2 20 144 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/8a962b5798d431ed7a49e3c965d3293d.pdf 3793cc17bc61a17cc2d746104329864a PDF Text Text '"T__ / <'Y J /x X<X X I z / //. / c f-vX' ‘'t Xr" Y ( <lr~ / <■ Ye t e tZ<? Z C z4 /X/ Xi /z- a / r /XX «) - YY/XX e X X'X xC <?— C" Z j>ctYe^_Z^Z l -■ X-^—y X—- I X .X i/x /l t tC c X * /7Z’’' <j Y^X ft J X<>-^ XX Y C'U1 Y c^ 7 XYy / // Y X n ?-/ ^i/'^ /q /’*■ XX 3 2- /< Y'1^ Xr^x 6 ,’ 'A/' C ■"' z// '- 7/XxY . 1 ��:) 2. 2 f.y; �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Computer printout, draft paper with emendations and annotations, Intrinsic value, quantum theory, and environmental ethics by J. Baird Callicott. Includes annotation addressed to Professor Routley from J. Baird Callicott. (37 pages) Paper published, Callicott J B (1985) ‘Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics’, Environmental Ethics, 7(3): 257275. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19857334 � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document '"T__ / <'Y J /x X<X X I z / //. / c f-vX' ‘'t Xr" Y ( <lr~ / <■ Ye t e tZ<? Z C z4 /X/ Xi /z- a / r /XX «) - YY/XX e X X'X xC <?— C" Z j>ctYe^_Z^Z l -■ X-^—y X—- I X .X i/x /l t tC c X * /7Z’’' <j Y^X ft J X<>-^ XX Y C'U1 Y c^ 7 XYy / // Y X n ?-/ ^i/'^ /q /’*■ XX 3 2- /< Y'1^ Xr^x 6 ,’ 'A/' C ■"' z// '- 7/XxY . 1 :) 2. 2 f.y; The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Computer printout, draft paper with emendations and annotations, Intrinsic value, quantum theory, and environmental ethics by J. Baird Callicott. Includes annotation addressed to Professor Routley from J. Baird Callicott. (37 pages) Paper published, Callicott J B (1985) ‘Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics’, Environmental Ethics, 7(3): 257275. https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19857334  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 14, Item 1765: Letter, Richard Sylvan to J. Baird Callicott, 25 Oct c1985 ; Draft of Intrinsic value, quantum theory, and environmental ethics by J. Baird Callicott Subject The topic of the resource Computer printout of draft paper with emendations and annotations. Includes annotation on title page, addressed to Professor Routley from J. Baird Callicott. Paper published, Callicott J B (1985) 'Intrinsic Value, Quantum Theory, and Environmental Ethics', Environmental Ethics, 7(3): 257-275, https://doi.org/10.5840/enviroethics19857334. Description An account of the resource Note, one of two papers digitised from item 1765. Paper by J. Baird Callicott redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 14, Item 1765 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource October 25 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [40] leaves. 1.73 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Correspondences Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f77bd00">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:f77bd00</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Second Shelf - Bottom Shelf Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Second Shelf > Bottom Shelf Box 14: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/e8f40bdcc644ad46c5a77df4b8940142.pdf 2b370a7c388f901ab1a9176c90205ab4 PDF Text Text Richapd'Sylvan /> << Ji 197d p. I WHAT IS WRONG WITH APPLIED ETHICS Richard Sylvan There is much that is wrong with and in applied ethics. Specifically, there are three comprehensive counts where things are wrong with the commodity concerned, applied ethics, that is with applied ethics so economically viewed.1 Namely on the following three counts: • extraneous, with the supply, delivery, consumption, and the like of applied ethics, AE. The category prominently includes the delivery of applied ethics: what is done, taught and learnt, by whom, and how qualified (e.g. whether taught by professionals, professional ethicists or philosophers in particular). That has tended to presume that the commodity itself is more or less in order, though the presumption lacks good pedigree, delivery of defective goods being almost as ubiquitous as business enterprise. The present focus is not however upon the delivery, or other features of the production and consumption, packaging and marketing of the goods, but on features of the commodity itself, applied ethics itself. Thus • intraneous counts, concerning the commodity itself, where a further two things are wrong: •• the applied idea, and ••• what the application is presumed to be made to, established - or, should it be, establishment - ethics. Because an implicit premiss in organising the Philosophy and Applied Ethics Re-examined1 Conference seems to have been that the issues to be addressed are predominantly extraneous, and because most of the papers actually relevant to the Conference topic appear to focus on extraneous issues, the present exercise, by contrast, concentrates upon intraneous problems, especially the third: radical deficiencies in what is supposed to be applied, prevailing ethics, and some extensive repairs thereto. 1. The applied count To begin with, there is something decidedly3 odd, not to say radically unsatisfactory, about the very idea of applied ethics. To bring out the oddness, the conceptual inadequacy, it helps to consider the dictionary senses and established usage of applied. The term in the only relevant sense (the other obsolete sense is that offolded) means: ‘put to practical use; practical as distinguished from abstract or theoretical' (OED, similarly Concise English). Relevant examples cited are: ‘the applied sciences’ (from Babbage 1832), ‘applied logic (as distinguished from pure)’ (from Thomson 1806).4 It may appear then, that "applied ethics" amounts to pleonasm, a popular tautology (and "pure ethics" correspondingly to an oxymoron), because ethics itself is already practical, for instance much or all of it being concerned with practical action and its qualities (such is Maclver s assumption: moral philosophy is practical - in a way in which other branches of philosophy are not’, p.206). In this respect "applied ethics", even more "applied morals", is rather like "applied motoring", "applied nursing" or "applied housekeeping". Conceptual confusion would be considerably reduced by removing the modifier ‘applied .5 Such a charge of confusion can however be mitigated by properly I7 �18 What is wrong with applied ethics distinguishing ethics, which includes philosophy and theory of morality, from morals, thereby revealing, perhaps, elements of some theory apt for application. No doubt something like this is the presupposition of those who preach or profit from practical ethics (similarly practical economics, but doubtfully practical housekeeping): that standing in contrast is a suitably established theoretical ethics (could it perchance be utilitarianism?) which can rather uncontroversiarbe used to guide practice. But is there such a theory, apt for application, for translation into practice? To appreciate what is required for adequacy, consider successful applied subjects. Let us compare "applied ethics" with^long established applied discipline, namely applied mathematics, which often boasts a separate department in universities (a discipline I was obliged to study as an undergraduate in order to proceed further in pure mathematics). In the first place, applied mathematics contrasts with pure mathematics, applied logic with pure. Where, a naive outsider may ask, is pure ethics that similarly stands in contrast with applied ethics? Could there decently be separate departments of pure and of applied ethics? For the most part, applied mathematics applies to practice, in some wide sense, a body of pure mathematics that is more or less correct, at least within the assumption framework and contextual settings where it is applied. (The qualified formulation is given for pluralistic reasons; given the dominant paradigm, the pure mathematics that is applied is correct without further qualification, correct period.) A body of substantially correct theory ready for application is then the first of several pertinent features of that relational object, applied mathematics, the first of several dubiously matchable by "applied ethics". The proviso ‘for the most part’ (introducing the paragraph) signals another discrepancy. There is a, presumably derivative, part of applied mathematics that investigates, in essentially the manner of pure mathematics, theories, algebras, spaces and similar, selected through postulates, principles or equational sets drawn from standard applied mathematics (thus e.g. Newtonian theories where classical force laws are satisfied, Hilbert and phase spaces, and so on).6 Such derivative applied mathematics need not compromise at all normal methodological requirements (such as they are) of pure mathematics, for rigour, exactness, and similar. Ordinary applied mathematics, in its quest, even haste, for practical results, does compromise, or violate, pure mathematical methodology. For example, shortcuts are taken, simplifications made, information shed, figures rounded, approximations adopted, and so. Science veers towards art. From a pure perspective, dreadful things are often done to data or mathematical transformations of data. Skilled practitioners tend to appreciate what they can get away with in this sort of regard. Again, none of this, neither the body of information nor the kinds of skills, is really matched in ethics, in putting ethical theory to practical work. Next, the mathematics that is applied, a body of pure mathematics, is not thoroughly contested. Ethics however is. There is nothing in ethics like arithmetic or elementary mechanics; the nearest thing ethics can offer is some controversial development along axiomatic geometric lines. Mathematics has its critics, both inside (e.g. intuitionists) and out (e.g., cultural relativists), but none (hard core sceptics excepted) suggest changing all of it or tampering with most of what is applied. By contrast, in ethics, there continues to be an array of competing theories, none of which has managed to win broad allegiance. What pure theory is there to apply, to do dreadful things to? It might be said in response: whichever of them is adopted! Even that, a hollow compromise will not stand up for long. For deeper environmental ethics challenge a broad range of pure theory that is alleged to be applied! What challenges a whole subject, that would change it, can hardly be an application of it. The rise of such environmental ethics is one reason why the modifier applied is a misnomer. For deeper environmental ethics is not any sort of / �Richard Sylvan 19 application of ethics; it instead challenges prevailing ethics. Nor is it, like stock "applied ethics", an adaptation of ethics within an environmental context. The label applied is substantially, if not entirely, a misnomer. Adjectives in modifier or attributive roles, in the combination adjective-noun phrase, often enough do not signify application. The assumption that all modification is application invokes a dubious, presumably false, theory of adjectival attribution. Consider a few examples involving a relevant adjective, ‘medical’. Combinations such as ‘medical student’, ‘medical book’, ‘medical trial’ do not signify applications. A medical s is not normally an application of s to medical matters (of books or students in this fashion); normally it is a type (an m type) of s.7 There are occasional exceptions, in which case compounds are liable to be recorded in dictionaries, as with medical jurisprudence which is not a type of jurisprudence, but ‘the legal knowledge required of a doctor’. There is good reason to think that ethics induces no exception, that medical ethics, and similarly business ethics, follow the normal pattern. Thus business ethics is a type of ethics, namely ethics within a specifically business setting, and accordingly adapted thereto. Observe that such a preliminary account incorporates automatically (what gives the applied presumption some problemsj^sce-^ppendix T) allowance for variations in standards, that business corporations for example should not be expected to measure up to standards set up for ordinary persons (any more than they should iw»t be expected to pay the same levels of taxes)! Given the manifold inadequacies of the label applied, amendment of terminology appears warranted. Amendment, not abandonment. After all, what ‘applied ethics’ is supposed to comprehend, such as medical ethics, business ethics, even environmental ethics, are not themselves in court, but presently taken as viable fields. A superior label is field, for field-defined or field-restricted; another is type, for type-delimited, another domain. Where others speak of "applied ethics", let us discourse about field ethics. Investment ethics, for instance, is a field ethic, with field investment. An "institute for applied ethics concentrating upon applications to business" is an institute for field ethics with main field business. The "applied ethics" movement becomes effectively a field ethics movement. Observe that professional ethics are field ethics, with the field in each case the profession concerned. But professional ethics in sum form a quite proper subclass of field ethics; bio-ethics and ecological ethics are plainly not professional ethics. Less obviously, more importantly, field ethics differs from practical ethics (as usually poorly defined), with which "applied ethics" is regularly conflated. For, on the one side, ordinary living and daily life, central to practical ethics, are not fields. On the other, field ethics are not confined to practice, but may involve considerable theoretical material, particularly from the fields concerned. 2. The ethics count Not only is the applied operation in trouble, ethics also is in deep trouble. Indeed, in a way, the main problem lies here. There is not a fit, properly satisfactory subject, for some significant applications. For some "applications" have to change and develop the subject! But, the problems do not vanish when the amendment to field ethics is made. Satisfactory fieldwork, satisfactory outcomes in field ethics are seriously hampered by long-standing troubles in ethics. For as field ethics involve ethics, whatever is wrong with ethics affects field ethics. To glimpse these troubles, consider recent ambivalence towards ethics. Is ethics even a good good. There is a most curious contrast in later 20th century attitudes towards ethics. On the one side, there are great expectations, for instance for what ethics can contribute, to social and professional lite �20 What is -wrong with applied ethics especially; but on the other there is serious disquiet, occasionally verging upon despair and into nihilism, as to ethics, and its role. Virtually the whole spectrum from great expectations through no expectations to substantial forebodings is selectively represented. A few examples: • Great expectations for ethics, beginning to re-emerge these days, tend to come from outside professional philosophical ranks, from scientists and social scientists.8 Ethics is seen as taking up again its grand legitimization and critical roles. It can indeed be used in this respect as regards to a wide variety of practices, such as in business, economics, government, scientific experimentation, and so on. Of course it cannot always succeed, because one ethics can be pitted against another, and each and all challenged. ( p-— These expectations, a bit surprising after the drab days of analytic moral philosophy (where I philosophy could express no interesting moral opinions), contrast sharply with ' /•—• heavy disquiet or worse as to present ethics. A recent example is afforded by z MacIntyre’s disturbing introduction to After Virtue', that ‘we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical of morality’ (p.2). Some, like MacIntyre, promise a happy, even a great, outcome, should we return to proper paths, to a virtue ethic in the tradition of Aristotle. Others are not so sanguine; , there is 1 • no hope for ethics. There are divergent routes here. Either it can play no relevant , role any longer, or it can play only a negative or damaging role (thus e.g. Hinckfuss). Though both these routes lead badly astray, present (merely classificatory) objectives do not include showing as much.9 There is, furthermore, reason for at least serious disquiet. Should we care to look closely at, and try to assess, the total ethical heritage, then what we find is not very promising. • What is on offer is mostly extremely sketchy and very piecemeal, much of it a hotchpotch. There are extraordinarily few well-worked out and detailed ethics. Spinoza’s Ethics is perhaps one rare example. • Most of what is on offer is seriously biassed or prejudiced, indeed from a deep environmental perspective even unethical. Prime examples include • religious bias, heavily constraining or distorting creatures’ lives, and putting them to work to serve imagined religious objectives. • spiritualistic distortion. Even where an explicit religion does not feature, as in Platonism and neo-Platonism and in edified Buddhism, the whole of life may be distorted through promise of an after-life or successor life or extra-material life, where furthermore some system of rewards or punishments may be dished out for previous performance. No doubt such biasses help in conferring upon ethics authority, unwarranted authority (fulfil duties or be dammed, etc.). • humanistic distortion, summed up as human chauvinism. It is upon this prejudice, critical for environmental ethics, that we concentrate. A main matter that is wrong with ethics, and ipso facto its practice and its belated appearance in many professional settings (when it$ should have been in evidence long ago), is its anthropic bias, its considerable prejudice in favour of (present) humans.10 The matter is highly material in several fields, most obviously in environmental ethics, but also in medical ethics, bio-ethics, agricultural and vefinarian ethics, and similar. It is widely assumed, however, that ethics is inevitably human biassed, that it has to be anthropocentric. That is not so. Ethics can be repaired. So much is the substance of ethics without humans. Both morals and ethics can be characterised, in substantially reportive ways, so as to free �Richard Sylvan 21 them of anthropocentrism and the like.11 Furthermore, the whole superstructural theory can be developed in a fashion that makes no essential reference to humans or any other biological species.12 These repairs represent, however, only the beginning of adjustment and change - of many changes if a satisfactory deep-green ethics is to be reached. When repairing goods, there often comes a stage, increasingly rapidly encountered those days, when it becomes a more attractive proposition to acquire new items than to persist with repairs. So it may be, it is now suggested, with ethics. So increasingly it has been suggested this century, with demands for new ethics, new moral philosophies. Those making such proposals include Schweitzer, Maclver, Leopold, along with many others.13 Suppose we should arrive, through addressing different or new fields, at what amounts to a new ethics, as many think we do (thus Maclver, p. 179 and many ecocentric philosophers). Then what emerges is no "application" of a standard ethics, but something different, not an applied standard ethics at all. Now something similar may appear to occur for normal applied subjects. A newly encountered group of physical phenomena, for instance, leads not to the elevation of some dusty mathematical theory buried in archives, what is mostly the case, but to elaboration of a new mathematical theory. Normally in this event, the main body of pure mathematics would remain untouched; a new annex or suburb would simply be added to it.14 With ethics, however, things are different. There are grounds for contending that the green (environmental) revolution has shaken ethics to its (dubious) foundations and core, and, as coupled with associated non domination themes (as emphasised especially in ecofeminism), has left comparatively little untouched. The standard city of ethics is not left alone, unscathed. Much the same sort of points can be presented in the form of a dilemma, for standard ethics and a proposed field, such as environmental issues. Either standard ethics will not cover the field (or cannot be extended to do so because it (or its extension) does not apply, or through being forced upon the field it twists or damages the data, for instance leaves an indelible anthropic bias. A homely carpentry analogy may help: there is some cabinet work where delicate hammering would be appropriate, but the only tool we have is a sledgehammer.15 Likewise, a standard chauvinistic ethic is the wrong tool to try to use or extend for deeper environmental work. Unremarkably, the three options emerging, namely (inappropriate) application, extension or adjustment, and fashioning of something new or different, correspond more or less to the now familiar threefold division of environmental positions, into shallow, intermediate and deep.16 As before, deep ethics are not "applications", but near ethics. 3. Extraneous issues Among the many extraneous issues concerning field ethics, those that have come to exercise philosophers do look distinctly partisan:17 namely, the role of philosophers, especially professionals; the place of philosophy in field ethics; and the poor practice of these ethics, particularly from a professional philosophical perspective. Here the main thesis to be advanced inclines towards these professionally unsympathetic lines: insofar as these matters, philosophical extranalities, are of negatixe impact for philosophy, philosophers have largely themselves to blame, for they are largely of their own making (or, to sheet some of the responsibility more accurately, of the controlling power elite of the profession}.18 Let us investigate some of the extraneous issues seriatim. Because a field ethics concerns the field as well as (relevant parts of) ethics, its investigation, practice and teaching, requires an intersection of capacities and skills, drawn from both ethics and the field. �n What is wrong with applied ethics This simple observation enables an immediate response to such questions as: if not philosophers, then who is to investigate, and teach, field ethics? That response is: those from one area or the other who have acquired requisite knowledge and technique in the other, or less promising, those from outside (but with some appropriate informational background) who acquire these prerequisites in both. In medical ethics, where there is perhaps a larger pool of information concerning the field than there is regarding ethics, a moral philosopher untrained in medicine may have more to learn than a medical doctor unversed in ethics and lacking philosophical skills. (Really, neither should be let loose on students before they are duly prepared in the intersection.) It is evident, then, that philosophy enjoys no natural monopoly in field ethics. The place of philosophy is less exalted, and certainly is not dominant - still less given recent proposed (but hardly well justified) decoupling of ethics from philosophy.19 There are corollaries regarding the roles of philosophers on committees relating to field ethics, in decision-making and so on on these topics. Philosophers do not have an automatic place. Unless they are well-informed as to ethics (many philosophers are not) and as to the field, they do not deserve a place at all (of course they still may gain a role for want of any better placed). Ousting of under-informed or unenergetic philosophers is not always such a bad thing. While the informational situation is now significantly better than in 1945 when Maclver was agonising over the predicament of moral philosophy, it is still true that ‘academic moral philosophers are not using ‘every opportunity to make themselves acquainted, so far as possible, with the real difficulties of those [not merely present humans] who need the help of moral philosophy most... I ... confess that I myself lack the factual knowledge which would be required to do this work well. I suspect that many ethic philosophers are in the same position ...20 One of the reasons why philosophy has lost prestige in recent years is that it has not kept pace’ (pp.204-205). One example Maclver incisively develops concerns ‘discoveries associated with the name of Freud. The behaviour of philosophers in this connection is particularly hard to excuse. At first they flatly denied the reality of the alleged discoveries - maintained that the notion of "unconscious mind" was self contradictory, and so forth. But all this has now been given up. ... Philosophers no longer dispute ... details of the Freudian system - but disregard them. If they mention them at all, they talk as if they somehow concerned none but medical men - as if the same propositions could be sene in medicine and false outside it. In the light of the recognition of unconscious motives the whole traditional theory of moral responsibility needs overhauling, but no moral philosopher undertakes this’ (p.205). The reason why the corresponding philosophical debate (about whether unconscious desires are sometimes evil, whether relevant moral predicates are restricted to conscious motives, and so forth) had not "by 1945, after 40 years of exposure to Freudian issues, Maclver attributed to the mass of psychological literature which philosophers have not read and would have to read, reading that is obligatory if moral philosophy is to be made ‘the subject which it ought to be’ (p.206). There has been disappointment among some professional philosophers, those with expansionist . instin^tions, that field ethics has not turned out to be quite the bonanza anticipated, that the expected / boom in new opportunities and positions began to dissipate as field practitioners started to supply their own "field ethicists".21 None of this should have been surprising, for broad inductive reasons. Philosophy had long shed subjects and fields of overlap; and those professionals who have hung in have become something different (economists instead of social philosophers, computer scientists instead of logicians22) Nor have philosophers, especially those who have not changed or reskilled, all the virtues assumed by professionals; e.g. they have little or no theory, they are too fuzzy, they are indecisive, or vacillate, etc. (remember the sophists; these provide some of the reasons too why philosophers are often not welcome on committees). ( �Richard Sylvan 23 Some outside inputs into ethics, such as field studies or field workers may supply, would not go astray. For there is theoretically little that is new or interesting on the standard ethics scene. Much of it is 19th century revival, refinement of utilitarianism or Kantianism, and ornate additions (with bells and whistles). One of the few "new" offerings is the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics! Nothing, however, stops outside inputs. Anyone is free to attempt philosophy. Professionals have no exclusive rights over philosophy, still less over ethics; nor should they. There is a case for widening practice of philosophy, and encouraging paraphilosophers. For critical problems emerging are not so much those of philosophy itself (which could be very different from the way it is practised and professionalised), but of philosophy as professionalised and as conducted. The immediate future does not bode well for change in the latter, for several reasons; the prevailing materialistic technological ethos (which dev^lyes pure intellectual activity), the consequent marginalisation of subjects like philosophy and continuing narrowness of dominant philosophical activity. Nor, moreover, have philosophers proceeded well, particularly in the Antipodes, in training and "^pp^ing students who can readily adapt to become field ethicists. Philosophy has never been strongly employment-market driven (but has tended to rely on a version of Say’s flawed law); indeed there are features intrinsic to philosophy, such as its contemplative character, that renders it antithetical to the veiy idea of responding to markets at all. There are other regional features that compound this sort of problem: the conservative, and class, bias of philosophy (inherited from similar British arrangements), which has meant that Australian philosophy has not been innovative in adapting its topics and emphases to changing circumstances;23 and the heavy concentration, as in British empiricism (still dominant in Australia), upon epistemology, with ethics and what went into moral sciences and social philosophy still regarded as second class arenas and not what philosophy was really about or what first class chaps would mainly concern themselves. These are major reasons why philosophy lost out, and Reserved to lose. It is for those latter sorts of reasons in particular, that environmental ethics and environmental philosophy have been unable to gain more than occasional marginal status in philosophy curricula in Australian universities. Fuller accounts of the predicament of environmental philosophy have been given elsewhere.24 Its predicament tends to illustrate a general problem for field ethics, with bioethics (with its own institutional settings) the only partial exception. Now that field ethics is being lost to the fields in many cases, there are complaints about the calibre of what is done and taught, the quality of the investigators and teachers, and so on. No doubt much of this criticism is warranted; some similar criticism of ethics within philosophy would also be warranted. Among the justified criticisms are these: • that field ethics as done from the field is divorced from ethical theory (from what theory has so far been developed). Too much comprises mere case studies, as with business MBAs. • that the field practitioners are not trained in ethical theory, and are often ill-informed ethically and lacking in analytic and critical skills crucial for satisfactory philosophy. A different complaint, of importance, concerns the poor ethical practice, even the unethical practice in some of the fields, despite the development of field ethics. Such a problem is particularly conspicuous in the field of business.25 But this has been a long-standing problem for ethics itself; how to get people to behave as they ought? Teaching agents ethics can certainly enable, and encourage, them to be moral: but it cannot make them moral. Nor would it be proper for it to do so. The field ethics movement, successor to the late AE movement, is both important and timely, especially as regards getting ethics and axiology back into many fields that hard tried, erroneously it now appears, to eliminate them. The movement will have to be carefully orchestrated however to \ I 1 �24 What is wrong with applied ethics avoid capture by the very power structures and disciplinary paradigms that it should transform. These are certainly grounds for some cynicism about such movements: that they are easy targets for co-option, that they can bemused to cover up abuses by power structures, and to authorise dubious procedures, or worse,^with a rubber stamp of ethical approval from appropriate ethics’ committees and inquiries. Such grounds for cynicism can be reasoned, however, and new hope inaugurated, given more adequate formulation and development of relevant field ethics (exercises including considerable theoretical work), along with independent and impartial administration of emerging codes and decision methods, and with appropriate openness of the formerly abused procedures they are intended to regulate fairly. REFERENCES Callicott, J.B., In Defense of the Land Ethic, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989. Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982. Engel, J.R., Ethics of Environment and Development, Belhaven Press, 1990. Hinkfuss, I., The Moral Society: Its Structure and Effects, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, no. 16, The Australian National University, 1987. Leopold, A., A Sand Country Almanac, Oxford University Press, New York, 1949. MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1981. Maclver, A.M., "Towards anew moral philosophy", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, no. 46 (1945-6): 179-206. Sylvan, R. "Prospects for regional philosophy in Australasia", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1986. Sylvan, R., From Wisdom to Wowserism, typescript, 1991. Sylvan, R., Deep-Green Ethics, typescript, 1993. i Sylvan, R. and Bennett, H., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 199^. Wilson, E.O. (ed.), Biodiversity, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1988. NOTES 1. For such a treatment of items like ethics, as economic goods, see further Greening of Ethics. 2. The Conference, organised by the University of Newcastle in August 1993, where this paper was presented. 3. Ethical theory has tended to borrow classifications from elsewhere, from apparently more successful enterprises. Thus, for instance, the (normative) ethics/meta-ethics distinction lifted, none too adeptly, �25 Richard Sylvan from logical theory. Thus too the present pure/applied distinction, also purloined. By no means everything that intelligent agents dream up and promote is entirely in order. Rather uncontroversially colourless green ideas is one such combination, more controversially human nature, deep ecology and post-modernism are such. Applied ethics appears to belong to this not-in-satisfactory-order or out-of-order bunch. 4. ‘Applied. Practical, put to practical use. Applied science. Science of which the abstract principles are put to practical use in the arts’ (Concise English'). ‘2. Put to practical use; practical as distinguished from abstract or theoretical’ (OED). Though we persevere with these dictionary explications, there are grounds for complaint; there are neglected nuances. For example, the practical/theoretical contrast (just one of the muddy contrasts with practical) differs from an applied/pure contrast. A theory can in principle be applied (a plying to, i.e., a mapping) in a non practical, or impractical, field. Different again is that concrete/abstract contrast. And what exactly is practical? 5. The advance notices for the Conference (which look pretty confused, even mumbo jumbo), well they add insult to injury by invoking talk of a theory of applied ethics. There is said to ‘appear to be a significant gap between the theory of applied ethics and its practice’; this is said to be why ‘disillusionment has set in’ now. While there may be a theory of applications, talk of a "theory of applied ethics" heaps confusion (‘theory of) upon confusion (‘applied ethics’). As for gaps (really, between the theory and practice of ethics), there are two, as we shall see; there is an ambiguity in ‘gap’As for mumbo jumbo, try the following sentence: ‘The teaching and practice of applied ethics has grown rapidly and in an unruly manner across many disciplines, with many practitioners now not possessing any depth of philosophical knowledge and expertise and, because of difficulties experienced with the theory and practice given, in some cases deciding that same is relevant.’ Its sequel is easily unscrambled: ‘We wish to hold a conference to explore this issue for the Australian community and its practical consequences.’ 6. Thus, too, there is a two way process. Application feeds back to inform theory and to enrich the pure subject. With ethics, as we shall see, something similar or more dramatic happens. Field developments not merely may inform and enlarge the ethical theory; some may alter it irrevocably. 7. Of course not all adjectives function in this way. butTor. instance without types of responded s. Thus, e.g. possible, probable, alleged, putative,etc. I 8. Examples include Wilson in Biodiversity, Engel. 9. We try to show as much elsewherey-Routley and HTIF. 10. This is by no means all that is wrong with standard ethics. Another, important for field ethics, is the lack of an adequate theory of ethical dilemmas, confronting which is a main engine of progress in ethics. 11. See Greening of Ethics', also ‘Ethics without humans. Philosophy without humans', Observe that ^repairs are not unique. <y : » 12. As to how this is accomplished, see the annular theory, reiterated in Greening'. X �26 What is wrong with applied ethics 13. Maclver suggests ‘that all the old codes are out of date and a satisfactory new one has still to be discovered. A lost moral code cannot be recovered, and a new one obtained, simply for the asking’ (p.201). 14. Nothing, no paradigm shift as revolution has effected the whole citadel of mathematics; none is likely to (even dialethism, more threatening than much else, because central areas can be protected by /w roj due qualification). 15. A different example: an isolated person has an extensive weeding tool in a weed invaded forest, with the only techniques availabe a broad-acre chemical defoliant. 16. For a classification of environmental positions along the lines of the three options, see Callicott Introduction, where attention is also drawn to shortcomings in the applied idea. 17. On extraneous issues in ethics, including especially field ethics such as environmental ethics, see for a detailed treatment Greening of Ethics, part II/. JJ 18. Among other things, philosophers did not act, did not respond to incipient demand, fast enough in organising appropriate structures for delivery of field ethics. <5? 19. See esp. Edwards, plhieswilhourPhilosophy^ 20. Maclver continues ‘and for this reason this conception of the task of moral philosophy is unlikely to be popular in the profession.’ There are two troubles with the tack: firstly, field ethics do not should not - exhaust ethics; secondly, field ethics are enjoying some popularity. 21. The proposition, from the circulated Conference announcement, that field ethics might rejuvenate a flagging philosophy, that they had ‘given philosophy a rebirth’ can hardly be taken seriously (for all that they may have given jaded philosophy departments a fillip). Concrete working examples and dilemmas might stimulate ethical investigation, but would only exceptionally impact an ethical theory, and moreover ethics itself has but rarely been a source of growth and development in philosophy. Field practitioners, who often have their own expansionist and imperialist ambitions and programs, are unlikely to let a service subject be supplied from elsewhere unless they cannot yet manage the subject themselves and then only so long as times are good so they do not need the jobs and can avoid chores involved. 22. Interestingly there has been no similar fuss from professionals regarding the attrition of logicians within philosophy (for which some of them have responsibility), or the on-going loss of logic to computing science and mathematics. 23. It is for this sort of reason that philosophy in Australia, unlike that in parts of USA^,missed the field van. 24. See Sylvan 1986, The Greening of Ethics, From Wisdom to Wowserism. iSrn- 25. A problem in fact exacerbated under prominent ethical positions, e.g., crude utilitarian fostering "greed is good" notions, most social Darwinism encouraging cut-throat competition. I' � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Richapd'Sylvan /> << Ji 197d p. I WHAT IS WRONG WITH APPLIED ETHICS Richard Sylvan There is much that is wrong with and in applied ethics. Specifically, there are three comprehensive counts where things are wrong with the commodity concerned, applied ethics, that is with applied ethics so economically viewed.1 Namely on the following three counts: • extraneous, with the supply, delivery, consumption, and the like of applied ethics, AE. The category prominently includes the delivery of applied ethics: what is done, taught and learnt, by whom, and how qualified (e.g. whether taught by professionals, professional ethicists or philosophers in particular). That has tended to presume that the commodity itself is more or less in order, though the presumption lacks good pedigree, delivery of defective goods being almost as ubiquitous as business enterprise. The present focus is not however upon the delivery, or other features of the production and consumption, packaging and marketing of the goods, but on features of the commodity itself, applied ethics itself. Thus • intraneous counts, concerning the commodity itself, where a further two things are wrong: •• the applied idea, and ••• what the application is presumed to be made to, established - or, should it be, establishment - ethics. Because an implicit premiss in organising the Philosophy and Applied Ethics Re-examined1 Conference seems to have been that the issues to be addressed are predominantly extraneous, and because most of the papers actually relevant to the Conference topic appear to focus on extraneous issues, the present exercise, by contrast, concentrates upon intraneous problems, especially the third: radical deficiencies in what is supposed to be applied, prevailing ethics, and some extensive repairs thereto. 1. The applied count To begin with, there is something decidedly3 odd, not to say radically unsatisfactory, about the very idea of applied ethics. To bring out the oddness, the conceptual inadequacy, it helps to consider the dictionary senses and established usage of applied. The term in the only relevant sense (the other obsolete sense is that offolded) means: ‘put to practical use; practical as distinguished from abstract or theoretical' (OED, similarly Concise English). Relevant examples cited are: ‘the applied sciences’ (from Babbage 1832), ‘applied logic (as distinguished from pure)’ (from Thomson 1806).4 It may appear then, that "applied ethics" amounts to pleonasm, a popular tautology (and "pure ethics" correspondingly to an oxymoron), because ethics itself is already practical, for instance much or all of it being concerned with practical action and its qualities (such is Maclver s assumption: moral philosophy is practical - in a way in which other branches of philosophy are not’, p.206). In this respect "applied ethics", even more "applied morals", is rather like "applied motoring", "applied nursing" or "applied housekeeping". Conceptual confusion would be considerably reduced by removing the modifier ‘applied .5 Such a charge of confusion can however be mitigated by properly I7 18 What is wrong with applied ethics distinguishing ethics, which includes philosophy and theory of morality, from morals, thereby revealing, perhaps, elements of some theory apt for application. No doubt something like this is the presupposition of those who preach or profit from practical ethics (similarly practical economics, but doubtfully practical housekeeping): that standing in contrast is a suitably established theoretical ethics (could it perchance be utilitarianism?) which can rather uncontroversiarbe used to guide practice. But is there such a theory, apt for application, for translation into practice? To appreciate what is required for adequacy, consider successful applied subjects. Let us compare "applied ethics" with^long established applied discipline, namely applied mathematics, which often boasts a separate department in universities (a discipline I was obliged to study as an undergraduate in order to proceed further in pure mathematics). In the first place, applied mathematics contrasts with pure mathematics, applied logic with pure. Where, a naive outsider may ask, is pure ethics that similarly stands in contrast with applied ethics? Could there decently be separate departments of pure and of applied ethics? For the most part, applied mathematics applies to practice, in some wide sense, a body of pure mathematics that is more or less correct, at least within the assumption framework and contextual settings where it is applied. (The qualified formulation is given for pluralistic reasons; given the dominant paradigm, the pure mathematics that is applied is correct without further qualification, correct period.) A body of substantially correct theory ready for application is then the first of several pertinent features of that relational object, applied mathematics, the first of several dubiously matchable by "applied ethics". The proviso ‘for the most part’ (introducing the paragraph) signals another discrepancy. There is a, presumably derivative, part of applied mathematics that investigates, in essentially the manner of pure mathematics, theories, algebras, spaces and similar, selected through postulates, principles or equational sets drawn from standard applied mathematics (thus e.g. Newtonian theories where classical force laws are satisfied, Hilbert and phase spaces, and so on).6 Such derivative applied mathematics need not compromise at all normal methodological requirements (such as they are) of pure mathematics, for rigour, exactness, and similar. Ordinary applied mathematics, in its quest, even haste, for practical results, does compromise, or violate, pure mathematical methodology. For example, shortcuts are taken, simplifications made, information shed, figures rounded, approximations adopted, and so. Science veers towards art. From a pure perspective, dreadful things are often done to data or mathematical transformations of data. Skilled practitioners tend to appreciate what they can get away with in this sort of regard. Again, none of this, neither the body of information nor the kinds of skills, is really matched in ethics, in putting ethical theory to practical work. Next, the mathematics that is applied, a body of pure mathematics, is not thoroughly contested. Ethics however is. There is nothing in ethics like arithmetic or elementary mechanics; the nearest thing ethics can offer is some controversial development along axiomatic geometric lines. Mathematics has its critics, both inside (e.g. intuitionists) and out (e.g., cultural relativists), but none (hard core sceptics excepted) suggest changing all of it or tampering with most of what is applied. By contrast, in ethics, there continues to be an array of competing theories, none of which has managed to win broad allegiance. What pure theory is there to apply, to do dreadful things to? It might be said in response: whichever of them is adopted! Even that, a hollow compromise will not stand up for long. For deeper environmental ethics challenge a broad range of pure theory that is alleged to be applied! What challenges a whole subject, that would change it, can hardly be an application of it. The rise of such environmental ethics is one reason why the modifier applied is a misnomer. For deeper environmental ethics is not any sort of / Richard Sylvan 19 application of ethics; it instead challenges prevailing ethics. Nor is it, like stock "applied ethics", an adaptation of ethics within an environmental context. The label applied is substantially, if not entirely, a misnomer. Adjectives in modifier or attributive roles, in the combination adjective-noun phrase, often enough do not signify application. The assumption that all modification is application invokes a dubious, presumably false, theory of adjectival attribution. Consider a few examples involving a relevant adjective, ‘medical’. Combinations such as ‘medical student’, ‘medical book’, ‘medical trial’ do not signify applications. A medical s is not normally an application of s to medical matters (of books or students in this fashion); normally it is a type (an m type) of s.7 There are occasional exceptions, in which case compounds are liable to be recorded in dictionaries, as with medical jurisprudence which is not a type of jurisprudence, but ‘the legal knowledge required of a doctor’. There is good reason to think that ethics induces no exception, that medical ethics, and similarly business ethics, follow the normal pattern. Thus business ethics is a type of ethics, namely ethics within a specifically business setting, and accordingly adapted thereto. Observe that such a preliminary account incorporates automatically (what gives the applied presumption some problemsj^sce-^ppendix T) allowance for variations in standards, that business corporations for example should not be expected to measure up to standards set up for ordinary persons (any more than they should iw»t be expected to pay the same levels of taxes)! Given the manifold inadequacies of the label applied, amendment of terminology appears warranted. Amendment, not abandonment. After all, what ‘applied ethics’ is supposed to comprehend, such as medical ethics, business ethics, even environmental ethics, are not themselves in court, but presently taken as viable fields. A superior label is field, for field-defined or field-restricted; another is type, for type-delimited, another domain. Where others speak of "applied ethics", let us discourse about field ethics. Investment ethics, for instance, is a field ethic, with field investment. An "institute for applied ethics concentrating upon applications to business" is an institute for field ethics with main field business. The "applied ethics" movement becomes effectively a field ethics movement. Observe that professional ethics are field ethics, with the field in each case the profession concerned. But professional ethics in sum form a quite proper subclass of field ethics; bio-ethics and ecological ethics are plainly not professional ethics. Less obviously, more importantly, field ethics differs from practical ethics (as usually poorly defined), with which "applied ethics" is regularly conflated. For, on the one side, ordinary living and daily life, central to practical ethics, are not fields. On the other, field ethics are not confined to practice, but may involve considerable theoretical material, particularly from the fields concerned. 2. The ethics count Not only is the applied operation in trouble, ethics also is in deep trouble. Indeed, in a way, the main problem lies here. There is not a fit, properly satisfactory subject, for some significant applications. For some "applications" have to change and develop the subject! But, the problems do not vanish when the amendment to field ethics is made. Satisfactory fieldwork, satisfactory outcomes in field ethics are seriously hampered by long-standing troubles in ethics. For as field ethics involve ethics, whatever is wrong with ethics affects field ethics. To glimpse these troubles, consider recent ambivalence towards ethics. Is ethics even a good good. There is a most curious contrast in later 20th century attitudes towards ethics. On the one side, there are great expectations, for instance for what ethics can contribute, to social and professional lite 20 What is -wrong with applied ethics especially; but on the other there is serious disquiet, occasionally verging upon despair and into nihilism, as to ethics, and its role. Virtually the whole spectrum from great expectations through no expectations to substantial forebodings is selectively represented. A few examples: • Great expectations for ethics, beginning to re-emerge these days, tend to come from outside professional philosophical ranks, from scientists and social scientists.8 Ethics is seen as taking up again its grand legitimization and critical roles. It can indeed be used in this respect as regards to a wide variety of practices, such as in business, economics, government, scientific experimentation, and so on. Of course it cannot always succeed, because one ethics can be pitted against another, and each and all challenged. ( p-— These expectations, a bit surprising after the drab days of analytic moral philosophy (where I philosophy could express no interesting moral opinions), contrast sharply with ' /•—• heavy disquiet or worse as to present ethics. A recent example is afforded by z MacIntyre’s disturbing introduction to After Virtue', that ‘we have - very largely, if not entirely - lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical of morality’ (p.2). Some, like MacIntyre, promise a happy, even a great, outcome, should we return to proper paths, to a virtue ethic in the tradition of Aristotle. Others are not so sanguine; , there is 1 • no hope for ethics. There are divergent routes here. Either it can play no relevant , role any longer, or it can play only a negative or damaging role (thus e.g. Hinckfuss). Though both these routes lead badly astray, present (merely classificatory) objectives do not include showing as much.9 There is, furthermore, reason for at least serious disquiet. Should we care to look closely at, and try to assess, the total ethical heritage, then what we find is not very promising. • What is on offer is mostly extremely sketchy and very piecemeal, much of it a hotchpotch. There are extraordinarily few well-worked out and detailed ethics. Spinoza’s Ethics is perhaps one rare example. • Most of what is on offer is seriously biassed or prejudiced, indeed from a deep environmental perspective even unethical. Prime examples include • religious bias, heavily constraining or distorting creatures’ lives, and putting them to work to serve imagined religious objectives. • spiritualistic distortion. Even where an explicit religion does not feature, as in Platonism and neo-Platonism and in edified Buddhism, the whole of life may be distorted through promise of an after-life or successor life or extra-material life, where furthermore some system of rewards or punishments may be dished out for previous performance. No doubt such biasses help in conferring upon ethics authority, unwarranted authority (fulfil duties or be dammed, etc.). • humanistic distortion, summed up as human chauvinism. It is upon this prejudice, critical for environmental ethics, that we concentrate. A main matter that is wrong with ethics, and ipso facto its practice and its belated appearance in many professional settings (when it$ should have been in evidence long ago), is its anthropic bias, its considerable prejudice in favour of (present) humans.10 The matter is highly material in several fields, most obviously in environmental ethics, but also in medical ethics, bio-ethics, agricultural and vefinarian ethics, and similar. It is widely assumed, however, that ethics is inevitably human biassed, that it has to be anthropocentric. That is not so. Ethics can be repaired. So much is the substance of ethics without humans. Both morals and ethics can be characterised, in substantially reportive ways, so as to free Richard Sylvan 21 them of anthropocentrism and the like.11 Furthermore, the whole superstructural theory can be developed in a fashion that makes no essential reference to humans or any other biological species.12 These repairs represent, however, only the beginning of adjustment and change - of many changes if a satisfactory deep-green ethics is to be reached. When repairing goods, there often comes a stage, increasingly rapidly encountered those days, when it becomes a more attractive proposition to acquire new items than to persist with repairs. So it may be, it is now suggested, with ethics. So increasingly it has been suggested this century, with demands for new ethics, new moral philosophies. Those making such proposals include Schweitzer, Maclver, Leopold, along with many others.13 Suppose we should arrive, through addressing different or new fields, at what amounts to a new ethics, as many think we do (thus Maclver, p. 179 and many ecocentric philosophers). Then what emerges is no "application" of a standard ethics, but something different, not an applied standard ethics at all. Now something similar may appear to occur for normal applied subjects. A newly encountered group of physical phenomena, for instance, leads not to the elevation of some dusty mathematical theory buried in archives, what is mostly the case, but to elaboration of a new mathematical theory. Normally in this event, the main body of pure mathematics would remain untouched; a new annex or suburb would simply be added to it.14 With ethics, however, things are different. There are grounds for contending that the green (environmental) revolution has shaken ethics to its (dubious) foundations and core, and, as coupled with associated non domination themes (as emphasised especially in ecofeminism), has left comparatively little untouched. The standard city of ethics is not left alone, unscathed. Much the same sort of points can be presented in the form of a dilemma, for standard ethics and a proposed field, such as environmental issues. Either standard ethics will not cover the field (or cannot be extended to do so because it (or its extension) does not apply, or through being forced upon the field it twists or damages the data, for instance leaves an indelible anthropic bias. A homely carpentry analogy may help: there is some cabinet work where delicate hammering would be appropriate, but the only tool we have is a sledgehammer.15 Likewise, a standard chauvinistic ethic is the wrong tool to try to use or extend for deeper environmental work. Unremarkably, the three options emerging, namely (inappropriate) application, extension or adjustment, and fashioning of something new or different, correspond more or less to the now familiar threefold division of environmental positions, into shallow, intermediate and deep.16 As before, deep ethics are not "applications", but near ethics. 3. Extraneous issues Among the many extraneous issues concerning field ethics, those that have come to exercise philosophers do look distinctly partisan:17 namely, the role of philosophers, especially professionals; the place of philosophy in field ethics; and the poor practice of these ethics, particularly from a professional philosophical perspective. Here the main thesis to be advanced inclines towards these professionally unsympathetic lines: insofar as these matters, philosophical extranalities, are of negatixe impact for philosophy, philosophers have largely themselves to blame, for they are largely of their own making (or, to sheet some of the responsibility more accurately, of the controlling power elite of the profession}.18 Let us investigate some of the extraneous issues seriatim. Because a field ethics concerns the field as well as (relevant parts of) ethics, its investigation, practice and teaching, requires an intersection of capacities and skills, drawn from both ethics and the field. n What is wrong with applied ethics This simple observation enables an immediate response to such questions as: if not philosophers, then who is to investigate, and teach, field ethics? That response is: those from one area or the other who have acquired requisite knowledge and technique in the other, or less promising, those from outside (but with some appropriate informational background) who acquire these prerequisites in both. In medical ethics, where there is perhaps a larger pool of information concerning the field than there is regarding ethics, a moral philosopher untrained in medicine may have more to learn than a medical doctor unversed in ethics and lacking philosophical skills. (Really, neither should be let loose on students before they are duly prepared in the intersection.) It is evident, then, that philosophy enjoys no natural monopoly in field ethics. The place of philosophy is less exalted, and certainly is not dominant - still less given recent proposed (but hardly well justified) decoupling of ethics from philosophy.19 There are corollaries regarding the roles of philosophers on committees relating to field ethics, in decision-making and so on on these topics. Philosophers do not have an automatic place. Unless they are well-informed as to ethics (many philosophers are not) and as to the field, they do not deserve a place at all (of course they still may gain a role for want of any better placed). Ousting of under-informed or unenergetic philosophers is not always such a bad thing. While the informational situation is now significantly better than in 1945 when Maclver was agonising over the predicament of moral philosophy, it is still true that ‘academic moral philosophers are not using ‘every opportunity to make themselves acquainted, so far as possible, with the real difficulties of those [not merely present humans] who need the help of moral philosophy most... I ... confess that I myself lack the factual knowledge which would be required to do this work well. I suspect that many ethic philosophers are in the same position ...20 One of the reasons why philosophy has lost prestige in recent years is that it has not kept pace’ (pp.204-205). One example Maclver incisively develops concerns ‘discoveries associated with the name of Freud. The behaviour of philosophers in this connection is particularly hard to excuse. At first they flatly denied the reality of the alleged discoveries - maintained that the notion of "unconscious mind" was self contradictory, and so forth. But all this has now been given up. ... Philosophers no longer dispute ... details of the Freudian system - but disregard them. If they mention them at all, they talk as if they somehow concerned none but medical men - as if the same propositions could be sene in medicine and false outside it. In the light of the recognition of unconscious motives the whole traditional theory of moral responsibility needs overhauling, but no moral philosopher undertakes this’ (p.205). The reason why the corresponding philosophical debate (about whether unconscious desires are sometimes evil, whether relevant moral predicates are restricted to conscious motives, and so forth) had not "by 1945, after 40 years of exposure to Freudian issues, Maclver attributed to the mass of psychological literature which philosophers have not read and would have to read, reading that is obligatory if moral philosophy is to be made ‘the subject which it ought to be’ (p.206). There has been disappointment among some professional philosophers, those with expansionist . instin^tions, that field ethics has not turned out to be quite the bonanza anticipated, that the expected / boom in new opportunities and positions began to dissipate as field practitioners started to supply their own "field ethicists".21 None of this should have been surprising, for broad inductive reasons. Philosophy had long shed subjects and fields of overlap; and those professionals who have hung in have become something different (economists instead of social philosophers, computer scientists instead of logicians22) Nor have philosophers, especially those who have not changed or reskilled, all the virtues assumed by professionals; e.g. they have little or no theory, they are too fuzzy, they are indecisive, or vacillate, etc. (remember the sophists; these provide some of the reasons too why philosophers are often not welcome on committees). ( Richard Sylvan 23 Some outside inputs into ethics, such as field studies or field workers may supply, would not go astray. For there is theoretically little that is new or interesting on the standard ethics scene. Much of it is 19th century revival, refinement of utilitarianism or Kantianism, and ornate additions (with bells and whistles). One of the few "new" offerings is the revival of Aristotelian virtue ethics! Nothing, however, stops outside inputs. Anyone is free to attempt philosophy. Professionals have no exclusive rights over philosophy, still less over ethics; nor should they. There is a case for widening practice of philosophy, and encouraging paraphilosophers. For critical problems emerging are not so much those of philosophy itself (which could be very different from the way it is practised and professionalised), but of philosophy as professionalised and as conducted. The immediate future does not bode well for change in the latter, for several reasons; the prevailing materialistic technological ethos (which dev^lyes pure intellectual activity), the consequent marginalisation of subjects like philosophy and continuing narrowness of dominant philosophical activity. Nor, moreover, have philosophers proceeded well, particularly in the Antipodes, in training and "^pp^ing students who can readily adapt to become field ethicists. Philosophy has never been strongly employment-market driven (but has tended to rely on a version of Say’s flawed law); indeed there are features intrinsic to philosophy, such as its contemplative character, that renders it antithetical to the veiy idea of responding to markets at all. There are other regional features that compound this sort of problem: the conservative, and class, bias of philosophy (inherited from similar British arrangements), which has meant that Australian philosophy has not been innovative in adapting its topics and emphases to changing circumstances;23 and the heavy concentration, as in British empiricism (still dominant in Australia), upon epistemology, with ethics and what went into moral sciences and social philosophy still regarded as second class arenas and not what philosophy was really about or what first class chaps would mainly concern themselves. These are major reasons why philosophy lost out, and Reserved to lose. It is for those latter sorts of reasons in particular, that environmental ethics and environmental philosophy have been unable to gain more than occasional marginal status in philosophy curricula in Australian universities. Fuller accounts of the predicament of environmental philosophy have been given elsewhere.24 Its predicament tends to illustrate a general problem for field ethics, with bioethics (with its own institutional settings) the only partial exception. Now that field ethics is being lost to the fields in many cases, there are complaints about the calibre of what is done and taught, the quality of the investigators and teachers, and so on. No doubt much of this criticism is warranted; some similar criticism of ethics within philosophy would also be warranted. Among the justified criticisms are these: • that field ethics as done from the field is divorced from ethical theory (from what theory has so far been developed). Too much comprises mere case studies, as with business MBAs. • that the field practitioners are not trained in ethical theory, and are often ill-informed ethically and lacking in analytic and critical skills crucial for satisfactory philosophy. A different complaint, of importance, concerns the poor ethical practice, even the unethical practice in some of the fields, despite the development of field ethics. Such a problem is particularly conspicuous in the field of business.25 But this has been a long-standing problem for ethics itself; how to get people to behave as they ought? Teaching agents ethics can certainly enable, and encourage, them to be moral: but it cannot make them moral. Nor would it be proper for it to do so. The field ethics movement, successor to the late AE movement, is both important and timely, especially as regards getting ethics and axiology back into many fields that hard tried, erroneously it now appears, to eliminate them. The movement will have to be carefully orchestrated however to \ I 1 24 What is wrong with applied ethics avoid capture by the very power structures and disciplinary paradigms that it should transform. These are certainly grounds for some cynicism about such movements: that they are easy targets for co-option, that they can bemused to cover up abuses by power structures, and to authorise dubious procedures, or worse,^with a rubber stamp of ethical approval from appropriate ethics’ committees and inquiries. Such grounds for cynicism can be reasoned, however, and new hope inaugurated, given more adequate formulation and development of relevant field ethics (exercises including considerable theoretical work), along with independent and impartial administration of emerging codes and decision methods, and with appropriate openness of the formerly abused procedures they are intended to regulate fairly. REFERENCES Callicott, J.B., In Defense of the Land Ethic, State University of New York Press, Albany, 1989. Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982. Engel, J.R., Ethics of Environment and Development, Belhaven Press, 1990. Hinkfuss, I., The Moral Society: Its Structure and Effects, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, no. 16, The Australian National University, 1987. Leopold, A., A Sand Country Almanac, Oxford University Press, New York, 1949. MacIntyre, A., After Virtue, University of Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame, 1981. Maclver, A.M., "Towards anew moral philosophy", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, no. 46 (1945-6): 179-206. Sylvan, R. "Prospects for regional philosophy in Australasia", Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1986. Sylvan, R., From Wisdom to Wowserism, typescript, 1991. Sylvan, R., Deep-Green Ethics, typescript, 1993. i Sylvan, R. and Bennett, H., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 199^. Wilson, E.O. (ed.), Biodiversity, National Academy Press, Washington, DC, 1988. NOTES 1. For such a treatment of items like ethics, as economic goods, see further Greening of Ethics. 2. The Conference, organised by the University of Newcastle in August 1993, where this paper was presented. 3. Ethical theory has tended to borrow classifications from elsewhere, from apparently more successful enterprises. Thus, for instance, the (normative) ethics/meta-ethics distinction lifted, none too adeptly, 25 Richard Sylvan from logical theory. Thus too the present pure/applied distinction, also purloined. By no means everything that intelligent agents dream up and promote is entirely in order. Rather uncontroversially colourless green ideas is one such combination, more controversially human nature, deep ecology and post-modernism are such. Applied ethics appears to belong to this not-in-satisfactory-order or out-of-order bunch. 4. ‘Applied. Practical, put to practical use. Applied science. Science of which the abstract principles are put to practical use in the arts’ (Concise English'). ‘2. Put to practical use; practical as distinguished from abstract or theoretical’ (OED). Though we persevere with these dictionary explications, there are grounds for complaint; there are neglected nuances. For example, the practical/theoretical contrast (just one of the muddy contrasts with practical) differs from an applied/pure contrast. A theory can in principle be applied (a plying to, i.e., a mapping) in a non practical, or impractical, field. Different again is that concrete/abstract contrast. And what exactly is practical? 5. The advance notices for the Conference (which look pretty confused, even mumbo jumbo), well they add insult to injury by invoking talk of a theory of applied ethics. There is said to ‘appear to be a significant gap between the theory of applied ethics and its practice’; this is said to be why ‘disillusionment has set in’ now. While there may be a theory of applications, talk of a "theory of applied ethics" heaps confusion (‘theory of) upon confusion (‘applied ethics’). As for gaps (really, between the theory and practice of ethics), there are two, as we shall see; there is an ambiguity in ‘gap’As for mumbo jumbo, try the following sentence: ‘The teaching and practice of applied ethics has grown rapidly and in an unruly manner across many disciplines, with many practitioners now not possessing any depth of philosophical knowledge and expertise and, because of difficulties experienced with the theory and practice given, in some cases deciding that same is relevant.’ Its sequel is easily unscrambled: ‘We wish to hold a conference to explore this issue for the Australian community and its practical consequences.’ 6. Thus, too, there is a two way process. Application feeds back to inform theory and to enrich the pure subject. With ethics, as we shall see, something similar or more dramatic happens. Field developments not merely may inform and enlarge the ethical theory; some may alter it irrevocably. 7. Of course not all adjectives function in this way. butTor. instance without types of responded s. Thus, e.g. possible, probable, alleged, putative,etc. I 8. Examples include Wilson in Biodiversity, Engel. 9. We try to show as much elsewherey-Routley and HTIF. 10. This is by no means all that is wrong with standard ethics. Another, important for field ethics, is the lack of an adequate theory of ethical dilemmas, confronting which is a main engine of progress in ethics. 11. See Greening of Ethics', also ‘Ethics without humans. Philosophy without humans', Observe that ^repairs are not unique. <y : » 12. As to how this is accomplished, see the annular theory, reiterated in Greening'. X 26 What is wrong with applied ethics 13. Maclver suggests ‘that all the old codes are out of date and a satisfactory new one has still to be discovered. A lost moral code cannot be recovered, and a new one obtained, simply for the asking’ (p.201). 14. Nothing, no paradigm shift as revolution has effected the whole citadel of mathematics; none is likely to (even dialethism, more threatening than much else, because central areas can be protected by /w roj due qualification). 15. A different example: an isolated person has an extensive weeding tool in a weed invaded forest, with the only techniques availabe a broad-acre chemical defoliant. 16. For a classification of environmental positions along the lines of the three options, see Callicott Introduction, where attention is also drawn to shortcomings in the applied idea. 17. On extraneous issues in ethics, including especially field ethics such as environmental ethics, see for a detailed treatment Greening of Ethics, part II/. JJ 18. Among other things, philosophers did not act, did not respond to incipient demand, fast enough in organising appropriate structures for delivery of field ethics. <5? 19. See esp. Edwards, plhieswilhourPhilosophy^ 20. Maclver continues ‘and for this reason this conception of the task of moral philosophy is unlikely to be popular in the profession.’ There are two troubles with the tack: firstly, field ethics do not should not - exhaust ethics; secondly, field ethics are enjoying some popularity. 21. The proposition, from the circulated Conference announcement, that field ethics might rejuvenate a flagging philosophy, that they had ‘given philosophy a rebirth’ can hardly be taken seriously (for all that they may have given jaded philosophy departments a fillip). Concrete working examples and dilemmas might stimulate ethical investigation, but would only exceptionally impact an ethical theory, and moreover ethics itself has but rarely been a source of growth and development in philosophy. Field practitioners, who often have their own expansionist and imperialist ambitions and programs, are unlikely to let a service subject be supplied from elsewhere unless they cannot yet manage the subject themselves and then only so long as times are good so they do not need the jobs and can avoid chores involved. 22. Interestingly there has been no similar fuss from professionals regarding the attrition of logicians within philosophy (for which some of them have responsibility), or the on-going loss of logic to computing science and mathematics. 23. It is for this sort of reason that philosophy in Australia, unlike that in parts of USA^,missed the field van. 24. See Sylvan 1986, The Greening of Ethics, From Wisdom to Wowserism. iSrn- 25. A problem in fact exacerbated under prominent ethical positions, e.g., crude utilitarian fostering "greed is good" notions, most social Darwinism encouraging cut-throat competition. 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Title A name given to the resource Box 14, item 1978: What is wrong with applied ethics Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Description An account of the resource Typescript with handwritten emendations and annotations. Paper presented at the 1993 Philosophy and applied ethics re-examined conference. [10] leaves. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 14, item 1978 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5bcffeb">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5bcffeb</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [10] leaves. 8.49 MB. Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - [Unlisted in Error Likely 2nd Drawer] Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > [Unlisted in Error Likely 2nd Drawer] Box 14: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/df8de55a3ac9bb4d5b8436b004c5b43d.pdf ae1e86b57088469825e03475b2c4723c PDF Text Text r at b'l 2051THE IRREFUTABILITY of anarchism 1. GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE. The State is like God: the anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed. The parallel, drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. While the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe that there are no states: none are legitimate. on the contrary, there are all too many, though The important parallel is as to arguments. The agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed, and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence­ sitting position. Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are arguments, or at least solid considerations, against. So it is with soundly based anarchism, which can both fault arguments for the State and produce a case against the State. A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again emphasised by Bakunin^ is that of State and Church. This institutional comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised; for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly an organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but as a necessary evil. Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove that God exists. Since the State is unnecessary, as well as costly and typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other respects, it should be superseded. social arrangements. And it can be succeeded, by alternative �2 2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT ARGUMENT. The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State activity being dispensed with. The argument is not a straight substitution argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements. There is much the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft, corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest­ destructive pine planting and woodchip projects). The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial kind. This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism. The argument, implicit in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions, and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the powerful groups the State tends to serve). But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required. For why should people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their collective interest? Such functions can be performed, and performed better, without the coercion which is the hallmark of of the State, and without the accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves". The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case 2 form, considering each function in turn. In each case the function is carried out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements. Consider, for example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community access communications (e.g. radio)^ most of which are presently either starved of infrastructure or hindered by the State. Such beneficial services would in general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally �held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals and powerful agencies. Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private individuals. As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation. But those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective interest. In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality, corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus is detached. State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may be similarly removed or replaced. These services, which include reduction of violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services, security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it. do not. They Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by communities themselves without intervention by the State. Secondly, a great many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence of which the State is the main purveyor .and which is often the outcome of WAvditai 3 the State's propping up of gross . A community which seriously A limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes «// gross inequities in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and many of those involving personal violence. Such a left-leaning anarchism is also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution. As all too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and police inequitable distribution. 5? This then is the main classical argument for anarchism. The argument has however been challenged, both by historical �and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot act in their collective interest without coercion. I 3. THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE LIKE. The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where individuals will not agree or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can furnish.In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others’ contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from others' restraint). The claim is that only the State with its backing of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed. A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type, Including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two players.Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have been separately imprisoned. A State representative makes the following offers separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while the accomplice gets 8 years. It so happens that if both prisoners remain silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence. if both confess they would each receive 4 years. But The "game" can be summarised in the following "payoff" matrix:Prisoner 1 S(ilence) C(onfess) S -1, -1 -8, 0 C 0, -8 S t rategies -4, -4 The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also in fact a minimax strategy). For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by confessing. But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent. �5 4. FOILING THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA ARGUMENT. It is bizarre that a dilemma alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene, forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.Of course the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemmas is inessential, as is much else from the example. But some features of the prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate or really cooperate. Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed. The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly seriously limited.? A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference. It is claimed that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate, that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement' (Taylor, p. 5). Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently encouraged privatisation of life, the extent of cooperation and trust would o undoubtedly be much higher. The argument has to depend crucially then on substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings, e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people were that unreliable and devious,tate arrangements involved in providing public goods/-oueh as—taxatioa-y would not succeed either) . That such assumptions are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the first.suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical scepticism, involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the other security against default, and so on. The question of the character of human interests and preferences and the extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities. A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count �is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings of others nor on the social context in which that human operates. While the individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence, And, sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community A (which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners' Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State. 5. WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED. What the Dilemma-based case for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are outs tanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also o’wt foot damaging if unresolved, lint ypsoHved by State intervention, and only so g- fa (optimally) resolved, ami Finallythat in the course of so resolving these Dilemma situations, worse situations than those that are resolved are not thereby induced. These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging. For several of the conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional, worse) and involve considerations about whichf reasonable parties can differ. /W/’ chuck The selection of Dilemmas,provides an example: after all there are many such A A Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of .—t>n Vi o!-c h family -fs*tds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not worthy of State attention. There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be satisfied at all. For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games, Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately represented by what is called a supergame. But in many such sequential Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming separated players with purely egoistic interests/^ For what sequential games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be dependent upon past performance of other players. This dependence effectively removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from past social interaction. In such supergames then, no intervention is required. �7 Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that they can really cooperate. Equally important, and equally independent of the State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate J'1 Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has a good record of adhering, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc. A Nor is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives they be required in recalcitrant cases), and is known (should is used even by the State, e.g. But at no stage is the State gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc. required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners' Dilemmas are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they are not already catered for. And in fact communal and cooperative organisation did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in the case of the Commons. In sum, here also replacement works. There are no important Dilemma situations, it seems, where the State is essential. The State has been thought to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example, that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective goods - is through State control.But it is quite evident that there are other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs). Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations /J has very extensive effects, many of them negative, so that the gains made, if any, in so resolving Dilemma^ situations, appear to be substantially outweighed by the costs involved. For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State to put in the balance. As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with ty showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more , new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as/ /A t * /<» the working differently with the State as a further player (since the State may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.). also to further arguments against the State. These points lead �9 to accept. (Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation). But institutional checks which operate only insofar as a ^system*^ acceptable to the powerholders is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration of those checked,^ are not really checks at all. £ gand preventing The problem of controlling the power of the State, 'ur IA the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the first place. The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation. 8. THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY. responsible for actions deliberately undertaken. A person is This premiss can be derived, if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent, Taking responsibility for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about what to do on each occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside,A 4 determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision over to someone or something else. , It implies, that is, moral autonomy, Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom. For the autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject to the will of another. another so directs. Even if it does what another directs, it is not because In being free, not of constraints (both physical and self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous being is morally free. A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory (under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon them. Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and with freedom. An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State. 7 s In sum, being a person, as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on , ika. /J 18 personhiood implies^anarchism. V It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State", one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy. But such a "State", with no independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism, On the contrary, such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic organisation. �10 9. The replacement THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE. argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State is not necessary. But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable. The gap may be closed by appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked. Examples of such Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have not been omitted. There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are, 19 anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives, and there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic 20 arrangements within the State structure. 10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION. The arguments outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on. For example, spontaneous anarchism — according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrange­ ments will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution without any prior organisation — is a position which is not viable and could not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which durable supersession of the State depends. which these theoretical arguments. A The sort of anarchist society will certainly be organised, but the organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures (and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct democracy. The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes pictured it. It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily. Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by representation and subject to a downward system of command. Within each community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth and property, and no highly concentrated economic power. community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is communally owned or not owned at all. A �11 While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely, they offer no detailed blueprint. Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives. 11. STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITION TO ANARCHIST SOCIETY ; THE FOREST SUCCESSION MODEL OF REPLACEMENT BY AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE. The main strategy, emerging from the First Way, is that of replacement : transition to a new anarchist social order proceeds by replacement or addption of the more satisfactory State organisations and structures by organisations and structures of a more anarchistic cast, and by removal or phasing out of remaining no longer necessary or unsatisfactory State arrangements. Replacement and supersession suggest a biological model, of such change and succession as occurs where one forest type succeeds another; and such a model is in turn very suggestive. To make the model more definite, and to give it some local colour, consider forest succession where a sub-tropical rainforest replaces a eucalypt forest, as analogous to the case where anarchism replaces a Statist society. There is certainly a marked change in structure, typically from a tall forest with a fairly open canopy to a more compact closed forest with more layers of vegetation, much more local diversity and a richer variety of life forms, especially floral forms. A forest is not merely a set of trees, but trees in structural arrangement and interdependence, not merely on one another but on other life forms such as pollinating insects, seed-carrying birds and animals, and so on; and the changes in structure include changes in microclimate, in soil moisture levels and humus and bacterial content. The change of forest type may be by evolution, by hastened or induced evolution, or by catastrophe (revolution) as when a eucalypt forest is clearfelled and artificially succeeded by planted rainforest. (Strictly, there is a spectrum of practices and replacement strategies between evolutionary and revolutionary, and various different revolutionary strategies; and the standard evolutionary-revolutionary contrast presents a false dichotomy.) Even reliance on predominantly evolutionary methods, which tend to be very slow by human time scales may require some (management) practices, else evolution towards rainforest will not begin or continue. For example, seeds for rainforest species may not be available if adjoining areas have been stripped of suitable seed trees, e.g. by clearing or eucalypt conversion, in which case it will be necessary to introduce seeds (of anarchist ideas, methods, arrangements, etc.). And rainforest evolution may not be able to �13 12. APPLYING THE FOREST SUCCESSION MODEL. How to apply the model is not difficult to see in broad outline, and many of the further details have been filled out by work, that can be described as indicating how allegiance can be shifted in practice from where we mostly are to alternative social 22. arrangements and life-styles built on self-management and mutual aid. The seeds of anarchism should be broadcast or planted, anarchist (nonStatist) arrangements instituted or strengthened, and efforts made to replace or vulnerable Statist arrangements.^ Some of the practices are familiar : 'anarchist groups, clubs, pamphlets, broadcasts, newsletters, etc.; (anarchist) cooperatives, exchanges, neighbourhood groups, rural communities, etc. Others are slightly less familiar: avoidance of State influence by arrangements beyond State reach such as costless (or alternative currency) interchanges of goods and services, action directed at removing decision-making from State departments, such as forest services, and into citizen hands, and ultimately, to decentralized local communities. In this sort of way worthwhile State arrangements can be replaced, and power can be progressively transferred from the State, and returned to the community and to people more directly involved. "V- ht) �FOOTNOTES 1. Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London, especially p. 139. 1973, Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin. 2. That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of generally beneficial state activity - there is only a (relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it can be replaced in one way or another. course uniquely determined. Replacement is not of Lines such replacements can take are indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature, consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid. New York University Press, 1972, and also his Fields, Factories and Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913. 3. On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York, 1970, p. 206 ff. ; also P.J. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary . For recent discussion of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone, 'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', A Nomos / XIX^New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4. V 4. J- Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest case that can be made for the desirability of the State' Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9). (M. Taylor, To cover all arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations, 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are X not merely e^gjistic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such games are iterated. As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate, there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of the same logical form - those where people do not contribute to supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a "collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum" quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons, �2 unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness). That received arguments of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere. An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 5. 1980. An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance of population size in the arguments for the State. But size is not decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided (or relocated) by organisation info The figures smaller communities. given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5. 6. It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation, when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of social cooperation. 7. This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley, Theories, Self Management, and 'Social Environmental Problems' in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. 8. As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self- Managing Environment, Allison & BUfsby, London, 1979, chapter 10, but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332. Similar points apply as regards many other Dilemma situations. 'In the. experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'. Abrams, op. cit., p. 308. 9. Cf. the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93. �3 10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially chapter 5. 11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including cases where the State is one of the "adversaries". 12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife, in modem economic and political theorising. Both are to be found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the firstJ^(with an attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition^/ op. cit., p. 250 ff. 13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes one's social roles erf and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze. Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity. cit., chapter 7. A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way o/icA 14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op. in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off regions. 15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent of his Third Man argument. 16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II. Fourth edition (revised), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, p. 129 and p. 127. The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State1, 'upon which' Marxists never had 'any well-considered view' (p. 129). 17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and Opposition 13 (1978), 199-217: see p. 209 and p.(^25jTP 18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. l/olff, In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. No argument is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute. argument, for example^is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff. Wolff's i nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining �THE IRREFUTABILITY OF ANARCHISM 1. GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE. The State is like God: the anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed. The parallel, drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. While the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe that there are no states: none are legitimate. on the contrary, there are all too many, though The important parallel is as to arguments. The agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed, and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence­ Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not sit-ting position. only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are arguments, or at least solid considerations, against. So it is with soundly , nene. based anarchism^ which can both faults arguments for the State^and (ncisi'je. X case against the State. A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again emphasised by Bakunin^- is that of State and Church.Clx This institutional comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised; for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly an organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as A business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but as a necessary evil Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove that God exists. Since the State is unnecessary, as well as costly and typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other respects, it should be superseded. social arrangements.,^ And it can be succeeded, by alternative �2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT ARGUMENT. The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State activity being dispensed with. The argument is not a straight substitution argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements. There is much the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft, corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest­ destructive pine planting and woodchip projects). The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial J$ind. This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism. The argumertf:, implicit in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions, and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the powerful groups the State tends to serve). But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required. For why should people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their collective interest? Such functions can be performed, and performed better, without the coercion which is the hallmark of of the State, and without the accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves". The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case 2 form, considering each function in turn. In each case the function is carried out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements. Consider, for example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community access communications (e.g. radio)^ most of which are presently either starved of infrastructure or hindered by the State. Such beneficial services would in general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally �3 held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals and powerful agencies. Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private individuals. As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation. But those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective interest. In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality, corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus is detached. State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may be similarly removed or replaced. These services, which include reduction of violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services, security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it. do not. They Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by communities themselves without intervention by the State. Secondly, a great many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence of which the State is the main purveyor and which is often the outcome of ol 3 the State's propping up of gross inequities. A community which seriously limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes a// gross inequities in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and many of those involving personal violence. Such a left-leaning anarchism is also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution. As all too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and police inequitable distributionThis then is the main classical argument for anarchism. The argument has however been challenged, both by historical �and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot act in their collective interest without coercion. 3. THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE LIKE. The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where --------- (?) individuals will not agree“or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can 4 furnish. In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others' contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from others' restraint). The claim is that only the State with its backing of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed. (6J A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type, including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two players.Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have been separately imprisoned. A State representative makes the following offers separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while the accomplice gets 8 years. It so happens that if both prisoners remain silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence. if both confess they would each receive 4 years. But The "game" can be summarised in the following "payoff" matrix:- Prisoner 2 The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also in fact a minimax strategy). For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by confessing. But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent. �5 4. FOILING THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA ARGUMENT. It is bizarre that a dilemma alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene, forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.Of course the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemma£is inessential, as is much else from the example. But some features of the prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate or really cooperate. Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed. The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly seriously limited.? A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference. It is claimed that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate, that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement' (Taylor, p. 5). Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently encouraged privatisation of life, the extent of cooperation and trust would o undoubtedly be much higher. The argument has to depend crucially then on substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings, e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people were that unreliable and deviousState arrangements involved in providing public goodsy such as taxation', would not succeed either). That such assumptions are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the first,suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical scepticism, involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the other security against default, and so on. The question of the character of human interests and preferences and the extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities. A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count �is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings of others nor on the social context in which that human operates. While the individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence. And^sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community (which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners' Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State. 5. WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED.' What the Dilemma-based case for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are outstanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also qaA'-fkc-l' oft damaging if unresolved,\but resolve^/by State intervention, and only so A A- jZAz-zv (optimally) resolved, and finally.that in the course of so resolving these Dilemma situations, worse situation than those that are resolved are not thereby induced. These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging. For several of the conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional, worse) and involve considerations about which reasonable parties can differ. The selection of Dilemmas^provides an example^: after all there are many such Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of l/«o|on<c or family, feuds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not worthy of State attention. There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be satisfied at all. For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games, Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately represented by what is called a supergame. But in many such sequential Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming separated players with purely egoistic interests?^ For what sequential games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be dependent upon past performance of other players. This dependence effectively removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from past social interaction. In such supergames then, no intervention is required. �7 Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that they can really cooperate. Equally important, and equally independent of the State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate. Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has a good record of adhering, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc. A Nor is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives they be required in recalcitrant cases), and is known (should is used even by the State, e.g. But at no stage is the State gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc. required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners’ Dilemmas are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they are not already catered for. And in fact communal and cooperative organisation did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in the case of the Commons. In sum, here also replacement works. There are no important Dilemma situations, it seems, where the State is essential. The State has been thought to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example, that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective goods - is through State control.1- But it is quite evident that there are other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs). Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations has very extensive effects', many of them negative, so that the gains made, if any, in so resolving Dilemma1 situations, appear to be substantially outweighed by the costs involved. For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State to put in the balance. As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with its authority showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more /A of important, new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as with the working example, or differently with the State as a further player (since the State may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.). also to further arguments against the State. These points lead �8 6. THE SECOND WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM PROBLEM RECURRENCE^/ The solution by the State to problems of social organisation repeats or generates in more dangerous form the very problems introduction of the State was designed to solve, including new Dilemmas. Suppose, for instance, the secular State really were introduced in order to solve Prisoners' Dilemmas - introduced as opposed to inherited from the religious State and the Church, and maintained to prop up privilege and foster objectives that are not in its communities' interests - then the array of States generates new Prisoners' Dilemmas, which there is no Super-State to resolve by coercion. Suppose, as the myth has it, the State really were introduced in the interest of order and stability and to curb violence; then the arrays of States resulting more than negates these advantages, with instability, disorder and violence on a grander scale than before the 14 emergence of modem secular States. 7. THE THIRD WAY : THE OVERSHOOT ARGUMENT,FROM THE INADEQUACY OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ON STATE POWER. Having ceded a monopoly on power to the State, in order to resolve some dilemmas, some of them arising from an oontrols or balances the power of the inequitable distribution of power, what State? A Super-State. And its power? There is a vicious infinite regress if the reply to the question "What controls the controller?" is "a further controller".^ The only promising way of avoiding this problem - other routes lead (even more) directly to totalitarianism - is by having the first of these controllers, the State, answer back to those in whose interests it is allegedly established, those of the society or group of communities it controls. implies democratic methods of some kind. Others go further: This 'democracy Lis] the only known means to achieve this control, the only known device by which , 16 we can try to protect ourselves against the misuse of political power . In this event, control has mostly failed. Democracy is extremely attenuated, even in those states that claim to practice it. The exercise of power in modern "democratic" states - much increased power reaching deep into peoples' lives, power which has passed to certain political elites and is directed at the attainment of such objectives as economic growth and material "progress" - is often channelled through 'non-elected authority' and 'is not democratic in the traditional meaning of the term'.In any case, indirect democratic and other institutional checks are tenuous in as much as they depend ultimately on the toleration of those who have direct control of the forces of the State. Experience seems to show that such toleration will only be shown so long as democratic procedures deliver results that are not too disagreeable, that are broadly in accord with what those who control the coercive power are prepared �9 to accept. (Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation). But institutional /I checks which operate only insofar as a "system" acceptable to the powerholders is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration of those checked, are not really checks at all. n. ? ’■ The problem of controlling the power of the State, u/surping and preventing the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the first place. The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation. 8. THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY. responsible for actions deliberately undertaken. A person is This premiss can be derived, if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent. Taking responsibility for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about what to do on each occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside,£»/ A determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision over to someone or something else. It implies, that is, moral autonomy. Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom. For the autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject to the will of another. another so directs. Even if it does what another directs, it is not because In being free, not of constraints (both physical and self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous being is morally free. A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory (under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon them. Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and with freedom. An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State. In sum, being a person, as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on ike. a >18 personhood implies anarchism. It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State", one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy. But such a "State", with no independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism. On the contrary, such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic organisation. �10 9. THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE. The replacement argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State is not necessary. But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable. The gap may be closed by appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked. Examples of such Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have not been omitted. There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are, 19 anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives, and there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic 20 arrangements within the State structure. 10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION. The arguments outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on. For example, spontaneous anarchism — according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrange­ ments will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution without any prior organisation — is a position which is not viable and could not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of anarchist society deJintafe. which these theoretical arguments will certainly be organised, but the A organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures (and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct democracy. The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes pictured it. It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily. Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by representation and subject to a downward system of command. Within each community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth Zand property, and no highly concentrated economic power. A community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is communally owned or not owned at all. �FOOTNOTES 1. Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London, 1973, especially p. 139. Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin. 2. That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of generally beneficial state activity - there is only a (relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it can be replaced in one way or another. course uniquely determined. Replacement is not of Lines such replacements can take are indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature, consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid. New York University Press, 1972, and also his Fields, Factories and Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913. 3. On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York, 1970, p. 206 ff.; also P.O. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary. For recent discussion of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone, 'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', Anarchism(<y>»~7 Nomos, XIX), New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4. 4. Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest case that can be made for the desirability of the State' Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9). (M. Taylor, To cover all arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations, 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are not merely eristic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such games are iterated. As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate, there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of che same logical form - those where people do not contribute to supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a "collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons, �2 unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness). That received arguments of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere. An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 5. 1980. An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance of population size in the arguments for the State. But size is not decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided (or relocated) by organisation into smaller communities. The figures given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5. 6. It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation, when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of social cooperation. 7. This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley, 'Social Theories, Self Management, and Environmental Problems' in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. 8. As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self- Managing Environment, Allison & Ba<sby, London, 1979, chapter 10, <A./ but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332. Similar points apply as regards many other Dilemma situations. ( ' 'In the experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game . > approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'. Abrams, op. cit., p. 308. ). Cf. the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93. �10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially chapter 5. 11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including cases where the State is one of the "adversaries". 12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife, in modern economic and political theorising. Both are to be found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the first (with an attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition) in Taylor. For a further criticism of such false dichotomies, see Routley, op.cit.,pp.250 13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes one's social roles and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze. Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity. 14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op. cit., chapter 7. A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining regions. X 15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent of his Third Man argument. 16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II. Fourth edition (revised), Routledge and Regan Paul, London, 1962, p. 129 and p. 127. The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State1, Marxists never had 'any well-considered view' 'upon which' (p. 129). 17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and Opposition 13 ( 1978), 199-2 17: see p. 209 and p. 211 . 18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. No argument is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute. Wolff's argument, for example, is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff. While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely, no detailed blueprint. they offer Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives. �19. Documented in The Anarchist Collectives (edited S. Dolgoff), Free Life Editions, New York, 1974. 20. As B. Martin boldly asserts, 'The advantages of self-management and alternative lifestyles are many and significant. And these alternatives are entirely feasible: there is plenty of evidence and experience to support operates. their superiority over the present way society The obstacles to self-management and alternative life styles are powerful vested interests and institutional resistance to change', Changing the Cogs, Friends of the Earth, Canberra, 1979, p- 6. 21. As sketched in some of the material already cited, for example, Routley, 284 ff. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document r at b'l 2051THE IRREFUTABILITY of anarchism 1. GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE. The State is like God: the anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed. The parallel, drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. While the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe that there are no states: none are legitimate. on the contrary, there are all too many, though The important parallel is as to arguments. The agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed, and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence­ sitting position. Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are arguments, or at least solid considerations, against. So it is with soundly based anarchism, which can both fault arguments for the State and produce a case against the State. A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again emphasised by Bakunin^ is that of State and Church. This institutional comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised; for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly an organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but as a necessary evil. Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove that God exists. Since the State is unnecessary, as well as costly and typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other respects, it should be superseded. social arrangements. And it can be succeeded, by alternative 2 2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT ARGUMENT. The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State activity being dispensed with. The argument is not a straight substitution argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements. There is much the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft, corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest­ destructive pine planting and woodchip projects). The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial kind. This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism. The argument, implicit in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions, and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the powerful groups the State tends to serve). But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required. For why should people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their collective interest? Such functions can be performed, and performed better, without the coercion which is the hallmark of of the State, and without the accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves". The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case 2 form, considering each function in turn. In each case the function is carried out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements. Consider, for example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community access communications (e.g. radio)^ most of which are presently either starved of infrastructure or hindered by the State. Such beneficial services would in general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals and powerful agencies. Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private individuals. As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation. But those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective interest. In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality, corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus is detached. State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may be similarly removed or replaced. These services, which include reduction of violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services, security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it. do not. They Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by communities themselves without intervention by the State. Secondly, a great many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence of which the State is the main purveyor .and which is often the outcome of WAvditai 3 the State's propping up of gross . A community which seriously A limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes «// gross inequities in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and many of those involving personal violence. Such a left-leaning anarchism is also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution. As all too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and police inequitable distribution. 