subsidiarization: organisational functions should be allowed to fall down to (or to be pushed down to) the lowest level compatible with their satisfactory performance. Thus, for instance, most matters concerning such things as sewerage and primary education would be localized. This subsidiarization principle, drawn from classical anarchism, has been widely adopted in green planning proposals. (It is said to have been applied by the Catholic Church in administration of the Holy Roman Empire, whence the not altogether apt title derives. It is presently being reassessed for use in that successor organisation, united Europe.) No doubt the principle is open to challenge, for instance on grounds of efficiency, that larger size may prove more efficient, of duplication, and so on. But, the objective is not maximization of technological values such as efficiency factors; instead it aims to satisize on a wider framework of values, including holistic social arrangements. Presumably, however, undue duplication of expensive administrative bodies is to be avoided. Coupled with subsidiarization is another principle, • direct accountability downwards: units should answer directly to regional constituencies. This 49 See e.g. Meadows. 50 See Thackway and Cresswell. Rudiments of a politically useful classification begin to emerge on their 30 Group Regionalisation. * 24 .contrasts with prevailing accountability (such as it is) upwards, through some indirect and tenuous, centralized circuiting chain. Naturally much more gets comprehended under accountability, for instance openness of environmental accounting. There are also principles interrelating smaller with larger regions, both bottom-up and topdown (or centre-down) principles. Among these will be • representation of smaller regions in relevant planning institutions of more comprehensive regions. Representation, appropriately regulated, would often replace anarchistic federation, which as observed appears too weak for requisite environmental control. The point needs no labouring that the classifications and principles are open to challenge at every step; for instance, there is nothing rock-hard about the type of ecoregional classification preferred, nor about social functions to be addressed. At a theoretical stage that is unproblematic: there are other (less preferable) models; elaborate your own if you want to and can. In any case, it is to be hoped that a diversity in theory might be to some extent reflected in some diversity in practice—with different regions and continents trying different arrangements, with much less of the sort of cosmopolitan political monoculture that we are presently being harassed toward, with much more resilient political biodiversity. Of course, not all political forms (including stateless types) are equally desirable or satisfactory, and some (including present state examples) are unacceptable. So there are bounds upon diversity. Moreover, what suits one community or region well may not suit another to be satisfactory for it. So too there are limits upon successful transfer of organisational structure; what works in one region may require much modification in another, or may substantially resist transfer. • 2 a social function classification, of those community matters that require explicit organisation at some level. An initial listing can be compiled by consulting Australian metropolitan telephone directories, especially the government sections that used to feature in the front (until a year ago). What results under redesign and reorganisation would, of course, look very different from what is listed. Parliaments, parties and all their supporting apparatus would vanish; the Australian Bureau of Statistics will assume a new significance and independent role, and so on. But which institutions are retained, which adapted, and so on, would depend on further social organisational features, not yet considered here. The result would be a levelled pyramidal structure, a flat-untopped network as depicted in the structural diagram below, not a power hierarchy. 25 Structural diagram: a schematic depiction of organisational structure (with some sample components indicated, but not all their network interlinkages displayed). statistics bureau upper levels: administrative, executive, research ground level: functional selectoral college Australian region (federal) immigration control of materials inflow super regions (a to k) interregional transport (local) regions (1 to n) arbitration bureau upper levels rental entitlements office resources income office ground level water systems sewer systems hospital systems region 1 region n While some requisite research has been undertaken upon how the various functional bodies and decision-making committees can be selected and can operate51, insufficient investigation has been made of the interrelations and adequate funding of the bodies and institutions involved — whichever they are! For little such detailed anarchoid modelling has apparently been attempted for any region anywhere. Evidently there is much to be done 51 Thus e.g. Burnheim 85. The present article is not only heavily indebted to Burnheim's work, but overlaps on-going investigations on his part. 26 theoretically. Detailed modellings could bring issues down to earth, without setting things in concrete; no doubt too they would disclose many further problems hidden in the detailing, problems to which anarchoid solutions can however reasonably be expected. Nonetheless comparatively little is likely to be done, unless requisite support is forthcoming, support in the shape of researchers (research volunteers and students) and research infrastructure (from research gifts, donations and the like). For such support, support for investigating its own demise, a state is hardly likely knowingly to supply; nor are its established research institutions. Insofar then as it is done visibly, it will probably have to be accomplished largely outside state-supported and state-supporting infrastructure, such as prominent university projects (like Reshaping Australian Institutions). Fortunately there are now other structures, such as internet and radio communicational channels, that can facilitate interconnections and interchanges of researchers, both regionally and internationally. On these sorts of anarchoid communicational bases, networks of groups interested in elaborating such alternative political modellings, both in theory and in practice, could be formed. Given the dismal state of present political arrangements, almost everywhere terrestial, there is a great need, as a very minimum, for networks of innovative researchers who share such goals.52 Richard Sylvan References. Bello, W., Dark Victory, Pluto Press, London, 1994. Bookchin, M., Remaking Society: Pathways to a Green Future, South End Press, Boston, 1990. Burnheim, J., Is Democracy Possible?, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1985. Burnheim, J., ‘Democracy, nation states and the world system’, New Forms of Democracy, (ed. D. Held and C. Pollitt) London, Sage, 1986, pp.218-239. Carter, A., ‘Towards a green political theory’, in The Politics of Nature. Explorations in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie), Routledge, London, 1993, pp.39-62. Goodin, R., Green Political Theory, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1992. Green, G., The New Radicalism: Anarchist or Marxist?, International Publishers, New York, 1971. 