5? This then is the main classical argument for anarchism. The argument has however been challenged, both by historical and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot act in their collective interest without coercion. I 3. THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE LIKE. The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where individuals will not agree or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can furnish.In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others’ contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from others' restraint). The claim is that only the State with its backing of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed. A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type, Including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two players.Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have been separately imprisoned. A State representative makes the following offers separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while the accomplice gets 8 years. It so happens that if both prisoners remain silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence. if both confess they would each receive 4 years. But The "game" can be summarised in the following "payoff" matrix:Prisoner 1 S(ilence) C(onfess) S -1, -1 -8, 0 C 0, -8 S t rategies -4, -4 The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also in fact a minimax strategy). For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by confessing. But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent. 5 4. FOILING THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA ARGUMENT. It is bizarre that a dilemma alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene, forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.Of course the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemmas is inessential, as is much else from the example. But some features of the prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate or really cooperate. Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed. The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly seriously limited.? A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference. It is claimed that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate, that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement' (Taylor, p. 5). Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently encouraged privatisation of life, the extent of cooperation and trust would o undoubtedly be much higher. The argument has to depend crucially then on substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings, e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people were that unreliable and devious,tate arrangements involved in providing public goods/-oueh as—taxatioa-y would not succeed either) . That such assumptions are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the first.suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical scepticism, involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the other security against default, and so on. The question of the character of human interests and preferences and the extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities. A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings of others nor on the social context in which that human operates. While the individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence, And, sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community A (which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners' Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State. 5. WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED. What the Dilemma-based case for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are outs tanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also o’wt foot damaging if unresolved, lint ypsoHved by State intervention, and only so g- fa (optimally) resolved, ami Finallythat in the course of so resolving these Dilemma situations, worse situations than those that are resolved are not thereby induced. These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging. For several of the conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional, worse) and involve considerations about whichf reasonable parties can differ. /W/’ chuck The selection of Dilemmas,provides an example: after all there are many such A A Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of .—t>n Vi o!-c h family -fs*tds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not worthy of State attention. There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be satisfied at all. For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games, Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately represented by what is called a supergame. But in many such sequential Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming separated players with purely egoistic interests/^ For what sequential games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be dependent upon past performance of other players. This dependence effectively removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from past social interaction. In such supergames then, no intervention is required. 7 Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that they can really cooperate. Equally important, and equally independent of the State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate J'1 Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has a good record of adhering, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc. A Nor is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives they be required in recalcitrant cases), and is known (should is used even by the State, e.g. But at no stage is the State gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc. required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners' Dilemmas are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they are not already catered for. And in fact communal and cooperative organisation did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in the case of the Commons. In sum, here also replacement works. There are no important Dilemma situations, it seems, where the State is essential. The State has been thought to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example, that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective goods - is through State control.But it is quite evident that there are other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs). Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations /J has very extensive effects, many of them negative, so that the gains made, if any, in so resolving Dilemma^ situations, appear to be substantially outweighed by the costs involved. For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State to put in the balance. As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with ty showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more , new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as/ /A t * /<» the working differently with the State as a further player (since the State may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.). also to further arguments against the State. These points lead 9 to accept. (Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation). But institutional checks which operate only insofar as a ^system*^ acceptable to the powerholders is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration of those checked,^ are not really checks at all. £ gand preventing The problem of controlling the power of the State, 'ur IA the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the first place. The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation. 8. THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY. responsible for actions deliberately undertaken. A person is This premiss can be derived, if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent, Taking responsibility for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about what to do on each occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside,A 4 determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision over to someone or something else. , It implies, that is, moral autonomy, Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom. For the autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject to the will of another. another so directs. Even if it does what another directs, it is not because In being free, not of constraints (both physical and self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous being is morally free. A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory (under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon them. Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and with freedom. An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State. 7 s In sum, being a person, as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on , ika. /J 18 personhiood implies^anarchism. V It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State", one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy. But such a "State", with no independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism, On the contrary, such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic organisation. 10 9. The replacement THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE. argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State is not necessary. But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable. The gap may be closed by appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked. Examples of such Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have not been omitted. There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are, 19 anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives, and there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic 20 arrangements within the State structure. 10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION. The arguments outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on. For example, spontaneous anarchism — according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrange­ ments will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution without any prior organisation — is a position which is not viable and could not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which durable supersession of the State depends. which these theoretical arguments. A The sort of anarchist society will certainly be organised, but the organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures (and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct democracy. The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes pictured it. It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily. Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by representation and subject to a downward system of command. Within each community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth and property, and no highly concentrated economic power. community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is communally owned or not owned at all. A 11 While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely, they offer no detailed blueprint. Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives. 11. STRATEGIES FOR TRANSITION TO ANARCHIST SOCIETY ; THE FOREST SUCCESSION MODEL OF REPLACEMENT BY AN ALTERNATIVE STRUCTURE. The main strategy, emerging from the First Way, is that of replacement : transition to a new anarchist social order proceeds by replacement or addption of the more satisfactory State organisations and structures by organisations and structures of a more anarchistic cast, and by removal or phasing out of remaining no longer necessary or unsatisfactory State arrangements. Replacement and supersession suggest a biological model, of such change and succession as occurs where one forest type succeeds another; and such a model is in turn very suggestive. To make the model more definite, and to give it some local colour, consider forest succession where a sub-tropical rainforest replaces a eucalypt forest, as analogous to the case where anarchism replaces a Statist society. There is certainly a marked change in structure, typically from a tall forest with a fairly open canopy to a more compact closed forest with more layers of vegetation, much more local diversity and a richer variety of life forms, especially floral forms. A forest is not merely a set of trees, but trees in structural arrangement and interdependence, not merely on one another but on other life forms such as pollinating insects, seed-carrying birds and animals, and so on; and the changes in structure include changes in microclimate, in soil moisture levels and humus and bacterial content. The change of forest type may be by evolution, by hastened or induced evolution, or by catastrophe (revolution) as when a eucalypt forest is clearfelled and artificially succeeded by planted rainforest. (Strictly, there is a spectrum of practices and replacement strategies between evolutionary and revolutionary, and various different revolutionary strategies; and the standard evolutionary-revolutionary contrast presents a false dichotomy.) Even reliance on predominantly evolutionary methods, which tend to be very slow by human time scales may require some (management) practices, else evolution towards rainforest will not begin or continue. For example, seeds for rainforest species may not be available if adjoining areas have been stripped of suitable seed trees, e.g. by clearing or eucalypt conversion, in which case it will be necessary to introduce seeds (of anarchist ideas, methods, arrangements, etc.). And rainforest evolution may not be able to 13 12. APPLYING THE FOREST SUCCESSION MODEL. How to apply the model is not difficult to see in broad outline, and many of the further details have been filled out by work, that can be described as indicating how allegiance can be shifted in practice from where we mostly are to alternative social 22. arrangements and life-styles built on self-management and mutual aid. The seeds of anarchism should be broadcast or planted, anarchist (nonStatist) arrangements instituted or strengthened, and efforts made to replace or vulnerable Statist arrangements.^ Some of the practices are familiar : 'anarchist groups, clubs, pamphlets, broadcasts, newsletters, etc.; (anarchist) cooperatives, exchanges, neighbourhood groups, rural communities, etc. Others are slightly less familiar: avoidance of State influence by arrangements beyond State reach such as costless (or alternative currency) interchanges of goods and services, action directed at removing decision-making from State departments, such as forest services, and into citizen hands, and ultimately, to decentralized local communities. In this sort of way worthwhile State arrangements can be replaced, and power can be progressively transferred from the State, and returned to the community and to people more directly involved. "V- ht) FOOTNOTES 1. Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London, especially p. 139. 1973, Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin. 2. That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of generally beneficial state activity - there is only a (relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it can be replaced in one way or another. course uniquely determined. Replacement is not of Lines such replacements can take are indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature, consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid. New York University Press, 1972, and also his Fields, Factories and Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913. 3. On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York, 1970, p. 206 ff. ; also P.J. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary . For recent discussion of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone, 'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', A Nomos / XIX^New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4. V 4. J- Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest case that can be made for the desirability of the State' Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9). (M. Taylor, To cover all arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations, 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are X not merely e^gjistic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such games are iterated. As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate, there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of the same logical form - those where people do not contribute to supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a "collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum" quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons, 2 unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness). That received arguments of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere. An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 5. 1980. An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance of population size in the arguments for the State. But size is not decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided (or relocated) by organisation info The figures smaller communities. given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5. 6. It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation, when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of social cooperation. 7. This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley, Theories, Self Management, and 'Social Environmental Problems' in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. 8. As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self- Managing Environment, Allison & BUfsby, London, 1979, chapter 10, but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332. Similar points apply as regards many other Dilemma situations. 'In the. experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'. Abrams, op. cit., p. 308. 9. Cf. the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93. 3 10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially chapter 5. 11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including cases where the State is one of the "adversaries". 12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife, in modem economic and political theorising. Both are to be found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the firstJ^(with an attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition^/ op. cit., p. 250 ff. 13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes one's social roles erf and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze. Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity. cit., chapter 7. A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way o/icA 14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op. in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off regions. 15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent of his Third Man argument. 16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II. Fourth edition (revised), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1962, p. 129 and p. 127. The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State1, 'upon which' Marxists never had 'any well-considered view' (p. 129). 17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and Opposition 13 (1978), 199-217: see p. 209 and p.(^25jTP 18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. l/olff, In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. No argument is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute. argument, for example^is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff. Wolff's i nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining THE IRREFUTABILITY OF ANARCHISM 1. GOD, THE CHURCH, AND THE STATE. The State is like God: the anarchist is like the atheist in disbelief and nonrecognition of what is commonly assumed, mostly as a matter of faith, to be needed. The parallel, drawn by Bakunin, has its weaknesses as well as its strengths. While the atheist believes that God does not exist, the anarchist does not believe that there are no states: none are legitimate. on the contrary, there are all too many, though The important parallel is as to arguments. The agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the existence of God succeed, and so adopts a "neutral" stance; similarly the State-agnostic does not believe that the arguments for the State work, and likewise tries to adopt a fence­ Soundly based atheism goes further than agnosticism, not sit-ting position. only faulting the arguments for, but taking it for granted that there are arguments, or at least solid considerations, against. So it is with soundly , nene. based anarchism^ which can both faults arguments for the State^and (ncisi'je. X case against the State. A more obvious comparison, appreciated from Reformation on and again emphasised by Bakunin^- is that of State and Church.Clx This institutional comparison enables several relevant features of the State to be emphasised; for example, how, as the Church used to, the State assigns to itself many very extensive powers, such as a monopoly on the production and control of the main medium of exchange, currency, and an ultimate monopoly an organised violence, all other internal security arrangements being eventually answerable to its police and military; how it is of the same category as A business organisations such as multinationals, which now to some extent threaten it but by and large collaborate with it; how, as again the Church used to, it has nominal support of most of its "subjects", though many of them are little better than Sunday believers, and an increasing number have come to see the State as in many respects evil and inevitably corrupt, but as a necessary evil Whether the State is inevitably evil or not, it is unnecessary, so it will be argued, in a way parallelling the famous Five Ways of Aquinas designed to prove that God exists. Since the State is unnecessary, as well as costly and typically at least evil in many of its practices and undesirable in other respects, it should be superseded. social arrangements.,^ And it can be succeeded, by alternative 2. THE FIRST WAY OF SHOWING THAT THE STATE IS NOT REQUIRED : THE REPLACEMENT ARGUMENT. The core of the argument is simple and persuasive: everything in the collective interest accomplished by the State can equally be accomplished by alternative arrangements such as voluntary cooperation, the remainder of State activity being dispensed with. The argument is not a straight substitution argument, for it is not as if a rational person would want to have everything accomplished by the State replicated by alternative arrangements. There is much the State does or supports that is at best rather indifferent, e.g. sponsorship of pomp and ceremony and of junkets by VIPs; and a great deal of typical State activity is positively evil and not in the collective interest, e.g. graft, corruption, brutality, maintenance of inequitable distribution of wealth, land and other resources, and encouragement or protection of polluting or environmentally destructive industries (e.g. without state sponsorship we should not be well embarked on a nuclear future, without state assistance and subsidization Australia would not be burdened with its extensive forest­ destructive pine planting and woodchip projects). The modern State has however many other functions than repressive or damaging ones, functions of community welfare or of otherwise beneficial J$ind. This does not upset the replacement argument for anarchism. The argumertf:, implicit in the works of the classical anarchists, goes like this:- The functions of the State can be divided into two types, those that are in the collective interest and generally beneficial such as community welfare and organisational functions, and those that are not (but are, presumably, in the interests of some of the powerful groups the State tends to serve). But as regards functions of the first type, the generally beneficial functions which are in the collective interest, no coercion is required. For why should people have to be coerced into carrying out functions which are in their collective interest? Such functions can be performed, and performed better, without the coercion which is the hallmark of of the State, and without the accompanying tendency of the State to pervert such functions to the maintenance of privilege and inequality of power, and to remove power from those it "serves". The detailed argument that such functions can be performed takes a case by case 2 form, considering each function in turn. In each case the function is carried out through alternative arrangements, such as voluntary cooperation by the people directly concerned, which replace State arrangements. Consider, for example, the operation of mutual aid or self help medical services or building programs, or self managed welfare, housing or environment services, or community access communications (e.g. radio)^ most of which are presently either starved of infrastructure or hindered by the State. Such beneficial services would in general be reorganised so that all the relevant infrastructure became communally 3 held, and those wishing to arrange or use the service would manage the operation themselves, taking the operation into their own hands instead of being the passive recipients of favours meted out to them by professionals and powerful agencies. Coercion is unnecessary because, in more communal types of anarchism, the basic infrastructure and many resources (other than individual labour) are already held by the community, so there is no need to apply coercion to individuals to extract these resources needed for community welfare projects, as there is in the situation where wealth and resources are privatised and coercion is required to wrest resources from unwilling private individuals. As for the second type of functions, those which are not in the collective interest, coercion will normally be required for the performance of those functions, and is thus an essential part of the State's operation. But those functions are better dispensed with, since they are not in the collective interest. In this way, while the good part of the State's operation is retained and improved upon, the bad part - especially the evils of brutality, corruption and other abuses invariably associated with the coercive apparatus is detached. State services that are concerned with order, in the general sense, may be similarly removed or replaced. These services, which include reduction of violence to persons and redress for such violence, quarantine services, security, orderly operation of traffic, and so on, have often been said to make for especial difficulties for anarchism, or even to refute it. do not. They Firstly, disputes can be settled and offences dealt with directly by communities themselves without intervention by the State. Secondly, a great many of these problems are created or enhanced by the State, e.g. violence of which the State is the main purveyor and which is often the outcome of ol 3 the State's propping up of gross inequities. A community which seriously limits (or dispenses with) the institution of private property and removes a// gross inequities in the distribution of wealth thereby removes the need for many "welfare" services and the basis for a great many offences involving violence: virtually all those involving violence to private property and many of those involving personal violence. Such a left-leaning anarchism is also quite invulnerable to further familiar, but ludicrous, arguments for the State, such as those from the fairer distribution of land, property and wealth that is alleged to be achieved by State enforcement of redistribution. As all too many people are aware, a major function of the State is to maintain and police inequitable distributionThis then is the main classical argument for anarchism. The argument has however been challenged, both by historical and more recent objections, which are designed to show that people cannot act in their collective interest without coercion. 3. THE CASE AGAINST REPLACEMENT FROM PRISONERS' DILEMMA SITUATIONS AND THE LIKE. The main arguments designed to rebut the replacement argument for anarchism and to buttress the State status quo, are based on variants of the Prisoners' Dilemma, to the effect that there are important cases where --------- (?) individuals will not agree“or cooperate to provide themselves with (or to maintain) collective goods without coercion, such as only the State can 4 furnish. In such "dilemma" situations each individual will hope to gain advantage, without contributing (or exercising restraint), from others' contributions (or restraint), by freeloading on others (or profiting from others' restraint). The claim is that only the State with its backing of force can resolve such situations: anarchistic replacement cannot succeed. (6J A basic ingredient of a considerable variety of arguments of this type, including Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State, the "Tragedy of the Commons" argument, and recent economic arguments for State intervention to secure collective goods, is the single Prisoners' Dilemma game with just two players.Two prisoners, 1 and 2, taken to be accomplices in a crime, have been separately imprisoned. A State representative makes the following offers separately to each: if the prisoner confesses and becomes a State's witness while his or her accomplice remains silent, he or she will be released at once while the accomplice gets 8 years. It so happens that if both prisoners remain silent the State has only enough evidence to impose a 1 year sentence. if both confess they would each receive 4 years. But The "game" can be summarised in the following "payoff" matrix:- Prisoner 2 The game is not intended to present a moral dilemma, that each can only go free at the cost of the others' freedom, but the following dilemma:- It is in each prisoner's private interest to choose strategy C no matter what the other does : strategy C is, in the jargon, each players' "dominant" strategy (and also in fact a minimax strategy). For if 2, for example, remains silent, then 1 goes free by confessing, while if 2 confesses, then 1 halves his or her sentence by confessing. But if both prisoners choose their dominant strategy they obtain an inferior outcome to that which would have resulted by what is tendentiously called "cooperating", by their both remaining silent. 5 4. FOILING THE PRISONERS' DILEMMA ARGUMENT. It is bizarre that a dilemma alleged to show the necessity of the State - which is supposed to intervene, forcibly if required, to ensure that the prisoners "cooperate" to obtain an optimal outcome - should be set up by the State's own operative.Of course the State's presence in arranging (or accentuating) some such dilemma£is inessential, as is much else from the example. But some features of the prisoner's relations are essential, in particular the separability assumption that the prisoners are isolated, and so have no opportunity to communicate or really cooperate. Similarly, in the more general argument, a privatisation assumption is smuggled in in the way the dilemma is formulated, that we are dealing with self contained individuals who, like the prisoners, act only in their own narrowly construed private interests and whose interests are opposed. The applicability of the dilemma to the human condition is accordingly seriously limited.? A cursory aside is often added to the Prisoners' Dilemma to the effect that the segregation of the prisoners makes no real difference. It is claimed that even if the prisoners could meet and discuss and even agreed to cooperate, that would make no difference, since neither could trust (the sincerity) of the other (Abrams, p. 193), 'neither has an incentive to keep the agreement' (Taylor, p. 5). Experimental and historical evidence indicates that this is very often not so - and in a more cooperative social setting than the currently encouraged privatisation of life, the extent of cooperation and trust would o undoubtedly be much higher. The argument has to depend crucially then on substantially mistaken assumptions about human propensities in various settings, e.g. that purely egoistic interests are always pursued, backed up by a large measure of scepticism about the reliability of other people (but if people were that unreliable and deviousState arrangements involved in providing public goodsy such as taxation', would not succeed either). That such assumptions are operating can be seen by elaborating the situation; e.g., to bring out the first,suppose the prisoners have a common bond, e.g., they are friends or they are political prisoners with a shared social commitment, or they are neighbours and face a future in the same community; to bring out the philosophical scepticism, involved, suppose the prisoner with a tarnished record offers the other security against default, and so on. The question of the character of human interests and preferences and the extent of their determination by the social context in which they occur is fundamental to the whole question of social and economic arrangements, and also accordingly to arguments for the State on the basis of human propensities. A major assumption underlying prevailing (non-Marxist) economics and associated political theory, is that the interests and preferences, as summed up in a preference ranking or utility function, of each human that is taken to count is an independent parameter, which depends neither on the preference rankings of others nor on the social context in which that human operates. While the individuals and firms of mainstream economic theory do, by definition, satisfy the independence requirements, and while there is very substantial cultural pressure on consumers to conform (through advertising, education, popular media), very many humans do not conform, and the extent of cultural pressure towards privatisation itself belies the naturalness of this independence. And^sufficiently many interest-interdependent people in a small community (which is not thoroughly impoverished) is normally enough, given their social influence, to avoid or resolve, by cooperation, the types of Prisoners' Dilemma situations that appear to count in favour of the State. 5. WHY THE DILEMMA ARGUMENTS CANNOT SUCCEED.' What the Dilemma-based case for the State has to show - what never has been shown - is that there are outstanding Dilemma situations, which are relevant and important, and also qaA'-fkc-l' oft damaging if unresolved,\but resolve^/by State intervention, and only so A A- jZAz-zv (optimally) resolved, and finally.that in the course of so resolving these Dilemma situations, worse situation than those that are resolved are not thereby induced. These complex conditions cannot be satisfied, if they can be satisfied at all, in a way that is not question begging. For several of the conditions are value dependent (e.g. what is important, damaging, optional, worse) and involve considerations about which reasonable parties can differ. The selection of Dilemmas^provides an example^: after all there are many such Dilemmas (e.g. as to environmental degradation, of overexploitation, of l/«o|on<c or family, feuds) which are considered beyond the sphere of the State or not worthy of State attention. There are now grounds for concluding that the conditions cannot be satisfied at all. For many of the arguments using Prisoners' Dilemma games, Hobbes' and Hume's arguments for the State and Hardin's "Tragedy of the Commons" for instance, turn out when properly formalised to consist not just of a single game but of a sequence of such games, to be more adequately represented by what is called a supergame. But in many such sequential Prisoners' Dilemma games, rational "cooperation" can occur, even assuming separated players with purely egoistic interests?^ For what sequential games permit that isolated games exclude, is that players' actions may be dependent upon past performance of other players. This dependence effectively removes one extremely unrealistic self-containment assumption from Dilemma situations, that individuals act in totally isolated ways, not learning from past social interaction. In such supergames then, no intervention is required. 7 Undoubtedly some Dilemmas are resolved by "intervention", e.g. by allowing the prisoners to get in touch so that they find they are neighbours or that they can really cooperate. Equally important, and equally independent of the State, is the matter of breaking down the adversary, or game, situation so the prisoners do not act as competitors but are prepared to cooperate. Informational input may also be important, e.g. news that each prisoner has a good record of adhering, or if not is prepared to stake collateral, etc. A Nor is force or threat of force required as an incentive to guarantee optimal strategies : a range of other inducements and incentives they be required in recalcitrant cases), and is known (should is used even by the State, e.g. But at no stage is the State gifts, deprivation, social pressure, etc. required to make these arrangements: much as some real Prisoners’ Dilemmas are resolved by work of Amnesty International, so voluntary organisations can be formed to detect and deal with Prisoners' Dilemma situations where they are not already catered for. And in fact communal and cooperative organisation did resolve Prisoners' Dilemma-type situations historically, for example in the case of the Commons. In sum, here also replacement works. There are no important Dilemma situations, it seems, where the State is essential. The State has been thought to be essential because of certain influential false dichotomies; for example, that all behaviour that is not egoistic is altruistic (but altruistic behaviour is uncommon, and "irrational"), that the only way of allocating goods, apart from profit-directed markets - which tend to deal abysmally with collective goods - is through State control.1- But it is quite evident that there are other methods of allocation, both economic (e.g. exchange, through traditional markets, based on supply costs) and social (e.g. by cooperatives, clubs). Lastly, introduction of the State to resolve some Dilemma situations has very extensive effects', many of them negative, so that the gains made, if any, in so resolving Dilemma1 situations, appear to be substantially outweighed by the costs involved. For there are the many evil aspects of the typical State to put in the balance. As regards Dilemma situations, entry of the State with its authority showing may not help but may worsen some situations, and more /A of important, new Dilemmas may be initiated by State activity, as with the working example, or differently with the State as a further player (since the State may engage in whaling, have access to a commons, etc.). also to further arguments against the State. These points lead 8 6. THE SECOND WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM PROBLEM RECURRENCE^/ The solution by the State to problems of social organisation repeats or generates in more dangerous form the very problems introduction of the State was designed to solve, including new Dilemmas. Suppose, for instance, the secular State really were introduced in order to solve Prisoners' Dilemmas - introduced as opposed to inherited from the religious State and the Church, and maintained to prop up privilege and foster objectives that are not in its communities' interests - then the array of States generates new Prisoners' Dilemmas, which there is no Super-State to resolve by coercion. Suppose, as the myth has it, the State really were introduced in the interest of order and stability and to curb violence; then the arrays of States resulting more than negates these advantages, with instability, disorder and violence on a grander scale than before the 14 emergence of modem secular States. 7. THE THIRD WAY : THE OVERSHOOT ARGUMENT,FROM THE INADEQUACY OF INSTITUTIONAL CONTROLS ON STATE POWER. Having ceded a monopoly on power to the State, in order to resolve some dilemmas, some of them arising from an oontrols or balances the power of the inequitable distribution of power, what State? A Super-State. And its power? There is a vicious infinite regress if the reply to the question "What controls the controller?" is "a further controller".^ The only promising way of avoiding this problem - other routes lead (even more) directly to totalitarianism - is by having the first of these controllers, the State, answer back to those in whose interests it is allegedly established, those of the society or group of communities it controls. implies democratic methods of some kind. Others go further: This 'democracy Lis] the only known means to achieve this control, the only known device by which , 16 we can try to protect ourselves against the misuse of political power . In this event, control has mostly failed. Democracy is extremely attenuated, even in those states that claim to practice it. The exercise of power in modern "democratic" states - much increased power reaching deep into peoples' lives, power which has passed to certain political elites and is directed at the attainment of such objectives as economic growth and material "progress" - is often channelled through 'non-elected authority' and 'is not democratic in the traditional meaning of the term'.In any case, indirect democratic and other institutional checks are tenuous in as much as they depend ultimately on the toleration of those who have direct control of the forces of the State. Experience seems to show that such toleration will only be shown so long as democratic procedures deliver results that are not too disagreeable, that are broadly in accord with what those who control the coercive power are prepared 9 to accept. (Toleration of such a tamed democracy then brings benefits to those who hold power, especially the cover of legitimation). But institutional /I checks which operate only insofar as a "system" acceptable to the powerholders is not seriously challenged, and which depend ultimately upon the toleration of those checked, are not really checks at all. n. ? ’■ The problem of controlling the power of the State, u/surping and preventing the State once established from usurping further power and exceeding its mandate, is only satisfactorily solved by not ceding power to the State in the first place. The best way of avoiding the evils of accumulated power is the anarchist way, of blocking its accumulation. 8. THE FOURTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM FREEDOM AND AUTONOMY. responsible for actions deliberately undertaken. A person is This premiss can be derived, if need be, from the notion of a person as a moral agent. Taking responsibility for one's actions implies, among other things, making the final decision about what to do on each occasion oneself; not acting simply on direction from outside,£»/ A determining how to act, what ought to be done, oneself; not handing that decision over to someone or something else. It implies, that is, moral autonomy. Autonomy in turn implies, what responsibility requires, freedom. For the autonomous being, endorsing its own decisions and principles, is not subject to the will of another. another so directs. Even if it does what another directs, it is not because In being free, not of constraints (both physical and self-determined), but of the constraints and will of others, an autonomous being is morally free. A necessary feature of the State is authority over those in its territory (under its de facto jurisdiction), the right to rule and impose its will upon them. Such authority backed by force is incompatible with moral autonomy and with freedom. An autonomous being, though it may act in accordance with some imperatives of the State, those it independently endorses, is bound to reject such (a claim to) authority, and therewith the State. In sum, being a person, as also being autonomous and being free, implies rejecting the authority of the State, and so not acknowledging the State; that is, each condition on ike. a >18 personhood implies anarchism. It is possible to combine autonomy with an extremely attenuated "State", one based on on-going unanimous direct democracy. But such a "State", with no independent authority, is not really a state, since any participant can dissolve it at any time, and so constitutes no threat to anarchism. On the contrary, such direct democratic methods are part of the very stuff of anarchistic organisation. 10 9. THE FIFTH WAY : THE ARGUMENT FROM ANARCHIST EXPERIENCE. The replacement argument enables construction of a model of a society functioning without the State, of a practically possible Stateless world; which shows that the State is not necessary. But it can always be claimed - even if the claim can seldom or ever be made good - that the modelling leaves out some crucial feature of real world circumstances, rendering it inapplicable. The gap may be closed by appeal to the independently valuable argument from experience, that at various times and places anarchism has been tested and has worked. Examples of such Stateless organisation suffice to show that crucial real world features have not been omitted. There are many examples of nonindustrialised societies which were, or are, 19 anarchistic, there is the rich experience of the Spanish collectives, and there is much localised experience of self-management and small-scale anarchistic 20 arrangements within the State structure. 10. THE EMERGING CHARACTER OF ANARCHISM AND ITS ORGANISATION. The arguments outlined, predominantly theoretical, inform the practical, revealing the options open for anarchism, courses of action in superannuating the State and for transition to a stateless Society, and so on. For example, spontaneous anarchism — according to which organisation is unnecessary and social arrange­ ments will arise spontaneously, and will be ushered in during the revolution without any prior organisation — is a position which is not viable and could not endure, because it makes none of the requisite replacements upon which durable supersession of the State depends. The sort of anarchist society deJintafe. which these theoretical arguments will certainly be organised, but the A organisation will not be compulsory, and will eschew authoritarian measures (and, by the overshoot argument, will reject transition by any strengthening of the centralised State), relying heavily on voluntary cooperation and direct democracy. The society which emerges will be much as Bakunin and Kropotkin sometimes pictured it. It will be based on smaller-scale decentralised communities, for otherwise such arrangements as community replacement of State welfare arrangements, control of their environment, removal of Prisoners' Dilemmas, and participatory democracy, will work less satisfactorily. Communities will be federated and control will be bottom-up, not merely by representation and subject to a downward system of command. Within each community there will not be great discrepancies in the distribution of wealth Zand property, and no highly concentrated economic power. A community will be a rather equalitarian group, sharing in much that is communally owned or not owned at all. FOOTNOTES 1. Bakunin on Anarchy (edited S. Dolgoff), Allen & Unwin, London, 1973, especially p. 139. Much else in this paper, e.g. the distinction between the State and Society, also derives from Bakunin. 2. That is, proper elaboration of this argument takes each facet of generally beneficial state activity - there is only a (relatively small) finite number to consider - and shows how it can be replaced in one way or another. course uniquely determined. Replacement is not of Lines such replacements can take are indicated in much anarchist (and self-management) literature, consider especially, but not uncritically, P. Kropotkin, Mutual Aid. New York University Press, 1972, and also his Fields, Factories and Workshops, second edition, Nelson, London, 1913, and The Conquest of Bread, Chapman and Hall, London, 1913. 3. On these points see, e.g. Kropotkin's Revolutionary Pamphlets (edited S. Baldwin), Dover Publications, New York, 1970, p. 206 ff.; also P.O. Proudhon, Confessions of a Revolutionary. For recent discussion of, and practical examples of, replacements for arbitration and law court procedures (but for right-leaning anarchism), see C.D. Stone, 'Some reflections on arbitrating our way to anarchy', Anarchism(<y>»~7 Nomos, XIX), New York University Press, 1978, pp. 213-4. 4. Arguments of this type are sometimes said to represent 'the strongest case that can be made for the desirability of the State' Anarchy and Cooperation, Wiley, London, 1976, p. 9). (M. Taylor, To cover all arguments of the type, and to avoid repetition of the phrase 'variants of' and disputes as to whether certain arguments such as those of Hume and of Olson involve Prisoners' Dilemma situations, 'Prisoner's Dilemma' is used in a wide sense to include not merely single n-person Prisoners' Dilemma games, but for example, games where the payoffs are not merely eristic (as with both Hobbes and Hume) and where such games are iterated. As the bracketed clauses in the text indicate, there are two types of case, not sharply separated and both of che same logical form - those where people do not contribute to supply themselves with, or with "optimum" quantities of, a "collective good" (e.g. security, order, sewage), and those where people do not restrain themselves to maintain, or maintain "optimum quantities of, some already available "collective good" (e.g. commons, 2 unpolluted streams, whales, wilderness). That received arguments of all these types involves Prisoners' Dilemma situations (in the wide sense) is argued, in effect, in Taylor, op. cit. and elsewhere. An easier introduction to the material covered by Taylor, which also surveys other important literature, is given in the final chapter of R. Abrams, Foundations of Political Analysis, Columbia University Press, New York, 5. 1980. An important matter the two player game does not illustrate is the relevance of population size in the arguments for the State. But size is not decisive (see, e.g., Taylor, chapter 2), and the issue can be avoided (or relocated) by organisation into smaller communities. The figures given in the matrix are illustrative only; for inequalities which suffice for a Dilemma situation, see Taylor, p. 5. 6. It is similarly bizarre that there should be outcomes that the State alone is said to be able to arrange, but not mere social cooperation, when the State is (as on many theories) the result or reflection of social cooperation. 7. This important point is much elaborated in V. and R. Routley, 'Social Theories, Self Management, and Environmental Problems' in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. 8. As a result of G. Hardin's "Travesty of the Commons", historical evidence has been assembled which reveals how far Hardin's "Commons" diverges from historic commons; see, in particular, A. Roberts, The Self- Managing Environment, Allison & Ba<sby, London, 1979, chapter 10, <A./ but also Routley, op. cit., p. 285 and pp. 329-332. Similar points apply as regards many other Dilemma situations. ( ' 'In the experimental studies of the prisoner's dilemma game . > approximately half of the participants choose a cooperative strategy even when they know for certain that the other player will cooperate'. Abrams, op. cit., p. 308. ). Cf. the discussion in Taylor, op. cit., p. 93. 10. This important result is established in Taylor, op. cit., for a number of critical cases, though not generally; see, e.g. p. 32 but especially chapter 5. 11. Such moves have proved valuable in reducing the State's role in legal prosecution, and in eliminating courtroom procedures, including cases where the State is one of the "adversaries". 12. Both the false dichotomies cited are commonplace, not to say rife, in modern economic and political theorising. Both are to be found in Abram's final chapter, for example, and the first (with an attempt to plaster over the gap with a definition) in Taylor. For a further criticism of such false dichotomies, see Routley, op.cit.,pp.250 13. For instance, a certain social escapism : one escapes one's social roles and is enabled to concentrate on private affairs or just to laze. Or so it may appear : for in reality anyone who works, works long and often alienated hours to pay for this apparent escapism and to cover the high costs of frequently inadequate State activity. 14. The argument, to be found in Bakunin, is elaborated a little in Taylor, op. cit., chapter 7. A related argument, also in Bakunin, is from the way in which emergence of the State compromises and even closes off nonstate solutions to problems of social organisation in adjoining regions. X 15. The question is in effect Plato's question, and the regress is reminiscent of his Third Man argument. 16. K.R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Enemies, Vol. II. Fourth edition (revised), Routledge and Regan Paul, London, 1962, p. 129 and p. 127. The (overshoot) problem is, according to Popper 'the most fundamental problem of all politics: the control of the controller, of the dangerous accumulation of power represented in the State1, Marxists never had 'any well-considered view' 'upon which' (p. 129). 17. V. Lauber, 'Ecology, politics and liberal democracy', Government and Opposition 13 ( 1978), 199-2 17: see p. 209 and p. 211 . 18. The argument, outlined by Bakunin, is much elaborated in R.P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, Harper & Row, New York, 1970. No argument is however without assumptions, which are open to dispute. Wolff's argument, for example, is disputed by G. Wall, 'Philosophical anarchism revised' Nomos XIX, op. cit., p. 273 ff. While theoretical arguments help outline the general shape of social and also economic arrangements they do not determine them completely, no detailed blueprint. they offer Accordingly what emerges is not a particular form of anarchism, for instance anarchist communism, but a more experimental and pluralistic anarchism, such as was instituted in the Spanish collectives. 19. Documented in The Anarchist Collectives (edited S. Dolgoff), Free Life Editions, New York, 1974. 20. As B. Martin boldly asserts, 'The advantages of self-management and alternative lifestyles are many and significant. And these alternatives are entirely feasible: there is plenty of evidence and experience to support operates. their superiority over the present way society The obstacles to self-management and alternative life styles are powerful vested interests and institutional resistance to change', Changing the Cogs, Friends of the Earth, Canberra, 1979, p- 6. 21. As sketched in some of the material already cited, for example, Routley, 284 ff.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 14, item 2051: Irrefutability of anarchism Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Val+Plumwood&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Plumwood</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Description An account of the resource Two copies of paper (typescript), with handwritten emendations and annotations. Title in collection finding aid: RS: Irrefutability of anarchism (2 tss). [28] leaves. Two copies of paper (typescript), with handwritten emendations and annotations. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 14, item 2051 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5b35e7e" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:5b35e7e</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [28] leaves. 21.99 MB. Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Desk Top Subject The topic of the resource Two copies of paper (typescript), with handwritten emendations and annotations. Paper published, Routley R and Routley V (1982) 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Social alternatives, 2(3): 23-29. Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Desk Top Box 14: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/68d29df80f9d20e41a77ef7fdb412966.pdf f2093594e525a6ba4c68813d0f8e0eb4 PDF Text Text GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY. ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be improved with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the back of moneying economics and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the Greenhouse problematique, upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches, range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, the substantially new socio-economic arrangements soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches, and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forests for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. But there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among those, a result of the increases of “greenhouse” gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture. The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. �2 Diagram 1. Spectrum of approaches: Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action1 Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. Breifly too the outcome is that there is no easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with argument. Investigative philosophy is applied philosophy, investigating arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes, but outside normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain arguments for severe dislocation pprobabilities, as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rational decision formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, and doomsday arguments. 1 Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. �3 The main run of arguments to considerable action are neo-Malthusian in character. The general form of these arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter encounters limits, with severe effects. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: limits growth parameter time exponential growth pattern J encountering limits subsequent varying unstable behavior The limits are often imposed just by finitude, e.g. finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General Malthusian arguments loom in the background in what follows. But a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following anthropic doomsday argument:• There is some probability that the Gaean “greenhouse effect”, generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or Lesser Venus Prospect, premiss). • That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans (Catastrophe Prospect). • Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans, such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (Catastrophe Probability). That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probability will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. �4 It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself is an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but one of a substantial raft of arguments that should have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual string, so to say, from the inconspicuous cosmological tail. Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:• Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but who -will exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) • Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the moral irrationality of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. Diagram 2. Macro-climatic setting. Bands: all boundaries fuzzy mean global temperature (degrees C) escalating emissions Disequilibrium: Venus prospect increasing dislocation possible adaptation increasing dislocation thermonuclear war disequilibrium: Mars prospect �5 1860 1990 The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear wars is entirely in place and indeed on alert. The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemo-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these nuclear arrangements - both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irrational, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested2 - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.3 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts, for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some “developing” nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than being the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggestions for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick most easily achieved no doubt on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backburning against out-of- control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, irrational expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that many who have some role in decision making For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace series in Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National UniversityGlobal warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. �6 (including both experts and politicians), lack a firm grasp on decision-making in conditions of uncertainty or possible risk.4 The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social paradigm, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 2 Broad policy responses to the Greenhouse problematique. Dominant paradigm Alternative paradigm Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, all the dominant approaches. • Procrastination, the prevailing response. In fact the main gooon mental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or “wait-and-see” as it is more benignly known.5 The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings in even the most elaborate general circulation models, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases, it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more “research”. It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act6 But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely consequences are also known. Theoretical consideration, have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outlines of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline, rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial Following Knight, some economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numberable probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards the global greenhouse effect. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, also say that ‘decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable’ (p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of ‘adaptation’. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymumies, for instance, scientists begin ‘threatening mankind with a rather swift “bad death’” as the universe random ‘Thus m. Aber, on ‘balant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves’ (Bernard p.9). �7 small-scale models of the Greenhouse effect in action. For example a city such as MexicoCity, which is situated in the bowl-like valley is placed in an environment traps heat as well as pollution. The ecological affects, like the human affects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or amelated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many scientists, that Greenhouse difficulties have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed even is the Villiers conference and statement of 1986 (e.g. Pittoch ....). Actually there have been Greenhouse warmings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inaction. Nor is any action of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climate logists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine Nature, not noted for its green sympathies, recorded that ‘the release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, concemally, the most important environmental issue in the world today’ (May ? 1975). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserting that ‘the government must start dealing with this problem now’. They meant the United States government. “The” government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then scientists have been emphasizing that the greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the problem has happened. There has been more than a decade of inaction , during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive action disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to bark up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or may be, as some more reactionary modal-managering academics would have - a problem or two. Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that “scientific activity” is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not done in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making order uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unreputable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. ‘Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing ever problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found.’ Natural scientists �including dematologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous-reduction-toconlittainable-certainty trip. ‘This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption’ (Cyort and DeGroot p.l). But there are several classes of problematic situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty cannot be discarded by first, reduction strategeness or otherwise, notably:• inheritantly probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; • essentially unpredictable situations (which may be deterministic) such as those now under investigation chaos theory; • presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may turn into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumption being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not; there are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class. The standard approach of too many research scientists is a pathetic begging-bowl posture: Supply more funding so we can go on researching until we obtain certainty.7 There are some severe problems with this standard response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty if achieved may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non additive (non additive) and so incapable of delivering stable results over slightly fluctuating in strict data. The standard response is methodologically unsound. • Adaptation, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy ‘that tends to be favoured by most economists’ is an adaptive strategy: “Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance” We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strain [themselves] ... more widely adopted... ’ (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly restricted “adaptation” that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting them. It is assumed that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt these practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, “Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and 7 It does not seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money (even more per article) that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect is because their research results could, if unfavorable, act a serious drag on the industrial establishment. They are not going to be funded to delegitimize modem industrial society. �9 so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance.” Such “adaptative agriculture”, the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is antienvironmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't back natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you. Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism badaptation. Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say medaptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that unilateral action to prevent a warning is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation unattainble. Both contentions open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the World's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant domains) backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations could make a major difference. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential grown economists. In any case, international agreements such as those in whaling and Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptation proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force societies towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertainties are alleged to produce. Characteristic of adaptation too is a minimisation of the extent of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a rational course of action (instead of the seemingly irrational course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the law end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4°C - in a setting, furthermore, where fractions of a degree centigrade may well be linked ot macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, an average, on increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect, yielding a 4°C temperature increase.8 8 Sources. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas where atmospheric propostems really matter and whose present increase is excessive. �10 The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacities of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cities, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust-bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse conditions. The mid continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average, under greenhouse conditions they could be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dustbowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern com) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again. A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. • Intervention, high-tech Gaean engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include • New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like childrens' play. • Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, are far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. • Regulation, controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself, not so bureaucratically popular under that presentation in these latter days of economic irrationalism, is of course transparadigmatic, where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally-constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled prevention in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in �11 growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives, in effect without far-reaching systems and a devological adjustment. While such adjustment may be rational, it is unlikely. Power structures have too much to lose.9 This is an opposite point to record the chauvinism and environmental shallowness of the Greenhouse debate. Like heart disease and cancer, the Greenhouse effect is gaining much discussion and some funding because it just may severely effect the affluent, affluent people and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in North America especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global worming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex ecosystems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increase in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural environments and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests wetlands, maritime environments. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed (cf. Keeton pp.763-4). Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change,... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities Holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, to make much difference acting or their own. Some are too beg even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concerte. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers, as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. �12 of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Brown p.10). Of course the immediate climate patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. When natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However ‘several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn’ (p.19 ref?)10 Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behavior (as distinct from radioactivity levels) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be no similar recovery under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the impact,11 disequilibrium induced. An eventual longterm return to some different equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the “year” to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. Stability is defined in physics in terms of return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. �13 temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.12 Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at... in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometers of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees 13 The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early greenhouse or even pollution effects.14 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose effects are enhanced on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). The relevant point is that these features are likely to be accelerated given the additional impact of greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. There are several major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the delicacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is • nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear Winter. But there are of course other severe shocks the planet could suffer than those chemo-nuclear warfare, some human induced, some a “chance” matter of the planets' position in space, namely • a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentation (see Leslie) • a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertainties, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not rationally.. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblematic lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertainties do The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Reported by Recher on Earthworm. Thus coastline vegetational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. �14 appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate, ascribable to: • excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, etc, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagration.; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in desiccative systems under stress or strain. • excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others), [describe briefly] Such non-additive, or nonlinear, effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, are bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example. With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reactions and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected doubting of carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years15. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixation of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% 15 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO2 exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminority was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proposition of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). �15 bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits to continuation of present developmental practices. Now there can be no rational confidence with respect to complex dissipative systems - about the behavior of which we presently know comparatively little - that no other nonadditive effects will no be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essentially unexperienced and substantially unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from past times of such elevated temperatures as Green house effects will lead to, to draw upon. ‘There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years’. There is experience of much colder periods. ‘During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents’ (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in a warm interglacial period), ‘a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization’ (Schneider p.6) It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision makings, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small, though experience implies it is not always so but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing a strong antipathy for environmentalists.16 Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalation.17 ‘Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, Coupled with this, there is a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There is also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine barring to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is ‘tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable’, virtually indestructable (p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also 88? [detail] �16 finding a suitable’ destructive agent to bring about a ‘doom scenario’ ‘turns out to be an almost insoluble problem’ (p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all “life”, ‘down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria’ (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental ‘doomsday scenario’ is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scientific fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of ‘the US National Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own distinguished members, assisted by forty-eight other scientists chosen from those expert in the effects of nuclear explosions and all things subsequent to them’ (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the distinguished expert report the findings that ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter.. Not for the first time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground18 considerably in the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaia in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... Shifting ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honestly and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a caricuture of his own previous position to critics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever ‘fabrication’ which it was not); that it is ‘an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess (85 p.53). �17 It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp5354). The argument to the lesser Venus path, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a discipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present balance by a combination of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetation complanes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composition. TABLE 1. Substance Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen T R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Planetary comparisons (principal components per cent). Equilibrium Earth Venus Lifeless Earth Mass Present Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 95 2.7 0.03 79 0 1 trace 0.1 trace 0.1 0.13 2 21 1 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290±50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, pp37 and p.39. �18 The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behavior as locals increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress they system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire into what evidence we have on this case. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaia hypothesis). But for the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially the Earth would not be blessed with its present life-benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltios and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on, perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for what of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, but the mean global temperatures have exhibited no corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected consistency in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plants, [detail] Lovelock and collaberaters have devised an elementary daisy world model which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing energy input. The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. diagram Q Similarly several of the well-known chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sulphur, sodium and so forth depends for their maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as forests, which is severely disturbed then the cycle itself could be disrupted. There is some probability furthermore that the foregoing changes will disturb crucial equilibrium systems and chemical cycles. Some of these feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium by natural ecosystems (an example is Lovelock's daisy world model, which becomes unstable when temperature rises too high). Instability could ensue under disturbance [explain, include Greenhouse holism]. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness19 is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Natural richness is the main richness, much exceeding human artifice. �19 The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is nonzero,20 and indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows: there is a decent probability that a modest Gaia hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So containing probabilities, there at least a nonneglizible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it fast and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select text crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy nonelite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will breakdown and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.21 Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are aptly rarely Daedelian 4. The Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and the likely demise of homo sapiens, spp. economicus.. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: if anything can go wrong, it will, From logical theories of probability such as Carnap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be characteristed, to some extent, by restruction to physical models). The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the “bus analogy”, see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this opposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaians control systems. �20 was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting..22 Certain crucial qualifications are required:• Replacement of the certain (certainlistic) conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: namely, it probably will. • Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of ‘anything’ or ‘something’ put ‘some thing ... given a chancy situation’. The modified formulation is accordingly the following Mini-Furphy result:23 if some thing can genuinely go wrong, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. Here ‘chancy’ means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparatively low probability vis-a-vis its alternatives. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary bad situation, a suitable disaster. Let the possibility of D's happening something's going wrong - be represented by a non-zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small, otherwise the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the features that render the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D < C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which take the following form where there are n alternative hypotheses hi,...,hn including h: Pv(h) x P(i < h) P(h < i) X P(hr) X P(i < hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, is in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.24 P(h < i) is the probability of h 22 23 24 For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the “law”, which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aviation Mechanics, see the Encyclopaedia Americana', Chase's initial formulation in a 1955 issue read ‘If an aircraft part can be installed in correctly, someone will install it the way”. This little theorem was originally more accurately entitled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. This section is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie; for Leslie's debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his legitimate doomsday apprehensions. The next not indicates the limited extent to which Leslie's arguments are endorsed. The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. �21 given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, <, symbolises the condition involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: p(D < C) __________ P(D) x P(C < D)__________ P(D) x P(C < D) + P(D*) x P(C < D*)' = The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: Cases D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say Vd m/l, say 1/dl of outcome relative chance that C As it is the relative chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, I has some modest size; specifically let I exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D < C), is d x 1/d d x 1/d + (l-d)/dl where k = • 1 1+k _ “ That is» and P(D < C) | y when k < 1, i.e. when I [ p(D < C) = where k = 1, . Thud D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when I is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, In effect we shall look at the form P(h < i) = --------------- < h)------------------------------P(h) X P(i < h) + XP(hr) X P(i < hr)’ n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes ‘been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results’ thus: ‘This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common’ (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. �P(D [ C) 22 d x m d x m + (1-d) x m/l 1 1 + k’ 1 as before. That is m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little Furphy theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), they continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system ( in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the initial probability of D*, human “success”, is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Application Table 1. Cases D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, VlOO, i.e. .01 1/100 x l/l ofC Then the probability of human decline given .01 x ,01 P(D < C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1 !/2 , when I > 99. �23 It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that I is likely much much larger, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. a posteriori probable in the usual jargon. There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously that, of the Club of Rome) Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption,.... It is appropriate for estimate posterier probability relative to anyone of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterier probability is assessed relative to such matters as our being alive, humans being thus and so (Leslie's reference class), this being present energy use, present wast output, present forest destruction and so forth.25 The anthropic argument considers the environmentally invidious situation of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as estimated for instance through energy consumption. Let us consider the prospects given additional information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, is alive now. Chart: Our present population predictment on the two scenerios. Demise scenerio “Success” scenerio - representative zjs human numbers human numbers On of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropriate choice of relative class. For, the relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, e.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes cuh as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. �24 Humans have got themselves - to some extent put themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious and unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their pollution are both excessive - and all chose and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponential curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponential, with the present in the near vertical growth phase: graphs Many other similarly shaped graphs26 could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as methane, and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster. Those curves are tightly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of hugh urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in turn on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. 26 All the graphs exhibited are drawn from Boyden. �25 Nor, as observed, is there much effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other Malthusian factors; they are becoming very disasterprone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:• manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfard, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a min-Big-Bang; see Leslie). • Accumulated risk factors, such as the hugh relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc..27 Despite the ideological obstacles, enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change, major efforts should be put into reducing both these types of risks. Philosophers could have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. 5. What ought to be done about Greenhouse? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to rational Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge is not all that there is to try, that should rationally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and all that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing human-induced 27 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, neo-Malthusian and probabilistic in particular. �26 output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound upon temperature of importance, which can serve to supply a significant limit as output. That bound - which reduces risk taking by confining encountered situations to those where there is some past experiential basis - is given by estimated temperatures during Altithermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about 1°C. Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions beginning easily in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth paradigm; it means expensive re- and deindustrialisation. It is unlikely. Final corollary: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already guessed as much from the latest...... in the long history of human wars. References H.W. Bernard, The Greenhouse Effect, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Murphy's Law. Book Two, Magnum, Methuen, ... S. Boyden, Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, State of the World 1989, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic Theory, Rowman & Littfield, New Jersey, 1987. ‘Developing policies for responding to climatic change’, Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. Keeton, J. Leslie, ‘Risking and World's End’, Bulletin of the Curiadian Nuclear Society 10(3) (1989) 1-6; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, ‘Is the end of the world nigh?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaia. A new look at life on Earth, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, ‘Are we destabilising world climate?’, The Ecologist 15(1985) 52-55. �27 J.Lovelock, ‘Man and Gaia’, The Earth Report Monitoring the Battle for Our Environment, (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilgard) Mitchell Benzley, London, 1988, 51-64. R. and V. Routley, ‘Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquirey 21(1978) 133R. Routley, ‘Ultralogic as universal?’ reprinted as an Appendix in Exploring Meinong's Jungle, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider ‘Not to decide is to decide’, in Greenhouse 1988: Planning for Climate Change (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R.P. Turco and others, ‘Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-1292. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY. ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be improved with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the back of moneying economics and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the Greenhouse problematique, upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches, range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, the substantially new socio-economic arrangements soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches, and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forests for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. But there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among those, a result of the increases of “greenhouse” gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture. The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. 2 Diagram 1. Spectrum of approaches: Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action1 Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. Breifly too the outcome is that there is no easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with argument. Investigative philosophy is applied philosophy, investigating arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes, but outside normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain arguments for severe dislocation pprobabilities, as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rational decision formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, and doomsday arguments. 1 Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. 3 The main run of arguments to considerable action are neo-Malthusian in character. The general form of these arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter encounters limits, with severe effects. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: limits growth parameter time exponential growth pattern J encountering limits subsequent varying unstable behavior The limits are often imposed just by finitude, e.g. finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General Malthusian arguments loom in the background in what follows. But a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following anthropic doomsday argument:• There is some probability that the Gaean “greenhouse effect”, generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or Lesser Venus Prospect, premiss). • That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans (Catastrophe Prospect). • Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans, such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (Catastrophe Probability). That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probability will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. 4 It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself is an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but one of a substantial raft of arguments that should have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual string, so to say, from the inconspicuous cosmological tail. Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:• Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but who -will exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) • Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the moral irrationality of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. Diagram 2. Macro-climatic setting. Bands: all boundaries fuzzy mean global temperature (degrees C) escalating emissions Disequilibrium: Venus prospect increasing dislocation possible adaptation increasing dislocation thermonuclear war disequilibrium: Mars prospect 5 1860 1990 The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear wars is entirely in place and indeed on alert. The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemo-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these nuclear arrangements - both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irrational, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested2 - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.3 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts, for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some “developing” nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than being the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggestions for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick most easily achieved no doubt on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backburning against out-of- control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, irrational expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that many who have some role in decision making For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace series in Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National UniversityGlobal warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. 6 (including both experts and politicians), lack a firm grasp on decision-making in conditions of uncertainty or possible risk.4 The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social paradigm, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 2 Broad policy responses to the Greenhouse problematique. Dominant paradigm Alternative paradigm Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, all the dominant approaches. • Procrastination, the prevailing response. In fact the main gooon mental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or “wait-and-see” as it is more benignly known.5 The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings in even the most elaborate general circulation models, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases, it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more “research”. It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act6 But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely consequences are also known. Theoretical consideration, have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outlines of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline, rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial Following Knight, some economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numberable probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards the global greenhouse effect. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, also say that ‘decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable’ (p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of ‘adaptation’. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymumies, for instance, scientists begin ‘threatening mankind with a rather swift “bad death’” as the universe random ‘Thus m. Aber, on ‘balant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves’ (Bernard p.9). 7 small-scale models of the Greenhouse effect in action. For example a city such as MexicoCity, which is situated in the bowl-like valley is placed in an environment traps heat as well as pollution. The ecological affects, like the human affects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or amelated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many scientists, that Greenhouse difficulties have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed even is the Villiers conference and statement of 1986 (e.g. Pittoch ....). Actually there have been Greenhouse warmings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inaction. Nor is any action of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climate logists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine Nature, not noted for its green sympathies, recorded that ‘the release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, concemally, the most important environmental issue in the world today’ (May ? 1975). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserting that ‘the government must start dealing with this problem now’. They meant the United States government. “The” government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then scientists have been emphasizing that the greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the problem has happened. There has been more than a decade of inaction , during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive action disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to bark up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or may be, as some more reactionary modal-managering academics would have - a problem or two. Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that “scientific activity” is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not done in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making order uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unreputable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. ‘Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing ever problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found.’ Natural scientists including dematologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous-reduction-toconlittainable-certainty trip. ‘This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption’ (Cyort and DeGroot p.l). But there are several classes of problematic situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty cannot be discarded by first, reduction strategeness or otherwise, notably:• inheritantly probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; • essentially unpredictable situations (which may be deterministic) such as those now under investigation chaos theory; • presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may turn into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumption being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not; there are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class. The standard approach of too many research scientists is a pathetic begging-bowl posture: Supply more funding so we can go on researching until we obtain certainty.7 There are some severe problems with this standard response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty if achieved may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non additive (non additive) and so incapable of delivering stable results over slightly fluctuating in strict data. The standard response is methodologically unsound. • Adaptation, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy ‘that tends to be favoured by most economists’ is an adaptive strategy: “Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance” We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strain [themselves] ... more widely adopted... ’ (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly restricted “adaptation” that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting them. It is assumed that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt these practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, “Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and 7 It does not seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money (even more per article) that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect is because their research results could, if unfavorable, act a serious drag on the industrial establishment. They are not going to be funded to delegitimize modem industrial society. 9 so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance.” Such “adaptative agriculture”, the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is antienvironmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't back natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you. Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism badaptation. Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say medaptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that unilateral action to prevent a warning is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation unattainble. Both contentions open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the World's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant domains) backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations could make a major difference. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential grown economists. In any case, international agreements such as those in whaling and Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptation proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force societies towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertainties are alleged to produce. Characteristic of adaptation too is a minimisation of the extent of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a rational course of action (instead of the seemingly irrational course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the law end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4°C - in a setting, furthermore, where fractions of a degree centigrade may well be linked ot macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, an average, on increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect, yielding a 4°C temperature increase.8 8 Sources. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas where atmospheric propostems really matter and whose present increase is excessive. 10 The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacities of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cities, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust-bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse conditions. The mid continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average, under greenhouse conditions they could be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dustbowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern com) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again. A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. • Intervention, high-tech Gaean engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include • New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like childrens' play. • Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, are far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. • Regulation, controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself, not so bureaucratically popular under that presentation in these latter days of economic irrationalism, is of course transparadigmatic, where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally-constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled prevention in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in 11 growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives, in effect without far-reaching systems and a devological adjustment. While such adjustment may be rational, it is unlikely. Power structures have too much to lose.9 This is an opposite point to record the chauvinism and environmental shallowness of the Greenhouse debate. Like heart disease and cancer, the Greenhouse effect is gaining much discussion and some funding because it just may severely effect the affluent, affluent people and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in North America especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global worming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex ecosystems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increase in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural environments and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests wetlands, maritime environments. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed (cf. Keeton pp.763-4). Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change,... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities Holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, to make much difference acting or their own. Some are too beg even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concerte. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers, as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. 12 of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Brown p.10). Of course the immediate climate patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. When natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However ‘several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn’ (p.19 ref?)10 Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behavior (as distinct from radioactivity levels) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be no similar recovery under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the impact,11 disequilibrium induced. An eventual longterm return to some different equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the “year” to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. Stability is defined in physics in terms of return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. 13 temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.12 Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at... in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometers of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees 13 The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early greenhouse or even pollution effects.14 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose effects are enhanced on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). The relevant point is that these features are likely to be accelerated given the additional impact of greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. There are several major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the delicacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is • nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear Winter. But there are of course other severe shocks the planet could suffer than those chemo-nuclear warfare, some human induced, some a “chance” matter of the planets' position in space, namely • a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentation (see Leslie) • a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertainties, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not rationally.. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblematic lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertainties do The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Reported by Recher on Earthworm. Thus coastline vegetational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. 14 appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate, ascribable to: • excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, etc, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagration.; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in desiccative systems under stress or strain. • excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others), [describe briefly] Such non-additive, or nonlinear, effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, are bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example. With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reactions and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected doubting of carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years15. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixation of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% 15 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO2 exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminority was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proposition of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). 15 bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits to continuation of present developmental practices. Now there can be no rational confidence with respect to complex dissipative systems - about the behavior of which we presently know comparatively little - that no other nonadditive effects will no be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essentially unexperienced and substantially unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from past times of such elevated temperatures as Green house effects will lead to, to draw upon. ‘There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years’. There is experience of much colder periods. ‘During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents’ (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in a warm interglacial period), ‘a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization’ (Schneider p.6) It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision makings, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small, though experience implies it is not always so but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing a strong antipathy for environmentalists.16 Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalation.17 ‘Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, Coupled with this, there is a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There is also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine barring to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is ‘tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable’, virtually indestructable (p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also 88? [detail] 16 finding a suitable’ destructive agent to bring about a ‘doom scenario’ ‘turns out to be an almost insoluble problem’ (p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all “life”, ‘down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria’ (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental ‘doomsday scenario’ is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scientific fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of ‘the US National Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own distinguished members, assisted by forty-eight other scientists chosen from those expert in the effects of nuclear explosions and all things subsequent to them’ (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the distinguished expert report the findings that ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter.. Not for the first time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground18 considerably in the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaia in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... Shifting ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honestly and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a caricuture of his own previous position to critics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever ‘fabrication’ which it was not); that it is ‘an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess (85 p.53). 17 It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp5354). The argument to the lesser Venus path, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a discipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present balance by a combination of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetation complanes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composition. TABLE 1. Substance Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen T R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Planetary comparisons (principal components per cent). Equilibrium Earth Venus Lifeless Earth Mass Present Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 95 2.7 0.03 79 0 1 trace 0.1 trace 0.1 0.13 2 21 1 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290±50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, pp37 and p.39. 18 The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behavior as locals increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress they system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire into what evidence we have on this case. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaia hypothesis). But for the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially the Earth would not be blessed with its present life-benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltios and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on, perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for what of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, but the mean global temperatures have exhibited no corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected consistency in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plants, [detail] Lovelock and collaberaters have devised an elementary daisy world model which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing energy input. The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. diagram Q Similarly several of the well-known chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sulphur, sodium and so forth depends for their maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as forests, which is severely disturbed then the cycle itself could be disrupted. There is some probability furthermore that the foregoing changes will disturb crucial equilibrium systems and chemical cycles. Some of these feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium by natural ecosystems (an example is Lovelock's daisy world model, which becomes unstable when temperature rises too high). Instability could ensue under disturbance [explain, include Greenhouse holism]. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness19 is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Natural richness is the main richness, much exceeding human artifice. 19 The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is nonzero,20 and indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows: there is a decent probability that a modest Gaia hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So containing probabilities, there at least a nonneglizible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it fast and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select text crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy nonelite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will breakdown and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.21 Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are aptly rarely Daedelian 4. The Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and the likely demise of homo sapiens, spp. economicus.. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: if anything can go wrong, it will, From logical theories of probability such as Carnap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be characteristed, to some extent, by restruction to physical models). The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the “bus analogy”, see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this opposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaians control systems. 20 was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting..22 Certain crucial qualifications are required:• Replacement of the certain (certainlistic) conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: namely, it probably will. • Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of ‘anything’ or ‘something’ put ‘some thing ... given a chancy situation’. The modified formulation is accordingly the following Mini-Furphy result:23 if some thing can genuinely go wrong, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. Here ‘chancy’ means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparatively low probability vis-a-vis its alternatives. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary bad situation, a suitable disaster. Let the possibility of D's happening something's going wrong - be represented by a non-zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small, otherwise the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the features that render the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D < C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which take the following form where there are n alternative hypotheses hi,...,hn including h: Pv(h) x P(i < h) P(h < i) X P(hr) X P(i < hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, is in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.24 P(h < i) is the probability of h 22 23 24 For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the “law”, which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aviation Mechanics, see the Encyclopaedia Americana', Chase's initial formulation in a 1955 issue read ‘If an aircraft part can be installed in correctly, someone will install it the way”. This little theorem was originally more accurately entitled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. This section is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie; for Leslie's debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his legitimate doomsday apprehensions. The next not indicates the limited extent to which Leslie's arguments are endorsed. The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. 21 given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, <, symbolises the condition involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: p(D < C) __________ P(D) x P(C < D)__________ P(D) x P(C < D) + P(D*) x P(C < D*)' = The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: Cases D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say Vd m/l, say 1/dl of outcome relative chance that C As it is the relative chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, I has some modest size; specifically let I exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D < C), is d x 1/d d x 1/d + (l-d)/dl where k = • 1 1+k _ “ That is» and P(D < C) | y when k < 1, i.e. when I [ p(D < C) = where k = 1, . Thud D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when I is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, In effect we shall look at the form P(h < i) = --------------- < h)------------------------------P(h) X P(i < h) + XP(hr) X P(i < hr)’ n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes ‘been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results’ thus: ‘This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common’ (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. P(D [ C) 22 d x m d x m + (1-d) x m/l 1 1 + k’ 1 as before. That is m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little Furphy theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), they continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system ( in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the initial probability of D*, human “success”, is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Application Table 1. Cases D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, VlOO, i.e. .01 1/100 x l/l ofC Then the probability of human decline given .01 x ,01 P(D < C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1 !/2 , when I > 99. 23 It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that I is likely much much larger, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. a posteriori probable in the usual jargon. There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously that, of the Club of Rome) Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption,.... It is appropriate for estimate posterier probability relative to anyone of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterier probability is assessed relative to such matters as our being alive, humans being thus and so (Leslie's reference class), this being present energy use, present wast output, present forest destruction and so forth.25 The anthropic argument considers the environmentally invidious situation of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as estimated for instance through energy consumption. Let us consider the prospects given additional information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, is alive now. Chart: Our present population predictment on the two scenerios. Demise scenerio “Success” scenerio - representative zjs human numbers human numbers On of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropriate choice of relative class. For, the relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, e.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes cuh as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. 24 Humans have got themselves - to some extent put themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious and unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their pollution are both excessive - and all chose and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponential curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponential, with the present in the near vertical growth phase: graphs Many other similarly shaped graphs26 could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as methane, and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster. Those curves are tightly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of hugh urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in turn on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. 26 All the graphs exhibited are drawn from Boyden. 25 Nor, as observed, is there much effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other Malthusian factors; they are becoming very disasterprone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:• manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfard, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a min-Big-Bang; see Leslie). • Accumulated risk factors, such as the hugh relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc..27 Despite the ideological obstacles, enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change, major efforts should be put into reducing both these types of risks. Philosophers could have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. 5. What ought to be done about Greenhouse? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to rational Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge is not all that there is to try, that should rationally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and all that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing human-induced 27 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, neo-Malthusian and probabilistic in particular. 26 output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound upon temperature of importance, which can serve to supply a significant limit as output. That bound - which reduces risk taking by confining encountered situations to those where there is some past experiential basis - is given by estimated temperatures during Altithermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about 1°C. Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions beginning easily in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth paradigm; it means expensive re- and deindustrialisation. It is unlikely. Final corollary: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already guessed as much from the latest...... in the long history of human wars. References H.W. Bernard, The Greenhouse Effect, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Murphy's Law. Book Two, Magnum, Methuen, ... S. Boyden, Western Civilization in Biological Perspective, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, State of the World 1989, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Logical Foundations of Probability, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, Bayesian Analysis and Uncertainty in Economic Theory, Rowman & Littfield, New Jersey, 1987. ‘Developing policies for responding to climatic change’, Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. Keeton, J. Leslie, ‘Risking and World's End’, Bulletin of the Curiadian Nuclear Society 10(3) (1989) 1-6; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, ‘Is the end of the world nigh?’, The Philosophical Quarterly, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaia. A new look at life on Earth, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, ‘Are we destabilising world climate?’, The Ecologist 15(1985) 52-55. 27 J.Lovelock, ‘Man and Gaia’, The Earth Report Monitoring the Battle for Our Environment, (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilgard) Mitchell Benzley, London, 1988, 51-64. R. and V. Routley, ‘Nuclear energy and obligations to the future’, Inquirey 21(1978) 133R. Routley, ‘Ultralogic as universal?’ reprinted as an Appendix in Exploring Meinong's Jungle, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider ‘Not to decide is to decide’, in Greenhouse 1988: Planning for Climate Change (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R.P. Turco and others, ‘Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions’, Science 222 (1983) 1283-1292.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 14, item 2064: Gaean Greenhouse, Nuclear Winter, and Anthropic Doomsday Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of paper published in Australian National University. Department of Philosophy (1990) Research series in unfashionable philosophy, 4. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Gaean Greenhouse, Nuclear Winter, Anthropic Doomsday ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 14, item 2064 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1990-01-01. Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [27] leaves. 18.58 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <div class="element-set"> <div id="dublin-core-identifier" class="element"> <div class="element-text"><a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fdb034b" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:fdb034b</a></div> </div> </div> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Miscellaneous Box 14: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/25d2a53b15afcd5de40afc43ffff2826.pdf f4ec86397788c8e5164df2c4e3b701db PDF Text Text ---'--A-— ori exrif(paring- mm : / A ' ■ ?./. 2073 WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN flAClF/Stf Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much �2 dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. �3 Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are "resolved”. �4 Deep-green chart: dilemma input Arguments to incompatible prescriptions -> Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, �5 every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just war for party d’.) �6 excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p. 160). On neo-Daoism, sec UT. �7 generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered, wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to �8 this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. �9 advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p. 181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. �10 doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also �facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars — the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive v/ax, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of �12 value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really z7/-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting �13 enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).5 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and �14 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuwei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. �15 profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. �16 Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent �17 demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.'1 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. �18 The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. �19 is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p. 152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than �20 popularization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be �21 somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably P2 MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 modified 9 results: The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use �22 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) �23 ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in. Inquiry ); referred to as AL R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)-, referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document ---'--A-— ori exrif(paring- mm : / A ' ■ ?./. 2073 WAR AND PEACE IV: TAO AND DEEP-GREEN flAClF/Stf Taoism and deep-green environmental theory, although closely aligned on very many issues, diverge over war. For Taoism, by contrast for instance with Buddhism, is not a pacific doctrine, but is committed to skilful defensive militarism. While it does not espouse a fortress mentality, Taoism certainly condones limited defensive military operations for specific purposes, a sort of guerilla warfare. By contrast, deep-green theory, while acknowledging the role of organised social defence, stands opposed to professional militarism, and thereby to military defence, and is committed to a principled pacifism. Conveniently a route through Taoism, philosophically fascinating in its own right, will lead us to problems of pacifism and towards deep-green theory. 1. Features of a Taoist critique of war and militarism. War did not receive a favourable press in ancient Chinese philosophy. Generally aggression and war were to be avoided. Even Confucius imposed very demanding conditions: for example, ‘when good men have instructed the people [in morals, agriculture, military tactics] for seven years, they may be allowed to bear arms,’ ‘If a ruler ... does not set himself right, even his commands will not be obeyed’ (SB p.41, italics added). Mo Tzu went much further than Confucius, roundly condemning war - on utilitarian grounds, that war yields no net benefit at any level (SB p.227). What is more, he backed his heavy condemnation practically (unlike some conspicuous contemporary theoretical utilitarians); ‘he did not hesitate to walk for ten days and ten nights in an effort to dissuade a ruler from making war’ (SB p.212). But none, it is said, went as far, in a detailed and sophisticated criticism of war, as Lao Tzu; ‘none has condemned war more strongly than Lao Tzu’. ‘[T]he opposition of Taoism to the use of force is well-known, and the most bitter attack on militarism if found in the Lao Tzu' (Chan, p.154, p.17.) But, after that splendid build-up, the text is slightly disappointing. Lao Tzu does not assert outright that war is an abomination, or even roundly condemn it. His critique of war, militarism, and military technology, is subtle and oblique, and, on the surface, far distanced from pacifism. For he does not recommend an end to war - in that genuine Taoists, those who possess Tao, will never participate in them - but expects wars to continue as unavoidable evils. Worse, he even goes so far as to outline proper attitudes to war and conduct in war, and indeed to suggest military techniques and strategies, some of which look decidedly devious. Among the classical works of Taoism, we focus on the Lao Tzu because, by contrast with other works, a remarkable component of that book is devoted to war and militarism. The apparent deviousness of the tactics Lao Tzu allocates serves to highlight what has been seen as ‘the most troublesome element’ in his philosophy (Chan p.17) - not so much however because they concern military operations, but because they are taken to apply much 2 dispensation? Why should what is not tolerated more generally be exonerated there? But given that Taoism has here the virtue of consistency (i.e. uniformity on principles) and of universalizability, that simply leaves more explaining to be done. • Puzzles for Taoism, and wars as unavoidable evils There are two puzzles here in Taoism rather than one. There is the military-practices paradox, and, varying and generalising on that, there are life-practices paradoxes. The special paradox is generated by the following incompatible elements: on the one side, ‘the most bitter attack on militarism’, the well-known opposition of Taoism to the use of force (p. 17) and to the possession and use of smart military weapons and technology - implying that war is far from all right - and on the other, advocacy of certain (devious) military tactics, outlines of (deceitful) conduct in war, and so on - implying that war is all right after all. A straightforward generalisation of this paradox would look at other morally-sensitive parts of life, where some practice was strongly condemned yet engaged in (for many examples, see the dilemmas assembled in MD). But the variation of concern to Chan and the neo-Confucians concerns the conjunction of upright with devious practices in life, in particular in the life of the sage. For a Taoist sage is presumed to lead an upright straightforward life, yet appears to engage in devious and even deceitful practices incompatible with such a life-style. Call this the Taoist-lifestyle paradox. Evidently a good deal of explaining is required, as to how Taoism can coherently take the positions it appears to presume, both on war and peace, and on life more generally. A desirable preliminary would seem to be a little investigation of what position A taken, especially on war and militarism. One key pasage runs: Fine weapons are instruments of evil They are hated by creatures Therefore those who possess the Tao turn away from them.... Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire. ... For a victory, let us observe the occasion with funeral-ceremonies (LT p.154). Wars, which involve the use of weapons, instruments of evil, are accordingly themselves evil. They are also evil because they involve the slaughter of men. But they are also sometimes unavoidable (also p. 152). Therefore such wars are unavoidable evils. Such discourse, obtained by almost immediate inference from the passage, is within the standard orbit of dilemma talk. But Taoism lacks, through deliberately eschewing deontic talk, the discourse which enables direct expression of such dilemmas, or even direct condemnation of wars or of clever weapons. Instead the points are made by circumlocution, what the possesser of Tao does, how the good ruler conducts himself, or by analogy, of victory in war with death. 3 Unavoidable evils are the very stuff of deontic dilemmas (though many theories, underpinned by shonky logic, lack the resources for representing this stuff properly). Where something is unavoidably evil, it is both bad, because evil, and also not bad, doing it is excusable, because it is unavoidable. So, given such an argument (which has its weaknesses), an unavoidable evil is a genuinely dilemmatic object with inconsistent features. Certain wars have looked, since ancient times, like such dilemmatic objects. Revealingly, Chan tries to explain that ‘most troublesome element’ in Taoism, the military-practice paradox, through the following exercise in lateral thinking: It can ... be argued that Lao Tzu uses warfare to illustrate his principles of taking no action and weakness because warfare is among the most dynamic and critical of human experiences, just as the Indian classic, the Bhagavadgita chooses fighting as the theme on which to discuss the terrible dilemma whether one should fulfil his duty, as in the case of a soldier, and kill, or should fail in his duty and refrain from killing (p. 17). ‘Just as’? The Indian classic prevents a classic moral dilemma, a dilemma represented in contemporary philosophy (following its rediscovery by Sartre), where there are incompatible duties: the duty to kill, because of one's role as a soldier, and the duty not to kill, because of one's human condition, and the supervenient dilemma of failing in and fulfilling one's duties. These dilemmas for an individual (male, as it then was) are replicated in dilemmas regarding war for group institutions: at bottom, the obligation to engage in war (for one set of compelling reasons) as contraposed with the obligation not to engage in war (for another, perhaps overlapping, set of reasons). A theory of moral dilemmas (as worked out for example in MD) is crucial for an adequate treatment of major issues in war and peace, especially (as will become evident) for a viable strong pacifism. But Taoism, eschewing deontic discourse, lacks the apparatus to state or develop moral dilemmas. Hence it is logically excluded from giving a full or adequate account of what is going on conceptually. One of the philosophically fascinating feature of Taoism is the fashion in which it manages to avoid deontic discourse, and to substitute for direct deontic discourse or improvise circumlocutions when deontic discourse would otherwise appear inevitable (cf. UT for examples). But there are costs. One is inability to display the mechanism of deontic dilemmas, or to show what reasons and argument lie behind Taoist prounouncements and conclusions (the shortage of Taoism on argument is another philosophically conspicious feature, also observed in UT). As conceptual apparatus for analysizing moral dilemmas is missing, most of the machinery involved has to be passed over. Only the outcomes, as Taoism sees them, are presented, as if from a black box. Taoism blacks out the story on deontic dilemmas that deep-green theory can tell, as the following diagram tries to show: Diagrams . Charting the processing of deontic dilemmas that are "resolved”. 4 Deep-green chart: dilemma input Arguments to incompatible prescriptions -> Processing of dilemma, directive situational procedures output Corresponding Taoist chart: Black directive Box output input It is evident that Taoism can be extended', information can be put into the Black Box rendering it less opaque. That extension can be made so as to conform to deep-green theory, i.e. so that the extended Taoist chart, a neo-Daoist chart, looks like the deep-green one. That is indeed essentially how neo-Daoism get characterised, in terms of conformity of the extension to deep ecological theory (see UT). We are now placed to explain how to dissolve, or at least neutralize, the paradoxes deriving from repudiation of militarism, an awkwardly qualified repudiation in the case of Taoism. In a significant sense there is no resolving of genuine deontic dilemmas. The principles delineating the fix may stand, incompatible, signalling the persisting suboptimality (or better, sublimenality) of the dilemmatic situation. Where there is a dilemma, involved parties should try to do well enough in the sublimenal circumstances (for a much fuller account, see MD). Thus where there is a war, itself a non-Taoist process, engaged or caught up Taoists will not abandon Taoism. Taoist methods will be applied, Taoist strategies pursued. So much for theoretical representation and (non-)resolution of life-practices and other dilemmas, details of which are readily elaborated in deep-green extensions of Taoism. A prior substantive issue is whether dilemmas always are generated: not whether wars are evil (typically they are, an issue we shall come to), but whether wars are unavoidable. Analysis of wars does not bear that familiar claim out decisively. Many wars could have been avoided, through conciliation, negotiation, restraint, etc., and no worse results apparently obtained, through sanctions, exchange, trade, etc. Through a typology of wars (coming up) that conjecture can be given some substance. Consider, for instance, what would be walk-overs. Then there is little point in making a military response. So war can be avoided. Certainly an occupation, to be met in a different way, may still occur. And so on, perhaps, for various other types of war. But, more generally, try this:Every war involves an aggressor, who makes an aggressive move. Such an aggressor could always avoid that move, taking a different (or a do-nothing) course of action. Therefore, 5 every war can be avoided. No war is entirely unavoidable. Setting aside determinism (which renders all actual wars along with all other events unavoidable), it could be argued that a war sometimes simply boils up, without an aggressor, an intensification of a conflagatory situation. There are grounds for scepticism regarding such examples; for such intensification can only occur if provocative military moves are made, for instance troops are stationed in provocative or risky positions. The presumption that certain wars are unavoidable typically derives from a one-sided perspective on war, a defender's perspective. A defender has no option, so it is routinely averred, but to respond to a determined aggressor. Even if that should be so sometimes, when there is no running away or going underground, it does not establish that such a war is unavoidable; for it neglects the role of the aggressor. By a smarter formulation, relevant features of unavoidability can be captured. Although wars may not be unavoidable, defensive action in wars that have been initiated may be unavoidable. At least such action may be unavoidable if unacceptably high costs (death, enslavement, etc.) are not to be avoided. Thereupon another highly relevant feature emerges: the linkage of avoidability to costs. For whether an action is unavoidable then depends upon what costs a party is prepared to incur before and when insisting on action: but this appears entirely unacceptable. How can what is “unavoidable” cease to be so when some further costs are absorbed? However with basics like survival, a certain liberty, and so on, we do reach such bounds. An important type of unavoidability. We also reach scenarios, unavailable to Lao Tzu but kindly brought within range by modem technology, which may appear to justify aggressive strikes. State Z, while not an aggressor, is carrying out practices which will impose unacceptably high costs upon peoples of other states and implacably refuses to desist. It could, for example, be poisoning air or water flowing to other states. But ,to make the case vivid, let us suppose that state Z is constructing, for reasons Zeders find convincing (they are committed to a faith which depicts all humans as incorrigible sinners and unworthy of life), an effective doomsday machine. Would an (aggressive) preemptory strike designed to disable or destroy the machine be unavoidable?1 In a sense, No; in another Yes. For different modalities can operate. Physically outsiders need to do nothing, but watch Zeders go about their zealous work. But deontically they are under heavy moral pressure, because of the costs of standing by idly: if the human race is worth anything very substantial, then they are obliged to act, action is deontically unavoidable. Here is a situation where a proposed reduction of deontic logic proves illuminating. Obligation is explicated through not implying, or necessitating, the sanction, i.e. 1 Whether it would be justifiable, or just, are separate issues. But it is evident enought that such scenarios further damage the obsolescent idea of just war. For, according to received doctrine, a just war is defensive. (How such a war can be fought at all is another matter; coherence requires relativization to ‘just war for party d’.) 6 excessive ethical costs such as extermination. Let us explain deontic unavoidability analogously: an action is so unavoidable if not undertaking it would result in excessive ethical costs. Then if it can be established that there is no other way than a military strike, an act of war, to ensure that the Zeders desist (and certainly we can envisage scenarios like that), then that is deontically unavoidable. It is also dilemmatic for those committed to, or inclined towards pacifism; and it is, for them at least, but paradoxically justifiable, as the negation is also justifiable, on pacific grounds. Scenarios like that sketched, that appear to render certain wars deontically unavoidable require but little or no elaboration to render them evil. Evil indeed is such a standard feature of standard wars that at least its great presence call for little supporting evidence. But it has taken to vast stretch of human history to reach this general point of recognition. The manifold evils of war Lao Tzu very early recognised and emphasized: Wherever armies are stationed, briars and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines (p.152). And nowadays followed by great tides of refugees. This passage includes not only recognition of the widely-observed socio-environmental consequences of war, but, more striking, very early recognition of the severe environmental impact of military forces. That critique is not however developed in Taoism.2 Only recently has it been pushed substantially further. And only recently could a new, most significant twist occur, the merging of resource security, long a military objective, with environmental security. The appalling idea has recently been floated that the military, in need of new work and roles with the apparent warming of West-East relations and cooling of the Cold War, should exchange usual military idleness for meddling in environmental matters: regulation and policing of environmental resources, ensurance of environmental security of powerful states, and similar. This is a bit like reassigning those imprisoned for child abuse to managing kindergartens; for consider the impressive military record of environmental vandalism. What the military is alleged to offer is a structure appropriate and available for handling such matters. But, to the contrary, it is precisely the sort of hierarchical, authoritarian expensive structure that should be wound down and up as soon as the opportunity appears, as (briefly) now, rather than being retained and shockingly reoriented (as a state-serving “Greenwar”). 2. On the divergence of deep-green from Taoism. Having arrived, by better or worse arguments, at the conclusion that wars, though 2 But a bridge to deep-green theory can be made through neo-Daoism, an updating of Taoism in confirmity with deep ecology (which however is somewhat thin and threadbare on war; for what there is so far, see Naess p. 160). On neo-Daoism, sec UT. 7 generally evil, may be sometimes unavoidable, it is evidently important to say something about how they - those of the theoretical residue - are to be conducted. By appropriate conduct the damage they do may be reduced; also the conduct should be appropriate to the funereal nature of wars (to exceed Taoist resources for stating this sort of point). It is at this stage that deep­ green theory begins to diverge from Taoism. In further explaining the Taoist and deep-green critiques of war, and diverting objections to them, a rough and preliminary typology of wars is important. It is also of passing interest in its own philosophical right. War, according to English Dictionaries, is a ‘contest carried on by force of arms, typically between nations or states’. More exactly, war is a game - in the generous technical sense of game-theory, with players, rules, goals, strategies, and so on carried on in significant part by military means, normally between states or substates. Call the contestants, (warring) parties. They typically represent of course larger populations. The set­ up between parties resembles the arrangements of players in game theory. There are several analogical extensions of the term war to cover games where one of the parties is an object, construed as hostile (an enemy of the state), such as Crime, Drugs, Poverty or Nature. These we can set aside as analogical wars. Of course wars form only a part of military activities. Military interests and objectives have always stretched significantly further than war, to include surveillence and security, easily extended to resource security, environmental security and life­ style security, and beyond that to political stability and other political matters. Evidently military ambitions have far over-extended themselves in bagging such democratic concerns. An anarchist solution to the whole problem of war, which some have seen Taoism as reaching towards, is immediate: eliminate the source of war, states. Unfortunately it is not quite that simple (and that's not simple). For wars can also occur between nations, cultures, races or tribes (which are not such artifices as states, and not always so readily or desirably abolished), between inhabited regions, and between factions within states (thus civil wars) or, perhaps by extension, between factions within other social structures (thus, for instance, gang wars). But undoubtedly eliminating states and aspiring states would abolish most wars and virtually all the worst wars. While “nonviolent wars” are excluded by definition, by virtue of ‘force of arms’, token wars, limited wars, and so on, are not: for instance, wars fought by small armed teams representing competing sides (cf. medieval and science fiction war games). As wars are hemmed in by conventions and agreed rules, there is no reason in principle why they should not be reduced to two person contests, fought under strict rules like boxing or gladiatorial contests. But in modern times wars have never taken such sensible forms, but have been much larger affairs, making heavy (though fortunately restricted) use of latest technology. Let us distinguish such wars as techno-powered, wars. They have, directly or indirectly (for the technology may be bought or bartered), a heavy research and development support structure (indeed the bulk of contemporary science is devoted - misdirected - in one way or another to 8 this effort). Among wars, an important distinction is that between offensive and defensive wars. An offensive war is one which ventures off a given party's territory or recognised pad, “invading” that of another party or parties; correlatively defensive parties, if they have not also invaded. Force projection typifies offensive practice. Plainly, offensiveness and defensiveness are not strictly features of a war, but of parties to a war. In a two-party war, while both parties can easily act offensively, the possibility of both parties proceeding defensively is excluded, unless they share territory. (Even then issues may arise as to which party, if any, was the aggressor, which started it, was responsible for starting it, and so on.) Thus mutually defensive wars between contemporary states are impossible (but would be possible if states shared territory, e.g. if Eire and Britain shared the territory of Northern Ireland). Tao-accredited wars were defensive wars, never wars aiming at domination: last-resort wars, in which no pride was taken (LTp.152).3 The pretence that offensive wars are defensive is widespread, and reflected in the subterfuge that departments or ministries of war are those of defence, security or whatever. (If they really were what they purport to be, we should be well on the way to an end to war.) Offensive practices are rendered defensive ones by shabby redefinitional strategems, such as redefining ‘defensive’ to include defence of ideals like democracy or liberty, infringed (or allegedly infringed) on territories abroad, or to include “defence” of a third party or place (whence every offensive war is “defensive”). In the present war in which part of Arabia is engulfed (February 1991), one party claims to be defending what really was (or should be) part of its territory, namely Kuwait, another party to be defending (what Kuwait did not enjoy) democracy. It is a doubly offensive war presented in this guise as jointly defensive. Aggressive wars are waged for a variety of reasons, but usually for resources or access to resources or markets, a matter often disguised by appeal to ideology (thus a war for oil is represented as a war of liberation). But there are other reasons than narrowly economic ones, such as religion (as with crusades), power and aggrandisement (as in building an empire), and so on. Nor are those reasons necessarily far separated; ideologies like Marxism and market capitalism, for example, exhibit many of the features of religion. The economic reasons for war appear to have become much more complex with the 3 There is one line in LT that may suggest that attack was sometimes justifiable, namely ‘For deep love helps one to win in the case of attack’ (p.219). But how can compassion be appropriate unless this attack is within a defensive setting, a larger context of unavoidability or such like. A passage shortly below confirms this interpretation: I dare not take the offensive but I take the defensive: I dare not advance an inch but I retreat a foot (p.222). These are advances and attacks within a defensive setting. 9 advent of an integrated world economy. At the same time many of the independent reasons for economic wars are now obsolete. For to powerful states accrue the advantages of war without war. At least most of the former economic advantages of war can be obtained without expensive wars, through trade, institution of economic dependence, etc. Small medieval wars were sometimes instituted for the collection of neighbouring riches and booty, a kind of piracy meeting conditions of war. “Small” contemporary wars can be waged for a remarkable mix of political-economy ends: to establish a regime favourable to economic penetration and profit repatriation, to subjugate markets and to remove competition, to boost a sagging weapons economy by using up old stocks and also testing new equipment, to restart a depressed economy, and so on. Such wars, along with the economic aims which motivate them, are in effect heavily castigated by Lao Tzu: When Tao prevails in the world, galloping horses are turned back to fertilize (the fields ...). When Tao does not prevail in the world, war horses thrive in the suburbs. There is no calamity greater than lavish desires. (LT p. 181). But it does exceed evidential warrant to claim that Tao is not only sufficient, but necessary, for cessation of such practices. The practice of regularly stimulating complex military-saturated economies through war is reminiscent of older, much ridiculed practices in simpler societies. They now ridicule the Tsembaga, who proceeded to destroy much of their surplus product by going to war every 5-15 years (cf Rapaport). But they do not similarly ridicule the most powerful nation on the Earth, the USA, which proceeds to write off a colossal amount of surplus in war every 10-20 years (the Gulf war liquidated some $1.7 billion per day). Taoists would. For ridicule was a favoured method, an important rhetorical strategem, and war and its idiocy were favourite targets. Some classification of defensive wars is also important, for various reasons: reducing and abolishing wars, their costs and damage, restructuring societies away from war and military practices, and, not least, for appreciating Taoism. A main distinction is between • conventional defence, maintained by armies of armed soldiers, many of them professionals, and • social defence, where there are no such armies or but fragments of them, and defence is carried out through social networks of a significant part of society.4 It is here that Taoism and deep-green theory part company. Under Taoism, the state will have a standing army, but a defensive army operating by strange, surprise tactics (p.201). No 4 Details of social defence are presented in Sharp and in Martin. 10 doubt defensive wars are to remain last resort action. Nonetheless the state will operate in secrecy, in a way incompatible with decentralised social defence; people will be kept in the dark about smart weapons of the state; and they too will be surprised, along with presumed enemies of the state. By contrast, under deep-green theory, there should be no hidden smart weapons of state; information would flow more freely and not be hidden from the people (who should retain influence in informed decision making). Under deep-green, standing armies, and more generally military organisation, will be wound down altogether. Taoism should have pushed its searching criticism further. For military objectives, easily acquired by standing armies with time on their hands, are frequently incompatible with Taoism. For example, Taoism is opposed to domination (LT p.152), whereas military operations frequently seek or involve domination; and military structure is invariably hierarchical and authoritarian. Taoism aims for self-regulation, wherever feasible (cf. p.201); so does deep­ green theory, which is one reasons why it aims to dispose of standing armies, as an important preliminary to the withering away of states themselves (military forces being major props of state control and power, and often maintained primarily for internal state security). Taoism has no project for ending the era of wars; deep-green theory does. That project involves an elimination of standing armies, too often poised for fighting or political interference. A recommended route to end war consists in progressive scaling down: reduction of the means and manpower. The initial stages are well-known, and include • elimination of nuclear, biological and chemical weaponry, and • force reduction. It can hardly be pretended that the Earth's states have managed to proceed very far on even this complex of stages. The next stage consists in • contraction to defensive capacities only, and the final stage consists in • elimination of remaining military defensive forces, and adoption, so far as required, of social defence practices. The complete route thus involves complete demilitarisation. Reasons why deep-green aims to proceed the full distance are readily grasped by considering the environmental shallowness of an otherwise cogent traditional case for the sharp curtailment of wars and militarism. The traditional Western case against wars has been primarily along two dimensions: social and moral. Wars are highly disruptive of the social fabric; wars may be unjust. From these joint features, it was argued that wars should be a matter of last resort, to be fought to ensure peace. It was argued further that only just wars should be fought. Just wars were rare objects. But as there was little evidence of the decline and fall of wars, much effort was expended, more practically and unsuccessfully, upon endeavouring to improve the calibre of wars, and more theoretically, upon trying to characterize just war satisfactorily, or rather to bend the notion in an effort to approximate the gory unjust facts. Progress was long hindered, furthermore, because there was always a rival positive perspective on wars, which encouraged the exaltation of wars and military feats. It also facilitated the transfer of the favourable image of war to other problem areas, whence the long and apparently successful war against Nature (but the short-term successes are turning into long-term problems), the short and unsuccessful war against Poverty, and so on. Behind all this is the complex idea of war as rejuvenating, even cleansing, like fire; of war as heroic, and glorious, of war as the supreme testing ground of men. These pictures of war - finally shattered by the first World War (where even the poets began to tell of horrors and atrocities) and subsequent technological wars - though no longer in ascendency, have by no means vanished. The notion of war as rejuvenating a flagging economy persists, along with the practice of keeping capitalism running smoothly by integrating substantial military components into the industrial engine. With the development of highly technological wars — the celebrated development of the dirty industrial age is substantially military - the traditional negative case has grown in strength. Wars have become much more damaging, with the potential for much more that is significantly worse, and the possibility of a just war has correspondingly contracted, virtually to zero. The opposition to war has likewise grown, but more than correspondingly with the rise of women in social and political influence. Wars have almost always and everywhere been Men's affairs; likewise conquest. Deep-green theory accepts much of the traditional negative case, but would further strengthen it. For example, the stricture against unjust wars, as out and out immoral, can be strengthened, through the following syllogism: All wars should be fully just wars. Modem wars cannot be fully just wars. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. A fully just war is not merely a just war, but a war those just character can be reliably forecast in advance. A modern war is of course a war that deploys modern technology, at least that available this century. The evidential basis for the second premiss derives from much information that collateral damage, damage to innocent bystanders and involved citizens is always likely and cannot be excluded. Such wars are always liable to violate uncontroversial requirements for a just war, even if they are purely “conventional” wars, not throwing radiation or chemical or biological weapons around. From a contemporary viewpoint the traditional doctrine of a just war, really of a just defensive v/ax, is seriously out of date. The reasons for this reach wider than the new features introduced by modem technological wars and the character of modem civilization, with its giant cities littered with dangerous and vulnerable military targets. They have also to do with the chauvinism of the justice proposed, which is shallow human justice, not natural or environmental justice. There is no consideration of justice to other creatures or to the Earth (cf Naess p.160). Two troubles are really intertwined here: conceptual difficulties with too narrow a notion of justice, and ideological difficulties with too narrow a vision of what is an object of 12 value, of what counts. The deep-green case against war adds to the traditional case a further dimension, neglected until very recently: the environmental dimension. It has suddenly been seen that wars are typically environmental atrocities. Earlier, of course, “environments” were simply backgrounds, backdrops in paintings and plays, to the real drama. Contemporary technological wars tend to be not merely social tragedies but environmental ones as well. There is a doctrine of just war, but it is a human chauvinistic affair. There is no similarly developed doctrine of an ecologically sound war, a deep ecological war. Unless any such war were literally different from modern wars, that is from contemporary technological wars, it would overstep permitted bounds. For such wars are characteristically ecological disasters. Hardened military people, desensitized by a rigorous unethical training, feel even less compunction about degrading or destroying environments or members of other species than they do of maiming or killing civilians through “collateral” activity. Matching the no-just-war syllogism is a no-sound-war syllogism: All wars should be environmentally sound wars. Modern wars cannot be environmentally sound. Therefore, there should be no modern wars. The argument for the second premiss has of course to be different. It looks to the information accumulating on what wars do to natural and built environments. The Vietnam and Gulf wars both inflicted immense damage on natural environments or what was left of them. The environmental effects of war are not confined to direct and collateral damage. There are indirect effects also. Thus, for instance, war also supplied the mechanism of, and the technology for, modern environmental destruction: explosives, bulldozers from tanks, etc. As well, training for war and engagement in war have much fostered, along with attitudes that make for social callousness or ruthlessness, those that contribute to environmental insensitivity and cruelty. 3. Puzzles about Taoist strategy and its critiques of technology and violence ‘It is surprising how much of the Lao Tzu is devoted to military strategy’. Which strategies? Surprise, above all. But why such strategies? ‘Do they not contradict the Taoists’ strong opposition to the use of force’ (Chan p.222), the implied commitment to quietism? Briefly, Taoism is not committed to quietism, and while certainly antagonistic to violence, does not oppose certain uses of force (only really z7/-forcing, as will be explained). Even so, the emphasis on military strategy remains puzzling. The strategies, many of them relevant to social defence, include • seriousness, not ‘making light of the enemy’ (p.222) • surprise, and nonvisibility (p.201). The defensive strategy involves guerilla tactics: marching without formation, holding weapons without seeming to have them, confronting 13 enemies without seeming to meet them (p.222). But even in times of peace, ‘smart weapons of the state should not be displayed to the people’ (p.164). Such recommendations helped to fuel the charge of deviousness lodged against Lao Tzu. But look at part of the reason for concealing smart weapons: ‘The more smart weapons the people have, the more troubled the state will be’ (p.201). Smart weapons are carried in corrupt states, where the rich engage in conspicuous consumption and the people are suppressed, not where Tao is practiced (LT p.194). • advance from weakness, flexibility but firmness. Weakness is the principle of life and will overcome strength (LT p.164, p.233). • coolness and non-competition (LT p.233, p.164). Like these, most of the general strategies are standard Taoist practices simply applied to military conduct. For these standard practices the charge of deviousness looks feeble. The response applies more generally to other allegedly devious political strategies. For the strategies are but application of Taoist principles and techniques to warfare, politics and elsewhere. Nothing excludes application of these techniques to what are accounted, in general, unnecessary evils (which must sometimes, on other Taoist grounds, be countered). Nor, to meet the main criticism, need any deceit or deviousness be involved; nor is it. In particular, the legalist tactic, Tn order to grasp, it is necessary first to give’ (LT p.164), is cited as involving ‘an element of deceit’ ‘undeniably’, and ‘worse’ it is ‘morally questionable’ (Chan p.17). But in order for me to grasp your hand in a normal handshake, it is necessary first for me to give my hand. There is no deceit here, nothing morally questionable. All the tactics permit of benign construals, of a Taoist kind. Consider, for instance, Tn order to contract, it is necessary first to expand’ (LT p.164). In order to bend a copper pipe to the intended angle, it is better to bend it first a little further than required. The transformation of water to ice (both favoured natural items for symbolic purposes: natural processes which may look devious!) neatly illustrates the Taoist principle (which is however hardly necessary), and shows softness and weakness turned hardness and strength. The Taoist critique of militarism is as much a critique of technology as of war. Sharp weapons, ‘smart weapons’ as we might now say, come in for much critical attention, as we have already noticed. Only in corrupt and degenerate states are they displayed or flaunted (p.194, p.164); in deep-green regions smart weapons of state’ would not be retained unexhibited. The people will not have them for they mean trouble (p.201); for similar reasons deep-green regions will be free of them. So, it seems, will ideal Taoist regions: ‘Even if there are arrows and weapons, none will display them’ (LT p.238). Much technology, military and other, is excluded under the Taoist edict against violence (a further facet of the military-practices paradox).5 5 Under contemporary technology and technological arrangements, such as the storage of quantities of oil and nuclear and chemical materials in great cities, wars have assumed new and 14 The powerful critique of militarism in the Tao-te Ching is coupled with strong opposition to violence. Some of the linkage is evident enough. Militarism as practised represents an ultimate form of state (or party) violence. A basic theme is that violent practices will come to an unnatural end, and accordingly to a non-Taoist end (generalising LT p.176). While force may occur in spectacular, but satisfactory, natural forms, force is duly distinguished from violence. To force the growth of life means ill omen. For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence (LT p. 197). One who follows Tao does not apply dominating force, which usually has had results bringing requital (p.152). Dominating force, like power, is in general castigated, under doctrine of wuwei, no forced actions, no violence. To force natural growth is deviant, destroying harmony. To stop natural growth is deviant. But there is a significant difference between force and violence. To intentionally employ destructive force is to do violence. To so force things is condemned. To remain in harmony with things one does not so force things or practice violence. There is a non-interference principle at work, which also indicates types of non­ interference that are excluded. However Taoism does not always get the distinction between force and violence quite right. ‘Vital force without restraint’, intentionally excessive force, is only part of what counts as violence, which is more generally force which violates, i.e. transgresses, descrecrates, very destructive dimensions, to the point of being utterly irresponsible. A different approach to technology, as to war, is now mandatory. These are no longer things that can in principle be nicely confined and need not touch parties outside the fray. An important part of ending wars, “winning the war against wars”, is removing the technology of war, above all from irresponsible state power. As for which technology to try to jettison and which to try to retain or improve, it is not so difficult to indicate, provided evaluative terminology is not outlawed. What is wanted is technology that is good in its place, what should be excluded is technology that is indifferent or bad or potentially so. Technology to be justified has to do something worthwhile, it has to address identifiable respectable needs. That is why merely indifferent technology is out; there is no virtue in technology for technology's sake, as it is a mere means technique. It is because of the crucial evaluative component in choice of technology that appropriateness, itself evaluative, comes closer to encapsulating the criterion than other recent efforts. Size, such as smallness, or intermediateness, are not what matter, though modest and not excessive technologies are likely to fare better in satisfying appropriateness. In simpler societies, small technology is of course more appropriate; for that is what is good there. From known criteria for what is good these other features for locally appropriate technology can be read off: reliability, esp. in maintenance, functioning well and safely under the expected range of operating conditions (which may be difficult), ease of repair, capital cheapness and repair inexpensiveness, environmental benignness, and meeting sound social needs. 15 profanes, injures, outrages, etc. It is thus a negatively connoted force, an evil force in some specified intentional respect. There is a tendency for Taoist commentators, not Taoists, to regard Taoism as condemning all uses, or even occurrences, of force, but this is not so. Rather intentional ill-forcing is what is castigated, what is deviant. Thus Taoism does not exclude a range of defensive practices, which make satisfactory use of natural forces, like letting the machines of war industry stop. Those who would abolish war and its machinery, substituting for it nonwarlike and ideally nonviolent methods, technology, and strategies, have been confronted not merely with much sub-rational abuse but with plenty of criticism and even some paradoxes. Here is a recent paradox concerning war and nonviolence: • War must be abolished. One reason is simply economic. We can no longer afford it, and the opportunity costs are enormous. Along with other extraordinarily wasteful activities, it is an anachronism. • Doing so cannot be accomplished without violence, i.e. in effect, given the types of violence involved, without what amounts to war. According to a fuller version of this premiss, the process of abolishing a war would only be achieved through a revolution so profound that it could not succeed without extensive and extreme violence, amounting to (civil) war. But then war cannot be abolished without war. Therefore, war which must be abolished cannot be abolished.6 This “paradox” has been compared with the Liar paradox, but the parallel does not persist far. For this paradox does not involve self-referential features, and is easily broken, as follows. Let the “last war” be not the last standard war but the revolution abolishing war. Then, given that the revolution is successful, war will be abolished therewith, i.e. with that last war. There need be no regress, given again a successful outcome. All the premisses stand intact, but the conclusion, following the ‘therefore’ is a nonsequitur. However, while the dissolution of the argument is accordingly logically fine, the route is repugnant. Standard pacifism challenges the second premiss. 4. Standard and moral pacifism. 6 Brian Medlin, who forcefully propounded this puzzle, set other analogous puzzles alongside it - designed to reveal deep difficulties in contemporary political, and especially alternative, thought. Another puzzle, concerning liberty and repression in the context of capitalism, revolved around the following inconsistent triad: • capitalism must be removed, but liberty retained. • capitalism cannot be removed without repression. • repression is antithetical to liberty. The puzzle is resolved as with the analogous puzzle of abolishing. Let the “last capitalist” action before the days of liberty be the repressive but liberating revolution overthrowing capitalism. 16 Although Taoism is strongly opposed to war, and much in favour of peace - and accordingly by prevailing standards a substantially pacific position - it is not (nowhere in the central texts) committed to pacifism in usual senses, for two different reasons:• It is not, by contrast with pacifism, opposed to all types of warfare, for example smart defensive wars. • It eschews deontology in terms of which moral pacifism is commonly stated, for instance through the watershed thesis P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. By contrast with Taoism, deep environmentalism does not avoid deontic claims, and is committed in principle to nonviolent technologies and ways and to pacifistic principles. Moreover, certain forms of deep environmentalism are completely committed to pacifism, notably European forms. Is deep green? There is heavy contemporary opposition to pacifism, as there also was to Taoism in the warring times when Taoism was first being promulgated. Many of the central institutions of contemporary life are intricated in coercion, violence and war. The most prominent contemporary institutions, states, are premissed on these elements of damaging force; they claim entitlement to use them widely, and even claim a certain territorial monopoly on their use. As a result they are having constantly to engage in them in attempt to maintain that monopoly. They are certainly the main perpetrators of wars, and of violence. They are indeed inured to wars, are in constant preparation for wars, yet propound dialectial (and normally dishonest and cynical) doctrines of peace through war (for a recent example see the appendix). Unremarkably then, the extensive propagandistic machinery of state has invested heavily in “justificatory” exercises in favour of controlled use, its own use, of destructive force, and continues to inveigh against pacifism. Because a routine trick in this sophistical repetoire consists in conflating pacifism with extreme, naive and inplausible, forms, an inevitable and important early task commits in unscrambling senses of ‘pacifism’. Semantical skulduggery can be thwarted in this way. Pacifism, as explained by English dictionaries, invariably concerns wars and warfare, and contains two components, negative and, elaborating on that, positive:- The negative component is, in Amauld's word, anti-War-ism, opposition (in ways to be further specified) to all forms of warfare (see OED). The positive component supplies alternative ways of settling disputes (what it is supposed that wars with some semblance of justification involve), such as negotiation, arbitration,... - and, adding to too narrow dictionary accounts - sanctions, substitutions (e.g. of sporting events, operatic contests, cooperative ventures),... . In brief standard pacifism is opposition to all warfare and resolution of potential wars by other nonmilitary means. Plainly the opposition to warfare, like the sanctions and so on, cannot itself be military (using soldiers and other devices of war), on pain of some incoherence. But otherwise the ways of opposition can be many and various: they can certainly be active, as with nonviolent 17 demonstrations, resistance movements, and so forth, and they may also be devious (e.g. turning the forces of war upon themselves so they are neutralised). It quickly becomes evident, then, that some of the dictionaries offer but loaded definitions which, by restricting the negative components, reduce the initial appeal and plausibility of pacifism. Consider the Concise English definition of the negative component: ‘the doctrine of non-resistance to hostilities and of total non-co-operation with any form of warfare’. Thereby excluded are forms of pacifism which offer active and plausible alternatives to warfare such as social defence. The Concise English tends to force pacifism into what the Oxford English Dictionary lists as its final item: ‘often, with depreciatory implication, the advocacy of peace at any price’, ‘in any circumstance’. Pacifism can easily resist being forced into these sorts of circumstances: it has many resources, as an extensive series of texts on alternatives to war, such as negotiation, non­ violent action and social defence, from Taoism to contemporary environmentalism attest. Academic philosophers have much advanced the semantical strategy of some dictionaries, of rendering pacifism more difficult from the very outset by narrow and biassed definitions. They have stretched the term from its restricted setting of warfare, confined to state and organised gang violence, to cover all forms of violence, from state and interstate to, what is very different, personal and interpersonal violence. Call the resulting considerably stretched notion of pacifism, according to which it is morally wrong to use violence, according to which P2 holds, stretched pacifism.'1 While stretched pacifism certainly includes standard pacifism (unless the notions of war and warfare are tampered with), the converse is very far from being the case. A pacifist is in no way committed to stretched pacifism, which is a much more problematic and difficult position than standard pacifism. There are several, substantially different reasons for this, which will be picked up seriatim. Stretched pacifism, also misleadingly called moral pacifism, has looked a very easy critical target to moral philosophers. Many the effusive philosopher who, upon sighting such a target, has charged, whooping such rhetoric as “incoherent”, “inconsistent”, “insensitive”, “fanatical”. However, with improved logical technology now available for accommodating and treating moral dilemmas, it is no great feat to resist such attacks, in the fashion of previous investigations (see esp. Al, also MD). A main aim was to demonstrate that stretched pacifism was not so stupid as it was made out to be or appeared to be to these inured to present dominant violent ways. So far from being stupid, it is viable. In future gentler times stretched pacifism could even be realised for whole communities of creatures (as some genuinely Christian sects envisaged); whence it will finally be seen to be feasible not merely for sages and supermen, and many ordinary women, but much more extensively. 7 In Al this notion was contrasted with standard pacifism as comprehensive pacifism: overcomprehensive might have been better. 18 The method of philosophical accommodation was through moral dilemmas. The sort of moral dilemma that stretched pacifism can induce derives as follows. On the one side stands the theme P2, Wv, in convenient symbols, for Wrong V-ing, violencing. Now this implies to WB, where B presents a case of of violence. On the other side, particular circumstances develop which lead to W ~B, because ~B would produce in the circumstances considerable wrong, for instance extensive violence, mass murder, etc. One stock example from the literature concerns calling off the firing squad about to shoot several captives if the pacifist shoots one of them (it is elaborated in Al p.13). Interestingly, another stock example from the literature concerns standard pacifism (it can also be presented in terms of patriotism; for details of both see MD p.10). Resolution of intractable moral dilemmas is, where it is required, situational. The agent decides in the situation, within the fix, what to do. There are many ways in which such decision making can proceed, less rational, such as those applying chance or involving bad faith, or more rational, such as those applying consequentialist decision theory (for details see MD, pp.32-9). A decision theory taking account of all that should be included will not however be purely consequential. It would also take account of relevant motivation. This defence and rehabilitation of moral pacifism has been challenged, in particular by Smith (hereafter JWS). JWS claims the defence offered is a ‘failure because it trivializes pacifism’ (p. 153 twice). The rehabilitation trivializes pacifism because it entails that pacifism doesn't substantially differ from a form of activism which holds that while violence is always wrong one is sometimes justified on consequentialist grounds for preferring violent acts, if these acts are lesser evils than any other real alternatives. This is the commonsense position which most people hold - yet - pacifism after all was supposed to be radical moral doctrine - (p.153 rearranged).8 Part of the criticism is, then, not so much that pacifism is trivialized - JWS “activism” is hardly trivial - as that pacifism is popularised, deflated from a radical position to the commonsense position most people hold (p.154 also). Yet not a shred of evidence is adduced that JWS activism is such a populist position. Available evidence, for example from peace movements and oppositional opinion polls, suggests the very opposite: that, for instance, most people support state-justified conventional wars with the military violence they incur, and accordingly do not hold that violence is always wrong. From such a commonsense angle, pacifism with its condemnation of conventional wars and the violence they involve remains a radical doctrine. As regards wars and other violence-incurring social authorities, contemporary pacificism 8 JWS now informs me that he has changed his position. Whether the move effects his criticism, I don't know. 19 is, as previous explained (e.g. Al p.3), a form of activism. Pacifism does not imply utter pacifity, but may actively involve social defence, resistance and so on. However a certain level of misrepresentation enters into the JWS challenge in the details of what forms of activism pacifism may include. That misrepresentation begins in the second clause concerning what is said to be sometimes justified. For the situational procedure where dilemmas arise will not generally be consequential applying a principle of lesser evil. In dilemmatic situations such principles are suspended, and such a principle is in any case unacceptable to moral pacifists. A small amount of violence may be less bad in its consequences than verbal offence, but a principled pacifist will choose the slightly greater evil where other obligations do not exclude it. A more serious distortion occurs in JWS's effort to force procedures in dilemma situations into purely consequentialist form. In fact consequential decision theory was deployed as a model only for how to proceed rationally in a situational setting where deontic procedures were suspended (see MD p.38). What was said, still misleadingly retrospective vision reveals, was this: ‘what is done is a very consequentialist thing’ (Al p.13), not ‘one acts in a consequentialist fashion to do the sufficiently good thing in the circumstances’ (JWS p.152). Situationally other procedures than those resembling orthodox rational decision making (modified from maximizing to satisizing objectives) may be adopted (MD p.38). Further the orthodox consequentialist theory is inadequate because it leaves out, or tries to reduce to consequences, nonconsequential elements, notably motives. It is not difficult, in principle (in advance of attempted consequentialization of motives), to design situations where motives, such as integrity or maintaining faith, enter to yield outcomes upsetting consequential calculations. More elaborate decision making procedures than those of consequentialism, sometimes at variance with consequentialism, are thus presupposed. A further part of JWS's criticism accordingly goes by the board, the alleged appeal ‘to “second best” consequentialist considerations,... already explicitly condemned’ (p.154). What was condemned was stock universal consequentialism, ‘that only consequentialist considerations carry argumentative weight’ (quoted on p. 152), so undercutting other deontic principles, such as those of pacifism. It was not claimed, what is utterly different, that consequentialist considerations can nowhere enter into deliberation and decision making. The conclusion JWS arrives at is therefore substantially astray. After criticising modern moral philosophy for its reliance upon consequentialist modes of thought, it is surprising, and inconsistent, to find ... [reliance] upon such modes of thought to escape logical difficulties raised by moral dilemmas facing ... pacifis[m] (p. 152) There is no inconsistency. JWS has confused universal with particular. As well he has wrongly contracted all situational decision making to consequentialist modes. There is a third part to the criticism, that the defence is too easy; the ‘strategy will allow too much violence to be (perpetrated and) justified to suit the tastes of any real pacifist’ (p. 153). This another part of the so-called trivialization, this time however dilution rather than 20 popularization, weakening the moral stand against violence. This third contention is premissed on a mistake: that one can ‘justify on consequentialist grounds any number of violent acts, providing that such acts are lesser evils than other real alternatives facing social agents’ (p.153). Moral pacifism offers no such licence; allowing such consequentialism to take over was never part of the position. The slide to such consequentialism is made on the strength of a similarly erroneous example. The potential victim of an aspiring rapist ‘is supposed to flee or wriggle free if possible. But it is easy to consequentially justify the use of violence by the woman to prevent herself from being raped’ (p.153 italics added). In the example so far described there is no dilemma, and no such easy resort to consequentially ‘justified’ violence. What allows too much violence is the lesser evil JWS assumes is easily consequentially justified; for example that the woman is entitled to inflict, and escalate, violence so long as it remains ‘a lesser evil than the violence of attempted rape’ (p. 153). Since she may thereby inflict quite unreasonable damage (esp. if she is a Kung Fu expert), the result is inconsistent with ‘the basic principle of self-defence’ which JWS earlier adduced according to which what is ‘appropriate, in response is only that level of force necessary to defend oneself against the threat’ (p.150). There is evidence in JWS's work of some enthusiasm for levels of violence which exceed his ‘basic principle’, his appeal to ‘lesser evil’ generates some instances. The ‘basic principle’, itself fraught with difficulties (cf. the contorted discussion of what weapons are appropriate in response to what attacks, p. 150), still exceeds what stretched pacifism would enjoin; for instance, it may not be appropriate to respond with force. But in a technical sense stretched pacifism is compatible with the ‘basic principle’, since it only imposes the upper bound on level of force. As for easiness, moral pacifism is not an easy position to live by, or to justify. Removing objections to pacifism is one thing; solidifying a positive case for it is quite another, and so far hardly conclusive (as Al tried to explain, pp 29-31). Stretched pacifism was advanced, hypothesized to put it more precisely, as a still viable option. It was not presented as a morally compulsory position, or, for that matter, as one that this defender adhered to or affirmed. To reiterate, while a cumulative case can be made for stetched pacifism as principled non­ violence, that case was not conclusive, and is hard to improve. For, further, some serious difficulties standing in the way of stretched pacifism were assembled, the most important of which derives from the extent of violence apparent in transactions within the natural world. Simply consider the practices of carnivores, essential to their natural way of life. In order to meet their life needs for sustenance, these creatures do, and are often obliged to, engage routinely in violent activity. While it can no doubt be argued, as some vegetarians may do, that the natural order is an immoral order, and that remaining carnivores should be converted to vegetarianism as rapidly as proves possible (in the way domestic dogs are converted to dog biscuits), the difficulties with such proposals are immense. The task envisaged is gigantic, and beyond human capacities - even if it were desirable. For there are millions of species to be 21 somehow converted to proper vegetarianism. Then there are millions of other species to be converted to proper and well regulated contraceptive practices, else their numbers will get out of hand (uncontrollably) with predation removed. Given humans lack of success in limiting their own excessive numbers, such regulation appears entirely remote. Aside however from the practical difficulties, is such a fully vegetarian order, with evolution further derailed, a desirable improvement on the natural order? Is it morally obligatory? It is certainly not obligatory, as alternative systems of morality in harmony with the prevailing natural order are feasible. Nor is it desirable, for (to appeal to such alternative value systems) the natural order is more or less in order as it is. Full vegetarianization would only reduce its value, vastly. More generally, a defensible ethical framework should not, it would be rightly contended, be right out of step with the natural order of other creatures, decently depicted. Decent depiction is important, for some features of the natural order, such as competition, combat and predation, so far from escaping attention, have been grossly exaggerated and exploited. Thus, for instance, the ludicrous picture of nature red in truth and claw, so beloved of descendents of orthodox Victorians and of orthodox economists. However, even under decent depiction, the “natural order” is often not benign. That appears to be enough to induce a supervenient moral dilemma for any stretched pacifism which is coupled to a deep ethic (e.g. which does not separate humans out from the natural order) and which eschews the desperate vegetarian route: The natural order is not an immoral order The natural order contains (regular) instances of violence. Therefore, instances of violence are not immoral in apparent defiance of P2 Moreover, there are too many instances of violence, too regularly occurring, for them all to be plausibly shunted into the moral dilemma category (and predatory carnivores face no dilemmas). Raptors that practice violence every week are not immoral (neither are they clearly moral; the category of morality only significantly extends so far). The main trouble lies however with P2 (which needs some finer adjustment, as was alrady indicated in Al). While P2 is alright in context, within a particular, perfectly viable, ethical framework, designed for the usual human round, the conventional setting for ethical theories, it stands in need of modification outside that setting. It is time to suggest the sort of modification envisaged. Evidently P2 was addressed to moral agents. Which agents? Not to carnivores that supply their own livelihood, nor really to morally degenerate humans, but to peace-sensitive agents. With that semi-technical form, yet to be characterised, a suitably P2 MP2. It is morally wrong, for a peace-sensitive agent, to use violence.9 modified 9 results: The generalization of P2, suggested in Al, to cover also the parallel situation of environmental vandalism, can be similarly modified. The anti-vandolence principle becomes MP2°. It is morally wrong, for a peace- and environmentally-sensitive agent, to use 22 To recover what amounts, in the previous discussive context, to P2, it suffices to add the proposition that every human agent ought to be peace-sensitive. Much as that proposition has to recommend it, it appears too ethically advanced for many modern humans; it sets too high a moral standard to be taken as a serious guide to practice. It seems wise to settle presently for something less demanding, such as that every advanced moral agent ought to be peace sensitive. To put essentially the same proposition alternatively: Stretched pacifism (as modified) is supererogatory. While it is perhaps too late to hope for much moral progress in humans, it is pleasant to contemplate alternative futures where what is supererogatory became obligatory, and widely practiced. Richard Sylvan* Appendix I began drafting this essay at the time (January 17, midday Australian time) of the American attacks upon Iraq. The optly named Prime Minister Hawke of Australia had just made a statement to the nation-state, announcing (the) war. In this statement there was much talk of peace. There was even - in what was effectively a declaration of war - reiteration of the modem quest for ‘a new world order of peace’. Peace through war; so it rings out again and again, through the centuries. ‘War must be for the sake of peace’ (Aristotle p.220). More than two thousand years later, we have fought those wars to end all wars. But it is no use, Hawke solemely pronounced, just talking about peace, and thinking about peace; we must work for peace, fight for it - through war. Impeccable logic? President Bush, supreme commander, convinced us with similar logic, speaking too with many tongues. Of how he ‘preferred to think of peace, not war’. But now ‘only force will prevail’, as ‘all reasonable efforts to reach a peaceful solution are exhausted’. ‘What must be done’ must be done, or will be anyway. With God on side with the US offensive (as well as on the other side), it will go well. As it was said to have, though it achieved comparatively little that other efforts may not have yielded more satisfactorily, and thought it may now have to followed with another invasion. Nor have we ever managed to glimpse much of what is now supposed, when we are no longer engaged, to come ‘out of the horror of war’: a ‘new world order ... which governs the conflict of nations’; a ‘rule of law’, not war. How the one, enforcable law, is achieved, unless backed by the the other, is not explained (Medlin's paradox hits back). Similarly what we now hear from many militarists, as they rush to war, is that vandolence. Thank to David Bennett for joint contributions (from UT) and to JWS for opposition (in JWS) 23 ‘peace is a great good, war a great evil’. But, for the most part, only the rhetoric has shifted; practice has scarcely changed at all. REFERENCES W.-T. Chan, A Source Book on Chinese Philosophy, Princeton University Press, 1963; referred to as ST. W.-T. Chan (ed.), The Way of Lao Tzu (Tao-te Ching), Bobbs-Merrill, New York, 1963; referred to as LT. B. Martin, Uprooting War, Freedom Press, London, 1984. A. Naess, Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge UK, 1989. R.A. Rapaport, Pigs for the Ancestors : ritual in the ecology of a New Guinea People, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1967. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #9, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1983 (also in. Inquiry ); referred to as AL R. Routley and V. Plumwood, ‘Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #6, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984 (also in Paraconsistent Logic)-, referred to as MD. R. Routley, ‘War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, #5, Research School Of Social Science, Australian National University, 1984. G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent, Boston, 1980. J.W. Smith, The Worms at the Heart of Things , Public Relations Unit, Flinders University, 1989. R. Sylvan, ‘War and Peace III, Australia's defence philosophy’, Social Philosophy, for Nuclear Conference, University of Queensland, 1985. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #19, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UT.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 14, item 2073: On extirpating war: Tao and deep-green pacifism marked Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Subject The topic of the resource Typescript with handwritten emendations and annotations. Previous title of paper: War and peace IV: Tao and deep-green. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: On Extirpating War: Tao and Deep-Green Pacifism marked ts. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 14, item 2073 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [23] leaves. 19.4 MB. 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Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University - Miscellaneous Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Miscellaneous Box 14: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/87ae026d1b7eb1686912cf50e2b4c625.pdf da91a8a30bfeb69bfdd62ed9f6cc3aeb PDF Text Text a/c*/ /Mi J (JO ef , • *1 A >—k Z /<—. Z^-!-< ��' 4 , X I �cM 'j /) r ex Zy / *~>Z A: » -^.—. '~^~y t ’ ’ / • -*x/^ < ’---- c« /' z/- 7^ . . . a new democratic public sphere of empowered, decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of national and regional state structures to facilitate legal, economic, educational and cultural values and practices, to support those local citizens lacking in material and cultural resources, and to settle the many disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local, direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures at the national level will make life for traditional political parties very difficult if not impossible. This development is to be applauded because too many citizens in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of the possibilities of democratic participation and often equate democracy with voting rituals® . /zCtZJ/J �» <3 j > . ' i — publicpolicies-ts-involved in one or other project/ Arterton s study shows stimulate the promise of some ways of using and enhance the impact and technology quality of to citizen participation in politics in the US, almost exclusively at the local level^?. Barber is perhaps the most prominent example of a democratic theorist putting great faith in teledemocracy to revitalise local participation and local political power in his As one of a range of far’strong democracy'. reaching reforms,, including the establishment of 'neigborhood assemblies', he advocates 'a national civic communications vision of regulate and oversee technology and to communications __ ____ ___ __ .68 • discussion of referendum issues cooperative to the civic supervise /Z-<W • use of debate new and �8.2.95 A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according forexample to For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. __ This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which 'it typically supports, is put in a sharp form as follows:1* Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect.^It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic ocout-r outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes happens, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an antidemocratic tyrant.3 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a strong version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon holismand intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green theory. In clearest form, the version turns as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which 3 Goodin condensing Saward p.168. ( For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) Such paradxes of democracy, and varieants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in UTD. �make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents.4 As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratien, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency. As more than a century of Hegalian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejectee^) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.5 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. \ first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ‘local production for local need’, Tow consumption’, ‘labour-intensive production’, and ‘voluntary siplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).6 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convey (fatTup-grading by high redefinition), ^ twistzgoals, programs, and principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable principles, intimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’; ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.7 Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5. Cf. p.12 essay. [Reference] [Reference] �3 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however splendid, overriden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. ‘..^principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] Taws of nature’, against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.). To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims CO l Qf~ (it is like appealing for information of a newspaper repeat to other newspapers). Frankel accuses Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic’ vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’8 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givenT, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti-democratic vision’, but rather an unecological prbxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.9 familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. What Skyward proposes instead is dep Out therewith go deep-green positions. 8 9 [Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. The last part of Saward’s essay contains much fitfand a good deal of garbage. [ref]. �4 ... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.10 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to itberate a central point, no inteVal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^ell-disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole world obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on. In the end, Saward too recognises the popules power of attitutdinal change, thereby removing himself;his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political ) culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that ‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’. Byibandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.11 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led (retardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under permuaible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. And:the fmq ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans. 10 11 Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it y>uld be better expre^n terms of principles, policy objectives or the like. [Ref. and page] . / /“■ w /’ �11 4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures. The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts. Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem- dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R, where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <£2, R> is a simple ordered structure, or a frame. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.33) Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 X / \ „ = {=2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2} R = — is as shown by arrows. T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component -1 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. 33 Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). �11 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to L Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives Qt various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism in decentralism egalitarianism anarchism Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10. n �12 central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t. t c Cl C4 a C2 c3 b at b2 a2 bi Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10. �13 actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.36 36 Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Bumheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of reference is explained) and Sylvan 95. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document a/c*/ /Mi J (JO ef , • *1 A >—k Z /<—. Z^-!-< ' 4 , X I cM 'j /) r ex Zy / *~>Z A: » -^.—. '~^~y t ’ ’ / • -*x/^ < ’---- c« /' z/- 7^ . . . a new democratic public sphere of empowered, decentralized and diverse local communities needs a set of national and regional state structures to facilitate legal, economic, educational and cultural values and practices, to support those local citizens lacking in material and cultural resources, and to settle the many disputes and conflicts which will continue to be a part of any foreseeable social formation. A combination of local, direct democracy and new semi-direct democratic structures at the national level will make life for traditional political parties very difficult if not impossible. This development is to be applauded because too many citizens in contemporary societies have an impoverished notion of the possibilities of democratic participation and often equate democracy with voting rituals® . /zCtZJ/J » <3 j > . ' i — publicpolicies-ts-involved in one or other project/ Arterton s study shows stimulate the promise of some ways of using and enhance the impact and technology quality of to citizen participation in politics in the US, almost exclusively at the local level^?. Barber is perhaps the most prominent example of a democratic theorist putting great faith in teledemocracy to revitalise local participation and local political power in his As one of a range of far’strong democracy'. reaching reforms,, including the establishment of 'neigborhood assemblies', he advocates 'a national civic communications vision of regulate and oversee technology and to communications __ ____ ___ __ .68 • discussion of referendum issues cooperative to the civic supervise /Z-<W • use of debate new and 8.2.95 A FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM FOR (DEEP-)GREEN POLITICAL THEORY? DEMOCRATIC OR AUTHORITARIAN PROCEDURES There is strictly no logical space for a deep-green democracy, according forexample to For there is a clash, an essential tension, between deeper green values and commitments, notably to intrinsic values in nature, and democratic procedures. The main drift of the argument is that green values, which are mandatory for deeper greens, require for their implementation anti-democratic, indeed authoritarian procedures; otherwise they cannot be guaranteed. __ This nasty conundrum for green theory over democracy, which 'it typically supports, is put in a sharp form as follows:1* Democracy concerns procedures, environmentalism certain outcomes. What guarantee can there be that the procedures will deliver the outcomes? What guarantee that democracy will yield a way of protecting environments? However the type of situation is worse than a matter of guarantess, which greens are not really seeking and could not in general expect.^It is a type of situation, moreover, which effects not only environmentalism but any sort of social and other amelioration, and even democracy itself. For democratic procedures may yield unsatisfactory and even anti-democratic ocout-r outcomes. Plausible scenarios are easily designed where just such outcomes happens, for instance as in what has been called a “paradox of democracy” where a constituency elects an antidemocratic tyrant.3 A concerned attempt is made by Saward to mount a strong version of such a paradox against deep-green political theory (which he calls ‘dark green’). The version is based upon holismand intrinsic value requirements, coupled with democratic demands, of deep-green theory. In clearest form, the version turns as follows: Holism implies consistency or compatibility. But intrinsic value maintenance and democracy are not compatible, under evident conditions (e.g. democratic procedures result in diminution or destruction of intrinsic value). Firstly, partial confirmation for this explication: The green imperative contains a number of elements, variously economic, political, social, geographical, religious, and so on. Its force comes partly from the holism it embodies, and partly from its basis in the idea of the ‘intrinsic value’ of nature. Holism implies that the various elements which 3 Goodin condensing Saward p.168. ( For here as almost everywhere else, things can go wrong. Philosophy especially supplies few absolutes and little certainty.) Such paradxes of democracy, and varieants thereupon, are presented trenchantly by Popper, and nullified in UTD. make up the imperative are compatible. The elements of the imperative gain their importance, and their links with each other, by being referable back to a common, intrinsic value. It is at this point that we can pick up the position of democracy or ‘direct democracy’ in lists of basic values set out by greens. These goals are the elements of the overall green imperative, and gain their importance from both the holistic nature and intrinsic merit of the values which the imperative represents.4 As should now be plain, and will be made plainer, consistency is not an invariant desideratien, and is not insisted upon; coherence is what is “implied” and what supersedes consistency. As more than a century of Hegalian theory revealed, there may be inconsistent wholes. A further key assumption in the argument is that guaranteeing that intrinsic value is protected (or like absolutes sustained) will require undemocratic procedures, such as authoritarian ones. An underlying assumption (soon to be rejectee^) is that only undemocratic, authoritarian procedures fit with deeper green imperatives or givens.5 Several illustrations are offered of inconsistency of green imperatives with types of democratic procedures—none of which tell, without testing adaptation, specifically against deeper green positions. \ first illustration is directed against Porritt: A direct democratic procedure (is not) compatible with imperative goals like ‘local production for local need’, Tow consumption’, ‘labour-intensive production’, and ‘voluntary siplicity’ (other items from Porritt’s list).6 Against this and other illustrations, it is worth emphasizing goals resemble objectives and targets, goals are goals which are not mandatory and by no means always achieved, especially if the achievers, like present humans, fall short (e.g. in ecological sensitivity) or their organisational means and opportunities are inadequate. Observe the oppositional attempt, to convey (fatTup-grading by high redefinition), ^ twistzgoals, programs, and principles—through ‘imperative goals’ and the like—into ‘imperatives’, ‘prescribed outcomes’, undeniable principles, intimates. That attempt should be resisted. A second example looks at an alleged contradiction in the programme of the German Green Party. ‘Grassroots democracy’ is one of the four ‘basic principles’ of the party’s ‘global conception’. Another is the ‘ecological’; ‘Proceeding from the laws of nature, and especially from the knowledge that unlimited growth is impossible in a limited system, and ecological policy means understanding ourselves and our environment as part of nature’. In effect, this means that certain outcomes are proscribed from decision-making procedures. Proscribed outcomes go well beyond any plausible list of outcomes which must be proscribed in the interests of defending a direct democratic decision procedure. Therefore, there is a clear contradiction between elements of the value-set, whereas given the holism the green imperative is based on we would have the right to expect these goals and values to be thoroughly compatible.7 Saward, paper version p.3.; repeated p.5. Cf. p.12 essay. [Reference] [Reference] 3 The last charge repeats the critical point already rejected, that holism implies consistency. A further critical point should also be rejected: the flawed inference that ‘certain outcomes are proscribed’. A political party in a democratic system has to be prepared to see its principles, however splendid, overriden, certainly by other parties if they gain or hold political power. ‘..^principles [too] can only be akin to [givens and] Taws of nature’, against which democratic procedures must inevitably be traded off the board’. Sets of principles, which may themselves turn out to be inconsistent, are hardly akin to natural laws; consider for instance reasons for their revision, procedures for rechecking and revision, and so on. In any case, democratic procedures are not traded away against laws of nature, which they may try to upset or suppress. (Rather effort should be directed at informing the electorate, etc.). To reinforce his case, Saward appeals to other authors who have advanced similar claims CO l Qf~ (it is like appealing for information of a newspaper repeat to other newspapers). Frankel accuses Bahro of an ‘anti-democratic’ vision of an ecological society, given that politics as conflict will have no place in a sea of ‘givens’. He sees the dilemma as being similar to that of socialists—deeming certain things as desirable in an ultimate sense, but proclaiming attachment to democracy and the diversity it implies. Ophuls has stated the matter especially clearly. The basic question about politics, he writes, is ‘Is the way we organize our communal life and rule ourselves compatible with ecological imperatives and other natural laws? ... how we run our lives will be increasingly determined by ecological imperatives’8 In an ecological society, enough of the demos (members of democratic constituency) will hold ecological attitudes and vote accordingly, almost by definition. Problems of effecting change lie with unecological communities, which may not support ecological principles under instituted democratic procedures (as presently in many places). Principles, and ecological “givenT, stand, they remain ‘desirable in an ultimate sense’, but they are not followed and implemented, while revealed democratic preferences go unchanged. There need be no ‘anti-democratic vision’, but rather an unecological prbxis, which principled greens will work to change. The route is accordingly barred to Say ward’s important conclusions...: that at best direct democracy, and for that matter indirect forms of democracy, can only be at or near the bottom of value-lists of greens. A commitment to democracy must clash with values that are inherent to ecologism—and ecologism is about inherency, intrinsic values, laws of nature and holism. Things—like democracy—that can only have instrumental value must lose out to imperatives backed by inescapable canonical force.9 familiar: pragmatism, jettison intrinsic value. What Skyward proposes instead is dep Out therewith go deep-green positions. 8 9 [Ref.] Note that a very streamlined version of Saward’s case is being presented. The last part of Saward’s essay contains much fitfand a good deal of garbage. [ref]. 4 ... greens should not think in terms of green imperatives. Indeed, it suggests that to think in terms of imperatives based on arguments about intrinsic merit is unjustifiable.10 Fortunately the argument developed does not sustain the proposals. There is, to itberate a central point, no inteVal or latent contradiction between (deep-)green policy objectives and democratic procedures. Rather, green objectives will fail to be achieved without ^ell-disposed decision makers, who may not straightforwardly reflect any “will” of the demos. A logical requirement on a realistic set of political objectives is that there are accessible circumstances where they are realisable, where all elements of the whole world obtain. It should not be required that there are are no situations where they may conflict, become inconsistent. It is certainly not required that they are realised, by whatever means. A community, as variously represented, can choose better or worse. There are many means available, which it may shun (again there are no guarantees), enabling it to choose better, including improved structures, attitudinal change and consciousness raising, and so on. In the end, Saward too recognises the popules power of attitutdinal change, thereby removing himself;his previous loading of authoritarian means upon greens. There needs, from a green perspective [and others], to be a change in political ) culture such that it will be compatible with sustainability. This, of course, is a familiar theme from green writing. How[?] ... It can only be the case that ‘political change will ony occur once people think differently or, more particularly, that sustainable living must be prefaced by sustainable thinking’. Byibandoning foundationalist myths of intrinsic merit, greens abandon the implicit arrogance that have made democracy such a tenuous part of green political theory.11 But he overstates the attitudinal point, with ‘only...the case’. People can be politically led (retardation, as distinct from genuine advancement is a common phenomena); they could just elect a green government which instituted, under permuaible democratic methods, sustainable living or the like. And:the fmq ungrammatical sentence is a complete non-sequitur. Attitudinal change may including coming to appreciate intrinsic merit in natural things other than humans. 10 11 Of course it is now put in terms of “imperatives”; it y>uld be better expre^n terms of principles, policy objectives or the like. [Ref. and page] . / /“■ w /’ 11 4. Technical interlude: Strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures. The skeleton or scaffolding of organisation is structure; it is the frame on which organisation is hung, which organisation fills or fleshes out. The sense of structure, explicating the underlying organic image, implies as much. According, for instance, to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, ‘structure: manner in which a building or organism or other complete whole is constructed, supporting framework or whole of the essential parts of something’. Structure itself is primarily, though not entirely, a matter of relations of elements and parts. Remarkably, the same sort of problem-generating structures occur in a range of seemingly diverse theoretical areas, to be displaced in each case by a similar sort of problem- dissipating structure. To illustrate, consider an order on a type (or set) of items Q given by one order relation R, where R may itself depend on item c in Q, i.e. R = Rc. For example, where Q is a system of worlds including your world the ordering R of worlds may depend on your world (and my world could supply a different order). Differently, where Q is a system of values or valued items, R may depend upon your values; and so on. As an order, R is at least transitive, and perhaps either (if like <) reflexive or (if like <) symmetric, on its range. The system <£2, R> is a simple ordered structure, or a frame. (The latter is the term now used in modal logic, where such structures are the bases of models for the logic.) A cap or top t of such a system is an element such that all items of Q bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to any element of Q. (The notion, that of supremum, and likewise maximum, may be similarly defined relative to subsets or types within Q.33) Simple Theorem. There are order structures without tops. Examples are provided by systems (often with much more structure) with no supremum. Here is a simple 6 element example drawn from relevant logical theory. +1 X / \ „ = {=2, -1, -0, +0, +1, +2} R = — is as shown by arrows. T = {+0, +1, +2} is a truth component -1 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. 33 Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of A supremum t of R (in type T) is an (that) element (of T) such that all elements (of T) bear R to t but which does not itself bear R to anything (in T). 11 Topologically, several notions of prime political and philosophical cast are tantamount to tops in order structures, including chiefs (top persons in power rankings) hierarchs, grand leaders, centres, absolutes, and objective items. Consider, a pertinent issue, the matter of central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to L Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives Qt various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism in decentralism egalitarianism anarchism Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 93/4, chapter 10. n 12 central control or authority, where as in the next diagram all elements answer to t. t c Cl C4 a C2 c3 b at b2 a2 bi Looked at from above t is centre of a network. In the diagram shown, it remains a structure, a flattened hierarchy, when t and relations leading to it are deleted, under decapitation so to say. What this shows in a simple fashion is that there can be ordered structures without central control (and ranging further there can be statelessness, absence of central control, anarchy without “anarchy” or chaos, because there is order), anencephaletic structures. Order, including good order of a range of sorts, does not require central controls, leaders, absolute rulers or arrangements, or similar. Order does not require hierarchy, such hierarchy.34 Let us briefly allude to a much wider philosophical sweep. Related order structural considerations to those that tell against central states, absolute rulers, top authorities as required for satisfactory order, also count against absolutes of other sorts, such as absolute truth (there need be none, as the first diagram above indicates), absolute order (thus R itself is relative to c), and objectives of various sorts, such as objective fact (another supposed absolute), objective value (supplied under an absolute order), and so on. On this broad sweep the following sorts contrast sets emerge:35 centralism elitism statism absolutism realism objectivism in rough contrast respectively with maximizing rationalism decentralism egalitarianism anarchism pluralism nonrealism nonjectivism satisizing rationalism Naturally, these simple structural considerations are only indicative, not decisive. For we might find, as more and more constraints are imposed on structures, as account is taken of Part of what seems correct in Bookchin's vendetta against hierarchy can be captured in this way. For a fuller picture see Sylvan 94, chapter 10. 13 actual conditions, that freedom contracts, that structural arrangements are forced towards centralism or absolutism. While such forcing may now look, in the light of a little logic, implausible, it requires further argument that it need not in general eventuate. The argument here against centralism and statism takes these lines: that there is ready design of institutional arrangements for decentralised communities which does not lead back to a central state. The state is organisationally otiose. Organisation is delivered anencephaletically, more specifically through a decentralised functional ecoregionalism. As to how this can be accomplished, a sweep of anarchoidal work discloses.36 36 Most of the key elements are already available from political theory relevant to anarchism. As to putting them together see e.g. Bumheim 85 (where demarchy and much else of reference is explained) and Sylvan 95.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 14, item 977: Notes and papers on anarchism Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes and typescript papers with handwritten emendations and annotations, 'A fundamental dilemma for (deep-) green political theory? Democratic or authoritarian procedures' (dated 8.2.95), and 'Technical interlude, strong family resemblances of ubiquitous problem-generating structures'. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: bundle of ms + ts for anarchism. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 14, item 977 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [13] leaves. 8.26 MB. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6593372" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:6593372</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Floor - Pile 7 Box 14: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Floor > Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b1bb957eb0669c86c103b14fb224f5fb.pdf 21d1b8e5d70d2b597b1948aa633e80c2 PDF Text Text MORAL DILEMMAS AND THE LOGIC OF DEONTIC NOTIONS Richard Routley and Vai Plumwood^ The §1. paradoxes of deontic logic consistency and the and modal requirements. Especially since mid-century many systems of deontic logic have been advanced, which logic of such deontic attempt to explore the prohibition, and wrong. right all Almost which treat deontic notions as modal, notions as obligation, permission and modal not demand functors, All such systems are mistaken m a For deontic functors such as obligation and prohibition are but are more highly of degree greater a systems, i.e. as if strict or provable equivalents are intersubstitutable within them preserving truth. quite fundamental way. systems have been modal these intensional than propositional modal modal than discrimination and so functors, logics can provide. The damage caused by the mistaken treatment of deontic notions as modal shows up in various ways, but we shall be primarily concerned with only one of these, the consistency requirements and the exclusion thereby of moral dilemmas. which the modal damage appears is through a Another way in series of related paradoxes, such as, directly, the paradoxes of derived obligation, and, less directly, the paradoxes of the Robber and the Good Samaritan. The consistency requirements come out in two ways in mainstream deontic systems. consistency Firstly, a negation are requirement, - obligatory in the that usual no claim such is symbolism, Op that ~0~p, both it i.e. and its ~(0p & 0~p) — appears as a principle, frequently a postulate, in all mainstream absolute systems.21 Such absolute systems, which are variants on alethic modal systems, are characteristically obtained from corresponding alethic systems by replacing the modal axiom, that’ or ’it ought to be the case that’, or the functor ’□ ’, modal (such as logics system demands world is ’it is obligatory ’it ought to be seen to that', replaces ’it is necessary that', of alethic systems. We know of course that consistency requirement; some ~0~p - where ’O’, read Op D p, by the deontic axiom, Op the doxastic systems) the standard but it appears that the intended interpretation of deontic the consistency requirement. or encapsulates acceptable subsequently introduced, can be designed without For its semantical equivalent what is permitted (i.e. is that in symbols (Px)STx) which is surely true (for let world x be determined precisely by what is so permitted). Moreover, the second related way in which consistency escaped by a modal formulation of deontic (or doxastic) logics. figures cannot be so For it seems clear, �2 and is widely agreed, that 0 satisfies the following distribution principle: (1) Op&OqiffO(p&q). Since however 0 is modal, and p & ~p & q p&~p (i.e. - the sides are strictly equivalent), 0(p & ~p) iff 0(p & ~p & q) Thence, Op & 0~p implies 0(p & ~p), which implies 0(p & ~p & q), and (2), by (1) which implies Oq; (2) if there are cases of moral dilemmas where Op and also 0~p, i.e. then obligation spreads so that any claim is obligatory. This argument tells against all mainstream deontic logics; rock-bottom system, minimal deontic logic. for it holds in the This logic MDS, presented by von Wright and others (see e.g. Hilpinen 81, p.3 and p.5), adds to classical sentential logic CL (with rules of Material Detachment and Substitutivity duly extended) the one-place connective P, of permissibility, subject to just the conditions P(A v B) e (1’) PA v PB and Intersubstitutivity of provably equivalent CL (i.e. truth functional) wff Now define a connective - in fact the standard obligation Then, where A and B are any CL wff, 0(A & B) OA =£j£~P~A. negation and It then follows, given that (extensional) principles to De Morgan = ~(~P~A & ~P~B). follows), 0 moral claim is dilemmas obligatory, the consequence as above of the nothing functor ) * (2 - thus: OA & OB, upon applying of (1 ) * that P~(—A & —B) (or by variants thereupon that which form OA & 0~A, (extensional) i.e. any permissible. The that is OB, revealing variant argument applies the provable CL-equivalence A & -A = B & ~B to get 0(A & ~A) = 0(B & ~B). d OB & 0~B => OB. Then (in condensed notation) OA & 0~A => 0(A & ~A) => 0(B & ~B) That is, if there are any deontic moral dilemmas (of such forms as OA & 0~A) then everything is obligatory. other forms; But there are moral dilemmas, of this and and not everything is obligatory. incorrect. So too are all its extensions, and Therefore minimum deontic logic is thereby all mainstream systems. For 'most systems of deontic logic include the system’ of von Wright 'as a subsystem' (F & H, p.13). There is little appreciation of the involve in the ethical Hare, having set up a force of these arguments or of what they literature. But one prominent example will dilemma, and rejected one logical have to suffice. route out, proceeds to pronounce that 'it is not very helpful to try to sort out these difficulties by some relatively minor tinkering with the calculus of deontic logic. The linguistic and logical intuitions which give rise to them are all right so far as they go' (82, �3 intuitions behind the mainstream systems are not alright, but lead to The p.28). deontic collapse and to a heap of paradoxes; and a bit of '’tinkering" is enough to remove the worst difficulties.5 (2’) and The trouble lies we shall argue, just with the modal requirement (i.e. its usual extension to all wff). that not everything is obligatory, evident For while it is This leaves much to be defended. on no more than the strength of a few examples (such as that it is not obligatory that everyone visit the tallest eucalypt every day), none of the other assertions is so uncontroversial. Given that there are such moral dilemmas, as will be argued at length, and given that sentential logic CL is admissible when applied to consistent situations (which are all that are elsewhere (in arguments: required RLR in especially), modal the namely, the arguments there are a claim that has been argued above), two only and requirement, one fault the which to points at half of the distributivity principle, specifically r (O-adjunction). OA & OB -> 0(A & B) But it is bizarre to have to fail O-adjunction in order OA & 0~A =5 B has quite especially when OB to stand, 0(A & ~A) to be correctly foundation. And obligation. For, not it contemplated among in the things, is a irrelevant mates 7 desperate measure , systems since it intended role and mainstream against entirely other is conceded that its Faulting O-adjunction rejected. goes it to allow the paradox O-adjunction can be argued is without meaning for from of the semantics of 0, along these lines:- Roughly OA is true iff A holds in all acceptable situations. But if A holds in all such situations and B does also then so does A & B, validating O-adjunction. Accordingly, the trouble must be located in the modality requirements. This can be seen from another angle also. obligation, which also underlies O-adjunction, An important logical feature of is its transmissibility, that what is tightly entailed by what is obligatory is also obligatory; in symbolic form, A ■+ B -o OA -> OB But now, (0-transmission). if entailment is erroneously construed as strict implication, which is what the modal requirement would have us do, then 0(A & ~A) -> OB, since by a paradox of strict implication A & ~A B. If there are moral dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~A), as will be contended, then this result is sufficiently damaging on its own, and focusses the trouble on the modal requirement. properly maligned OA & 0~A ->0B. Otherwise apply O-adjunction, to obtain the �4 the Both and consistency requirements should modality be challenged then by anyone who claims that, for some p, both Op and 0~p (and that such judgements are not merely prima facie, vanishing upon further reflection). Many have argued that such cases do occur, indeed are central examples of value conflict, and are of fundamental importance in ethics.$ We want to go even further and claim, firstly, that such cases occur quite frequently, as cases of conflicting obligations, conflicting rights, and genuine moral dilemmas - so in particular there are many cases where both p and ~p ought to be the case - and secondly, that adequate logical treatment of such cases requires an underlying logic of a distinctively paraconsistent kind. we shall cases has, argue, with many important arguments and cases. many of logic rendered deontic Neglecting such incapable of dealing adequately The matter is particularly serious since fiercely debated moral cases are cases of moral dilemmas, lthe most e.g. limited resources, nuclear war, permissible war tactics. While our initial argument will overlap previous work,9 it goes beyond it by adding a semantical treatment and moral of explanation semantical dilemmas, and in setting adequate deontic logics within the framework of paraconsistent logic. simple The §2. resolution relevant epicycling. classical versus The relevant It has already been indicated. solution to the base problem is disarmingly simple. Abandon the modal assumption, that obligation, permissibility, and so on, are modal This blocks logical equivalents. functors allowing replacement of modal from OCA & ~A), or from OA & 0~A, to 0(B & ~B) and thence to OB. giving up intersubstitutivity are replacement coentailment, not simply just more in contexts; deontic rigorous than lax strict equivalence. intimately - the Spread with What ones. is permitting required is While A & ~A and B & ~B are strictly equivalent, they do not coentail one another. connected modal It does not involve conditions the the move law, That is as much of a fallacy as - one A that would have that a & ~A -> B, contradiction such as A & ~A entails any statement whatsoever. An alternative satisfactory distinctive implciation deontic way then logic of should explaining be in particular of relevant paraconsistent, feature of relevant logics, their and the is solution, simply and through why the a most rejection of the paradoxes of strict Spread. For, as remarked, one logical characteristic of deontic notions such as obligation is their transmissibility; i.e. where A entails B then OA is logically sufficient for OB.10 Then were entailment strict implication it would follow at once by Spread that 0(A & ~A) -> OB, whence by O-adjunction, OA & 0~A -> OB. basis of interpretations straightforwardly on RLR II). of Transmissibility may be independently argued for on the entailment (e.g. as content inclusion), and follows the semantical analysis of obligation to be advanced (cf. also �5 A good deal of effort has already been expended in trying to save mainstream deontic theory from the worst of the difficulties and consistency requirements. Most of through its modal it encounters, the repairs however attempted amount to epicycling: trying to tack theory-saving devices onto the initial theory, rather than questioning any fundamental features of it. Intractable exposed. problems is called What the with so-called minimal the standard system of deontic system already have been logic is in an even worse position than the minimal system, because it adds to the minimal system as an axiom 12 Then any standard system including a moral dilemma, 0(p^ & ~p ), is 13 o o simply inconsistent. For Op => Pp, hence Pp^ & ~Pp-j where p1 is pQ & ~pQ. ~p(p & ~p). Main marketed deontic logics are epicyclic variations on (i) standard deontic logic, being modal attempts to repair defects in earlier prototypes. They include (ii) reductions of systems of type (i) to alethic logics by introduction of a constant ’o’ read, for example, ’the world will be worse off’ or 'punishment ought to cr is the moral sanction or some bad state of affairs. follow’: is defined Then *0' EK-A^cr); i.e. A is obligatory iff the negation of A (non-fulfilment of A, it OA is said) necessitates the sanction. It is usually postulated: -0^. Such reductive frameworks, since they include minimal deontic logic, repeat its defects. (iii) relativistic systems which attempt axiomatise to circumstances, c', conditional of reads ’p is obligatory given, or permission and conditional obligation; thus ’0(p/c) * in notions underlying model being that of conditional the probability. These systems were designed chiefly to avoid the paradoxes of derived obligation to which systems of type really in (as and (i) probability (ii) theory) lead. to But the new operator, /, compensate for implicational connective in the modal framework assumed. so-called "logics of conditional e.g., van Fraassen, p.438 ’... obligation" still lack the is introduced of an adequate So, not surprisingly, these exclude moral dilemmas (thus, it would be more apt to say that we have here a logic of obligation that remains after obligational conflicts are resolved'). (iv) systems which conditional d, such include a modal conditional functor superior to the material­ as a Stalnaker-Lewis-style conditional, conditional deontic notions like those of (iii) can be defined. in terms of which But these systems, since modal, do not escape modal limitations and problems (see further RLR). (v) systems based on a logic of change or action. These systems turn out to be reducible to a combination of absolute systems with tense logics, i.e. 14 to multiply modal systems and so repeat the problems of modal systems. None of these modal types are satisfactory, none can be made so, they amount because of �6 What is at modal assumptions, like consistency requirements, that they all involve. fault is not merely types of systems of this sort, which confine the framework to a worlds possible defect enough, one thereby and but the write in conditions, consistency that is though sweeping consistency interpretation of deontic more logic, that ’principles of deontic logics are conditions of consistency for normative systems’.^ The consistency interpretation - which is deeply entrenched in much ethical theory (especially making no adequate allowance from Kant) deriving that for what is essential fundamentally mistaken, - is moral dilemmas and to morality, the familiar inconsistency of normative systems. Documenting moral dilemmas. Cases of moral dilemmas are, perhaps unfortunately, §3. both familiar and inevitable. perhaps not, and logic theory deontic (including is unfortunate It such for standard deontic approximations rough as utilitarianism) since they have ultimately to be dismissed as inadequate to account for the data. is also often extremely On the other dilemmas. awkward who those for such dilemmas hand, probity, and are a main source of moral change. A moral dilemma occurs when considerations, for instance cannot T situation in act (where such a of which shape cannot, or precisely as way afford real tests of moral worth and 16 is confronted with moral perhaps not directly inconsistent, factual the probably cannot, facts satisfy to principles, binding obtain); principles that is, one so as to or although be satisfied Then the situation T cannot but induce a moral fix. considerations. in moral (but not only when) one the in themselves enmeshed find It in the (probably) meet moral This can come about in two ways, either because of the logical limitations supposedly satisfied by T, in particular its consistency feature (that, whatever p, does not) or through certain contingent features if p holds in T then ~p of T. In what follows we shall concentrate on a major subclass of what are commonly accounted moral dilemmas, those of (paraconsistent) logical interest where what is given or derived are pairs such as OA and OB, WA and WB (i.e. A is wrong and so is B), or the like, where A and B are And incompatible. of particular logical importance are cases where deontically incompatible pairs such as Op and 0~p, Wp and W~p, or the like are guaranteed. The examples of moral dilemmas we consider provide only a small selection from the rich variety of such dilemmas, but hopefully they illustrate that variety. Several of the examples involve more than one moral principle: however some commonly- adopted moral principles generate dilemmas, of one sort or another, their own. pretty much on Consider for instance first principles of the following type: Situations involving the (indiscriminate) killing of numbers of (uninvolved) people should be avoided, should not happen, are wrong - principle at very first approximation of the form (p)(p satisfies condition C + Wp). Applying such a principle, a dilemma results �7 where and occurs a large number of people will be killed, if p obtains or if ~p obtains a large number of people will also be killed. War situations provide obvious examples, with the V(ietnam) dilemma typical. 17 For example, people have described the situation in Vietnam as follows (not that it really is this way): If the Americans withdraw from Vietnam, a large number of people If the Americans stay in (do not withdraw from) Vietnam, will be killed. number of people will withdraw from C. Hence under be killed. Vietnam', Hence, condition satisfies p where p is C 'the Americans withdraw from ~p and the principle both p and ~p are wrong, similar is the company commander's dilemma. of his troops will be killed. a large also i.e. satisfies condition 18 Wp and W~p. Rather If he invades the hamlet, a large number If he does not invade the hamlet the prisoners held Taking p as 'he invades the hamlet', p satisfies C and therein will be killed, etc. ~p satisfies C. Therefore, Wp & W~p. Both p and-not p are wrong; neither would occur The killing does not however have to be of large numbers in an acceptable situation. of people to induce moral dilemmas. variants on the commander's dilemma Favourite regularly wheeled out concern murdering a potential murderer to prevent him killing several other presented people and with the related constrained option killing of some choice situations smaller special person is where a group of people (or creatures) in order to avoid the certain killing of a larger or less favoured group 1Q of creatures. 7 The pacifist's (or differently seen, patriot's) dilemma, which Lemmon draws from on Sartre, concerns the proposition p^: Z goes to war. If Z does not go to war, he help his friends and fails to fellow countrymen when they are in desperate need. Thus ~p-j is wrong, W-p-j , on the principle that so failing to help one's friends and fellow countrymen is wrong. If Z goes to war, he will be involved in killing people he has nothing morally or otherwise against; whence Wp^, on the principle that things which involve such killing are wrong. Therefore again Wp^ and W~pp A different sort of example, again however involving the taking of life in one way or another is the abortion dilemma (as conceived by Anglicans, say). presented as a clash between conflicting rights. to life (i.e. (on that the one part of the should not foetus); have one's In one corner, there is the right in the other, the right to bodily integrity body used against one's detriment for someone else’s benefit) on the part of the mother. where a particular state of affairs is an instance of both so (~p) and will principles. Hence Wp. would deny the mother's right to bodily integrity. Whence adjoining, Wp & W~p. to one's A dilemma results performance of an abortion (p) would deny the foetal right to life. not doing This can be The But Hence W~p. �8 Not so far removed from these examples, particularly when omission is conflated with commission, are environmentally-oriented examples involving sacrifice (broadly construed), for resources. Suppose that we have a duly qualified principle to the effect that things which lead to the feeding of starving people should happen. example the is a dilemma of limited three cases:- First following Suppose also that we have limited resources, and have decided to distribute these as follows: If the coin comes down heads (p), then group A of starving people will be fed. But if the coin does not come down heads (~p) then group B of starving people will be fed. Plainly in an ideal situation both p and ~p will occur, that is the coin will come down heads and it will not come down heads, so that both groups of people will be fed. And if the moral principle cited is correctly applied then a case of Op and 0~p results. course minor Of involved leads to conclusions of the form adjustment of the principle W~p and W—p, whence Wp. For an analogous conservationist * s (or humanitarian * s) dilemma consider the case forest where it ought to happen that the is chopped down, the benefit of the for presently starving (or etc.), and it ought to happen that the forest is preserved by positive action and Op dilemma for the benefit of coming generations (or etc.). 