52 To echo one referee. My sincere thanks to demanding referees for several helpful suggestions and many improvements. 27 Jacobs, M., The Green Economy: environment, sustainable development, and the politics of the future., Pluto Press, Concord, Mass, 1991. Mackay, H., Reinventing Australia: the mind and mood of Australia in the 90s, Hugh Mackay, Pymble, NSW, Angus & Robertson, 1993. Macphee, I., A new constitution?’ (excerpts from an opening address) NILEFA Newsletter, Griffith University School of Law, June 1993. Marshall, P., Demanding the Impossible: a history of anarchism, London, Harper Collins 1992. Me Laughlin, A., Regarding Nature, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1993. Meadows D., and others, Beyond the Limits, Chesley Green, Vermont, 1992. Naess, A., Ecology, community and lifestyle (trans, and ed. D. Rothenberg), Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. Ponting, C., A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. Priest, G., Routley, R. and Norman, J. (eds), Paraconsistent Logic, Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989. Routley, V. and R., ‘Social theories, self management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. Saward, M., ‘Green Democracy’, in The Politics of Nature: Explorations in green political theory (ed. A. Dobson and P. Lucardie) Routledge, London, 1993 pp. 63-80. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series , RSSS, Australian National University, 1990. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Anarchism’, in Contemporary Political Theory (ed. R. Goodin and P.Pettit) Blackwell, Oxford, 1993. Sylvan, R., Green Anarchism, to appear, 1996. Thackway, R. and Cresswell, I.D., Environmental Regionalisations of Australia, Environmental Resources Information Network, Australian National Parks and Wildlife Service, 1992. Tynan, L., The Institute of Advanced Studies, The Australian National University, May 1993. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Problems in deeper green political organization: an Australian perspective on radical institutional change Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, dated 29 May 1995. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-29 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [27] leaves. 20.03 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49579da">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:49579da</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0676c48af777c619b101988ff9a41178.pdf 53eba82362d3d0a5d4703f83b8621f45 PDF Text Text RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication, confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially, changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical— type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance, particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles. Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being - serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR). 1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox. Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e. equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion of equivalence. A basic substitution principle takes the form A<-*B, F(A) / F(B) (S<->). It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as A<->B f(A) = n / f(B) = n and A~B / G(A) = G(B), given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength. Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to choose between prospects A and B: A complete certainty of a good outcome $lm B 0.10 probability of a very good outcome $5m 0.89 probability of a good outcome 0.01 probability of a bad outcome $lm $0. Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D: C 0.89 probability of bad outcome $0 �D 2 0.11 probability of good outcome $lm 0.90 probability of bad outcome $0 0.10 probability of very good outcome $5m. Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1 The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for “rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense, that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims. The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function (to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be represented as (1) U($lm) > 0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0), Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality (elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm. That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination 1 The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.) 2 The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52, p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close scrutiny in what follows. �(2) + 0.89U($0) 0.89U($lm). Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this (monotonic) addition, namely, U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) + 0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm), whence follows by utility arithmetic, (3) 0.11U($lm) + 0.89U($0m) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.9U($0). But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse. Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in response to Allais), these are two main strategies: A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are (intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to “framing illusions”.3 A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value, and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place: B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential. B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other settings it may well be required. We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point 3 For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope. �4 convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model]. The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures, [detail and reference]. Such differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these: Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with corresponding positive operatives. K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples, detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence. A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity. The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing” distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned, however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined. To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones. 2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision. Consider the classical expansion principle - A (A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism: �5 • Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality • causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes • standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A & ~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas). The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part. But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I. Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That simple argument proceeds as follows: A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B) (A & B) V (A & ~B) A&(B V ~B) A->. A & (B V ~B) A & (B V ~B) B V ~B A->.B V ~B Expansion Distribution by Rule Transitivity Simplification by Transitivity again That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles. 3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style). Therewith much relevant relocationis required. Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed that • agents are perfect (classical) reasoners • agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief • agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence]. References Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681. Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic Journal 97(1987) 825-841. Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957. Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 679. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1947. �Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon, 1989. Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982; referred to as RLR. Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678. Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of Business 59(1986) s251-s278. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication, confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially, changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical— type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance, particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles. Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being - serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR). 1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox. Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e. equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion of equivalence. A basic substitution principle takes the form A<-*B, F(A) / F(B) (S<->). It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as A<->B f(A) = n / f(B) = n and A~B / G(A) = G(B), given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength. Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to choose between prospects A and B: A complete certainty of a good outcome $lm B 0.10 probability of a very good outcome $5m 0.89 probability of a good outcome 0.01 probability of a bad outcome $lm $0. Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D: C 0.89 probability of bad outcome $0 D 2 0.11 probability of good outcome $lm 0.90 probability of bad outcome $0 0.10 probability of very good outcome $5m. Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1 The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for “rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense, that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims. The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function (to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be represented as (1) U($lm) > 0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0), Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality (elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm. That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination 1 The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.) 2 The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52, p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close scrutiny in what follows. (2) + 0.89U($0) 0.89U($lm). Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this (monotonic) addition, namely, U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) + 0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm), whence follows by utility arithmetic, (3) 0.11U($lm) + 0.89U($0m) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.9U($0). But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse. Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in response to Allais), these are two main strategies: A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are (intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to “framing illusions”.3 A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value, and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place: B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential. B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other settings it may well be required. We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point 3 For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope. 4 convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model]. The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures, [detail and reference]. Such differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these: Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with corresponding positive operatives. K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples, detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence. A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity. The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing” distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned, however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined. To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones. 2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision. Consider the classical expansion principle - A (A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism: 5 • Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality • causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes • standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A & ~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas). The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part. But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I. Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That simple argument proceeds as follows: A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B) (A & B) V (A & ~B) A&(B V ~B) A->. A & (B V ~B) A & (B V ~B) B V ~B A->.B V ~B Expansion Distribution by Rule Transitivity Simplification by Transitivity again That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles. 3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style). Therewith much relevant relocationis required. Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed that • agents are perfect (classical) reasoners • agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief • agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence]. References Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681. Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic Journal 97(1987) 825-841. Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957. Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 679. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1947. Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon, 1989. Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982; referred to as RLR. Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678. Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of Business 59(1986) s251-s278. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Draft of Rational decision theory without paradoxes Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [6] leaves. 4.2 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:338ec22">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:338ec22</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e1a2873a54fce7557cfbc89ada6c8b1c.pdf cf6cba564af11d9dbcc31c7e0159ae37 PDF Text Text MOVEMENTS New social movements along with, and in partial contrast with, new politics and past materialism as a quasi-technical term in political science and sociology. Like the others, it is an ill-defined term. Among the problems is the extreme slackness of identity criteria, so it is too often impossible to know when one has one.1 The terms are regularly introduced as if it was known what was meant (this is a widespread intellectual sin; the legitimate end of Wittgenstein's campaign against technical terms in philosophy). A major problem with the political social science investigations so far is that the classification of movements is too coarse-grained, and that when subclassifications are made there are not in terms of movements. For example, the broad environmental movement, the level movements is sifted down to, jets analysed in a typology, of shades of green, not into submovements. A movement involves action and/ or a diseration to action in a concerted direction by a group of engaged members type of intensional set-like objects OED. ‘series of actions and endevours of a body of persons for special object’ WRONG CATEGORY, otherwise Not bad. What is the movement though? Extent of doctrine socialism/ anarchism without doctrine knowing how without knowing that or theory practice without theory e.g. golf, most stickingls language. Deep ecology attempt to shed doctrine; empasis on movement. Doctrine involved that of sub social paradigm (model). Further features of a movement: • a certain duration. An action group that form for a short time purpose, holds a single parade, achieves its objective and dissolves, it not a movement. These are numerous short-lived action groups that do not rate as movement, and which need not be categorised or listed. • a certain integration. of members. Although there is now a widespread push for sustainable development (and attempts by many governments to coopt and neutralise environmental activity in this way), there is no sustainable development movement. That is not just because of the multiplicity of objectives subsumed under the smooth synthesized “objective”, but because there is no due integration, no appropriate organisation of adherents. Deep ecology is now a movement; it was it when Naess first presented it as one. 1 A hyporduct is that post-materialism, usually taken as a single stock-of-affairs, splits into several. �2 Environmental movements in Australia. The Australia-wide environmental organisations are not movements, but there are movements within or associated with them. The big four organisations, of which ACF is still the largest are ACF range of objects Greenpeace branches local Wilderness Society specific object WWOrganisation Friends of the Earth which used to be a significant organisations, and still runs a national journal Chain Reaction, for fullen into decline. All these organisations are presently under pressure from declining membership and declining funding. Advocacy groups • Regionally - linked “advocacy” groups: Some of these groups are spread (e.g. over a whole state); perhaps zeroing in on local issues in campaigns, some are local, sare are in between. Examples include: National Parks, Wilderness Societies, Heritage Groups, Forestry coalitions (e.g. SE forestry coalition which is composed of smaller local movements). Anti freeway and public transport groups,... • Non-rigionally-linked groups. These are of course contingently tied to actiosn and campaigns at various locations. Important examples include animal-concerned groups: animal preservation and conservations groups, animal liberation. Practice groups • Lifestyle groups. There are several strands within the broad commune movement, which is alive and for the most part thriving in Australia (by contrast with other countries where is was initiated). • Issue groups, include ^forestry, forest restoration and tree planting groups, such as nationally Greening Australia regionally bush regeneration groups and independently many local planting and restoration schemes from local councils down to ornamental rainforest gardens. Earlier there was a native garden movement, fostered by organisations for growing native plants. • sustainable and organic agriculture groups. There are several different groups, depending on the (production) methods allowed*. Prominent among these is the permaculture (abbreviating “permanent agriculture”) movement, which plans an integrated agrucultural system perannual food producing plants rather than annuals. • alternative energy groups • ‘Spiritual’ with ritual and ceremony, worship of the Earth, including Council of AllBeing, Re Earthly Homage to Gaia. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MOVEMENTS New social movements along with, and in partial contrast with, new politics and past materialism as a quasi-technical term in political science and sociology. Like the others, it is an ill-defined term. Among the problems is the extreme slackness of identity criteria, so it is too often impossible to know when one has one.1 The terms are regularly introduced as if it was known what was meant (this is a widespread intellectual sin; the legitimate end of Wittgenstein's campaign against technical terms in philosophy). A major problem with the political social science investigations so far is that the classification of movements is too coarse-grained, and that when subclassifications are made there are not in terms of movements. For example, the broad environmental movement, the level movements is sifted down to, jets analysed in a typology, of shades of green, not into submovements. A movement involves action and/ or a diseration to action in a concerted direction by a group of engaged members type of intensional set-like objects OED. ‘series of actions and endevours of a body of persons for special object’ WRONG CATEGORY, otherwise Not bad. What is the movement though? Extent of doctrine socialism/ anarchism without doctrine knowing how without knowing that or theory practice without theory e.g. golf, most stickingls language. Deep ecology attempt to shed doctrine; empasis on movement. Doctrine involved that of sub social paradigm (model). Further features of a movement: • a certain duration. An action group that form for a short time purpose, holds a single parade, achieves its objective and dissolves, it not a movement. These are numerous short-lived action groups that do not rate as movement, and which need not be categorised or listed. • a certain integration. of members. Although there is now a widespread push for sustainable development (and attempts by many governments to coopt and neutralise environmental activity in this way), there is no sustainable development movement. That is not just because of the multiplicity of objectives subsumed under the smooth synthesized “objective”, but because there is no due integration, no appropriate organisation of adherents. Deep ecology is now a movement; it was it when Naess first presented it as one. 1 A hyporduct is that post-materialism, usually taken as a single stock-of-affairs, splits into several. 