0~p emerges the from of application distinct In this case the The principles. society dilemma, concerns the reform of primitive societies so that they primitive Consider the dilemma of a feminist environmentalist as conform to outside standards. regards Aboriginal On the women. other hand, suppression of women in Aboriginal society should be opposed; on the other hand major western interference in Aboriginal affairs should be avoided; but changing the position of women would constitute major interference. Different examples involving public institution) dilemma, which following:- On the one hand, the be restricted and the funds will principle being the concerns preposition p2: the University The Vice-Chancellor, or rather his advisor on logic, argues opposes the government. both separate principles are the Vice-Chancellor * s (or formulated Wp2, p2 is wrong, students and accordingly). On because the University’s learning in general will suffer the other hand, W~p2, ~p2 (the is wrong because #p# will strengthen the present iniquitous status quo (the principle being states that of affairs which strengthen the present status quo be philosophers, is iniquitous avoided). Therefore, conjoining Wp2 & W~p2» A signifi ant source of moral dilemmas, long observed by afforded by a relatively unrestricted institution of promising, and more generally by parallel institutional arrangements for entering perhaps worth distinguishing two classes of cases. situations, Z is under an obligation into (moral) Firstly, contracts. It is in purely contractual p, because of a contract or promise, and also �9 under an obligation q, because of a (likely different) contract, where q entails or In the second sort of case, Z has promised to do ~p, and hence commits one to ~p. But p also satisfies conditions C, 0~p. it emerges, and Z adheres to the principle (q)(Cq ->0q), whence Op. As an example of the second type consider Lemmon’s simple and dated example, adapted from Plato: A friend leaves me with his gun saying he will be back for it in the evening, and I promise to return it when he calls. He arrives in a distraught condition, demands his gun, and announces he is going to shoot his wife because she has been unfaithful. I ought to return the gun, since I promised to do so - a case of obligation. And yet I ought not to do so, since to do so would be to be indirectly responsible for a murder, and my moral principles are such that I regard this as wrong. I am in an extremely straightforward moral dilemma, evidently resolved by not returning the gun (62, p.148). According to Lemmon the outcome is both Op, where p is ’I return the gun’, and also The 0~p. namely, for first an inference concerning promise-keeping; every q, that q is a genuine promise entails Oq (for genuine promises follows engender obligations), from and p is a immediate genuine promise. inference of the following sort: for every q, The second follows that q really contributes to a murder implies Wq, and that p really contributes to a murder; and moreover, -> 0~q. using an for every q, Wq Even if this last principle is repudiated a dilemma remains: for both Op and Wp, i.e. I ought to return the gun and it is wrong that I return the gun. that the initial principle sustains the conclusion 0~q as well. (It may be In any case, it is not difficult to amend Lemmon’s example so that it does, or more important, so as to render the ensuing dilemma more convincing.) Other dilemmas recur in variant form with contracts and promises. For instance, limited resources dilemmas reappear as follows: we promise all our surplus to a group of poor only to have even poorer people turn up. where one's deception, employment calls or participation in for activities Similarly work and role dilemmas, which are the production of nuclear morally repugnant (such as or chemical weapons), may arise either contractually, e.g. one signed up for the position, or from duty, e.g. to provide for one's family. Some of the moral dilemmas we have made look more determinate than perhaps they should, or than they would be if the circumstances were filled out, or got filled out slightly differently. Then we should find that some of the dilemmas take the form of Lemmon's more complex class, namely those where rather than OA and 0~A, what one has is Prob OA and Prob 0~A, where Prob is the probability functor ’it is probable that'. Lemmon describes this class of "fully dilemmatic situations" in these terms: ’there �10 is some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought to do something, and there is some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought not to do that thing’ (pp.152-3). sort of dilemma is again drawn from Sartre: in A real-life working example of this brief, Sartre’s pupil is under some (sort of) obligation to stay with his mother, but he also probably under is an obligation, felt only ambiguously, to join the Free French in England (for a fuller description see Lemmon, pp.153-4). Lemmon suggests that this class of dilemmas is, and perhaps should stay beyond deontic formalisation: however the dilemmas are now within the scope of formalisation of a sort by multiple functor intensional logics of a type not different represent such principles as ’’ought implies can”.22 those already from needed to Though we have presented a wide variety of dilemmas, some of them in some detail - to the dispel that dilemmas common prejudice are a rare phenomena that can be safely set aside or that need not be taken seriously in an ethical theory - we have by no means exhausted the range and wealth of such dilemmas. the extent of analogues practical of these Nor have we indicated the dilemmas; fact is that similar dilemmas are frequent in economics, over budgeting, devaluation (we ought to devalue because ... and we ought not to devalue because ...), and so on. Nor have we brought out the political significance of the dilemmas; but the fact also is that some of the deeper problems in moral and political theory revolve around dilemmas. Familiar examples are issues of (permitting permissiveness interests possibly harming or licence individuals to pursue offending others) and freedom (restricting freedom as regards actions which infringe others * freedom), of paternalism and state authority versus civil liberties, and of democracy as against minority interests. A assortment varied accounts of the where sources of examples is source of moral dilemmas, for moral claims conflict, contractual obligations. Lemmon also in particular and promises, is attracted principles as those morally simplistic that they generally arise greatest (p.150). But he fact that one and the same conflicting directives requiring type, since principle may conflict with or duties, may conflict with one another principle can deliver such removing by an account of this latter underestimates the extent of conflict, and neglects the contract or in e.g. duty with principles, principles with while realising that it will not always suffice, principle important (e.g. double maximization happiness of the greatest number). As well a sufficient variety of tough examples helps remove the illusion that moral dilemmas can one and all be escaped. Admittedly, fortunately, there are ways around some of the dilemmas we have outlined, especially those we have borrowed. with perhaps further around the dilemmas), artifice in setting up the cases (to exclude But lateral moves some of the dilemmas stand: from them (as is further argued in �11 residue ’To insist that there is in every case a solution without is no escape. § 6) there false is the to moral facts’ p.132), Marcus (Barcan a theme she well illustrates with the abortion dilemma. §4. deontic Paraconsistent logic cannot be modal makes it modal treatment the relevant development. logic: An adequate deontic have to be paraconsistent. but will For a modal treatment to accommodate moral dilemmas - which are hard data impossible it makes as dilemmas treat dilemmas impossible to (§3)• A without proper catastrophic collapse (as shown in §1). The of principles standard deontic logic are, however, as added to readily various paraconsistent logics as they are to modal or classical logic - at least this (e.g. OP), in (da Costa negation-weakened namely logic and now distinguished style) logic paraconsistent and For Jaskowski-style discussive logics there are some difficulties; relevant logics. in styles of paraconsistent two of the main for is true particular, the given of rejection can principles, adjunction such logics satisfactorily include O-adjunction, OA & OB -> 0(A & B), which reflects adjunction in for the possible-worlds sentential framework It would seem not; acceptable worlds? logic offers no way of handling of Jaskowski-style the form 0(C & ~C) that result by O-adjunction. properly accommodate dilemmas, for dilemmas concerning obligation, where such as moral clearly principles difficulties; For these require impossible worlds Generally, Jaskowski-style logics are in deep trouble trying to where C & ~C holds. adjunctive full-strength moral dilemmas of logics Negation—weakened hold. they cannot deliver expected deontic also are interconnections, e.g. in the deontic ’’square of opposition”, presented shortly, which depends crucially on normal principles. negation In difficulties. Relevant brief, deontic the reasons types of paraconsistent logics logics can both avoid choosing relevant logics over for (the substantial sets these of other main reasons for which are given in OP) are accentuated still farther as soon as applications, such as to deontic logic, are Accordingly we will assume a relevant logical base, and a relevant semantical made. in what follows. framework, Even so, much of what we say and do can be adapted to other logical bases, e.g. negation-weakened or positive-plus bases. Often a combined syntactical-semantical is approach more fruitful and illuminating than either a syntactical-axiomatic or a semantical approach carried out separately. Each enriches and controls the other.23 Such is the case with relevant logical theory, logic. Even analogue of and so it is with relevant deontic logic, which builds on relevant so, a standard syntactical deontic standard superstructure, relevant logic. beginning logic we normally added can is easier. simply add For an to obtain exact a analogue relevant of the to classical logic, to (what supersedes CL) �12 For minimal relevant deontic logic, MD, the one-place functor 0 - of obligation, as usual read (e.g. ’It ought suitable some to be extending system that’ - is added (the case) B system basic the to some relevant logic of RLR conforms to the usual formation rule: where A is a wff so is OA. however are options at Functor, F read ’It is forbidden that’, is defined thus: ’It is permissible that’, is defined : PA =Df~FA. FA =Df 0~A (cf. OED); and P, read There this stage (as at e.g. stages), can morality, be argued, from directions several other F could oh introduced independently. But this leads to complications that are unnecessary. It 0 The other familiar functors of deontic logic, F and P, are defined in the usual way. ’It is wrong that’ or, less satisfactorily, Functor I). (e.g. from the rationality be of from the meaning or semantics of obligation, from the idea of commitment), that 0 satisfies at least the following requirements:[RM] A -> B -> OA -> OB, i.e. where A + B is a theorem so is OA -> OB. That is to say, where A entails B is provable so is OA entails OB, obligation transmits over provable entailment. Hence the claim that this principle (R7 of RLR II) is a transmission principle. [K] OA & OB regards the i.e. -> 0(A & B), conjunction; or, a conjunction of obligations entails obligation as to adjunction (principle G of RLR II). These two important it put 25 principles, entailment and adjunction, make 0 a a little differently 0 is closed which ensure that 0 is closed under under provable systemic functor (in the sense of RLR II), and ensure that it has a relational (i.e. first order) semantical analysis. The postulates which correspondingly minimally characterise deontic functions F and P now follow by relevant logic upon applying the definitions. They are as follows:For wrongness: A For permissibility : With the A + B -*> functor further B —f> FByFA Q, FA & FB P(A v BH, PAv PA + PB defined F(A v B) QA =Df ~0A, a reduced pb deontic square of opposition follows: 0Ax ...............FA PA^ .............. .QA The opposites are dotted peripheral opposed, as modally, relations of the modal in the way the solid lines show. But the square are bound to be the lost given the �13 the modal (on fact of deontic dilemmas square Prior 62 p.220). see is worth It observing, however, that the peripheral relations can be reinstated through adoption of the so-called consistency scheme OA -> ~FA, i.e. OA + ~0~A; [D] and that the relevant deontic logic that results still excludes the rubbish brought in along deontic standard necessary truths, Nordamericano of that course not (though paradoxes, essentially because paradoxical etc.), deontic obligatoriness the of spread principles are not whereas triviality), incorporate dilemmas. the as degenerate dilemma-permitting The problem with deontic logics which include [D] also cannot they well as logic, Antipodean form we are advocating. is deontic In short, relevant theory can deliver a clean-cut, clean-living, dilemma- available. free (e.g. logic include relevant moral dilemmas systems without without can [D] inconsistency consistently These various logical claims, as to the modal rubbish that is not brought along, can all be made good by application of the semantical theory. The semantics shows what does not hold, as well as further explaining why the principles that hold do. Semantics for MD result upon adding to modellings for relevant logic a two-place relation S, on worlds, which is subject to the following condition W. b and Sbc then Sac, Where a i.e. where world a precedes b (indeed canonically a is contained in b) and world c is accepted vis-a-vis b then c is accepted vis-a-vis a. Given that a is a subworld of b this is evident enough. Distinctive features of the underlying semantical modellings for relevant logic - consisting of structures of the form <T, K, 0, R, *, be sufficiently and, well-known any in are case, explained v> - should elsewhere. These structures differ from the best of those for modal logics, the nonnormal structures <T, K, N, R, v> for the Lewis systems S2 and S3, in the following ways:- The class K of worlds, to which the factual (base) world T belongs, is expanded to include a much more comprehensive class of inconsistent and incomplete worlds; the class N of normal worlds K is in adjusted theorems hold; relation R, to a three-place the class to v(p, sentential a) relation = parameter 1) regular worlds, i.e. worlds; on then and wff. I(A, b) = 1, where all on is subject to a constraint where I is the so that Specifically, where a < b and p holds in a p holds in b, p. Conditions v for every world a and b modelling structures are hereditariness condition extends to all wff; i.e. in symbols, where a 1 then those used in modelling implication, is relaxed from a two-place inclusion of worlds is duly reflected. (written 0 of in K and every such that this b & I(A, a) = interpretation function which extends v to all Inclusion, <, can be added as an extra component of the model structures, but in fact it can be defined thus: a < b =Df (Px 0)Rxab. Finally relevant modellings �14 add to modal modellings a new function, *, in terms of which negation is evaluated, 27 which facilitates the inclusion of inconsistent and incomplete worlds. same role and interpretation as in standard relation S has the The semantical It is employed in the semantical evaluation of obligation functor 0, deontic theory. which is given by the following rule: I(0a, a) = 1 iff, for every world b such that Sab, I(A, b) = 1, i.e. OA holds at world a iff, for each world b accepted vis-avis a, A holds at b.28 The rule is a world relativisation of the idea that what is obligatory is what holds in all accepted worlds. (morally) It is thus an evident adaption of Leibnitzian prescriptions, given the linkages between obligation or moral binding and moral "musts” or imperatives, on the one side, and morally possible and or acceptable accepted worlds, the on other. The for motivation unrelativised connections can be forged at base world T; for there A is (morally) required, I(0A, T) = 1, iff for every b for which Mb I(A, b) = 1 (where Mb =Df STb), i.e. That is, what is required is iff A holds in every (morally) accepted world. what holds in all accepted or received worlds. Other construals of the semantical apparatus are of course open. tempting ideal, temptation (a succumbed to initially) regard the accepted worlds as and Sab as ’b is ideal as seen from c’. to read Mb as 'b is ideal’ i.e. to It is a little But that is like requiring supererogation in cases where the meeting of commitments or obligations is enough: the worlds do not need to be that good but simply to pass, to meet required standards. is worlds. acceptable through A perhaps easier construal than by way of accepted worlds construal That is alright provided the term ’’acceptable” is deployed, as it often is, nonevaluatively : for it is important in the semantical assessment to prescriptions for be able to make an evaluative step—down, to give meaning evaluative expressions nonevaluative terms. in Naturally this does not imply that evaluative notions are naturalistically eliminated, any more than familiar terms, extensional reductions, semantical extensional analysis of intensional implies that intensionality is removed: both are merely pushed down into the not-further-explained apparatus of worlds. Obligation is construed by way of what goes on in acceptable or accepted worlds, not what happens in permissible or permitted directly with the construal of permissibility. one another, but in worlds, because this latter Given modal muddles the two reduce to the more subtle relevant setting star shift is involved in the transfer from accepted to permitted worlds. The (derived) semantical rule for P is this: KPA, a) = ties 1 iff for some b such that Uab I(A, b) = 1, where Uab . b * Sa �15 at base Thus, A is permissible, world T, i.e. I(PA, = 1) iff A holds at some 1, permitted world b; what is permissible is worldwise what is somewhere permitted. modal equation of relations U and S further axioms, deontic the (where namely if Sab (in effect, condition then Sa ) b * (Pb)Sab The corresponds to e.g. guaranteed, is modally by ~0(P & ~p)) by the scheme OA ^PA. Now modal-strength deontic logics typically do include an axiom scheme of the form [D’J OA -> ~PA, i.e. from (alethic) is obligatory is not that permissible, under modal is, Indeed this used to be considered what distinguished deontic ~0~A. assumptions, OA logics what modal on logics the one side, which include a stronger principle analogous to OA -*■ A, and epistemic logics on the other, which were weaker in that [D’J failed. However [D’J, like [D], is deontically incorrect because it rules out consistent inclusion of moral dilemmas; or, to turn matters around, cases where OA & 0~A, [D’]» which or OA & FA, hold counterexample [D]. may seem a little more plausible transform of it on usual deontic definitions. than Similarly these cases refute [D], but is a definitional For what is obligatory is not ipso facto permissible where the obligatory item is also wrong, as in dilemmatic cases. To distance relevant deontic logic from modal analogues, while at the same time demonstrating that relevant theory can encompass moral dilemmas unproblematically , we next assume that some moral dilemmas hold, that is that for some p, both Op and Fp. Since however propositional quantifiers much complicate the semantical apparatus we shall introduce constants into the syntax, and let p^ be the first constant for which a dilemma ensues. That is, a new axiom, extending the logic, is [DD] 0p1 & Fpp i.e. p1 is dilemmatic.3° The modelling condition for [DD], is wd. For each a in 0, for some world x, Sax and v(ppx) = 1= v(ppX ). * This condition, which does not involve T, does not impose nonclassical conditions on normal worlds. Accordingly [DD] is only a weakly paraconsistent requirement; it does not imply that inconsistency protrudes into the factual or regular worlds. Indeed one advantage of the semantics is that it enable proof that dilemmatic judgements can be included without inconsistency. By contrast, modal theories cannot include even one half of [DD] do) without automatically excluding dilemmatic judgements. consideration has a thesis 0p2 for some (either will Suppose the logic under Then for every x in 0 there is some y such that Sxy with p2 set to hold at y. But modally this is enough to guarantee that [D] holds materially, More explicitly, so ~(0A & 0~A) generally, suppose otherwise that in i.e. there can be no such dilemmas. some model the material form of [D] �failed; I(OA, then = T) 1 = I(A~O, T), which impossibility at y since I(A, y) = 1 i I(A, y). syntactical problems earlier in 1). even for Although [DD] implies Op^, very weak obligatory is conjured from the fact some for STy yields y This is a semantical analogue of the deontic logics (considered type of modal it does not say, nor does it follow, that OT for any Such modal stupidity as that every necessary and every tautology T (e.g. C v ~C). truth is since automatically removed that relevant in the relevant wash. can be This theory removes such paradoxes as p1 from which 0(A v ~A) would follow modally by 0—distribution (i.e. A v ~A, Again the [RM]). semantics can be applied to establish the point in proper detail. primitive principles of minimal relevant logic are open to challenge, Both the and [K] * Jennings has been disputed by Schotch (in Jennings and 81). The main Schotch- arguments against [K] — which induces what they call ’paradoxes of complete * aggregation essentially turn — automatically avoided on modal deontic by relevant and assumptions, Their theory. accordingly are (p.152, also main point p.154) is that [K] obliterates the distinction between [D] (i.e. Op ~0~p) and [Con] ~0 , i.e. in effect ~0(r & ~r). Their argument depends on construing implication in [D] as material-implication and on strict replacement. ~0~p iff ~(0p & 0~p), i.e. iff ~0(p & ~p) using [K] Then Op and its provable converse, i.e. iff ~0(r & ~r) using p & ~p - . r & ~r and strict According to the relevant approach the trouble is not with [K] but with replacement. the modal assumptions, which are independently objectionable (see 1). Their further argument begins from the premiss that ’we should certainly want to include among our deontic principles the law of moral consistency [Con] across cuts all different things. moral theories’ (pp.153-6). The ... because that principle premiss appears to conflate What cuts across all moral theories is the theme that some things, such as a sufficiently evil state of affairs, are not obligatory, whence ~0s. does cut across all theories is the assumption that there are no moral dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~A), which is what [Con], with not just that there What are theories like properly defined, would imply. those of Lemmon and Sartre It is which include contradictory obligations; it is also that some theorists would want to insist that there is something logically wrong with principles like [Con], e.g. that it doesn’t make sense to talk of the nonobligatoriness of absurdity. Schotch and Jennings do contend that we should allow for moral conflict of the form OA & OB where A and B are inconsistent. their assumptions there [K] stops rejection of are moral dilemmas that yielding Since then B -> ~A, of the 0(A & -A). it follows that on form OA & 0~A. Yet as they Certainly only themselves have reported, the consensus view is that there are (in the end) no dilemmas of the form �OA & O~A: insofar, all theories’, ’cuts across then, rejection of dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~[~]A) so, near enough, does rejection of those of the form OA & 0~A. What certainly does not emerge is that there can [K]. The be no deontic logic which takes as a primitive law the principle be can that best if done, subscribe to [K], we is to formalise ethical theories - namely those which do not allow moral certain particular conflicts (p. 156). logics provide decisive counterexamples to this contention. Relevant deontic They can take [K] as primitive: they allow for moral conflict; but they do so by allowing, like Lemmon, for moral inconsistency.31 disconcerting More from flowing the than fundamental difficulties deriving principles, transmission [K] from are allegedly those difficulties include which well-advertised paradoxes of deontic logic. § 5. Resultant on impact other relevant paraconsistent shift. and puzzles of paradoxes deontic theory of the Often cleaning up one logical puzzle in due technical detail has a beneficial effect on surrounding puzzles and on associated problems in the area. Light is cast on, and So it turns out also in the case of moral dilemmas. Among them sometimes solutions are delivered for, a number of other linked problems. are the following puzzles generated by theorems of (relevant) deontic logic. are, the ’’paradoxes of commitment”. Where material implciation => is in first place, defined as usual, e.g. T1. There ~A v ~B, it is a theorem that A ° B 0(B => A), whence if OA then 0(B 25 A), OA sometimes read: A if is then obligatory anything one commits to A, or: ’Doing anything commits us to doing what is obligatory’; T2. FA OCA => B), if 0~A then 0(A = B), sometimes read: if A is forbidden then doing A commits one to doing anything at all, or: ’Doing what is not permitted commits us to doing anything whatever’ readings are proceed from Prior from there interpretation of paradoxes symbols, the The claims read off are paradoxical. 62, p.224). to little justification - reading ’0(A commits one to doing B’. the in and (the quoted in logic this case B)’ as depends, always, depends crucially on - But to on the what has as a commitment relation, e.g. as ’doing A Such a reading which presupposes that material implication is a satisfactory conditional can in no way be sustained (see RLR), and that is the end of the problem. that A then paradoxical guises; and it If, ought to for example, T1 be features disappear. these commitment the case is simply read: if it ought to be the case that either not B or A, then the alleged However puzzles have a tendency to reappear in new puzzles are no exception. Even with conditional �18 terms of obligation applied to a properly defined in obligation conditional, the puzzles in reemerge new forms, example, for genuine (relevant) in is what called ’’Ross’s paradox”, and in related transmission problems. It has been claimed that the principle, OA -> 0(A v B), yielding if OA then 0(A v B) T3. is which T1, to equivalent is Ross paradox principle), - paradoxical to do either A or B, it may be More generally, given OA, obligatory to read a letter but not to read or burn it. there is an obligation example, for because, where the content of B may be totally do to established. (The comment goes beyond what T3 supplies, but that is not material). the in circumstance which obligation the to is set inappropriate A or A similar objection is made to the analogous permissibility principle PA ■> P(A v B), T4. Ross’s paradox, on the alleged grounds that there are examples where A is permissible but A For example, be. not the following it is permissible that to post a takes based on some one application of T4 is said to the paradoxical: letter false proposition the distance implies that it is permissible to post a The assumption that there is some sort of paradox here is letter or kill one’s aunt. however B may the towards that the permissibility of of permissibility killing the consequent one’s The aunt. proposition itself seems to be based on an application, never articulated and quite inadmissible, of Disjunctive Syllogism, distribution, P(~A &. A For PB. (A v b) ■+ B, and what results from P- it may certainly be permissible not to post However it is assuming more than standard deontic logics will grant to the letter. go on ) ~A & to the permissibility of not posting the letter and letter or killing disjunction. one’s aunt, especially given the also either derivation of posting the latter the Still going on remains tempting (and would presumably be warranted by a Lukasiewicz deontic logic analogous to his 4-valued modal logic). But so going on is to no avail in a duly relevant setting, where Disjunctive Syllogism fails: there is no admissible route here to the permissibility of killing aunt, one’s however desirable the act might otherwise be. main The transmission conditional obligation, strict implication, as problems in found also modally derived. an adequate deontic logic are, like those of They come from reliance on material or representation of implication. The worst manifestation of this is that already discussed, deontic trivialisation leading from Op^ and 0~p.| to OB, for any B, in virtue of the provability of p^ & ~p^ => B. But there are variety of lesser manifestations of the same underlying problem, of which the following example (adapted from recent discussion) is just one sort: p4. We have an obligation to feed the starving poor D. There exist starving poor. Therefore, since starving poor, it ought to be by O-transmission, the case it ought that we meet our obligation to feed the to be that there exist starving poor, a �19 that is far from obviously true. deontic logic, for the simple reason presupposition relation, conclusion of transmission problems of modal the that the cannot p4 Such analyses do not entailment. an to rather or implication, (material-) upgraded be plague relevant The many systems all enamate from excessive O-distribution on basis of implications will not them, support in the as following transmission principles typical of orthodox deontic logics, all of which should be rejected: OCA D B) D. OA 3 OB A D B -> OA 3 OB A => B =>. OA => OB. With their rejection a thorny tangle of modally-derived paradoxes is also rejected. There appears however to be an immense temptation to try to impose excessively strong transmission principles; and the same phenomenon to be seen at work in modal contexts can also be observed when a proper entailment is introduced.3^ This occurs, particular, in attempts in to ’’normalise” [RM], to strengthen it a from rule connection to an entailment, for instance, to (the characteristic S3 form) [OT] A + B +. OA + OB; it occurs with analogous changes thereon, and e.g. A-> B. PA PB and A FB + FA, as well with as imported forms of these principles, e.g. OA & (A and (A -> B) & FB As an example of the FA. B B) OB type of puzzles that [OT] produces consider p5. Grannie killed the vicar. Grannie repented for having killed the vicar The problem with putative entailments such as p5 is that, while we are ordinarily (with the context duly flashed out) inclined to agree that Grannie ought to repent, we don’t want to agree to have killed the vicar. that Grannie ought The problem turns essentially however on the availability of [OT] in place of [RM], for p5 is not a provable entailment of the underlying logical theory (and there is little case for it one), trying to make sc [RM] does not apply to p5, in contrast with awkwardness [OT] appears to require, of having somehow entailment, is thereby straightforwardly avoided.33 Most the of paradoxes falling paradoxes and Robber paradoxes can be paradoxes and usual forms of these resolution. one’s According helping a man under such to deny descriptions as similarly resolved or avoided. variations upon [OT]. The is that p5 Good Samaritan an The original them certainly succumb to such to the Robber’s paradox if robbing a man is forbidden then The Good Samaritan whom one has robbed is also forbidden. paradox is a further turn on this paradox: not only the robber’s helping a man he has robbed is wrong, so is someone else’s, a good Samaritan’s, helping the robbed man (see Prior 58). - be It is undoubtedly paradoxical that it should - especially as a matter of logic wrong to help a man who has been robbed: but do any fundamental deontic �20 principles commit us to such a thing, for appropriate substitutions on variables? No, These puzzles all take the following form: B, which describes something they do not. admittedly wrong, gets in or implied as part of the description of something larger, A, arising as a result of the situation in B; however A is not wrong but perhaps even Nothing required. theory; and in none of shows this the however that A B literature can examples in the the provable in is it There be. logical is another important feature, commonly neglected however, which is that A does not assert B. If it did, then A, since amounting to A & B, would appear to be wrong also, as B is. This points to a difficulty also for the usual assumption that A entails B; for then A (certainly modally) coentails A & B, whence the wrongness of A coincides with that of A & B, the wrongness of which would seem to be guaranteed by B. If however A only involves B in a weaker sense, [OT] is exonerated.3^ The paradoxes can be pushed another way, to contest this data, and bear against systems as minimal as MD. For MD yields theorems like the following: T5. FB T6. 0( F(A & B), whence if FB then F(A & B). OB, whence if 0(A & B) then OB. &B) theses, Such minimal it is now suggested, are paradoxical in the same way as the Robber. This is not so: only gross confusion of decidedly distinct syntactical forms - a practice formalisation can unfortunately encourage - could support such a suggestion. If it is wrong to rob a man then it is wrong to rob him and help him;35 but it is not thereby wrong to help him, indeed to help him who has been robbed. But the relative and the tense shift are both important; and the whole relative clause in no way reduces to a conjunction conjoining robbing the man. The positivistic objection that the paradoxes of deontic logic show that there is really no ’’logic of norms” has come even from a modern founder of deontic logic, von Wright. This he now contends that There is no such thing as an "entailment” between a norm Op and a norm 0(p q) - and Ross’s paradox makes us aware of the absurdity of talking as though it existed. ... Ross was right when he offered his paradox as a proof that, properly understood, there could not be such a thing as a logic of norms (82, p.15, rearranged, emphasis suggested in text). And he ’essentially (p.14). (also also But mistakenly) of variations given that one regards and the von Wright contains such normative tautologies Op are inevitable. Thus while ’’paradoxes’* the same, viz. wants also the of deontic so-called to supply logic as Ross’s Paradox’ a deontic logic, which 0(p q), some subtle and dubious distinctions Op & ~0(p q) is normatively inconsistent, inconsistent; while Op can be thus said to ’’normatively entail” 0(p q) it is not it does not; and while Op comes rational commitment to Op, it does not carry logical commitment to �it. the Unlike said are connections associated to and entailment (p.15). no paradoxes induce other But normative these relations, what is said go to for normative entailment can be said as well as regards entailment, that one (e.g. a law giver) is Op adopts who rationally to 0(p q) going on to endorse the entailment of 0(p q) by Op. for a oitrary addition away there is no puzzle in associations are cleared once mistaken modal q. Indeed committed The ’’paradoxes” of deontic logic are not a reflection of the illusory notion of a logic of norms but rather a product of a modal logic of norm. However von Wright has other significant reasons for insisting that (in a sense) ’norms have no logic or that normative discourse is ’’alogical”’ from noncognitivism, that symbolising norms, formulas’, ’prescriptive standard a on One derives (p.4). interpretation deontic ’do not express true and false propositions. It makes no sense to speak of relations of contradiction or entailment between formulas when thus interpreted ’ hold nontruthvalued regards as semantical This is not so: (p.4). theory relevant as such discourse, for sketched logical relations such as inconsistency logic deontic carries no commitment to the position that normative discourse is truthvalued. 0 interpreted In imperatives. fact ineradicable The values 1 and by way of holding are not intended to be tied to truth and falsity, except at the factual world T (see RLR1); and that exception is readily removed. judgements, instead normative received, logic the both (the point requirements e.g. Otherwise the etc.). adjustments the and of the form Fp, semantical can be said to be in theory its ’’semantical” is developed, For force (or is as before. With such minor theory conform to noncognitivist to meet von Wright’s argument, in Morscher, pp.97-8). Von Wright’s other reason for coming out against a logic of norms is but grist It is that ’there cannot be a logic of norms because a for the paraconsistent nill. could enjoin contradictory legislator (at ’’relative least serves" Morscher, ...) dilemmas. it but p.98). to the is normal not states of affairs. This might be irrational purpose which the institution of giving orders logically excluded, it is not alogical’ (cited in That is, a legislator can set up (usually unintentionally) deontic This is certainly not triviality, by modal-strength indictment, not of deontic deontic logic, It impossible. but logics. of a is simply excluded, Once again the on criticism certain modally-dominated pain of is an approach to it.36 §6. Upsetting the moral consensus: unrealisable obligations, and inevitable wrongs. The theme that there are moral dilemmas, like those cited, which stand, which do not dissolve upon rational reflection, philosophers, 3? and apparently runs agains the consensus among moral certainly upsets dominant positions in ethical theory, notably �22 broadly Kantian positions (built into much contemporary British moral philosophy) and utilitarian positions (which pervade Anglo-American and theory value thinking, especially outside narrowly philosophical circles). Kantian positions suppose that morality is above all a rational procedure of a certain sort (which we tentatively grant), and that rationality requires consistency. Or put differently, but for instance, must be consistent. Thus what is obligatory, equivalent given modal assumptions, ought implies can, OA -> OA, for every A and some Wherever an agent appears to be in a moral dilemma suitable possibility functor 0. this is a matter of appearance only, a moral illusion which will (and must) vanish on further rational reflection.^ This Kantian assumption should be rejected: moral dilemmas are part of the data and no illusion, and no amount of reflection need budge them. By insistence upon consistency requirements, and through failure, consequently, to recognise intractable moral dilemmas, deontological theories have been forced to jump through a variety of different hoops and to weaken considerably their positions. In particular, temporary and moral firm principles are almost invariably weakened to something much more provisional. is experience While important, some revisability of principles in the light of such wholesale weakening of principles is decidedly There is a point then in trying to undesirable, on both logical and moral grounds. expose some of the tangled assumptions on which the weakening is based, and to loosen their grip. The assumptions involved on a Kantian approach include these: H1. Moral principles - in those concerning justice, particular more fairness and the basic principles of obligation, such as like - are to be explained at bottom as principles of rationality, or rational behaviour for persons. H2. Rationality is a matter of consistency; certainly it implies it. H3. Consistency reduces to, or can be accounted for, through possibility. Put together these assumptions yield the theme H4. What is obligatory must be possible - ought-implies-can , for short. So if that gives, so do some of the assumptions. but on moral dilemmas, It does give, not just because of So also then independent grounds. should the assumptions give; and they fail not just on the grounds that they lead to themes like H4. The deeper trouble is that they are based on a super-modal view of things which combines modal assumptions with rational strong The assumptions. combination is important, for once the modal assumptions are rejected, it becomes fairly transparent that the rationality assumptions, whatever their merit, cannot such things as moral framework or system or course of action. rational case, systems: removing much more modal is required assumptions - a than rationality main present uniquely determine Rather there are rival for uniqueness. exercise - In any destroys such �rationality route to ought-implies-can. Finally consistency is neither necessary nor That it is not sufficient is indicated by a variety of sufficient for rationality. consistent worlds which do not conform to minimal rationality requirements. is converse relevant refuted which conform inconsistent worlds by meet rationality requirements (see further RLR and OP). H3 fails, paradoxes induces ~0A -> ~(A ° B), generally is not just that the Modality removed. of paradoxes with entailment, e.g. anything all. from isolated transmitted to are inconsistent is arguments Not only H2 (as a necessary assumptions parallelling proposition impossible inconsistency It modal when consistency of an fails, also is not 40 this indiscriminate way. However to rationality to sufficient reason and the like), and by dialethic theories which standards (e.g. condition) The more impossibility in collapse; ought-implies-can at there are distinct from those supplied by moral dilemmas. counterexamples to the theme, The counterexamples concern obligations (or oughts) which are impossible, in some sense, to realise, counterexamples Op & ~0p) But wrongdoings. most the of possibility Derivatively then (substituting ~p for unrealisable obligations. that wrongs are inescapable, there are many determinates of possibility examples than concern also mere involve, in their logical possibility necessitated (and necessity), and less anemic notions of correspondingly broader notions of original (and p in setting, necessity than a narrow logical necessity). perhaps strained, adaption, and, in any case, they serve to undermine the point and Nonetheless they sometimes admit of, force of the ought-implies-can dictum (which is to link obligation to freedom to do otherwise), and These examples all arise nature, circumstances, its effective use against moral dilemmas. seriously weaken thereby because agents are constrained in one way or another - by fate, the Gods, their past actions - but are not thereby released from their obligations or exonerated from wrong-doing. Consider first very down-to-earth types of counterexample to ought-implies-can, before turning to more high-flown but not altogether dissimilar examples from our barbaric past. ’Suppose that I say "I ought to go and see him, but I can’t because I don’t know where he is”. There need be nothing inconsistent in such a remark; and, yet there would be if "ought” always implied ’’can'” (Hare 63, p.52). same with situation ”’I where ought I've to return driven the this car I’ve car so far borrowed, away that returning it in time to keep a promise’ (Thomason, p.175). but I It is much the can’t”, there is said no chance in a of my Likewise the claim of the person who cannot swim that she ought to rescue the child caught in the current but can't. One traditionally important class of counterexamples derives from the Catholic doctrine of perplexity secundum quid.^ Donegan, in defending what he calls 'the 24 �Hebrew-Christian tradition’, contends that once one has sinned one May be faced with situations from which one cannot escape without further wrong-doing (77, p.152). That ♦ is, one may be so placed (through one’s own fault) that one ought not to perform any of the available actions though one cannot do otherwise. So it is necessary that one act in a way that is forbidden. Protestant thinkers, particular Luther, appear to have considered the human race involved in one grand secundum quid on account of original sin. ’God punished justly sinners who not could otherwise do Luther believed that than sin’ that God and ’provided men with a law they were unable to keep and then righteously damned them for failing to keep it’. 242 The Calvinists also were committed - but through their doctrine of predestination predestined to sin, unpalatable conclusion - to rather they cannot but by suggesting Because conclusions. similar humans are However Calvin attempted to escape this sin. that in some suitable sense are not sinners compelled, that it is somehow possible for them to do otherwise than they do. J Given however the theme of predestination this attempt to escape looks unconvincing. Any stronger determinism that does not also obliterate morality is in a similar Creatures will have obligations which they cannot fulfil because they predicament. are determined and will to do otherwise, sometimes be bound to do wrong. Plainly where this becomes a general and automatic matter, a serious erosion of moral notions such as responsibility, normally linked to obligation, is bound to set in. However isolated cases analogous to those of determinism can occur without such erosion of moral notions (as indeed with moral dilemmas themselves). rigidifying personality and ossifying character are of this gets older Cases of A person as she sort. may build up a personality so rigid that she cannot escape from it. At some point it becomes impossible (at least psychologically) for her to act other than she does, yet on some occasions she ought not to act in the way she does. outcome resembles that with original sin though the route taken Yet even if we grant that the person ought not to have got still we are entitled to our moral judgements; modern morality * The is very different. into such a position, as Pigden puts it, ’an enlightened can allow such violations of ought-implies-can. Classical Greek morality certainly seems to have allowed for such violations. In Homeric ethics a man could be blamed for failings he could not avoid, unavoidable wrong-doing. and so for Subsequently it was taken for granted that impossible moral requirements could be placed upon a hero, yet he could be blamed for failing to meet them. Thus the situation of Agamemnon and of Oedipus, both despite their struggles, despite their awareness of their predicaments and their anguish, were bound, indeed, fated, to act wrongly, and were duly blamed for their wrong-doing. 25 �There have been various attempts to salvage the ought-implies-can theme, through a residual Kantianism. presupposes-can Thus Hare proposes, but does not really work out, an ought- a with theme weaker relation presupposition logical replacing implication (53, p.54); and both Barcan Marcus and Morscher suggest a model theoretic connection: essentially that for OA to hold true A must be satisfiable in some world, and so, modally, A is consistent. But within a relevant setting, the satisfiability is hardly a requirement and does not ensure consistency. constraint, Once again, consistency is only obtained at the cost of other more important connections, such as Nor does Hare’s comparison with presupposition (on p.54) succeed. O-adjunction. the analogy such situations the worked implies-can. as practical question those and dilemmas moral But (pace Hare, p.55) as to what to do not would counterexamples affording If arise in ought- to the question most certainly does arise in many cases. §7. Resolving proceed, in moral any dilemmas, dilemma so far situation be. as can easily are Recipes for what provided, enough decidedly poor recipes have been much canvassed in the literature. how to to, indeed several Among these are deontic ranking recipes, which would have us impose some type of priority ordering on deontic principles, so that consistency is maintained and in every situation there is a dominant rule; defeasibility recipes, which would have us weaken all deontic rules to merely prima facie or other-things-being—equal principles and operate, when things look would going like have wrong, utilitarian by and assessment; pure-chance recipes, which situationally but arbitrarily by such methods as us determine outcomes coin toss. Such recipes fail to meet important conditions of adequacy upon any account of the way resolution is effected, if and when it can be, namely: A1. The account should sufficiently resemble what rational choosers do when they find themselves in a moral dilemma. Many human choosers have moral principles, have not rigorously ordered in such which, as against ranking recipes, a way as to exclude dilemma they situations, and which, as against thorough-going defeasibility recipes, they are not prepared to give Thus, in addition, away or modify when they encounter snags. A2. The principles induce which moral dilemmas are not generally abandoned or qualified, but very often stand. Naturally sometimes moral dilemmas, especially development and revision of principles. if they recur, do lead to moral But the logic of dilemma situations does not force changes or adjustment and none may be made; and typically none will be made, where dilemmas are resolved, resolve dilemmas which they may not be. The assumption that we must is probably a hangover from consistency assumptions, that deontic inconsistency must be removed - whereas all we have to do is act, or do nothing, in 26 �the face of them. Part of what is wrong with the idea of a predetermined ordering of principles, the conflict, and also the they remove is that as with utilitarianism procedures, felt tension, and often anguish, that goes with it. Even if the appeal to priority succeed in some cases, it does not in fact work, and 45 general. For with Lemmon’s complex dilemmas where ordering of principles does not could succeed, in uncertainties enter be can there preassigned no solution moral to the in dilemma virtue of higher-order principles or a given ordering of one’s duties and obligations and the like, because part of the very dilemma is just one’s uncertainty as to one’s actual situation (p.153). In any event dilemmas do not go away as they should if the conflicting obligations were merely prima facie. Very often someone in a moral dilemma is in a fix and feels it^^; and doesn’t say ”My God there isn’t a problem, I must simply look up the book principles are ranked and what’s to be done’, to see how these not having been so prepared. in which we, as it were, merely .... dilemmas in which we morally prepared, have to look up the solution in our private ethical code, are rare ... and in case any of little practical Of interest. are those importance greater dilemmas in this class where some decision of a moral character is required Our predicament is here so described that, whatever we do, even if we do ... nothing at that might mean), we are doing all (whatever something which we ought not to do, and so can be called upon to justify either our activity or our inactivity (Lemmon, p.151). The usual deontological positions, which deontic weaken principles to provisional or prima facie principles to avoid problems with dilemmas, also play into utilitarian hands. reflecting things that of in often is which only are to act overriding requirement character utilitarians want For the for such to represent most a way disguised (a sc part as to of obligation statements concerning distributed, e.g. are the taken coherent way as derivative; net utilities position from would their own the deontic make this Deontic principles such as reduce somehow distributed type of action which tends to maximize utility. accounts typically rule out moral dilemmas: both apart or to tend complex to be an action is obligatory when it maximizes (expected) utility and it is of a recognised cannot they ar . - principles as deontic maximize utility, maximisation principle so only for the most part also). those all maximise utility, and indeed 27 Such reductive for example, an action and its opposite if an action increases utility then its �opposite characteristically diminishes it. if all moral injunctions More generally, answer back ultimately to just one standard, maximum utility, then there can be no real conflict (but etc.). for these It is apparent conflict through failure to calculate correctly, sorts of reasons that the considerable data now accumulated regarding moral try to explain away, to utilitarians deny that there can be So they are in the awkward position of having to dispute, dilemmas. genuine moral and only dilemmas. But how, when stuck in moral dilemmas, do we proceed to reach a decision? For a 47 decision is called for: those in dilemma situations still often have to act. The intuitive procedure in such dilemma situations is not difficult to grasp. terminology is regularly employed, and is instructive. to those the in - dilemmas weighed assessed, are The same Alternatives - outcomes open up, the balance. put in The familiar scales picture, with the scale sensitive to evaluative weights, is helpful - except it that can suggest, weighed against another, whereas there may be as with of justice where one thing is two competing principles or just that there are several. scales the options, In the light of such a weighing up of alternatives, those in dilemmas then determine what they should do, what is best, or satisfactory, ’If ... we are to act here in good faith,we shall recognise in the circumstances . that the dilemma is what it is and make the best decision we can * There is an attempt to then intuitive apply (Lemmon 62, p.151). methods, decision consist which in assessing and weighing the alternative outcomes open, and maximizing or satisizing on these This outcomes. already very looks consequentialist decision theory, which is what, a like preanalytic account of in a qualified way, we shall reach It is in a qualified way for several reasons; not only may no best (or even towards. sufficiently good) outcome be determinable - there is nothing approaching a decision procedure here - but the further decision theory methods apply within moral dilemmas, so they supply, at best, a second best resolution, a first best result requiring removal of moral dilemma constraints and so being ruled out. Those in dilemma unworkable (and situations usually do not resort to anything as mostly arbitrary and often ineffective) utilitarian as complex and assessment procedures. Nor do they surrender to pure chance procedures. A3. The account should not give way to irrationalism, but should adhere to rational decision procedures, which are not necessarily, however, effective. This requirement rules out pure chance methods, which are only appropriate where it is a matter of indifference which way the decision, if any, Even where some resort to methods can give a worse outcome than might be obtained. tie-breaking devices is appropriate, that may dilemma, but rather to some component of the not be situation. Otherwise such goes. to the final Envisage, outcome of a for instance, a decision-tree for an issue where a tie-breaking device such as a coin toss is applied to a high branch and that proves sufficient for rational decision methods to resolve 28 �Then it would be irrational to try to resolve the whole issue the issue concerned. by coin toss. Nonetheless A4. The account should be appropriately situational. That is, the account should be applicable to each situation on its own merits, taking It should not simply be a rule­ detailed account of the features of that situation. for in dilemma cases the rules have ceased to yield a resolution and based account, into a are locked be will fix position. situational, it will not that of situational be involve resort to pure—chance methods. by situation, situational most part, by example) or example by virtue of A3 and A4, though the account Thus, procedures ethics where such ethics Nor is a situational ethics (ethics situation For the of a broader type being recommended. into operation where a moral only go dilemma is reached; in general, deontic rule-based procedures apply. The broad outlines of a satisfactory account are beginning to emerge. Before we consider apply rational decision methods to each given dilemma situation. is how this to be so as account, to be said about the needs For to meet apparent objections. insensitive those accomplished more to in switches language, both FA and A, some options, and yet that, also F~A, that it ought also be that so B, very idea of it should be that B, where B entails We do not however go on to one of A and -A, so that not both A and ~A are ruled out. claim the is both A and ~A are ruled out as moral that situations, in certain in For are we not only claiming that decision-theoretic resolution of moral dilemmas. for structure of the things, there is, to among other contradiction a It should that not both A and ~A ruled are out morally.49 What is being claimed that B, or an adequate thing, is the best thing to do in the constrained circumstances, that B should be done in that sense, net that B is lifted to status obligation enough in the circumstances, by looking at you does not the can B is In brief, <»B, "second-best obligation"). determined (though imply OB. acceptable worlds worlds where B holds which fail to be acceptable. say, if you like, that it is a the best that can be done or good is not going to be When <£>B holds where B When holds, because there are holds is not going to be settled in general by falling back on deontic rules, because in the interesting cases the rules are jammed. But such deontic rules dees not being beyond imply being beyond rational procedures, indeed procedures that may be represented by way of rules (though not controlled by deontic rules). The rational procedures in question are essentially those of decision theory. What is required is a decision as to what can be done in the circumstances; and this can be determined by relevant alternatives. be of something weighing up the expected outcomes and selecting among The selectiin may be of the best in the circumstance; satisfactory in the circumstances. The approach adopted pluralistic, allowing for both maximizing and satisizing procedures. 29 the it may can be Maximizers will �of course argue that it would be irrational to select anything but the best among the alternatives (given that it was conceded to be the best); But satisizers will resist arguments.what such elaborates is what upon we a under do decision done normally this:- Set out the relevant alternatives, action courses of alternative. to us open Select a best, i.e. way - is - merely which in outline the results that the different list to. analysis intuitive more i.e. lead will a in theory Determine the of each likely value with maximum likely value, an alternative or a The basic procedure is childishly simple, but filling sufficiently good alternative. out the details may be extremely difficult or even impossible in a satisfactory way. The in problems, normally order increasing alternatives open, establishing their probability, rankings to them. things these cases, favourable more delineating the assigning values or desirability techniques from decision theory however for doing all There are in are: difficulty, of and in less circumstances favourable guestimates can be made or resort had to fuzzy methods. To descend to concrete applications (where procedures may be clearer than at the theoretical level), consider again the Platonic dilemma discussed by Lemmon, where I ought to return my friend’s gun and also ought not to do so. The alternatives are to return the gun and have the wife shot, or to return the gun avoiding a shooting but thereby breaking an undertaking. the alternative first wife It is certain, in the circumstances, that under the will be shot, highly a undesirable outweighing the lesser undesirability of the second alternative. the value of second Since the expected first, exceeds that of the alternative considerably much outcome, the best thing in the circumstances is to return the gun. However undertaking goes Lemmon to seriously the return ’to gun suggesting that one sacrifices one’s astray in utilitarian considerations’ No doubt (p.152). utilitarian considerations would bring out (could be massaged to bring out, rather) a But the fact is that no consideration (or interpersonal comparisons) similar result. of the utilities pleasures and pains contemplated. ’’critical involves an (whoever Lemmon utilitarian ones. the everybody of (involved they confuses are), the in is made, consequentialist universe, or or even needs whatever), to considerations with be their remotely much narrower Similarly the recipe Hare suggests for resolving moral dilemmas at level”, namely illegitimate resort to assimilation act-utilitarianism of (see, consequentialist e.g. 82, considerations p.43), under utilitarianisms. In certain respects Lemmon’s Platonic dilemma is not a good example of a moral dilemma; tougher in particular, dilemmas, the it is too easily resolved, and so characteristic features of pain, emerge, moral dilemmas can anguish, indecision, get omitted. As thus begins to be divided roughly into two types, easy and hard. 30 Easy �dilemmas are those that are comparatively easy to find a way through eventually, and But hard ones are those that leave people caught in the dilemma so are resolvable. at least uncomfortable irresolvable. they whatever to choose and do, are so in a good sense Though a way-through or a way-out may be charted by decision methods, it is a way that leaves those involved morally uneasy, dissatisfied, or worse. For at the far hard end of the spectrum lie those dilemmas of tragic dimensions. Although consequential decision rationally within moral dilemma theory provides a for model how proceed to situations, by no means everyone confronted with a moral dilemma will apply such procedures in an intuitive way, even though many will. For one thing, there is plenty of scope for bad faith, irrationality and and more generally, for non-rational procedures; and severe moral dilemmas often enough induce non-rational and even paralytic or self-destructive modes in those who are caught in them. another, For there are indirect ways of obtaining the effects of decision theory, analogue decision theory so to say. Counselling, whether through a friend or a professional counsellor, is an important analogue: there the discussive mode helps to bring out eludicating of and assemble alternatives, undesirability of each. the and elements the of the advantages decision and approach, the desirability and theory drawbacks, Alternatively, or as well, these elements may be bought out by reflecting on a range of similar situations and experience there using these cases as some sort of precedent, in particular, for determining value rankings of alternatives open. Moral dilemmas have corollaries for moral ways of doing things. is that perfectibility of the moral scheme of things is impossible. One corollary Any sufficiently rich set of rules risks inconsistency, and will be inconsistent if completed. dilemmas are thus inevitable be; in the larger scheme of things. Moral This is as it should for it is in this way especially that moral development occurs and moral stature is obtained. 31 �^A much earlier version of this paper was presented by the second author at the Australian National University in 1975. Subsequently much of the paper was lost; what survived is largely incorporated in the first three sections, especially §3. However the new version takes over the leading ideas of the initial version. The authors are much indebted for comments and criticism to C. Pigden, R. Goodin and G. Priest. was ^This even true Maliy’s of pioneering system of 1926 which permitted replacement of logical equivalents within the scope of obligation function 0 (see F & Von Wright’s seminal work H p.3). (in 51), which set the pattern for mainstream deontic logic, was explicitly based on the modal comparison of deontic functors with modal functors, and built modal that break the modal systems, exceptional assumptions in at the bottom of the theory. The connection, are deontic systems based on relevant logics on such systems see RLR, chapter 8. ^These paradoxes are explained, obligation, paradoxes of derived and their see modal bases exposed, On the for some of the p.224; and Prior 62, further in §5. considerable literature on paradoxes like those of the Robber and Good Samaritan, see anthologies and the Hilpinen A detailed uniform treatment of especially Vermazen. all these and other deontic paradoxes in the framework of relevant logic is given in RLR II. 4In its equivalent form, Op => ~Fp, i.e. what is obligatory is not forbidden, it is the dubbed ’’Bentham’s Law” by von Wright 81, p.2. 5In a way, furthermore, avoids that the , problems Hare’s and complexities attempt to transfer a levels-resolution to deontic paradoxes would lead to if worked out paradoxes. the compare properly: any In counterintuitively, case, that problems of semantical if we were even ’ought’ is ambiguous levels say, to as to Hare as levels, avoid to some semantical proposes, but tinkering would still be required to fix up a deontic calculus at each level. Moreover, there are good grounds for doubting that the so far ill-characterised and artificial distinction of levels that Hare wants to impose can be satisfactorily made out. For one thing, critical hardly the holds up; level for separation intuitive of the paradoxes intuitive are from the typical of rational or act utilitarian assessments at the upper level, and we can be rational and critical, and ask for why- explanations, at both levels. ^There are various different form, OA, OB -> ^It is this principle can take, e.g. also a rule 0(A & B), and a rather useless material form, OA & OB =>. 0(A & B). tried criticised below. forms however by Schotch and Jennings, p.152; their argument is It is also suggested by Barcan Marcus, p.134., and toyed with by 32 �Williams o In particular Lemmon, taking off from Sartre, has argued this in two important papers, neglected in mere recent philosophical literature on moral dilemmas and moral conflict. earlier Recent British work, in literature that it could logical further the next note). on conflict of values has particular, profitably have taken into ignored account (see Such an uninformed approach is however not uncharacteristic of British philosophy. ^Especially Lemmon’s work 62 and 65. But although Lemmon suggests (in 62, e.g. p.150) that there are no logical problems in accommodating moral dilemmas, including those of the form 0(A & ~A), none of the systems of deontic logic he presents (e.g. in 65), not even the very weak systems, can do so without trivialising. The reasons for collapse are the modal ones already explained. Apart from the work of Lemmon and a few who follow him, work which at least suggests the need for a bridge even if it does not offer so much as good working plans for one, the literature on moral dilemmas tends to bifurcate - into purely philosophical material which does not address the logical issues, and largely logical material which characteristically avoids the crucial moral issue of dilemmas, which the logics espoused cannot handle (and maybe because of that: otherwise the logical literature On the regrettable lack of interaction between deontic logicians disputes the data). and ethicists, the latter being the worse offenders, see also Thomason’s notes. 10 In fact the latter implication of O-transmission could be much weakened for the purpose of the arguments, e.g. the form A B - > OA D OB would serve to make the point. 11 Gumanski 80 affords a good example of the complication resulting, complication readily removed by relevant logic relocation. 12 The argument thoroughtly for this fallacious. ’principle of deontic contingency’ Either an in F & H, p.13, is illegitimate quantificational conversion (from some to all) or a modal confusion (from p & ~p to q & ~q) is used to get from P(p & ~p) for some p - which is all the denial of deontic contingency gives - to Pq, that is, to ’everything is permitted’. 1^For see axiom, (D1) Op =>~0~p, of the standard systems as formulated in F & H, p.13, and use the interdefinability of P and 0, e.g. PB 4 1 ~0~B. There would be little point in presenting features of the epicycling systems of types (iii)-(v) in any detail since all will be quickly dismissed. In any event, details can be found in the Hilpinen surveys 33 (71 and 81), texts which are ir fact �restricted to epicycling positions within the dominant modal paradigm for deontic Even Schotch and Jennings, who do question some minimal principles, remain logics. staunchly the within modal sphere, their as possible worlds and semantics their substitutivity principles reveal. 15 F & H, p.8, in support p.16. This consistency interpretation appears to have extensive Scandinavia. Of course if consistency were meant in a different sense (that of regularity), it would be different. But it is not: see the development in F & H, p.l6ff. 16 Cf. Lemmon: philosophers that ’It ... does the not to seem adoption of have been new morality a associated with the confrontation of a moral dilemma. much by observed an agent ethical by is frequently Indeed, it is hard to see what else would be likely to bring about a change of moral outlook other than having to make a difficult moral decision’ (62, p155). not settled without so to speak Similarly Barcan Marcus (p.12): ’although idealistically, a source of moral motion. dilemmas are is, Moral inconsistency residue, the recognition of their reality has a dynamic force. 17 In 1975 when the paper was first drafted and presented this example was still topical. However at most times in modern human history there are many candidates to substitute for variable V. 18 In the narrow scheme of standard deontic logic, these would be recast in terms of the forbidden functor F, defined as 0~. However in relevant logic settings, it is a further question, not settled by the framework whether W reduces to 0~. * ^Williams 20 are Jim-Pedro example (in 81) is of this type. As there are other war dilemmas, and especially nuclear war dilemmas, so there other violence. pacifist dilemmas, e.g. the problem of violence to prevent greater On nuclear war dilemmas, and on the main pacifist dilemma, see the War and Peace series. 21 For many of the contractual arrangements, isomorphism, known moral dilemmas we consider, especially those there are analogous legal dilemmas. preserving very many important logical generated by For there is a wellfeatures between moral obligations and rights and wrongs and corresponding legal obligations and rights and wrongs. The complexity of legal frameworks, the relatively independent design of using �parts and divine numerous lack of design control legal of likelihood the dilemmas and sources decidedly complexity to high. analogous An is dilemmas moral for consistency, or checks argument considered in render the fjrom the McConnell, p.275ff. pp Lemmon’s final treatment, but (fifth) type of ’’moral dilemma” does so far resist more formal is that the mainly because class concerned description and lacks even clear working examples. so far These are, defies adequate roughly, situations ‘in which an agent has to make a decision of a recognisably moral character though he is completely unprepared ... by his present moral outlook’ and has somehow to fashion a new moral outlook. is There so far of here nothing especial paraconsistent concern. By no means all the types of situations falling under Lemmon’s ’classification of moral dilemmas’ (62, classifying types of first class and p.156) are dilemmas. situation’, ‘moral the classification starts out is nothing dilemmatic about there and which Lemmon about the second, little Indeed the ‘does not wish to call ... moral dilemmas, because [as with the first] in all the cases our moral situation is perfectly clear’ (p.143). The main types of moral dilemmas Lemmon discerns, the third and fourth classes, are precisely those treated in the text. The concurrence even of several different, 23()f course the control is limited. perhaps apparently independent, logical approaches is no sure guide to correctness of an explication or has to answer back satisfactorily to The matter still account. preanalytic principles. 22* In dilemmas, the initial version of this paper three into types (0, 0~; complication was based on a mistake, collapse. are F, a rather F~; and artificial classification of 0,F) was proposed. But this that equation of 0~A and FA would lead to modal And, apparently a more natural and simpler theory does emerge if 0~ and F equated. Naturally definitional than coentailment. More highly equation intensional in this context does not differences between the imply more notions, which there are, remain unaffected. What holds for F does not automatically transfer independently. ^The labels and Jennings. [RM] and [K], convenient to P. Perhaps P should be treated in what follows, are taken from Schotch Note that although symbolically virtually the same as the originals, they symbolize different determinate principles. ^See as well as RLR I, Routley 72, Routley and Meyer 73 and OP. 35 �the 2?Under four-valued American plan for relevant logic * can be semantics, avoided. But here the superior two-valued Australian plan is followed. 2&Though here we simply take the rule over from standard deontic semantics, it can be argued in several ways, explained (though usually for the analogous necessity functor) as in RLR. class of such A, b One way is this:- in situation a, where OA holds, consider the i.e. {C: I(OC, a) = 1}. This gives an initially acceptable set up with respect to a; and indeed would yield the sought rule (with S improved to a but for 1-1 relation) fail, conditions the fact that bo may not be a world because required closure conspicuously We primeness. can however extend though not ba, uniquely, so that world requirements are met. The picture looks like this: S is the composition of the function (from a to b ) and the extension (to the b-’s). The b.’s are the accepted worlds vis-a-vis a. ^The point and role of evaluative step-down is explained in Routley 83. 3°The strategy resembles that earlier in Routley and Meyer 75 in Plainly there is room for other postulates, formulating explicitly dialethic logic. e.g. exploited In virtue of the model theorem Ot, where 0p2 where p2 is not dilemmatic, etc. t is any tautology, such a postulate is guaranteed in standard deontic logic, but it is rightly left as an option in relevant deontic logic, and also in Barcan Marcus. third 31A type of argument for rejecting [KJ is implicit in Schotch and and also in Barcan Marcus, namely that without [K] both moral conflict and Jennings, the Kantian ought-implies-can principle can be retained. That supposes of course that the Kantian principle is a desirable one, worth going considerably out of one’s logical way disaster to retain. [KJ But the is not from the combination of Kantian only in principle involved theory with moral dilemmas: reaching other equally solid and respectable principles than [KJ could be considered for rejection. ^2At this logic and point we do detour analyses of moral beyond our dilemmas, to look critique of modalisation of deontic at some separate puzzles in deontic logic - which have also been used against the idea of a formal treatment of ethics. And the approach we take to these further 36 puzzles - by limiting transmission �in the fashion of weaker, and deeper logics - is largely independent of principles, the reaminder IN short, we could have taken a different approach to paper. of the these transmission puzzles, without varying the rest of the paper. 33 Of course it can be argued that one is storing up problems for (much) later on when the logical theory repenting have fuller a better developed, is much more fully developed, and predicates like those of logical role. so also will be presumably when But the logical theory is the distinctions between types of predicates and those sustaining transmission. 34 It is common practice indict deontic logic by so stating the deontic ’'paradox" that they smuggle in much more than a satisfactory entailment relation could warrant and more even than a modal relation would grant. paradoxes will be presented as arguments Here is an example. These [deontic] against Consider the Good Samaritan paradoxes formulated the "standard" as follows: deontic logics. 1) A is obligated to help an injured criminal 2) If A is obligated to do B then A is obligated to do whatever B entails. (This is a principle of the standard deontic logics.) 3) There could not be an injured criminal if someone did not commit a crime. So 4) A is obligated to bring it about that someone commit a crime. (From 1- 3 by the standard deontic logics.) The So 5) logics are standard deontic (For flawed. 4) is outrageous, though its premisses are not.) Entailment principles do not justify the importing of 'bringing about' in clause 4). 35 And wrong to rob him and not rob him, and so on. Conjunction is not here connexive with one conjunct undercutting another - though connexive deontic logic is what some seem to be seeking. ^Accordingly Morscher's retreat to "rational norms" and "rational legislating" is But unnecessary. presupposed again that a deontic Morscher the grasps key point, that von Wright has logic must contain certain consistency-type principles, and that 'this presupposition need not be fulfilled' (p.98). 37 Schotch and Jennings, community of moral philosophers' philosophy, analysis. where claim 'widespread support for (a) among the (a) is the theme 'that cases of real moral Most likely this claim, like most such sociological claims conflict cannot occur'. in (pp.152-3) is merely impressionistic, and not based on any sort of survey or But we expect further investigation would tend to confirm it. no J Thus, to take just one example: there appears to be a conflict 'One may be in a situation of course in which of principles each of which appears categorically 37 �binding - but natural reflection will ultimately show that one or other must prevail’ Benn (p.5). But examples abound. The reason reflection removes inconsistency is that obligations do not collide. We have it from Kant himself Because however duty and obligation are in general concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certian actions, ... it follows that a conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntor). (Metaphysis of Morals, cited in Barcan Marcus, p.323.) But does it world the (merely) practical follow not of without action However necessity. sweeping a but the worlds concering consistency assumption picked out by function not of objective these worlds are, moral dilemmas certainly appear to show, sometimes inconcistent. There are depending what is the explanation can go, various different ways and contractual arrangements a route like that of Hobbes through Rawls will be followed. Given less, taken e.g. granted. for only grounded example, For or preferences given choice individual behaviour, interests a semantical route might be And so on. tried. 110 The inadequacy of modal accounts of inconsistency is explained in detail in RLR, chapter 5. ji -1 These examples and most of those that follow were suggested by C. Pigden, who also supplied the references. HO The first quote is from Kenny, p.75, the second from Skinner, p.7, both of which furnish additional details. 4^Cf. Kenny, p.78. 24/4 According to MacIntyre 66. The situation of Agamemnon and Oedipus are remarked upon in Williams 81, p.80. There there are is not a substantial and cannot literature be general arguing, not entirely universally applicable principles in all circumstances of their application. conclusively, rules for that ranking of Thus, for example, Ross, p.41, also discussed in Barcan Marcus, p.124, Barcan Marcus, p.135, Hare 82, pp.32-4. It seems that such a result would be proved, as regards effective rules, by methods of reversion theory. 38 �^The relevant; points Hare makes concerning anguish remorse and (82, pp.29-30) are they apply also against his own proposal to treat all principles as prima facie. But points concerning anguish and guilt are not decisive; account of how these attitudes arise can be given from for one thing, an modal a angle (cf. the discussion in Barcan Marcus, p.127). ^By no means all dilemmas require resolution, e.g. those of no practical import such as purely theoretical dilemmas of freedom, etc. liberty, These can, in principle, just stand. 48 As Lemmon explains (in 62), really following Sartre, there is considerable scope for bad faith and opting out of our responsibilities here, e.g. pretending that no decision is called for, or that another has preempted the decision, or that the decision is otherwise determined or out of our own control. 49No doubt we could tough it out dialectically, but the basis for doing so is Any lacking. adherence contradictions to calles for especially rigorous justification 500n satisizing decision theory, and the dialectic between maximizers and satisizers, see MS. Fuzzy decision theory is however only in the initial stages of development at present. 5^This is just one of several reasons why Hare’s grand synthesis (in 82) of Kant and the utilitarians, initially appealing in its two level tidiness and simplicity, goes down the philosophical drain. A main reason is that the synthesis is built upon, and incorporates, consistency and modal assumptions, and so is inadequate moral data to be accounted for theoretically (see further War and Peace II). to the �REFERENCES R. Barcan Marcus, 121-136. Journal of Philospohy 77 (1980) ’Moral dilemmas and consistency , * S. I. Benn, ’Public and private morality: clean living and dirty hands’ in Public and Private in Social Life (ed. S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus), Croom Helm, London & Canberra, 1983, 155-182. A. Donegan, The Theory of Morality, Chigago University Press, Chicago, 1977. D. Follesdal and R. Hilpinen, ’Deontic pp.1-35; referred to as F & H. B. C. logic: van Fraassen, ’The logic of conditional Logic 1 (1972) 417-38. an introduction’ Hilpinen in obligation’. Journal 1971, of Philospohical L. Gumanski, ’On deontic logic’, Studia Logica 39 (1980) 63-75. S. Hampshire (ed), Public and Private Morality, Cambridge University Press, 1978. R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Clarendon, Oxford, 1963. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Conflicts’). Clarendon, Oxford, 1982 (see especially chapter 2 ’Moral R. Harrison, Rational Action, Cambridge University Press, 1979. R. Hilpinen (ed). Deontic Dordrecht, 1971. Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, Reide1, R. Hilpinen (ed), New Studies in Deontic Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981. A. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979. E.J. Lemmon, ’Moral dilemmas’, Philosophical Review 71 (1962) 139-58. E.J. Lemmon,’ Deontic (1965) 39-71. Logic and the T. McConnell, ’Moral dilemmas and Philosophy 8 (1978) 269-87. logic of imperatives’, consistency in ethics’, Logique et Canadian Analyse 8 Journal A. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966. of �39 A. A. Martino (ed.), Deotnic Logic, Computational Systems, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1982. Linguistics and Legal Information E. Morscher, ’Antinomies and incompatibilities within normative languages’ in Martino 82, pp.83-102. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; hereafter OED. G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Australian National University, 1983; hereafter OP. in Papers Logic, #13, A.N. Prior, Formal Logic, Second edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. A.N. Prior, ’Escapism: the logical basis of ethics' (ed. A.I. Melden), Seattle, 1958. in Essays in Moral Philosophy, W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press, New York, 1930. R. Routley, ’War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war­ deterrence, and the political fall-out’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. R. Routley, ’On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Inquiry 26 (1984) , ; also War and Peace II. R. Routley, ’Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; hereafter MS. R. and V. Routley, ’The semantics of first degree entailment’, Nous 6 (1972) 335-59. R. and V. Routley, ’Semantical foundations of value theory’, Nous (1983) 441—56. R. Routley and R.k. Meyer, ’The semantics of entailment I’, in Truth, Syntax, and Modality (ed. H. Leblanc) North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1973» pp.199-243. R. Routley and R.K. Meyer, ’Dialectical logic, classical logic, and the consistency of the world’, Studies in Soviet Thought 16 (1976) 1-25. R. Routley and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, Part I (1982) and Part II (1984); referred to as RLR I and RLR II respectively. A. Ryan, The Idea of Freedom, Oxford, 1970. P. Schotch and pp.149-62. R.E. Jennings, ’Non-Kripkean deontic logic’, in Hilpinen 81, �40 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern University Press, Cambridge, 1978. Political Thought, Volume 11, Cambridge R. M. Thomason, ’Deontic logic as founded on tense logic’, in Hilpinen 81, pp.165-175. B. Vermazen, 'The (1977) 1-71. logic of practical 'ought’-sentences’, Philosophical Studies 32 B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge United Press, 1981. B. Williams, 'Conflict of values' in Williams 81, pp.71-82; also in Ryan 79. G.H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1951. G.H. von Wright, ’On the logic of norms/ and actions’, M. Hilpinen 81, pp.3-35. G.H. ven Wright, ’Norms, truth and logic’ in Martino 82, pp.3-20. �TYRANT MOPE ON NOPAL DILEMMAS 1. ethics. 2. Revolutionising Possible heading, why the failure to comprehend moral dilemmas. All these Reading force^'^^e off in other directions. Undoubtedly a great deal of ethics has been messed up by a failure to understand moral dilemmas. ' ... The failure is often reported; for instance human since justifiable claims ... and are rights claims, they be outweighed by other As in all conflicts of moral principles, human rights reasons must be weighed other moral can against one another by an as yet poorly understood and ill-defined process' (Rajfles, p.42). The failure shows up on the apparent clash between doing ethics by way of principles and doing ethics consistency reasons, principles. vor principles break down, through examples. or dilemmatic And examples. examples it is thought for air^. thought to refute A proper approach to dilemmas removes the tension between examples and principles and allows a synthesis to be achieved. 3. Moral rectitude. Now is notion this to be unpacked0 mhere are competing explanations, e.g. 1) in terms of obligation and deontics; 2) by way of consequentialist rectitude decisive. assessment. Pettit to make moral mhen it requires assessment thus 3) Method 1) unless dilemma; otherwise method 2\ rectitude so it is absolute in terms of O. 4. wants This is impossible. Mcjlly's system has no moral dilemmas, since ~fu For it proves trivial deontically. But he also wants to run 0~u^ - at least intentionally. Aquinas denies certain moral dilemmas, e.g. Np & F~p, in the doctrine concerning perplexus simpliciter F & N p.12. 5. Investigate further the connection of permitted and accepted worlds, and commission? This 'possibly permitted' does not involve discussed in NNL. the fallacy of reducing permission * 'permissible to It does tie with the suggested connection of commission and omission through the * function. ��2 6. Is problem of the individual in society, of a person in politics, an organisation or a company of this type i.e. dilemma of freedom? Of. a dilemma that can just stand, like the theoretical also Machiavellian a problem: person in public must (morally?) act evilly sometimes. 7. of PUBLIC distinction The moralities. VS MORALITIES PRIVATE implies that there are two The BASE ARGUMENT against is this: But there are not two. if we acknowledge this conception of morality as requiring some action as the thing to do, how, logically speaking, could there be two moralities0 the thing to do when they conflict? overriding reason for action?^ How could morality then What is provide an Similarly &n utilitarianism single maximisation recipe and results. (/? DOEBN'01 REQUIRE KANTIANISM.) However A can to be subject conflicting public and private claims. Seen this way ^public vs private just generates.heap of further moral dilemmas, and the 2 moralities ^is just shoddy attempt to escape these dilemmas, expedient (i.e. would become n shoves morality out as in the Hinduism resolution dilemmas. of often in a way that’s politically of the way for expediency'1. The 2 moralities * int if pursued this distinction-making attempt at / Something special about public/private case0 Or differently, why are arguments from expedience so much more acceptable in public sphere0 Be^n gives r interest some reasons, but these oughtn't to justify a difference. | public interest DIRTY HANDS PROBLEM (PARADOX) is like GOOD SAM? behalf of the statecommitting murder. Sometimes it is right get one's hands dirty. E.g. Doing such and such on OR just a straight dilemma? to try to succeed, and then it must also be right to But one's hands get dirty from doing what it is wrong to do. And how can it be wrong to do what is right? Or how can we get our hands dirty by doing what we ought to do9 Z M. Walzer, Philosophy and Public Affairs, moral 2, 10°^, dilemma. 164. Op Walzer sees this as a tragic dilemma: p-> q Oq, but 0~q. Example: but really a torturing captured terrorist to extract information to save innocent lives. The problems start from questions of relations between two different moralities. �Conclusion: 8. Conflict conscience 'that, the public to at its most liberal, loyalty, overriding moral liberalism in end. to a On between will stand the individual, tried committed concern for its collective interest, the one hand the individual as a relate this ambiguous model of the a individual and as an autonomous, citadel, on the other, the overriding perverse, wilful obstacles in the way of the general will. to with no gainsaying, and the claims of possessed of liberties that only he himself can waive, by consent; State, equipped society, not T have only to liberal conceptions of what belongs to the private and what to the public, but also to the tension between a morality of principles and one of valued outcomes, which, in my view, is very closely connected with the ambiguity of the model . * ("Renn? 9. Argument for weak paraconsistent position. Morality is a guide to action. Action is consistent. So have to r?l consistencize. ^Inconclusive"1. Like law one consistencizes (e.g. for action^ alright. But that confirms that it is inconsistent in the first place. 10. The difference. fought distinction is, it It hands the opposition its case. is objected, a Simply not so. distinction without a �The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • Letter, unidentified author to Richard, 27 Jul 1984 re Moral dilemmas. (2 pages (1 leaf)) Reference card and handwritten paper, ? Alchourron and Bulygin (1 reference card + 5 leaves) Letter, Charles to Richard, undated re New Studies in Deontic Logic and Castañeda's proposed deontic logic. (2 pages) Cuttings from unidentified publication, The paradoxes of deontic by Hector-Neri Castañeda (page 46-47), and Some main problems of deontic by Jaakko Hintikka 9page 94-96. (2 leaves) Letter, unidentified author to Richard, with annotations by Sylvan?, undated, re Moral dilemmas. (7 leaves) �Ml Although the sorts of examples we have described seem familiar enough, it might well be disputed that they are correctly described as cases of Op and 0~p, or in the alternative representation as cases of Fp & F~p. The main ground for this is the belief that �19. in any such case one of the parties to the conflict is less wrong, and that this one can be claimed to be not really wrong at all. There are however several objections to this move to neutralise the dilemmas (1) First, wrong party. there is no guarantee that there always is a less Both parties may be equally wrong, no way of deciding which is less wrong. Vietnam example; To take and there may be our hypothetical if we withdraw half a million people will die; but if we do not withdraw the war will continue and half a million people will die; clearly the example may be elaborated. There may be no grounds for choice. (2) The fact that one party is less wrong than the alternative is no grounds for saying that it is not wrong at all. In fact the case would normally be described as one of choice between " two evils", two wrong aciwsese©; if one chooses the lesser of two evils, then one still chooses an evil. ing One is simply not justified in claim1 that, where p involves killing 10 people, p is not wrong simply on the grounds that ~p involves killing 15 people, any more than one is in the case of preference theory justified in saying that p, which brings a gift of $10, is not a good thing simply on the grounds that ~p brings a gift of $11. things; (3) They are both good and in our moral case, both are wrong. If we do say this, plainly it will be very difficult to find any moral principles which can be asserted with any confidence universally. In fact it will probably be possible to find hypothetical counterexamples to any statement of the form "All actions of type x are wrong", just by producing a case where p is an action of type x, but ~p is an even worse action. that p, although an action of type x, is not wrong, It will follow so we will have �However, a counterexample. it seems to be important that we should be able to assert such general principles, and doing so gives us an essential way of assessing, morally, (4) Finally, types of actions. the proposed redescription of the case as involving only one wrong element, the one which is more wrong, leaves out an essential feature of such a case, that it is a dilemma, case where one cannot but act wrongly. If we omit this element the case is not properly described, it is falsified; a we may as a result find ourselves unable to explain many resulting features of the situation which result from the conflict, e.g. human behavioural features >n such a situation involving hesitation, doubt, inaction, perhaps anguish and guilt. All these will appear quite irrational. (5) Assigning a priority to our moral rules itself does nothing to resolve the logical problem raised by the dilemmas, (although it may solve the practical problem of how best to act). % For this logical problem iX the problem of how to arrange our logic so as to be able to describe such cases adequately and without falsification or incon-sisteney. Arranging a priority, so that A one alternative can be claimed to be less wrong, does not solve the logical problem, which is that whatever happens will be wrong, that T cannot be identical with I. The consequence that whatever happens is wrong cannot be removed unless as well as a priority assignment one also adopts the principle that what is less wrong is not wrong at all. But this principle leads to inconsistency for then the less wrong action is both wrong and not wrong. To be consistent this method must introduce a new concept of wrong in addition to the old one, say "wrong2" , and the less wrong action can be said to be not "wrong2". But now the original problem is �21. still not eliminated, because the problem was not that whatever be is . happened would /'wrong2" (although this/now false), but that whatever happened would be wrong, which is still true. sort of priority - dominated concept cannot replace, may supplement, the original concept. And this although it �Sf- The problem of classifying these dilemmas. z mainly using the term ’wrong’. We have stated our dilemmas However, it may seem that this is ambiguous, and that it is possible, or desirable, to make a further distinction, between pi inciples which are obligatory and principles which are prohibitory. For wrongs can be due to two very different causes - om^iission or commission. The distinction between obligation and prohibition principles can be explained initially as follows: an obligation principle of the form Op read ’it ought to be the case that p’,Qt is �f ? L ' r jT f'.Jlz.f:? /t/tjyJ /4-< 'it ought to come about that p'. This says that something, p, ought to should happen that p'A, r, happen, an ideal situation I. that is^ that it is a member of & A situation^satisfies Op, Op if p is not in it then, if p is In it ( p eaJ;and violates p's presence satisfies Op, whereas (pZ S?) • £ ["Obligation" Z7 —:----- is ’ being used here its omission or absence violates it. in a somewhat unusual sense, 4 for Lemmon seems to be right in urging that obligations are usually contractual in nature. and contracts may be contracts to do something or to refrain from However, we doing something - hence both positive and negative. must press 'obligation' and 'obligatory' and adjective corresponding to it * into service as a noun ought to be the case that' in order to avoid clumsiness and for lack of any other suitable words. The other class of principles, hand, we shall write prohibitive principles, on the other 'Ep' and read 'it is forbidden that p'. These principles claim that p is the sort of action which should p is not a member of the ideal situation I. be avoided satisfies Fp, situation a such that p Z such that pea violates it. a situation a whereas p's omission or absence satisfies Fp, whereas pSoccurrence or presence violates it. is paralleled on the obligations) The distinction action level by the distinction between action and by that between and inaction, A 'sins of omission' and 'sins of commision' A (which violate (which violate prohibitions). 'I have done those things which I ought not to have done' violating a prohibition but also, and not equivalently, not done those things which I ought to have done', thus 'I have thus violating An obligation is satisfied by doing something, an obligation. a prohibition by failing to do something, by avoiding something. It is important not to confuse 0~p, which says that should happen' or 'that ~p 'It is wrong that p', with Fp which says ’that p should not happen', or it * should not happen that p'. This �distinction is clear, as a scope distinction, in the English reading However the two are continually confused in modal treatments of But deontic logic, since given Modal Muddle p / I = ~p g I. that to say/p should happen is not to say anything about what should not happen but leaves the issue as to whether ~p should or should And to say that p should not happen is not say and 0~p tells anything about ~p,/whether it should happen or not. not happen open. aj us that ~p is a member of I, where.Fp tells us that p is not a member of 1.^ Dilemmas then seem to fall into three classes depending upon whether the principles which lead to them are obligation or prohibition principles^or both. Fp and F~p, Thus we obtain Op and 0~p, and Op and Fp from our examples depending upon how the principles involved are construed^ a<Tprohibitory or obligatory. (A): Dilemmas obtained from prohibition principles, Fp, % F~p1. i.e. cases of We obtain cases of this sort given principles of the * form. — (1) Whenever P satisfies condition C, (Action form: (2) it shouldn't happen that p. action of type x are wrong) it shouldn't happen that p. A Whenever p satisfies condition C', The dilemma is obtained where p satisfies condition C, ~p satisfies condition C'. Jo O F and - ■L Give the semantical reading of 0 and F?and the examples with 'wrong' . Then mention the necessity for distinction between 0~p and Fp. (1) Wrongs divide into sins of omission and sins of commission. (2) These are semantically different. (3) Unless one distinguishes these concepts semantically have the consistency assumption again. Give the readings. one will �10. Examples can also be obtained from two distinct prohibitory These are cases where the state of affairs described principles. (for reasons given by the first by p is really indescribable principle) (for different reasons given by the second principle). able, * (tndesir For/(B) and the state of affairs described by ~p is m^-ally The second category of dilemmas are dilemmas obtained from obligation principles i.e. cases of Op & O~p, for some p. We obtain cases of this sort given principles of the form:(1) Whenever p satisfies condition C, (2) Whenever p satisfies condition C', it should happen that p it should happen that p. The dilemma is obtained when for a given p, p satisfies condition C and ~p satisfies condition C': (C) Finally, so Op and O~p. examples derived from conflicting but not inconsistent moral principles, which urge both that p should occur and that it should not occur i.e. and prohibited. cases of Op and Fp, where p is both enjoined These cases come about where are principles of the following sort: (1) Whenever p satisfies condition C, p should happen. (2) Whenever p satisfies condition C', p should not happen. The dilemma results because one can find cases one and the same state of affairs C and condition C'? e.g. (p) (in T) where satisfies both condition as^our example derived from Lemmon's uAcrw-tt bolew, x gives back the gun and helping a murderer. (p) is a case both of keeping a promise But promises must be kept, so Op holds. However actions which help murderers are forbidden and should not occur; examples, hence Fp also holds. unlike the previous kind, It seems that these sorts of cannot be generated by a single moral principle, but requires two principles which come into conflict. �With a certain degree of artifice we can arrange our examples into these categories, with f A) groups being prohibitions the (fe)groups obligations, and the (C) groups mixed. �It is necessary then to avoid the modal treatment and to But though 0 principles and F principles distinguish 0~ and F. are distinct, 0 and F provide alternatives bases for (semantically) The O-principles correspond semantically to deontic system. inclusion principles,the F formulated principles to exclusion Thus e.g. principles. TRfH 5® where iff iff TROH * , (UH) (TRfH oX(p,H) = f) In contrast, I(Fp,T) = t iff (UH) TROH d Kp,H) Thus the modellingswill mirror f) . one another, with R Rf For the representation of principles then we can work satisfactorily with an O-basis, or with an F-basis, but not with a mixed basis which uses both 0 and F principles. Failure to distinguish 0~p and Fp will provide a ground for the mistaken consistency assumption: iff p i H. for it will follow from evaluation rules �12. The cases described satisfy the characterisation of moral For the principles involved are not inconsistent, yet dilemmas. they are not satisfiable in T. In the case of the first set of leading to Fp and F~p, dilemmas, the principles could not be satisfied unless neither p nor ~p occurred. necessarily complete, But since T is they cannot be satisfied in T. of the second set of examples, Op and 0~p, In the case the principles could only be satisfied if both p and ~p occur, hence since T is con­ sistent, they cannot be satisfied in T. different. The third case is very Here it cannot be satisfied because one and the same proposition satisfies both conditions for occurring and conditions for not occurring? this proposition, hence our principles direct, with respect to that it should occur and that it should not occur. This also cannot be satisfied in T, since p is either a member of T, or not a member of T. The principles involved are not however inconsistent ones; for in each case a finite proposition modelling of the principles can be provided. In the third case, directives, despite the fact there are inconsistent given a contingent proposition p^, which satisfies the antecedent conditions, no inconsistency need result because such a proposition p^ may not occur. In other words, though the principles together with p^ form an inconsistent set, p-^ is essential and can be deleted from the set since contingent; and the set without p1 as the principles on their own are satisfactory is consistent, where no antecedents satisfy both, a po£S»4ta- case. ■ v r • The principles ** (a. though inconsistent in application are not inconsistent^ i In the first two cases(they are T consistent?) also it is a contingent matter that the principles come i ... into^ cannot be satisfied in T; r; for detachment of a contingent truth is made, viz that the given ? proposition satisfies the conditions. �13. since they constantly arise““without sacrificing the generality of moral principles. For unless carefully treated dilemmas will/ as we shall see, provide counterexamples to moral principles. Our moral dilemmas result from judgements which cannot be satisfied in T, so that whatever happens will be wrong. Howe is there/still quite a crucial difference between the first two classes and the third class of dilemma. In the third case the result of the dilemma on detachment of a contingent premiss that p satisfies c and c' simultaneously is an inconsistency, cannot both belong and not belong to the ideal set-up I. since p Although the principles upon which the judgement Op and Fp was based were not themselves mutually inconsistent, moral judgerent they do result in a inconsistent that p both ought to happen and ought not to happen is prohibited from happening. Given that p has both properties, the moral principles concerned are in conflict. This is brought out by the fact that if p does satisfy these conditions, cannot be any situation, T-like or not, there in which the principles are satisfied. Furthermore here we have a case where each moral judgement provides a counterexample to the other. If Op and Fp both obtained, both the principles from which they were derived would be false; principle for Op would provide a counterexample to the prohibitory (p) (if p satisfies c’ then Fp) since Op ~Fp; while Fp would provide a counterexample to the obligatory principle (if p satisfies c then Op). (p) �J \ 14. In view of these points it seems that a moral code which resulted in this sort of conflicting judgement is defective; the principles involved should either be restricted by tightening one or other of conditionsc and c', or else restated by reformulating one or other of the principles, (p) (Cp => F~p) replaced by (p) (C'p => 0~p) . or i.e. either (p) (C'p => Fp) (p) (Cp => Op) is is replaced by the case is reduced to one of the first In short, two cases. In this case the dilemma arises because the principles In the first two cases however involved come into conflict. the difficulty does not arise from conflicting principles, but is simply a case where our not v/ judgements cannot both be satisfied in T, because they are conflicting, but because of the peculiar Where Op and 0~p both hold, nature of T. (or Fp and F~p) what- ever happens will be wrong, because p & ~p cannot both hold in T, The dilemma is however simply explained nor p & ~p fail to hold. and the judg.ements accepted once it is understood that I, situation, action, is not T-like. The dilemma may produce a conflict in because given the logical structure of T and the limitations it imposes upon action, both judgements. it is impossible to act in accordance with But this does not effect the judgements themselves; as moral judgenents, assessments of the moral worth of p of affairs) conflict. (a state of ~p^jthey are quite compatible and there is no To say that p is wrong and that ~p is also wrong is in no way to be inconsistent, true. the ideal and both judgements may very well be The absence of conflict also explains the fact that such cases can be produced from single moral principles, such as 'Killing is wrong', which in no way inhibit internal conflict. �15. Judgements such as 'p is wrong of action or states of affairs; as to how to act in T. alternative in T, Hence Op does not compare p with its ~p. Such judgements are implicitly comparative, not to ~p's worth, but to the Thus if we reach situations as to moral worth of its absence. (using moral criteria for selection), if for every situation H, H+p is worse than H-p. in a situation assess types and do not simply give directions but p's worth is assessed relative, desirability & ~p is wrong' p is wrong If p's presence makes the situation morally worse than it would be if p were absent, then p is wrong. But now it is a straightforward matter to claim that p is wrong and that ~p is also wrong; one is aHL simply claiming that situations without p^orally preferable to the that (should be chosen^etc.); same situations with p * and also situations without ~p are morally preferable to that same situation with ~p in it. These judgements in no way conflict, and if we were in a position to choose a situation with neither of them in, we could satisfy both judgements simultaneously. is the choice must be regarded as a hypothetical one, As it and the judgements as representing a kind of thought experiment, rather than in giving directions as to how to behave in T. The choice embodied in such a judgement is one between two hypothetical situations and not between alternative versions of T. It is just for this reason that this type of moral judgement is adequate for assessing morally different types of actions or sorts of states of affairs. Because we are concerned with choosing between hypothetical situations, we can opine that all actions of a certain specifiable type and states of affairs satisfying a certain condition are wrong (not wrongyetc.), without risking * In the case of Op & 0~p. In the case of Fp & F~p one ismaking a slightly different claim, that a situation from which p's absent is morally better than some in which it is present. Note that the difference between 0 and F can be to the difference in directionthe rankings. �16. falsification because of the contingent features of T. Finally, in such a judgement one is concerned with assessing the action or state of affairs in itself rather than passing judgement about the best way to act in a particular situation. Dilemmas of this sort then, as opposed to dilemmas of the conflict sort first discussed, are not the result of defective moral codes or principles and do not require any readjustment or resolution (beyond psychological acceptance of the fact that it is sometimes inevitable that what happens is wrong and that perfectibility is impossible). They do not provide counterexamples to general In contrast moral principles based on contingent features of T. codes containing the conflict type of dilemma are defective. Any code containing two principles of the form 'wherever p satisfies Cl, Op' and ’Whenever p satisfies C2, Fp’ where C1 and C2 are not inconsistent, will be defective because there is a possible situation (a hypothetical case) with a p^ which satisfies both C1 Whence the inconsistent pair Fp, potentially inconsistent. & Op,. and C2. Any such code is at least This sort of defectiveness of a moral code might be excusable if it were inevitable. But it is not. can be avoided if we adopt either 0 or F as primitive, and state our judgements in terms of one or other of them, but not both. alternative, terms, conflicting is intolerable. moral It The principles stated in No principle could be asserted with any confidence, because they would hold or fail just according to whether or not a suitable proposition with conflicting properties appeared in T and provided a counterexample. And since this is contingent whether such principles hold or not would be entirely a matter of good or bad luck. Moral judgements on the other hand ought to apply beyond T to possible situations, ought to be non-empirical and apply to hypothetical cases, matter of accident. and ought not to hold just as a �4 C ‘S’ -X f * �univeralisa'blemoral principle was a judgement The general ‘ 7^' about types of action or states of affairs and compared p's presence in a situation with its absence from the same situation on a scale of moral desirability. This concept of wrongness is essential to be able to state general moral judgements. But as well as this concept we can distinguish another important concept which is designed to assess not types of action but what is the best course of action in a given situation. This is obtained by comparing p's presence in a situation not with its absence but with the presence of its rivals in a given situation, e.g. ~p in the case of T. p will be said to be ’the best course of action' ~p are both wrong) if a situation Thus (even where p and (usually T), with p in, ranks higher morally then the same one with ~p in. A more practical - concept still can be obtained by comparing p and its practical rivals, say will be the best course of action practical alternative q) f Y r if a situation (as compared with its (usually T) (morally) when p is in it than when q is in it. between alternative ways of extending will rank higher One chooses T. It is important as Lemmon points out to distinguish this concept clearly from the more general concept earlier explained. Lemmon is wrong in suggesting that this is not a moral concept at all and does not give rise to moral judgements but to judgements of expedience. The judgements involved in this case are still moral in the sense that the criteria for ranking situations are �22 specifically moral ones and not based simply, say, on aesthetic considerations or desirability considerations. clear that this distinction Yet it is (which we shall call the distinction between differential obligation and intrinsic obligation) must be ignored and eliminated if obligation is treated as a modal functor For give/} the principle of Modal Muddle (H) (p e H = ~p e H) semantical recipes we have given will be identical. p's presence in H with p's absence (p / H) comparing p in H with ~p's being in H. the To compare will be the same as It is essential however to distinguish this notion of 'best course of action' (differential basic notion we have discussed, because it has quite different properties. * It cannot replace although it can supplement, The reasons are as follows other notion. 02 does not allow for (1) the moral dilemmas. p with its practical alternative in T, e.g. For since we compare ~p, to say that Op & 0~p is to say that a situation H such p e H is morally better than a situation H such that ~p e H, and also to say that a situation H such that ~p e H is better than one such that p e H. This is a (Similar results will ensue when F is taken as a contradiction. basis). (2) 02 cannot allow for general moral judgements of the form "All actions (states of affairs) counterexample. of type x are wrong" without fear of For no matter how compelling our principle and how repugnant the type of action described, we can almost always find a case where the only alternative action is worse. however repugnant p may be, Hence, it will not in this case be wrong, a counterexample to one general judgement will be provided. new notion then cannot do the same job as the old; —----------------------------------------- . and Our it should be , We u^e such as 'the best thing in the circumstances' 'the right thing', 'the correct course all in all' to capture differential obligations . �23. regarded as parasitic, because it can be alternatively represented as admitting the wrongness of the alternatives, but going on to weigh up the alternatives to obtain a recipe for practical action. (3) implies can" slogan It is to this notion that the "ought applies. O2P o locjically possible p, because one has selected p as the best course of action from logically possible alternatives in T. Indeed ’02p’ can be made to imply ‘p is physically possible' (or even physically possible to the person being exhorted) by comparing p with its physically possible alternatives in ranked situations. In a similar way, the concept of blame attaches to failure to follow the best course of action,i.e. if p is better as a course of action than its and one fails to do it. action.* (practical) alternatives, One is not blameworthy for doing p merely only as good as, because p is no better than, i.e. alternatives, one is blameworthy its remaining it has to be worse than some alternative course of It is important to note that blame attaches to this second differential concept of obligation, rather than the first intrinsic notion, for the possibility and obvious unfairness of someone's being blamed for doing wrong where both Op and 0~p hold and he has no alternative which is not wrong would otherwise be a powerful objection to cases of moral dilemmas. (5) Finally, differential obligation makes a basically different type of judgement from the intrinsic notion. not of a type of action or state It is an assessment or of affairs, the action/state of affairs in itself, but of the situation in which it occurs, action in this situation. This is reflected in such phrases as "the best thing in the circumstances" "the right thing to do the conditions obtained at the time)", etc. * Oh well, you cannot be blamed. circumstances . the (given Hence it is not You did the best thing in the �universalisable , and does not try to be. It “results in a recipe for action, and is closely allied to advice or exhortation/orders , persuasion, recommendation or other directed activities. Intrinsic obligation however/ frafc^s no account of possible action and does not need to; it assesses action-types regardless of how they occur in a given situation. This last point is important in connection with argument about moral dilemmas. For the confusion between our two concepts has a disastrous effect on argument, particularly those hotly disputed arguments which occur in the case of moral dilemmas. The following sort of argument, due to confusion between Oi and O2 is all too common in such cases. Actions of type x are wrong (1') (if p satisfies c then Oi~p). (p) This must be Oj because it represents a general and exceptionless (2) p is an action (3) ~ 02 i.e. ~p: (state of affairs) judgement about a type. of type x. p should not be done. Therefore do not do p. The argument is plainly unsatisfactory because the fact that Oi~p holds is not sufficient to establish that 02~p To holds. do this one would have to show that the alternative, p, was not worse or even just as good. not be so. And in cases of dilemmas this may very well To establish 02~p one needs to show not merely that p is wrong but that there is some better course of action. The fallacy derives from trying to base a recipe for action on the intrinsic obligation notion, Oi. �s 25. A closely related confusion holds that it is inconsistent to claim that p is a wrong type of action, that it should be done nonetheless the best course of action. August 6 197 x (e.g. is repugnant etc., but - because it is nevertheless Canberra Times Editorial, on abortion reads as follows: "It is significant, and inconsistent with its official stand that the s ynod should have qualified its recommendation to family doctors with the words "however regrettable we feel this to be"." to be inconsistentthen, one states to be What is being claimed is that one should recommend a course of action (morally) there is no inconsistency. regrettable or repugnant. But of course One is simply saying that ~p is wrong, "Oi-p", but that it is nevertheless the best thing to do given the circumstances because the alternatives are worse?i.e. "O2P"• The distinction between differential and intrinsic obligation, then, seems to be an important factor in assessing the validity of argument where moral dilemmas are concerned. �/, �2 �ft I z^z/ / rt&jZy 7-, I � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document MORAL DILEMMAS AND THE LOGIC OF DEONTIC NOTIONS Richard Routley and Vai Plumwood^ The §1. paradoxes of deontic logic consistency and the and modal requirements. Especially since mid-century many systems of deontic logic have been advanced, which logic of such deontic attempt to explore the prohibition, and wrong. right all Almost which treat deontic notions as modal, notions as obligation, permission and modal not demand functors, All such systems are mistaken m a For deontic functors such as obligation and prohibition are but are more highly of degree greater a systems, i.e. as if strict or provable equivalents are intersubstitutable within them preserving truth. quite fundamental way. systems have been modal these intensional than propositional modal modal than discrimination and so functors, logics can provide. The damage caused by the mistaken treatment of deontic notions as modal shows up in various ways, but we shall be primarily concerned with only one of these, the consistency requirements and the exclusion thereby of moral dilemmas. which the modal damage appears is through a Another way in series of related paradoxes, such as, directly, the paradoxes of derived obligation, and, less directly, the paradoxes of the Robber and the Good Samaritan. The consistency requirements come out in two ways in mainstream deontic systems. consistency Firstly, a negation are requirement, - obligatory in the that usual no claim such is symbolism, Op that ~0~p, both it i.e. and its ~(0p & 0~p) — appears as a principle, frequently a postulate, in all mainstream absolute systems.21 Such absolute systems, which are variants on alethic modal systems, are characteristically obtained from corresponding alethic systems by replacing the modal axiom, that’ or ’it ought to be the case that’, or the functor ’□ ’, modal (such as logics system demands world is ’it is obligatory ’it ought to be seen to that', replaces ’it is necessary that', of alethic systems. We know of course that consistency requirement; some ~0~p - where ’O’, read Op D p, by the deontic axiom, Op the doxastic systems) the standard but it appears that the intended interpretation of deontic the consistency requirement. or encapsulates acceptable subsequently introduced, can be designed without For its semantical equivalent what is permitted (i.e. is that in symbols (Px)STx) which is surely true (for let world x be determined precisely by what is so permitted). Moreover, the second related way in which consistency escaped by a modal formulation of deontic (or doxastic) logics. figures cannot be so For it seems clear, 2 and is widely agreed, that 0 satisfies the following distribution principle: (1) Op&OqiffO(p&q). Since however 0 is modal, and p & ~p & q p&~p (i.e. - the sides are strictly equivalent), 0(p & ~p) iff 0(p & ~p & q) Thence, Op & 0~p implies 0(p & ~p), which implies 0(p & ~p & q), and (2), by (1) which implies Oq; (2) if there are cases of moral dilemmas where Op and also 0~p, i.e. then obligation spreads so that any claim is obligatory. This argument tells against all mainstream deontic logics; rock-bottom system, minimal deontic logic. for it holds in the This logic MDS, presented by von Wright and others (see e.g. Hilpinen 81, p.3 and p.5), adds to classical sentential logic CL (with rules of Material Detachment and Substitutivity duly extended) the one-place connective P, of permissibility, subject to just the conditions P(A v B) e (1’) PA v PB and Intersubstitutivity of provably equivalent CL (i.e. truth functional) wff Now define a connective - in fact the standard obligation Then, where A and B are any CL wff, 0(A & B) OA =£j£~P~A. negation and It then follows, given that (extensional) principles to De Morgan = ~(~P~A & ~P~B). follows), 0 moral claim is dilemmas obligatory, the consequence as above of the nothing functor ) * (2 - thus: OA & OB, upon applying of (1 ) * that P~(—A & —B) (or by variants thereupon that which form OA & 0~A, (extensional) i.e. any permissible. The that is OB, revealing variant argument applies the provable CL-equivalence A & -A = B & ~B to get 0(A & ~A) = 0(B & ~B). d OB & 0~B => OB. Then (in condensed notation) OA & 0~A => 0(A & ~A) => 0(B & ~B) That is, if there are any deontic moral dilemmas (of such forms as OA & 0~A) then everything is obligatory. other forms; But there are moral dilemmas, of this and and not everything is obligatory. incorrect. So too are all its extensions, and Therefore minimum deontic logic is thereby all mainstream systems. For 'most systems of deontic logic include the system’ of von Wright 'as a subsystem' (F & H, p.13). There is little appreciation of the involve in the ethical Hare, having set up a force of these arguments or of what they literature. But one prominent example will dilemma, and rejected one logical have to suffice. route out, proceeds to pronounce that 'it is not very helpful to try to sort out these difficulties by some relatively minor tinkering with the calculus of deontic logic. The linguistic and logical intuitions which give rise to them are all right so far as they go' (82, 3 intuitions behind the mainstream systems are not alright, but lead to The p.28). deontic collapse and to a heap of paradoxes; and a bit of '’tinkering" is enough to remove the worst difficulties.5 (2’) and The trouble lies we shall argue, just with the modal requirement (i.e. its usual extension to all wff). that not everything is obligatory, evident For while it is This leaves much to be defended. on no more than the strength of a few examples (such as that it is not obligatory that everyone visit the tallest eucalypt every day), none of the other assertions is so uncontroversial. Given that there are such moral dilemmas, as will be argued at length, and given that sentential logic CL is admissible when applied to consistent situations (which are all that are elsewhere (in arguments: required RLR in especially), modal the namely, the arguments there are a claim that has been argued above), two only and requirement, one fault the which to points at half of the distributivity principle, specifically r (O-adjunction). OA & OB -> 0(A & B) But it is bizarre to have to fail O-adjunction in order OA & 0~A =5 B has quite especially when OB to stand, 0(A & ~A) to be correctly foundation. And obligation. For, not it contemplated among in the things, is a irrelevant mates 7 desperate measure , systems since it intended role and mainstream against entirely other is conceded that its Faulting O-adjunction rejected. goes it to allow the paradox O-adjunction can be argued is without meaning for from of the semantics of 0, along these lines:- Roughly OA is true iff A holds in all acceptable situations. But if A holds in all such situations and B does also then so does A & B, validating O-adjunction. Accordingly, the trouble must be located in the modality requirements. This can be seen from another angle also. obligation, which also underlies O-adjunction, An important logical feature of is its transmissibility, that what is tightly entailed by what is obligatory is also obligatory; in symbolic form, A ■+ B -o OA -> OB But now, (0-transmission). if entailment is erroneously construed as strict implication, which is what the modal requirement would have us do, then 0(A & ~A) -> OB, since by a paradox of strict implication A & ~A B. If there are moral dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~A), as will be contended, then this result is sufficiently damaging on its own, and focusses the trouble on the modal requirement. properly maligned OA & 0~A ->0B. Otherwise apply O-adjunction, to obtain the 4 the Both and consistency requirements should modality be challenged then by anyone who claims that, for some p, both Op and 0~p (and that such judgements are not merely prima facie, vanishing upon further reflection). Many have argued that such cases do occur, indeed are central examples of value conflict, and are of fundamental importance in ethics.$ We want to go even further and claim, firstly, that such cases occur quite frequently, as cases of conflicting obligations, conflicting rights, and genuine moral dilemmas - so in particular there are many cases where both p and ~p ought to be the case - and secondly, that adequate logical treatment of such cases requires an underlying logic of a distinctively paraconsistent kind. we shall cases has, argue, with many important arguments and cases. many of logic rendered deontic Neglecting such incapable of dealing adequately The matter is particularly serious since fiercely debated moral cases are cases of moral dilemmas, lthe most e.g. limited resources, nuclear war, permissible war tactics. While our initial argument will overlap previous work,9 it goes beyond it by adding a semantical treatment and moral of explanation semantical dilemmas, and in setting adequate deontic logics within the framework of paraconsistent logic. simple The §2. resolution relevant epicycling. classical versus The relevant It has already been indicated. solution to the base problem is disarmingly simple. Abandon the modal assumption, that obligation, permissibility, and so on, are modal This blocks logical equivalents. functors allowing replacement of modal from OCA & ~A), or from OA & 0~A, to 0(B & ~B) and thence to OB. giving up intersubstitutivity are replacement coentailment, not simply just more in contexts; deontic rigorous than lax strict equivalence. intimately - the Spread with What ones. is permitting required is While A & ~A and B & ~B are strictly equivalent, they do not coentail one another. connected modal It does not involve conditions the the move law, That is as much of a fallacy as - one A that would have that a & ~A -> B, contradiction such as A & ~A entails any statement whatsoever. An alternative satisfactory distinctive implciation deontic way then logic of should explaining be in particular of relevant paraconsistent, feature of relevant logics, their and the is solution, simply and through why the a most rejection of the paradoxes of strict Spread. For, as remarked, one logical characteristic of deontic notions such as obligation is their transmissibility; i.e. where A entails B then OA is logically sufficient for OB.10 Then were entailment strict implication it would follow at once by Spread that 0(A & ~A) -> OB, whence by O-adjunction, OA & 0~A -> OB. basis of interpretations straightforwardly on RLR II). of Transmissibility may be independently argued for on the entailment (e.g. as content inclusion), and follows the semantical analysis of obligation to be advanced (cf. also 5 A good deal of effort has already been expended in trying to save mainstream deontic theory from the worst of the difficulties and consistency requirements. Most of through its modal it encounters, the repairs however attempted amount to epicycling: trying to tack theory-saving devices onto the initial theory, rather than questioning any fundamental features of it. Intractable exposed. problems is called What the with so-called minimal the standard system of deontic system already have been logic is in an even worse position than the minimal system, because it adds to the minimal system as an axiom 12 Then any standard system including a moral dilemma, 0(p^ & ~p ), is 13 o o simply inconsistent. For Op => Pp, hence Pp^ & ~Pp-j where p1 is pQ & ~pQ. ~p(p & ~p). Main marketed deontic logics are epicyclic variations on (i) standard deontic logic, being modal attempts to repair defects in earlier prototypes. They include (ii) reductions of systems of type (i) to alethic logics by introduction of a constant ’o’ read, for example, ’the world will be worse off’ or 'punishment ought to cr is the moral sanction or some bad state of affairs. follow’: is defined Then *0' EK-A^cr); i.e. A is obligatory iff the negation of A (non-fulfilment of A, it OA is said) necessitates the sanction. It is usually postulated: -0^. Such reductive frameworks, since they include minimal deontic logic, repeat its defects. (iii) relativistic systems which attempt axiomatise to circumstances, c', conditional of reads ’p is obligatory given, or permission and conditional obligation; thus ’0(p/c) * in notions underlying model being that of conditional the probability. These systems were designed chiefly to avoid the paradoxes of derived obligation to which systems of type really in (as and (i) probability (ii) theory) lead. to But the new operator, /, compensate for implicational connective in the modal framework assumed. so-called "logics of conditional e.g., van Fraassen, p.438 ’... obligation" still lack the is introduced of an adequate So, not surprisingly, these exclude moral dilemmas (thus, it would be more apt to say that we have here a logic of obligation that remains after obligational conflicts are resolved'). (iv) systems which conditional d, such include a modal conditional functor superior to the material­ as a Stalnaker-Lewis-style conditional, conditional deontic notions like those of (iii) can be defined. in terms of which But these systems, since modal, do not escape modal limitations and problems (see further RLR). (v) systems based on a logic of change or action. These systems turn out to be reducible to a combination of absolute systems with tense logics, i.e. 14 to multiply modal systems and so repeat the problems of modal systems. None of these modal types are satisfactory, none can be made so, they amount because of 6 What is at modal assumptions, like consistency requirements, that they all involve. fault is not merely types of systems of this sort, which confine the framework to a worlds possible defect enough, one thereby and but the write in conditions, consistency that is though sweeping consistency interpretation of deontic more logic, that ’principles of deontic logics are conditions of consistency for normative systems’.^ The consistency interpretation - which is deeply entrenched in much ethical theory (especially making no adequate allowance from Kant) deriving that for what is essential fundamentally mistaken, - is moral dilemmas and to morality, the familiar inconsistency of normative systems. Documenting moral dilemmas. Cases of moral dilemmas are, perhaps unfortunately, §3. both familiar and inevitable. perhaps not, and logic theory deontic (including is unfortunate It such for standard deontic approximations rough as utilitarianism) since they have ultimately to be dismissed as inadequate to account for the data. is also often extremely On the other dilemmas. awkward who those for such dilemmas hand, probity, and are a main source of moral change. A moral dilemma occurs when considerations, for instance cannot T situation in act (where such a of which shape cannot, or precisely as way afford real tests of moral worth and 16 is confronted with moral perhaps not directly inconsistent, factual the probably cannot, facts satisfy to principles, binding obtain); principles that is, one so as to or although be satisfied Then the situation T cannot but induce a moral fix. considerations. in moral (but not only when) one the in themselves enmeshed find It in the (probably) meet moral This can come about in two ways, either because of the logical limitations supposedly satisfied by T, in particular its consistency feature (that, whatever p, does not) or through certain contingent features if p holds in T then ~p of T. In what follows we shall concentrate on a major subclass of what are commonly accounted moral dilemmas, those of (paraconsistent) logical interest where what is given or derived are pairs such as OA and OB, WA and WB (i.e. A is wrong and so is B), or the like, where A and B are And incompatible. of particular logical importance are cases where deontically incompatible pairs such as Op and 0~p, Wp and W~p, or the like are guaranteed. The examples of moral dilemmas we consider provide only a small selection from the rich variety of such dilemmas, but hopefully they illustrate that variety. Several of the examples involve more than one moral principle: however some commonly- adopted moral principles generate dilemmas, of one sort or another, their own. pretty much on Consider for instance first principles of the following type: Situations involving the (indiscriminate) killing of numbers of (uninvolved) people should be avoided, should not happen, are wrong - principle at very first approximation of the form (p)(p satisfies condition C + Wp). Applying such a principle, a dilemma results 7 where and occurs a large number of people will be killed, if p obtains or if ~p obtains a large number of people will also be killed. War situations provide obvious examples, with the V(ietnam) dilemma typical. 17 For example, people have described the situation in Vietnam as follows (not that it really is this way): If the Americans withdraw from Vietnam, a large number of people If the Americans stay in (do not withdraw from) Vietnam, will be killed. number of people will withdraw from C. Hence under be killed. Vietnam', Hence, condition satisfies p where p is C 'the Americans withdraw from ~p and the principle both p and ~p are wrong, similar is the company commander's dilemma. of his troops will be killed. a large also i.e. satisfies condition 18 Wp and W~p. Rather If he invades the hamlet, a large number If he does not invade the hamlet the prisoners held Taking p as 'he invades the hamlet', p satisfies C and therein will be killed, etc. ~p satisfies C. Therefore, Wp & W~p. Both p and-not p are wrong; neither would occur The killing does not however have to be of large numbers in an acceptable situation. of people to induce moral dilemmas. variants on the commander's dilemma Favourite regularly wheeled out concern murdering a potential murderer to prevent him killing several other presented people and with the related constrained option killing of some choice situations smaller special person is where a group of people (or creatures) in order to avoid the certain killing of a larger or less favoured group 1Q of creatures. 7 The pacifist's (or differently seen, patriot's) dilemma, which Lemmon draws from on Sartre, concerns the proposition p^: Z goes to war. If Z does not go to war, he help his friends and fails to fellow countrymen when they are in desperate need. Thus ~p-j is wrong, W-p-j , on the principle that so failing to help one's friends and fellow countrymen is wrong. If Z goes to war, he will be involved in killing people he has nothing morally or otherwise against; whence Wp^, on the principle that things which involve such killing are wrong. Therefore again Wp^ and W~pp A different sort of example, again however involving the taking of life in one way or another is the abortion dilemma (as conceived by Anglicans, say). presented as a clash between conflicting rights. to life (i.e. (on that the one part of the should not foetus); have one's In one corner, there is the right in the other, the right to bodily integrity body used against one's detriment for someone else’s benefit) on the part of the mother. where a particular state of affairs is an instance of both so (~p) and will principles. Hence Wp. would deny the mother's right to bodily integrity. Whence adjoining, Wp & W~p. to one's A dilemma results performance of an abortion (p) would deny the foetal right to life. not doing This can be The But Hence W~p. 8 Not so far removed from these examples, particularly when omission is conflated with commission, are environmentally-oriented examples involving sacrifice (broadly construed), for resources. Suppose that we have a duly qualified principle to the effect that things which lead to the feeding of starving people should happen. example the is a dilemma of limited three cases:- First following Suppose also that we have limited resources, and have decided to distribute these as follows: If the coin comes down heads (p), then group A of starving people will be fed. But if the coin does not come down heads (~p) then group B of starving people will be fed. Plainly in an ideal situation both p and ~p will occur, that is the coin will come down heads and it will not come down heads, so that both groups of people will be fed. And if the moral principle cited is correctly applied then a case of Op and 0~p results. course minor Of involved leads to conclusions of the form adjustment of the principle W~p and W—p, whence Wp. For an analogous conservationist * s (or humanitarian * s) dilemma consider the case forest where it ought to happen that the is chopped down, the benefit of the for presently starving (or etc.), and it ought to happen that the forest is preserved by positive action and Op dilemma for the benefit of coming generations (or etc.). 0~p emerges the from of application distinct In this case the The principles. society dilemma, concerns the reform of primitive societies so that they primitive Consider the dilemma of a feminist environmentalist as conform to outside standards. regards Aboriginal On the women. other hand, suppression of women in Aboriginal society should be opposed; on the other hand major western interference in Aboriginal affairs should be avoided; but changing the position of women would constitute major interference. Different examples involving public institution) dilemma, which following:- On the one hand, the be restricted and the funds will principle being the concerns preposition p2: the University The Vice-Chancellor, or rather his advisor on logic, argues opposes the government. both separate principles are the Vice-Chancellor * s (or formulated Wp2, p2 is wrong, students and accordingly). On because the University’s learning in general will suffer the other hand, W~p2, ~p2 (the is wrong because #p# will strengthen the present iniquitous status quo (the principle being states that of affairs which strengthen the present status quo be philosophers, is iniquitous avoided). Therefore, conjoining Wp2 & W~p2» A signifi ant source of moral dilemmas, long observed by afforded by a relatively unrestricted institution of promising, and more generally by parallel institutional arrangements for entering perhaps worth distinguishing two classes of cases. situations, Z is under an obligation into (moral) Firstly, contracts. It is in purely contractual p, because of a contract or promise, and also 9 under an obligation q, because of a (likely different) contract, where q entails or In the second sort of case, Z has promised to do ~p, and hence commits one to ~p. But p also satisfies conditions C, 0~p. it emerges, and Z adheres to the principle (q)(Cq ->0q), whence Op. As an example of the second type consider Lemmon’s simple and dated example, adapted from Plato: A friend leaves me with his gun saying he will be back for it in the evening, and I promise to return it when he calls. He arrives in a distraught condition, demands his gun, and announces he is going to shoot his wife because she has been unfaithful. I ought to return the gun, since I promised to do so - a case of obligation. And yet I ought not to do so, since to do so would be to be indirectly responsible for a murder, and my moral principles are such that I regard this as wrong. I am in an extremely straightforward moral dilemma, evidently resolved by not returning the gun (62, p.148). According to Lemmon the outcome is both Op, where p is ’I return the gun’, and also The 0~p. namely, for first an inference concerning promise-keeping; every q, that q is a genuine promise entails Oq (for genuine promises follows engender obligations), from and p is a immediate genuine promise. inference of the following sort: for every q, The second follows that q really contributes to a murder implies Wq, and that p really contributes to a murder; and moreover, -> 0~q. using an for every q, Wq Even if this last principle is repudiated a dilemma remains: for both Op and Wp, i.e. I ought to return the gun and it is wrong that I return the gun. that the initial principle sustains the conclusion 0~q as well. (It may be In any case, it is not difficult to amend Lemmon’s example so that it does, or more important, so as to render the ensuing dilemma more convincing.) Other dilemmas recur in variant form with contracts and promises. For instance, limited resources dilemmas reappear as follows: we promise all our surplus to a group of poor only to have even poorer people turn up. where one's deception, employment calls or participation in for activities Similarly work and role dilemmas, which are the production of nuclear morally repugnant (such as or chemical weapons), may arise either contractually, e.g. one signed up for the position, or from duty, e.g. to provide for one's family. Some of the moral dilemmas we have made look more determinate than perhaps they should, or than they would be if the circumstances were filled out, or got filled out slightly differently. Then we should find that some of the dilemmas take the form of Lemmon's more complex class, namely those where rather than OA and 0~A, what one has is Prob OA and Prob 0~A, where Prob is the probability functor ’it is probable that'. Lemmon describes this class of "fully dilemmatic situations" in these terms: ’there 10 is some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought to do something, and there is some, but not conclusive, evidence that one ought not to do that thing’ (pp.152-3). sort of dilemma is again drawn from Sartre: in A real-life working example of this brief, Sartre’s pupil is under some (sort of) obligation to stay with his mother, but he also probably under is an obligation, felt only ambiguously, to join the Free French in England (for a fuller description see Lemmon, pp.153-4). Lemmon suggests that this class of dilemmas is, and perhaps should stay beyond deontic formalisation: however the dilemmas are now within the scope of formalisation of a sort by multiple functor intensional logics of a type not different represent such principles as ’’ought implies can”.22 those already from needed to Though we have presented a wide variety of dilemmas, some of them in some detail - to the dispel that dilemmas common prejudice are a rare phenomena that can be safely set aside or that need not be taken seriously in an ethical theory - we have by no means exhausted the range and wealth of such dilemmas. the extent of analogues practical of these Nor have we indicated the dilemmas; fact is that similar dilemmas are frequent in economics, over budgeting, devaluation (we ought to devalue because ... and we ought not to devalue because ...), and so on. Nor have we brought out the political significance of the dilemmas; but the fact also is that some of the deeper problems in moral and political theory revolve around dilemmas. Familiar examples are issues of (permitting permissiveness interests possibly harming or licence individuals to pursue offending others) and freedom (restricting freedom as regards actions which infringe others * freedom), of paternalism and state authority versus civil liberties, and of democracy as against minority interests. A assortment varied accounts of the where sources of examples is source of moral dilemmas, for moral claims conflict, contractual obligations. Lemmon also in particular and promises, is attracted principles as those morally simplistic that they generally arise greatest (p.150). But he fact that one and the same conflicting directives requiring type, since principle may conflict with or duties, may conflict with one another principle can deliver such removing by an account of this latter underestimates the extent of conflict, and neglects the contract or in e.g. duty with principles, principles with while realising that it will not always suffice, principle important (e.g. double maximization happiness of the greatest number). As well a sufficient variety of tough examples helps remove the illusion that moral dilemmas can one and all be escaped. Admittedly, fortunately, there are ways around some of the dilemmas we have outlined, especially those we have borrowed. with perhaps further around the dilemmas), artifice in setting up the cases (to exclude But lateral moves some of the dilemmas stand: from them (as is further argued in 11 residue ’To insist that there is in every case a solution without is no escape. § 6) there false is the to moral facts’ p.132), Marcus (Barcan a theme she well illustrates with the abortion dilemma. §4. deontic Paraconsistent logic cannot be modal makes it modal treatment the relevant development. logic: An adequate deontic have to be paraconsistent. but will For a modal treatment to accommodate moral dilemmas - which are hard data impossible it makes as dilemmas treat dilemmas impossible to (§3)• A without proper catastrophic collapse (as shown in §1). The of principles standard deontic logic are, however, as added to readily various paraconsistent logics as they are to modal or classical logic - at least this (e.g. OP), in (da Costa negation-weakened namely logic and now distinguished style) logic paraconsistent and For Jaskowski-style discussive logics there are some difficulties; relevant logics. in styles of paraconsistent two of the main for is true particular, the given of rejection can principles, adjunction such logics satisfactorily include O-adjunction, OA & OB -> 0(A & B), which reflects adjunction in for the possible-worlds sentential framework It would seem not; acceptable worlds? logic offers no way of handling of Jaskowski-style the form 0(C & ~C) that result by O-adjunction. properly accommodate dilemmas, for dilemmas concerning obligation, where such as moral clearly principles difficulties; For these require impossible worlds Generally, Jaskowski-style logics are in deep trouble trying to where C & ~C holds. adjunctive full-strength moral dilemmas of logics Negation—weakened hold. they cannot deliver expected deontic also are interconnections, e.g. in the deontic ’’square of opposition”, presented shortly, which depends crucially on normal principles. negation In difficulties. Relevant brief, deontic the reasons types of paraconsistent logics logics can both avoid choosing relevant logics over for (the substantial sets these of other main reasons for which are given in OP) are accentuated still farther as soon as applications, such as to deontic logic, are Accordingly we will assume a relevant logical base, and a relevant semantical made. in what follows. framework, Even so, much of what we say and do can be adapted to other logical bases, e.g. negation-weakened or positive-plus bases. Often a combined syntactical-semantical is approach more fruitful and illuminating than either a syntactical-axiomatic or a semantical approach carried out separately. Each enriches and controls the other.23 Such is the case with relevant logical theory, logic. Even analogue of and so it is with relevant deontic logic, which builds on relevant so, a standard syntactical deontic standard superstructure, relevant logic. beginning logic we normally added can is easier. simply add For an to obtain exact a analogue relevant of the to classical logic, to (what supersedes CL) 12 For minimal relevant deontic logic, MD, the one-place functor 0 - of obligation, as usual read (e.g. ’It ought suitable some to be extending system that’ - is added (the case) B system basic the to some relevant logic of RLR conforms to the usual formation rule: where A is a wff so is OA. however are options at Functor, F read ’It is forbidden that’, is defined thus: ’It is permissible that’, is defined : PA =Df~FA. FA =Df 0~A (cf. OED); and P, read There this stage (as at e.g. stages), can morality, be argued, from directions several other F could oh introduced independently. But this leads to complications that are unnecessary. It 0 The other familiar functors of deontic logic, F and P, are defined in the usual way. ’It is wrong that’ or, less satisfactorily, Functor I). (e.g. from the rationality be of from the meaning or semantics of obligation, from the idea of commitment), that 0 satisfies at least the following requirements:[RM] A -> B -> OA -> OB, i.e. where A + B is a theorem so is OA -> OB. That is to say, where A entails B is provable so is OA entails OB, obligation transmits over provable entailment. Hence the claim that this principle (R7 of RLR II) is a transmission principle. [K] OA & OB regards the i.e. -> 0(A & B), conjunction; or, a conjunction of obligations entails obligation as to adjunction (principle G of RLR II). These two important it put 25 principles, entailment and adjunction, make 0 a a little differently 0 is closed which ensure that 0 is closed under under provable systemic functor (in the sense of RLR II), and ensure that it has a relational (i.e. first order) semantical analysis. The postulates which correspondingly minimally characterise deontic functions F and P now follow by relevant logic upon applying the definitions. They are as follows:For wrongness: A For permissibility : With the A + B -*> functor further B —f> FByFA Q, FA & FB P(A v BH, PAv PA + PB defined F(A v B) QA =Df ~0A, a reduced pb deontic square of opposition follows: 0Ax ...............FA PA^ .............. .QA The opposites are dotted peripheral opposed, as modally, relations of the modal in the way the solid lines show. But the square are bound to be the lost given the 13 the modal (on fact of deontic dilemmas square Prior 62 p.220). see is worth It observing, however, that the peripheral relations can be reinstated through adoption of the so-called consistency scheme OA -> ~FA, i.e. OA + ~0~A; [D] and that the relevant deontic logic that results still excludes the rubbish brought in along deontic standard necessary truths, Nordamericano of that course not (though paradoxes, essentially because paradoxical etc.), deontic obligatoriness the of spread principles are not whereas triviality), incorporate dilemmas. the as degenerate dilemma-permitting The problem with deontic logics which include [D] also cannot they well as logic, Antipodean form we are advocating. is deontic In short, relevant theory can deliver a clean-cut, clean-living, dilemma- available. free (e.g. logic include relevant moral dilemmas systems without without can [D] inconsistency consistently These various logical claims, as to the modal rubbish that is not brought along, can all be made good by application of the semantical theory. The semantics shows what does not hold, as well as further explaining why the principles that hold do. Semantics for MD result upon adding to modellings for relevant logic a two-place relation S, on worlds, which is subject to the following condition W. b and Sbc then Sac, Where a i.e. where world a precedes b (indeed canonically a is contained in b) and world c is accepted vis-a-vis b then c is accepted vis-a-vis a. Given that a is a subworld of b this is evident enough. Distinctive features of the underlying semantical modellings for relevant logic - consisting of structures of the form <T, K, 0, R, *, be sufficiently and, well-known any in are case, explained v> - should elsewhere. These structures differ from the best of those for modal logics, the nonnormal structures <T, K, N, R, v> for the Lewis systems S2 and S3, in the following ways:- The class K of worlds, to which the factual (base) world T belongs, is expanded to include a much more comprehensive class of inconsistent and incomplete worlds; the class N of normal worlds K is in adjusted theorems hold; relation R, to a three-place the class to v(p, sentential a) relation = parameter 1) regular worlds, i.e. worlds; on then and wff. I(A, b) = 1, where all on is subject to a constraint where I is the so that Specifically, where a < b and p holds in a p holds in b, p. Conditions v for every world a and b modelling structures are hereditariness condition extends to all wff; i.e. in symbols, where a 1 then those used in modelling implication, is relaxed from a two-place inclusion of worlds is duly reflected. (written 0 of in K and every such that this b & I(A, a) = interpretation function which extends v to all Inclusion, <, can be added as an extra component of the model structures, but in fact it can be defined thus: a < b =Df (Px 0)Rxab. Finally relevant modellings 14 add to modal modellings a new function, *, in terms of which negation is evaluated, 27 which facilitates the inclusion of inconsistent and incomplete worlds. same role and interpretation as in standard relation S has the The semantical It is employed in the semantical evaluation of obligation functor 0, deontic theory. which is given by the following rule: I(0a, a) = 1 iff, for every world b such that Sab, I(A, b) = 1, i.e. OA holds at world a iff, for each world b accepted vis-avis a, A holds at b.28 The rule is a world relativisation of the idea that what is obligatory is what holds in all accepted worlds. (morally) It is thus an evident adaption of Leibnitzian prescriptions, given the linkages between obligation or moral binding and moral "musts” or imperatives, on the one side, and morally possible and or acceptable accepted worlds, the on other. The for motivation unrelativised connections can be forged at base world T; for there A is (morally) required, I(0A, T) = 1, iff for every b for which Mb I(A, b) = 1 (where Mb =Df STb), i.e. That is, what is required is iff A holds in every (morally) accepted world. what holds in all accepted or received worlds. Other construals of the semantical apparatus are of course open. tempting ideal, temptation (a succumbed to initially) regard the accepted worlds as and Sab as ’b is ideal as seen from c’. to read Mb as 'b is ideal’ i.e. to It is a little But that is like requiring supererogation in cases where the meeting of commitments or obligations is enough: the worlds do not need to be that good but simply to pass, to meet required standards. is worlds. acceptable through A perhaps easier construal than by way of accepted worlds construal That is alright provided the term ’’acceptable” is deployed, as it often is, nonevaluatively : for it is important in the semantical assessment to prescriptions for be able to make an evaluative step—down, to give meaning evaluative expressions nonevaluative terms. in Naturally this does not imply that evaluative notions are naturalistically eliminated, any more than familiar terms, extensional reductions, semantical extensional analysis of intensional implies that intensionality is removed: both are merely pushed down into the not-further-explained apparatus of worlds. Obligation is construed by way of what goes on in acceptable or accepted worlds, not what happens in permissible or permitted directly with the construal of permissibility. one another, but in worlds, because this latter Given modal muddles the two reduce to the more subtle relevant setting star shift is involved in the transfer from accepted to permitted worlds. The (derived) semantical rule for P is this: KPA, a) = ties 1 iff for some b such that Uab I(A, b) = 1, where Uab . b * Sa 15 at base Thus, A is permissible, world T, i.e. I(PA, = 1) iff A holds at some 1, permitted world b; what is permissible is worldwise what is somewhere permitted. modal equation of relations U and S further axioms, deontic the (where namely if Sab (in effect, condition then Sa ) b * (Pb)Sab The corresponds to e.g. guaranteed, is modally by ~0(P & ~p)) by the scheme OA ^PA. Now modal-strength deontic logics typically do include an axiom scheme of the form [D’J OA -> ~PA, i.e. from (alethic) is obligatory is not that permissible, under modal is, Indeed this used to be considered what distinguished deontic ~0~A. assumptions, OA logics what modal on logics the one side, which include a stronger principle analogous to OA -*■ A, and epistemic logics on the other, which were weaker in that [D’J failed. However [D’J, like [D], is deontically incorrect because it rules out consistent inclusion of moral dilemmas; or, to turn matters around, cases where OA & 0~A, [D’]» which or OA & FA, hold counterexample [D]. may seem a little more plausible transform of it on usual deontic definitions. than Similarly these cases refute [D], but is a definitional For what is obligatory is not ipso facto permissible where the obligatory item is also wrong, as in dilemmatic cases. To distance relevant deontic logic from modal analogues, while at the same time demonstrating that relevant theory can encompass moral dilemmas unproblematically , we next assume that some moral dilemmas hold, that is that for some p, both Op and Fp. Since however propositional quantifiers much complicate the semantical apparatus we shall introduce constants into the syntax, and let p^ be the first constant for which a dilemma ensues. That is, a new axiom, extending the logic, is [DD] 0p1 & Fpp i.e. p1 is dilemmatic.3° The modelling condition for [DD], is wd. For each a in 0, for some world x, Sax and v(ppx) = 1= v(ppX ). * This condition, which does not involve T, does not impose nonclassical conditions on normal worlds. Accordingly [DD] is only a weakly paraconsistent requirement; it does not imply that inconsistency protrudes into the factual or regular worlds. Indeed one advantage of the semantics is that it enable proof that dilemmatic judgements can be included without inconsistency. By contrast, modal theories cannot include even one half of [DD] do) without automatically excluding dilemmatic judgements. consideration has a thesis 0p2 for some (either will Suppose the logic under Then for every x in 0 there is some y such that Sxy with p2 set to hold at y. But modally this is enough to guarantee that [D] holds materially, More explicitly, so ~(0A & 0~A) generally, suppose otherwise that in i.e. there can be no such dilemmas. some model the material form of [D] failed; I(OA, then = T) 1 = I(A~O, T), which impossibility at y since I(A, y) = 1 i I(A, y). syntactical problems earlier in 1). even for Although [DD] implies Op^, very weak obligatory is conjured from the fact some for STy yields y This is a semantical analogue of the deontic logics (considered type of modal it does not say, nor does it follow, that OT for any Such modal stupidity as that every necessary and every tautology T (e.g. C v ~C). truth is since automatically removed that relevant in the relevant wash. can be This theory removes such paradoxes as p1 from which 0(A v ~A) would follow modally by 0—distribution (i.e. A v ~A, Again the [RM]). semantics can be applied to establish the point in proper detail. primitive principles of minimal relevant logic are open to challenge, Both the and [K] * Jennings has been disputed by Schotch (in Jennings and 81). The main Schotch- arguments against [K] — which induces what they call ’paradoxes of complete * aggregation essentially turn — automatically avoided on modal deontic by relevant and assumptions, Their theory. accordingly are (p.152, also main point p.154) is that [K] obliterates the distinction between [D] (i.e. Op ~0~p) and [Con] ~0 , i.e. in effect ~0(r & ~r). Their argument depends on construing implication in [D] as material-implication and on strict replacement. ~0~p iff ~(0p & 0~p), i.e. iff ~0(p & ~p) using [K] Then Op and its provable converse, i.e. iff ~0(r & ~r) using p & ~p - . r & ~r and strict According to the relevant approach the trouble is not with [K] but with replacement. the modal assumptions, which are independently objectionable (see 1). Their further argument begins from the premiss that ’we should certainly want to include among our deontic principles the law of moral consistency [Con] across cuts all different things. moral theories’ (pp.153-6). The ... because that principle premiss appears to conflate What cuts across all moral theories is the theme that some things, such as a sufficiently evil state of affairs, are not obligatory, whence ~0s. does cut across all theories is the assumption that there are no moral dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~A), which is what [Con], with not just that there What are theories like properly defined, would imply. those of Lemmon and Sartre It is which include contradictory obligations; it is also that some theorists would want to insist that there is something logically wrong with principles like [Con], e.g. that it doesn’t make sense to talk of the nonobligatoriness of absurdity. Schotch and Jennings do contend that we should allow for moral conflict of the form OA & OB where A and B are inconsistent. their assumptions there [K] stops rejection of are moral dilemmas that yielding Since then B -> ~A, of the 0(A & -A). it follows that on form OA & 0~A. Yet as they Certainly only themselves have reported, the consensus view is that there are (in the end) no dilemmas of the form OA & O~A: insofar, all theories’, ’cuts across then, rejection of dilemmas of the form 0(A & ~[~]A) so, near enough, does rejection of those of the form OA & 0~A. What certainly does not emerge is that there can [K]. The be no deontic logic which takes as a primitive law the principle be can that best if done, subscribe to [K], we is to formalise ethical theories - namely those which do not allow moral certain particular conflicts (p. 156). logics provide decisive counterexamples to this contention. Relevant deontic They can take [K] as primitive: they allow for moral conflict; but they do so by allowing, like Lemmon, for moral inconsistency.31 disconcerting More from flowing the than fundamental difficulties deriving principles, transmission [K] from are allegedly those difficulties include which well-advertised paradoxes of deontic logic. § 5. Resultant on impact other relevant paraconsistent shift. and puzzles of paradoxes deontic theory of the Often cleaning up one logical puzzle in due technical detail has a beneficial effect on surrounding puzzles and on associated problems in the area. Light is cast on, and So it turns out also in the case of moral dilemmas. Among them sometimes solutions are delivered for, a number of other linked problems. are the following puzzles generated by theorems of (relevant) deontic logic. are, the ’’paradoxes of commitment”. Where material implciation => is in first place, defined as usual, e.g. T1. There ~A v ~B, it is a theorem that A ° B 0(B => A), whence if OA then 0(B 25 A), OA sometimes read: A if is then obligatory anything one commits to A, or: ’Doing anything commits us to doing what is obligatory’; T2. FA OCA => B), if 0~A then 0(A = B), sometimes read: if A is forbidden then doing A commits one to doing anything at all, or: ’Doing what is not permitted commits us to doing anything whatever’ readings are proceed from Prior from there interpretation of paradoxes symbols, the The claims read off are paradoxical. 62, p.224). to little justification - reading ’0(A commits one to doing B’. the in and (the quoted in logic this case B)’ as depends, always, depends crucially on - But to on the what has as a commitment relation, e.g. as ’doing A Such a reading which presupposes that material implication is a satisfactory conditional can in no way be sustained (see RLR), and that is the end of the problem. that A then paradoxical guises; and it If, ought to for example, T1 be features disappear. these commitment the case is simply read: if it ought to be the case that either not B or A, then the alleged However puzzles have a tendency to reappear in new puzzles are no exception. Even with conditional 18 terms of obligation applied to a properly defined in obligation conditional, the puzzles in reemerge new forms, example, for genuine (relevant) in is what called ’’Ross’s paradox”, and in related transmission problems. It has been claimed that the principle, OA -> 0(A v B), yielding if OA then 0(A v B) T3. is which T1, to equivalent is Ross paradox principle), - paradoxical to do either A or B, it may be More generally, given OA, obligatory to read a letter but not to read or burn it. there is an obligation example, for because, where the content of B may be totally do to established. (The comment goes beyond what T3 supplies, but that is not material). the in circumstance which obligation the to is set inappropriate A or A similar objection is made to the analogous permissibility principle PA ■> P(A v B), T4. Ross’s paradox, on the alleged grounds that there are examples where A is permissible but A For example, be. not the following it is permissible that to post a takes based on some one application of T4 is said to the paradoxical: letter false proposition the distance implies that it is permissible to post a The assumption that there is some sort of paradox here is letter or kill one’s aunt. however B may the towards that the permissibility of of permissibility killing the consequent one’s The aunt. proposition itself seems to be based on an application, never articulated and quite inadmissible, of Disjunctive Syllogism, distribution, P(~A &. A For PB. (A v b) ■+ B, and what results from P- it may certainly be permissible not to post However it is assuming more than standard deontic logics will grant to the letter. go on ) ~A & to the permissibility of not posting the letter and letter or killing disjunction. one’s aunt, especially given the also either derivation of posting the latter the Still going on remains tempting (and would presumably be warranted by a Lukasiewicz deontic logic analogous to his 4-valued modal logic). But so going on is to no avail in a duly relevant setting, where Disjunctive Syllogism fails: there is no admissible route here to the permissibility of killing aunt, one’s however desirable the act might otherwise be. main The transmission conditional obligation, strict implication, as problems in found also modally derived. an adequate deontic logic are, like those of They come from reliance on material or representation of implication. The worst manifestation of this is that already discussed, deontic trivialisation leading from Op^ and 0~p.| to OB, for any B, in virtue of the provability of p^ & ~p^ => B. But there are variety of lesser manifestations of the same underlying problem, of which the following example (adapted from recent discussion) is just one sort: p4. We have an obligation to feed the starving poor D. There exist starving poor. Therefore, since starving poor, it ought to be by O-transmission, the case it ought that we meet our obligation to feed the to be that there exist starving poor, a 19 that is far from obviously true. deontic logic, for the simple reason presupposition relation, conclusion of transmission problems of modal the that the cannot p4 Such analyses do not entailment. an to rather or implication, (material-) upgraded be plague relevant The many systems all enamate from excessive O-distribution on basis of implications will not them, support in the as following transmission principles typical of orthodox deontic logics, all of which should be rejected: OCA D B) D. OA 3 OB A D B -> OA 3 OB A => B =>. OA => OB. With their rejection a thorny tangle of modally-derived paradoxes is also rejected. There appears however to be an immense temptation to try to impose excessively strong transmission principles; and the same phenomenon to be seen at work in modal contexts can also be observed when a proper entailment is introduced.3^ This occurs, particular, in attempts in to ’’normalise” [RM], to strengthen it a from rule connection to an entailment, for instance, to (the characteristic S3 form) [OT] A + B +. OA + OB; it occurs with analogous changes thereon, and e.g. A-> B. PA PB and A FB + FA, as well with as imported forms of these principles, e.g. OA & (A and (A -> B) & FB As an example of the FA. B B) OB type of puzzles that [OT] produces consider p5. Grannie killed the vicar. Grannie repented for having killed the vicar The problem with putative entailments such as p5 is that, while we are ordinarily (with the context duly flashed out) inclined to agree that Grannie ought to repent, we don’t want to agree to have killed the vicar. that Grannie ought The problem turns essentially however on the availability of [OT] in place of [RM], for p5 is not a provable entailment of the underlying logical theory (and there is little case for it one), trying to make sc [RM] does not apply to p5, in contrast with awkwardness [OT] appears to require, of having somehow entailment, is thereby straightforwardly avoided.33 Most the of paradoxes falling paradoxes and Robber paradoxes can be paradoxes and usual forms of these resolution. one’s According helping a man under such to deny descriptions as similarly resolved or avoided. variations upon [OT]. The is that p5 Good Samaritan an The original them certainly succumb to such to the Robber’s paradox if robbing a man is forbidden then The Good Samaritan whom one has robbed is also forbidden. paradox is a further turn on this paradox: not only the robber’s helping a man he has robbed is wrong, so is someone else’s, a good Samaritan’s, helping the robbed man (see Prior 58). - be It is undoubtedly paradoxical that it should - especially as a matter of logic wrong to help a man who has been robbed: but do any fundamental deontic 20 principles commit us to such a thing, for appropriate substitutions on variables? No, These puzzles all take the following form: B, which describes something they do not. admittedly wrong, gets in or implied as part of the description of something larger, A, arising as a result of the situation in B; however A is not wrong but perhaps even Nothing required. theory; and in none of shows this the however that A B literature can examples in the the provable in is it There be. logical is another important feature, commonly neglected however, which is that A does not assert B. If it did, then A, since amounting to A & B, would appear to be wrong also, as B is. This points to a difficulty also for the usual assumption that A entails B; for then A (certainly modally) coentails A & B, whence the wrongness of A coincides with that of A & B, the wrongness of which would seem to be guaranteed by B. If however A only involves B in a weaker sense, [OT] is exonerated.3^ The paradoxes can be pushed another way, to contest this data, and bear against systems as minimal as MD. For MD yields theorems like the following: T5. FB T6. 0( F(A & B), whence if FB then F(A & B). OB, whence if 0(A & B) then OB. &B) theses, Such minimal it is now suggested, are paradoxical in the same way as the Robber. This is not so: only gross confusion of decidedly distinct syntactical forms - a practice formalisation can unfortunately encourage - could support such a suggestion. If it is wrong to rob a man then it is wrong to rob him and help him;35 but it is not thereby wrong to help him, indeed to help him who has been robbed. But the relative and the tense shift are both important; and the whole relative clause in no way reduces to a conjunction conjoining robbing the man. The positivistic objection that the paradoxes of deontic logic show that there is really no ’’logic of norms” has come even from a modern founder of deontic logic, von Wright. This he now contends that There is no such thing as an "entailment” between a norm Op and a norm 0(p q) - and Ross’s paradox makes us aware of the absurdity of talking as though it existed. ... Ross was right when he offered his paradox as a proof that, properly understood, there could not be such a thing as a logic of norms (82, p.15, rearranged, emphasis suggested in text). And he ’essentially (p.14). (also also But mistakenly) of variations given that one regards and the von Wright contains such normative tautologies Op are inevitable. Thus while ’’paradoxes’* the same, viz. wants also the of deontic so-called to supply logic as Ross’s Paradox’ a deontic logic, which 0(p q), some subtle and dubious distinctions Op & ~0(p q) is normatively inconsistent, inconsistent; while Op can be thus said to ’’normatively entail” 0(p q) it is not it does not; and while Op comes rational commitment to Op, it does not carry logical commitment to it. the Unlike said are connections associated to and entailment (p.15). no paradoxes induce other But normative these relations, what is said go to for normative entailment can be said as well as regards entailment, that one (e.g. a law giver) is Op adopts who rationally to 0(p q) going on to endorse the entailment of 0(p q) by Op. for a oitrary addition away there is no puzzle in associations are cleared once mistaken modal q. Indeed committed The ’’paradoxes” of deontic logic are not a reflection of the illusory notion of a logic of norms but rather a product of a modal logic of norm. However von Wright has other significant reasons for insisting that (in a sense) ’norms have no logic or that normative discourse is ’’alogical”’ from noncognitivism, that symbolising norms, formulas’, ’prescriptive standard a on One derives (p.4). interpretation deontic ’do not express true and false propositions. It makes no sense to speak of relations of contradiction or entailment between formulas when thus interpreted ’ hold nontruthvalued regards as semantical This is not so: (p.4). theory relevant as such discourse, for sketched logical relations such as inconsistency logic deontic carries no commitment to the position that normative discourse is truthvalued. 0 interpreted In imperatives. fact ineradicable The values 1 and by way of holding are not intended to be tied to truth and falsity, except at the factual world T (see RLR1); and that exception is readily removed. judgements, instead normative received, logic the both (the point requirements e.g. Otherwise the etc.). adjustments the and of the form Fp, semantical can be said to be in theory its ’’semantical” is developed, For force (or is as before. With such minor theory conform to noncognitivist to meet von Wright’s argument, in Morscher, pp.97-8). Von Wright’s other reason for coming out against a logic of norms is but grist It is that ’there cannot be a logic of norms because a for the paraconsistent nill. could enjoin contradictory legislator (at ’’relative least serves" Morscher, ...) dilemmas. it but p.98). to the is normal not states of affairs. This might be irrational purpose which the institution of giving orders logically excluded, it is not alogical’ (cited in That is, a legislator can set up (usually unintentionally) deontic This is certainly not triviality, by modal-strength indictment, not of deontic deontic logic, It impossible. but logics. of a is simply excluded, Once again the on criticism certain modally-dominated pain of is an approach to it.36 §6. Upsetting the moral consensus: unrealisable obligations, and inevitable wrongs. The theme that there are moral dilemmas, like those cited, which stand, which do not dissolve upon rational reflection, philosophers, 3? and apparently runs agains the consensus among moral certainly upsets dominant positions in ethical theory, notably 22 broadly Kantian positions (built into much contemporary British moral philosophy) and utilitarian positions (which pervade Anglo-American and theory value thinking, especially outside narrowly philosophical circles). Kantian positions suppose that morality is above all a rational procedure of a certain sort (which we tentatively grant), and that rationality requires consistency. Or put differently, but for instance, must be consistent. Thus what is obligatory, equivalent given modal assumptions, ought implies can, OA -> OA, for every A and some Wherever an agent appears to be in a moral dilemma suitable possibility functor 0. this is a matter of appearance only, a moral illusion which will (and must) vanish on further rational reflection.^ This Kantian assumption should be rejected: moral dilemmas are part of the data and no illusion, and no amount of reflection need budge them. By insistence upon consistency requirements, and through failure, consequently, to recognise intractable moral dilemmas, deontological theories have been forced to jump through a variety of different hoops and to weaken considerably their positions. In particular, temporary and moral firm principles are almost invariably weakened to something much more provisional. is experience While important, some revisability of principles in the light of such wholesale weakening of principles is decidedly There is a point then in trying to undesirable, on both logical and moral grounds. expose some of the tangled assumptions on which the weakening is based, and to loosen their grip. The assumptions involved on a Kantian approach include these: H1. Moral principles - in those concerning justice, particular more fairness and the basic principles of obligation, such as like - are to be explained at bottom as principles of rationality, or rational behaviour for persons. H2. Rationality is a matter of consistency; certainly it implies it. H3. Consistency reduces to, or can be accounted for, through possibility. Put together these assumptions yield the theme H4. What is obligatory must be possible - ought-implies-can , for short. So if that gives, so do some of the assumptions. but on moral dilemmas, It does give, not just because of So also then independent grounds. should the assumptions give; and they fail not just on the grounds that they lead to themes like H4. The deeper trouble is that they are based on a super-modal view of things which combines modal assumptions with rational strong The assumptions. combination is important, for once the modal assumptions are rejected, it becomes fairly transparent that the rationality assumptions, whatever their merit, cannot such things as moral framework or system or course of action. rational case, systems: removing much more modal is required assumptions - a than rationality main present uniquely determine Rather there are rival for uniqueness. exercise - In any destroys such rationality route to ought-implies-can. Finally consistency is neither necessary nor That it is not sufficient is indicated by a variety of sufficient for rationality. consistent worlds which do not conform to minimal rationality requirements. is converse relevant refuted which conform inconsistent worlds by meet rationality requirements (see further RLR and OP). H3 fails, paradoxes induces ~0A -> ~(A ° B), generally is not just that the Modality removed. of paradoxes with entailment, e.g. anything all. from isolated transmitted to are inconsistent is arguments Not only H2 (as a necessary assumptions parallelling proposition impossible inconsistency It modal when consistency of an fails, also is not 40 this indiscriminate way. However to rationality to sufficient reason and the like), and by dialethic theories which standards (e.g. condition) The more impossibility in collapse; ought-implies-can at there are distinct from those supplied by moral dilemmas. counterexamples to the theme, The counterexamples concern obligations (or oughts) which are impossible, in some sense, to realise, counterexamples Op & ~0p) But wrongdoings. most the of possibility Derivatively then (substituting ~p for unrealisable obligations. that wrongs are inescapable, there are many determinates of possibility examples than concern also mere involve, in their logical possibility necessitated (and necessity), and less anemic notions of correspondingly broader notions of original (and p in setting, necessity than a narrow logical necessity). perhaps strained, adaption, and, in any case, they serve to undermine the point and Nonetheless they sometimes admit of, force of the ought-implies-can dictum (which is to link obligation to freedom to do otherwise), and These examples all arise nature, circumstances, its effective use against moral dilemmas. seriously weaken thereby because agents are constrained in one way or another - by fate, the Gods, their past actions - but are not thereby released from their obligations or exonerated from wrong-doing. Consider first very down-to-earth types of counterexample to ought-implies-can, before turning to more high-flown but not altogether dissimilar examples from our barbaric past. ’Suppose that I say "I ought to go and see him, but I can’t because I don’t know where he is”. There need be nothing inconsistent in such a remark; and, yet there would be if "ought” always implied ’’can'” (Hare 63, p.52). same with situation ”’I where ought I've to return driven the this car I’ve car so far borrowed, away that returning it in time to keep a promise’ (Thomason, p.175). but I It is much the can’t”, there is said no chance in a of my Likewise the claim of the person who cannot swim that she ought to rescue the child caught in the current but can't. One traditionally important class of counterexamples derives from the Catholic doctrine of perplexity secundum quid.^ Donegan, in defending what he calls 'the 24 Hebrew-Christian tradition’, contends that once one has sinned one May be faced with situations from which one cannot escape without further wrong-doing (77, p.152). That ♦ is, one may be so placed (through one’s own fault) that one ought not to perform any of the available actions though one cannot do otherwise. So it is necessary that one act in a way that is forbidden. Protestant thinkers, particular Luther, appear to have considered the human race involved in one grand secundum quid on account of original sin. ’God punished justly sinners who not could otherwise do Luther believed that than sin’ that God and ’provided men with a law they were unable to keep and then righteously damned them for failing to keep it’. 242 The Calvinists also were committed - but through their doctrine of predestination predestined to sin, unpalatable conclusion - to rather they cannot but by suggesting Because conclusions. similar humans are However Calvin attempted to escape this sin. that in some suitable sense are not sinners compelled, that it is somehow possible for them to do otherwise than they do. J Given however the theme of predestination this attempt to escape looks unconvincing. Any stronger determinism that does not also obliterate morality is in a similar Creatures will have obligations which they cannot fulfil because they predicament. are determined and will to do otherwise, sometimes be bound to do wrong. Plainly where this becomes a general and automatic matter, a serious erosion of moral notions such as responsibility, normally linked to obligation, is bound to set in. However isolated cases analogous to those of determinism can occur without such erosion of moral notions (as indeed with moral dilemmas themselves). rigidifying personality and ossifying character are of this gets older Cases of A person as she sort. may build up a personality so rigid that she cannot escape from it. At some point it becomes impossible (at least psychologically) for her to act other than she does, yet on some occasions she ought not to act in the way she does. outcome resembles that with original sin though the route taken Yet even if we grant that the person ought not to have got still we are entitled to our moral judgements; modern morality * The is very different. into such a position, as Pigden puts it, ’an enlightened can allow such violations of ought-implies-can. Classical Greek morality certainly seems to have allowed for such violations. In Homeric ethics a man could be blamed for failings he could not avoid, unavoidable wrong-doing. and so for Subsequently it was taken for granted that impossible moral requirements could be placed upon a hero, yet he could be blamed for failing to meet them. Thus the situation of Agamemnon and of Oedipus, both despite their struggles, despite their awareness of their predicaments and their anguish, were bound, indeed, fated, to act wrongly, and were duly blamed for their wrong-doing. 25 There have been various attempts to salvage the ought-implies-can theme, through a residual Kantianism. presupposes-can Thus Hare proposes, but does not really work out, an ought- a with theme weaker relation presupposition logical replacing implication (53, p.54); and both Barcan Marcus and Morscher suggest a model theoretic connection: essentially that for OA to hold true A must be satisfiable in some world, and so, modally, A is consistent. But within a relevant setting, the satisfiability is hardly a requirement and does not ensure consistency. constraint, Once again, consistency is only obtained at the cost of other more important connections, such as Nor does Hare’s comparison with presupposition (on p.54) succeed. O-adjunction. the analogy such situations the worked implies-can. as practical question those and dilemmas moral But (pace Hare, p.55) as to what to do not would counterexamples affording If arise in ought- to the question most certainly does arise in many cases. §7. Resolving proceed, in moral any dilemmas, dilemma so far situation be. as can easily are Recipes for what provided, enough decidedly poor recipes have been much canvassed in the literature. how to to, indeed several Among these are deontic ranking recipes, which would have us impose some type of priority ordering on deontic principles, so that consistency is maintained and in every situation there is a dominant rule; defeasibility recipes, which would have us weaken all deontic rules to merely prima facie or other-things-being—equal principles and operate, when things look would going like have wrong, utilitarian by and assessment; pure-chance recipes, which situationally but arbitrarily by such methods as us determine outcomes coin toss. Such recipes fail to meet important conditions of adequacy upon any account of the way resolution is effected, if and when it can be, namely: A1. The account should sufficiently resemble what rational choosers do when they find themselves in a moral dilemma. Many human choosers have moral principles, have not rigorously ordered in such which, as against ranking recipes, a way as to exclude dilemma they situations, and which, as against thorough-going defeasibility recipes, they are not prepared to give Thus, in addition, away or modify when they encounter snags. A2. The principles induce which moral dilemmas are not generally abandoned or qualified, but very often stand. Naturally sometimes moral dilemmas, especially development and revision of principles. if they recur, do lead to moral But the logic of dilemma situations does not force changes or adjustment and none may be made; and typically none will be made, where dilemmas are resolved, resolve dilemmas which they may not be. The assumption that we must is probably a hangover from consistency assumptions, that deontic inconsistency must be removed - whereas all we have to do is act, or do nothing, in 26 the face of them. Part of what is wrong with the idea of a predetermined ordering of principles, the conflict, and also the they remove is that as with utilitarianism procedures, felt tension, and often anguish, that goes with it. Even if the appeal to priority succeed in some cases, it does not in fact work, and 45 general. For with Lemmon’s complex dilemmas where ordering of principles does not could succeed, in uncertainties enter be can there preassigned no solution moral to the in dilemma virtue of higher-order principles or a given ordering of one’s duties and obligations and the like, because part of the very dilemma is just one’s uncertainty as to one’s actual situation (p.153). In any event dilemmas do not go away as they should if the conflicting obligations were merely prima facie. Very often someone in a moral dilemma is in a fix and feels it^^; and doesn’t say ”My God there isn’t a problem, I must simply look up the book principles are ranked and what’s to be done’, to see how these not having been so prepared. in which we, as it were, merely .... dilemmas in which we morally prepared, have to look up the solution in our private ethical code, are rare ... and in case any of little practical Of interest. are those importance greater dilemmas in this class where some decision of a moral character is required Our predicament is here so described that, whatever we do, even if we do ... nothing at that might mean), we are doing all (whatever something which we ought not to do, and so can be called upon to justify either our activity or our inactivity (Lemmon, p.151). The usual deontological positions, which deontic weaken principles to provisional or prima facie principles to avoid problems with dilemmas, also play into utilitarian hands. reflecting things that of in often is which only are to act overriding requirement character utilitarians want For the for such to represent most a way disguised (a sc part as to of obligation statements concerning distributed, e.g. are the taken coherent way as derivative; net utilities position from would their own the deontic make this Deontic principles such as reduce somehow distributed type of action which tends to maximize utility. accounts typically rule out moral dilemmas: both apart or to tend complex to be an action is obligatory when it maximizes (expected) utility and it is of a recognised cannot they ar . - principles as deontic maximize utility, maximisation principle so only for the most part also). those all maximise utility, and indeed 27 Such reductive for example, an action and its opposite if an action increases utility then its opposite characteristically diminishes it. if all moral injunctions More generally, answer back ultimately to just one standard, maximum utility, then there can be no real conflict (but etc.). for these It is apparent conflict through failure to calculate correctly, sorts of reasons that the considerable data now accumulated regarding moral try to explain away, to utilitarians deny that there can be So they are in the awkward position of having to dispute, dilemmas. genuine moral and only dilemmas. But how, when stuck in moral dilemmas, do we proceed to reach a decision? For a 47 decision is called for: those in dilemma situations still often have to act. The intuitive procedure in such dilemma situations is not difficult to grasp. terminology is regularly employed, and is instructive. to those the in - dilemmas weighed assessed, are The same Alternatives - outcomes open up, the balance. put in The familiar scales picture, with the scale sensitive to evaluative weights, is helpful - except it that can suggest, weighed against another, whereas there may be as with of justice where one thing is two competing principles or just that there are several. scales the options, In the light of such a weighing up of alternatives, those in dilemmas then determine what they should do, what is best, or satisfactory, ’If ... we are to act here in good faith,we shall recognise in the circumstances . that the dilemma is what it is and make the best decision we can * There is an attempt to then intuitive apply (Lemmon 62, p.151). methods, decision consist which in assessing and weighing the alternative outcomes open, and maximizing or satisizing on these This outcomes. already very looks consequentialist decision theory, which is what, a like preanalytic account of in a qualified way, we shall reach It is in a qualified way for several reasons; not only may no best (or even towards. sufficiently good) outcome be determinable - there is nothing approaching a decision procedure here - but the further decision theory methods apply within moral dilemmas, so they supply, at best, a second best resolution, a first best result requiring removal of moral dilemma constraints and so being ruled out. Those in dilemma unworkable (and situations usually do not resort to anything as mostly arbitrary and often ineffective) utilitarian as complex and assessment procedures. Nor do they surrender to pure chance procedures. A3. The account should not give way to irrationalism, but should adhere to rational decision procedures, which are not necessarily, however, effective. This requirement rules out pure chance methods, which are only appropriate where it is a matter of indifference which way the decision, if any, Even where some resort to methods can give a worse outcome than might be obtained. tie-breaking devices is appropriate, that may dilemma, but rather to some component of the not be situation. Otherwise such goes. to the final Envisage, outcome of a for instance, a decision-tree for an issue where a tie-breaking device such as a coin toss is applied to a high branch and that proves sufficient for rational decision methods to resolve 28 Then it would be irrational to try to resolve the whole issue the issue concerned. by coin toss. Nonetheless A4. The account should be appropriately situational. That is, the account should be applicable to each situation on its own merits, taking It should not simply be a rule­ detailed account of the features of that situation. for in dilemma cases the rules have ceased to yield a resolution and based account, into a are locked be will fix position. situational, it will not that of situational be involve resort to pure—chance methods. by situation, situational most part, by example) or example by virtue of A3 and A4, though the account Thus, procedures ethics where such ethics Nor is a situational ethics (ethics situation For the of a broader type being recommended. into operation where a moral only go dilemma is reached; in general, deontic rule-based procedures apply. The broad outlines of a satisfactory account are beginning to emerge. Before we consider apply rational decision methods to each given dilemma situation. is how this to be so as account, to be said about the needs For to meet apparent objections. insensitive those accomplished more to in switches language, both FA and A, some options, and yet that, also F~A, that it ought also be that so B, very idea of it should be that B, where B entails We do not however go on to one of A and -A, so that not both A and ~A are ruled out. claim the is both A and ~A are ruled out as moral that situations, in certain in For are we not only claiming that decision-theoretic resolution of moral dilemmas. for structure of the things, there is, to among other contradiction a It should that not both A and ~A ruled are out morally.49 What is being claimed that B, or an adequate thing, is the best thing to do in the constrained circumstances, that B should be done in that sense, net that B is lifted to status obligation enough in the circumstances, by looking at you does not the can B is In brief, <»B, "second-best obligation"). determined (though imply OB. acceptable worlds worlds where B holds which fail to be acceptable. say, if you like, that it is a the best that can be done or good is not going to be When <£>B holds where B When holds, because there are holds is not going to be settled in general by falling back on deontic rules, because in the interesting cases the rules are jammed. But such deontic rules dees not being beyond imply being beyond rational procedures, indeed procedures that may be represented by way of rules (though not controlled by deontic rules). The rational procedures in question are essentially those of decision theory. What is required is a decision as to what can be done in the circumstances; and this can be determined by relevant alternatives. be of something weighing up the expected outcomes and selecting among The selectiin may be of the best in the circumstance; satisfactory in the circumstances. The approach adopted pluralistic, allowing for both maximizing and satisizing procedures. 29 the it may can be Maximizers will of course argue that it would be irrational to select anything but the best among the alternatives (given that it was conceded to be the best); But satisizers will resist arguments.what such elaborates is what upon we a under do decision done normally this:- Set out the relevant alternatives, action courses of alternative. to us open Select a best, i.e. way - is - merely which in outline the results that the different list to. analysis intuitive more i.e. lead will a in theory Determine the of each likely value with maximum likely value, an alternative or a The basic procedure is childishly simple, but filling sufficiently good alternative. out the details may be extremely difficult or even impossible in a satisfactory way. The in problems, normally order increasing alternatives open, establishing their probability, rankings to them. things these cases, favourable more delineating the assigning values or desirability techniques from decision theory however for doing all There are in are: difficulty, of and in less circumstances favourable guestimates can be made or resort had to fuzzy methods. To descend to concrete applications (where procedures may be clearer than at the theoretical level), consider again the Platonic dilemma discussed by Lemmon, where I ought to return my friend’s gun and also ought not to do so. The alternatives are to return the gun and have the wife shot, or to return the gun avoiding a shooting but thereby breaking an undertaking. the alternative first wife It is certain, in the circumstances, that under the will be shot, highly a undesirable outweighing the lesser undesirability of the second alternative. the value of second Since the expected first, exceeds that of the alternative considerably much outcome, the best thing in the circumstances is to return the gun. However undertaking goes Lemmon to seriously the return ’to gun suggesting that one sacrifices one’s astray in utilitarian considerations’ No doubt (p.152). utilitarian considerations would bring out (could be massaged to bring out, rather) a But the fact is that no consideration (or interpersonal comparisons) similar result. of the utilities pleasures and pains contemplated. ’’critical involves an (whoever Lemmon utilitarian ones. the everybody of (involved they confuses are), the in is made, consequentialist universe, or or even needs whatever), to considerations with be their remotely much narrower Similarly the recipe Hare suggests for resolving moral dilemmas at level”, namely illegitimate resort to assimilation act-utilitarianism of (see, consequentialist e.g. 82, considerations p.43), under utilitarianisms. In certain respects Lemmon’s Platonic dilemma is not a good example of a moral dilemma; tougher in particular, dilemmas, the it is too easily resolved, and so characteristic features of pain, emerge, moral dilemmas can anguish, indecision, get omitted. As thus begins to be divided roughly into two types, easy and hard. 30 Easy dilemmas are those that are comparatively easy to find a way through eventually, and But hard ones are those that leave people caught in the dilemma so are resolvable. at least uncomfortable irresolvable. they whatever to choose and do, are so in a good sense Though a way-through or a way-out may be charted by decision methods, it is a way that leaves those involved morally uneasy, dissatisfied, or worse. For at the far hard end of the spectrum lie those dilemmas of tragic dimensions. Although consequential decision rationally within moral dilemma theory provides a for model how proceed to situations, by no means everyone confronted with a moral dilemma will apply such procedures in an intuitive way, even though many will. For one thing, there is plenty of scope for bad faith, irrationality and and more generally, for non-rational procedures; and severe moral dilemmas often enough induce non-rational and even paralytic or self-destructive modes in those who are caught in them. another, For there are indirect ways of obtaining the effects of decision theory, analogue decision theory so to say. Counselling, whether through a friend or a professional counsellor, is an important analogue: there the discussive mode helps to bring out eludicating of and assemble alternatives, undesirability of each. the and elements the of the advantages decision and approach, the desirability and theory drawbacks, Alternatively, or as well, these elements may be bought out by reflecting on a range of similar situations and experience there using these cases as some sort of precedent, in particular, for determining value rankings of alternatives open. Moral dilemmas have corollaries for moral ways of doing things. is that perfectibility of the moral scheme of things is impossible. One corollary Any sufficiently rich set of rules risks inconsistency, and will be inconsistent if completed. dilemmas are thus inevitable be; in the larger scheme of things. Moral This is as it should for it is in this way especially that moral development occurs and moral stature is obtained. 31 ^A much earlier version of this paper was presented by the second author at the Australian National University in 1975. Subsequently much of the paper was lost; what survived is largely incorporated in the first three sections, especially §3. However the new version takes over the leading ideas of the initial version. The authors are much indebted for comments and criticism to C. Pigden, R. Goodin and G. Priest. was ^This even true Maliy’s of pioneering system of 1926 which permitted replacement of logical equivalents within the scope of obligation function 0 (see F & Von Wright’s seminal work H p.3). (in 51), which set the pattern for mainstream deontic logic, was explicitly based on the modal comparison of deontic functors with modal functors, and built modal that break the modal systems, exceptional assumptions in at the bottom of the theory. The connection, are deontic systems based on relevant logics on such systems see RLR, chapter 8. ^These paradoxes are explained, obligation, paradoxes of derived and their see modal bases exposed, On the for some of the p.224; and Prior 62, further in §5. considerable literature on paradoxes like those of the Robber and Good Samaritan, see anthologies and the Hilpinen A detailed uniform treatment of especially Vermazen. all these and other deontic paradoxes in the framework of relevant logic is given in RLR II. 4In its equivalent form, Op => ~Fp, i.e. what is obligatory is not forbidden, it is the dubbed ’’Bentham’s Law” by von Wright 81, p.2. 5In a way, furthermore, avoids that the , problems Hare’s and complexities attempt to transfer a levels-resolution to deontic paradoxes would lead to if worked out paradoxes. the compare properly: any In counterintuitively, case, that problems of semantical if we were even ’ought’ is ambiguous levels say, to as to Hare as levels, avoid to some semantical proposes, but tinkering would still be required to fix up a deontic calculus at each level. Moreover, there are good grounds for doubting that the so far ill-characterised and artificial distinction of levels that Hare wants to impose can be satisfactorily made out. For one thing, critical hardly the holds up; level for separation intuitive of the paradoxes intuitive are from the typical of rational or act utilitarian assessments at the upper level, and we can be rational and critical, and ask for why- explanations, at both levels. ^There are various different form, OA, OB -> ^It is this principle can take, e.g. also a rule 0(A & B), and a rather useless material form, OA & OB =>. 0(A & B). tried criticised below. forms however by Schotch and Jennings, p.152; their argument is It is also suggested by Barcan Marcus, p.134., and toyed with by 32 Williams o In particular Lemmon, taking off from Sartre, has argued this in two important papers, neglected in mere recent philosophical literature on moral dilemmas and moral conflict. earlier Recent British work, in literature that it could logical further the next note). on conflict of values has particular, profitably have taken into ignored account (see Such an uninformed approach is however not uncharacteristic of British philosophy. ^Especially Lemmon’s work 62 and 65. But although Lemmon suggests (in 62, e.g. p.150) that there are no logical problems in accommodating moral dilemmas, including those of the form 0(A & ~A), none of the systems of deontic logic he presents (e.g. in 65), not even the very weak systems, can do so without trivialising. The reasons for collapse are the modal ones already explained. Apart from the work of Lemmon and a few who follow him, work which at least suggests the need for a bridge even if it does not offer so much as good working plans for one, the literature on moral dilemmas tends to bifurcate - into purely philosophical material which does not address the logical issues, and largely logical material which characteristically avoids the crucial moral issue of dilemmas, which the logics espoused cannot handle (and maybe because of that: otherwise the logical literature On the regrettable lack of interaction between deontic logicians disputes the data). and ethicists, the latter being the worse offenders, see also Thomason’s notes. 10 In fact the latter implication of O-transmission could be much weakened for the purpose of the arguments, e.g. the form A B - > OA D OB would serve to make the point. 11 Gumanski 80 affords a good example of the complication resulting, complication readily removed by relevant logic relocation. 12 The argument thoroughtly for this fallacious. ’principle of deontic contingency’ Either an in F & H, p.13, is illegitimate quantificational conversion (from some to all) or a modal confusion (from p & ~p to q & ~q) is used to get from P(p & ~p) for some p - which is all the denial of deontic contingency gives - to Pq, that is, to ’everything is permitted’. 1^For see axiom, (D1) Op =>~0~p, of the standard systems as formulated in F & H, p.13, and use the interdefinability of P and 0, e.g. PB 4 1 ~0~B. There would be little point in presenting features of the epicycling systems of types (iii)-(v) in any detail since all will be quickly dismissed. In any event, details can be found in the Hilpinen surveys 33 (71 and 81), texts which are ir fact restricted to epicycling positions within the dominant modal paradigm for deontic Even Schotch and Jennings, who do question some minimal principles, remain logics. staunchly the within modal sphere, their as possible worlds and semantics their substitutivity principles reveal. 15 F & H, p.8, in support p.16. This consistency interpretation appears to have extensive Scandinavia. Of course if consistency were meant in a different sense (that of regularity), it would be different. But it is not: see the development in F & H, p.l6ff. 16 Cf. Lemmon: philosophers that ’It ... does the not to seem adoption of have been new morality a associated with the confrontation of a moral dilemma. much by observed an agent ethical by is frequently Indeed, it is hard to see what else would be likely to bring about a change of moral outlook other than having to make a difficult moral decision’ (62, p155). not settled without so to speak Similarly Barcan Marcus (p.12): ’although idealistically, a source of moral motion. dilemmas are is, Moral inconsistency residue, the recognition of their reality has a dynamic force. 17 In 1975 when the paper was first drafted and presented this example was still topical. However at most times in modern human history there are many candidates to substitute for variable V. 18 In the narrow scheme of standard deontic logic, these would be recast in terms of the forbidden functor F, defined as 0~. However in relevant logic settings, it is a further question, not settled by the framework whether W reduces to 0~. * ^Williams 20 are Jim-Pedro example (in 81) is of this type. As there are other war dilemmas, and especially nuclear war dilemmas, so there other violence. pacifist dilemmas, e.g. the problem of violence to prevent greater On nuclear war dilemmas, and on the main pacifist dilemma, see the War and Peace series. 21 For many of the contractual arrangements, isomorphism, known moral dilemmas we consider, especially those there are analogous legal dilemmas. preserving very many important logical generated by For there is a wellfeatures between moral obligations and rights and wrongs and corresponding legal obligations and rights and wrongs. The complexity of legal frameworks, the relatively independent design of using parts and divine numerous lack of design control legal of likelihood the dilemmas and sources decidedly complexity to high. analogous An is dilemmas moral for consistency, or checks argument considered in render the fjrom the McConnell, p.275ff. pp Lemmon’s final treatment, but (fifth) type of ’’moral dilemma” does so far resist more formal is that the mainly because class concerned description and lacks even clear working examples. so far These are, defies adequate roughly, situations ‘in which an agent has to make a decision of a recognisably moral character though he is completely unprepared ... by his present moral outlook’ and has somehow to fashion a new moral outlook. is There so far of here nothing especial paraconsistent concern. By no means all the types of situations falling under Lemmon’s ’classification of moral dilemmas’ (62, classifying types of first class and p.156) are dilemmas. situation’, ‘moral the classification starts out is nothing dilemmatic about there and which Lemmon about the second, little Indeed the ‘does not wish to call ... moral dilemmas, because [as with the first] in all the cases our moral situation is perfectly clear’ (p.143). The main types of moral dilemmas Lemmon discerns, the third and fourth classes, are precisely those treated in the text. The concurrence even of several different, 23()f course the control is limited. perhaps apparently independent, logical approaches is no sure guide to correctness of an explication or has to answer back satisfactorily to The matter still account. preanalytic principles. 22* In dilemmas, the initial version of this paper three into types (0, 0~; complication was based on a mistake, collapse. are F, a rather F~; and artificial classification of 0,F) was proposed. But this that equation of 0~A and FA would lead to modal And, apparently a more natural and simpler theory does emerge if 0~ and F equated. Naturally definitional than coentailment. More highly equation intensional in this context does not differences between the imply more notions, which there are, remain unaffected. What holds for F does not automatically transfer independently. ^The labels and Jennings. [RM] and [K], convenient to P. Perhaps P should be treated in what follows, are taken from Schotch Note that although symbolically virtually the same as the originals, they symbolize different determinate principles. ^See as well as RLR I, Routley 72, Routley and Meyer 73 and OP. 35 the 2?Under four-valued American plan for relevant logic * can be semantics, avoided. But here the superior two-valued Australian plan is followed. 2&Though here we simply take the rule over from standard deontic semantics, it can be argued in several ways, explained (though usually for the analogous necessity functor) as in RLR. class of such A, b One way is this:- in situation a, where OA holds, consider the i.e. {C: I(OC, a) = 1}. This gives an initially acceptable set up with respect to a; and indeed would yield the sought rule (with S improved to a but for 1-1 relation) fail, conditions the fact that bo may not be a world because required closure conspicuously We primeness. can however extend though not ba, uniquely, so that world requirements are met. The picture looks like this: S is the composition of the function (from a to b ) and the extension (to the b-’s). The b.’s are the accepted worlds vis-a-vis a. ^The point and role of evaluative step-down is explained in Routley 83. 3°The strategy resembles that earlier in Routley and Meyer 75 in Plainly there is room for other postulates, formulating explicitly dialethic logic. e.g. exploited In virtue of the model theorem Ot, where 0p2 where p2 is not dilemmatic, etc. t is any tautology, such a postulate is guaranteed in standard deontic logic, but it is rightly left as an option in relevant deontic logic, and also in Barcan Marcus. third 31A type of argument for rejecting [KJ is implicit in Schotch and and also in Barcan Marcus, namely that without [K] both moral conflict and Jennings, the Kantian ought-implies-can principle can be retained. That supposes of course that the Kantian principle is a desirable one, worth going considerably out of one’s logical way disaster to retain. [KJ But the is not from the combination of Kantian only in principle involved theory with moral dilemmas: reaching other equally solid and respectable principles than [KJ could be considered for rejection. ^2At this logic and point we do detour analyses of moral beyond our dilemmas, to look critique of modalisation of deontic at some separate puzzles in deontic logic - which have also been used against the idea of a formal treatment of ethics. And the approach we take to these further 36 puzzles - by limiting transmission in the fashion of weaker, and deeper logics - is largely independent of principles, the reaminder IN short, we could have taken a different approach to paper. of the these transmission puzzles, without varying the rest of the paper. 33 Of course it can be argued that one is storing up problems for (much) later on when the logical theory repenting have fuller a better developed, is much more fully developed, and predicates like those of logical role. so also will be presumably when But the logical theory is the distinctions between types of predicates and those sustaining transmission. 34 It is common practice indict deontic logic by so stating the deontic ’'paradox" that they smuggle in much more than a satisfactory entailment relation could warrant and more even than a modal relation would grant. paradoxes will be presented as arguments Here is an example. These [deontic] against Consider the Good Samaritan paradoxes formulated the "standard" as follows: deontic logics. 1) A is obligated to help an injured criminal 2) If A is obligated to do B then A is obligated to do whatever B entails. (This is a principle of the standard deontic logics.) 3) There could not be an injured criminal if someone did not commit a crime. So 4) A is obligated to bring it about that someone commit a crime. (From 1- 3 by the standard deontic logics.) The So 5) logics are standard deontic (For flawed. 4) is outrageous, though its premisses are not.) Entailment principles do not justify the importing of 'bringing about' in clause 4). 35 And wrong to rob him and not rob him, and so on. Conjunction is not here connexive with one conjunct undercutting another - though connexive deontic logic is what some seem to be seeking. ^Accordingly Morscher's retreat to "rational norms" and "rational legislating" is But unnecessary. presupposed again that a deontic Morscher the grasps key point, that von Wright has logic must contain certain consistency-type principles, and that 'this presupposition need not be fulfilled' (p.98). 37 Schotch and Jennings, community of moral philosophers' philosophy, analysis. where claim 'widespread support for (a) among the (a) is the theme 'that cases of real moral Most likely this claim, like most such sociological claims conflict cannot occur'. in (pp.152-3) is merely impressionistic, and not based on any sort of survey or But we expect further investigation would tend to confirm it. no J Thus, to take just one example: there appears to be a conflict 'One may be in a situation of course in which of principles each of which appears categorically 37 binding - but natural reflection will ultimately show that one or other must prevail’ Benn (p.5). But examples abound. The reason reflection removes inconsistency is that obligations do not collide. We have it from Kant himself Because however duty and obligation are in general concepts that express the objective practical necessity of certian actions, ... it follows that a conflict of duties and obligations is inconceivable (obligationes non colliduntor). (Metaphysis of Morals, cited in Barcan Marcus, p.323.) But does it world the (merely) practical follow not of without action However necessity. sweeping a but the worlds concering consistency assumption picked out by function not of objective these worlds are, moral dilemmas certainly appear to show, sometimes inconcistent. There are depending what is the explanation can go, various different ways and contractual arrangements a route like that of Hobbes through Rawls will be followed. Given less, taken e.g. granted. for only grounded example, For or preferences given choice individual behaviour, interests a semantical route might be And so on. tried. 110 The inadequacy of modal accounts of inconsistency is explained in detail in RLR, chapter 5. ji -1 These examples and most of those that follow were suggested by C. Pigden, who also supplied the references. HO The first quote is from Kenny, p.75, the second from Skinner, p.7, both of which furnish additional details. 4^Cf. Kenny, p.78. 24/4 According to MacIntyre 66. The situation of Agamemnon and Oedipus are remarked upon in Williams 81, p.80. There there are is not a substantial and cannot literature be general arguing, not entirely universally applicable principles in all circumstances of their application. conclusively, rules for that ranking of Thus, for example, Ross, p.41, also discussed in Barcan Marcus, p.124, Barcan Marcus, p.135, Hare 82, pp.32-4. It seems that such a result would be proved, as regards effective rules, by methods of reversion theory. 38 ^The relevant; points Hare makes concerning anguish remorse and (82, pp.29-30) are they apply also against his own proposal to treat all principles as prima facie. But points concerning anguish and guilt are not decisive; account of how these attitudes arise can be given from for one thing, an modal a angle (cf. the discussion in Barcan Marcus, p.127). ^By no means all dilemmas require resolution, e.g. those of no practical import such as purely theoretical dilemmas of freedom, etc. liberty, These can, in principle, just stand. 48 As Lemmon explains (in 62), really following Sartre, there is considerable scope for bad faith and opting out of our responsibilities here, e.g. pretending that no decision is called for, or that another has preempted the decision, or that the decision is otherwise determined or out of our own control. 49No doubt we could tough it out dialectically, but the basis for doing so is Any lacking. adherence contradictions to calles for especially rigorous justification 500n satisizing decision theory, and the dialectic between maximizers and satisizers, see MS. Fuzzy decision theory is however only in the initial stages of development at present. 5^This is just one of several reasons why Hare’s grand synthesis (in 82) of Kant and the utilitarians, initially appealing in its two level tidiness and simplicity, goes down the philosophical drain. A main reason is that the synthesis is built upon, and incorporates, consistency and modal assumptions, and so is inadequate moral data to be accounted for theoretically (see further War and Peace II). to the REFERENCES R. Barcan Marcus, 121-136. Journal of Philospohy 77 (1980) ’Moral dilemmas and consistency , * S. I. Benn, ’Public and private morality: clean living and dirty hands’ in Public and Private in Social Life (ed. S.I. Benn and G.F. Gaus), Croom Helm, London & Canberra, 1983, 155-182. A. Donegan, The Theory of Morality, Chigago University Press, Chicago, 1977. D. Follesdal and R. Hilpinen, ’Deontic pp.1-35; referred to as F & H. B. C. logic: van Fraassen, ’The logic of conditional Logic 1 (1972) 417-38. an introduction’ Hilpinen in obligation’. Journal 1971, of Philospohical L. Gumanski, ’On deontic logic’, Studia Logica 39 (1980) 63-75. S. Hampshire (ed), Public and Private Morality, Cambridge University Press, 1978. R.M. Hare, Freedom and Reason, Clarendon, Oxford, 1963. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Conflicts’). Clarendon, Oxford, 1982 (see especially chapter 2 ’Moral R. Harrison, Rational Action, Cambridge University Press, 1979. R. Hilpinen (ed). Deontic Dordrecht, 1971. Logic: Introductory and Systematic Readings, Reide1, R. Hilpinen (ed), New Studies in Deontic Logic, Reidel, Dordrecht, 1981. A. Kenny, The God of the Philosophers, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979. E.J. Lemmon, ’Moral dilemmas’, Philosophical Review 71 (1962) 139-58. E.J. Lemmon,’ Deontic (1965) 39-71. Logic and the T. McConnell, ’Moral dilemmas and Philosophy 8 (1978) 269-87. logic of imperatives’, consistency in ethics’, Logique et Canadian Analyse 8 Journal A. MacIntyre, A Short History of Ethics, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London, 1966. of 39 A. A. Martino (ed.), Deotnic Logic, Computational Systems, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1982. Linguistics and Legal Information E. Morscher, ’Antinomies and incompatibilities within normative languages’ in Martino 82, pp.83-102. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; hereafter OED. G. Priest and R. Routley, On Paraconsistency, Research Australian National University, 1983; hereafter OP. in Papers Logic, #13, A.N. Prior, Formal Logic, Second edition, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1962. A.N. Prior, ’Escapism: the logical basis of ethics' (ed. A.I. Melden), Seattle, 1958. in Essays in Moral Philosophy, W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Oxford University Press, New York, 1930. R. Routley, ’War and Peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war­ deterrence, and the political fall-out’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, #5, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1983. R. Routley, ’On the alleged inconsistency and moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism’, Inquiry 26 (1984) , ; also War and Peace II. R. Routley, ’Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms’, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984; hereafter MS. R. and V. Routley, ’The semantics of first degree entailment’, Nous 6 (1972) 335-59. R. and V. Routley, ’Semantical foundations of value theory’, Nous (1983) 441—56. R. Routley and R.k. Meyer, ’The semantics of entailment I’, in Truth, Syntax, and Modality (ed. H. Leblanc) North-Holland, Amsterdam, 1973» pp.199-243. R. Routley and R.K. Meyer, ’Dialectical logic, classical logic, and the consistency of the world’, Studies in Soviet Thought 16 (1976) 1-25. R. Routley and others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, Part I (1982) and Part II (1984); referred to as RLR I and RLR II respectively. A. Ryan, The Idea of Freedom, Oxford, 1970. P. Schotch and pp.149-62. R.E. Jennings, ’Non-Kripkean deontic logic’, in Hilpinen 81, 40 Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern University Press, Cambridge, 1978. Political Thought, Volume 11, Cambridge R. M. Thomason, ’Deontic logic as founded on tense logic’, in Hilpinen 81, pp.165-175. B. Vermazen, 'The (1977) 1-71. logic of practical 'ought’-sentences’, Philosophical Studies 32 B. Williams, Moral Luck, Cambridge United Press, 1981. B. Williams, 'Conflict of values' in Williams 81, pp.71-82; also in Ryan 79. G.H. von Wright, An Essay in Modal Logic, North Holland, Amsterdam, 1951. G.H. von Wright, ’On the logic of norms/ and actions’, M. Hilpinen 81, pp.3-35. G.H. ven Wright, ’Norms, truth and logic’ in Martino 82, pp.3-20. TYRANT MOPE ON NOPAL DILEMMAS 1. ethics. 2. Revolutionising Possible heading, why the failure to comprehend moral dilemmas. All these Reading force^'^^e off in other directions. Undoubtedly a great deal of ethics has been messed up by a failure to understand moral dilemmas. ' ... The failure is often reported; for instance human since justifiable claims ... and are rights claims, they be outweighed by other As in all conflicts of moral principles, human rights reasons must be weighed other moral can against one another by an as yet poorly understood and ill-defined process' (Rajfles, p.42). The failure shows up on the apparent clash between doing ethics by way of principles and doing ethics consistency reasons, principles. vor principles break down, through examples. or dilemmatic And examples. examples it is thought for air^. thought to refute A proper approach to dilemmas removes the tension between examples and principles and allows a synthesis to be achieved. 3. Moral rectitude. Now is notion this to be unpacked0 mhere are competing explanations, e.g. 1) in terms of obligation and deontics; 2) by way of consequentialist rectitude decisive. assessment. Pettit to make moral mhen it requires assessment thus 3) Method 1) unless dilemma; otherwise method 2\ rectitude so it is absolute in terms of O. 4. wants This is impossible. Mcjlly's system has no moral dilemmas, since ~fu For it proves trivial deontically. But he also wants to run 0~u^ - at least intentionally. Aquinas denies certain moral dilemmas, e.g. Np & F~p, in the doctrine concerning perplexus simpliciter F & N p.12. 5. Investigate further the connection of permitted and accepted worlds, and commission? This 'possibly permitted' does not involve discussed in NNL. the fallacy of reducing permission * 'permissible to It does tie with the suggested connection of commission and omission through the * function. 2 6. Is problem of the individual in society, of a person in politics, an organisation or a company of this type i.e. dilemma of freedom? Of. a dilemma that can just stand, like the theoretical also Machiavellian a problem: person in public must (morally?) act evilly sometimes. 7. of PUBLIC distinction The moralities. VS MORALITIES PRIVATE implies that there are two The BASE ARGUMENT against is this: But there are not two. if we acknowledge this conception of morality as requiring some action as the thing to do, how, logically speaking, could there be two moralities0 the thing to do when they conflict? overriding reason for action?^ How could morality then What is provide an Similarly &n utilitarianism single maximisation recipe and results. (/? DOEBN'01 REQUIRE KANTIANISM.) However A can to be subject conflicting public and private claims. Seen this way ^public vs private just generates.heap of further moral dilemmas, and the 2 moralities ^is just shoddy attempt to escape these dilemmas, expedient (i.e. would become n shoves morality out as in the Hinduism resolution dilemmas. of often in a way that’s politically of the way for expediency'1. The 2 moralities * int if pursued this distinction-making attempt at / Something special about public/private case0 Or differently, why are arguments from expedience so much more acceptable in public sphere0 Be^n gives r interest some reasons, but these oughtn't to justify a difference. | public interest DIRTY HANDS PROBLEM (PARADOX) is like GOOD SAM? behalf of the statecommitting murder. Sometimes it is right get one's hands dirty. E.g. Doing such and such on OR just a straight dilemma? to try to succeed, and then it must also be right to But one's hands get dirty from doing what it is wrong to do. And how can it be wrong to do what is right? Or how can we get our hands dirty by doing what we ought to do9 Z M. Walzer, Philosophy and Public Affairs, moral 2, 10°^, dilemma. 164. Op Walzer sees this as a tragic dilemma: p-> q Oq, but 0~q. Example: but really a torturing captured terrorist to extract information to save innocent lives. The problems start from questions of relations between two different moralities. Conclusion: 8. Conflict conscience 'that, the public to at its most liberal, loyalty, overriding moral liberalism in end. to a On between will stand the individual, tried committed concern for its collective interest, the one hand the individual as a relate this ambiguous model of the a individual and as an autonomous, citadel, on the other, the overriding perverse, wilful obstacles in the way of the general will. to with no gainsaying, and the claims of possessed of liberties that only he himself can waive, by consent; State, equipped society, not T have only to liberal conceptions of what belongs to the private and what to the public, but also to the tension between a morality of principles and one of valued outcomes, which, in my view, is very closely connected with the ambiguity of the model . * ("Renn? 9. Argument for weak paraconsistent position. Morality is a guide to action. Action is consistent. So have to r?l consistencize. ^Inconclusive"1. Like law one consistencizes (e.g. for action^ alright. But that confirms that it is inconsistent in the first place. 10. The difference. fought distinction is, it It hands the opposition its case. is objected, a Simply not so. distinction without a The following have been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. • • • • • Letter, unidentified author to Richard, 27 Jul 1984 re Moral dilemmas. (2 pages (1 leaf)) Reference card and handwritten paper, ? Alchourron and Bulygin (1 reference card + 5 leaves) Letter, Charles to Richard, undated re New Studies in Deontic Logic and Castañeda's proposed deontic logic. (2 pages) Cuttings from unidentified publication, The paradoxes of deontic by Hector-Neri Castañeda (page 46-47), and Some main problems of deontic by Jaakko Hintikka 9page 94-96. (2 leaves) Letter, unidentified author to Richard, with annotations by Sylvan?, undated, re Moral dilemmas. (7 leaves) Ml Although the sorts of examples we have described seem familiar enough, it might well be disputed that they are correctly described as cases of Op and 0~p, or in the alternative representation as cases of Fp & F~p. The main ground for this is the belief that 19. in any such case one of the parties to the conflict is less wrong, and that this one can be claimed to be not really wrong at all. There are however several objections to this move to neutralise the dilemmas (1) First, wrong party. there is no guarantee that there always is a less Both parties may be equally wrong, no way of deciding which is less wrong. Vietnam example; To take and there may be our hypothetical if we withdraw half a million people will die; but if we do not withdraw the war will continue and half a million people will die; clearly the example may be elaborated. There may be no grounds for choice. (2) The fact that one party is less wrong than the alternative is no grounds for saying that it is not wrong at all. In fact the case would normally be described as one of choice between " two evils", two wrong aciwsese©; if one chooses the lesser of two evils, then one still chooses an evil. ing One is simply not justified in claim1 that, where p involves killing 10 people, p is not wrong simply on the grounds that ~p involves killing 15 people, any more than one is in the case of preference theory justified in saying that p, which brings a gift of $10, is not a good thing simply on the grounds that ~p brings a gift of $11. things; (3) They are both good and in our moral case, both are wrong. If we do say this, plainly it will be very difficult to find any moral principles which can be asserted with any confidence universally. In fact it will probably be possible to find hypothetical counterexamples to any statement of the form "All actions of type x are wrong", just by producing a case where p is an action of type x, but ~p is an even worse action. that p, although an action of type x, is not wrong, It will follow so we will have However, a counterexample. it seems to be important that we should be able to assert such general principles, and doing so gives us an essential way of assessing, morally, (4) Finally, types of actions. the proposed redescription of the case as involving only one wrong element, the one which is more wrong, leaves out an essential feature of such a case, that it is a dilemma, case where one cannot but act wrongly. If we omit this element the case is not properly described, it is falsified; a we may as a result find ourselves unable to explain many resulting features of the situation which result from the conflict, e.g. human behavioural features >n such a situation involving hesitation, doubt, inaction, perhaps anguish and guilt. All these will appear quite irrational. (5) Assigning a priority to our moral rules itself does nothing to resolve the logical problem raised by the dilemmas, (although it may solve the practical problem of how best to act). % For this logical problem iX the problem of how to arrange our logic so as to be able to describe such cases adequately and without falsification or incon-sisteney. Arranging a priority, so that A one alternative can be claimed to be less wrong, does not solve the logical problem, which is that whatever happens will be wrong, that T cannot be identical with I. The consequence that whatever happens is wrong cannot be removed unless as well as a priority assignment one also adopts the principle that what is less wrong is not wrong at all. But this principle leads to inconsistency for then the less wrong action is both wrong and not wrong. To be consistent this method must introduce a new concept of wrong in addition to the old one, say "wrong2" , and the less wrong action can be said to be not "wrong2". But now the original problem is 21. still not eliminated, because the problem was not that whatever be is . happened would /'wrong2" (although this/now false), but that whatever happened would be wrong, which is still true. sort of priority - dominated concept cannot replace, may supplement, the original concept. And this although it Sf- The problem of classifying these dilemmas. z mainly using the term ’wrong’. We have stated our dilemmas However, it may seem that this is ambiguous, and that it is possible, or desirable, to make a further distinction, between pi inciples which are obligatory and principles which are prohibitory. For wrongs can be due to two very different causes - om^iission or commission. The distinction between obligation and prohibition principles can be explained initially as follows: an obligation principle of the form Op read ’it ought to be the case that p’,Qt is f ? L ' r jT f'.Jlz.f:? /t/tjyJ /4-< 'it ought to come about that p'. This says that something, p, ought to should happen that p'A, r, happen, an ideal situation I. that is^ that it is a member of & A situation^satisfies Op, Op if p is not in it then, if p is In it ( p eaJ;and violates p's presence satisfies Op, whereas (pZ S?) • £ ["Obligation" Z7 —:----- is ’ being used here its omission or absence violates it. in a somewhat unusual sense, 4 for Lemmon seems to be right in urging that obligations are usually contractual in nature. and contracts may be contracts to do something or to refrain from However, we doing something - hence both positive and negative. must press 'obligation' and 'obligatory' and adjective corresponding to it * into service as a noun ought to be the case that' in order to avoid clumsiness and for lack of any other suitable words. The other class of principles, hand, we shall write prohibitive principles, on the other 'Ep' and read 'it is forbidden that p'. These principles claim that p is the sort of action which should p is not a member of the ideal situation I. be avoided satisfies Fp, situation a such that p Z such that pea violates it. a situation a whereas p's omission or absence satisfies Fp, whereas pSoccurrence or presence violates it. is paralleled on the obligations) The distinction action level by the distinction between action and by that between and inaction, A 'sins of omission' and 'sins of commision' A (which violate (which violate prohibitions). 'I have done those things which I ought not to have done' violating a prohibition but also, and not equivalently, not done those things which I ought to have done', thus 'I have thus violating An obligation is satisfied by doing something, an obligation. a prohibition by failing to do something, by avoiding something. It is important not to confuse 0~p, which says that should happen' or 'that ~p 'It is wrong that p', with Fp which says ’that p should not happen', or it * should not happen that p'. This distinction is clear, as a scope distinction, in the English reading However the two are continually confused in modal treatments of But deontic logic, since given Modal Muddle p / I = ~p g I. that to say/p should happen is not to say anything about what should not happen but leaves the issue as to whether ~p should or should And to say that p should not happen is not say and 0~p tells anything about ~p,/whether it should happen or not. not happen open. aj us that ~p is a member of I, where.Fp tells us that p is not a member of 1.^ Dilemmas then seem to fall into three classes depending upon whether the principles which lead to them are obligation or prohibition principles^or both. Fp and F~p, Thus we obtain Op and 0~p, and Op and Fp from our examples depending upon how the principles involved are construed^ a<Tprohibitory or obligatory. (A): Dilemmas obtained from prohibition principles, Fp, % F~p1. i.e. cases of We obtain cases of this sort given principles of the * form. — (1) Whenever P satisfies condition C, (Action form: (2) it shouldn't happen that p. action of type x are wrong) it shouldn't happen that p. A Whenever p satisfies condition C', The dilemma is obtained where p satisfies condition C, ~p satisfies condition C'. Jo O F and - ■L Give the semantical reading of 0 and F?and the examples with 'wrong' . Then mention the necessity for distinction between 0~p and Fp. (1) Wrongs divide into sins of omission and sins of commission. (2) These are semantically different. (3) Unless one distinguishes these concepts semantically have the consistency assumption again. Give the readings. one will 10. Examples can also be obtained from two distinct prohibitory These are cases where the state of affairs described principles. (for reasons given by the first by p is really indescribable principle) (for different reasons given by the second principle). able, * (tndesir For/(B) and the state of affairs described by ~p is m^-ally The second category of dilemmas are dilemmas obtained from obligation principles i.e. cases of Op & O~p, for some p. We obtain cases of this sort given principles of the form:(1) Whenever p satisfies condition C, (2) Whenever p satisfies condition C', it should happen that p it should happen that p. The dilemma is obtained when for a given p, p satisfies condition C and ~p satisfies condition C': (C) Finally, so Op and O~p. examples derived from conflicting but not inconsistent moral principles, which urge both that p should occur and that it should not occur i.e. and prohibited. cases of Op and Fp, where p is both enjoined These cases come about where are principles of the following sort: (1) Whenever p satisfies condition C, p should happen. (2) Whenever p satisfies condition C', p should not happen. The dilemma results because one can find cases one and the same state of affairs C and condition C'? e.g. (p) (in T) where satisfies both condition as^our example derived from Lemmon's uAcrw-tt bolew, x gives back the gun and helping a murderer. (p) is a case both of keeping a promise But promises must be kept, so Op holds. However actions which help murderers are forbidden and should not occur; examples, hence Fp also holds. unlike the previous kind, It seems that these sorts of cannot be generated by a single moral principle, but requires two principles which come into conflict. With a certain degree of artifice we can arrange our examples into these categories, with f A) groups being prohibitions the (fe)groups obligations, and the (C) groups mixed. It is necessary then to avoid the modal treatment and to But though 0 principles and F principles distinguish 0~ and F. are distinct, 0 and F provide alternatives bases for (semantically) The O-principles correspond semantically to deontic system. inclusion principles,the F formulated principles to exclusion Thus e.g. principles. TRfH 5® where iff iff TROH * , (UH) (TRfH oX(p,H) = f) In contrast, I(Fp,T) = t iff (UH) TROH d Kp,H) Thus the modellingswill mirror f) . one another, with R Rf For the representation of principles then we can work satisfactorily with an O-basis, or with an F-basis, but not with a mixed basis which uses both 0 and F principles. Failure to distinguish 0~p and Fp will provide a ground for the mistaken consistency assumption: iff p i H. for it will follow from evaluation rules 12. The cases described satisfy the characterisation of moral For the principles involved are not inconsistent, yet dilemmas. they are not satisfiable in T. In the case of the first set of leading to Fp and F~p, dilemmas, the principles could not be satisfied unless neither p nor ~p occurred. necessarily complete, But since T is they cannot be satisfied in T. of the second set of examples, Op and 0~p, In the case the principles could only be satisfied if both p and ~p occur, hence since T is con­ sistent, they cannot be satisfied in T. different. The third case is very Here it cannot be satisfied because one and the same proposition satisfies both conditions for occurring and conditions for not occurring? this proposition, hence our principles direct, with respect to that it should occur and that it should not occur. This also cannot be satisfied in T, since p is either a member of T, or not a member of T. The principles involved are not however inconsistent ones; for in each case a finite proposition modelling of the principles can be provided. In the third case, directives, despite the fact there are inconsistent given a contingent proposition p^, which satisfies the antecedent conditions, no inconsistency need result because such a proposition p^ may not occur. In other words, though the principles together with p^ form an inconsistent set, p-^ is essential and can be deleted from the set since contingent; and the set without p1 as the principles on their own are satisfactory is consistent, where no antecedents satisfy both, a po£S»4ta- case. ■ v r • The principles ** (a. though inconsistent in application are not inconsistent^ i In the first two cases(they are T consistent?) also it is a contingent matter that the principles come i ... into^ cannot be satisfied in T; r; for detachment of a contingent truth is made, viz that the given ? proposition satisfies the conditions. 13. since they constantly arise““without sacrificing the generality of moral principles. For unless carefully treated dilemmas will/ as we shall see, provide counterexamples to moral principles. Our moral dilemmas result from judgements which cannot be satisfied in T, so that whatever happens will be wrong. Howe is there/still quite a crucial difference between the first two classes and the third class of dilemma. In the third case the result of the dilemma on detachment of a contingent premiss that p satisfies c and c' simultaneously is an inconsistency, cannot both belong and not belong to the ideal set-up I. since p Although the principles upon which the judgement Op and Fp was based were not themselves mutually inconsistent, moral judgerent they do result in a inconsistent that p both ought to happen and ought not to happen is prohibited from happening. Given that p has both properties, the moral principles concerned are in conflict. This is brought out by the fact that if p does satisfy these conditions, cannot be any situation, T-like or not, there in which the principles are satisfied. Furthermore here we have a case where each moral judgement provides a counterexample to the other. If Op and Fp both obtained, both the principles from which they were derived would be false; principle for Op would provide a counterexample to the prohibitory (p) (if p satisfies c’ then Fp) since Op ~Fp; while Fp would provide a counterexample to the obligatory principle (if p satisfies c then Op). (p) J \ 14. In view of these points it seems that a moral code which resulted in this sort of conflicting judgement is defective; the principles involved should either be restricted by tightening one or other of conditionsc and c', or else restated by reformulating one or other of the principles, (p) (Cp => F~p) replaced by (p) (C'p => 0~p) . or i.e. either (p) (C'p => Fp) (p) (Cp => Op) is is replaced by the case is reduced to one of the first In short, two cases. In this case the dilemma arises because the principles In the first two cases however involved come into conflict. the difficulty does not arise from conflicting principles, but is simply a case where our not v/ judgements cannot both be satisfied in T, because they are conflicting, but because of the peculiar Where Op and 0~p both hold, nature of T. (or Fp and F~p) what- ever happens will be wrong, because p & ~p cannot both hold in T, The dilemma is however simply explained nor p & ~p fail to hold. and the judg.ements accepted once it is understood that I, situation, action, is not T-like. The dilemma may produce a conflict in because given the logical structure of T and the limitations it imposes upon action, both judgements. it is impossible to act in accordance with But this does not effect the judgements themselves; as moral judgenents, assessments of the moral worth of p of affairs) conflict. (a state of ~p^jthey are quite compatible and there is no To say that p is wrong and that ~p is also wrong is in no way to be inconsistent, true. the ideal and both judgements may very well be The absence of conflict also explains the fact that such cases can be produced from single moral principles, such as 'Killing is wrong', which in no way inhibit internal conflict. 15. Judgements such as 'p is wrong of action or states of affairs; as to how to act in T. alternative in T, Hence Op does not compare p with its ~p. Such judgements are implicitly comparative, not to ~p's worth, but to the Thus if we reach situations as to moral worth of its absence. (using moral criteria for selection), if for every situation H, H+p is worse than H-p. in a situation assess types and do not simply give directions but p's worth is assessed relative, desirability & ~p is wrong' p is wrong If p's presence makes the situation morally worse than it would be if p were absent, then p is wrong. But now it is a straightforward matter to claim that p is wrong and that ~p is also wrong; one is aHL simply claiming that situations without p^orally preferable to the that (should be chosen^etc.); same situations with p * and also situations without ~p are morally preferable to that same situation with ~p in it. These judgements in no way conflict, and if we were in a position to choose a situation with neither of them in, we could satisfy both judgements simultaneously. is the choice must be regarded as a hypothetical one, As it and the judgements as representing a kind of thought experiment, rather than in giving directions as to how to behave in T. The choice embodied in such a judgement is one between two hypothetical situations and not between alternative versions of T. It is just for this reason that this type of moral judgement is adequate for assessing morally different types of actions or sorts of states of affairs. Because we are concerned with choosing between hypothetical situations, we can opine that all actions of a certain specifiable type and states of affairs satisfying a certain condition are wrong (not wrongyetc.), without risking * In the case of Op & 0~p. In the case of Fp & F~p one ismaking a slightly different claim, that a situation from which p's absent is morally better than some in which it is present. Note that the difference between 0 and F can be to the difference in directionthe rankings. 16. falsification because of the contingent features of T. Finally, in such a judgement one is concerned with assessing the action or state of affairs in itself rather than passing judgement about the best way to act in a particular situation. Dilemmas of this sort then, as opposed to dilemmas of the conflict sort first discussed, are not the result of defective moral codes or principles and do not require any readjustment or resolution (beyond psychological acceptance of the fact that it is sometimes inevitable that what happens is wrong and that perfectibility is impossible). They do not provide counterexamples to general In contrast moral principles based on contingent features of T. codes containing the conflict type of dilemma are defective. Any code containing two principles of the form 'wherever p satisfies Cl, Op' and ’Whenever p satisfies C2, Fp’ where C1 and C2 are not inconsistent, will be defective because there is a possible situation (a hypothetical case) with a p^ which satisfies both C1 Whence the inconsistent pair Fp, potentially inconsistent. & Op,. and C2. Any such code is at least This sort of defectiveness of a moral code might be excusable if it were inevitable. But it is not. can be avoided if we adopt either 0 or F as primitive, and state our judgements in terms of one or other of them, but not both. alternative, terms, conflicting is intolerable. moral It The principles stated in No principle could be asserted with any confidence, because they would hold or fail just according to whether or not a suitable proposition with conflicting properties appeared in T and provided a counterexample. And since this is contingent whether such principles hold or not would be entirely a matter of good or bad luck. Moral judgements on the other hand ought to apply beyond T to possible situations, ought to be non-empirical and apply to hypothetical cases, matter of accident. and ought not to hold just as a 4 C ‘S’ -X f * univeralisa'blemoral principle was a judgement The general ‘ 7^' about types of action or states of affairs and compared p's presence in a situation with its absence from the same situation on a scale of moral desirability. This concept of wrongness is essential to be able to state general moral judgements. But as well as this concept we can distinguish another important concept which is designed to assess not types of action but what is the best course of action in a given situation. This is obtained by comparing p's presence in a situation not with its absence but with the presence of its rivals in a given situation, e.g. ~p in the case of T. p will be said to be ’the best course of action' ~p are both wrong) if a situation Thus (even where p and (usually T), with p in, ranks higher morally then the same one with ~p in. A more practical - concept still can be obtained by comparing p and its practical rivals, say will be the best course of action practical alternative q) f Y r if a situation (as compared with its (usually T) (morally) when p is in it than when q is in it. between alternative ways of extending will rank higher One chooses T. It is important as Lemmon points out to distinguish this concept clearly from the more general concept earlier explained. Lemmon is wrong in suggesting that this is not a moral concept at all and does not give rise to moral judgements but to judgements of expedience. The judgements involved in this case are still moral in the sense that the criteria for ranking situations are 22 specifically moral ones and not based simply, say, on aesthetic considerations or desirability considerations. clear that this distinction Yet it is (which we shall call the distinction between differential obligation and intrinsic obligation) must be ignored and eliminated if obligation is treated as a modal functor For give/} the principle of Modal Muddle (H) (p e H = ~p e H) semantical recipes we have given will be identical. p's presence in H with p's absence (p / H) comparing p in H with ~p's being in H. the To compare will be the same as It is essential however to distinguish this notion of 'best course of action' (differential basic notion we have discussed, because it has quite different properties. * It cannot replace although it can supplement, The reasons are as follows other notion. 02 does not allow for (1) the moral dilemmas. p with its practical alternative in T, e.g. For since we compare ~p, to say that Op & 0~p is to say that a situation H such p e H is morally better than a situation H such that ~p e H, and also to say that a situation H such that ~p e H is better than one such that p e H. This is a (Similar results will ensue when F is taken as a contradiction. basis). (2) 02 cannot allow for general moral judgements of the form "All actions (states of affairs) counterexample. of type x are wrong" without fear of For no matter how compelling our principle and how repugnant the type of action described, we can almost always find a case where the only alternative action is worse. however repugnant p may be, Hence, it will not in this case be wrong, a counterexample to one general judgement will be provided. new notion then cannot do the same job as the old; —----------------------------------------- . and Our it should be , We u^e such as 'the best thing in the circumstances' 'the right thing', 'the correct course all in all' to capture differential obligations . 23. regarded as parasitic, because it can be alternatively represented as admitting the wrongness of the alternatives, but going on to weigh up the alternatives to obtain a recipe for practical action. (3) implies can" slogan It is to this notion that the "ought applies. O2P o locjically possible p, because one has selected p as the best course of action from logically possible alternatives in T. Indeed ’02p’ can be made to imply ‘p is physically possible' (or even physically possible to the person being exhorted) by comparing p with its physically possible alternatives in ranked situations. In a similar way, the concept of blame attaches to failure to follow the best course of action,i.e. if p is better as a course of action than its and one fails to do it. action.* (practical) alternatives, One is not blameworthy for doing p merely only as good as, because p is no better than, i.e. alternatives, one is blameworthy its remaining it has to be worse than some alternative course of It is important to note that blame attaches to this second differential concept of obligation, rather than the first intrinsic notion, for the possibility and obvious unfairness of someone's being blamed for doing wrong where both Op and 0~p hold and he has no alternative which is not wrong would otherwise be a powerful objection to cases of moral dilemmas. (5) Finally, differential obligation makes a basically different type of judgement from the intrinsic notion. not of a type of action or state It is an assessment or of affairs, the action/state of affairs in itself, but of the situation in which it occurs, action in this situation. This is reflected in such phrases as "the best thing in the circumstances" "the right thing to do the conditions obtained at the time)", etc. * Oh well, you cannot be blamed. circumstances . the (given Hence it is not You did the best thing in the universalisable , and does not try to be. It “results in a recipe for action, and is closely allied to advice or exhortation/orders , persuasion, recommendation or other directed activities. Intrinsic obligation however/ frafc^s no account of possible action and does not need to; it assesses action-types regardless of how they occur in a given situation. This last point is important in connection with argument about moral dilemmas. For the confusion between our two concepts has a disastrous effect on argument, particularly those hotly disputed arguments which occur in the case of moral dilemmas. The following sort of argument, due to confusion between Oi and O2 is all too common in such cases. Actions of type x are wrong (1') (if p satisfies c then Oi~p). (p) This must be Oj because it represents a general and exceptionless (2) p is an action (3) ~ 02 i.e. ~p: (state of affairs) judgement about a type. of type x. p should not be done. Therefore do not do p. The argument is plainly unsatisfactory because the fact that Oi~p holds is not sufficient to establish that 02~p To holds. do this one would have to show that the alternative, p, was not worse or even just as good. not be so. And in cases of dilemmas this may very well To establish 02~p one needs to show not merely that p is wrong but that there is some better course of action. The fallacy derives from trying to base a recipe for action on the intrinsic obligation notion, Oi. s 25. A closely related confusion holds that it is inconsistent to claim that p is a wrong type of action, that it should be done nonetheless the best course of action. August 6 197 x (e.g. is repugnant etc., but - because it is nevertheless Canberra Times Editorial, on abortion reads as follows: "It is significant, and inconsistent with its official stand that the s ynod should have qualified its recommendation to family doctors with the words "however regrettable we feel this to be"." to be inconsistentthen, one states to be What is being claimed is that one should recommend a course of action (morally) there is no inconsistency. regrettable or repugnant. But of course One is simply saying that ~p is wrong, "Oi-p", but that it is nevertheless the best thing to do given the circumstances because the alternatives are worse?i.e. "O2P"• The distinction between differential and intrinsic obligation, then, seems to be an important factor in assessing the validity of argument where moral dilemmas are concerned. /, 2 ft I z^z/ / rt&jZy 7-, I  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 140, Item 1: Draft of Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions ; Draft of Moral dilemmas ; Notes, correspondence and cutting on moral dilemmas and deontic logic Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of drafts of two papers, undated. Second paper with handwritten emendations, and first paper published, Routley R and Plumwood V (1984) 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions', Discussion papers in environmental philosophy, 6. Dept. of Philosophy, Australian National University. Includes three letters addressed to Richard: 27 July 1984 (handwritten, 1 leaf (2 pages)), author unidentified re Moral dilemmas; Undated (handwritten, 2 pages), from Charles re New Studies in Deontic Logic and Castaneda's proposed deontic logic; Undated (handwritten, 7 leaves with annotations by Sylvan?), author unidentified re Moral dilemmas; and one letter from Richard Sylvan? to Philip, undated (handwritten (photocopy), 3 pages), re feedback on a paper. Includes incomplete draft paper, Other attempts to neutralise moral dilemmas (21 leaves), with handwritten emendations, undated. Description An account of the resource Letters and cuttings redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Val+Plumwood&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Val Plumwood</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 140, Item 1 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [87] leaves. 64.35 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ba641e1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:ba641e1</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy Box 140: File Cabinet 1 Draw 2 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6b77012c0a66d38b0416c8154df0b2c9.pdf 76b38d3523658bc16adbace6e129781e PDF Text Text <* Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice. The bus example. very long journey. Suppose we consider a bus which, hopefully, is to make a Early in the journey of the bus someone consigns on it, to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explo­ sive gas. This is packaged in a thin container, which as the consigner well knows may well not contain the gas for the full distance for which it is con­ signed, and certainly will not do so if the bus should strike any trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the freight. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the bus, while others could be maimed or contract serious diseases. Most of us would condemn such an action. parcel say to try to justify it? What might the consigner of the He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will, that the world needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, and that in any case he is not responsible for the bus or the people on it. These sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous. Suppose he says that it is his own pressing needs which justify his action. The firm he owns, which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits, and couldn't afford to produce a better container (even if it knew how to make one). If the firm goes broke, he and his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the whole village, through loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off. The poor of the village whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer especially. Few people would accept this story,even if correct, as justification. Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom one is concerned^one is usually thought not to be entitled to simply transfer the burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise from one's own chosen life style and the transfer of costs creates a risk of serious harm to others (the transfer principle). �Tbe nuclear comparison. One of the major problems arising from the use of nuclear power is the disposal of highly radioactive wastes which must be segregated from the biosphere for periods on the order of a million years (Ringwood 78, p.l). The wastes are highly toxic and will be spread around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead as planned. Yet there is no method of packaging them whose safety has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt and which we can be confident will be generally used. Despite recent 'new strategies for safe disposal of nuclear waste', it remains true that there is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods. (Fox Report, p.110). It was presumably largely for this sort of reason that the Fox Report endorsed the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report 'with respect to nuclear waste' namely:- There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of long-lived radioactive waste for the indefinite future (Fox Report, p.189; our italics). - a reliable method, the Report should have added, whose commercial viability and use is assured. example. The need for these further conditions can be seen from the bus The consigner can hardly justify his action as regards the people on the bus, the people of the future, by saying that a better container is too expensive, or that he does have a strategy for producing or theory which will enable him to produce a superior container,if he has failed to use the method. It is thus a non sequitur to argue as Ringwood does on the basis of his proposed strategy for the safe disposal of radwastes (i.e. high-level nuclear wastes) that the radwaste problem is no reasonable ground upon which to curtail use of nuclear power: The principle conclusion of this book is that the problem of isolating high level nuclear wastes from the biosphere can be solved. Although there may be other objections to the use of nuclear power, the radwaste problem cannot reasonably be cited in justification of policies to abandon its use (78, Ringwood's italics). Even if the premiss that the problem can be solved had been established - it 2 hasn't at all - the no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion in no way fellows. There is a large gap between the theoretical possibility of a method of safe storage (hardly an important issue in the nuclear debate) and the availability of a commercial containment method whose reliability has been demonstrated beyond �3. reasonable doubt and whose general use can be reasonably assumed. It is the latter that is required for Ringwood's no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion; but of the latter Ringwood's strategy gives no assurance.