2 Environmental movements in Australia. The Australia-wide environmental organisations are not movements, but there are movements within or associated with them. The big four organisations, of which ACF is still the largest are ACF range of objects Greenpeace branches local Wilderness Society specific object WWOrganisation Friends of the Earth which used to be a significant organisations, and still runs a national journal Chain Reaction, for fullen into decline. All these organisations are presently under pressure from declining membership and declining funding. Advocacy groups • Regionally - linked “advocacy” groups: Some of these groups are spread (e.g. over a whole state); perhaps zeroing in on local issues in campaigns, some are local, sare are in between. Examples include: National Parks, Wilderness Societies, Heritage Groups, Forestry coalitions (e.g. SE forestry coalition which is composed of smaller local movements). Anti freeway and public transport groups,... • Non-rigionally-linked groups. These are of course contingently tied to actiosn and campaigns at various locations. Important examples include animal-concerned groups: animal preservation and conservations groups, animal liberation. Practice groups • Lifestyle groups. There are several strands within the broad commune movement, which is alive and for the most part thriving in Australia (by contrast with other countries where is was initiated). • Issue groups, include ^forestry, forest restoration and tree planting groups, such as nationally Greening Australia regionally bush regeneration groups and independently many local planting and restoration schemes from local councils down to ornamental rainforest gardens. Earlier there was a native garden movement, fostered by organisations for growing native plants. • sustainable and organic agriculture groups. There are several different groups, depending on the (production) methods allowed*. Prominent among these is the permaculture (abbreviating “permanent agriculture”) movement, which plans an integrated agrucultural system perannual food producing plants rather than annuals. • alternative energy groups • ‘Spiritual’ with ritual and ceremony, worship of the Earth, including Council of AllBeing, Re Earthly Homage to Gaia. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1225: Movements Subject The topic of the resource Printout, undated. Description An account of the resource One of seven papers digitised from item 1225. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1225 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [2] leaves. 1.37 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:3f37666">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:3f37666</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/475beee1c933c2e15191dcd1524477cf.pdf 53eba82362d3d0a5d4703f83b8621f45 PDF Text Text RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication, confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially, changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical— type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance, particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles. Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being - serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR). 1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox. Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e. equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion of equivalence. A basic substitution principle takes the form A<-*B, F(A) / F(B) (S<->). It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as A<->B f(A) = n / f(B) = n and A~B / G(A) = G(B), given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength. Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to choose between prospects A and B: A complete certainty of a good outcome $lm B 0.10 probability of a very good outcome $5m 0.89 probability of a good outcome 0.01 probability of a bad outcome $lm $0. Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D: C 0.89 probability of bad outcome $0 �D 2 0.11 probability of good outcome $lm 0.90 probability of bad outcome $0 0.10 probability of very good outcome $5m. Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1 The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for “rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense, that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims. The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function (to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be represented as (1) U($lm) > 0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0), Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality (elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm. That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination 1 The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.) 2 The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52, p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close scrutiny in what follows. �(2) + 0.89U($0) 0.89U($lm). Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this (monotonic) addition, namely, U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) + 0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm), whence follows by utility arithmetic, (3) 0.11U($lm) + 0.89U($0m) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.9U($0). But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse. Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in response to Allais), these are two main strategies: A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are (intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to “framing illusions”.3 A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value, and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place: B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential. B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other settings it may well be required. We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point 3 For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope. �4 convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model]. The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures, [detail and reference]. Such differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these: Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with corresponding positive operatives. K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples, detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence. A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity. The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing” distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned, however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined. To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones. 2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision. Consider the classical expansion principle - A (A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism: �5 • Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality • causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes • standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A & ~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas). The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part. But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I. Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That simple argument proceeds as follows: A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B) (A & B) V (A & ~B) A&(B V ~B) A->. A & (B V ~B) A & (B V ~B) B V ~B A->.B V ~B Expansion Distribution by Rule Transitivity Simplification by Transitivity again That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles. 3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style). Therewith much relevant relocationis required. Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed that • agents are perfect (classical) reasoners • agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief • agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence]. References Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681. Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic Journal 97(1987) 825-841. Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957. Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 679. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1947. �Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon, 1989. Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982; referred to as RLR. Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678. Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of Business 59(1986) s251-s278. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document RATIONAL DECISION THEORY WITHOUT PARADOXES The uniform strategy applied to remove paradoxes in several other arenas - implication, confirmation, conditionality, explanation, logic itself — will be adapted to defuse all the usual paradoxes vexing supposedly rational decision theory. That strategy comprises, essentially, changing the underlying logic (which is the source of central rationality principles of logical— type) to a modest relevant logic. It yields two important components: removal of irrelevance, particularly in derivatives of the logical theory, for instance in this case probability and preference theory; and reduction of excessive strength, not merely in the logical theory and its derivatives, but especially in this case in maximization principles. Decision theory hitherto has been, virtually without exception, classical: it has unquestioningly assumed classical principles of consistency and maximality. Well it might be claimed that these principles - which derive from the very classical Great Chain of Being - serve, with but few further impeccable principles, to deliver classical logic, its derivatives such as standard probability theory, and much else. The universality of these formative principles is however a myth, one of the pervasive myths of modem rationality (see MR). 1. Common (i.e. equivalent) consequences arguments, and Allais' paradox. Common consequences arguments depend upon the substitution of common, i.e. equivalent, consequences. It is evident that what substitutions are permitted will depend not merely upon admissible logical substitution principles, but above all upon the underlying notion of equivalence. A basic substitution principle takes the form A<-*B, F(A) / F(B) (S<->). It yields, as derived cases, such further inference principles as A<->B f(A) = n / f(B) = n and A~B / G(A) = G(B), given requisite vocabulary. But critical features of the resulting logics and theories depend upon what the co-implication relation, <-», permits; its strength. Over dinner at a Paris cafe one evening during an international colloquium on risky choice, Allais asked Savage a pair of now very famous questions. First Allais asked Savage to choose between prospects A and B: A complete certainty of a good outcome $lm B 0.10 probability of a very good outcome $5m 0.89 probability of a good outcome 0.01 probability of a bad outcome $lm $0. Savage preferred A to B. Allais next asked him to choose between prospects C and D: C 0.89 probability of bad outcome $0 D 2 0.11 probability of good outcome $lm 0.90 probability of bad outcome $0 0.10 probability of very good outcome $5m. Savage preferred D to C. Subsequent researchers quickly discovered that most of their seemingly rational subjects responded initially to Allais' pair of questions as Savage had.1 The problem with these responses is that they violate classical expected utility theory, and are accordingly classically irrational, that theory affording necessary conditions for “rationality”. Therein too lies the Allais' paradox, that seemingly rational responses by seemingly rational subjects are ruled irrational by the theory. For conjoint preferences of A over B and D over C contradict the deliverance of the dominant theory, which specifies what is rational here, according to which C over D is equivalent to A over B, and so the conjoint preferences are inconsistent. The situation certainly supplies a paradox in the standard sense, that preanalytic claims (that so and so definitely does not imply, does not confirm, such and such) are contradicted by results of the dominant theory covering those claims. The (too) brief argument to inconsistency of the seemingly rational preference rankings under the dominant theory runs as follows:- Where U symbolizes the relevant utility function (to which probabilities are immaterial in the present context), the preference for A over B can be represented as (1) U($lm) > 0.10U(%5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0), Now it is assumed that an equivalent ranking - sometimes said to be the same ranking - results by either adding common consequences to each side of the inequality (introduction or combination rule) or by deleting common consequences from either side of the inequality (elimination or deletion rule). These procedures are after all distinguishing features of dominant expected utility theory.2 Let us then add the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $0, and delete the common consequences of a 0.89 probability of receiving $lm. That is, putting these operations together, let us add to each side of (1) the combination 1 The presentation follows Pope's adjustment of Allais' original account (in his 79 p.354). For detail of subsequent research on initial responses, see also Pope 89. (Note however that Pope tends to conflate acting rationally with acting consistently.) 