^ There is in fact little reason to believe that nuclear pollution will be treated in a different fashion from other forms of pollution, where the availability of more satisfactory methods of control is by no means sufficient to guarantee their effective employ­ ment, especially if they are expensive. It is methodologically unsound to ignore social, ethical and political factors and to regard the radwaste problem as a purely technological one which can be classed as solved should a theoretical solution with practical application possibilities be reached. The practical likelihood, even given (what we lack) a disposal method proven safe beyond reasonable doubt, remains - that nuclear wastes will not be adequately contained, with the result that nuclear power will impose serious costs and risks on future people who do not benefit. Por nuclear fission generates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. Thus 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks,without any corresponding benefits, resulting from the provision ot the extravagant energy use of only 5 generations or so. Like the consigner in the bus example, contemporary industrial society proposes, in extricating itself ^rom a mess arising from its own life style - the creation of economies dependent on an abundance of non-renewable energy which is limited in physical supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding energy benefits. The solution may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties. For these reasons the nuclear energy option is, like the consigner's What makes matters worse is that present industrial action morally unacceptable. society has clear alternatives to its nuclear choice, which is made essentially to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to protect the interests of those who profit from them. Obligations to the future. One way of trying to escape the conclusion that present large-scale nuclear development involves serious injustice with respect to people of the distant future is to deny, as the occasional philosopher has, that there are moral obligations to remotely future people. But the view that there are no such obligations, that we are free to do as we like with respect to future people, is a very difficult one to sustain. Would scientists, for example, in the course of conducting an experiment, be entitled to do something, say release a disease-carrying organism with a very long incubation period, which �4. while not affecting the present, could cause death and disease for many future people, for example? Most people would say they certainly are not. Nevertheless 'The future can take case of itself; why should we worry about it, we have enough problems' is also a common attitude. But it is not as if in the nuclear case we are simply leaving the future alone to take care of itself. We are causally influencing it and in doing so acquire moral responsibilities with respect to future people, namely the obligation to take account of people affected and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability of our actions causing harm, and to see that we do not act so as to rob future people of the chance of a good life - and a satisfactory environment. That there are obligations to the distant future^-which follows logically from examples, such as that of scientists who act wrongly in deliberately or carelessly damaging people displaced in timej-may be argued, more generally, on the basis of the spatial analogy (that the temporal dimension is like spatial dimensions and remoteness in space does not eliminate, or substantially diminish, obligation), or on the basis of ethical theories, and general principles common to such theories. ^The main modern theories of obligation^ e.g. utilitarian, contractual, intuitionisti when properly applied, converge to show that there are moral obligations to people in the distant future of the same sort that there are to present people. (Thus the rejection of nuclear development as morally unacceptable does not depend on a particular ethical theory, but uses only ground common to the main theories.) The convergence of theories may be accounted for in terms of conditions of adequacy an ethical theory should meet. The principles of obligation of such a theory should be universalisable or lawlike in that they do not make exceptions for particular times or places or peoples (such as those of contemporary industrial society): to make exceptions would be to accept unfairness, and so injustice. Thus the temporal position of a person cannot affect that person's entitlement to just and fair treatment; are the same sorts of general obligations to future people as to present. Engineering and economic comparisons and assessments of different energy options are usually inadequate because they neglect these general features of obligation. Just as the fact that the consigner and his immediate environment will benefit from sending the parcel does not show it is morally acceptable, so arguments for nuclear power based on alleged economic benefits for the present, or a favourable benefit-risk analysis, do not even begin to show that it is morally acceptable. Economics and engineering must (like law) operate within the framework of moral constraints, not determine those constraints. �5. Uncertainty arguments. Elements of uncertainty or indeterminacy in a situation (especially in our knowledge of the situation) provide no exemptions from general obligations, any more than they upset or modify the operation of general physical laws. It is commonly argued, however that we cannot really be expected to take account of the interests of future people, because the damage to the future from nuclear waste is by no means certain, we cannot be sure that future people will not develop a way of coping with the problem or will care about the risk anyway. Aren't we being asked to forego tangible benefits for the present for the sake of avoiding a merely speculative risk of harm to people we do not even know will exist? This sort of argument may seem initially plausible, but a little reflection on examples, such as the bus example, shows that it is mistaken. It is like the consigner saying that there is nothing wrong in his sending his parcel, since it is not certain the gas will escape, or that there will be anybody on the bus when it does, or that the people on the bus may think of a way of coping with the problem, or may not care anyway. Can he really be expected to forego tangible benefits for himself and his family just to avoid speculative harm to the possibly non-existent passengers? The answer of course is yes. The damage to the passengers does not have to be certain or even probable - it is enough that a significant risk of serious harm is imposed on the unconsenting and uninvolved passengers. In the nuclear case it is clear that a significant risk will be imposed on the future. The circumstances in which nuclear waste disposal could be improper or ineffective are only too easy to envisage, and must be considered real risks with a real evidential basis, not merely idle speculation or science-fiction possibility. And uncertainty about the future is not so great as this line of argument likes to make out - there is uncertainty about many details of little moral consequence concerning the future, such as which girls' names will be used commonly in 100 years, but we do have good reason to believe, especially if we consider 3000 years of history, that future people will have basic needs and desires rather like our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life, and that their lives will not be improved by an increased incidence of disease and cancer from increased radiation. written off in this way: Moral conflict arguments. The legitimate interests of future people cannot be These uncertainty arguments are moral cop-outs. The alternative to disputing obligations to the future is to appeal to overriding obligations involving the present (which induce situations where obligations conflict). According to moral conflict arguments, nuclear development does have its morally undesirable aspects, but the only practical alternatives to nuclear development are morally even worse. ^Observe that such arguments are only satisfactory provided the options presented are �6. genuine and exhaustive, all practicable alternatives being considered and shown to be worse than the option under consideration: in the nuclear development case this necessary condition is not satisfied.14oral conflict arguments are commonly advanced in favour of nuclear development, some alleging competing and overriding duties to future people, and some analogous duties to present people. The main (and representative) argument of the last class, laying stress on duties to present people, is the Poverty Argument, according to which there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both of the third world and the industrialized countries who, according to the argument, will suffer or be denied the opportunity to reach affluence if nuclear development does not proceed. In neither case does the argument stand up to examination. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, and creates negligible employment. Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem something which may help explain why it is attractive to many of the military governing elites of these countries. The poverty argument then - like many modern economic arguments for development which appeal to the way in which development will, allegedly, assist the poor - is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used, except incidentally, to help the poor. Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries there are well-known energy conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources, alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor. The other, major, moral conflict argument appeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to present and future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. Future people also will be the losers. �7. The assumptions upon which this Lights-going-out Argument is based are untenable. It appears to assume that existing high-energy consumption society is uniformly and uniquely valuable and that it cannot be directed towards energy conservation or alternative energy sources without utter collapse. But no enormous reduction in energy use, and perhaps little in real welfare, is needed to obviate the need for nuclear power in the shorter term, and alternative energy strategies to nuclear will have, in any case, to be adopted for the longer term anyway. High rates of energy use may be necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, but they are scarcely necessary to maintain what is really valuable in our society, much of which we inherited from a past with a vastly lower energy con­ sumption, and much of which might well be better fostered in lower (energy) con­ sumption society with less concentration of political and economic power. Not only are the extravagant levels of energy consumption upon which the ''need" for nuclear power is premissed unnecessary to maintain what is valuable, but there is some reason to believe they are positively inimical to doing so. Nuclear develop­ ment may help in passing on to future generations some of the worse aspects of our society, the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature and latent authori­ tarianism, while many valuable aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished. But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in our society, presumably, that we have an obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible enhance. Both moral conflict escape routes are closed then, because the arguments depend on false contrasts, ignore practicable alternatives which are not morally worse than nuclear power, and in painting their picture of inevitability, vastly understate the extent of available social choice. It is like the consigner of the parcel arguing that if he does not send his parcel his family and the village will starve, when in fact there appear to be viable, but perhaps less profitable, alternatives he has not troubled to consider or investigate seriously. Alternative energy options. The future energy option that is most frequently contrasted with nuclear, that based on coal, is not without ethical problems. Certainly there is no radioactive waste disposal problem, and other important grounds for moral and political concern over extensive reliance on nuclear energy are removed, namely problems arising from the real possibilities of proliferation of nuclear weapons, of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion, and of catastrophic releases of radiation or of radioactive fuel or waste into the environment following an �8. accident such as reactor melt-down, and from security measures adopted to reduce such eventualities. But the coal-based option carries nonetheless serious costs and risks both to the environment and to health - because of the likelihood of severe pollution and associated damaging phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which will result from use of coal in meeting very high projected Such an option would also fail, it seems, to satisfy the consumption figures. transfer principle, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some contemporary users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement. These are the conventional options and a third is often added which emphasizes soft or benign technologies, such as those of solar energy. However the fundamental choice, such options usually neglect, is not technological but social, and involves both the restructuring of production, and change of consumption, away from energy intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic and nonconsumeristic futures.^ It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet unexamined goals but also a matter of examining the goals and underlying values. That is, we are not just faced with the question of comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of society that creates them. It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these alleged needs conceived of us inevitable and unchangeable. There are solar ways of producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants and of squandering energy, as well as nuclear ways. This is not to deny that softer options may be superior to the ethically unacceptable features of the others. But it is doubtful that any technology however benign in principle will be likely to leave a tolerable world for future people if it is expected to meet limitless and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands. Even the more benign technologies such as solar technology may well be used in ways which create costs for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being transmitted to them. Consider, to take one important example, the effect on the world's forests, which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of methonal or of electricity by woodchipping, as already planned by forest authorities in California and contemplated by many other energy organisations. Few would object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, but the un­ restricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of solar energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands would have a very damaging effect on the world's already hard pressed natural forests.5 Some of us do not �9. want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - to the future a world largely devoid of natural forests and accordingly much impoverished in fauna and flora, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products. In short, a mere switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any more basic structural and social changes is inadequate. Social options. The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social structure which promotes consumerism and an economic structure which encourages the use of highly energy-intensive modes of production. This involves, for instance, trying to change a social structure in which those who are fortunate enough to make it into the work force are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods and services. A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction in work and in social relations and other activities, is bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption. (A production system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and nongenuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.) Consumption frequently becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas. The social change option is a hard option, but it seems the only way to avoid passing on serious costs and risks to the future; and there are not only ethical grounds, but ecological reasons for choosing it. Conventional technology-oriented discussions of energy options and of how to meet future energy "needs" obscures the social change option, in part because the option questions values underlying current social arrangements. The conventional discussion proceeds by taking y alleged demand (often restated as wants or needs) as unchallengeable,' and the issue to be one which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them. This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengable and unchangeable. The social changes that the option requires will be strongly resisted because they mean changes in current social organisation and power structure, and to the extent that the option represents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds g by misrepresenting and often obscuring it. �FOOTNOTES 1. Some leading proponents of nuclear development admit the absence of satisfactory storage and disposal methods; others do not. Some of the newer strategies for waste disposal, e.g. that promoted by Cohen 77 fail, conspicuously, to meet conditions of adequacy on disposal (see Routley and Routley 78, footnote 1). Ringwood's new strategy, in 78, was immediately rejected by some of the pronuclear establishment both as too expensive (even allowing Ringwood's optimistic costguestimates) and as unnecessary, which does not augur well for its use. Yet Ringwood cast serious doubt on the adequacy of alternative disposal strategies, notably immobilisation of wastes in glass and in supercalcine. All Ringwood has shown conclusively is that he can create an artificial equivalent of a uranium one-bodv (Hallam 79) What Ringwood's 'strategy for radwaste disposal' amounts to is a further possible method of treating radwaste, with significant gaps in the argument, a considerable lack of experimental and practical support, no commercial feasibility studies, etc: see Martin 78 and Hallam 79. -1* It depends on several processes whose large-scale commercial viability has very definitely not been shown beyond reasonable doubt, including reprocessing (Fox Report, p.29). It appears to be far too expensive for the nuclear industry, and certainly for poorer nations that have embarked on nuclear power projects. There are moreover reasons for thinking that governments may not want or favour permanent irretrievable disposal methods; they may want to keep open their options for employing waste components either for military purposes or for use in breeder reactors or elsewhere. 4. On alternative technology and softer energy options, see especially Lovins 77; also Lovins 76. For criticism of Lovins' comparative neglect of social alternatives, see Martin 77 (and Lovins' reply thereto). 5. The already very serious situation of the world's forests, especially the wet tropical forests, is not sufficiently widely appreciated. Et is a commonplace reflection, however, among rainforest botanists and ecologists that nearly all tropical lowland rainforest and much highlevel rainforest will have been cut over by about the year 2000. Moreover such forests cannot at present be utilised on a sustained yield basis or as a renewable resource (see, e.g. p.219 of Prance and Elias 77). Worse, there are now few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values. In many temperate regions too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded. The addition of a major further demand source - that for energy, whether advertised as part of a "soft" energy path or otherwise and especially one which shows every sign of being not readily limitable, on top of the present sources is a development which anyone with a realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry operations, who is also properly concerned about the longterm integrity of the forests and remaining natural communities, must regard with considerable alarm. �6. The transmission principle, that one should not hand the world on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it, is a corollary of the transfer principle - applied in the bus example and suggested as a necessary condition on energy options - that to be morally acceptable a course of action should not involve the transfer of significant cost and risks onto uninvolved parties who are not beneficiaries. For if we violated the transmission principle, there would be a significant transfer of costs, contradicting the transfer principle. The transmission principle can be independently argued for, e.g. on the basis of contract (and other) theories of obligation. 7. Thus it is argued by representatives of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners, power boats, ... and that it would be authoritarian to stop them satisfying these wants. The argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such needs and wants arise or are produced. To point to the determination of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework level (e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual choice or determination at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of commercial and political advantage. 8. This paper draws on material from Routley and Routley 78 and 79 where fuller discussion of many of the topics covered, especially the question of obligations to the future and uncertainty arguments, may be found. �w REFERENCES B.L. Cohen, 'The disposal of radioactive wastes from fission reactors', Sg-Zg^tf^a Amgr-faa^ 236 (June 1977) 22-31. Flowers Report: Fz^aZgar Pazjgr a?zJ ^Fg FwPra^g??^. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London, 1976. Fox Report.: Fa??pgr Pra??7'zw Pw-Zra?w?g7ztaZ F-frst Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 19/7. J.R. Hallam, 'Synroc or C#nroc?', F/za*Z?n Pgaat^azz 4 (2-3) (1979) 4-5. A. Lovins, 'Energy strategy: the road not taken:', Forgan Aj^a-frs 55 (1) (October 1976) 65-96. A. Lovins, Soft F%grgrp Pa^As, Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, 1977 B. Martin, 'Is alternative technology enough?', 6%a-f% Pgaat-Zaz? 3 (2) (1977) 17-21. B. Martin, 'Call for research into Synroc', 7%g Fan&grua Tvxgs, December 6, 1978, p.15. G.T. Prance and T.S. Elias (editors), Botanic Garden, 1977. -fs Fcrgpgr, New York A.E. Ringwood, Safa PZspasaZ a/ Pgz?gZ F^aZgar Fgaa^a?^ fVasZgs.* 4 Fgzj s^ratgpp, ANU Press, Canberra, 1978. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', 21 (1978) 133-179. R. and V. Routley, 'Some ethical aspects of energy options', in Fzzgrpz/ a?%f PggpZg; Saa-ZaZ JmpZtaat'Za^s <pf P-Z/ygrgn^ F?zgrpz/ FM^z^rgs, edited by M. Diesendorf, Society for Social Responsibility in Science (A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document <* Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice. The bus example. very long journey. Suppose we consider a bus which, hopefully, is to make a Early in the journey of the bus someone consigns on it, to a far distant destination, a package which contains a highly toxic and explo­ sive gas. This is packaged in a thin container, which as the consigner well knows may well not contain the gas for the full distance for which it is con­ signed, and certainly will not do so if the bus should strike any trouble, for example if there is a breakdown and the interior of the bus becomes very hot, if the bus should strike a very large bump or pothole of the sort commonly found on some of the bad roads it has to traverse, or if some passenger should interfere deliberately or inadvertently with the cargo or perhaps try to steal some of the freight. If the container should break the resulting disaster would probably kill at least some of the people on the bus, while others could be maimed or contract serious diseases. Most of us would condemn such an action. parcel say to try to justify it? What might the consigner of the He might say that it is not certain that the gas will escape and that it is mere speculation to suppose it will, that the world needs his product and it is his duty to supply it, and that in any case he is not responsible for the bus or the people on it. These sorts of excuses however would normally be seen as ludicrous. Suppose he says that it is his own pressing needs which justify his action. The firm he owns, which produces the material as a by-product, is in bad financial straits, and couldn't afford to produce a better container (even if it knew how to make one). If the firm goes broke, he and his family will suffer, his employees will lose their jobs and have to look for others, and the whole village, through loss of spending and the cancellation of the Multiplier Effect, will be worse off. The poor of the village whom he would otherwise have been able to help, will suffer especially. Few people would accept this story,even if correct, as justification. Even where there are serious risks and costs to oneself or some group for whom one is concerned^one is usually thought not to be entitled to simply transfer the burden of those risks and costs onto other uninvolved parties, especially where they arise from one's own chosen life style and the transfer of costs creates a risk of serious harm to others (the transfer principle). Tbe nuclear comparison. One of the major problems arising from the use of nuclear power is the disposal of highly radioactive wastes which must be segregated from the biosphere for periods on the order of a million years (Ringwood 78, p.l). The wastes are highly toxic and will be spread around the world if large-scale nuclear development goes ahead as planned. Yet there is no method of packaging them whose safety has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt and which we can be confident will be generally used. Despite recent 'new strategies for safe disposal of nuclear waste', it remains true that there is at present no generally accepted means by which high level waste can be permanently isolated from the environment and remain safe for very long periods. (Fox Report, p.110). It was presumably largely for this sort of reason that the Fox Report endorsed the conclusion of the British (Flowers) Report 'with respect to nuclear waste' namely:- There should be no commitment to a large programme of nuclear fission power until it has been demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt that a method exists to ensure the safe containment of long-lived radioactive waste for the indefinite future (Fox Report, p.189; our italics). - a reliable method, the Report should have added, whose commercial viability and use is assured. example. The need for these further conditions can be seen from the bus The consigner can hardly justify his action as regards the people on the bus, the people of the future, by saying that a better container is too expensive, or that he does have a strategy for producing or theory which will enable him to produce a superior container,if he has failed to use the method. It is thus a non sequitur to argue as Ringwood does on the basis of his proposed strategy for the safe disposal of radwastes (i.e. high-level nuclear wastes) that the radwaste problem is no reasonable ground upon which to curtail use of nuclear power: The principle conclusion of this book is that the problem of isolating high level nuclear wastes from the biosphere can be solved. Although there may be other objections to the use of nuclear power, the radwaste problem cannot reasonably be cited in justification of policies to abandon its use (78, Ringwood's italics). Even if the premiss that the problem can be solved had been established - it 2 hasn't at all - the no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion in no way fellows. There is a large gap between the theoretical possibility of a method of safe storage (hardly an important issue in the nuclear debate) and the availability of a commercial containment method whose reliability has been demonstrated beyond 3. reasonable doubt and whose general use can be reasonably assumed. It is the latter that is required for Ringwood's no-abandonment-of-nuclear-power conclusion; but of the latter Ringwood's strategy gives no assurance.^ There is in fact little reason to believe that nuclear pollution will be treated in a different fashion from other forms of pollution, where the availability of more satisfactory methods of control is by no means sufficient to guarantee their effective employ­ ment, especially if they are expensive. It is methodologically unsound to ignore social, ethical and political factors and to regard the radwaste problem as a purely technological one which can be classed as solved should a theoretical solution with practical application possibilities be reached. The practical likelihood, even given (what we lack) a disposal method proven safe beyond reasonable doubt, remains - that nuclear wastes will not be adequately contained, with the result that nuclear power will impose serious costs and risks on future people who do not benefit. Por nuclear fission generates wastes which may remain toxic for a million years, but even with the breeder reactor it could be an energy source for perhaps only 150 years. Thus 30,000 generations of future people could be forced to bear significant risks,without any corresponding benefits, resulting from the provision ot the extravagant energy use of only 5 generations or so. Like the consigner in the bus example, contemporary industrial society proposes, in extricating itself ^rom a mess arising from its own life style - the creation of economies dependent on an abundance of non-renewable energy which is limited in physical supply - to pass on costs and risks of serious harm to others who will obtain no corresponding energy benefits. The solution may enable the avoidance of some uncomfortable changes in the lifetime of those now living and their immediate descendants, just as the consigner's action avoids uncomfortable changes for him and his immediate surroundings, but at the expense of passing heavy burdens to other uninvolved parties. For these reasons the nuclear energy option is, like the consigner's What makes matters worse is that present industrial action morally unacceptable. society has clear alternatives to its nuclear choice, which is made essentially to avoid changing wasteful patterns of consumption and to protect the interests of those who profit from them. Obligations to the future. One way of trying to escape the conclusion that present large-scale nuclear development involves serious injustice with respect to people of the distant future is to deny, as the occasional philosopher has, that there are moral obligations to remotely future people. But the view that there are no such obligations, that we are free to do as we like with respect to future people, is a very difficult one to sustain. Would scientists, for example, in the course of conducting an experiment, be entitled to do something, say release a disease-carrying organism with a very long incubation period, which 4. while not affecting the present, could cause death and disease for many future people, for example? Most people would say they certainly are not. Nevertheless 'The future can take case of itself; why should we worry about it, we have enough problems' is also a common attitude. But it is not as if in the nuclear case we are simply leaving the future alone to take care of itself. We are causally influencing it and in doing so acquire moral responsibilities with respect to future people, namely the obligation to take account of people affected and their interests in what we do, to be careful in our actions, to take account of the probability of our actions causing harm, and to see that we do not act so as to rob future people of the chance of a good life - and a satisfactory environment. That there are obligations to the distant future^-which follows logically from examples, such as that of scientists who act wrongly in deliberately or carelessly damaging people displaced in timej-may be argued, more generally, on the basis of the spatial analogy (that the temporal dimension is like spatial dimensions and remoteness in space does not eliminate, or substantially diminish, obligation), or on the basis of ethical theories, and general principles common to such theories. ^The main modern theories of obligation^ e.g. utilitarian, contractual, intuitionisti when properly applied, converge to show that there are moral obligations to people in the distant future of the same sort that there are to present people. (Thus the rejection of nuclear development as morally unacceptable does not depend on a particular ethical theory, but uses only ground common to the main theories.) The convergence of theories may be accounted for in terms of conditions of adequacy an ethical theory should meet. The principles of obligation of such a theory should be universalisable or lawlike in that they do not make exceptions for particular times or places or peoples (such as those of contemporary industrial society): to make exceptions would be to accept unfairness, and so injustice. Thus the temporal position of a person cannot affect that person's entitlement to just and fair treatment; are the same sorts of general obligations to future people as to present. Engineering and economic comparisons and assessments of different energy options are usually inadequate because they neglect these general features of obligation. Just as the fact that the consigner and his immediate environment will benefit from sending the parcel does not show it is morally acceptable, so arguments for nuclear power based on alleged economic benefits for the present, or a favourable benefit-risk analysis, do not even begin to show that it is morally acceptable. Economics and engineering must (like law) operate within the framework of moral constraints, not determine those constraints. 5. Uncertainty arguments. Elements of uncertainty or indeterminacy in a situation (especially in our knowledge of the situation) provide no exemptions from general obligations, any more than they upset or modify the operation of general physical laws. It is commonly argued, however that we cannot really be expected to take account of the interests of future people, because the damage to the future from nuclear waste is by no means certain, we cannot be sure that future people will not develop a way of coping with the problem or will care about the risk anyway. Aren't we being asked to forego tangible benefits for the present for the sake of avoiding a merely speculative risk of harm to people we do not even know will exist? This sort of argument may seem initially plausible, but a little reflection on examples, such as the bus example, shows that it is mistaken. It is like the consigner saying that there is nothing wrong in his sending his parcel, since it is not certain the gas will escape, or that there will be anybody on the bus when it does, or that the people on the bus may think of a way of coping with the problem, or may not care anyway. Can he really be expected to forego tangible benefits for himself and his family just to avoid speculative harm to the possibly non-existent passengers? The answer of course is yes. The damage to the passengers does not have to be certain or even probable - it is enough that a significant risk of serious harm is imposed on the unconsenting and uninvolved passengers. In the nuclear case it is clear that a significant risk will be imposed on the future. The circumstances in which nuclear waste disposal could be improper or ineffective are only too easy to envisage, and must be considered real risks with a real evidential basis, not merely idle speculation or science-fiction possibility. And uncertainty about the future is not so great as this line of argument likes to make out - there is uncertainty about many details of little moral consequence concerning the future, such as which girls' names will be used commonly in 100 years, but we do have good reason to believe, especially if we consider 3000 years of history, that future people will have basic needs and desires rather like our own, that they will need a healthy biosphere for a good life, and that their lives will not be improved by an increased incidence of disease and cancer from increased radiation. written off in this way: Moral conflict arguments. The legitimate interests of future people cannot be These uncertainty arguments are moral cop-outs. The alternative to disputing obligations to the future is to appeal to overriding obligations involving the present (which induce situations where obligations conflict). According to moral conflict arguments, nuclear development does have its morally undesirable aspects, but the only practical alternatives to nuclear development are morally even worse. ^Observe that such arguments are only satisfactory provided the options presented are 6. genuine and exhaustive, all practicable alternatives being considered and shown to be worse than the option under consideration: in the nuclear development case this necessary condition is not satisfied.14oral conflict arguments are commonly advanced in favour of nuclear development, some alleging competing and overriding duties to future people, and some analogous duties to present people. The main (and representative) argument of the last class, laying stress on duties to present people, is the Poverty Argument, according to which there is an overriding obligation to the poor, both of the third world and the industrialized countries who, according to the argument, will suffer or be denied the opportunity to reach affluence if nuclear development does not proceed. In neither case does the argument stand up to examination. There is good evidence that large-scale nuclear energy will help to increase unemployment and poverty in the industrial world, through the diversion of very much available capital into an industry which is not only an exceptionally poor provider of direct employment, but also helps to reduce available jobs through encouraging substitution of energy use for labour use. The argument that nuclear energy is needed for the third world is even less convincing. Nuclear energy is both politically and economically inappropriate for the third world, since it requires massive amounts of capital, requires numbers of imported scientists and engineers, and creates negligible employment. Politically it increases foreign dependence, adds to centralised entrenched power and reduces the chance for change in the oppressive political structures which are a large part of the problem something which may help explain why it is attractive to many of the military governing elites of these countries. The poverty argument then - like many modern economic arguments for development which appeal to the way in which development will, allegedly, assist the poor - is a fraud. Nuclear energy will not be used, except incidentally, to help the poor. Both for the third world and for the industrialised countries there are well-known energy conserving alternatives and the practical option of developing other energy sources, alternatives which are morally acceptable and socially preferable to nuclear development, and which have far better prospects for helping the poor. The other, major, moral conflict argument appeals to a set of supposedly overriding and competing obligations to present and future people. We have, it is said, a duty to pass on the immensely valuable things and institutions which our culture has developed. The argument is essentially that without nuclear power, without the continued level of material wealth it alone is assumed to make possible, the lights of our civilization will go out, our valuable institutions and traditions will fall into decay or be swept away. Future people also will be the losers. 7. The assumptions upon which this Lights-going-out Argument is based are untenable. It appears to assume that existing high-energy consumption society is uniformly and uniquely valuable and that it cannot be directed towards energy conservation or alternative energy sources without utter collapse. But no enormous reduction in energy use, and perhaps little in real welfare, is needed to obviate the need for nuclear power in the shorter term, and alternative energy strategies to nuclear will have, in any case, to be adopted for the longer term anyway. High rates of energy use may be necessary to maintain the political and economic status quo, but they are scarcely necessary to maintain what is really valuable in our society, much of which we inherited from a past with a vastly lower energy con­ sumption, and much of which might well be better fostered in lower (energy) con­ sumption society with less concentration of political and economic power. Not only are the extravagant levels of energy consumption upon which the ''need" for nuclear power is premissed unnecessary to maintain what is valuable, but there is some reason to believe they are positively inimical to doing so. Nuclear develop­ ment may help in passing on to future generations some of the worse aspects of our society, the consumerism, alienation, destruction of nature and latent authori­ tarianism, while many valuable aspects, such as the degree of political freedom and those opportunities for personal and collective autonomy which exist, would be lost or diminished. But it is not the status quo, but what is valuable in our society, presumably, that we have an obligation to pass on to the future, and if possible enhance. Both moral conflict escape routes are closed then, because the arguments depend on false contrasts, ignore practicable alternatives which are not morally worse than nuclear power, and in painting their picture of inevitability, vastly understate the extent of available social choice. It is like the consigner of the parcel arguing that if he does not send his parcel his family and the village will starve, when in fact there appear to be viable, but perhaps less profitable, alternatives he has not troubled to consider or investigate seriously. Alternative energy options. The future energy option that is most frequently contrasted with nuclear, that based on coal, is not without ethical problems. Certainly there is no radioactive waste disposal problem, and other important grounds for moral and political concern over extensive reliance on nuclear energy are removed, namely problems arising from the real possibilities of proliferation of nuclear weapons, of deliberate release or threat of release of radioactive materials as a measure of terrorism or of extortion, and of catastrophic releases of radiation or of radioactive fuel or waste into the environment following an 8. accident such as reactor melt-down, and from security measures adopted to reduce such eventualities. But the coal-based option carries nonetheless serious costs and risks both to the environment and to health - because of the likelihood of severe pollution and associated damaging phenomena such as acid rain and atmospheric heating, not to mention the despoliation caused by extensive strip mining, all of which will result from use of coal in meeting very high projected Such an option would also fail, it seems, to satisfy the consumption figures. transfer principle, because it would impose widespread costs on nonbeneficiaries for some concentrated benefits to some profit takers and to some contemporary users who do not pay the full costs of production and replacement. These are the conventional options and a third is often added which emphasizes soft or benign technologies, such as those of solar energy. However the fundamental choice, such options usually neglect, is not technological but social, and involves both the restructuring of production, and change of consumption, away from energy intensive uses: at a more basic level there is a choice between consumeristic and nonconsumeristic futures.^ It is not just a matter of deciding in which way to meet unexamined goals but also a matter of examining the goals and underlying values. That is, we are not just faced with the question of comparing different technologies or substitute ways of meeting some fixed or given demand or level of consumption, and of trying to see whether we can meet this with soft rather than hard technologies; we are also faced, and primarily, with the matter of examining those alleged needs and the cost of society that creates them. It is not just a question of devising less damaging ways to meet these alleged needs conceived of us inevitable and unchangeable. There are solar ways of producing unnecessary trivia no one really wants and of squandering energy, as well as nuclear ways. This is not to deny that softer options may be superior to the ethically unacceptable features of the others. But it is doubtful that any technology however benign in principle will be likely to leave a tolerable world for future people if it is expected to meet limitless and uncontrolled energy consumption and demands. Even the more benign technologies such as solar technology may well be used in ways which create costs for future people and are likely to result in a deteriorated world being transmitted to them. Consider, to take one important example, the effect on the world's forests, which are commonly counted as a solar resource, of use for production of methonal or of electricity by woodchipping, as already planned by forest authorities in California and contemplated by many other energy organisations. Few would object to the use of genuine waste material for energy production, but the un­ restricted exploitation of forests - whether it goes under the name of solar energy" or not - to meet ever increasing energy demands would have a very damaging effect on the world's already hard pressed natural forests.5 Some of us do not 9. want to pass on - we are not entitled to pass on - to the future a world largely devoid of natural forests and accordingly much impoverished in fauna and flora, any more than we want to pass on one poisoned by nuclear products or polluted by coal products. In short, a mere switch to a more benign technology - important though this is - without any more basic structural and social changes is inadequate. Social options. The deeper social options involve challenging and trying to change a social structure which promotes consumerism and an economic structure which encourages the use of highly energy-intensive modes of production. This involves, for instance, trying to change a social structure in which those who are fortunate enough to make it into the work force are cogs in a production machine over which they have very little real control and in which most people do unpleasant or boring work from which they derive very little real satisfaction in order to obtain the reward of consumer goods and services. A society in which social rewards are obtained primarily from products rather than processes, from consumption, rather than from satisfaction in work and in social relations and other activities, is bound to be one which generates a vast amount of unnecessary consumption. (A production system that produces goods not to meet genuine needs but for created and nongenuine needs is virtually bound to overproduce.) Consumption frequently becomes a substitute for satisfaction in other areas. The social change option is a hard option, but it seems the only way to avoid passing on serious costs and risks to the future; and there are not only ethical grounds, but ecological reasons for choosing it. Conventional technology-oriented discussions of energy options and of how to meet future energy "needs" obscures the social change option, in part because the option questions values underlying current social arrangements. The conventional discussion proceeds by taking y alleged demand (often restated as wants or needs) as unchallengeable,' and the issue to be one which technology can be most profitably employed to meet them. This effectively presents a false choice, and is the result of taking needs and demand as lacking a social context so that the social structure which produces the needs is similarly taken as unchallengable and unchangeable. The social changes that the option requires will be strongly resisted because they mean changes in current social organisation and power structure, and to the extent that the option represents some kind of threat to parts of present political and economic arrangements it is not surprising that official energy option discussion proceeds g by misrepresenting and often obscuring it. FOOTNOTES 1. Some leading proponents of nuclear development admit the absence of satisfactory storage and disposal methods; others do not. Some of the newer strategies for waste disposal, e.g. that promoted by Cohen 77 fail, conspicuously, to meet conditions of adequacy on disposal (see Routley and Routley 78, footnote 1). Ringwood's new strategy, in 78, was immediately rejected by some of the pronuclear establishment both as too expensive (even allowing Ringwood's optimistic costguestimates) and as unnecessary, which does not augur well for its use. Yet Ringwood cast serious doubt on the adequacy of alternative disposal strategies, notably immobilisation of wastes in glass and in supercalcine. All Ringwood has shown conclusively is that he can create an artificial equivalent of a uranium one-bodv (Hallam 79) What Ringwood's 'strategy for radwaste disposal' amounts to is a further possible method of treating radwaste, with significant gaps in the argument, a considerable lack of experimental and practical support, no commercial feasibility studies, etc: see Martin 78 and Hallam 79. -1* It depends on several processes whose large-scale commercial viability has very definitely not been shown beyond reasonable doubt, including reprocessing (Fox Report, p.29). It appears to be far too expensive for the nuclear industry, and certainly for poorer nations that have embarked on nuclear power projects. There are moreover reasons for thinking that governments may not want or favour permanent irretrievable disposal methods; they may want to keep open their options for employing waste components either for military purposes or for use in breeder reactors or elsewhere. 4. On alternative technology and softer energy options, see especially Lovins 77; also Lovins 76. For criticism of Lovins' comparative neglect of social alternatives, see Martin 77 (and Lovins' reply thereto). 5. The already very serious situation of the world's forests, especially the wet tropical forests, is not sufficiently widely appreciated. Et is a commonplace reflection, however, among rainforest botanists and ecologists that nearly all tropical lowland rainforest and much highlevel rainforest will have been cut over by about the year 2000. Moreover such forests cannot at present be utilised on a sustained yield basis or as a renewable resource (see, e.g. p.219 of Prance and Elias 77). Worse, there are now few forestry operations anywhere in the world where the forests are treated as completely renewable in the sense of the renewal of all their values. In many temperate regions too the rate of exploitation which would enable renewal has already been exceeded. The addition of a major further demand source - that for energy, whether advertised as part of a "soft" energy path or otherwise and especially one which shows every sign of being not readily limitable, on top of the present sources is a development which anyone with a realistic appreciation of the conduct of forestry operations, who is also properly concerned about the longterm integrity of the forests and remaining natural communities, must regard with considerable alarm. 6. The transmission principle, that one should not hand the world on to our successors in substantially worse shape than we received it, is a corollary of the transfer principle - applied in the bus example and suggested as a necessary condition on energy options - that to be morally acceptable a course of action should not involve the transfer of significant cost and risks onto uninvolved parties who are not beneficiaries. For if we violated the transmission principle, there would be a significant transfer of costs, contradicting the transfer principle. The transmission principle can be independently argued for, e.g. on the basis of contract (and other) theories of obligation. 7. Thus it is argued by representatives of such industries as transportation and petroleum, as for example by McGrowth of the XS Consumption Co., that people want deep freezers, air conditioners, power boats, ... and that it would be authoritarian to stop them satisfying these wants. The argument conveniently ignores the social framework in which such needs and wants arise or are produced. To point to the determination of many such wants at the framework level is not however to accept a Marxist approach according to which they are entirely determined at the framework level (e.g. by industrial organisation) and there is no such thing as individual choice or determination at all. It is to see the social framework as a major factor in determining certain kinds of choices and to see apparently individual choices made in such matters as being channelled and directed by a social framework determined largely in the interests of commercial and political advantage. 8. This paper draws on material from Routley and Routley 78 and 79 where fuller discussion of many of the topics covered, especially the question of obligations to the future and uncertainty arguments, may be found. w REFERENCES B.L. Cohen, 'The disposal of radioactive wastes from fission reactors', Sg-Zg^tf^a Amgr-faa^ 236 (June 1977) 22-31. Flowers Report: Fz^aZgar Pazjgr a?zJ ^Fg FwPra^g??^. Sixth Report of the British Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, London, 1976. Fox Report.: Fa??pgr Pra??7'zw Pw-Zra?w?g7ztaZ F-frst Report, Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, 19/7. J.R. Hallam, 'Synroc or C#nroc?', F/za*Z?n Pgaat^azz 4 (2-3) (1979) 4-5. A. Lovins, 'Energy strategy: the road not taken:', Forgan Aj^a-frs 55 (1) (October 1976) 65-96. A. Lovins, Soft F%grgrp Pa^As, Friends of the Earth, San Francisco, 1977 B. Martin, 'Is alternative technology enough?', 6%a-f% Pgaat-Zaz? 3 (2) (1977) 17-21. B. Martin, 'Call for research into Synroc', 7%g Fan&grua Tvxgs, December 6, 1978, p.15. G.T. Prance and T.S. Elias (editors), Botanic Garden, 1977. -fs Fcrgpgr, New York A.E. Ringwood, Safa PZspasaZ a/ Pgz?gZ F^aZgar Fgaa^a?^ fVasZgs.* 4 Fgzj s^ratgpp, ANU Press, Canberra, 1978. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', 21 (1978) 133-179. R. and V. Routley, 'Some ethical aspects of energy options', in Fzzgrpz/ a?%f PggpZg; Saa-ZaZ JmpZtaat'Za^s <pf P-Z/ygrgn^ F?zgrpz/ FM^z^rgs, edited by M. Diesendorf, Society for Social Responsibility in Science (A.C.T.), Canberra, 1979.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 142, Item 1931: Draft of Nuclear waste, obligations to the future, and social choice Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft, with handwritten emendations. Handwritten on first leaf: Penguin paper 1974 unpublished? Description An account of the resource Note, one paper digitised from item 1931. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 142, Item 1931 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [12] leaves. 31.86 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:287059e">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:287059e</a> Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Far Bookshelf > Second Bay > Fourth Shelf -> Pile 2 Box 142: File Cabinet 2 Draw 1 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/997fd85057676508d18a88b1e6bf281d.pdf 516f4fd88e81218b85118182cadc8850 PDF Text Text GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY? ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be compared with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the task of managing economies and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the the cluster of problems upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, unless substantially new socio-economic arrangements - with restructured cities, revitalized lands, rejuvenated oceans - soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches (see Diagram 1), and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forecasts for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. Nonetheless there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among these, a result of the increases of "greenhouse" gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture (see Diagram 7). The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. �Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High-tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action^ Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. In accord with an esteemed philosophical tradition, a medical analogy is first deployed; it serves to throw main points into high relief. Consider the possible illness of the Earth, for instance as a result of brutalisation and poisoning. Look on the Earth then as a patient^, who exhibits some symptoms of a possibly disabling illness; for instance the patient's system is overloaded with troublesome trace elements and her temperature appears to be rising. Compare rational medical practice where a human patient gives indications of possibly disabling illness, for instance the patient shows signs of hypertension. Now consider some of the spectrum of approaches. Suppose the advice is to take no action, to do nothing but monitor the situation until further information comes in, until even (to take a worst case) it becomes evident that the patient indeed has hypertension and suffers a severe consequence. That would be regarded as irresponsible practice. To say that there is no problem when symptoms are there, would be regarded as utterly irresponsible, and medically refutable. To say that no action should be taken until certainty as to the complaint is established would be seen as incompetent medical practice. Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. This is precisely not the way less modest Gaean hypotheses regard the Earth. For there the Earth is active, actively participating in co-evolutionary developments. But the health analogy does of course go right back to ancient chthonic view, systematically presented in Plato, according to which The Earth is a living being of whom humans are only a part. Right relationship with the Earth means that the total organism is in good health; so environmental problems are seen as illness, as a failure of one part of the organism to interact supportivcly with others' (Hughes, p.60). For Gaean themes in other ancient philosophies, both before and after Plato, see Hughes p.57. �a ? 3 A responsible practitioner begins recommending some remedial action straight away. Naturally there are various options open as to what may be prescribed. These include, at the one end, high-tech procedures, such as, what would be ridiculous simply for hypertension, full medical engine-and-gearbox replacement (heart and kidney transplant), or, a little less ludicrous but ridiculously commonplace, a whole-remaining-life course of pharmaceutical products, e.g. tablets. At the other end, lifestyle changes are proposed, such as more exercise, weight loss, stress reduction, and an improved diet with less sodium input. Reasonable advice would not include pure adaptation, that the patient went on living as before in the expectation that her system would adapt to the situation. Nor would it be reasonably suggested, except in somewhat unusual circumstances, that the patient entirely change her lifestyle, abandon her work, house and so on, and live somewhere else. Even so unusual circumstances, which might include residence in a very polluted environment or work in a nuclear plant, are no doubt on the increase. Like all analogies, the medical analogy has limitations. One feature it does not capture concerns the holistic aspects of the Earth's sickness, and why accordingly an individualistic survival approach, egotistically rational enough for hypertension and perhaps even for a localised nuclear war, cannot succeed. The reason is, of course, that holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, acting on their own to be effective or to make much difference. Some are too big even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concert. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. The medical analogy also indicates the outcome of further investigation of approaches. Briefly, as with a chronic illness, the conclusion is that there is no very easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision as applied to climatic probiematiques. The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse effects is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with Investigative philosophy resembles philosophy, except that it may upset the philosophy it applies; it investigates arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes and methods, but normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox narrow range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. �4 A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain argumcmj pointing to probabilities of severe dislocation as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rariana/ formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest for radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, catastrophe arguments, and doomsday arguments. A main run of arguments to considerable action are limitative in character. Such ZimifafMm arguments are sometimes alternatively called *neo Malthusian', since Malthus presented a very elementary, very controversial, argument of this general type. But such is the hostility, especially in Marxist-influenced quarters, to Malthus's associated themes (some of them admittedly repulsive) that merely to associate an argument terminologically with Malthus is thereby likely to condemn it. To avoid such fallacious condemnation-byassociation, the graphic term 'neo-Malthusian' is largely avoided in what follows. The general form of these limitation arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter over time encounters limits, typically with severe, even catastrophic, effects; for seldom is the transition to severely constrained behaviour smooth. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: Diagram 2. GrowfA ZimiM growth parameter exponential growth pattern encountering limits subsequent varying behaviour The limits are often imposed just by finitude, for instance finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General limitation arguments loom in the background in what follows, where we shall be arguing on a double front: �* * 5 A. Significant disequilibrium of the Earth's systems is a real possibility, and accordingly must be reckoned with in decision procedures. Though the probability of such an outcome may only be modest, the case has to be taken seriously because the result (arrived at by a limitation argument typically) is so bad. Suppose, for instance, the outcome is that the Earth ceases to be habitable in present terms, to be able to carry its present demanding load. Such an outcome would have an extremely high negative value, so it would tend to dominate other alternatives. (But it need not be an entirely worst case, where perhaps the dominant terrestrial species becomes extinct, or the Earth becomes devoid of "higher" life. Under the bad result contemplated some better-off humans in special circumstance may subsist for a while.) Such sufficiently bad cases be taken account of in decision making; they have to be taken account of in rgrz'o/ia/ decision procedures. A*. Significant disequilibrium not only has a non-negligible probability, but set in the proper content has a sizeable probability; so it cannot be ignored or discounted as too low to bother about. For such an argument has to be established at the outset than for a rational decision theory argument. Such a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following argument:- * There is some probability that the Gaean "greenhouse effect", generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or premiss). * That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans Pr<9.sp(?cf). * Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans (of certain critical anthropic parameters), such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large. As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (C^^^p/26 That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probably will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself looks an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but ong of a substantial raft of arguments, suggesting that we are already in deep trouble, that 5/23^ have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual sting, so to say, from the previously inconspicuous cosmological tail. �6 Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:* Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but nonetheless they wzZ/ exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) * Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the mora/ Zrrtmpna/f/y of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. �7 Diagram 3. Macro-c/wKmc jarring am?Observed global average temperatures, 1880-1987, with forward projections (historic data from Worldwatch p.10). mean global temperature (degrees C) The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear war is entirely in place and indeed on alert The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would probably bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemico-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these general nuclear arrangements both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral �8 opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irradonal, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested^ - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.4 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some "developing" nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. These nations want, or are heavily encouraged, to extend the war against Nature through the habitats they have gained control over, in the name of economic progress. War also joins Greenhouse summer and nuclear winter. For the barely-analogical rapacious war against Nature is a major contributor to Greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, in the domestication of wetlands for rice paddies, through the heavy pillaging of forests, and the like, typically carried on with swords and bayonets reforged to jump ploughs, chemical weapons turned to herbicide guns, and tanks converted to bulldozers. The protracted war against Nature^, carried, it had been supposed, to a victorious conclusion with the rise of science and technology and the ubiquitous advance of industralisation, seems however to have backfired. For it is turning the Earth, Gaea herself, into a patient, with crippled life support systems, thereby endangering the sustained future even of the victorious. Yet another Pyrrhic victory. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than through war and as the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggested for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick no doubt most easily achieved on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backbuming against out-of-control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, dangerous expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that /pta/ry q/ r/io-yg wAo who have some role For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace scries in Papery E/iwv/wig/mxZ RSSS, Australian National University. Global warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some mean temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. A war incited and applauded by illustrious philosophical forebears. �* & 9 in decision making (including both experts and politicians), mah'ng in con^'n'on^ p/nncorrainiy or possible riskA a J7rm gra.%? on The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social outlook, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 4 E?r<9<26? po/z'cy fa rA^ Gr^g/i/z<9^^ /?ra^/^marz^a^. Dominant paradigm options Alternative ecological outlook Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, a// the dominant approaches. * Procra^rznaaon, the prevailing response. In fact the main governmental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or "wait-and-see" as it is more benignly known.*? The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings, in even the most elaborate general circulation models for future climatic change, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more "research". It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. Certainly a few scientists, outside main policy making reaches, do have a sound intuitive appreciation of these problems, and of the deficiencies of prevailing practices, e.g. Pittock 87. There is little excuse for prevailing ignorance of or ignoring of decision theory: for the elements of the standard theory are readily accessible and very elementary. In the present essay a modification of standard decision theory (as expounded e.g. in Jeffrey) is assumed as background; for details see Sylvan. Following Knight, many economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numerical probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards global greenhouse effects. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, who say that 'decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable'(p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty - to which rational procedures should be applied. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of 'adaptation*. �10 There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act.s But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely enough consequences are also known. Theoretical considerations have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outcomes of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline: rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial small-scale models of Greenhouse effects in action. For example, a city such as Mexico City, which is situated in the bowl-like valley, is placed in an environment which traps heat as well as polludon. The ecological effects, like the human effects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or emulated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many sciendsts, that Greenhouse difficuldes have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed event is the Villiers conference and statement of 1985 (e.g. Pittock 87 pp.2-3). Actually there have been Greenhouse warnings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inacdon. Nor is any acdon of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climatologists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine not then noted for its green sympathies, recorded that The release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, conceivably, the most important environmental issue in the world today" (May 3 1979). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserdng that 'the government must start dealing with this problem now". They meant the United States government. "The"" government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then, sciendsts have been emphasizing that the Greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the effects has happened. There has been more than a q/TKacdo/t, during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive acdon disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to back up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or T/zay be, as some more reactionary modal-mongering academics would have - a problem or two. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymamics, for instance, scientists began 'threatening mankind with a rather swift "heat death"' as the universe ran down. Thus M. Alier, on 'blatant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves' (see Bernard p.9). More recently, many rang alarm bells prematurely concerning an impending mini-ice-age. The past predictive failures of scientists have been used as evidence for scepticism concerning greenhouse effects; see Me Kibben p.8. It is an unsatisfactorily selective argument; interestingly it is not used in a similar way against economists, whose predictive record is significantly worse. �11 Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that "scientific certainty" is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not alone in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making under uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unrepeatable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. 'Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing every problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found/ Natural scientists including climatologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous reducdon-tounattainable-certainty trip. 'This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption' (Cyert and DeGroot, continuing, p.l). But there are several classes of problemadc situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty be removed or discarded by fiat, reducdon stratagems or otherwise, notably:* inherently probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; * essentially unpredictable situadons (which may be determinisdc) such as those now under invesdgadon in chaos theory; * presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may tum into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumpdon being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not. Climate is now a prime arena for applications of chaos theory (in any case inidal conditions for application of meteorological equadons are seldom very accurate and are now shifting with the accumulation of Greenhouse gases). There are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class, that the sought certainly is unattainable. If so the standard begging-bowl posture of too many research scientists: Supply more funding so we can go on researching undl we obtain certainty, is misguided.^ Or, less charitably, downright dishonest. Nor does it seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect, or even enough to run complex modellings on expensive computers, is because their research results could, if unfavourable, act as a serious drag on the industrial establishment. 77zey are Aar<^/y go//7g to /?e we// jrt/tt/et/ to ^e/eg/twuze woder/i /a^artr/a/ society. �12 There are thus some severe problems with this prevailing response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty, achieved, may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non-linear (nonadditive) and so incapable of delivering firm results given slightly fluctuating initial data. Not only are many experts and decision makers only comfortable about acting in circumstances of relative certainty; almost as bad, where some uncertainty is involved, only what is considered Zz^/y gets genuine consideration. Rational decision making has however to take account of what may not be very likely at all, but may be quite disastrous should it occur (e.g. a nuclear accident with full meltdown). In this respect too, the standard response is methodologically unsound. * AzZapzarz^n, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy That tends to be favoured by most economists' is an adaptive strategy: '"Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance". We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strains [themselves] ... more widely adapted... ' (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly rayzrzcf&% "adaptation" that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting fAem. It is zz^^zz/?z^6Z that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt r/z&yg practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, "Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance." Such "adaptadve agriculture", the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is anti-environmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't buck natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you? Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say wa^aptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that zznzZat^raZ action to prevent a warming is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation is unattainable. Both contentions are open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the Earth's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant dimensions), could make a major difference, especially when backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential growth economists. In any case, international agreements such as those on whaling and �13 concerning Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs, show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptadon proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean little or no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force sociedes towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertaindes are alleged to produce. Characterisdc of adaptadon too is a minimisadon of the of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a radonal course of acdon (instead of the seemingly irradonal course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the low end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4° C - in a setting, furthermore, where fracdons of a degree centigrade may well be linked to macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, on average, an increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect^, thus yielding a 4°C temperature increase around 2050. The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacides of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cides, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust­ bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse condidons. The mid-continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average; under greenhouse conditions they could well be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dust-bowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern corn) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again (only winter precipitation increasing). A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. 10 See e.g. Pearman p.18. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas whose atmospheric propordons really matter and whose present exponential increase is excessive. �14 * Tnfgrvenn'o?!, high-tech Earth engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include (D New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like children's play. @ Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. * controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself is of course transparadigmatic; where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally- constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives; both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives - in effect without far-reaching systemic and ideological adjustment. While such adjustment appears rational, it seems unlikely (see further section 5). Power holders and the power structures into which they slot have too much to lose. So it is hardly remarkable that regulation itself is not so bureaucratically popular (at least under that mode of presentation) in these latter days of economic irrationalism, and is strongly resented and resisted. Some of the U.S. bureaucratic reaction to the Antarctic ozone hole, now regularly attributed to extensive CFC usage, is instructive. A top Reagan official 'said that since CFO's were useful to industry, people should use sunglasses and baseball caps as protection against retina damage and skin cancer' - individualisdcally distributed adaptationism, terrific �€? & 15 for creatures outside "sunglasses and baseball caps" economies. Other Reagan administrators spoke for procrastination, one academic-turned-bureaucrat observing that 'so far the ozone hole has had little effect on skin cancer rates in the United States'. The prevailing bureaucratic procrastination stance that was applied to the much easier ozone problem (which has belated obtained weak international responses), is now extended to Greenhouse effects. It is typically, typically irrationally, stated by high administrators that 'significant gaps exist in our knowledge .... These scientific uncertainties must be reduced before we commit the economic future to drastic and potentially misplaced policy responses' (preceding quotations from McKibben p.10, p.ll, italics added). and the of the Greenhouse business is thereby also revealed. Like heart disease and cancer, Greenhouse effects are gaining much discussion and some funding because they just may severely effect the affluent, affluent humans and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in United States especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive The extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, be pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global warming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex eco­ systems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increases in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural habitats and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests, wetlands, and marine environments. For example, most wetlands will either be flooded or else evaporate under increasing temperatures. Again, the prospect is for the boreal forest to shrink from about 23% of the world's forest to something like 1% of a much diminished forest covering. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed n. 11 Cf. Keeton pp.763-4, '... typical migration rates for forest boundaries are of the order of 502000m per annum ... [A requisite] shift of 500-1000km would, however, take hundreds of years. ... Pollen evidence... suggests that large changes occurred in forest composition during the Holocene period some 8000-10000 years ago, even though the climate changes then were less �16 Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change.... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases, will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Worldwatch p.10). Of course the immediate climatic patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. For when natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However 'several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn" (Worldwatch p.19).^ Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behaviour (as distinct from radioactivity levels and, differently, from ecological communities) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be /7<9 similar under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the than those expected by 2030 [and forests were more extensive and less interfered with]' (Pittock 87a p.209, rearranged). Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. �17 impact,^ disequilibrium induced. An eventual long-term return to some different but sufficiently congenial equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the "year" to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for Greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.^ Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at a famous place in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometres of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early Greenhouse or even pollution effects. "6 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose efforts are concentrated on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). Excessive disturbance of ecological systems, though overclearing of trees, has seriously upset the systems. Types of systemic stress and disturbance are likely to be much accelerated given the additional impact of Greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. f<9 some q/ worth disentangling. Firstly, a system may be disturbed by interfering with critical components There are several within the system structure, processing parts, such as botanical systems or their interconnections. As with a computer, if a cridcal component is broken or a circuit cut, the probability of serious malfunction increases. Secondly, a system normally operates within a Stability is defined in physics in terms of immediate return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Other effects of increased heat on major food plants matter for human affairs. Severe heat interferes with fertilization and reproduction in com, and apparently affects the ability of rice in Asia to reproduce; so considerably reduced yields of staple foods may be anticipated. Reported by Recher on EarfAworw. Thus coastline vegctational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. �18 certain range of condition. Take it outside these conditions or push it towards limits (let the computer get too hot or too cold), and probability of breakdown is much increased. Feedback loops, which are an important feature of cybernetic systems are particularly vulnerable to normality disturbance. Cybernetic systems afford one example of more holistic behaviour; dissipative systems, where perhaps strange new features may enter as systemic loading is increased, another. Such new features may not be at all congenial to dominant forms, or to maintenance of life support arrangements. It should be evident from details already assembled that there is some probability the Greenhouse efforts could seriously disturb the crucial carbon cycle. The carbon cycle loops, in major fashion, through both the higher plant complexes and the oceans, both major carbon dioxide reservoirs - but just how critically through them is uncertain. However, with the serious disturbance of main components in the cycle, the real possibility of cycle malfunction can hardly be excluded. Much the same holds with other crucial chemical cycles, such as the sulphur cycle (though woody plants are perhaps less important here, the oceans are highly significant, the oceans Costeau has already pronounced moribund). To a lesser extent, several of the other well-known bio-chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sodium, and so forth, depend for their stability and maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as a tropical forest, which is severely disturbed then the crucial cycle itself could be locally disrupted. There is some probability, furthermore, that the changes will disturb other physical cycles crucial to the stability of systems. For some of the Earth's feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium through natural ecosystems. A striking example appears to be the regulating of the Earth's temperature itself. Lovelock and collaborators have devised an elementary daiyy wor/d m(9dg/ which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing solar energy input (see the next diagram). The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. Thus again, instability could ensue under disturbance. �19 Diagram 5.77z^rm<9.s7anc r^ga/aizoa a/*rA^ Earr/z j ^zayac^ i^mp^ramrf rAraag/z p/a/zM (a much simplified picture from Lovelock 88 p.58). !n the "Datsyworid" mode), tife adjusts the pfanefs temperature to suit ttseif. A basic assumption is that on Daisyworid, as on Earth, the sun is getting progressive^ hotter. Biack daisies grow best when the surface temperature is tow, because their petals absorb radiation. As the sun's heat increases, the white daisies begin to nourish. Their petais reflect radiation, thus heipingto iower surface temperature. Between the time the seeds first germinate and when the sun gets too hot, the piants maintain a steady surface temperature by adjusting the pfanefs aibedo. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness^ is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Apart from direct ecological breakdown, there are several other major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the d^/zcacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is * nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear winter. But there are of course other severe shocks that the planet could suffer than those chemonuclear warfare, some human induced, some a "chance" matter of the planets' posidon in space; namely * a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentadon (see Leslie); * a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertaindes, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not radonally. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblemadc lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertaindes do so 17 Natural richness is its main richness, much exceeding human arufice. �20 far appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate.is The Greenhouse problemadque differs (as do nuclear winter and also high energy experimentation) from such possibilities as destruction of the Earth's favourable climate or life-supports by collision with an asteroid in two crucial respects: the poor prognoses are largely a matter of human making (meaning the making of certain among humans) and the damaging situations could be substantially averted by positive or concerted human activity. According analogies with remote phenomena such as decline of the sun, asteroid collisions, etc., sometimes applied to dismiss concerns with global environmental problems, do not hold up, and should be resisted. The human-induced climatic problems are primarily ascribable to: * excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, and so on, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagradon; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in dissipative systems under stress or strain. * excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others). Such non-additive or nonlinear effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, seem bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example: None of these assessments are strikingly objective, but are a matter of appearance. The risk of catastrophic destruction of Earth civilization by an asteroid or comet is discussed, and compared with either less exotic risks, in Chapman and Morrison, chapter 19. It has been guesstimated at a 1 in 300,000 chance per year, a much smaller probability than that serious Greenhouse effect will eventuate (often put at about 85%), but comparable with some rather more mundane risks (see p.283). The risks from very high energy experimentation will no doubt rise sharply as orders of attainable energy increase. �21 With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reacdons and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected increases in carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years^. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards accentuated levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixadon of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits (fortunately a fairly remote one) to condnuation of present developmental pracdces. Now there can be no radonal confidence with respect to complex dissipadve systems about the behaviour of which we presendy know comparadvely little - that other nonaddidve effects will not be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essendally unexperienced and substandally unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from comparable past times of such elevated temperatures as Greenhouse effects will lead to, to draw upon. 'There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years'. There is experience of much colder periods. 'During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents' (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in any warm interglacial period), 'a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization' (Schneider p.6). It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision making, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we actually have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of 19 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO? exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminosity was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proportion of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). �22 something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small (though experience implies it is not always so), but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing, a strong antipathy for environmentalists.^ Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalations^ 'Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, finding a suitable" destructive agent to bring about a 'doom scenario" 'turns out to be an almost insoluble problem" (79 p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all "life"', 'down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria" (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental 'doomsday scenario" is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scienufic fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of 'the US Nadonal Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own assisted by forty-eight other explosions and a// chosen from those members, in the effects of nuclear to them" (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the disdnguished expert report the findings that Coupled with this, there was a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There was also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine tuning to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is 'tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable', virtually indestructible (79 p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See e.g. Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also, on ozone, 88 p.63. �23 ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario, that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter. Not for the only time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground,^ considerably, on the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaea in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp.5354). The argument to the lesser par/i, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a dissipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present by a combinadon of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetational complexes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composidon. Shifdng ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honesdy and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a cancature of his <9WH previous position to cdtics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever Tabneation', which also it was not): that it is 'an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess '(85 p.53). �24 TABLE 1. Substance Funerary Equilibrium (principal components per cent). Venus Earth Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen 1 R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Lifeless Mars Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 0 trace trace 1 0.1 0.1 Earth 95 2.7 0.13 2 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 Present 0.03 79 21 1 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290+50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, p.37 and p.39. The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behaviour as loads increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress the system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire briefly into what evidence we so far have on this score. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaea hypothesis, to the effect that the (outer) Earth is a naturally regulated nonadditive cybernetic system, important attributes of which are regulated by the biota). /or the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially, the Earth would not be blessed with its present life- benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltier and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on; perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for most of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, whereas the mean global temperatures have exhibited no �25 corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected constancy in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plant life, as already indicated. The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical and other models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is not merely nonzero^ but indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows:- There is a decent probability that a modest Gaea hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build-up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So combining probabilities, there at least a nonnegligible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it faster and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select test crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy non-elite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will break/down and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.^ Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures never before attained. As a result too of these enhanced temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are From logical theories of probability such as Camap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be averted, to some extent, by restriction to physical models.) The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the "bus analogy", see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this apposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaean control systems. Others speak of a colossal experiment with the Earth; but strictly the conditions for a controlled experiment are not met. �26 aptly named D<2^Zfa?i. Given anthropic terrestrial practices, a Daedelian future and fate should not be excluded. 4. A Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and on the iikeiy decline of Homo sapiens spp. economicus. The anthropic doomsday argument developed relies upon a modified Murphy's law. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: ^anyf/ung can go wrong, if wii/, was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting.^ Certain crucial qualifications are required:* Replacement of the too certain conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: for instance, it pro&a&/y will. * Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of "anything" or "something" put "some thing ... given a chancy situation". The modified formulation is accordingly the following mini-Furphy proposition^ r/HKg can ge/iMZMe/y go wrong, given o re/onvefy cAoncy Mfi/ohon, zf pro/MZ&iy wi/i. Here "chancy" means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparadvely low probability vis-a-vis its altemadves. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. The proposidon is itself a corollary of a more general result, an ancient principle. The generalisadon replaces "go wrong" by "happen'; the ancient principle is that of jy/^ndfM^, sometimes stated, with quite insufficient reservations, as that all places are full, or ony ggnfdn^/y ^fofg &onn<% fo rgo/fy^Z (when genuinely possible states are compadble with all that is already transpiring). The principle, whose distinguished history is traced in Lovejoy, has emerged in contemporary particle physics, in such forms as the For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the "law", which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aw'adPH see the A/nerzcgmi; Chase's inidal formulation in a 1955 issue read 'If an aircraft part can be installed incorrectly, someone will install it that way". Silberman's paradox, that if Murphy's Law can go wrong, it will, is not a genuine paradox. For it can simply be asserted that where Murphy's Law is a real law it will not go wrong. The connection of Murphy's Law with the pnnciple of plendtude appears to have escaped much notice. This little theorem was originally titled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. While this secuon is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie, the arguments developed from those Leslie advances. For Leslie's arguments and also his debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his own legidmate doomsday apprehensions. The Appendix indicates the very limited extent to which Leslie's arguments arc here endorsed. �27 following: if a thing (e.g. an elementary particle) is not forbidden, excluded by quantum rules, then it is bound to occur (or be realised), even is "compulsory". For things and events generally, such completeness (all nonexcluded particle niches are occupied) cannot reasonably be expected.^ The main mini-plentitude proposition has, like its mini-Furphy specialization to bad outcomes, to take the much more hedged form: if something can genuinely happen, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary (bad) situation, a suitable disaster in the intended application. Let the possibility of D's happening - such as something's going wrong - be represented by a non­ zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small; if it were large enough the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the relativizing features, what is given that renders the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D { C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which takes the following form where there are n alternative hvpotheses hi,...,hn including h: P(h { i) = " * Pd 1 M I P(hr) X P(i { hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, as in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.28 P(h j i) is the probability of h given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, { , symbolises the condition There is a marvellous Greek term, which could serve to cover items where the particle physics "principle" is satisfied. 'We may call an event agathonic to convey that, though in itself it was highly unlikely, we might have known that something of that sort was bound to happen. ... from the name of the tragic poet to whom Aristotle attributes the view that it is very probable that the improbable should happen. (Kaplan p.9 rearranged). Is the chronic chthonic Greenhouse escalation agathonic? The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. In effect we shall look at the form P(h ) ,) = --------------- * PC < D ' P(h) X P(i { h) + XP(hr) X P(i { hr) n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes 'been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results' thus: 'This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common' (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. �28 involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: P(D { C) = __________ { D)_______________ _ ' P(D) x P(C { D) + P(D*) x P(C { D*) The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: C<2.$ay D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say 1/d m/L,say 1/d! of outcome relative chance that C As it is the chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, L has some modest size; specifically let L exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D { C), is d x 1/d dxl/d + (l-d)/dL _ " __ 1 1+^ where k - - That is, P(D { C) = y where k = 1, andP(D { C)> when -when L > . Thus D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when L is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, P(D { C) ______ d x m______ d x m + (1-d) x m/1 1 1 1 + k' as before. That is, m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little plendtude theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena, of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a �29 catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system (in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D, ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the inidal probability of D*, human "success", is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Table 2. D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, 1/100, i.e. .01 1/100 x 1/1 ofC Then the probability of human decline given C, .01 X .01 P(D { C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1/2 , when 1 > 99. For example, when 1 is set, conservatively, at 1,000, then the probability of human decline given present chanciness is approximately 90%. It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that 1 is very likely much much larger than 99, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. 6! usual jargon. probable in the There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously, that of the Club of Rome), Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption, ... . (The list rolls on.) It is appropriate to estimate posterior probability relative to any one of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterior probability is assessed relative to such matters as humans now being thus and so, our or my being alive �30 now (Leslie's first-person reference class), this being present energy use, present waste output, present forest destruction and so forth. The upshot is not the triviality that probability can be jacked up by placement in a suitably restricted context, though that analyticity is established.^ The point is that, environmentally, more affluent humans have fdgmjg/vgj produced such adverse circumstances, which are upon us, the very circumstances typically productive of limitadon results. In sum, the aadirapfc argument considers the environmentally invidious situadon of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as esdmated for instance through energy consumption. In fact all the other factors are anthropically tied, to gross human numbers, via the environmental impact equation and because the levels are human-use numbers. Let us consider the prospects given addidonal information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, are alive now. Diagram 6: (?ar praf^nf popidadon pred/camg/zf <?n die /wo jce/iarioj. Humans have got themselves - to some extent pat themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious, and One of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropnate choice of relative class. For, the high relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, c.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes, such as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. It is not so remarkable that probabilities can be wound up - or down - perhaps quite dramatically, by appropriate relativisation, by appropriate selection of a reference class. �31 unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their polludon are both excessive - and all these and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponendal curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponendal, with the present in the near verdeal growth phase: Digram 7 : GrowrA in are drawn from Boyden). envzronm^nfgZZy r^Z^vanr parg/neter-P (all graphs exhibited �32 Many other similarly shaped graphs could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as the chlorofluorocarbons (which accelerated from zero in the nineteen thirties), and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster (or air bus). Those curves are dghtly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of huge urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in tum on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. Nor, as observed, is there much real effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other limitative factors; they are becoming very disaster-prone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their collective ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:- * Manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfare, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a miniBig-Bang; see again Leslie). * Accumulated risk factors, such as the huge relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc.30 30 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, limitative and probabilistic in particular. �33 Despite the ideological obstacles - enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change - major efforts should be put into reducing these types of risks. Philosophers, beyond other intellectuals, cozdd have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. Given the track-record of professional philosophers, don't expect very much.31 5. Further notes on human prospects and improved practices: What in generai ought to be done about the Greenhouse problematique? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should substantially reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to radonal Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge - with all that it entails by way of radical change upon present arrangements - is not all that there is to try, all that should radonally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and what that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing humaninduced output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound of importance, upon temperature, which can serve to supply a significant limit on output. That bound - which conrrnns rfyZr raZd/zg by confining encountered situadons a? those where there is some ba-sds* - is given by esdmated temperatures during Aldthermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about PC. 31 There is much else for philosophers to contribute in these fields, especially on the expanding issues of future redistributive justice, ecological equity, genuinely pluralistic arrangements, etc. �34 gZo^zzZ zznd^r Z&ree zn/^rcy/zzzg sc^zzzzrzoy. AT (°C ) Dnzgram # : B^zckgroz/nd in/orw^hozz: 'Annual mean global surface air temperature computed for trace gas scenarios A, B, and C .... Scenario A assumes continued growth rates of greenhouse gas emissions typical of the past 20 years, i.e., about 1.5% per year emission growth; scenario B has emission rates approximately fixed at current rates; scenario C drastically reduces trace gas emissions between 1990 and 2000.... The shaded range is an estimate of global temperature during the peak of the current and previous interglacial periods, about 6,000 and 120,000 years before present, respectively. The zero point fbr observation is the 1951-1980 mean; the zero point for the model is the control run mean' (Walsh p.14, from whom the diagram is drawn). Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions, beginning early in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth ideology; it means expensive re- and de­ industrialisation. Short of catastrophic nuclear war it seems unlikely. �35 There are several reasons why requisite change looks unlikely. Firstly, requisite changes are generally difficult, ideologically unwelcome, extensive and expensive. Politicians will accordingly be extremely loath to undertake them, to offer more than tokenism. Moreover, those states and corporations that avoid making hard changes will, like free riders, be at a comparadve advantage in the short term as regards both profits and power. Secondly, then, there are Tragedy-of-Commons reasons, i.e. those deriving from general Prisoners' Dilemma situations. However the troughs induced by such dilemmas could be climbed out of; they can be transcended given, for instance, some resolute players committed to major change, despite heavy commercial and political disadvantages, and prepared to pursue judicious tit-for-tat strategies. Thirdly, because main Greenhouse effects are gradual, long-term by polidcal standards, and uncertain, the main pohdcal temptation will undoubtedly again be to avoid the problems - to muddle incrementally along, and hope that the problems will dissolve or that something (some magical technology perhaps) will turn up or that adaptadon will occur or, at worst, that the problems will fall to some successors. Meanwhile the problems will continue to be dismissed as "too hard", "too uncertain", and their costs, polidcal and economic and ideological, as "too great". We have already accumulated substantial experience of these inadequate evasive, dismissive and postponement procedures. What should of course be attempted involves extensive changes and restructuring across virtually the entire face of industrialisation and urbanisation, and therewith extensive alterations in the demands they impose upon new urban environments. The ultimate objective as regards the Greenhouse problems - a reduction in the rate of increase of, and then in the gross levels of, emissions of Greenhouse gases - direcdy implies, above all, constraints on the combustion of fossil fuels, both decelerating use and improved use, but also much better regulation, in one way or another, of production of other Greenhouse gases and of interference with ecosystems storing or absorbing Greenhouse gases. The main burden as regards requisite changes falls on the main users of fossil fuels and main consumers of Greenhouse relevant products, namely the Earth's most affluent centres: North America, Japan and Europe. In these centres especially, the work should be started on reducing consumption of fossil fuel involved goods and services. (In a thoroughly methodical approach a GG, Greenhouse gas, rating would be assigned to each sort of good and service, the objective being to reduce these ratings, an effort that would no doubt concentrate upon highly rated and easily altered items.) The general types of changes needed or desirable are well enough known to environmental planners, and include: restructuring of cides into network systems, so that reliance upon automobile commudng and truck transport of goods is much reduced, improved building practices for energy efficiency cogeneration and related technologies, increased reliance on solar energy technologies, and so on. �36 Venturing much further into unknown territory are the types of political and economic alterations required to implement the planning changes. It has already been insinuated that conventional governmental and public policy practices, analyses and procedures are inadequate to the tasks ahead. For these presuppose, for example, reladvely short-term and quite bounded settings, in which most information (as to costs, benefits, beneficiaries, etc.) is more or less certain, and where an ethical/ideological framework is taken for granted. Indeed most of the favoured procedures - such as reliance on standard cost-benefit analyses, on markets of orthodox economics, on muddling through, etc - not only depend on certainty and are unfitted for situations of uncertainty, and assume at best a decidedly shallow approach to environmental matters; but further they tend to exhibit, what is quite compatible with short-term rationality, long-term irrationality. Much intellectual effort should be invested, straightaway, in designing and developing improved political structures and matching decision-making procedures. Such structures deserve to be better articulated and understood - a large task - before the struggle is begun in earnest - perhaps in East European style - to put some of them into place. From the angle of radical change, then, impact of the Greenhouse problematique is far from entirely negative. For it may encourage or even force many more of us into thinking about and doing what should be done from a deep perspective anyway, such as rectifying recent heavy human impact upon environments, and beginning at once to put in place more environment-friendly arrangements and structures'^ Richard Sylvan APPENDIX: As to the Doomsday Argument circulated by Leslie. The anthropic argument of the penultimate section applies limitation results to escalate probabilities. By contrast, the argument deployed by Leslie has comparatively little to do with limitation features or the special risks of the present times (it does depend upon some features of the temporal distribution of the total human population). As a consequence also, 32 This more positive conclusion contrasts with final pessimistic corollary which ended the previous interim version of this essay. The corollary, which followed the gloomy (but warranted) claim that requisite restructuring change seems unlikely, and was intended to underpin it, was simply this: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already been told as much by philosophers like Russell and surmised as much from the latest perambulations in the long history of human wars. Finally, a significant debt should be recorded at least to all the following: to John Leslie for leading ideas and for comments, to David Bennett for comments and for research and production assistance, to Pat Troy for an opportunity to read his unpublished paper on the topic, to Malcolm Slade and Joseph Wayne Smith for encouragement to write on the topic, and to several members of the audience at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, held in Christchurch, New Zealand, during August 1989, where parts of the essay were fruitfully discussed and several worthwhile suggestions or objections made. �37 it has no direct application to the special environmental problems of the present. It yields at best a general admonition against human risk taking - and even the inference to that is shaky the argument itself is unavoidable. The central claim of Leslie's argument comes to this: unless the human race ends soon, then any one of us present humans is not an ordinary one at all, but an exceptionally early one. (Such statistical ordinariness is presumably supposed analytic upon total human populadon distributions.) Thus (contraposing and distributing a reasonable expectation functor), since it is reasonable to expect that such humans are ordinary (minor premiss), it is reasonable to expect the human race will soon die out of the weaknesses of Leslie's Doomsday Argument, especially in its quasiinductive guise (e.g. PQ p.2), is its background reliance upon an indifference principle assumpdon, much as in faulty applicadons of Bayes' theorem, already noted. (The principle is used in Leslie's um argument; see p.12.) The problemadc assumption shows up in c^rz.y clauses in Leslie's deontic probability (typicality) principle, what he describes as "the Argument's underlying principle' (in fact a minor premiss): one should. %ZZ eZ^ &^Zng take one's position to be fairly typical rather than very untypical, or in different formulation: whenever Zach'/zg gvz'^nce to r/zg ccnfra/y, one should prefer to think of one's own position as fairly typical rather than highly untypical (both principles are stated, though with different emphases in PQ p.2). Much the same principle, but in stronger form, operates in what he calls 'the crux of the argument': dmZ^yj you /zav^ specially jfrong to believe that you are a very untypically early human, you ought not to believe it' (p.10, rearranged, different emphasis). Unfortunately for the Argument's principle, matters are not so indifferent, things are not so equal, some sciendsts have reasons which they think are cogent, for believing that present humans are fairly early members of the species. Consider Lovelock, whom, as we have seen, used to think that the Earth and its life systems were virtually indestructible; it is only necessary to add the familiar belief that humans themselves (like rats) are very resourceful beings, virtually impossible to exterminate, to arrive at the result that there is reason to believe that the human race is bound to persist for many more generations. That is, of course, both the informed and not unreasoned popular view, guiding much practice. As a result the principle is, at the very least, in doubt. Accordingly what Leslie presents as the crux of the argument is not endorsed here. The Argument is vulnerable in other ways as well. For one, the main premiss is, in duly contraposed form, not quite so evident, as for instance the human race could just tail off at low population levels on Earth. For another, the distribution of the functor 'it is reasonable to expect that' across the conditional involved is not unproblematic: the �38 distribution principle itself is contested in the literature, and here the result it is supposed to yield looks unreasonable! References H. W. Bernard, T/za GraaK/zazz^a E)/acr, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Mzap/zy'.? Law. Boo/: Two, Magnum, Methuen Paperbacks, London, 1980. S. Boyden, WasfarK Czvz'ZzzarzaK zn EzaZagzcaZ Parspacrzva, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, ^rara a/r/za WarZzZ 79^9, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Eagz'caZ FazzK<7a?zaK.s' a/ PraZ?a/?zZzzy, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. C.R. Chapman and D. Morrison, Ca^mzc Cara^rrap/za^, Plenum, New York, 1989. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, 7?ayasz'aK AKaZy^z^ aK<7 (/zzcortoz/zzy ZK EcaKaKzzc T/zaary, Rowman & LittEeld, New Jersey, 1987. 'Developing policies for responding to climatic change", Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. W.T. Keeton, BzaZagzcaZ -SczaKca, Third edition, Norton, New York, 1980. I. Prigogine, Or^ar azTra/C/zaag , Batam, Toronto, 1984. J. D. Hughes, 'Gaia: an ancient view of our planet", T/za EcaZagz^r 13(1983) 54-60. R. Jeffrey, T/za Eagzc p/Dacz\YzaK 2ed., University Chicago Press, 1983. A. Kaplan, 7K Pz/r^zzz'r p/Wz'-y&wz, Glencoe, Beverly Hills Ca., 1977. J. Leslie, 'Risking and World's End", EzzZZazzK a/ r/za C<2K<2<7Z<2K Azzc/aar 5aczary 10(3) (1989) 10-15; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, 'Is the end of the world nigh?", T/za E/zzZa^ap/zzcaZ Czzarrar/y, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaza. A Kaw Zaa/z ar Zz/a <9K Earr/z, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, 'Are we destabilising world climate?", T/za Eaa/agz^r 15(1985) 52-55. J.Lovelock, 'Man and Gaia", T/za Earr/z E apart. MaKz'zarzKg z/za Eazz/a/ar Czzr EKVz'raKKzaKZ (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilyard), Mitchell Beazley, London, 1988, 51-64. A. Lovejoy, T/za Graaf C/zaz'K p/EazKg, Harvard University Press, Massuchusetts, 1950. B. McKibben, 'Is the world getting hotter?" T/za Aaw Yar% Eavz'aw, 8 December 1988, 711. G.I. Pearman (ed.), GraaK/zazz^a. P/aKKZKg /ar c/zKzaza c/zaKga, Division of Atmospheric Research,CSIRO, 1988. �39 B. Pittock, 'Climatic catastrophes: The international implications of the greenhouse effect and nuclear winter', Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 20, RSPacS, Australian National University, 1987. B. Pittock, 'Forests beyond 2000 - effect of atmospheric change', AM.yfra/i(2M For^rry 50(1987a) 205-215. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', 7E%zEry 21(1978) 133179. R. Routley, 'Ultralogic as universal?' reprinted as an Appendix in Expiring Jzz/tgZ^ RM^E^yafxZ, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider, 'Not to decide is to decide', in '88: P/anm/ig/br OZ/ware C/zange (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R. Sylvan, 'Modern myths concerning rationality: the imperatives of consistency and (constrained) maximality', 1988, Rarzona/zzy antZ ZrrazfpfzaZzzy.* E^r <2HtZ (ed. S. Bidermann and B. Scharfstein), Brill, 1989. R.P. Turco and others, 'Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions', 5cz^nce 222 (1983) 1283-1292. K. Walsh, 'Greenhouse-induced climatic change in Australia' in Urgex/zazAfe '88., op.czf., 10-19. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document GAEAN GREENHOUSE, NUCLEAR WINTER, AND ANTHROPIC DOOMSDAY? ... climate change, like no other issue, calls the whole notion of human progress into question. The [ever promised] benefits of newer technologies, more efficient economics, and improved political systems could be overwhelmed by uncontrolled global warming. ... the pace of climate change will soon overwhelm natural variability in the earth's climate. Indeed, it can be compared with nuclear war for its potential to disrupt a wide range of human and natural systems, [severely] complicating the task of managing economies and coping with other problems. Irrigation works, settlement patterns, and food production [among others] would be tragically disrupted ... (Worldwatch 89, p.ll, p.10) There are many approaches to the the cluster of problems upon which this philosophical investigation focuses. These approaches range from playing the issue down entirely, dismissing it as not a problem, not something anyone should worry about, at the one end of the range, to playing it up at the other. Those who play it up may even foresee the demise of the human race, unless substantially new socio-economic arrangements - with restructured cities, revitalized lands, rejuvenated oceans - soon eventuate. There is certainly plenty of room for different approaches (see Diagram 1), and for some eclecticism. For what is being relied upon, in every case, comprises shaky and contestable arguments, from flimsy forecasting models lacking many apparently relevant details. No one of sound judgment, aware that weather reports for twelve hours ahead can be wildly astray, would place a very high level of confidence on climatic forecasts for fifty years ahead down a very hazardous track. Nonetheless there is enough information to act; and there is information rationally requiring action. For things in the future are not going to be the same. It is very doubtful that they are going to be any better (though much important economic theorizing presupposes as much, such as the monetary discounting of the future). They are not going to be similar even, because so many parameters important to life are changing, several at exponential rates. Significant in these changes are likely climatic changes. The Greenhouse effect is among these, a result of the increases of "greenhouse" gases, especially carbon dioxide and methane, in the Earth's atmosphere, which have followed exponential paths since the highenergy phase of industrial culture (see Diagram 7). The growth in gas concentration produces, what it is lagged by, but is now apparent, a significant increase in mean global temperatures. This has major implications for much of life on Earth. Course of action Reasons offered Short response No problem Refutable No certainty Irrational Adaptive capacity Exaggerated High-tech resolution Wishful thinking Severe dislocation otherwise Utopian Individual survival Pointless No action^ Moderate action Considerable action These very condensed responses will be expanded and explained as we proceed. In accord with an esteemed philosophical tradition, a medical analogy is first deployed; it serves to throw main points into high relief. Consider the possible illness of the Earth, for instance as a result of brutalisation and poisoning. Look on the Earth then as a patient^, who exhibits some symptoms of a possibly disabling illness; for instance the patient's system is overloaded with troublesome trace elements and her temperature appears to be rising. Compare rational medical practice where a human patient gives indications of possibly disabling illness, for instance the patient shows signs of hypertension. Now consider some of the spectrum of approaches. Suppose the advice is to take no action, to do nothing but monitor the situation until further information comes in, until even (to take a worst case) it becomes evident that the patient indeed has hypertension and suffers a severe consequence. That would be regarded as irresponsible practice. To say that there is no problem when symptoms are there, would be regarded as utterly irresponsible, and medically refutable. To say that no action should be taken until certainty as to the complaint is established would be seen as incompetent medical practice. Taoist no-action would be different. It would not have undertaken excessive industrial action in the first place. This is precisely not the way less modest Gaean hypotheses regard the Earth. For there the Earth is active, actively participating in co-evolutionary developments. But the health analogy does of course go right back to ancient chthonic view, systematically presented in Plato, according to which The Earth is a living being of whom humans are only a part. Right relationship with the Earth means that the total organism is in good health; so environmental problems are seen as illness, as a failure of one part of the organism to interact supportivcly with others' (Hughes, p.60). For Gaean themes in other ancient philosophies, both before and after Plato, see Hughes p.57. a ? 3 A responsible practitioner begins recommending some remedial action straight away. Naturally there are various options open as to what may be prescribed. These include, at the one end, high-tech procedures, such as, what would be ridiculous simply for hypertension, full medical engine-and-gearbox replacement (heart and kidney transplant), or, a little less ludicrous but ridiculously commonplace, a whole-remaining-life course of pharmaceutical products, e.g. tablets. At the other end, lifestyle changes are proposed, such as more exercise, weight loss, stress reduction, and an improved diet with less sodium input. Reasonable advice would not include pure adaptation, that the patient went on living as before in the expectation that her system would adapt to the situation. Nor would it be reasonably suggested, except in somewhat unusual circumstances, that the patient entirely change her lifestyle, abandon her work, house and so on, and live somewhere else. Even so unusual circumstances, which might include residence in a very polluted environment or work in a nuclear plant, are no doubt on the increase. Like all analogies, the medical analogy has limitations. One feature it does not capture concerns the holistic aspects of the Earth's sickness, and why accordingly an individualistic survival approach, egotistically rational enough for hypertension and perhaps even for a localised nuclear war, cannot succeed. The reason is, of course, that holistic problems are too extensive for individuals, or even small collectives, acting on their own to be effective or to make much difference. Some are too big even for large collectives or states, but would require whole regions of the Earth acting in concert. But of course some state players, such as the superpowers as regards nuclear winter, can make a substantial difference, or even all the difference. The medical analogy also indicates the outcome of further investigation of approaches. Briefly, as with a chronic illness, the conclusion is that there is no very easy path; future humans should expect a hard landing. 1. Investigative philosophy, argument and rational decision as applied to climatic probiematiques. The role of philosophy in such a complex problematique as that of Greenhouse effects is not difficult to state briefly. Philosophy, Anglo-American philosophy especially, is concerned above all with Investigative philosophy resembles philosophy, except that it may upset the philosophy it applies; it investigates arguments, their features - assumptions, reliability, etc. - and their generalisation to rational processes and methods, but normal philosophical topics. The generalisation to rational processes comprehends a wider range of philosophical throughput than the orthodox narrow range of argument typically addressed in logic courses; to probabilistic and plausibilistic reasoning, to decision processing and making. 4 A main objective in this piece of investigative philosophy is to consider certain argumcmj pointing to probabilities of severe dislocation as a result of Greenhouse effects, and the resulting impact on rariana/ formation and action. There are certain arguments of particular interest for radical decision and action: various neo-Malthusian arguments, catastrophe arguments, and doomsday arguments. A main run of arguments to considerable action are limitative in character. Such ZimifafMm arguments are sometimes alternatively called *neo Malthusian', since Malthus presented a very elementary, very controversial, argument of this general type. But such is the hostility, especially in Marxist-influenced quarters, to Malthus's associated themes (some of them admittedly repulsive) that merely to associate an argument terminologically with Malthus is thereby likely to condemn it. To avoid such fallacious condemnation-byassociation, the graphic term 'neo-Malthusian' is largely avoided in what follows. The general form of these limitation arguments is simply this: growth in some parameter over time encounters limits, typically with severe, even catastrophic, effects; for seldom is the transition to severely constrained behaviour smooth. A characteristic graphic representation is as follows: Diagram 2. GrowfA ZimiM growth parameter exponential growth pattern encountering limits subsequent varying behaviour The limits are often imposed just by finitude, for instance finiteness of a resource or a sink. But other limits can be important, for instance where new phenomena or thresholds come into play. General limitation arguments loom in the background in what follows, where we shall be arguing on a double front: * * 5 A. Significant disequilibrium of the Earth's systems is a real possibility, and accordingly must be reckoned with in decision procedures. Though the probability of such an outcome may only be modest, the case has to be taken seriously because the result (arrived at by a limitation argument typically) is so bad. Suppose, for instance, the outcome is that the Earth ceases to be habitable in present terms, to be able to carry its present demanding load. Such an outcome would have an extremely high negative value, so it would tend to dominate other alternatives. (But it need not be an entirely worst case, where perhaps the dominant terrestrial species becomes extinct, or the Earth becomes devoid of "higher" life. Under the bad result contemplated some better-off humans in special circumstance may subsist for a while.) Such sufficiently bad cases be taken account of in decision making; they have to be taken account of in rgrz'o/ia/ decision procedures. A*. Significant disequilibrium not only has a non-negligible probability, but set in the proper content has a sizeable probability; so it cannot be ignored or discounted as too low to bother about. For such an argument has to be established at the outset than for a rational decision theory argument. Such a different argument, of especial concern as regard climatic changes, is the following argument:- * There is some probability that the Gaean "greenhouse effect", generated by human activity, will get out of control, that Gaean control mechanisms will fail, and that the Earth will, for example, overheat (Runaway Greenhouse, or premiss). * That result would be disastrous for human activities, and indeed for humans Pr<9.sp(?cf). * Because of the unusual, and unusually precarious, position of humans (of certain critical anthropic parameters), such a probability of disaster is not in fact small but decidedly large. As a consequence then, the human species will probably sharply decline, and even become extinct (C^^^p/26 That is, by a rectified version of Murphy's law - that if something can go wrong then in appropriate unusual conditions, it very probably will - an incrementally small probability is inflated into a very large probability. It would be a mistake to conclude that because the argument itself looks an unlikely one, everyone can stop worrying. The argument is but ong of a substantial raft of arguments, suggesting that we are already in deep trouble, that 5/23^ have everyone worried; it is but a final intellectual sting, so to say, from the previously inconspicuous cosmological tail. 6 Such a doomsday argument no doubt puts together, in one more exact form, some of the sorts of considerations that are troubling many people, especially concerned youth, about the Greenhouse business: that humans (including themselves) are on a decline or extinction path. It is no doubt not the only consideration that should be troubling them or us. For whether or not doomsday warnings are warranted, there are other matters that should be sufficiently worrisome, to anyone of moral integrity:* Future times are likely to be exceedingly uncomfortable for very many creatures, as habitats are destroyed, food producing regions are eliminated, and environments seriously impoverished. (Many of these creatures are nonexistents, mere future existents, i.e. creatures that do not yet exist or participate in market or voting rituals, but nonetheless they wzZ/ exist and may participate. But, despite their presently unfavourable ontological status, they are entitled to fair and decent treatment.) * Given such future prospects, present practices which do nothing or vanishingly little to ameliorate these prospects, are decidedly irrational. Indeed a main message that will emerge from the present exercise is the mora/ Zrrtmpna/f/y of critical large-scale human practices. The irrationality, morally-weighed-down irrationality, of present large-scale human practices is already conspicuous from the wintry downside of climatic prospects of which Greenhouse warming is the upside. 7 Diagram 3. Macro-c/wKmc jarring am?Observed global average temperatures, 1880-1987, with forward projections (historic data from Worldwatch p.10). mean global temperature (degrees C) The apparatus for conducting a world-wide nuclear war is entirely in place and indeed on alert The probability of such a war, even if small, is not zero. Among the many awful effects of a large nuclear war is that of nuclear winter, which would probably bring about the demise of present human civilisation, and would at the very least mean enormous dislocation for most surviving humans and other creatures. A sufficiently diabolical chemico-nuclear war, reaching into all inhabited parts of the globe, could indeed drive the human species close to extinction. The decidedly dubious rationality and morality of these general nuclear arrangements both through what they are in themselves for what purposes, and through their moral 8 opportunity costs - are widely appreciated. The thesis that the arrangements and practices are immoral, irradonal, and ought to be dismantled - already much argued, and also contested^ - is not the present concern. The thermonuclear downside is, by comparison, a very easy case to examine philosophically, and argue, as compared with the greenhouse upside.4 For there is, for instance, a case of sorts for much increased use of greenhouse gases, such as CFCs in refrigerators, a case that hardly extends very plausibly to nuclear weapons. It is a case heavily pressed by some "developing" nations, for polluting devices already in widespread use in more affluent places, as necessary for local standards of living. These nations want, or are heavily encouraged, to extend the war against Nature through the habitats they have gained control over, in the name of economic progress. War also joins Greenhouse summer and nuclear winter. For the barely-analogical rapacious war against Nature is a major contributor to Greenhouse gas emissions, for instance, in the domestication of wetlands for rice paddies, through the heavy pillaging of forests, and the like, typically carried on with swords and bayonets reforged to jump ploughs, chemical weapons turned to herbicide guns, and tanks converted to bulldozers. The protracted war against Nature^, carried, it had been supposed, to a victorious conclusion with the rise of science and technology and the ubiquitous advance of industralisation, seems however to have backfired. For it is turning the Earth, Gaea herself, into a patient, with crippled life support systems, thereby endangering the sustained future even of the victorious. Yet another Pyrrhic victory. Greenhouse and nuclear winter are more intricately connected than through war and as the upside and downside of meteorological phenomena. One of the high-tech solutions suggested for atmospheric overheating, involves the generation of wintering effects - to cool things down - by flinging enough dust up into the atmosphere, a trick no doubt most easily achieved on the requisite scale by nuclear explosives. Needless to say, like backbuming against out-of-control fires, artificial winter would be a pretty desperate and, given present expertise, dangerous expedient. 2. The Greenhouse debate, main policy responses, and irrational decision. The Greenhouse debate, as to what to do, if anything, about forecast Greenhouse effects on Earth, is intellectually disturbing. For it has revealed, as we shall soon see, that many of those who have spoken, worse that /pta/ry q/ r/io-yg wAo who have some role For my very small contribution to this, see the War and Peace scries in Papery E/iwv/wig/mxZ RSSS, Australian National University. Global warming, by no means entirely certain, is assumed to be the outcome of increasing greenhouse gas build up. Of course though some mean temperatures will rise, cooling will probably occur also in some localized regions. A war incited and applauded by illustrious philosophical forebears. * & 9 in decision making (including both experts and politicians), mah'ng in con^'n'on^ p/nncorrainiy or possible riskA a J7rm gra.%? on The main canvassed policy approaches to the Greenhouse problematique lie firmly within the dominant social outlook, the high-tech growth and development ideology. Diagram 4 E?r<9<26? po/z'cy fa rA^ Gr^g/i/z<9^^ /?ra^/^marz^a^. Dominant paradigm options Alternative ecological outlook Procrastination (wait-and-see) Soft energy paths and alternative regulation Adaptation (sink-or-swim) Socio-economic transformation Regulation Intervention (star wars) We will briefly outline, and find wanting, a// the dominant approaches. * Procra^rznaaon, the prevailing response. In fact the main governmental and conservative response thus far has been procrastination, or "wait-and-see" as it is more benignly known.*? The approach makes much of the uncertainties, of the shortcomings, in even the most elaborate general circulation models for future climatic change, of the high noise-to-signal levels. On such bases it contends that it is too early to do anything, except staging some meetings, organising some review committees, undertaking some monitoring, and funding a little more "research". It obviously does nothing to rock the growth ideology boat. Certainly a few scientists, outside main policy making reaches, do have a sound intuitive appreciation of these problems, and of the deficiencies of prevailing practices, e.g. Pittock 87. There is little excuse for prevailing ignorance of or ignoring of decision theory: for the elements of the standard theory are readily accessible and very elementary. In the present essay a modification of standard decision theory (as expounded e.g. in Jeffrey) is assumed as background; for details see Sylvan. Following Knight, many economists (try to) distinguish between uncertainty and risk. Risk is said to obtain when some more or less objective numerical probabilities can be assigned to outcomes, a situation not obtaining as regards global greenhouse effects. Bayesians, who can always assign subjective probabilities tend to eschew the distinction, e.g. Cyert and DeGroot, who say that 'decision making under uncertainty refers to situations in which the outcome of the decision is not precisely predictable'(p.3). Either way, Greenhouse involves uncertainty - to which rational procedures should be applied. There is significant rhetorical art in the choice of classificatory labels, a rather philosophically neglected art. A PR person must have been hired to produce the Greenhouse adaptation of 'adaptation*. 10 There is the pretence that we do not know enough to act.s But it is known that carbon dioxide, methane and other greenhouse gases are fast increasing. The main causes and enough likely enough consequences are also known. Theoretical considerations have already been partially confirmed by rising temperatures in the eighties. Outcomes of rising temperatures are also known in broad outline: rising sea levels, and so forth. In addition, there are partial small-scale models of Greenhouse effects in action. For example, a city such as Mexico City, which is situated in the bowl-like valley, is placed in an environment which traps heat as well as polludon. The ecological effects, like the human effects, are pretty dramatic even at this small level, and hardly to be sought, or emulated elsewhere. There is a pretence, fostered also by many sciendsts, that Greenhouse difficuldes have only just been discovered; a date commonly set for that watershed event is the Villiers conference and statement of 1985 (e.g. Pittock 87 pp.2-3). Actually there have been Greenhouse warnings for more than a decade, and there has been a corresponding decade of inacdon. Nor is any acdon of much significance presently seriously contemplated. Back in 1979 Bernard wrote at length about and reported the substantial concern of climatologists about Greenhouse effects. Even the magazine not then noted for its green sympathies, recorded that The release of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels is, conceivably, the most important environmental issue in the world today" (May 3 1979). Bernard quotes many other concerned scientists, several asserdng that 'the government must start dealing with this problem now". They meant the United States government. "The"" government didn't take the hint. For more than a decade then, sciendsts have been emphasizing that the Greenhouse threat is a major environmental problem, and that action should be taken immediately. Over 10 years nothing of real significance to counter the effects has happened. There has been more than a q/TKacdo/t, during which matters have got worse, and the time frame for evasive acdon disturbingly shorter. It is already evident that requisite decision making under uncertainty is not taking place. On straight inductive grounds, it would be reasonable to expect nothing will be done. While there are theoretical grounds to back up such an assessment, still it is only just beginning to get through to a much wider public (which can exercise a marginal influence on what politicians say) that there is - or T/zay be, as some more reactionary modal-mongering academics would have - a problem or two. Part of the problem is that scientists have been caught out (e.g. crying wolf) and have become ultra-cautious. With the advent of thermodymamics, for instance, scientists began 'threatening mankind with a rather swift "heat death"' as the universe ran down. Thus M. Alier, on 'blatant ideological use of science even by scientists themselves' (see Bernard p.9). More recently, many rang alarm bells prematurely concerning an impending mini-ice-age. The past predictive failures of scientists have been used as evidence for scepticism concerning greenhouse effects; see Me Kibben p.8. It is an unsatisfactorily selective argument; interestingly it is not used in a similar way against economists, whose predictive record is significantly worse. 11 Many scientists have joined the wait-and-see queue, with their begging bowls, hoping for more hand-outs for research. They assume, rightly enough, that more information would assist with rational decision-making, and also, quite wrongly, that "scientific certainty" is required for action to be taken. Physical scientists are not alone in their misapprehension of rational decision methods. Although there is a good deal of practical experience available of statistical-type decision making under uncertainty, for instance as regards insurance coverage and engineering projects, decision theory, especially as regards unrepeatable situations, has not penetrated very far into standard scientific methodology or much into mainstream parts of social sciences. 'Economists in particular have shown a talent for bringing every problem back to a world of certainty where all solutions are known or can be easily found/ Natural scientists including climatologists are, for the most part, on the same erroneous reducdon-tounattainable-certainty trip. 'This is not to say that economists have not worked on uncertainty. ... however ... uncertainty is introduced and then taken out by assumption' (Cyert and DeGroot, continuing, p.l). But there are several classes of problemadc situations, where decision and action may be required, where uncertainty be removed or discarded by fiat, reducdon stratagems or otherwise, notably:* inherently probabilistic situations, such as those of indeterminacy in quantum theory; * essentially unpredictable situadons (which may be determinisdc) such as those now under invesdgadon in chaos theory; * presently uncertain situations and outcomes, which may eventually resolve into certain cases, or may tum into some of the above classes, where there is not time to wait for resolution. The Greenhouse problem is regularly put into the latter class, a standard assumpdon being that with enough money and research effort thrown at it, it will resolve to decent certainty. But it may well not. Climate is now a prime arena for applications of chaos theory (in any case inidal conditions for application of meteorological equadons are seldom very accurate and are now shifting with the accumulation of Greenhouse gases). There are grounds for supposing that critical parts of climatology will fall into the essentially unpredictable class, that the sought certainly is unattainable. If so the standard begging-bowl posture of too many research scientists: Supply more funding so we can go on researching undl we obtain certainty, is misguided.^ Or, less charitably, downright dishonest. Nor does it seem to have occurred to most research scientists demanding more money that an important reason why they are not obtaining the funding they expect, or even enough to run complex modellings on expensive computers, is because their research results could, if unfavourable, act as a serious drag on the industrial establishment. 77zey are Aar<^/y go//7g to /?e we// jrt/tt/et/ to ^e/eg/twuze woder/i /a^artr/a/ society. 12 There are thus some severe problems with this prevailing response. Firstly, it is irrational. Certainty, achieved, may be achieved too late. What was required for rationality was decision making in advance of certainty. Secondly, certainty may be unobtainable. The meteorological equations may be non-linear (nonadditive) and so incapable of delivering firm results given slightly fluctuating initial data. Not only are many experts and decision makers only comfortable about acting in circumstances of relative certainty; almost as bad, where some uncertainty is involved, only what is considered Zz^/y gets genuine consideration. Rational decision making has however to take account of what may not be very likely at all, but may be quite disastrous should it occur (e.g. a nuclear accident with full meltdown). In this respect too, the standard response is methodologically unsound. * AzZapzarz^n, learning to live with and love the Greenhouse. The policy That tends to be favoured by most economists' is an adaptive strategy: '"Let society adjust to environmental changes without attempting to mitigate or prevent the changes in advance". We could adapt to climate change for example, by planting alternative crop strains [themselves] ... more widely adapted... ' (Schneider p.8). Observe, however, that it is a decidedly rayzrzcf&% "adaptation" that is being proposed, that humans adjust to the results of present economic and industrial practices, rather than adjusting fAem. It is zz^^zz/?z^6Z that economic growth comes first, that we do not change (e.g. through decent regulation) high energy industrial practices. A fuller and smarter adaptation would adapt r/z&yg practices. The policy is like a pernicious agriculture policy that says, "Let farmers adjust to the results of soil erosion, salination and so on, without attempting to mitigate or prevent these deleterious changes in advance." Such "adaptadve agriculture", the present predominant practice in advanced agriculture, is anti-environmental, but is given a spurious air of evolutionary inevitability and evolutionary redistributive justice; you can't buck natural evolution, which is entirely natural, can you? Let us condense such far-from-inevitable and highly artificial mal-adaptation in the neologism Greenhouse adaptation, like nuclear adaptation, is badaptation (some, less kind, would say wa^aptation). There is a pragmatic, if cynical, political argument for badaptation, namely, that zznzZat^raZ action to prevent a warming is unfeasible and requisite international cooperation is unattainable. Both contentions are open to doubt. Unilateral action by the USA, by far the Earth's heaviest resource and energy consumer (per capita and on several other relevant dimensions), could make a major difference, especially when backed up by pressure (familiar from other settings, such as the narcotics war) on other nations and through the United Nations. Unfortunately the USA is also the world's largest supplier of influential growth economists. In any case, international agreements such as those on whaling and 13 concerning Antarctica, are attainable, and sometimes effective. The ozone protocols, limiting production of CFCs, show that results can be achieved to limit trace gas emissions. The adaptadon proposal is presently compatible with wait-and-see; both mean little or no hauling back on trace gas production. Indeed procrastination will force sociedes towards badaptation. Typical of adaptation, like procrastination, is an (over-)emphasis on the uncertainties of Greenhouse forecasts, and on the decision-theoretic paralysis such uncertaindes are alleged to produce. Characterisdc of adaptadon too is a minimisadon of the of Greenhouse modification. No doubt the impression that things won't be so very different, or far removed from what has already been experienced, is important in getting adaptationism more readily accepted, as a radonal course of acdon (instead of the seemingly irradonal course it is). Thus badaptation tends to play with figures at the low end of projected ranges of temperature increase, such as 1.5°C for 2050, when in fact present data indicates something rather in the vicinity of 4° C - in a setting, furthermore, where fracdons of a degree centigrade may well be linked to macro-physical and macro-biological change. Recent modellings deliver, on average, an increase in 2°C attributable to carbon dioxide, and it is widely thought that other trace gases will double the CO2 effect^, thus yielding a 4°C temperature increase around 2050. The colossal extent of future human dislocation has correspondingly been deliberately underemphasized. The adaptive capacides of human arrangements, when humans are living at the margin, to massive natural shifts, has been grossly exaggerated. Consider agriculture alone - set aside flooded cides, sunken atoll islands, and all the rest. Some of the Earth's major grain producing regions - upon which famine relief projects depend - could be pushed substantially out of business. The conditions which prevailed during the American dust­ bowl experience of the nineteen-thirties were benign indeed compared with those which threaten with mid twenty-first century Greenhouse condidons. The mid-continental summer temperatures were only 1-2° C warmer than the present average; under greenhouse conditions they could well be more than 3-4° C warmer. In the dust-bowl rainfall only slipped at critical growing times (e.g. July for northern corn) to 80% of the contemporary norm; but under Greenhouse conditions it could be significantly less again (only winter precipitation increasing). A super dust-bowl is not improbable (for much more detail, see Bernard). Similarly for other similar latitude Northern grain producing regions. But the high-energy industrial superstructure is crucially based upon sufficient cheap food (bread) for the urban masses. 10 See e.g. Pearman p.18. Note that methane is beginning to rival carbon dioxide as a gas whose atmospheric propordons really matter and whose present exponential increase is excessive. 14 * Tnfgrvenn'o?!, high-tech Earth engineering. Interventionist proposals so far floated include (D New oceans in parts of the Earth's land surface lying below, at, or near sea level. These projects would make the mega-dams of recent times look like children's play. @ Wintering effects. Production of sufficient dust in the atmosphere, achieved for instance by nuclear detonations, to mitigate heating effects. Such enterprise would make modification of the weather by cloud seeding look like childs' play. Fortunately these and other expensive and grandiose proposals, which would call for considerable international cooperation, far down the planning track; with these schemes procrastination is rational. * controlling free(-wheeling) enterprise. Regulation itself is of course transparadigmatic; where it belongs depend on what measures (what sorts of constraints, rights, etc.) are proposed and how they are imposed or enforced. If it is, for example, some industrial law-and-order, smokestack scrubbing regulations or Greenhouse polluting rights, within the status quo, that is one thing, but if a minimally- constrained growth paradigm is questioned and alternative socio-economic arrangements advocated, that is quite another, and falls outside the dominant paradigm. Such policies involving regulations controlling fossil fuel emissions especially, are negatively labelled in the predominantly American policy literature, though there is now no preventing some Greenhouse effects; but the worse to follow could still be prevented. What is usually covered under the label is however some regulation within prevailing political arrangements. So energy efficiencies and savings for investment in growth elsewhere is comprehensible, straight growth-curtailing non-consumption is not contemplated. But the latter is just what alternatives do contemplate. Democratic political arrangements do not exclude such alternatives; both the power bases of political leaders and economic prescriptions do. Adequate regulation within prevailing socio-economic arrangements is going to prove impossible, without adjustment of power structures and economic imperatives - in effect without far-reaching systemic and ideological adjustment. While such adjustment appears rational, it seems unlikely (see further section 5). Power holders and the power structures into which they slot have too much to lose. So it is hardly remarkable that regulation itself is not so bureaucratically popular (at least under that mode of presentation) in these latter days of economic irrationalism, and is strongly resented and resisted. Some of the U.S. bureaucratic reaction to the Antarctic ozone hole, now regularly attributed to extensive CFC usage, is instructive. A top Reagan official 'said that since CFO's were useful to industry, people should use sunglasses and baseball caps as protection against retina damage and skin cancer' - individualisdcally distributed adaptationism, terrific €? & 15 for creatures outside "sunglasses and baseball caps" economies. Other Reagan administrators spoke for procrastination, one academic-turned-bureaucrat observing that 'so far the ozone hole has had little effect on skin cancer rates in the United States'. The prevailing bureaucratic procrastination stance that was applied to the much easier ozone problem (which has belated obtained weak international responses), is now extended to Greenhouse effects. It is typically, typically irrationally, stated by high administrators that 'significant gaps exist in our knowledge .... These scientific uncertainties must be reduced before we commit the economic future to drastic and potentially misplaced policy responses' (preceding quotations from McKibben p.10, p.ll, italics added). and the of the Greenhouse business is thereby also revealed. Like heart disease and cancer, Greenhouse effects are gaining much discussion and some funding because they just may severely effect the affluent, affluent humans and affluent nations, that have a good deal to lose, in United States especially. The impact will, however, be at least as severe in some third world nations, whose lands or much of them will be flooded, countries which cannot afford extensive The extensive expensive dyking (or where such effort would be in the longer term, as seas rise, be pointless), countries such as Pacific coral atoll nations and delta states like Bangladesh. But the really serious losers will no doubt be, not humans , rich or poor, but nonhumans. Biological diversity, already being reduced by various human activities, may be one of the chief casualties of global warming. Massive destruction of forests, wetlands, and even the polar tundra could irrevocably destroy complex eco­ systems that have existed for millennia. Indeed, various biological reserves created in the past decade to protect species diversity could become virtual death traps as wildlife attempt to survive in conditions for which they are poorly suited. Accelerated species extinction is an inevitable consequence of a rapid warming (Worldwatch p.10). 3. Arguments to dislocation and for a Lesser Venus Prospect. There is at least a small probability that predicted increases in mean atmospheric temperatures will seriously interfere with most remaining natural habitats and result in the degeneration or destruction of many of them, especially forests, wetlands, and marine environments. For example, most wetlands will either be flooded or else evaporate under increasing temperatures. Again, the prospect is for the boreal forest to shrink from about 23% of the world's forest to something like 1% of a much diminished forest covering. Nor will adaptationism help here; for natural evolution is much too slow for adaptationism to succeed n. 11 Cf. Keeton pp.763-4, '... typical migration rates for forest boundaries are of the order of 502000m per annum ... [A requisite] shift of 500-1000km would, however, take hundreds of years. ... Pollen evidence... suggests that large changes occurred in forest composition during the Holocene period some 8000-10000 years ago, even though the climate changes then were less 16 Natural ecosystems will not adapt effectively to rapid climatic change.... With regard to forests, habitats for plants and animals cannot be re-created or transplanted rapidly. Continuing climatic changes would strain the capabilities of management practices even in commercial tree plantations (Beijer Institute Report pp.21-3). The decline or demise of these systems, vast reservoirs for greenhouse gases, will accelerate the warming, and accordingly make matters substantially worse: Trees are adapted to a narrow range of temperature and moisture levels, and cannot cope with rapid climate change. A temperature increase of 1 degree Celsius per decade in mid- to upper latitudes translates into a shift in vegetation zones of 60-100 miles northward. Terrestrial ecosystems cannot migrate that fast. Vast numbers of trees are likely to die, and new trees adapted to warmer temperatures are unlikely to be able to replace them rapidly. During such a disruption, huge areas of forest could die and, as they decay or bum, send large quantities of additional CO2 into the atmosphere, accelerating the warming (Worldwatch p.10). Of course the immediate climatic patterns would be somewhat more complex. If enough soot and ash from fires were flung into the atmosphere there would be a cooling effect, like that of a small nuclear winter, before heating accelerated. The present pattern of ecosystemic loss would also be sharply accelerated. For when natural ecosystems get reduced to about 30% of their initial size, they tend to collapse of themselves. Moreover, there would be other significant positive feedback from ecosystems other than the terrestrial forests, from the oceans especially. As the oceans warm, they lose their capacity to serve as carbon dioxide reservoirs. So they too release additional gases, including previously absorbed CO2, back into the atmosphere, further accelerating the warming. A critical question arises as to how much danger such positive feedback poses? As so often, informed opinions, and so probability estimates differ. However 'several scientists working in the area consider that positive feedback effects will force a very bleak picture to be drawn" (Worldwatch p.19).^ Unlike the interim effect of a small nuclear winter, where after a few years at most, climatic behaviour (as distinct from radioactivity levels and, differently, from ecological communities) would presumably return towards the previous norm, there will be /7<9 similar under greenhouse impact. Technically then, stability would be lost under the than those expected by 2030 [and forests were more extensive and less interfered with]' (Pittock 87a p.209, rearranged). Second order probabilities, probabilities and uncertainties in the light of first order subjective probabilities, enter importantly. 17 impact,^ disequilibrium induced. An eventual long-term return to some different but sufficiently congenial equilibrium could well be excluded. Under new climatic regimes plants themselves may be able to do little more than hang on for part of their own lives. In many places conditions would be too severe for much of the "year" to permit normal plant functioning, including what is crucial for Greenhouse amelioration, photosynthesis. In most plants, photosynthesis only occurs across a narrow band of temperatures (e.g. 6 - 34°C); outside that range the plants shut down operations.^ Even more important, many plants would leave few or no successful successors. Even where plants set seed, seedlings would not survive under the severe conditions expected; for instance, they would be killed by hot dry summer conditions, or in other places by frosts to which they are not adapted, both phenomena already familiar after clearfelling of forests. The situation at a famous place in southern Sahara, where there is but one ancient tree hanging on in thousands of square kilometres of desert, a tree with viable seeds which sets no seedlings, could be more or less replicated in many other places where forests or woody plants once grew. In fact we are already witnessing the demise of the trees in much of Australia. Already dead and dying trees form a predominant feature of the Australian rural landscape. Virtually whichever way ecologists travel in Australia where trees remain, they are confronted with dead and dying trees The reasons for the present decline of trees in rural Australia is, for the most part, not to be attributed to early Greenhouse or even pollution effects. "6 It is thought to be due to a complex of factors, including a range of insect predators whose efforts are concentrated on isolated trees left after an excessive zeal for clearing (i.e. holistic effects enter as regards healthy persistence of trees). Excessive disturbance of ecological systems, though overclearing of trees, has seriously upset the systems. Types of systemic stress and disturbance are likely to be much accelerated given the additional impact of Greenhouse warming on plant functioning and reproduction. f<9 some q/ worth disentangling. Firstly, a system may be disturbed by interfering with critical components There are several within the system structure, processing parts, such as botanical systems or their interconnections. As with a computer, if a cridcal component is broken or a circuit cut, the probability of serious malfunction increases. Secondly, a system normally operates within a Stability is defined in physics in terms of immediate return to an initial (inertial) position after small disturbance. The upper bound may be difficult to appreciate in most of Aotearoa. But in much of Australia, during the summer, many plants close down their operations for much of the day. Other effects of increased heat on major food plants matter for human affairs. Severe heat interferes with fertilization and reproduction in com, and apparently affects the ability of rice in Asia to reproduce; so considerably reduced yields of staple foods may be anticipated. Reported by Recher on EarfAworw. Thus coastline vegctational destruction through detergents in sewerage waters. 18 certain range of condition. Take it outside these conditions or push it towards limits (let the computer get too hot or too cold), and probability of breakdown is much increased. Feedback loops, which are an important feature of cybernetic systems are particularly vulnerable to normality disturbance. Cybernetic systems afford one example of more holistic behaviour; dissipative systems, where perhaps strange new features may enter as systemic loading is increased, another. Such new features may not be at all congenial to dominant forms, or to maintenance of life support arrangements. It should be evident from details already assembled that there is some probability the Greenhouse efforts could seriously disturb the crucial carbon cycle. The carbon cycle loops, in major fashion, through both the higher plant complexes and the oceans, both major carbon dioxide reservoirs - but just how critically through them is uncertain. However, with the serious disturbance of main components in the cycle, the real possibility of cycle malfunction can hardly be excluded. Much the same holds with other crucial chemical cycles, such as the sulphur cycle (though woody plants are perhaps less important here, the oceans are highly significant, the oceans Costeau has already pronounced moribund). To a lesser extent, several of the other well-known bio-chemical cycles, such as those for nitrogen, sodium, and so forth, depend for their stability and maintenance on the adequate operation of active ecological structures. Plainly if a cycle loops through a component, such as a tropical forest, which is severely disturbed then the crucial cycle itself could be locally disrupted. There is some probability, furthermore, that the changes will disturb other physical cycles crucial to the stability of systems. For some of the Earth's feedback systems are in fact maintained in equilibrium through natural ecosystems. A striking example appears to be the regulating of the Earth's temperature itself. Lovelock and collaborators have devised an elementary daiyy wor/d m(9dg/ which reveals how a feedback system with two types of daisies can, within limits, stabilize temperatures despite increasing solar energy input (see the next diagram). The limits are important, for as these limits are approached the maintenance systems break down. Thus again, instability could ensue under disturbance. 19 Diagram 5.77z^rm<9.s7anc r^ga/aizoa a/*rA^ Earr/z j ^zayac^ i^mp^ramrf rAraag/z p/a/zM (a much simplified picture from Lovelock 88 p.58). !n the "Datsyworid" mode), tife adjusts the pfanefs temperature to suit ttseif. A basic assumption is that on Daisyworid, as on Earth, the sun is getting progressive^ hotter. Biack daisies grow best when the surface temperature is tow, because their petals absorb radiation. As the sun's heat increases, the white daisies begin to nourish. Their petais reflect radiation, thus heipingto iower surface temperature. Between the time the seeds first germinate and when the sun gets too hot, the piants maintain a steady surface temperature by adjusting the pfanefs aibedo. Without doubt these matters are bad enough. Demise of most of the Earth's richness^ is not a minor matter. Worse could follow. Apart from direct ecological breakdown, there are several other major ways through which the maintenance structures of the Earth can be not merely awkwardly disturbed, but thrown right out of kilter - perhaps, given the d^/zcacy of several critical matters, never to return present norms. Most obvious and immediately threatening is * nuclear warfare, and therewith nuclear winter. But there are of course other severe shocks that the planet could suffer than those chemonuclear warfare, some human induced, some a "chance" matter of the planets' posidon in space; namely * a mini Big Bang, or an undermining of metastability, brought about through very high energy experimentadon (see Leslie); * a collision with a large meteorite or asteroid. Such uncertaindes, not germane to the main climatic arguments, are listed, not to achieve a bogus completeness, but to emphasize that complete certainty is not to expected, not radonally. Should we obtain it, should we obtain easy relatively unproblemadc lives, then we have, by world standards, been rather lucky. Moreover, these latter uncertaindes do so 17 Natural richness is its main richness, much exceeding human arufice. 20 far appear negligible compared with those bound up with climate.is The Greenhouse problemadque differs (as do nuclear winter and also high energy experimentation) from such possibilities as destruction of the Earth's favourable climate or life-supports by collision with an asteroid in two crucial respects: the poor prognoses are largely a matter of human making (meaning the making of certain among humans) and the damaging situations could be substantially averted by positive or concerted human activity. According analogies with remote phenomena such as decline of the sun, asteroid collisions, etc., sometimes applied to dismiss concerns with global environmental problems, do not hold up, and should be resisted. The human-induced climatic problems are primarily ascribable to: * excess economic development. The practices involve a complex and sustained assault on most of the Earth's major ecosystems, forests, seas, and so on, along with the alteration of atmospheric composition by greenhouse gases. For example, the forests are cut down, burnt, poisoned by herbicides and acid rain, or otherwise removed or destroyed. (Therewith too a great deal more carbon dioxide is released into the atmosphere and major sinks of carbon dioxide are removed.) As a result of these concerted growth-and-development activities such systems are driven to limits, and breakdown occurs. Once it occurs at some weak point it can escalate elsewhere, like a conflagradon; thus again ecosystemic collapse for example. Quite apart from breakdown at or approaching limits, for instance because of systemic overload, remarkable changes can occur in dissipative systems under stress or strain. * excess energy or chemical loading. Though such striking examples as the chemical clock, it has been demonstrated that dissipative systems can suddenly, and often rather unpredictably, undergo extraordinary changes, as for instance energy flux is increased (Prigogine and others). Such non-additive or nonlinear effects, characteristic of more holistic dissipative systems, seem bound to occur within the Earth's atmosphere and oceans as they undergo compositional changes. Carbon dioxide itself provides a good example: None of these assessments are strikingly objective, but are a matter of appearance. The risk of catastrophic destruction of Earth civilization by an asteroid or comet is discussed, and compared with either less exotic risks, in Chapman and Morrison, chapter 19. It has been guesstimated at a 1 in 300,000 chance per year, a much smaller probability than that serious Greenhouse effect will eventuate (often put at about 85%), but comparable with some rather more mundane risks (see p.283). The risks from very high energy experimentation will no doubt rise sharply as orders of attainable energy increase. 21 With small quantities its effect on the temperature of the air is proportional to the amount added; there is a linear effect. However once the carbon dioxide concentration in the air approaches 1%, new nonlinear effects come into play and heating greatly increases. In the absence of a biosphere to fix carbon dioxide, its concentration in the atmosphere would probably exceed the critical figure of 1%. The Earth would then heat up rapidly to a temperature near to that of boiling water. Increasing temperatures would speed up chemical reacdons and accelerate their progress towards chemical equilibrium. ... eventually ... the Earth would become permanently cocooned in a brilliant white cloud - a second Venus, although not quite as hot (Lovelock pp.45-6). Fortunately for Gaean prospects, the percentage of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is now nowhere near 1% nor likely to be pushed near 1% by projected increases in carbon dioxide levels under economic activity over the next 50 years^. However eventual exponential growth will lead towards accentuated levels, and the side effect of such growth, the release of carbon dioxide from forests and oceans and the considerable reduction in fixadon of carbon dioxide with the decline of forests, will lead in that disastrous direction rather more rapidly. The 1% bound constitutes just one of the many serious limits (fortunately a fairly remote one) to condnuation of present developmental pracdces. Now there can be no radonal confidence with respect to complex dissipadve systems about the behaviour of which we presendy know comparadvely little - that other nonaddidve effects will not be encountered at a much earlier stage. After all, the Gaean system, its atmosphere, oceans and ecosystems, will be pushed into essendally unexperienced and substandally unknown reaches. There is, for example, no experience from comparable past times of such elevated temperatures as Greenhouse effects will lead to, to draw upon. 'There is no evidence that the land-bound glaciers in Greenland and Antarctica have ever completely melted in the last two million years'. There is experience of much colder periods. 'During ice ages, the earth's average temperature has been about 5°C colder than at present, with glaciers covering major portions of continents' (Barth p.7). But there is no similar experience of temperatures 4-5° C warmer than at present (in any warm interglacial period), 'a global increase of more than 2°C above present is unprecedented in the era of human civilization' (Schneider p.6). It would accordingly be decidedly rash, rash decision making, to assign a zero or negligible probability to the emergence of new or unknown effects of relevance, to assume all will go smoothly and well. That would presuppose, in any event, a completeness in present scientific knowledge, contrary to the information we actually have that present investigation of holistic systems, among much else, is still in its infancy. The probability of 19 In the atmosphere of the very early Earth, CO? exceeded the critical 1% figure; but solar luminosity was about 25% less than now. With increasing solar flux the Earth would have overheated had the proportion of CO2 not been much reduced (e.g. see Lovelock 88 p.56). 22 something critical (e.g. perhaps radicals like hydroxyl) having been left out of estimations, of room accordingly for something unexpected or for something to go wrong, may be small (though experience implies it is not always so), but it certainly appears to be non-zero. For the overconfident, with excess faith in the flimsy scientific edifice, there is a salutary lesson to be drawn from the erratic and stumbling path of the main proponent of Gaia hypotheses, Lovelock. Lovelock, coming from a working life as an industrial chemist, part of that time for a giant chemical transnational, had, and retained for a considerable time after he began his holistic hypothesizing, a strong antipathy for environmentalists.^ Even Gaia was for industry and against the environmentalists; she was going to laughingly soak up all the pollution, courtesy of the chemical companies especially, that we humans could throw at her. In particular, we did not really need to worry much about ozone depletion or greenhouse gas escalations^ 'Contrary to the forebodings of many environmentalists, finding a suitable" destructive agent to bring about a 'doom scenario" 'turns out to be an almost insoluble problem" (79 p.40). Lovelock makes it easier for himself by helping himself to the assumption that a doomsday scenario involves the destruction of all "life"', 'down to the last spore of some deep-buried anaerobic bacteria" (p.40). But even for the least chauvinistic of environmentalists, destruction of all humans but the select elect would be quite enough for a decent doomsday. Lovelock's high redefinition of a environmental 'doomsday scenario" is unacceptable. Lovelock does not however stay within the bound of his redefinition. He proceeds to pooh-pooh the idea that anything much that we humans could accomplish would make any difference to Gaia (p.41) or even to most humans, including use of nuclear devices. Unfortunately for Lovelock's credibility, he was writing three years before the seemingly obvious wintering effects of a major nuclear war were realised by the accredited scientific community. Appealing in a common scienufic fashion to scientific authority, he proceeds to minimalize the human and ecological effects of a major war. The report he relies upon as authoritative was a 1975 (unreferenced) one of 'the US Nadonal Academy of Sciences ... prepared by an eight-man committee of their own assisted by forty-eight other explosions and a// chosen from those members, in the effects of nuclear to them" (p.41, italics added). Lovelock draws from the disdnguished expert report the findings that Coupled with this, there was a certain schizophrenia in Lovelock's attitude to the natural environment. There was also a matching schizophrenia as to the fragility of life on Earth. On the one side, it required very delicate settings and fine tuning to arise; this is part of the argument for a Gaia hypothesis. On the other side, life is 'tough, robust, and [highly] adaptable', virtually indestructible (79 p.90). But though a flawed hero, Lovelock is a hero nonetheless. See e.g. Lovelock 79, p.40ff; and also, on ozone, 88 p.63. 23 ... if half of all the nuclear weapons in the world's arsenals, about 10,000 megatons, were used in a nuclear war the effects on most of the human and man-made ecosystems of the world would be small at first and would become negligible within thirty years. Both aggressor and victim nations would of course suffer catastrophic local devastation, but areas remote from the battle and, especially important in the biosphere, marine and coastal ecosystems would be minimally disturbed (p.41). Three years later Turco and others proceeded to detail a very different scenario, that of widespread and ecologically damaging nuclear winter. Not for the only time, Lovelock had been caught out badly. As with pollution, Lovelock has more recently shifted ground,^ considerably, on the vulnerability of the Earth to human-induced disturbance. When a system such as Gaea in homeostatis is stressed to near the limits of regulation even a small disturbance may cause it to jump to a new stable state or even fail entirely.... It could be that the regulation of the Earth's climate is not far from one of these limits. Thus if some part of climate regulation is connected with the natural level of CO2 then clearly we are close to the limits of its regulation. This is because CO2 cannot be reduced much below the level observed for the last glaciation, about 180 ppm, without seriously limiting the rate of growth of the more abundant C3 type plants. If we perturb the Earth's radiation balance by adding more CO2 and other greenhouse gases to the atmosphere or reduce its capacity to regulate by decreasing the area of forests or both of these together then we could be surprised by a sudden jump of both CO2 and temperature to a new and much warmer steady state; or by the initiation of periodic fluctuations between that state and our present climate. The anomalously low abundance of CO2 on Earth when compared with the other terrestrial planets and especially the fact that the mean temperature of the Earth is on the cool side of the optimum for regulation, suggests strongly that the biota is regulating the climate by pumping CO2 from the air. The common feature of most of our pollutions and of our exploitation of the land surface seems to be unintentionally to thwart this natural process (Lovelock 85 pp.5354). The argument to the lesser par/i, to significant disequilibrium with the Earth's ecological support system destabilized, takes the following lines. The Earth appears to be a dissipative (far-from-equilibrium) system held at its present by a combinadon of an (increasing) solar flux - a main energy input into the system - and its major ecological arrangements, especially vegetational complexes and live oceans. The sheer extent to which the resulting system differs from the stable dead system it could otherwise be is shown by the following table for atmospheric and oceanic composidon. Shifdng ground may be fine, especially when it is to an improved position. But it should be done honesdy and openly, not stealthily or shiftily. Lovelock proceeds to attribute a cancature of his <9WH previous position to cdtics of the Gaia hypothesis (as a clever Tabneation', which also it was not): that it is 'an argument developed to allow industry to pollute at will, since mother Gaia will clean up the mess '(85 p.53). 24 TABLE 1. Substance Funerary Equilibrium (principal components per cent). Venus Earth Carbon dioxide A Nitrogen 1 R Oxygen Argon 0 C E A N S Water Lifeless Mars Earth 99 0 98 1.9 98 1.9 0 trace trace 1 0.1 0.1 Earth 95 2.7 0.13 2 63 Salt 3.5 Sodium nitrate 1.7 Present 0.03 79 21 1 96 n.a. n.a. 3.5 traces Surface temperatures (°C) n.a 477 Total pressure (bars) n.a. 90 290+50 60 -53 13 0064 1 The table is based upon tables 1 and 2 of Lovelock 79, p.37 and p.39. The whole Earth system is accordingly far from equilibrium. Unpredictable behaviour as loads increase is therefore almost to be expected. A likely moral is presumably: stress the system, or destabilize ecosystem controls sufficiently, and the system may be in deep trouble. It is relevant to inquire briefly into what evidence we so far have on this score. To do so let us reconsider some of the array of arguments there are from some sort of holistic organisation of the Earth (for a modest Gaea hypothesis, to the effect that the (outer) Earth is a naturally regulated nonadditive cybernetic system, important attributes of which are regulated by the biota). /or the participation of the Earth's ecological support systems, plant complexes especially, the Earth would not be blessed with its present life- benign physical characteristics. The oceans would be much saltier and too salty for most life, the air would not contain the present rich mixture of oxygen and carbon dioxide so important for terrestrial life, and so on; perhaps most important the Earth would be significantly hotter and too hot for most life, for most of what does the regulating and stabilizing of present conditions. For the solar flux has increased in intensity about 30% since life appeared on Earth, whereas the mean global temperatures have exhibited no 25 corresponding increase, but have remained relatively constant. Such an expected constancy in the face of disturbing inputs is ascribed, under holistic approaches that do something to explain it, to the concerted activity of plant life, as already indicated. The general tenor of the argument is so far this:- By arguments from physical and other models, and because of uncertainties, the probability that something could go badly wrong is not merely nonzero^ but indeed far from negligible. Part of the argument can be put as follows:- There is a decent probability that a modest Gaea hypothesis holds. But then, there is a considerable probability that excessive Greenhouse build-up will lead to damaging system destabilization. So combining probabilities, there at least a nonnegligible probability of such destabilization. An analogy should now emphasize both the dubiousness of what is being proposed under adaptationism and the precariousness of the human predicament. The proposal is to take this ancient craft, now overloaded with human passengers and their heavy baggage, a cargo it was never organised to carry, out on new routes and run it faster and higher than it has ever travelled before. Even for an experimental prototype, a now very fast (air-)bus say, with a select test crew, such a procedure, of running over new uncharted routes at speeds and heights never attained before, would be risky enterprise. With an ancient craft, with a heavy non-elite cargo of baggage and passengers (some whom try to interfere with the controls), the proposal is extremely rash. For the chances that the craft will break/down and perhaps crash, with serious consequences to passengers and for the baggage, are greatly elevated over the risks of proceeding as usual much more slowly. With the costs of crashing so severe, rational operators and sensible pilots would not take them.^ Unfortunately the analogy is not at all far-fetched, but resembles what is in store for spaceship Earth, already under significant stress with its excessive human passenger load and their heavy ecological practices. Not only is the future itself pretty new territory, but it is a future at terrestrial temperatures never before attained. As a result too of these enhanced temperatures, important processes will proceed faster than ever before, in particular all chemical processes. Simply to take the craft up there, as do-nothing and adaptation approaches would have is to emulate the risks and hubris of Daedelus; such approaches are From logical theories of probability such as Camap's non-zero probabilities are rather easily reached (perhaps too easily, with the converse feature that natural laws never obtain high probabilities. The difficulty can be averted, to some extent, by restriction to physical models.) The analogy is an old one, which we exploited before in the nuclear case; for the "bus analogy", see Routley and Routley. The analogy admits of much graphic variation. Instead of running the craft at excess speed, an alternative or additional image is that of destroying the controls of the craft. Lovelock deploys this apposite image (88 p.63), which corresponds to the demolition of Gaean control systems. Others speak of a colossal experiment with the Earth; but strictly the conditions for a controlled experiment are not met. 26 aptly named D<2^Zfa?i. Given anthropic terrestrial practices, a Daedelian future and fate should not be excluded. 4. A Sting in the Cosmic Tail: the mini-Furphy theorem and on the iikeiy decline of Homo sapiens spp. economicus. The anthropic doomsday argument developed relies upon a modified Murphy's law. The trouble with the initial formulation of Murphy's law: ^anyf/ung can go wrong, if wii/, was that it was insufficiently qualified, much too absolutist, and apparently self-refuting.^ Certain crucial qualifications are required:* Replacement of the too certain conclusion by a somewhat weaker probabilistic one: for instance, it pro&a&/y will. * Correlative to weakening the conclusion, strengthening the premiss, by rendering it more specific; namely, in place of "anything" or "something" put "some thing ... given a chancy situation". The modified formulation is accordingly the following mini-Furphy proposition^ r/HKg can ge/iMZMe/y go wrong, given o re/onvefy cAoncy Mfi/ohon, zf pro/MZ&iy wi/i. Here "chancy" means more or less what it means according to the dictionaries: doubtful, decidedly risky, or as we shall construe it, having a comparadvely low probability vis-a-vis its altemadves. The precise extent of relative chanciness will be explained as we go. The proposidon is itself a corollary of a more general result, an ancient principle. The generalisadon replaces "go wrong" by "happen'; the ancient principle is that of jy/^ndfM^, sometimes stated, with quite insufficient reservations, as that all places are full, or ony ggnfdn^/y ^fofg &onn<% fo rgo/fy^Z (when genuinely possible states are compadble with all that is already transpiring). The principle, whose distinguished history is traced in Lovejoy, has emerged in contemporary particle physics, in such forms as the For this and other formulations of Murphy's law, and many loosely associated humorous maxims with grains of truth encapsulated, see Block. As to the history of the "law", which originated with J.M. Chase, editor of Aw'adPH see the A/nerzcgmi; Chase's inidal formulation in a 1955 issue read 'If an aircraft part can be installed incorrectly, someone will install it that way". Silberman's paradox, that if Murphy's Law can go wrong, it will, is not a genuine paradox. For it can simply be asserted that where Murphy's Law is a real law it will not go wrong. The connection of Murphy's Law with the pnnciple of plendtude appears to have escaped much notice. This little theorem was originally titled the Murphy-Leslie theorem. It is an adaptation, suggested by Leslie's work, of Murphy's Law. While this secuon is overwhelmingly indebted to Leslie, the arguments developed from those Leslie advances. For Leslie's arguments and also his debts, and so the transitive debts of this section, see Leslie himself, who deserves to be read in defence his own legidmate doomsday apprehensions. The Appendix indicates the very limited extent to which Leslie's arguments arc here endorsed. 27 following: if a thing (e.g. an elementary particle) is not forbidden, excluded by quantum rules, then it is bound to occur (or be realised), even is "compulsory". For things and events generally, such completeness (all nonexcluded particle niches are occupied) cannot reasonably be expected.^ The main mini-plentitude proposition has, like its mini-Furphy specialization to bad outcomes, to take the much more hedged form: if something can genuinely happen, given a relatively chancy situation, it probably will. To prove this proposition, let us first recast it in appropriate symbolic form. Let D be some arbitrary (bad) situation, a suitable disaster in the intended application. Let the possibility of D's happening - such as something's going wrong - be represented by a non­ zero probability, and genuineness by non-negligible probability. It can be assumed that that probability, P(D), is small; if it were large enough the requisite conclusion would follow in any case. Let C represent the relativizing features, what is given that renders the situation chancy. Then what we aim to show is that where P(D) is small positive, P(D { C) is probable. The proof applies a special case of Bayes' theorem, which takes the following form where there are n alternative hvpotheses hi,...,hn including h: P(h { i) = " * Pd 1 M I P(hr) X P(i { hr) r = 1 Here h is the hypothesis, which in our application is D, i is the additional information (or, as in Carnap, a new observation), which in our case is C.28 P(h j i) is the probability of h given i, or of h on condition i (the backward arrow notation, { , symbolises the condition There is a marvellous Greek term, which could serve to cover items where the particle physics "principle" is satisfied. 'We may call an event agathonic to convey that, though in itself it was highly unlikely, we might have known that something of that sort was bound to happen. ... from the name of the tragic poet to whom Aristotle attributes the view that it is very probable that the improbable should happen. (Kaplan p.9 rearranged). Is the chronic chthonic Greenhouse escalation agathonic? The formulation is a special case of that proved in Carnap, p.331; namely that (absolute) case where the evidence e is elided, or e set = 1. A similar result follows, subject to slightly more rigorous conditions, in relevant probability theory; see Routley 79 p.954. In effect we shall look at the form P(h ) ,) = --------------- * PC < D ' P(h) X P(i { h) + XP(hr) X P(i { hr) n with the sum excluding the product for h. Though demonstrable given satisfiable exclusion and exhaustion conditions, Bayes' theorem is not lacking critics, in part because of the surprises this bit of logic can deliver. Carnap meets the objection that Bayes' theorem has sometimes 'been applied to cases where it led to strange or even absurd results' thus: 'This was mostly due to an uncritical use of the principle of indifference :... [The] theorem is provable ... on the basis of those weak assumptions which practically all theories of probability seem to have in common' (p.331, sub 1 elided). Of course the present applications could (just) be objected to on the grounds that the logical conditions for the theorem to apply are not fully satisfied. 28 involved and shows its direction). For simplicity we shall suppose that all the alternatives to D are concentrated (as far as symbolic exposure goes) in one, namely D*. Then the form we seek to apply is simply: P(D { C) = __________ { D)_______________ _ ' P(D) x P(C { D) + P(D*) x P(C { D*) The arithmetic details needed can be tabulated in a revealing form as follows: C<2.$ay D D* Initial (or prior) probability d 1-d m, say 1/d m/L,say 1/d! of outcome relative chance that C As it is the chance of C that matters, we can rescale to set m = 1/d. To make C relatively chancy, L has some modest size; specifically let L exceed 1-d/d. Then the probability to be estimated, P(D { C), is d x 1/d dxl/d + (l-d)/dL _ " __ 1 1+^ where k - - That is, P(D { C) = y where k = 1, andP(D { C)> when -when L > . Thus D is probable, at least in being more probable than not, given C, when L is of at least modest size, i.e. given C is relatively chancy. In a merely apparently more general form of the estimation, where we do not align m to d, P(D { C) ______ d x m______ d x m + (1-d) x m/1 1 1 1 + k' as before. That is, m drops out, only the relative chanciness really matters. The little plendtude theorem follows as before. Now to put some relevant flesh on these abstract statements and figures. Let D be some future disaster such as the catastrophic decline, for instance, through summer or winter phenomena, of the human species, from which the enormous present population never recovers. At worst (from a chauvinistic angle) the population, like many catastrophically effected by human activities, goes extinct. Suppose, for a bifurcating outcome, there is a 29 catastrophe stage, before halfway through next century, 2050. If humans do not get their act together before then, they go into catastrophic decline, as already indicated. If however they do get their ecopolitical act together then humans, while they hardly live happily ever after (poverty, inequality, domination, and other evils not being removed), continue to persist or even grow in numbers, perhaps fanning out through the solar system (in the way envisaged by too many physicists). Suppose further we are optimists, imagining that the prior probability of D, ecodisaster and human decline, is small, say 1%. That is d = .01, and the inidal probability of D*, human "success", is .99. The figures are pretty notional. Supreme optimists would want to set d much smaller, pessimists rather at a higher probability. Table 2. D human decline D* human success Initial probabilities 1%, i.e. .01 99%, i.e. .99 Relative chanciness, 1/100, i.e. .01 1/100 x 1/1 ofC Then the probability of human decline given C, .01 X .01 P(D { C) .01 x .01 + .99 x .01/1 1/2 , when 1 > 99. For example, when 1 is set, conservatively, at 1,000, then the probability of human decline given present chanciness is approximately 90%. It remains to fill out C, thereby showing that 1 is very likely much much larger than 99, and correspondingly human decline so much the more probable in the light of additional information, i.e. 6! usual jargon. probable in the There are several high risk factors, acting in a certain concert, factors emphasized more than a decade ago in world systems modellings (such as, most famously, that of the Club of Rome), Malthusian factors such as human population, economic product, pollution, energy consumption, ... . (The list rolls on.) It is appropriate to estimate posterior probability relative to any one of these, any of which can serve as C, in order to expose the riskiness of present gross human practices. In brief, because there are several high risk factors, so there are several appropriate relative or reference classes. Thus the posterior probability is assessed relative to such matters as humans now being thus and so, our or my being alive 30 now (Leslie's first-person reference class), this being present energy use, present waste output, present forest destruction and so forth. The upshot is not the triviality that probability can be jacked up by placement in a suitably restricted context, though that analyticity is established.^ The point is that, environmentally, more affluent humans have fdgmjg/vgj produced such adverse circumstances, which are upon us, the very circumstances typically productive of limitadon results. In sum, the aadirapfc argument considers the environmentally invidious situadon of present humans on the Earth. The argument can be carried through either in terms of sheer population, gross numbers, or in terms of human resource grabbing, as esdmated for instance through energy consumption. In fact all the other factors are anthropically tied, to gross human numbers, via the environmental impact equation and because the levels are human-use numbers. Let us consider the prospects given addidonal information as to the present phase of gross human population. C will be some such proposition as: the proportional preponderance of humans who have ever lived alive now, or to personalize it: the chance that you or your family, are alive now. Diagram 6: (?ar praf^nf popidadon pred/camg/zf <?n die /wo jce/iarioj. Humans have got themselves - to some extent pat themselves, though much may be the result of muddling through - into an extremely dubious, environmentally insidious, and One of the weaknesses in the argument may appear to be its dependence on an appropnate choice of relative class. For, the high relative probabilities can fall away if different reference classes, not exhibiting such growth patterns are taken, c.g. present wattle distribution, birds being thus and so. On the other hand, probabilities can be elevated even more by selection of more unusual reference classes, such as our being scientists, or being computer programmers, etc.. It is not so remarkable that probabilities can be wound up - or down - perhaps quite dramatically, by appropriate relativisation, by appropriate selection of a reference class. 31 unsustainable position, on a range of critical parameters. Their numbers are excessive, their high energy use is excessive, their waste and their polludon are both excessive - and all these and other excesses are at the steep end of upward exponendal curves. Several relevant graphs are distressingly exponendal, with the present in the near verdeal growth phase: Digram 7 : GrowrA in are drawn from Boyden). envzronm^nfgZZy r^Z^vanr parg/neter-P (all graphs exhibited 32 Many other similarly shaped graphs could be added, for instance for growth of pollution, of waste products, of weapons (in terms of tonnes of explosive power), of other greenhouse gases such as the chlorofluorocarbons (which accelerated from zero in the nineteen thirties), and so on. The display typifies the accelerating human roller coaster (or air bus). Those curves are dghtly interconnected, in criss-crossing fashion. For example, the productivity of contemporary agriculture which enables the feeding of huge urbanised human populations depends on a very high energy use (in term of energy efficiency, contemporary high-tech agriculture falls below that of much traditional agriculture). The maintenance of high populations with supplies of cheap food depends in tum on fossil fuel agriculture. Because of the intertwining of these phenomena, there is no easy way of getting off the accelerating roller-coaster. Nor, as observed, is there much real effort devoted to slowing the coaster. For politicians it would be politically risky and inexpedient to try (for them the rhetoric about an ecologically sustainable future must remain just that, more rhetoric). For many other power holders and brokers such ideas are ideologically excluded: growth remains the gospel. So a precarious position becomes ever more precarious. Humans are in a decidedly chancy position, because of their population situation and other limitative factors; they are becoming very disaster-prone. If humans want an acceptable future for themselves - they have virtually ruled out an acceptable future for many other creatures, through their predominantly selfish thoughtless greedy practices - then they will probably have to mend their collective ways, very considerably and very soon. But, given the nature of the beast, that itself seems improbable. Humans, if they seek a more assured future, should make a concerted effort to put themselves into a less precarious position. That could be achieved by proceeding to reduce relative risks. These relative risks, sharply reducing prospects for a reliable future, fall into two classes:- * Manufactured risk factors, including weaponry such as mega-nuclear devices and elements of biochemical warfare, and experimental equipment such as very high energy particle accelerators (which could perhaps tunnel under a metastable state or induce a miniBig-Bang; see again Leslie). * Accumulated risk factors, such as the huge relative size of human population, energy consumption, greenhouse gas production, etc.30 30 As before, there are various different reasons why these induce risk, limitative and probabilistic in particular. 33 Despite the ideological obstacles - enormous political, religious and economic obstacles blocking the way of requisite change - major efforts should be put into reducing these types of risks. Philosophers, beyond other intellectuals, cozdd have a significant role in breaking down the ideological barriers and in clarifying and developing the arguments involved. Given the track-record of professional philosophers, don't expect very much.31 5. Further notes on human prospects and improved practices: What in generai ought to be done about the Greenhouse problematique? The general result already reached, that humans collectively should substantially reduce their risk taking, and in particular reduce their gross numbers, extends to radonal Greenhouse decision and action theory. But that large and difficult challenge - with all that it entails by way of radical change upon present arrangements - is not all that there is to try, all that should radonally be attempted. While some increase in mean global temperatures, and what that implies, can no longer be averted, the potentially most damaging effects can be: namely, by curtailing humaninduced output of Greenhouse gases. Moreover, there is an approximate upper bound of importance, upon temperature, which can serve to supply a significant limit on output. That bound - which conrrnns rfyZr raZd/zg by confining encountered situadons a? those where there is some ba-sds* - is given by esdmated temperatures during Aldthermal and Eemian eras. Those temperatures are estimated to have been between about 1/2 a degree and 1 degree Centigrade above contemporary (pre-1980) temperatures; so the upper bound is about PC. 31 There is much else for philosophers to contribute in these fields, especially on the expanding issues of future redistributive justice, ecological equity, genuinely pluralistic arrangements, etc. 34 gZo^zzZ zznd^r Z&ree zn/^rcy/zzzg sc^zzzzrzoy. AT (°C ) Dnzgram # : B^zckgroz/nd in/orw^hozz: 'Annual mean global surface air temperature computed for trace gas scenarios A, B, and C .... Scenario A assumes continued growth rates of greenhouse gas emissions typical of the past 20 years, i.e., about 1.5% per year emission growth; scenario B has emission rates approximately fixed at current rates; scenario C drastically reduces trace gas emissions between 1990 and 2000.... The shaded range is an estimate of global temperature during the peak of the current and previous interglacial periods, about 6,000 and 120,000 years before present, respectively. The zero point fbr observation is the 1951-1980 mean; the zero point for the model is the control run mean' (Walsh p.14, from whom the diagram is drawn). Not only will a continuation of current emission trends take global temperatures clean through and way beyond that bound, so also will an alternative set-up where emission rates are fixed more or less at current rates. The only apparent way to remain rationally within an experiential domain is to curtail sharply trace gas emissions, beginning early in the 1990s. That means shifting from the dominant growth ideology; it means expensive re- and de­ industrialisation. Short of catastrophic nuclear war it seems unlikely. 35 There are several reasons why requisite change looks unlikely. Firstly, requisite changes are generally difficult, ideologically unwelcome, extensive and expensive. Politicians will accordingly be extremely loath to undertake them, to offer more than tokenism. Moreover, those states and corporations that avoid making hard changes will, like free riders, be at a comparadve advantage in the short term as regards both profits and power. Secondly, then, there are Tragedy-of-Commons reasons, i.e. those deriving from general Prisoners' Dilemma situations. However the troughs induced by such dilemmas could be climbed out of; they can be transcended given, for instance, some resolute players committed to major change, despite heavy commercial and political disadvantages, and prepared to pursue judicious tit-for-tat strategies. Thirdly, because main Greenhouse effects are gradual, long-term by polidcal standards, and uncertain, the main pohdcal temptation will undoubtedly again be to avoid the problems - to muddle incrementally along, and hope that the problems will dissolve or that something (some magical technology perhaps) will turn up or that adaptadon will occur or, at worst, that the problems will fall to some successors. Meanwhile the problems will continue to be dismissed as "too hard", "too uncertain", and their costs, polidcal and economic and ideological, as "too great". We have already accumulated substantial experience of these inadequate evasive, dismissive and postponement procedures. What should of course be attempted involves extensive changes and restructuring across virtually the entire face of industrialisation and urbanisation, and therewith extensive alterations in the demands they impose upon new urban environments. The ultimate objective as regards the Greenhouse problems - a reduction in the rate of increase of, and then in the gross levels of, emissions of Greenhouse gases - direcdy implies, above all, constraints on the combustion of fossil fuels, both decelerating use and improved use, but also much better regulation, in one way or another, of production of other Greenhouse gases and of interference with ecosystems storing or absorbing Greenhouse gases. The main burden as regards requisite changes falls on the main users of fossil fuels and main consumers of Greenhouse relevant products, namely the Earth's most affluent centres: North America, Japan and Europe. In these centres especially, the work should be started on reducing consumption of fossil fuel involved goods and services. (In a thoroughly methodical approach a GG, Greenhouse gas, rating would be assigned to each sort of good and service, the objective being to reduce these ratings, an effort that would no doubt concentrate upon highly rated and easily altered items.) The general types of changes needed or desirable are well enough known to environmental planners, and include: restructuring of cides into network systems, so that reliance upon automobile commudng and truck transport of goods is much reduced, improved building practices for energy efficiency cogeneration and related technologies, increased reliance on solar energy technologies, and so on. 36 Venturing much further into unknown territory are the types of political and economic alterations required to implement the planning changes. It has already been insinuated that conventional governmental and public policy practices, analyses and procedures are inadequate to the tasks ahead. For these presuppose, for example, reladvely short-term and quite bounded settings, in which most information (as to costs, benefits, beneficiaries, etc.) is more or less certain, and where an ethical/ideological framework is taken for granted. Indeed most of the favoured procedures - such as reliance on standard cost-benefit analyses, on markets of orthodox economics, on muddling through, etc - not only depend on certainty and are unfitted for situations of uncertainty, and assume at best a decidedly shallow approach to environmental matters; but further they tend to exhibit, what is quite compatible with short-term rationality, long-term irrationality. Much intellectual effort should be invested, straightaway, in designing and developing improved political structures and matching decision-making procedures. Such structures deserve to be better articulated and understood - a large task - before the struggle is begun in earnest - perhaps in East European style - to put some of them into place. From the angle of radical change, then, impact of the Greenhouse problematique is far from entirely negative. For it may encourage or even force many more of us into thinking about and doing what should be done from a deep perspective anyway, such as rectifying recent heavy human impact upon environments, and beginning at once to put in place more environment-friendly arrangements and structures'^ Richard Sylvan APPENDIX: As to the Doomsday Argument circulated by Leslie. The anthropic argument of the penultimate section applies limitation results to escalate probabilities. By contrast, the argument deployed by Leslie has comparatively little to do with limitation features or the special risks of the present times (it does depend upon some features of the temporal distribution of the total human population). As a consequence also, 32 This more positive conclusion contrasts with final pessimistic corollary which ended the previous interim version of this essay. The corollary, which followed the gloomy (but warranted) claim that requisite restructuring change seems unlikely, and was intended to underpin it, was simply this: Humans collectively are not (particularly) rational. But we had already been told as much by philosophers like Russell and surmised as much from the latest perambulations in the long history of human wars. Finally, a significant debt should be recorded at least to all the following: to John Leslie for leading ideas and for comments, to David Bennett for comments and for research and production assistance, to Pat Troy for an opportunity to read his unpublished paper on the topic, to Malcolm Slade and Joseph Wayne Smith for encouragement to write on the topic, and to several members of the audience at the Australasian Association of Philosophy Conference, held in Christchurch, New Zealand, during August 1989, where parts of the essay were fruitfully discussed and several worthwhile suggestions or objections made. 37 it has no direct application to the special environmental problems of the present. It yields at best a general admonition against human risk taking - and even the inference to that is shaky the argument itself is unavoidable. The central claim of Leslie's argument comes to this: unless the human race ends soon, then any one of us present humans is not an ordinary one at all, but an exceptionally early one. (Such statistical ordinariness is presumably supposed analytic upon total human populadon distributions.) Thus (contraposing and distributing a reasonable expectation functor), since it is reasonable to expect that such humans are ordinary (minor premiss), it is reasonable to expect the human race will soon die out of the weaknesses of Leslie's Doomsday Argument, especially in its quasiinductive guise (e.g. PQ p.2), is its background reliance upon an indifference principle assumpdon, much as in faulty applicadons of Bayes' theorem, already noted. (The principle is used in Leslie's um argument; see p.12.) The problemadc assumption shows up in c^rz.y clauses in Leslie's deontic probability (typicality) principle, what he describes as "the Argument's underlying principle' (in fact a minor premiss): one should. %ZZ eZ^ &^Zng take one's position to be fairly typical rather than very untypical, or in different formulation: whenever Zach'/zg gvz'^nce to r/zg ccnfra/y, one should prefer to think of one's own position as fairly typical rather than highly untypical (both principles are stated, though with different emphases in PQ p.2). Much the same principle, but in stronger form, operates in what he calls 'the crux of the argument': dmZ^yj you /zav^ specially jfrong to believe that you are a very untypically early human, you ought not to believe it' (p.10, rearranged, different emphasis). Unfortunately for the Argument's principle, matters are not so indifferent, things are not so equal, some sciendsts have reasons which they think are cogent, for believing that present humans are fairly early members of the species. Consider Lovelock, whom, as we have seen, used to think that the Earth and its life systems were virtually indestructible; it is only necessary to add the familiar belief that humans themselves (like rats) are very resourceful beings, virtually impossible to exterminate, to arrive at the result that there is reason to believe that the human race is bound to persist for many more generations. That is, of course, both the informed and not unreasoned popular view, guiding much practice. As a result the principle is, at the very least, in doubt. Accordingly what Leslie presents as the crux of the argument is not endorsed here. The Argument is vulnerable in other ways as well. For one, the main premiss is, in duly contraposed form, not quite so evident, as for instance the human race could just tail off at low population levels on Earth. For another, the distribution of the functor 'it is reasonable to expect that' across the conditional involved is not unproblematic: the 38 distribution principle itself is contested in the literature, and here the result it is supposed to yield looks unreasonable! References H. W. Bernard, T/za GraaK/zazz^a E)/acr, Ballinger, Cambridge Mass., 1980. A. Block, Mzap/zy'.? Law. Boo/: Two, Magnum, Methuen Paperbacks, London, 1980. S. Boyden, WasfarK Czvz'ZzzarzaK zn EzaZagzcaZ Parspacrzva, Clarendon, Oxford, 1987. L.R. Brown and others, ^rara a/r/za WarZzZ 79^9, Norton/Worldwatch, New York, 1989; referred to as Worldwatch. R. Carnap, Eagz'caZ FazzK<7a?zaK.s' a/ PraZ?a/?zZzzy, Second edition, University of Chicago Press, 1962. C.R. Chapman and D. Morrison, Ca^mzc Cara^rrap/za^, Plenum, New York, 1989. R.M. Cyert and M.H. DeGroot, 7?ayasz'aK AKaZy^z^ aK<7 (/zzcortoz/zzy ZK EcaKaKzzc T/zaary, Rowman & LittEeld, New Jersey, 1987. 'Developing policies for responding to climatic change", Report of the Beijer Institute, February 1988. W.T. Keeton, BzaZagzcaZ -SczaKca, Third edition, Norton, New York, 1980. I. Prigogine, Or^ar azTra/C/zaag , Batam, Toronto, 1984. J. D. Hughes, 'Gaia: an ancient view of our planet", T/za EcaZagz^r 13(1983) 54-60. R. Jeffrey, T/za Eagzc p/Dacz\YzaK 2ed., University Chicago Press, 1983. A. Kaplan, 7K Pz/r^zzz'r p/Wz'-y&wz, Glencoe, Beverly Hills Ca., 1977. J. Leslie, 'Risking and World's End", EzzZZazzK a/ r/za C<2K<2<7Z<2K Azzc/aar 5aczary 10(3) (1989) 10-15; all references to Leslie are to this article unless otherwise indicated. J. Leslie, 'Is the end of the world nigh?", T/za E/zzZa^ap/zzcaZ Czzarrar/y, to appear; referred to as PQ. J.E. Lovelock, Gaza. A Kaw Zaa/z ar Zz/a <9K Earr/z, Oxford University Press, 1979. J. Lovelock, 'Are we destabilising world climate?", T/za Eaa/agz^r 15(1985) 52-55. J.Lovelock, 'Man and Gaia", T/za Earr/z E apart. MaKz'zarzKg z/za Eazz/a/ar Czzr EKVz'raKKzaKZ (ed. E. Goldsmith and N. Hilyard), Mitchell Beazley, London, 1988, 51-64. A. Lovejoy, T/za Graaf C/zaz'K p/EazKg, Harvard University Press, Massuchusetts, 1950. B. McKibben, 'Is the world getting hotter?" T/za Aaw Yar% Eavz'aw, 8 December 1988, 711. G.I. Pearman (ed.), GraaK/zazz^a. P/aKKZKg /ar c/zKzaza c/zaKga, Division of Atmospheric Research,CSIRO, 1988. 39 B. Pittock, 'Climatic catastrophes: The international implications of the greenhouse effect and nuclear winter', Peace Research Centre, Working Paper No. 20, RSPacS, Australian National University, 1987. B. Pittock, 'Forests beyond 2000 - effect of atmospheric change', AM.yfra/i(2M For^rry 50(1987a) 205-215. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future', 7E%zEry 21(1978) 133179. R. Routley, 'Ultralogic as universal?' reprinted as an Appendix in Expiring Jzz/tgZ^ RM^E^yafxZ, RSSS, Australian National University, 1979. S. Schneider, 'Not to decide is to decide', in '88: P/anm/ig/br OZ/ware C/zange (ed. T. Dendy), Department of Environment and Planning, Adelaide, 1989, 5-10. R. Sylvan, 'Modern myths concerning rationality: the imperatives of consistency and (constrained) maximality', 1988, Rarzona/zzy antZ ZrrazfpfzaZzzy.* E^r <2HtZ (ed. S. Bidermann and B. Scharfstein), Brill, 1989. R.P. Turco and others, 'Nuclear winter: Global consequences of multiple nuclear explosions', 5cz^nce 222 (1983) 1283-1292. K. Walsh, 'Greenhouse-induced climatic change in Australia' in Urgex/zazAfe '88., op.czf., 10-19.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 148, Item 1: Draft of Gaean greenhouse, nuclear winter and anthropic doomsday? Subject The topic of the resource Typescript draft of paper published, Sylvan R (1990), 'Gaean greenhouse, nuclear winter, and anthropic doomsday', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, 4. , Division of Philosophy and Law, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. Description An account of the resource Unnumbered paper from collection, item number assigned by library staff. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 148, Item 1 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [39] leaves. 42.24 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:00341fd">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:00341fd</a> Box 148: Offprints of Publications (to Como) https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/0c83abcc7b181b7f6a2ccf4330f20536.pdf 89f744a1ff89c888c8810f55b61f757a PDF Text Text Discussion Papers in environmental philosophy Philosophy Departments The Australian National University PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600. NUMBER 5 WAR AND PEACE Zgt ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT < RICHARD ROUTLEY ��FOR CIRCULATION AND EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT WAR AND PEACE. I ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT by R. Routley Number 5 Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy Department of Philosophy Australian National University 1984 ��INTRODUCTION. Virtually all the philosophical literature on nuclear war is written from either a superpower (predominantly American) or else European (mainly German, British or French) viewpoint. This article, after connecting in initial sections with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different Antipodean stance. Such regional perspectives, while the should not affect the morality of the matter, are highly politically relevant. Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the USA, also fails the test of morality. It is concerned only or primarily with what is good or "rational" or prudential for Americans, or for the American state, to do - whereas morality is independent of place, race, nationality and the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously. It concludes, among other things, that the American and Russian states have no moral business putting nonaligned peoples at such grave risk as present nuclear arrangements involve. CONTENTS AND OUTLINE: Italicised headings §3-§8 indicate the main structure of the argument Page No §0. Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wars, and new moral issues. Large-scale (LSN) vs limited nuclear wars, the focus on the former, but the implications for the latter. §1. How nuclear wars differ from other wars; wars and states, and the resulting limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war. War characterised. The essential role of the state. New and different features of nuclear wars. §2. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations to become entirely submerged in the context of war. The ancient distinction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning based on expediency. Arguments that war must be expediency-based refuted. Morality does not have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Utilitarianism and expediency distinguished. Limits to consensus: supermen and superhawks. National interest and expediency assimilated. Limits of state entitlement. §3. The initial argument to the immorality of LSN wars. One key argument, from the wrongness of killing noncombatants in mass, is presented, assessed, and criticisms met. Arguments for the premisses of the key argument elaborated. §4. Arguments from historical requirements on just wars, the important argument from convergence, and environmental arguments. Arguments from just war requirements: discrimination, proportionality, prospect of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral positions. Arguments from environmental principles. §5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: arguments to its immorality. Deterrence seen as the only practical way to satisfy major desiderata: prevention of war and maintenance of prudential values. Pure deterrence not the policy. Deterrence as practiced has increased the probability of nuclear war. The first argument to immorality of deterrence, from the plausibility of probability of immorality. Further arguments through deontic connecting principles: the probability linkage. Refuting the counterargument from the success of deterrence. The way the onus of 1 2 5 11 14 17 �Page No proof falls on deterrence policy, which cannot meet evidential require­ ments. The second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious preparation for nuclear war. The general form of connecting principles; separating out those that are correct. The third connecting principle: the wrongness of serious threats of nuclear devastation. Criticism of this principle leads to further connecting principles, through intention and through commitment. Meeting counterarguments from utilitarianism. Applying the connecting principles to argue to the immorality of deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti-utilitarian versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with deterrence. §6. Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from national dangers to nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas. The arguments from nuclear blackmail and foreign domination, and from risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial argument from basic rights and fundamental values. The argument from isolated people to superstate immorality. The superstate theme, and reasons for its appeal. The much less persuasive dependent state theme. Challenging the assumptions of the underlying relatiatory model. §7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas - for aligned states and their supporters. Character of the nuclear fix. Subsidiary dilemmas: national security vs freedom and democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features of deontic dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-best escape from the nuclear fix. The nuclear fix a fix of states' own making. Interconnections between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangements. §8. Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: initial political fall-out from the ethical results. The inevitability of limitations on national sovereignty. Interstate and extrastate approaches. The Way Up and the Way Down of extrastate approaches. Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case against it. Failure of international agreements, especially on human rights and genocide. Exclusion of nuclear deterrence under the Genocide Convention. Need for the reexamination of current political arrangements imposed by the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated political arrange­ ments revealed by nuclear problems. Further arguments from the nuclear fix for political reassessment. The weak link: the sovereign nation­ state. Forfeiture of political obligation by many states. Alternative political arrangements vs nuclear time horizons. The multi-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main political means lie outside state governmental apparatus. Laying the spectre of ideological domination. Social restructuring and devolution of power. Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty go. Dissolving the arguments from national dangers. State resistance to loss of power. Further lines of organised action against nuclear states. Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell and Anders. Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption. Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro­ pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence. ii 37 43 49 �Page No Appendix 2: On matters of collective and individual responsibility and on regional strategies. Individual and state responsibility. Opt-out positions, and arguments to them. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group cooperation. Arguments to direct obligations of individuals to the nuclear dissociation. Limitations of rival political obligations. Different policy reorganisation for different regions. Shallower and deeper goals. The important opportunity for deeper reorganisation afforded by nuclear dilemmas. Obligations of those in the Antipodes: what is required, and justified. Social and economic reorganisation in the Antipodes, and reducing costs involved. Blockages to social and political adjustment. iii 73 ��ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Large-scale nuclear wars raise ethical questions not generated, either at or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military encounters.This is at all bottom because of their projected effects, which are often to said differ so those of even the largest conventional wars (the World Wars) as to yield a from difference in kind of war. involve, and threatened Certainly massive exchanges such as nuclear exchanges such as nuclear deterrence presupposes, are neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of Much wars just wars. new philosophical reflection and investigation is required, even if rather well-tested and old-fashioned moral principles will serve as initial ethical base. Although nuclear wars are, thus nonexistent objects, nuclear wars (extrapolated from a very limited varieties. In far, only a decidedly class menacing of proper have several distinctive properties nuclear experience^) and come in several particular, confined or limited nuclear wars, of which tactical or strategic are subvarieties, contrast with Idrge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars) 1. The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forcefully: 'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could imagine: we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God's] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position, it differs significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with removal of the religious backdrop and its the associated unity-of-evil theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- Firstly, peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with it: religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there implied. Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to give it, e.g. sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence, pornography can operate without it, etc. It is a serious mistake to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms of violence) along with war as if they stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. Note that referencing, where not through an author's name, is by way of acronym explained in the references at the end. 2. an The isolated, and unnecessary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will be very different and very much more horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortably adjacent possible worlds, ought therefore to be confined to merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to actuality. �2 A large-scale nuclear which need not however be unlimited 3. explosion war it is of large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region; a function of two main parameters: distribution. war strategic) nuclear of quantities war a Such quantity markedly differs which limited, is where and explosives, (megatonnage a from targets to are and explosive) limited assumption, by the of the involves (tactical much or smaller characteristically circumscribed, for instance confined in principle to military installations in a given region. Though focus the in what follows is upon LSN wars and their prevention, limited nuclear wars are by no a separate wars to LSN wars are high (given usual reasonable assumptions second strike, since issue, a is a prerequisite, and the probabilities of escalation of such arsenal nuclear means etc.).^ Because of these of follow-up or connections, much of the case made against LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as will become evident. §1. How nuclear wars resulting differ from other wars wars: and party and limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war. of war that has dominated much thinking, including strategic two states (or thinking, the A model is the several person) game or, as a complication of that, the clan or tribe battle3. A picture of war thus on requirements for legitimate and just wars, which technological reflection advances have traditional now theory rendered of war, emerged, inappropriate hardly and especially sometimes surprisingly, as a result inapplicable. of The made no allowance for such 3. Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially the type of strike involved. Though the sequence is important for the moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it in no way alters the immorality of LSN wars, as will emerge. 4. 'The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no limits' (PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars: that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LSN war by its probability given a limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and present communication arrangements, the idea of a highly circumscribed purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European "theatre", is really a myth. 5. There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of prowess) in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological wars. Nuclear wars may be not just unsporting, in that no notice is given, etc., they are also remote and impersonal, and differently unjust, in a much deeper way. �3 phenomena as mass bombing of large cities, such as with Dresden and nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass And Tokyo. occurred bombing, adds further new dimensions. Yet it is important for the argument anchors, retain historical were accounted unjust war is essentially a matter of states and their control: the Oxford English Dictionary account, war is 'hostile contention armed protagonists, antagonists or players; of contention or combat; exchange is the actual experience. but other are not literal, but transferred, metaphoric, etc.8 'war' means and or wrong. to elaborate by means of forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state' for control of the state?; noun linkages to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and of when, and why, wars and military actions Firstly, to always a function of senses of the States are the forces comprising armed soldiers are the and combat or forceful and typically violent Thus wars are external or internal states or their rule. (civil), Thus too wars have grown in quantity and frequency as states have expanded, wars have changed as states have transformed, and nuclear war has emerged 'with nuclear states. theoretical way then to eliminate wars is to remove states: An obvious in short, wars are 6. There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term 'war', which was derived from a term meaning 'confusion'. In particular, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had in living use any word properly meaning 'war'': Oxford English Dictionary (OED) on war. 7. But of course there can be something quite analogous to war waged between clans, gangs, multinational firms, even against Nature, and still more metaphorically against poverty, etc. To this extent, a strict definition of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structures the argument will direct us to, has to extend beyond just the break-down of nation-states . 8. Into this category (since Nature is no nation) falls the ubiquitous and unwarranted war against Nature of modern times, which features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism. As could have been guessed, someone it was James - suggested channelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature. James proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a war against Nature (see Wasserstrom, p.12). What it boiled down to, however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil, especially discipline, but also service, devotion, physical fitness, constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical substitute for wars proper (in American ecotopian literature) is through war games and other games of competitive cast. Again specious arguments enter for those bringing out the "best" in human males, etc. �4 an outcome of political and associated technological structure, and are by structure. the altering state arrangements, arrangements. be to can thus be seen as a structural problem of War from along defective) political organisation of states; they are a helps these This semantically based picture situational fix, a structural malformation. war with (otherwise removed arise Wars of explain why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence argument devolves into an war-makers, against against In states. the fact (self-legitimised) on and war-declarers traditional theory, wars were the restricted to external wars, which were construed as the right or states of rulers (princes) to conduct for certain political purposes; their removed the argument was that private persons with grievances had access to the courts^, while states did not (wars were, so to speak, the international analogue of the law courts). But this is itself a very statist conception of the legitimate place of wars; the semantics is not so restrictive and permits internal wars within states, for example to end wars, injustice, etc. Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention a basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or sets (axes) of states, two-player external wars, games, competitive could be won, attentuated form for some "victors") the World Wars. agglomerations surrounding traditionally firstly for massive armed like wars, such exchanges as there may well be no winning in areas Northern the of very hemisphere countryside. Thus, and the secondly, for waste laying the point of of substantially substantially obliterated^, (exercised and most as nothing all worse off than at the outset of the "play". are huge war seen, to settle serious interstate disputes, is removed: another point of difference, the phenomenon of wars that prepared that That assumption still held good (though in With LSN wars it no longer holds; is settled with main protagonists players It was assumed An LSN war could involve destruction of all main Western metropolitan strategy. 9. to main Hence elaborately for, etc.), but which can never be pointfully fought; Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes, p.776, top). The argument presupposes rather a lot, including a neat public/private distinction. Put Aquinas's way, it looks as if it could be readily transferred into an argument for international government, or at least effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be one state! �5 hence the inevitable emphasis on pure deterrence. and the other elements of gamesmenship had a role in earlier wars, but it was not pure deterrence. military to Certainly, deterrence, bluff, Lastly, traditional wars could be confined in targets and military principle This feature is fundamental as exchanges. for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross regards just wars; ways to The special effects of uninvolved parties sacrifice any pretension to morality. nuclear explosives, especially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear cannot wars be legitimately horrifying detail in popular sources ozone destruction, These confined. shockwaves, such effects gigantic fumigations and become entirely rapid speed include pulses, fireball or firestorm etc., etc. As a result of these of exchange, LSN wars will resemble the recent tendency submerged in the context of war. of moral and expediency. considerations to It is particularly important in the case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the ancient morality radioactivity, more than they resemble older-style wars. The moral situation: §2. the Schell) electromagnetic devastation, rogue bacteria and viruses, ... compounded as special effects (presented in distinction between What is done in war, especially for local or national advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the 10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as involving annihilation or extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while not being entirely annihilated oneself: the side that somehow "survives" sufficiently to rebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely tenuous sense of winning, which in any case neglects the medical evidence concerning nuclear destruction. Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective medical intervention ... (PL, p.313). Moreover any such phoenix war is radically unjust, because of violation of the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons developed in the text. Unfortunately as documented in Scheer, significant officials who are responsible for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived by Americans and that a global nuclear war can actually be "won"! They rely, among other things, on an incredibly low, and unacceptable, redefinition of "winning". 11. In practice they often were not,they drained limited economies, they layed waste countryside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or chemical warfare or modern mining), impoverishing inhabitants, etc. �6 latter is determined using the codes and conventions Much not to be done in war i^ done, for one (alleged) advantage or ought that otherwise^. or war, of another, despite modern military codes and conventions and the like. we not live go a rather barbarous age: in unremarked, the if Militarily the horrors of the twentieth century will history gets written that (accurately) is. Furthermore military thinking and strategic planning tend (as Nagel explains) to induce a certain moral numbing, so that a range as such wiping rural populations, become real possibilities, included in out calculations. consequentialist characteristically based on is that strategic Each side in a military encounter reasont The expediency only disadvantages, its own gains and own its planning advantages is and losses as a result of alternative possible it ought, morally, to consider those of the other side(s) as moves: actions, excluded morally of well. In this way strategic planning displaces morality. Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted way, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of etc.). Such the classical through "bald an incremental limit) escalation distinct argument terms. from an that the It would And (but The externally will be broken by each player in turn for advantage. an extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed. the argument man" fallacy *3), that there can be no limit. assumption is that any merely selected limit (as enforced force, is the so-called "classic" view of Clausewicz, oft repeated. Clausewicz tries to argue, really this Thus too follow from idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in But it is not, though breaking off in the heat of war, or the of a supposedly limited nuclear exchange, may be singularly improbable. confusion Nuclear 12. For as Nagel contends (early on), there are moral restrictions on the conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither arbitrary nor merely conventional, nor a matter of usefulness. These themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausewicz - a theory outlined in Walzer. 13. As one less hair doos not, at any stage, distinguish a bald man from a hirsute man, there are, starting from the hirsute end, no bald men. The progressive escalation argument concerning war is an incremental argument like the technical Sorites syllogisms, formalising the type of fallacious argument which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. The fallacious escalation argument is part of the so-called "logic of war", for more on which see the conclusion of Appendix 1. �7 wars thus appear decidedly Clausewiczian. the for players Still the argument inconclusive; is can choose, at least in smaller calmer wars, not to escalate, and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types of weapons, etc.^ A state engaged in war seldom sees itself as entirely bound by of morality: it is taken to be mere prudence on the part of those attacked to take account of the no-immoral-holds-barred approach they from the other side. especially constraints the question not only as to may encounter, well So each group potentially engaged in war faces ought it what do to in permissible morally situations, but also both what it ought really do, and what it can morally do in the morally flawed situations it finds itself. not, But the last question does in that case, reduce to one of expediency. There is no question, then, of morality giving or having even expediency, For it is not as if shaky considerations of involves. give bound are morality theoretical fact is that miraculously deliver us from value the theory. to Expediency fact, but that local values - of self, family, clan, class, or nation - are considerations. proper characterisation, a therefore, much universalizable more universal fairness, equitability and principles, justice. distribution value of and, And morality thereby imposes, through principles. intersubstitutivity certain requirements of general Expediency yields an unfair, inequitable value system, one that subscribers would not adhere to if differently placed \ deep theoretical unsatisfactoriness of expediency, and associated strategic thinking, also derives from this failure evaluations 14. remote By contrast, morality requires, as a matter of its resultant The takes It assumes, or what really count, and override or are to be maximized at the expense of foreign not does simply narrowly-construed local advantage or power as what is valuable. urges, crucial But the morality and* expediency fall within the same, both equally shaky or equally solid, domain of value or to to the firm ground of expediency when the chips are down, since often way enough such moral erosion does not occur in crisis situations. even to circumstances such as the prospect of LSN war extreme under way give to of interreplacement, from the same and results not holding when persons X and Y are interchanged under As Walzer argues, p.24. An historical example is the era of genuinely limited wars in Europe following the barbarism of the Thirty Years war. �8 For expediency does not elude expediency assessments^. it deontic presentation: be presented as through such popular slogans as "local might is right", can or given tight formal characterisation. The will characterisation normally that of utilitarianism, except that utilities are only assigned to, or resemble are biassed in favour of, certain individuals. However, theories of utility not have to be positions of expediency if utility is not locally confined. do Thus utilitarianism proper is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency; meet intersubstitutivity requirements of morality; can it it does not, unlike the methods of war game theory, assign different weights to the individual utility of (certain) Americans, as opposed to Russians, say. are There especially, deontologists regarding war^. which differences, between or justify, ugly strategies and practices as regards to some render to seemed enemy civilians, that deontological principles would not permit. effect and utilitarians serve to further complicate the moral picture In particular, utilitarian approaches have permissible, morally significant however utilitarians this But is would reject the description of practices permitted under their principles as 'ugly'; whereas an to already in aim what follows since partisanship, is to avoid meta-ethical meta-ethical neutrality, though of course not there is a moral partisanship, neutrality. to achieve And morally large area of consensus, or at least moral convergence, from which argument can begin. Virtually all positions agree that obliteration of several major cities in a LSN war would be wrong, indeed morally outrageous. If the there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to feel no qualms when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian ones, simply increase the costs involved, up to loss of whole nations if 15. The severe limitations of those lesser "virtues", nationalism and patriotism, also come from the failure of replacement which excessive applications of nationalism easily engender. Try for example swapping a person from inside the homeland with one from outside as regards treatment. The point of, and reasons for, intersubstitutivity as a requirement of morality, is well explained in Hare, p.78ff. Hare applies the requirement to make a telling case against nationalism (a case which extends to strategic decision-theory). Nationalism, along with fanaticism, is the main cause of war, so Hare contends, p.72. 16. The case against expediency was developed in detail especially the criticism of Thrasymachus in The Republic. 17. Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare the other, in Cohen et al. by Plato; see on �9 then try to work down necessary, until moral repugnance ijs encountered; The again. fact remains however that in the nuclear area things have got substantially abandon tended Strategic thinking, in particular, has out of perspective, morally. to suppress moral considerations (as indeed theories of the state also or do, sometimes flamboyantly, in favour of partisan values). Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that not total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be Consider the rising world empire. be southern (hemisphere) no advantage. one's strongman, SS, who has visions of While the superpowers of the north remain, SS's dream can realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try nuclear to exchange in the North. There be would waters southern to encourage a hardly of US all-out an point then in securing institutional arrangements so that potential SS's do not accumulate much given especially the apparent instability of crucial world arrangements. that is to anticipate: the present point is that (the fact of) moral has and its power, limitations, is an inadequate But consensus constraint without accompanying structural adjustments. national For, typically, differently to impose interest is taken hostages or override morality, even holding civilian populations as of those those of Eastern Europe. things. substitution of justification; fails in The first, expediency classes regimes, But morally national interest can do neither the overriding for morality, of morality, which the second, the alleged moral dominance of important And, killing millions in the national interest*8). unfortunately, these assumptions are not confined to more totalitarian such or irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary ethical considerations (such as those concerning nuclear to is entirely national simply lacks the moral interests, of cases, including, so the argument will go, the case of LSN war. 18. As Schell bluntly puts it, 'What is being claimed is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents in the name of certain beliefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity, since the beliefs may be morally grounded rather than based on national interests. �10 States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis, let it not be that pretended expediency (namely, that of is it a moral basis as distinct from one of There egoism"). "group but moral special no is dispensation for governments. individuals: there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or analysis of obligation. Morality works in the same way for groups as for For example, what ought to be as regards X is (analysed semantically) what would happen as regards X in all ideal worlds; no whether difference is an reasons aside, just behaving as system, group or individual or individual States such as Israel (in its recent invasion organisation. extenuating X immorally of as brigands or mass Certainly there are grounds on which states or their agents conceded, special moral dispensations; been more than that and do not stand up to criticism. cannot furnish two (incompatible) claimed, have but the excuses offered are no A moralities, satisfactory a state theory moral or public one and a private or individual citizen one — state expediency and individual morality because this would lead to violations of substitutivity, neutrality, etc. instance, a state operative X could use state cover morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g. Y are permuted. special are, Lebanon) there is no moral difference. killers: or makes and it to considerations citizen * For Y in by state interests) when X and A group or organisation or person can be derivative damage 19 bound of course by in virtue of role, but these are derivative principles - good for any such institution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency. particular, a survival. In state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even own (at for its Thus it is not entitled to do what both nuclear war and nuclear deterrence require, as will emerge. 19. There are also other arguments against two (or see Routley and Plumwood. multiple) morality lines: �11 §3. The initial argument pacifism yield arguments to the immorality of to the immorality of war. controversial in an area where there is no LSN for But such arguments are be to reason good Arguments wars. controversial. Pacifism can accordingly be set aside as a special case, since the immorality of LSN wars follows. All but pacifist positions concede that war in itself is not a crime. all wars are immoral, though even inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior Among more or less admissible ways of settling political issues between states. wars who Not are the international "tournaments" of aristocratic young men or warriors volunteer as and soldiers action whose not does spill over onto noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, where few or even no combatants were killed in war. conscription, Since the establishment press-gangs and recruitment of such of the largely ceased to take these less offensive forms; induction practices as near-destitute, wars have modern massive wars are far removed from the ideal war-tournament types (which feature now only in ecotopian portrayals, in ways that are increasingly dubious). immoral, sorts Most of wars are because of what is done to the essentially uninvolved, but few to such an extent as LSN wars. The first argument to the immorality of LSN and wars sufficiently of large-scale wars generally, takes the following form: Pl. The (deliberate) killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong. P2. LSN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants. P3. What involves what is wrong is wrong. - (KA) LSN wars are wrong. The particular argument given is just one representative of a set of this type. taken off killing: the on (KA) replaces But the quite 'killing sufficiently evil. creatures'. can Thus a first in mass of noncombatants' by a suitable clause concerning 'huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or involved focus destruction of lifestyle of nonhumans and humans alike that an LSN war will bring is variation arguments Characteristically, in Western culture, it is thought that mass killing of humans is about the worst thing that can happen. be of not directly Other variations will emerge in the discussion (including �that where the bracketed 'deliberate' figures). but The argument is valid, attacked) on the of basis be may attacked (and of its premisses. each has in effect been Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves "what is wrong" is wrong, has been challenged on rather Scholastic grounds. There are, in particular, problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. assisting an injured robbed person is said robbed; but, since the robbing is wrong, "involve" to providing For which instance, that person's assistance being is also wrong. But these problems derive from too slack a notion of involvement; with a tighter account of involvement the problems disappear and P3 stands. As against P2, it may legitimately directed be argued against that military nuclear targets. 