2 The names given to these features of the expected utility procedure - with the different names linked with their various axiomatic derivations - include Neumann and Morgenstern's rule for equivalent classes, presented in their 47, p.24 and Malinvaud 52, Samuleson's independence axiom, presented in his 53, Luce and Raiffa's substitution principle, presented in their 52, p.26, the “combination” and “cancellation” property in Tversky and Kahneman 86 and the joint result of “ordering” and the “reduction principle” in Fishburn 87. These critical principles, especially their negative (reduction) forms or outputs, will come in for close scrutiny in what follows. (2) + 0.89U($0) 0.89U($lm). Then the preference for A over B can be equivalently represented by the result of this (monotonic) addition, namely, U($lm) + 0.89 U($0) - 0.89U($lm) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.89U($lm) + 0.01U($0) + 0.89U($0) - 0.89U($lm), whence follows by utility arithmetic, (3) 0.11U($lm) + 0.89U($0m) > 0.10U($5m) + 0.9U($0). But (3) represents nothing but the preference of C over D. Hence, given adherence to the dominant theory and its procedures, preference for (or choice of) A over B is equivalent to preference for C over D, not D over C. So whoever prefers one and adheres to the procedures is rationally obliged to prefer the other, and is rationally inconsistent in preferring its converse. Short of postponement (Savage's immediate move, in asking for time to think, in response to Allais), these are two main strategies: A. Dominant options, which involve explaining away pre-analytic responses. Savage's further moves went this this theory-saving way, through the “sure-thing” principle. From a logical perspective, the sure-thing principle is applied in transforming cases like assessment of D vis a vis C, which are put out of intuitive bounds, into equivalent canonical forms, which are (intuiively) decidable. The dominant theory is sho3red up, in a typical way, by psychological work; those who do try to assess complex non-canonical cases like C vs. D are subject to “framing illusions”.3 A*. Subversive options, which accept the pre-analytic responses, at more or less face value, and modify the dominant theory. There are various ways modification can take place: B. Reject the formalisation of the argument offered as too simple, because omitting decisive information. Such an approach is taken by Pope, who contends that an occasionally glimpsed but generally omitted time dimension is crucial. On that approach, which certainly does not rule out fuller formalisation, a dynamic theory is regarded as essential. B*. Accept the style of formalisation, as not overly simplistic, but reject specific principles used in establishing equivalence of preferences. Such an approach, though of a fully systematic kind, is of course that course pursued here. A rival relevant static theory is elaborated. Although a static theory is adequate, so it is claimed, to remove paradox, dynamic implementation naturally is not excluded. While it is not essential in the present setting, in other settings it may well be required. We now proceed to what breaks down on the B* approach, namely subtraction principles fail. The result is that we can have both A over B and C over D. To establish the point 3 For one fuller account of those dominant strategies, see Pope. 4 convincingly, we should supply a requisite model, [do model]. The relevant resolution sits very happily with significant empirical material which Kahneman and Tyersky (K & T hereafter) have adduced contrasting combinative or additive procedures with eliminative or substractive procedures, [detail and reference]. Such differences are strikingly exhibited not only in empirical practice (including the arithmetic without zero of earlier human societies), but in logical theory. Two logical examples are these: Gentzen methods, where there may be significant differences between introduction and eliminative procedures, and, nearer to the present issue, relevant arithmetic, where negative operations such as subtraction and division induce difficulties not encountered with corresponding positive operatives. K & T's positive assistance in distinguishing positive and negative diverences at work in choice procedures is however utterly overwhelmed by their predominant (classical theory saving) contentions. These attempt to remove all differences between ways of rectifying classical decision theory. All are equally based on framing illusions, [work through examples, detail this epistemological escape-chute]. Framing is a theory-solving device par excellence. A highly favoured strategy for distancing rational decision theory from empirical information consists in presentation of inconsistent preferences alleged to violate transitivity. The argument runs like this: there can be no rational theory without transitivity, but actual preferences, empirically recorded, may violate transitivity; so rational theory must discount such empirical information. Such information is set aside, for instance as involving “framing” distictions. There have been heroic attempts to slip around the first premiss, to design nontransitive preference theories. No doubt something of this sort can be done; but in order to gain a theory of some strength postulates much less pausible than transitivity are infiltrated. (In any event, the major project of founding economic on aggregated preference theory depends heavily, and approvently essentially on transitivity.) What should have been questioned, however, is the second premiss, that transitivity is violated. Experimenters and other who arrive at such a result have typically assumed consistency of subjects. Without consistency nothing stops both the preferences empiricially found and transitivity. Such subjects have inconsistent preferences. But, to exaggerate a little, nothing is more common than inconsistent preferences or devises. Often, at least, preference sets are overdetermined, rather than, what has highterto been supposed must be the case, logically underdetermined. To allow properly for inconsistent preferences, as it is proposed to do, the underlying logic must be paraconsistent. Otherwise, as with a classical base, the theory will trivialize preferences. But the most satisfactory types of paraconsistent logics are relevant ones. 2. Rational decision theory and rational belief revision. Consider the classical expansion principle - A (A & B) V (A & ~B) and its extensions to further parameters. - This principle is at the core of standard Bayesianism: 5 • Jeffrey's derivability axiom requires it for its generality • causal decision theories require it for building ultimate partitions of outcomes • standard conditional expected utility requires it, e.g. U(A) = U(A & B) + U(A & ~ B), leading to U(A / B) = U(A & B) (on which see Malinas). The same expansion principle is critical in Lewis's triviality proof. Likewise belief revision theory, there are negative results where similar expansion principles play a major part. But expansion is intricated in implicational paradox, indeed it plays a crucial part in C.I. Lewis's “independent” proof of the inevitability of positive paradox in entailment theory. That simple argument proceeds as follows: A-». (A & B) V (A & ~B) (A & B) V (A & ~B) A&(B V ~B) A->. A & (B V ~B) A & (B V ~B) B V ~B A->.B V ~B Expansion Distribution by Rule Transitivity Simplification by Transitivity again That is, positive paradox, and irrelevance since B may have nothing to do with A. For this reason among other, Expansion is rejected in relevant logic (see further RLR). With its rejection a mass of established theory, implausible theory, crumbles. 3. Conditional preference theory (Bayesian style). Therewith much relevant relocationis required. Relevant relocation enables the wholesale removal of much of the surrounding belt of idealisations which shield standard theory from criticism but at the same time prevents its practical application to real-life agents and situations. Examples of idealisation in belief and theory revision normative theory, sharing their disabling extents are as follows: It is assumed that • agents are perfect (classical) reasoners • agents have determinate (real) degrees of belief • agents have determinate conditional degrees of beliefs for every pair of propositions expressible in their language [ - maintenance of probabilistic coherence]. References Allais,M., ‘The so-called Allais paradox and rational decision under uncertainty’, in M. Allais and O. Mazen (eds), Expected Utility and the Alluis Paradox, Reidal, Dordrecht 1979, 437681. Fishbum, P., ‘Reconsiderations in the foundations of decision under uncertainty’, Economic Journal 97(1987) 825-841. Lace, R., and Ruiffa, H. Games and Decisions, John Wiley, New York, 1957. Malinvaud, E., ‘A note on von Neumann - Morgenstern's strong independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 679. von Neumann, J., and Morgenstern, O., Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour, Princeton University press, New Jersey, 1947. Pope, R., ‘The delusion of certainty in Savage's some-thing principle’ typescript Duntroon, 1989. Routley, R., and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982; referred to as RLR. Samuelson, P., ‘Probability, utility and the independence axiom’, Econometrica 20(1952) 670678. Sylvan, R., ‘Modem myths concerning rationality’, ; referred to as MR. Tversky, A., and Kahneman, D., ‘Rational choice and the framing of decisions’, Journal of Business 59(1986) s251-s278. Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 18, Item 1235: Draft of Towards green anakrism: eucratic political investigation Subject The topic of the resource Printout of draft, undated. See also item 948 in collection, Early drafts and finished papers of Anarkism. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 18, Item 1235 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [165] leaves. 129.65 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:72b2588">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:72b2588</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Typing Table at End of Desk Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 18: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8e7daae9baa6742dce79f815f186d6ff.pdf 3cfac978365f5707e5deea901d316501 PDF Text Text ��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting (photocopy), title page and two pages (158-159) from Snell B (1953) The discovery of the mind: the Greek origins of European thought (Rosenmeyer TG trans), Blackwell, Oxford. (3 pages (2 leaves)) ��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting (photocopy), 8 pages (476-483) from Jamieson D (1991) ‘Method and moral theory’, in Singer P (ed) A companion to ethic, Blackwell, Oxford. (8 pages (4 leaves) ��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting (photocopy), 14 pages (268-285) from Broad CD (1967) Five types of ethical theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. (14 pages (7 leaves) ��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter (typescript), ? to Richard, 20 Jan 1989 re feedback on draft paper. (1 leaf) ��The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Typescript, Questions for interview with Richard Routley. (2 pages) �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting (photocopy), title page and two pages (158-159) from Snell B (1953) The discovery of the mind: the Greek origins of European thought (Rosenmeyer TG trans), Blackwell, Oxford. (3 pages (2 leaves)) The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting (photocopy), 8 pages (476-483) from Jamieson D (1991) ‘Method and moral theory’, in Singer P (ed) A companion to ethic, Blackwell, Oxford. (8 pages (4 leaves) The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Cutting (photocopy), 14 pages (268-285) from Broad CD (1967) Five types of ethical theory, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London. (14 pages (7 leaves) The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter (typescript), ? to Richard, 20 Jan 1989 re feedback on draft paper. (1 leaf) The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Typescript, Questions for interview with Richard Routley. (2 pages) Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 19, Item 772: Notes and early drafts of Deep-green ethics Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten, typescript and printout notes and early drafts of paper, undated. Includes cuttings. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: Ring Binder - Foundations Ethics. RS: Deep Green Ethics - Contents - Ts + ms. RS: Many pages of notes - occasional connected passages. Verso of scrap papers not digitised. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&range=&collection=&type=&user=&tags=&public=&featured=&exhibit=&geolocation-mapped=&geolocation-address=&geolocation-latitude=&geolocation-longitude=&geolocation-radius=10&submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&pageSize=20&sortBy=score&sortDirection=Desc&searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a>, Box 19, Item 772 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [84] leaves. [75.85 MB] Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:55c3bc1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:55c3bc1</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Como - Shelves - Bottom - Pile 2 Box 19: More Green Como House Como House > Shelves > Bottom > Pile 2