20 can wars be encounters But given the character of There is nuclear weapons, LSN wars could in no way be confined to such targets. not merely the likelihood that many missiles explode off target, there are all the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings. fallout down-wind from military people, especially in the case of targets US and For example, the radioactive will affect large concentrations of European targets, and may affect uninvolved countries such as Canada. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal effect)21. to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side if missiles were characteristically reliably on target, and one 20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obligation over entailment" principle, can be removed by a tighter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For details see Routley and Plumwood, where Good Samaritan problems are diagnosed. 21. According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are responsible only for the intended effects or consequences of our freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even if these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended consequences. Unless carefully hedged, the doctrine is pernicious, allowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect, have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! Taking the issues concerning double effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly distinguished acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions. �13 which was intended unfortunately went only off to destroy an underground unmanned course and destroyed a large city, it could be claimed that the (unintended) mass destruction is legitimised under principle. a make Nonetheless effect double the circumstances difference, for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible for firing the missile, since it was not as if they had deliberately aimed at The double effect principle conflates [diminution of] responsibility city. the the the action would be wrong, and the Such claims should be rejected: wrongness not lessened by the given intention. could silo missile assigned for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act. As against Pl, and as regards the middle term of argued that there is an important equivocation. While it will the bracketed term, 'deliberate'. killing and Pl P2, may it be The equivocation is induced by conceded be that deliberate of genuine innocents is impermissible, two challenges will be made. It will be charged firstly that noncombatants, insofar as they are distinguishable, are no means all innocent, many being directly involved in military effort, by whether just as taxpayers or as suppliers of military, e.g. farmers or goods or services bootmakers or entertainers. as innocent. The second defensible — version of premiss P2. and for other reasons, it properly point concerns a much narrower - and less Because P2 so amended is is best to leave out the less defensible, "modifier" 'deliberate'. What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is not a mixture that with the motives of the perpetrators. of require the qualification 'deliberate' or done, So 'deliberate' gets left out, equivocation is avoided, P2 stands, and so does Pl. not the Secondly, it will be contended that LSN wars do not involve the deliberate killing of those excluded by used For Pl does 'intentional' or the like.22 Admittedly also 'noncombatant' is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and there is noserious people who are is, moreover, problem in marking out a class of notdirectly involved in the command and action no need to adopt the practice, deriving stating an initialversion of Pl in terms of innocents - 22. clear noncombatants, at chains. There from Catholicism, of least as problematic Despite Nagel's suggestion that it does (p.158). The suggestion depends upon similar mistaken assimilations, of act with intention, and wrongness with responsibility, to those of the double effect doctrine. �14 a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then endeavouring to make the difficult transition to noncombatants. Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met, are arguments the for there premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pl they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort and tend will For example, one argument for vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory. Pl, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one, (to seriously understate point) the doing to that fails to treat them with the so minimal respect owed to them as persons 2 3. §4. Arguments from historical requirements on just argument from convergence, and environmental arguments. wars, The conclusion that LSN wars cannot be justly waged - and accordingly are unjustified something dreamed up by contemporary "free-enterprise" capitalist state (and opponents communist important the of is America inspired, merely not or the of The etc). same conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked out in medieval times, for just wars. One of the requirements gives but a variant on the first argument (KA). 2** For a necessary condition for fighting a war justly was that it not be the case that large numbers of [innocent] noncombatants are bound killed (cf. to be Barnes, p.775). A just war requires just means, that the war should be means, fought by morally which implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate killing of noncombatants. The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle legitimate of discrimination (between combatants and others) which 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of p.312) 25 . civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate this requirement 2 6. 23. Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from the military angle in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants. One favored argument is a variation on the Bald Man: there is no clear line between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g. in carrying or using arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of their harmfulness, the threat they offer. See also PL, p.312, where a simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied. 24. Note that throughout, the text adopts the OED equations, reflecting common usage, of just with morally right or correct, and unjust with morally �15 Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of being that of net evil to net good: proportion proportionality , 'the damage to be inflicted and costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected up arms' (PL, requirement: the damage and costs, to goods moral proportionality requirement is of the achieved nationally not that in doctrine through war. "improvement" are which way. overall consequences of war conditions way bad, (Barnes, p.782). 'a nation wages war justly the than Similarly only if the for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent chance of being better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). no and According to the first, 'X wages war abstaining from war' improvement "puts wrongs to rights": are Entangled with the "ameliorative" of confined, justly upon Y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less the taking by p.312).2? It is not difficult to see that LSN wars violate this disproportionate criterion the satisfy LSN wars can in these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such wars reveal. Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are also wars, for example that of infringed reasonable expectation of success. by LSN It seems that there can be no reasonable expectation of state success in an LSN war - whatever the very differently, exchanges. limited prospects of success for some whatever the prospects of success in What small strictly state limited elite, or nuclear is less clearcut is the question of whether LSN wars conflict with the requirements of just cause or due fault, and of right intention. For 25. The principle can be argued to in various ways. One (by no means conclusive) way is Nagel's way, from the requirements of directness and relevance in combat, the underlying (controversial) principle being that, 'whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15). 26. The situation with strictly limited nuclear wars where the targets are essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "indirectly",would be different. Such wars are not however excused by the pernicious doctrine of double effect. For such wars remain unjust on several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. on life systems, etc. As Zuckermann says, 'It is still inevitable that were military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of nuclear attack, millions, even tens of millions of civilians would be killed ...' (quoted in Thompson and Smith, p.14, where the italics are added). 27. This is not to be confused with what is very different, the vicious ancient doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest official policy of flexible response, adjusted to the level of attack. �16 this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are seen as basic human rights and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can While the mainstream position be ideologically justified. theory medieval opposed to ideologically justified wars and "humanitarian" wars, these were was not definitively excluded by the traditional theory (cf. is of merit, little when (and issues will arise again subsequently). historical requirements are arguments not do simply not There in puzzling over dubiously effective requirements, however, when so many are decisive against LSN wars sensitive Barnes, p.778). commit arguments any from matters the underlying Finally, these arguments from prescriptive fallacy; historical authority for to the moral conclusions, but use also premisses to the effect that the requirements imposed, and sometimes applied, were justified. As they are. In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the moral rightness justness of wars, the just war theory and a rival pacifist or strand, prominent in early Christianity, but largely submerged from Augustine on contemporary until times. Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and This is the beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars: that is duly expediency such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once removed (and even, very frequently, when it is not). however you look at it morally. consensus violence^^. involve argument; it The argument is not proceeds They are morally wrong the same as the weaker from similar results from the full sweep of genuinely ethical positions, not from massive agreement of opinion. The detailed convergence argument is an exhaustive case by case each type of moral theory. Fortunately details can be deontological and contractual theories lead back to requirements 28. one, from shortcut. For for just war These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear. For the aim of just war theory is not 'to legitimize war but to prevent it. The presumption is against the use of force' (PL, p.312). And most types of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction between the alternatives. In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may be condemned 'the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims' (PL, p.311). Under recent international law, defence, narrowly construed, is the only legitimate basis for war; Roman law was only slightly more generous, in allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780). �17 which, it has already been shown, LSN wars violate. war arrived sometimes were defended through principles of such moral or at In fact conditions for just work theories, so that a good deal of the requisite argumentative been The latter point holds also as regards utilitarianism, where it has done. in effect been shown that whatever brand of utilitarianism is maximisation utility already has is finally LSN accomplished, adopted, wars however excluded are utilitarian grounds.The reason for such convergence is not far to seek; LSN such massive infliction of pain and colossal removal of pleasure, involve wars on that this dominates in assessments however they are accomplished in utilitarian Thus any genuine alternative to LSN war is better30. fashion. The arguments so moral overwhelming far case outlined against principles are derivable some from war worse substantially are of the theories just considered). These the obligation to maintain to accountable, condition than the these we violate would earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems: we exhaust not (again LSN principles include environmental ones, such as: generations, to whom do wars For there are other significant wars. such moral principles which the waging of an LSN against the the responsibility to future the world it". Such "pass "received on" not in conservative bound principles - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are to be violated in the event of an LSN war. §5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: support nuclear arguments to its immorality. Those arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars, engagement done is, it is claimed, quite different from is most important precisely in preventing LSN in such war: is continued, deterrence is the only practical desiderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. way indeed wars from ever occurring, as well as in maintaining other fundamental Western values. it by What is being pointing out that there is no actual engagement in any such wars. deterrence who Indeed, of obtaining both Similar arguments are But compare Hardin. 29. For details see, e.g., Lackey, especially MM. 30. An argument of this sort is developed in more detail, complete generality, in Goodin, especially 'Disarmament'. though not in �18 advanced for all the various guises that deterrence is presented in: mutually assured destruction as formerly, flexible response as latterly, or otherwise. Such claims as to the roles and dubious, several for reasons. objectives of If it were, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. superiority. than this, and sometimes goal. In fact there has renewed a even military drive for Pure deterrence can account neither for actual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Western military strategy32. process decidedly A first reason is that there is much evidence, despite pronouncements, that deterrence is not the - the only - been a quest for more are deterrence Nor has deterrence set in motion the of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels appropriate f<?r deterrence. On the contrary, under "its" impulse there has been almost unlimited acceleration in building arms (to paraphrase PL p.318). Another major reason for serious doubt about what sold 31. is being under "deterrence" labels concerns the probability factor: marketed and deterrence has It is important to observe that the discussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies to all forms of response likely to engender LSN war. This includes "flexible response", since the likely further development is massive retaliation to an initial Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for this is the extreme vulnerability of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes and to electromagnetic pulses. In the resulting great confusion, escalation appears the likely outcome. In any case, flexible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its range and is ultimately backed by it. It is also important to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) attack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nuclear power. It is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does. 32. As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive for superiority (often represented as "negotiating" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular intervention in other nations; there have been repeated US threats to use nuclear weapons, especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war; and in official military strategy no sharp line has been drawn between conventional and nuclear weapons: on these and other related points see further Lackey MM, p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed further, to the alarming conclusion that deterrence is largely a front, which plays only a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among further evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrence policy would repeatedly emphasize its strength (even when it lacks strength), whereas the US government often parades its vulnerability and weakness in public. For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff. �19 of increased the probability type arms-race that war. LSN deterrence precisely, More of the is being practised, which involves full-scale preparation for total nuclear war, has prepared the conditions for nuclear war to occur, and has to that extent reasons also, connected with pure the last 30 years. deterrence with and (its war" "cold the probability of a LSN war has increased considerably in the setting), original For other least enhanced its prospects of occurring. at The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to maintain credibility overridden or with "sacrificed a for etc. many there analysts century, i.e think before 2000. real The situation has is a high There are several are interests being the dangerous and risky military objectives! state of military readiness; sober whose population now where reached been probability of an LSN war this routes to a such probability assignment.33 It would only require one incident with a 20% chance of leading to an escalating war every 8 years between 1960 and 2000. alerts, Cuban missile crisis, carry a considerably higher chance been have lucky already. In of nuclear For markedly. the years ahead it appears likely that the the danger supplicant nations resources declines. and the worsens and the extent The danger is enhanced by connected increasing chance of the lot. 33. Cox). easily as the plight extractable continuation of of crucial the arms of nuclear accident and human or technical error, none of them negligible factors as (cf. increase zones separating the superstates are increasing in size and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and reveals the exchange. number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war will race, on side alone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes, as with the American We Full past experience copiously Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are Another route to a more than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' assessments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only "nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in recent years. American officials have themselves admitted that the policies of realising the strategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear war (Ball, p.128). �20 For better contentious (though not always for good reasons). way no seems worse, or there to make such an overall probability argument particularly tight; and there are plausible arguments, from the complexity of the data concerned and the contingency of the future, that it cannot be made tight. It is bad enough however that it is decidedly plausible that it that probable LSN an war distribution principles) that it probable that century. And that is enough grossly a is immoral to decidedly morally on moral grounds, to change deterrence as policy is immoral. that plausible it highly is sequence of events will be perpetrated this evasive warrant morally to take action to avert the outcome. deterrence highly For then it follows (by occur this century. will is action. ought We That in turn implies taking steps, presently practised. Thus present That is but the first of several ways we shall arrive at that damaging conclusion for present super-state deterrence policies. The plausibility of claims as to the high or increasing probability of war has of course been disputed. * The main counterargument runs as follows: Nuclear war is unlikely, because the consequences are too horrifying. The underlying assumption is that wars and the like, with are LSN improbable. assumption. Unfortunately however horrifying outcomes, much available evidence counters this More than enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges horrifying wars, or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper). What is less assailable than the high probability claim, what the certainly have already got into since LSN thereby perhaps helping to bring it about, in the sense war, the probability. immoral of raising The more detailed underlying arguments, then,to the immorality of nuclear deterrence proceed by LSN an deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for situation, against evidence seems to support, is that there is a non-negligible probability of an Thereby, through deterrence, we LSN war. and way of principles mapping war into arguments against deterrence of LSN war might appropriately be called deontic connecting principles moral arguments Such principles The first of these principles takes the following preliminary form: Cl. should If it is wrong that X should occur, then not only be probable is it wrong that it that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly �21 increase the probability that X occur. Thus, for example, it since wrong is to kill large a noncombatant population in LSN war (by §4) it is also wrong to put the population at risk and wrong to increase the chance that the hostage population is wiped out, which both of For similar reasons a superstate is not morally nuclear deterrence does. entitled to impose nuclear risks upon uninvolved noncombatants, especially those of third party nonaligned states. most Like situations. defeat by example, substantive moral Unless counterexamples, X that in and of accordingly, Cl encounters to into runs require dilemma For complication. apparent trouble where clash of order to that the passenger he plane is flying sure that the troubled aircraft does not hit city make Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of where deterrence, Consider for example the to avoid a greater evil. occurs apartment buildings 3**. nuclear Cl dilemmas are duly allowed for, Cl appears liable to pilot who increases the probability crashes, ethics, in Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the principles occurs. probability part second the principles (though there explains) wrongness of a practice is not is a offset or principles, as §6 of clash removed by its role in avoiding greater evil. It can be argued that it is: argument the from previous argument deserves little perhaps from more such is part of success credence the deterrence. than the of the popular However this inductive driver's racing world As Barnett argues, argument, 'the happy accident has survived the first thirty-five years of the nuclear era is unimpressive evidence that we can avoid nuclear war 34. point a similar time base, that because he hasn't had a fatal crash yet (despite some close calls), he won't. that of the in the coming era, ...' This dilemma example was supplied by D. Johnston. There are more difficult putative counterexamples. For example, in inciting people to civil disobedience, the risk of state violence in retaliation is increased. Thus, to take C. Pigden's example, in encouraging disobedience, Gandhi increased the probability of wrongdoing by the British Raj. But surely Gandhi, unlike the Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi did not directly increase the probability of violence. But spelling out what 'directly' means - in terms of short causal chains over which responsibility can be distributed - is not only problematic but leads on to other connecting principles. �22 (p.100). He offers familiar reasons such as the changing power increase in Russian the strength, rise the relations, of other nuclear powers, etc. (cf. similarly Cox). There are, accordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that Deterrence will not continue to work, DI. and, more important for the present argument, that Deterrence does increase the probability of LSN war. D2. The themes are of course interrelated, and the reasons for them (which are again persuasive but inconclusive) can be taken together: some respects) weaker D2 - the probability factor. proliferation, the but the focus is on the (in An initial of lesser nuclear powers. emergence reason concerns As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagration, and so enhanced prospect it.3$ Some analysts consider that a very likely route to LSN war is the initial use of nuclear weapons by confrontation a lesser state. Moreover scarcity the growing and weapon systems, more or terror situations, deterrence power involves 36, being maintained: balance of have an exceedingly bad historical track record. increasing as the race proceeds. of With so many more Arms races, and interwoven There is substantial inductive evidence that present costs widely distributed, the probability of war through accident or error is increased. power resource A second group of reasons concerns the of cheaper supplies, etc. nuclear arms race which deterrence, as practised, is tied to. weapons for opportunities to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political instability, relating to third world economic decline, and of lead escalating eventually to races, arms war, with such as probability Next, deterrence depends on a certain balance if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail. A related reason for supposing that deterrence practice increases the 35. It can be theoretically argued that the fewer the nations nuclear weapons, the less the chance of nuclear war: cf. p.230n. 36. The standard argument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the probability of war,would be decidedly better if the arms race were abandoned, and weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for deterrence. Of course such a probability-well assumption is only one of several things required if deterrence is to be justified. armed with Lackey, MM, �23 probability of war concerns the continuing shifts in US policy, especially the renewed quest for superiority which is increasing the incentive of both sides to resort to nuclear war, the USSR to avoid being of advantage the overwhelmed, USA to take superiority achieved.3? Recent dangerous shifts in US policy the towards war fighting are in part induced by a much increased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrence (since military targets can be selected for strike and cities to some extent removed as thereby also weakens against case the resort to leaders, and even some nuclear shared understanding, mutual principles, and cooperation Finally, level judgement among information of and important) of soundness transmission war. nuclear deterrence requires a certain (admittedly rather minimal, yet of hostages), between It is not just that the increasing numbers of operators super-states. in a position to launch nuclear weapons must remain of "sound mind" and not, for through on delusions of one sort or another. follow instance, deterrence depends upon judgements seriously mistaken: 'each is regarding other the It is also that which side, side's is to the other' (PL, p.313). threat we But think'.38 about what the other considerable, and perhaps catastrophic, margin of evidence, that one perception of what is possible result As side thinks side error. Not thinks, there only not can be a is there side (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) rational, as regards limited nuclear war, of a first strike countered by massive retaliation; must now be severe doubts effectively. "convincing" There is a grain of truth in the claim that 'deterrence is primarily about what the other what be at the mercy of the other's perception of what strategy is "rational", what kind of damage is "unacceptable", how one may as to whether rational principles are with the but there operating to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous 37. The point is discussed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for superiority is documented. The vicissitudes of US "defence" policy - not to say its shiftiness and occasional incoherence (as in strategic forward defence) - have confused many of its supporters even. Perhaps there is some advantage in the very incomplete and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies: we don't see, with alarm, their incoherence and irrationality. 38. Pym, quoted in Thompson, p.19. Yet a fundamental problem Russia and the West face, it is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understand one another but that 'there is a lack of a wish to understand'. This casts into doubt the psychological basis of nuclear deterrence. �idea (already alluded to, as held in high places of power in USA and in UK) that LSN war can be survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won. The supporter of deterrence connecting such principles has not defeat to only arguments Cl, but, more difficult, to field a convincing as For the onus of proof lies in showing that the costly rival case. deterrence is justified. through practice of But far from the fairly decisive case that is required (to contrast with the argument through Cl), feeble a only through case the questionable obverse of Cl, Clt. If X is wrong then it is right to reduce the probability of X, For it has to be shown that appears open. * deterrence (substantially) reduces the probability of LSN war, and strictly (this indicates part of the trouble with Clt) that * deterrence does this better (more morally) than available options. The latter uniqueness condition certainly fails, so it will be argued. reasons already given, does the probability claim. up the very conditions probability of such for a LSN an war, it So, for When nuclear deterrence sets can hardly reduced have the war, especially over the situation a mere 25 years ago when such an LSN war was not technically possible. More generally, in showing that nuclear deterrence is justified, it is refute the theme that deterrence is wrong. enough to out that deterrence is permissible, or alright. alternative permissible courses action of deterrence, which appear more morally satisfactory. uniqueness condition has to be established; to be not merely alright, but right. But It is not enough to make For there certainly seem to without not be the costs or problems of To surpass these options, a nuclear deterrence has to be shown establishing such a claim, to fear or acceptable evidential standards, is virtually impossible.39 Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by threats including fright OED)**°. (cf. For most people, portraying the horror of LSN wars would serve adequately enough from 39. LSN wars, without all the enormous expense, trouble vivid scenarios to deter them and wastage of An analogous point will appear when it is asked whether deterrence is the way out of the nuclear fix, the thing to persist with in the circumstances. Given that there are apparently superior, less dangerous procedures, the answer has to be, No. �25 preparing to engage in them. deterrence And deterrence by such means (which in any case depends upon) is of course not immoral. military (Schell was not immoral in publishing his graphic descriptions of the nuclear destruction of New York.) But though deterrence per se is permissible, nuclear deterrence, that is deterrence by complete preparation for the object to be prevented, is not, where this object, a war, itself is not permissible. LSN The argument for this is through the principle If X is wrong then complete preparation for (carrying out) X is wrong. C2. Hence since preparation, LSN wars nuclear are wrong and nuclear deterrence deterrence of LSN wars is wrong. claimed that preparing for X is just as bad as doing X: wrong and Z (much) worse than Y. complete It is not however being Y and may Z both What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil In 1945 there would have been little doubt that LSN war was wrong. implies complete preparation be 41 for Among the three types of crime specified in Article 6 of the Charter for the International Military Tribunals (which tried the major war criminals at Nuremburg) were Crimes against peace: namely planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the following (cited in Kuper, p.21; italics added). But after many years of nuclear deterrence, the become increasingly liable to question. wrongness implied in C2 has However the doubts mainly come from 40. Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity, deception, misinformation, that is elements of what are, for the most part, morally undesirable traits. 41. Nor are ordered because wrong, equally degrees of wrongness required: wrongs can simply be partially as regards relative worseness. The point requires some labouring it has been quite erroneously assumed that if Y and Z are both categorically or absolutely, then they must be equally "wrong" or evil. Thus, e.g. Williams: there is no moral difference between running a deterrent strategy on the one hand, and intentionally - indeed wantonly - starting a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil as the second. This is because both are held to be absolutely forbidden. Not at all. The arguments from "Y and Z are both absolutely forbidden" to "So Y is as totally evil as Z" and to "Therefore Y and Z do not differ morally" are both entirely without validity. Compare: 2 is a number, and 3 is a number; so 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numerically from 3! �26 assuming that complete preparation includes less than it needs to or does. Complete preparation for something, such as several other LSN war, already writes in In particular, it presupposes the preparation is not features. half-hearted but is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pretence. Observe that mere pretence, or other more psychological ploys, cannot substitute for complete preparation in nuclear deterrence. too sophisticated bluff for alone to there succeed: preparation for war accompanying the threats involved in the other has is now be serious to deterrence. But, on complete preparation does not imply that what is prepared for hand, will be attempted other than conditonally: imply attempted X. complete preparation for X does not It does however involve a conditional undertaking to proceed with what is prepared whether intelligence Military under for certain Complete conditions. preparation, for a wedding or murder or whatever, would be pointless otherwise, so a (proclaimed) commitment to proceed under given circumstances can for be taken of connecting granted. Principle C2 A principles. is part way not the in line a series principle of the same sort that is higher in the series is that if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong connecting X with attempted X: perhaps down as bad), whether X succeeds or not. But the series ends; off well before the lower limits of intensionality, contrary to various religious positions. then the contemplation consideration of of it cuts claims of For example, it does not follow that if X is wrong X is wrong carrying out X is wrong. or that mere non-action-oriented The point applies equally to sexual fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear nightmares. nothing the (though In particular, there is wrong with contemplating nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable, and in some senses are all too thinkable. Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles appeal is that each commonly involves it connects with. decidedly increased probability of the wrongdoing or outcome Accompanying the increased probability are certain reprehensible attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves; not those of mere passive contemplation*^. However all the sets of these are connecting �27 principles except Cl hold, where they do, even when the probability of invoked wrongdoing eventuating is not increased. One reason for this is that the means to reprehensible ends may be inefficacious, for instance intending to do chosen someone harm using witchcraft. The increased probability evil an of outcome simply makes things worse. announcement Nuclear deterrence involves not only war preparation, but this threats by accompanied and a threatening posture. For some party, the if potential enemy, has to be suitably frightened or moved, of deterrence succeed: the threat must be recognised as such and be credible. nuclear deterrence yields a further connecting principle: is to This aspect of If X is wrong then serious threatening of X under given conditions is also C3. or, in brief, If X is wrong then conditional threatening of X is wrong. wrong; The remaining connecting conditions invoked all take this general form CG. If X is wrong so is a conditional requires further some explanation. intension to is some intensional functor, threatening from Apart intentions that). C to 'the the most is the not are impossible or even remote or improbable: claim in what (specifically those involving commitment) for follows certain is that sorts there of discussed an conditions the conditions typically concern those specifying a nuclear strike by a potential fundamental credible functor: To remove complication it can be assumed henceforth that the involved which it is obligatory in propositional rather than event style: (or form a e.g. themselves, conditional intensions are conditional obligations where obligation - A conditional intension is a judgement of the form, ^(X if C), where of'.**3 X do enemy. The are intensional functors threatening, intending, and which CG holds, and that these versions suffice to demonstrate of Naturally again many the immorality 42. There is plenty of scope for further elaboration here. Passive spectatorship of evil events where one is in an appropriate position to make a difference is quite another thing, from contemplation of other worlds where evil occurs. 43. The conditional intension, ^(X if C), which is an intension, should not be confused with the provisional form, if C then^X, which is not. The Americans are threatening the Russians with retaliatory action if they strike: it is not that if the Russians strike the Americans will threaten them with retaliatory action. Such confusion has arisen because of the problems of formalising conditional obligation given usual defective theories of conditionality. nuclear deterrence. there are �28 non-action-oriented functors for which versions contemplation, thinking, dreaming, etc. GC of fail, of those e.g. There is also an interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping (for), expecting, the and awaiting like, for which CG is only dubiously correct. Connecting principle C3 evolved from the simpler principle, if X then threatening to do... into X is also wrong, or, as formulated by Ramsay: is wrong to threaten...'**** The reason is that practice (e.g. 'What is wrong putting if wrong is something committing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into threatening to put that into practice, in particular the declared intent to that into practice. beginning as follows: The point can if worlds where alternatively X are happens be put argued semantically, excluded so then are adjacent worlds where X is poised to happen. The complication of the simple form is required for two reasons. only conditionally threatened, i.e. is should certain conditions nuclear war obtain. However the required conditional form can be derived through form, the following argument:- which is perfectly general, X if C. particular, by earlier arguments 44. so also is the simple Observe, furthermore that if something X is if it weren't it wouldn't (The converse route fails (of §§3-4) LSN opposition has struck, or not, and so wrong when it wrong, from substitute for X in the simple form, wrong, it is also wrong under restrictive conditions; have been wrong in the first place. Firstly, threatening X if C. war has. of course.) In is wrong whether the Hence, where X is More generally, to establish CG it is Ramsay's formulation of simplified C3 is considered in Walzer, p.272. It is this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk, into the awkward position he ends in, which as Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move. For in virtue o simplified 03 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten a also in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral non-combatant populations. It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, would be inconsistent. see Simplified principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops: PL p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong. simplified C3 is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to However the moral status of a threat by way of expected utility. This is assess all the objections to expected utility as a test of morality open to mentioned below. �29 enough to establish the simpler If X is wrong so is an intension to do X. CG'. The second complication in C3, modifying the threat to causes threat, Some modification appears required, because it is often trouble. more serious a contended that empty threats or bluff are warranted on occasion even where is wrong, to prevent the occurrence of something worse .**$ And in threatened is what fact one way of trying to vindicate deterrence, as morally permissible, has been by presenting deterrence as involving threats which do not involve any intention at all to proceed to action on plausible threats. it the support removes basis for of simplified C3. sense one that is not a pretence, empty or a bluff, but credible. says which intended, consider a For the challenge immoral grossly where case conduct under certain not and calls for moral double-think. the circumstances* result To bring this an from improbable intricate Either the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Machine circuitry, etc.) or with further choice, or - somehow - not. is Principle C3 is not simplified and unqualified C3. is unconvincing, conditions, accident. is in effect that itis perfectly morally permissible to issue serious threats to undertake out this Hence the shift to serious A serious threat then, in the slightly technical open to thesame challenges as as Insofar threats. Either it is way the outcome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously, in the second case because the intermediate reconsideration makes it plain that the threat nor ought not to have been issued at all, being justifiable on neither moral more "practical" representatives Furthermore, grounds. natures, to the kinds of themselves to be (as Benn explains). insignificant their and may accept moral double attitudes, such as morally assenting to immoral threats, less corrupt agents cannot: moral states while proportion morally it would run counter to their principled agents they are or take For such agents, who may comprise a not of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such as C3 are not in doubt. The argument against nuclear deterrence using C3 is as follows:- Either the 45. For a discussion of threats where the threatener has no intention of carrying out the threat, or incentive to do so, see Schelling, p.35ff. The question of the morality of these threats, where the item threatened is immoral, can be left open. �30 threat involved in deterrence is serious or it is not. is then by C3 deterrence wrong. The sub-argument depends on serious threats is a practical one: not is it inadequate, so deterrence is not maintained. is it then If serious But if it is serious nuclear that deterrence namely, that if the threats were not serious, but merely gave the impression that they would be followed through, then would find out, in one way or another. opposition the could not be endorsed in an open or democratic political A policy of bluff system, for example, gaining some discussion, and so giving the game away to the opposition. without Even in closed non-democratic systems maintaining a such policy weapons, especially during there the down of times would be major difficulties in chains of command involved with nuclear in change governing elites, and the opposition intelligence. But then, since the bluff could be called, deterrence would not have succeeded. There are as likely would information through escape well other arguments that the threats involved must be serious. One is that nuclear deterrence already faces a credibility problem, namely that doubts about the rationality of carrying out the big nuclear threat weaken the credibility essential to its effectiveness. To be effective then it must serious be (cf. Benn). Meeting objections to principle C3 leads on to two further versions of one centred on intention, one on commitment. CG, Principle C3 is intimately linked with, and it sometimes considered but a variant upon, the principle C4. If X is wrong then to conditionally intend to do X [knowing it is wrong] is also wrong. The principles are intimately associated because a threat is, according to dictionaries, etc.'. of 'a declaration of intent to inflict punishment, loss, injury, It is their interconnection which lies at the bottom of which deterrence, intending to go to war. principle, that turn C4 is some paradoxes on the problem of credibly threatening war without Principle 04 is justified through the simplified intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is intending to do wrong unless favourable circumstances for one's principle some an extremely position prevail. Simplified widely assumed moral thesis,*^ perhaps for the excellent reason that it holds analytically. Its elaboration C4 can be used to �31 since proceeding to LSN war when against nuclear deterrence, as follows: argue the enemy duly misbehaves is wrong (by §§3-4), by C4, intending to go to LSN war the enemy duly misbehaves is also wrong. when Nuclear deterrence involves such Hence an intention, all the available evidence shows. deterrence nuclear is wrong. But like virtually every utilitarian themselves, principles utilitarian grounds. deontic principle, principles For it is not difficult to those except from flowing C3 and C4 can be challenged on outline strategic situations where maximum expected utility results from a policy of nuclear deterrence. But on its own this concession casts but little doubt upon C4. For it likewise is not principles difficult to outline situations where the hanging of innocent people, or other injustices, are sanctioned or enjoined by maximum expected and C3 utility. pursuit Those who appeal to utilitarian assumptions try to avoid such more obvious difficulties with reliance upon utilitarianism, scrapping the spots not by doctrine, but by hedging applications of their principles around with qualifications, which, they hope, will trouble of with utilitarianism. enable it So them evade to the worst is with Kavka, whose work nicely illustrates that whatever (little) deterrence has in its moral favour depends upon utilitarian assumptions. Kavka 'begin[s] by noting that any reasonable system of substantial utilitarian elements' (PD, p.287). Even observation were correct — it is not, depending for one consequential elements systems include must infiltrate, an with the 'assumption if thing ethics this upon must have astonishing conflating utilitarian - it would not follow that reasonable particular that assumption produces normative assumption involved is that the act Kavka thereupon tries the paradoxes of deterrence'. with maximum expected to The utility '(the most useful act) should be performed whenever a very great deal of utility 46. Kavka, who labels simplified C4 the Wrongful Intentions Principle (PD, p.289), attributes the principle to Abelard, Aquinas, Butler, Bentham, Kant, Sidgwick, Kenny and Narveson. Kavka also gives reasons as to why the principle appears 'so obviously true'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Catholic Bishops, that 'nuclear deterrence is immoral' (cf. Kavka p.291). It is the clash of C4 with certain utilitarian principles (especially the maximisation principle of p.287) that directly generates Kavka's first paradox of deterrence and lies behind his other "paradoxes": see PD. �32 is at stake' (p.287). objections This assumption is open to essentially the same batch utilitarianism as it is mainly a matter of increasing or itself: varying the stakes involved sufficiently in any counterexample. strategy usual of Kavka tries the weakening and fudging the normative assumption to avoid the of worst problems of distributive injustice, and the like, that maximising utility can morally enjoin. But the crucial defect in Kavka's argument lies follow normative the from overridden supposed to assumptions utilitarian by way, as if it dominated C4 (see especially p.290), what C4 is Though Kavka tends to apply the fudged normative assumptions in this (p.287).**? and what assumption however fudged, namely that 'this means other moral assumptions are that ... in when produce, situations, are moral combined situations in dilemmas. These are the cases assumption special as such not fudged deterrent one where deontic principle, that yielded by utilitarianism, overrides others, but where there are competing, even contradictory deontic principles, such as that it is right to to proceed to LSN war when the enemy misbehaves (on specious utilitarian intend grounds) and also wrong to intend to do so (by C4). that judgement is not overriden. wrong: remains Nuclear deterrence Nor does it in any way follow that C4 is in need of qualification as a result (Kavka's assumption, p.290). situations, However, there are countervailing utilitarian considerations suggesting different imperatives. For what is in these is wrong. the also case is that these in special special circumstances a greater utility can be realised by doing what However it is hardly news, but a objection, standing that utilitarianism sometimes enjoins what is wrong. Special sponsonship deterrent may appear situations, where under utilitarian to get a foot in the moral door, are very special. characterised by Kavka, they are such that the 47 deterrence deterrence is very likely As to Lackey's utilitarian approach rests on a similar fallacy, that utilitarian considerations predominate where stakes are large enough: see his argument for the approach in MM p.192. What happens is not that important consequences override moral principles, but that application of one principle with important consequences conflicts with that of another principle with less significant consequences, and in the weigh-up of what to do in the problematic circumstances the principle with important consequence prevails. �33 succeed, and nothing else is likely to succeed (see p.286), i.e. is deterrence This is very far removed from the real world lodged in a deep probability-well. situation where nuclear deterrence appears to be increasing the probability of LSN war, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as likely to succeed as deterrence. that principles deontic Even if it were supposed mistakenly to real-life dilemmas should be qualified to subject avoid dilemmas, there is little point in qualifying working deontic principles such as C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situations. Instead of pulling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral intentions it involves, it can be criticized more broadly through the commitments it requires, by way of the following principle: If X is wrong then a conditional commitment to carry out X is also wrong. C5. The reason is that the commitment is a commitment and circumstances; that commitment is to act in wrongly certain Nuclear deterrence is itself wrong. however a policy which commits states to war under certain conditions. with conditional intention, that superstates and and commitment controlling to use representatives nuclear weapons. not did occur) is to enough establish have relevant the The dangerous strategy of launch-on-warning (which could, for instance, result in a that as so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt their intention And response to attacks the point, for which there is otherwise quite sufficient factual evidence. are Now the connecting principles suffice but logically, nuclear deterrence, for weighty case. instance conditional commitment to LSN war, is wrong. This one principle would By detachment from the by complete preparation for and Deterrence of this type is wrong. also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so paradoxical: deterrence. itself sound when all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a principles applied: it out the connections between and not be engaged in (unless its has appeared nuclear war and nuclear Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that should changed, e.g. left bizarre nuclear war direction can be drastically at least limited, per impossibile in the case of nuclear warfare, �34 to purely military targets). The arguments through connecting principles, can be reinforced by different sorts arguments against the moral correctness of nuclear deterrence. of There are arguments from limited convergence of ethical theories, which start from the commonplace observation that All the ethical arguments in * favour of nuclear deterrence broadly are utilitarian. In fact most of the arguments in favour of deterrence, including many that infiltrated have the ethical literature, are of those generally drawn from game theory, and primarily interested in the one player, the USA. Utilitarianism, though still looking of those expediency advantage of basically at advantages, interests and (typically individual) utilities, has to take a partisan pain of position, and forfeiting its claim to morality supported by other consider nationalities otherwise. The as well, commonplace on less observation is the fact that such qualified moral support as deterrence obtains, derives from utilitarianism. 48 There are two directions on to a general claim against deterrence, either by way of the pro-utilitarian theme * Utilitarianism properly applied also comes out against deterrence or, more strongly, by way of the anti-utilitarian theme, * Utilitarianism does not furnish satisfactory moral arguments. Then, by the anti-utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory in favour direction: 48. of deterrence. moral arguments Naturally, it would be easy to strengthen the second after all it is widely thought that utilitarianism is a false, Thus the hedged utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and Joynt, and Showing that cogent also within the broadly utilitarian range, of Gautier. ______ defences of nuclear deterrence have to take a utilitarian route would be a Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the much tougher enterprise. T' ' , much would depend on what was enterprise could be carried through, For certainly bizarre principles, e.g. obverses of the connecting principles, can be introduced, which afford deontological routes to deterrence. despite some backsliding by bishops, all other ethical positions; can A deontological made to speak against deterrence and its continuation, be 1___ — . connecting deontic case against deterrence, primarily the way of principles, has been argued in some detail. In the light of these principles, it is not difficult to see how cases from other ethical 2 go.. After all C4 has been defended from a wide range of positions would Af--- -1...... And stances, e.g. contractual, natural law, utilitarian even. <— �35 seriously astray, or even shabby ethical position. political which system depends in some utilitarian arguments for its policies. It hardly does measure for then a upon consensus, to rely on Yet with nuclear deterrence just that appears to be happening, with readily overturned arguments at that. For whether even utilitarianism supports deterrence depends essentially on: it how with applied; is which maximisation recipes; along with what other restrictive assumptions (such as those of a deep probability-well); are generous With sovereignty, national security, etc. or assumptions, different arguably (and superior) varying the guestimation methods, very different results upon The emerge, opposing deterrence and favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament. reason for this is straightforward (and like that ending §4). basic LSN war has an extremely large negative utility. deterrence out to recipes Any policy such It is that as nuclear which increases the probability of this, or even risks it, must lose feasible other of how for such things as preservation of national assignments utility and on a alternatives, consequentialist type whatever are initially applied (e.g. plausible decision Minimax, Dominance, Disaster Avoidance, Expected Value). The anti-utilitarian theme can be defended either by a full-scale criticism of utilitarianism, beginning for instance with its well-known justification of localised injustices, $0 or else utilitarianism when applied One obvious deficiency is this: by to addressing some of the inadequacies of issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrence. on standard utilitarianism, what to do, whether to proceed with deterrence, depends on the probability of its success and on the improbability of other options working. deep, utilitarianism If the deterrence probability-well is morally requires deterrence, otherwise not.$* But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are probable. 49. The instability of utilitarianism is illustrated by the discussion involving Kavka, Lackey and Hardin, continued in Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilitarianism, diametrically opposed conclusions are reached. (Hardin's approach tends however to expediency reasoning of the strategic type.) 50. Such wider criticisms of utilitarianism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-known to repeat. Some of the main defects are considered in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism' . The point that utilitarianism gives no firm place to stand comes from L. Mirlin. �36 Whether deterrence is morally wrong or not, is likely work to independent it is are princip]gs Moral not through expected values, whether utilities or otherwise - though how determined bad some outcome is may be. are deterrence decidedly essentially nowhere whether If nuclear deterrence is wrong where it increases the or not. probability of war, then is it wrong, simpliciter. depend of upon firm to stand. Worse, since the expected utilities in the case uncertain, these of the results utilitarianism delivers and uncertainty measures, offers utilitarianism In contrast with the solid deontic ground of principle, utilitarianism provides only shifting sand. The objections made apply especially against act utilitarianism. form shows special interests, such as conditions security (the probability-well state, of estimation rules are pulled in). high have is deep, utilities, nation-state and special It does not yield a deterrence policy; indeed hardly yields policies at all (other than act utilitarianism itself). and certain other difficulties may be avoided by considering instead a of act most that nuclear deterrence is "wrong" according to its lights at under very it The acts.52 But the method lacks stability; These sequence different prescriptions will result depending upon how the sequence is selected, what is included and what left (as also associated probabilities depend critically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal recipe is delivered. selected out to To see this, suppose the sequence is include worst cases, for instance cases where deterrence fails and war breaks out. In this event it can hardly be argued that deterrence is the policy that maximizes utility over the sequence. Along with the arguments, there are dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence. other conventional wars. for Firstly, the peace it has provided only nuclear peace, or rather lack of nuclear war, as there smaller-scale reasons concomitant is deep is shortage of no And the "peace" provided is at best a tenuous peace, which is not stable, but liable to upset at any stage by a range of 51. Though this is to oversimplify, the points made are not affected by the simplification. In any case the simplified picture reflects well enough the differences between Kavka and Lackey that matter in their debate (referred to in footnote 49). 52. Whether this is rule utilitarianism, or still act utilitarianism the sequence can be construed as one long act, may be left open. because �37 factors, including error, both human and technical. It does not genuine offer of the sort required for a stable international life, but only a fragile Peace, peace of a sort opportunity is enormous the cost, moral cost of deterrence, because expenditure on it excludes other urgent moral priorities. way, Marxist Secondly, there (PL, p.316). in The US Bishops put this familiar terms of 'the destructive capacity and what is for in between contradiction needed point, spent is what constructive surprisingly a for (PL, development' p.316). §6 - Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from dangers national nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas. to While there are arguments to the immorality of nuclear war preparation, there are also counter-arguments, that have Americans), to the moral proved justifiability persuasive remarkably of nuclear war (especially preparation in to the present circumstances . The underlying style of argument is simply an elaboration, or state-uplift, of that for the escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or for stocking-up the neighbourhood armoury - and every bit argument from local dangers. and domination; dubious first of all second of nuclear destruction. atomic surrender and so avoid the destruction' (Walzer, p.273). preparation is supposed to guard against more than these; third element, namely, loss of basic rights there with these. blackmail of foreign appeasement In fact nuclear is a crucial of ways life This further set of elements is linked to the danger of foreign domination - which is really a separate element from risk of Though and (freedom, equality, etc.) and fundamental values (upholding of truth, human dignity, etc.) and integrated that The two go together, since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy or as It is that nuclear preparation, 'so we have been told, guards against the double danger: foreign as blackmail. domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various national objectives; conversely loss or erosion or infringement of basic values can occur without foreign domination, for instance, as is commonplace in the �38 "free" world, by internal change of government or governmental approach, through the increased security and control a nuclear risks, increasingly preparation state nuclear demands, But etc. what nuclear destruction, also extensive involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction of the material of the cherished life-style.^ So nuclear preparation is hardly a clearcut base means of guaranteeing basic values.5^ In other respects too the argument from loss of lacks cogency rings and It hollow. is basic values and rights hard to avoid the feeling that the oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like citation values at political ceremonies; religious of clean cover for economic consideration of one sort demands from of of wealth private appealed to category: in and them to having arising with do the an argument isn't, or However associations. And rights the and But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main alleged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment or many another, are, mostly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice. this of power. and oughtn't to be, defeated by its unsavoury values that the argument is a military-industrial complex, many concerned with foreign the domination of other lesser states, and many concentration pious "communism" of of "socialism", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of capitalism. communism has happened What has been here with confused of (the totalitarianism, which does remove certain more freedoms (of opinion, association, is course that reality basic information, of) values, etc., (the ideal of) socialist state namely certain and so does etc.), derivatively threaten basic values. One critical question, then, is whether extensive nuclear LSN war, and indeed for rational way of preserving nuclear those holocaust, fundamenmtal preparation for is a good or effective or even values, which we have left. 53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerful state imposes its values and way of life. 54. The argument from freedom, advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives, is further considered early in Appendix 1. �39 arise Similar questions and domination as regards arguments the preparation depends essentially on an arrangement of hostile structure which itself is open questioned (in §8), both from the serious to question, view of point foreign of danger of the methods of extensive nuclear Justification blackmail. from and basic of states, nation a is subsequently values, such as freedom, and otherwise. But whether ultimately justified or dangers not, these national those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear are preparation, and have They justification. been accepted outlook. moral by policy Within particular, that extensive nuclear the as affording moral arguments preparation do not such Northern conventional a It is within such a framework, in framework the moral justification holds good. however, makers fact been widely accepted, and undoubtedly form in have part of many people's others, from arguments engenders establish moral a fix. For the morality of extensive nuclear preparation, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. people face a nuclear dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it is also not a specifically moral one. And for many others and their respective rights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. people who not are who again, so or as familiar with Soviet and American culture and ways of life, by impressed Such beyond live For such the "beneficial" reach of the superstates, prudential counter-arguments from national dangers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged. This is the genesis of the argument from isolated people who Consider some a comparatively remote area, whose freedoms are not (yet) in live people. under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nuclear (as under principle Cl). deterrence For such isolated people, who may have little interest in the preservation of nuclear states, there is no nuclear dilemma, and nuclear locations may have problems to national is wrong. dangers, People in less fortunate but in meeting these they are not entitled to impose grave risks on the uninvolved isolated problems people. as deterrence genuine In doing so immorally; and for through similar nuclear reasons deterrence, superstates the are proceeding conventional Northern framework is �40 The same conclusion can be alternatively reached impugned. argument: a put isolated person, and check the resulting substitution Russian in the position of such an or American reflective a by assessment of nuclear deterrence. it would be the same as that of a reflective isolated person, stripped of Since superstate bias, morally opposed to deterrence and not morally transfixed, the conventional framework fails to satisfy requirements of morality. The outcome of the arguments from dangers is, then,very different depending on the whether are arguments applied regards a superstate or not. as The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief, SST. Because of multiple connected dangers from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obliged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons. Hence, by detachment, a super-nation-state, such as USA, ought to have something in the the nuclear armoury that it has. of order meet objections concerning excess, a least at retain Or, weakening the theme to "overkill" capacity, it core of the nuclear devices it has. solid [morally] ought to For subsequent argument it can be left open whether the obligation involved is a moral one, for instance of because the character of the protected, or only (as argued above) one of to grounds supporting those against disarmament a the SS reason $5. prudential theme nuclear dangerous Northern values supposedly being on similar it can be argued that unilateral opponent would be prudentially irrational. It will be freely admitted that what is prudentially or morally required is a suboptimal strategy, like the familiar strategies of the prisoners' dilemma situations and of certain related competitive games. that like could be achieved, would agreement would be cooperative draining of For such resources, the details are well-enough known. future 55. admitted arrangements. Cooperation and be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a range of other respects. expensive, be strategy for nuclear adversaries, if sufficient trust and the superior a So it should arrangements would be much less risky, destructive of the environment, and so on; However for the present and the foreseeable the prospects of cooperation appear - so we are repeatedly told by state It can still, and presumably does, amount to more than mere expediency, since the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue. local �41 representatives, who are (not always wittingly) helping to make true - unfortunately rather remote: only the policies their sure insurance is extensive nuclear preparation and full preparedness to apply nuclear force. At least this is so where one is a superstate: proceed, largely unabated. nuclear preparation Where one is not a superstate, but a lesser state one must, the representatives continue, rely on a larger ally who has a arsenal, one's nuclear preparation, one under huddles and which contrasts the lack of trust displayed, and encouraged elsewhere. Does a state, one which relies for its nuclear cover on a super-ally, ground for another's But here a level of trust and cooperation is^ called for, by umbrella. dependent states, which is far from foolproof, with nuclear insurance (which is presumably not free) is obtained indirectly through some superstate's nuclear confidence in its rather super-ally strangely dependent have exchange on its territory? much that its ally's opponent? than Confidence, for instance, that its ally will not render it a target or nuclear must stage a Given the proclivity of states, especially large states, to resort to expediency, and given the recent historical record of superstates and their leaders, too much faith would.be misplaced. Thus, whatever the limited force of the argument for the superstate it does theme, not extend to the analogous theme for a dependent state, which differs from SST and ends as follows: DST. Because ..., a state without adequate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to rely upon a superstate ally, and within that arrangement, to accommodate the facilities and nuclear installations of the protecting ally. In part for reasons already given, principle DST is not very plausible (and same goes for more obvious variants upon it). Nor do the arguments offered for SST transpose particularly well to direct arguments strikingly illustrated by the case the for DST.56 This is more of more remote nuclear dependent states. Consider the argument from basic values, for instance, from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values in Australia are not threatened by, or put in jeopardy through, the actions or plans of the Soviet Union. Nor are they threatened by the other superstate, the USA, the only country with 'the physical 56. As is widely known, inadmissible and usually much overrated considerations of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g. economic considerations such as trade or local revenue and short-term jobs. �42 capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia', but 'clearly lack[ing] motive to do so', so far.5? Clearly the argument from basic values does not any look convincing. carries reasons For similar In weight. little the with fact, from argument little care, the present level of a economic and political domination could be much reduced. of force For there only is questionable of because danger such superstate In this way too, nuclear umbrella, and facilities superstate the that would be removed with danger non-aligned practices.$8 With less remote dependent European states these of the from danger of nuclear destruction could be nullified. argument the domination foreign sorts arguments from national dangers are only marginally more convincing, and may be defeated along analogous lines. The differences in the situations of states, and peoples, break the theme of a of situated differently This is a theme especially monolithic West. favoured by US and the West European representatives, who present the West, its freedom, as threatened by Soviet domination. undifferentiated unit. dependent states with But this leading idea, NATO designed powers, and In this the West is a single in part to align lesser to justify putting them at and nuclear risk is as much a myth as the idea of the Golden West. not The West is so monolithic, it is not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free, much of it (including the Antipodes) is not threatened by Soviet domination. Principle DST - likewise what it depends upon, SST - is now under coming attack by European disarmament groups, who challenge the core assumptions of the underlying retaliatory model that * Safety lies in weapons, * More weapons imply more securityS9. Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear attack lies not in weapons but in excluding nuclear facilities (including visits from nuclear submarines). present system is more Europeans are arguing in of a similar way, that the a risk, indeed liability, than a protection (e.g. 57. For the quoted claim, and some of the Australia's Security, p.94. 58. The issue is further pursued in Appendix 2. 59. See, for example, the last article in Thompson. argument for it, see Threats to �43 envisaged the and that without nuclear installations, Europe cannot be Thompson, p.251); theatre limited nuclear war, in the way it is now seen by US a for (but not Soviet) strategists. Once the weapons assumptions are questioned, other the assumptions of and its variants come up for examination, namely retaliatory model * Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular , Whether the proper response is through nuclear armament, asopposed, say, to other military responses, such as conventional arms, or, taking off from the previous point, Whether military approaches and procedures (through * are proper methods, etc.) armaments, or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resolution at the international level. It is plausibly argued, against military procedures, that at no level ordinary do we sensibly set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and really frontier warranted, ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary6° and explanation it deserves, questioning of the framework of but never one that nation-states. already While emphasis anticipates subsequent the state system is intact, force is far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expected and are likely inevitable. nation-state system': For 'force has [a] ... permanent place the in thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements. §7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned states Assembling referred the to as themes the so far nuclear developed fix:- States war-deterrence, because (as argued in §3-§5) to engage in war-deterrence, at least 60. the yields both and__ their—supporter^. deontic dilemma, often ought not for prudential reasons (as conversion to such arrangements. engage in it is immoral, and also ought Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in Mohists. For contemporary work on alternative systems, see survey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature and social defence arrangements, and a growing literature on i.e. to argued using China by the especially the on non-violent transarmament, �44 SST and DST). the This dilemma is no idle construction paraconsistent of virtues but logic), (concocted to demonstrate a serious real-life dilemma, the outlines of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on nuclear and war its aspects 61, as well as being virtually ubiquitous in nuclear war discussions. The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense dilemma produced by the deontic war itself &2, or at least war which spreads beyond purely military targets, as larger wars inevitably do (since military arrangements, The main dilemma arises rail transport, typically rely on civilian ones). e.g. of version from a combination of the retaliatory model with the features of War war. is required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold); but war also involves immoral acts and evil consequences. can war" under certain justified. be also seen as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that circumstances Thus 'some these really justifications evil consequences aegis of war' (Walls, p.260). acceptable than fallacious asymptotic are morally of war aim to show that actions deemed normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible the The doctrine of "just But this arguments when under performed is no better or more morally for utilitarianism being as correct when the stakes are large. War and preparedness for 61. war also generate subsidiary dilemmas - for Thus Green, along with many others, 'find[s] nuclear deterrence ... the best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of world politics' but 'still demur[s] because of moral qualms' (p.xii). Green also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy, even while asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the traditional ethical codes' (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets down): '... though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue. Similarly the US Catholic Bishops dilemma; they speak of 'the dilemma of how to prevent the use Paskins and Dockrill and in Benn terms of moral dilemmas. present the situation in terms of a moral political paradox of deterrence ... the of nuclear weapons ...' (PL, p.313). In too the nuclear situation is presented in The nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admissibility of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the arguments from national dangers. But it is a dilemma for those locked into the conventional framework. 62. Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein. �45 authority: instance, a severe tension between freedom and difficult 'one of most the of war involves defending a free society without destroying problems p.324). the values that give it meaning and validity' (PL, The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arrangements. The nuclear fix not only intensifies and complicates other dilemmas induced by the contemporary sovereign state^^, in particular the deep tensions between national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (such individual liberty, popular control of institutions, etc). other more personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for (political) obligations to example question (the It also accentuates the extent one's of a nuclear state, and role-induced dilemmas such as one's conflicting obligations as a doctor or a nuclear researcher as of political obligations armaments and their processor or evasion is considered further in Appendix 2). At the more personal level, that of individual and group action, there several questions be disentangled - questions different from the key issue to 'What should my state be doing and influence, depending on who one is. do?', on which one may exert lives, and influences, i.e. in what little There is not only the question 'What should I do?' - a question which will have a quite different force depending one are on where sort of state, where one works, what one controls or on who one is and one's roles - but also the questions 'What sort of person do I want to be?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'^" Answers to these latter character questions will feed back to influence those to action-oriented questions. Each of those questions can, in given situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas. The essential feature of a deontic dilemma is that both A and the of A are wrong (or differently, pursuing a nuclear defence policy. obligatory), negation for some suitable A, such as The place and essential role of deontic and 63. The nuclear dilemma is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas. Large-scale nuclear power generation, and other types of warfare and security arrangements, also contribute. But a conflict of ree om a authority is already an outcome of the large central state. 64. For group formulation of the questions replace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The importance of distilling out these questions, and the moral undesirability of deterrence in terms of what it does to people morally, are brought out in Benn, where however the issues are made to look somewhat more separate than they are. �46 moral dilemmas are not widely well or particularly understood, ethical in This is partly because currently dominant ethical positions like literature^^. utilitarianism cannot at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which gives to rise them then such positions do not really offer reportive but - accounts of wrong and obligation anyway. Contrary to utilitarian perceptions a dilemma does not necessarily have any moral solution, though there may be better and worse ways out. By assessments, form which contrast the with ethical such preanalytical theories, of sensitive theories, do recognise moral basis dilemmas and reflect their features. Reactions and responses that are characteristic of deontic dilemmas the from There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to fix. nuclear do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to temporary crutch. for Thus, as way a of never exercising "morally our world'66, that is in a morally-strapped world. best" ethical Bishops who the of A similar 'strictly conditional' Deterrence has a strictly temporary role the object must and deterrence circumstances. deterrence, is "morally in a fallen acceptability' certainly one strictly wrong, is of from the conditional option as to of what nuclear the to do nevertheless the policy to fix. awkward in Thus Walzer, for example, struggles to the conclusion though "second a to be to move beyond deterrence, 'towards a world free of the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out And be try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. moral fix. but shift 'moral while acceptability, can good", responsibility moral deterrence we a (as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic functor speak as grasp example, the Bishop of London contends that the possession of nuclear weapons 'while acceptable" emerge that war in the pursue circumstances (p.274).6? However as more than an immediate stepping stone to a 65. There are exceptions of course, e.g. in the Catholic educated such as Sartre; and Nagel's final example is very instructive. For a fuller theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood. 66. Reported in The Economist; reprinted in 1983, Weekend Magazine p.2. 67. As a response to a moral dilemma, Walzer's approach is perfectly in order logically. Those who, like Benn, 'find it neither coherent nor acceptable' The have not grasped the logic of moral dilemmas. Australian, February 12-13 �47 superior it policy, (in assembled is reasons §5-§6), of option, poor decidedly a the sort reasons for are that decisive for those, outside the conventional Northern framework, who find sufficiently already no genuine of nuclear nuclear dilemma. To make matters worse the nuclear fix is, furthermore, own making. states' a fix It is not something they blundered into, by accident. initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by the the the USA and the USSR in interaction. and In these respects the situation is like people who deliberately let themselves be involved in two incompatible of relationships, and build up conflicting obligations though USA, has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again mainly by escalation that The build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response nuclear to Soviet The fact is that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has build-up. frequently led escalation, and apparently still does. programme is to be in addition to existing resources myth, a is some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, and nuclear with one It thereby. are (which agreed generally The recent (1980) United States' strategic be already in excess of to Russia's, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21). The present dilemma, that many people feel acutely, is then a direct outcome state policy, allies, and Naturally not the USSR policies. that indicates especially a merely route by taken advanced response to capitalist the USA and its NATO nations, Soviets (or of socialism). state would not have been feasible without complementing And independent evidence, such as Soviet-Sino confrontation, is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist there nations. There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements nation-states the and nuclear fix. arrangements are an evident source of the nuclear situation is increasingly present world political structure. is widely promulgated arrangements: it is '... seen On the dilemma as one hand, with the these result through political that the indicating the inadequacy of the Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but that the source of the nuclear problem comes from state a world of sovereign states ... which brought the �48 world the present dangerous situation' (PL, p.313). to nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into On the other hand, the the statist form, into The arrangements of an increasingly authoritarian and centralist cast. statist espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the national defend to and security, interests, reasons such as perpetuating the system state advantageous confrontation, and provide to but underneath there are other sovereign of (!), peace and states of framework the military-industrial interests, dependent state exploitation, and politically favoured inequality it supports. The emerging theme is then that the very nuclear situation arising from the statist and arrangements interrelations (economic ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock arrangements of states and zones of interest. sovereign theme is a piecemeal practical one. where side the pattern world the conflicting rivalries, into the present The argument to this Consider first, the matter from the Soviet of national control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer. The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own borders. In the West we have ... carefully controlled ... and selective release of 'official information' (Thompson, p.20). "We" in the West, especially the Americans, also integrated with state apparatus, have, in forms increasingly the military-industrial complex, which is a major beneficiary and promoter of the nuclear arms race.68 Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements, by things such as the SALT negotiations; there are fixed superpowers and a (growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a rules, partly held in place by deterrence. shown as flimsy negotiated set Connected with this, there are cases revealing the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. Soviet US is 68. of The invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so the not overduly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched in Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism, would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would freely concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation. �49 different, what it was worried about and made nuclear threats adjacent Western oil supplies: were concerning, these lay within the US zone of interest (cf. the discussion in Schell, p.212). §8. initial political fall-out from the ethical Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: Virtually all the ways are ways of limitation, and they all involve in results. one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limitations the on thus inevitable. and more powers of states. Limitations on national sovereignty are The limitations may be reached by agreement and negotiation, less voluntarily agreed to^^, or they may be imposed, or possibly or worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war. As with other fixes produced by are there suggested the structural arrangements of states, out which do not interfere with these arrangements, ways interstate approaches, and there are ways which do seriously alter the structure and power relations extrastate approaches. of states (and, in the limit, remove them altogether), All the familiar, allegedly practical and realistic , attempts to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations, etc., are interstate; sovereign state. The same goes (graduated) unilateral disarmament. about the nation-state; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the for less "realistic" But in fact there is proposals, nothing or empirical fact, is it particularly a stable one. nor, and its replacement by alternative arrangements. as a We are certainly free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as demise sacred it is not a particularly well justified political form; it is not even a very long-standing form of political arrangement; matter very such as to its And nuclear dilemmas should have encouraged such reflection. 69. In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through fighting in some form, but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers, lawyers, or etc. In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives are never much considered in these days of superstates. Animals, by contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like these. Even the ancient Greeks - though they had a clear appreciation of limits, which has been lost by post-Enlightenment leaders - regarded the institution of war as final (allegedly inevitable) means of arbitration between city-states, not seeing its social, structurally-emergent, character. �50 Extrastate approaches take one of international of states. routes, the way up, to genuine power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; but they are Some of the important machinery, for a way up to necessarily incompatible. not two world government,is already there in the international Were law-courts. the courts assigned sufficient authority and power, the remedy, namely through legal action, that medieval theorists saw all to intrastate and T superseded by the just case of S versus T. sufficient war deterrence, though Law courts, as usually conceived, are not equivalent super—statist But if the law courts were power then their authority and efficacy would likely rely (at upon least initially) their in could be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war between states S principle given disputes, back-up equivalent for of economic perhaps not by military means. effective without police and jails or and other penalties; and the either will involve the capacity to inflict quite substantial amounts of damage on "delinquents" - which, because delinquents will be typically organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissenting, participants in those organisations, as well as to other In parties. uninvolved short, such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to repeat it. The Way Up is one more statist, legalistic, authoritarian way of trying get to grips with the nuclear though mostly in passing to be 70. to problem, and accordingly is often mentioned, dismissed in orthodox strategic texts on Americans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the USSR) is a union, of fairly recent origin, and that a differently-oriented State of the Union message could well consider dissolution of the union. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular support at present. By contrast, there are significant separation movements, some deserving aid and encouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR, UK and France. The USSR already has trouble in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite empire together; and the one recent attempted addition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant. Nor should powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be fostered elsewhere. The same applies to state empire expansion, as illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Most important, the reunification of Germany should be resisted; instead a more rational regional deunification than the present East-West division of post-war Germany should be sought, along with removal of nuclear weapons from the border region, and so on. 71. Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical, etc. Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations. �51 the By contrast, the Way Down, though like thermonuclear war. an appearance (a comeback) in some more radical discussions, with the Way Up (in "world order" models: combined unlike the Way Down, is considered however beginning is and more much international system'; and 'the 'towards a no sometimes sympathetically There is by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching by The Way Up, Galtung). cf. be to Up but it is making new, is scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; means Way integrated morally missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constituted political authority' (PL, p.320). A main argument for the Way Up is just repetition a that of which is commonly supposed to underpin statist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners' of the Commons. Tragedy traditionally, ecological order. not as best regards problems to solutions nation-states, of superstate. of organisation, and one of the prospects is destruction of a said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "tragedy" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some their order—imposing correspondingly weakened. arguments role, and But all obligation political this is assume to , only sound under quite restrictive assumptions. There are, then, many problems through that states will these tragedy A further theoretical with the hitch is Way Up, that a both theoretical and the Way Up merely repeats arrangements. It is contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the problems of interstate relations are not repeated 72. be 72 statist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate only to of good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are are practical. the public order and, more recently, as to good part of the commons by nuclear war, the solution is now sort as So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are but herdsmen such It is that authority and coercion - in the form of the state * are required to ensure especially, Dilemma, See further Routley and Routley and material referred to a level therein, up and especially Griffin. The real reasons for the state are of course very different from the theoretical cover such arguments afford. Among other things, the state enables and guarantees the accumulation of power, privilege and capital. �The major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting again. such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended purpose. In reality, we are no nearer a world government than we were a century ago, .... In fact, it is even arguable that since World War II we have moved further away from a world government than we were before World War II. The disintegration of empires has multiplied sovereignties. It is true that we have something called the United Nations, but even the United Nations has declined in power as it has grown in membership. By the beginning of the 1970's the United Nations had become, in some ways, a less powerful and even less influential organisation than it was at the end of the 1950's (Mazrui, pp.2-3). For The reasons for this Mazrui goes on to outline. future foreseeable the nuclear ideological differences between states, including especially differences as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude any prospect of an world government or a world legal system capable of resolving nuclear operative In some ways, this is just as well. hostilities. monolithic, extremely would World would government foster economism, would entrench bureaucracy with all its damaging features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism. whatever certainly, its be (gray?) colour, political exploitative economic system which would do immense impose damage It would the world an on many remaining crucial respects, to natural systems.?3 The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely undesirable ideological, requisite of level indeed unity political cannot be economic and paradigmatic, and, separation in some Moreover, unity. of main Northern within nuclear deadlines. expected given cultures, When not even nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out, how much less likely is more much sovereignty, could blockages agreements, sweeping and be negotiated? deadlocks in the involving genuine There an way is endless (e.g. of of state series of such state reconciliation. applies to interstate arrangements, which may make limited use that it limitations almost the the of The same Way Up negotiations or other conciliation procedures within a framework arranged through the United Nations) .?** 73. For a more detailed (but decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world government, see Galtung. Naturally the objections to world government, and difficulties in the way of obtaining it, do not extend to more flexible world arrangements, such a world federation of cultures (cf. Mazrui). Such a pluralistic anarchistic Way Up can be genuinely synthesized with the Way Down. �53 There is regrettably and arrangements much also conventions are evidence frequently concerning war and human rights?$), and are sentiments smoothly not not observed (especially those worth into despicable deeds. not bode convention in great a deal: Even agreements states have openly violated. Indeed there already appears to be at least one any force, of It to which international all the major nuclear states are signatories, which would rule out LSN war and nuclear deterrence, that on genocide. includes lofty for nuclear arms limitations, should sufficient agreement well ever be reached. treaties, international are often enough disregarded, skirted around, or signed does slide that the following Genocide acts committed, in time of peace or war, with intent to destroy in whole or part a natural, ethical, racial or religious group killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to as such: the members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions of life to bring about physical destruction direct and public shall conspiracy to commit be Persons committing genocide or any of punished, whether they are the other acts responsible rulers, private individuals or public officials.?6 it is not difficult to argue nuclear genocide, incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, complicity in genocide. mentioned Beside genocide the in whole or in part. following associated acts are also punishable: calculated that larger a strike (such as deterrence policy requires as a back-up response) would almost certainly constitute an act of genocide, through what minority groups. to does some But then, by virtue of connecting principles like 05, nuclear deterrence stands indicted particular it conspiracy representatives of the and as involving incitement. nuclear states acts associated with genocide, in Some well-known political and military would thus appear to be liable to indictment and punishment under international law. 74. Even Dahlitz, who gives a detailed and sympathetic account of nuclear arms control attempts and lost opportunities, is by no means confident that suitable arrangements can now be achieved (see pp. 210-13). Reasons include technological advances now taking place, and the renewed American drive for strategic superiority. 75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty International reports. in this paragraph were suggested by C. Pigden. 76. The account of genocide given is taken directly from the Genocide Convention, which is reproduced in Kuper, p.210ff. Most of the points text of the �54 The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the impotence apparent interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed of with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation nearer to the nuclear "brink" — taken now is to contemporary angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political has given new impetus sovereignty the best-seller and to consideration of other extrastate resolutions. The the indicates the namely nuclear in The Schell's situation should reexamination of the foundations of political thought' world's political unsatisfactoriness radical of the present system of nation states has even reached stands Schell to According and book a new arrangements, thesis that the nuclear problem national (from indicate and of Fate lead to required Earth. the a full-scale to make 'the consonant with the global reality in which institutions ... they operate ...' and in 'work[ing] out the practical steps by which mankind ... can reorganise political its life' (p.219). However Schell himself tries to avoid these 'awesome urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by the political work of our age' ??. else overimpressed by the history, constitute So, not feeling the pressures of history or realities of (unstable) nation-states, do most But there is no good reason to avoid the task of political political theorists. reassessment, made so much more urgent by the nuclear situation. There is little doubt but that we live (too unthinkingly) with an antiquated system many present state arrangements, communications condition; especially, were in a of (allegedly when 17th century very different and the main outlines of the modern totalitarian state and its manifold deficiencies recognised, even earlier. 77. willingly, The features representative government, were largely fashioned in the us even of political arrangements which the nuclear impasse, among others, calls into question. best of even democratic) technology, more were the and primitive discerned, In the briefs presented A similar theme, similarly questioning 'such sacred traditions as absolute national sovereignty', was pressed by Bradley, a significant US general (see Cox, p.225). Schell (like Bradley) does not make it entirely clear whether he is thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the main thrust of what he says, e.g. 'Thus the peril of extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival" but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide itself up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original state were an undivided one? On Schell's position, see further Appendix 1. �55 for political arrangements such as representative government, the excessive size and complexity of modern states was not envisaged. But such systems continue to operate, insufficiently questioned, though their justificatory bases undermined. present Nuclear representative emphasized have problems political have been several other deficiencies in arrangements. particular, In they have revealed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of the people on an issue, for instance in installing US missiles European Now that modern communications and information-processing countries. make it feasible to determine the mix of public positions on major case for representative procedures is dissolved. century 19th issues, a issues. The reduced power excessive back at developments, issue-regulated and large imposes complex other modern What requirements. by states government recent technological Firstly, smaller initial grouping than giant states, integration of groups by principles of federation. as it is to informed citizens of satisfactory a approximate goodwill. As there are serious deficiencies in the information in present progressive and procedure, depends control, nation-states, even and release the distribution information, channels, and so forth. acceptable the from These distortion restrictive of most liberal of them (and Again, especially with new and less But there are evidently vested interests which stand to benefit from the limited of upon nuclear problems have again made patent, systems, there is little excuse for this. information upward Secondly, democracy, insofar political related deficiencies as regards education). publicly democratic like many other social arrangements, appear to function better with procedures, flow and called for are smaller are groupings, information flow, communication and education. and major on governmental power to more participatory democratic forms, a route made possible even in expensive least of governments would, to that extent at But the route down through least, be reduced. much elected way that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues) are not given an almost free hand on every issue, but are required to answer policy the It is past time for more issue-controlled democratic procedures, where governments once (in some in of data features in have availability major communication helped in making present deliberately fostered pattern of nation-state �56 confrontation, and in establishing the prisoner's superstates nuclear are often seen to be dilemma type the situation locked into (on which see, e.g., Hardin). A central argument, arising from the nuclear fix, for current questioning arrangements and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at political least), takes the following shape:e Political arrangements should answer back to certain in justified terms doing of at where least are so.These requirements include such things as enabling good and meaningful and moral lives for those arrangements, and requirements (as certainly in who under operate the much of the West) the basic material conditions for such lives are met. * Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have these requirements. For guarantee the prospect of arrangements. nation-states, good and at least in the North, can no longer meaningful to lives their yet there is a non-negligible probability that person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged a under those such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way. support meet A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before its prime in a nuclear disaster; many to ceased state to Furthermore a in acquiesce or engaged in nuclear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn). Therefore, nation-state arrangements have should be not all) nation-states: have their justification, and Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though amended. nation-states forfeited it is not only because of the forfeited their mandate. nuclear Political fix that some obligations to such states are correspondingly dissolved. There is enough evidence that power-brokers who control sight of, or worse have lost don't care about, the point of political arrangements, of what justifies or is supposed to justify their states. 78. states This applies both to How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the underlying political theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contractual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual advantage' (p.4). Mao puts it in a standard democratic way: 'since the purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and their interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the government' (see Soo, p.68). �57 more powerful states and to lesser states, both claim popular to a put value higher on military situations: sovereignty they do on human than for copious evidence see principles the just of warfare repeatedly, as have many other principles. violated 'nuclear where Kuper). This by Israel, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear illustrated already some have more often, they act without it or as national survival' (Schell's conclusion, p.210; is brokers The situation has been reached against the will of the people. powers where, and mandate the where blatantly been have Such states have forfeited much of what claim they had to external respect or internal political obedience; so, on other grounds, have many other states. It could just be, of course, as is often alternatives, that have or been insinuated, though effort little but option of world government). for dismissed, As to all whether little opportunity not do to and work, appear to we Down. There working towards the weakening especially on the alternatives can be may and have given been know very little about how humans sufficient give organising and trying out alternative Way such alternatives But, operate under substantially different arrangements. accessible expended been has instance as lacking feasibility, it is difficult to be entirely sure without taking the risk of being dogmatic; deadlines no the range of alternatives or their features (except perhaps for the researching very are there But alternatives there are, no possibly better alternatives. glimpsed, that to time arrangements, even again, once very far on proceed those nuclear of the more be time to proceed a little way however, in breakdown of the larger superunions, which are the immediate problem. invalid to simply conclude that alternative political and nuclear states, Thus it would be social arrangements, theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do not presently while offer a part of the practical response to the nuclear fix. But there is no need to insist upon a single-track Way Out of dilemma to the exclusion of all others: quite the contrary. the nuclear We can not only afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches and embrace whatever seems to be working or looks like helping, within recognised ethical (and other) constraints; indeed, given the urgency, the direness of the situation, we �58 should as fairly catholic and not inflexibly committed to narrow methods, such be bogged down (and very on arms limitations negotiations should methods perservered be unrepresentative) certainly and between main nuclear states. made attempts and with, No-first-use declaration, a ban on weapons in space, etc. But even such to e.g. superstates, the from concessions significant undemocratic further wring jointly a signed The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially The political means of the Way Out are what they have new. larger every liberal on issue that has mattered: humanitarian or been from outside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from within or and it, characteristically Bottom-Up methods are considerations familiar alternatives self-organising furnishing by and practically virtually upon without bypass which it, Top-Down. never Such but part of the more general, and very effective, case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to but supply, which can almost that effectively and for invariably matter be obtained, where required, more expensively less without (and them their monopolies). In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions, imposed, or frequently The opposition to the local from have in, military solutions involving nuclear installations acquiesced and nuclear weapons. that neighbourhood and escalating groups, fix nuclear has come some of them now federated across nations (so the direction is not really interstate). These have groups been successful in blocking some nuclear installations and establishing, for the time being, against movement nuclear-free some nuclear neighbourhoods. equipment The patchwork grass-roots is strongest in Europe, which is - as the movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a leading theatre, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and American Europe will make it a safer place: American shores. nuclear installations removed installations in on the contrary it seems probable that Europe will become much safer if the anti-nuclear movements these It is succeed and Europe rendered nuclear-free. grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced. in having The chances of �59 What of the spectre of Soviet domination, military, ideological and in Except case the Europe, of other? where the inexcusable suppression of Eastern Europe all too evidently persists, this is an obvious fabrication. Does anyone expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canada seriously or Brasil say? And even in Western Europe the spectre is failing partly giant fashioned financially dominated and economically politically and ideologically, by the USA. ideologically, dominated propped exaggerated, up by the NATO powers' and some in and, some measure, Indeed much of the "free" world is adequately not countered military by The means. domination to which nuclear weapons are considered relevant insofar as is basic any in mode of But military. military, and associated political, domination of Western Europe by the Soviets is a problem, there are several ways other predominantly American nuclear weapons to mitigate it. only local defence arrangements - whether top-down alternative is it dominated economically, by the USA. of That is not generally considered so much of a problem (as it is?9), and case a Since the last World War, Western Europe has been military-industrial alliance. increasingly largely and much methods social — but also some on methods, or restructuring, such as social power to dispersed local more cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and much and reliance These should include not state-supplied decentralisation, regionalisation and devolution of organisations, than Eastern Europe. Part of the point of whether external or restructuring internal, so is especially situations, is to state-contrived 79. break make military any takeover, much more difficult and pointless, and the restoration of local control easier.Part of interchange, to the point of cooperation and at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary down conditions of hostility and distrust and to sabotage the West-East confrontations, and thereby to remove For many peoples of the world, and in its impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppressive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast with austere Marxism-Leninism which would improve the lot of some of the oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corporate capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many more individual rights and liberties. Certainly Marxism-Leninism which appears to degenerate in practice to an authoritarian and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative. It is fortunate, then, that we need be saddled with neither: there are superior options. �60 other expenditures.81 popular and for, motives Western support Europe, for for, long military much too adventures partial to and military adventures, should now be helping itself rather than relying on a leaky American nuclear umbrella for its defence. Moreover it ought to be, at the very least, uncomfortable about the risks of catastrophically damaging the world in the of interests its own security. extensive parts of Nor should other "nuclear dependent" states be prepared to acquiesce in this not uncharacteristic European imposition. world, what There LSN is war no risks, enormous for virtue Western in sacrificing other parts of the Europe, military-based domination to other parts of the world. which has long exported There are better options than dubious and risky nuclear shields for Europe. 80. Thus, for example, to the extent that local defence groups are integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle that surrender of the central directing section absolved the federated groups from following suit or following further directions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or basic groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section would hold only limited information about the federated units it integrated. The locally organised groups themselves, which would merge with local populations, would be trained in tactics of passive resistance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, etc. The net effect (as C. Pigden, who made most of these points, argues) would be to make the cost of military conquest, occupations and exploitation prohibitively high. One reason why the Japanese Army High Command decided against invasion of Australia in March 1942 was the character of Australians and the fact that they 'would resist to the end' (Threats to Australia's Security, p.62). Yet the 1942 (war reduced) Australian population was substantially untrained and unorganised for locally—based defence. With such a defence restructuring, Australia would not only much reduce its vulnerability to military adventures, but remove standard reasons for succumbing to threats of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like. 81. In particular, with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separate, are removed. So too a main model supporting deterrence policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would be further corroded. In the same direction, it is important to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below the level of state trade deals, e.g. in grain and gas, to communication and cooperation between people. For such commercial deals there is sufficient trust, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also at more significant people-to-people levels? Many further sorts of interrelationship are feasible, and inexpensive by military standards, e.g. sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gift projects. If, for instance, 100,000 or more ordinary Americans were living, working or holidaying in USSR (and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclear missiles into Russia (or vice versa). Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; on the contrary, a lot of resources have been expended to encourage precisely the opposite attitudes, e.g. as part of the strategy of the "cold war". �61 What the anti-nuclear movements must press for and disarmament (and, on the more perceptive transarmament, to conversion i.e. outer of edges graduated movements, the alternative social defence arrangements). But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go, through in in part it is what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction broad outline: way clear accordingly is namely all the disarmament^^ to total nuclear disarmament, unilateral certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet's surface, including especially Europe. For once state is demoted, its the importance and the necessity of its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance on decision-making its diminished decision-making - once all that is happen), in duly of favour more localised control and for allowed not does (it need to major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the problem one of reduction or even loss of state sovereignty. Maintenance of that sovereignty has been assigned a mistaken importance, which in turn accounts for the mistaken weight assigned to the arguments from national dangers. What is and important worth preserving is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the state. The nation-state and dangers to it, and accompanying features such as misplaced nationalism, are the weakest links in the nuclear fix situation. Once the demise of the sovereign nation-state is allowed for, the arguments from national concerning particular. dangers individual also and group rights and In freedoms, by the that nation-state. matter The are 82. to arguments liberties in for them, as smaller exclusively or nation-state is neither sufficient for are disappearing, nor community arrangements can ensure them. But arguments from individual and group dangers remain, do they not? risks are civil necessarily them, since in increasingly many states these liberties necessary place their None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None of the rights and freedoms guaranteed disintegrate. individuals and groups remain: To be sure, that has always been so,83 and is not The initial but important steps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Were deterrence really the policy there would be little case for more than a fraction of present nuclear arsenals. The steps to disarmament are well-known, e.g. the scrapping of obsolete weapons, and an end to modernisation, the removal of nuclear weapons in crucial theatres such as Europe, etc. �62 being changed but only worsened in this age of mostly to want that sure be or other outsiders. People their lives will continue to run their course, ideally in a flourishing fashion, and will not be Russians nation-states. nuclear controlled Americans by or Nuclear arrangements which threaten their lives are not a rational route to these ends. In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way as dilemmas the out of deontic such fix and its subsidiary dilemmas, there are then much nuclear more important elements than features of the nation-state, namely some of those the state is supposed to safeguard, such as individual and local welfare things and autonomy; weapons. but those things are better ensured by main reasons are familiar: The threaten the loss of basic values, such removal the nuclear of in particular, nuclear circumstances as and welfare autonomy, many for creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general much greater than in a nuclear-free situation (even should another with example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local of the opportunity remain armed There are also well-known supplementary reasons; weapons). nuclear party ideological welfare for (because costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the accompanying security measures). Thus the appropriately devices and fix nuclear resolved, it can deploy, and considerable reduction of state sovereignty. how), and since rate, any by by allowing for the But, although that is a reasonable Way Out, at little cost in the circumstances, it will be practice, at theoretically sovereignty of the state (especially as to what nuclear limiting weapons is strongly resisted in those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the auspices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act against the state. Again the resolution also looks practical enough, since sovereignty reduction in need apply essentially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. 83. the Indeed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated It will remain so under any satisfactory political arrangements. Until human social arrangements change substantially, there is no substitute for on-going vigilance to ensure or maintain political liberty. �63 agreement (at the top levels of state). However to get this far with the superstates, the limitations of state-power will likely have to proceed further: for nuclear weaponry does not stand in splendid isolation. into both concerned. systems military and (civil) Rather it tied is industrial production of the states So, unsurprisingly, practical-looking resolutions are being solidly resisted by superstates. Accordingly more popular (bottom up) action against nuclear-involved states especially and the superstates, after all the states causing the most against serious dilemmas, will have to be taken much further. variety of organised forms. Once again it will take a These include a refusal to contribute to nuclear of war preparation, either directly or indirectly. widely, blockading of shipments of uranium, and the from such steps as the forms The action range refusal of supplies and services to sailors on nuclear ships and submarines, to withholding or redirection of taxes destined for nuclear security purposes. the They include as well the whole nuclear installations and range of nonviolent facilities protest which (methods methods against do exclude not incapacitation and decommissioning of equipment, and which do include new model resistance and defence organisations). 8** It is important to realise that petitioning of power state representatives and holders, for instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct appeal, is far from a complete strategy, and may be ineffective or ignored, the results discouraging. and This is one reason why popular action should be based on a more comprehensive political strategy, which also involves withdrawing support from prevailing state arrangements, and working out and participating in alternative arrangements, especially alternative defence forms.Sufficient details as to what to do are already known, enough to make an immediate start. 84. For some impression of the range of methods, see again Sharp. 85. For much more on all these points, see e.g. further Appendix 2. Martin. As to what to do, see �64 APPENDIX 1. ON THE FATE OF MANKIND AND THE EARTH, according to Schell, and to Anders. A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war and the alleged implications of human extinction.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the nuclear dilemma, down to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts with the transient superficialities of much of the political commentary. The most widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the slightest of the "prophets , Schell's The Fate of the Earth. This skillful piece of media—philosophy uncannily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often be considered together. To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle their work. In particular, Schell's little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects. Some of it is simply garbage: to select one example, consider the claim that 'without ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] species .... nothing else that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ... (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues: they don't cease to be so when compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges elsewhere, p.130). And the claim should also be junked on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rabbits in Australia a survivor species, unlikely to be exterminated under presently arranged nuclear holocausts. 1. The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many of the leading prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work (which might equally well have been translated as The Fate of Mankind) comes out in entirely the wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where and principles for which a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to__ all fallacy. Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. �65 The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders: 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption). It is applications of S2 which give Anders' and Schell's work ^ some of its apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 depend essentially on SI. For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Granted the factual assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real possibility; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct;^ granted the prospect of nuclear war does threaten leading centres of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so SI appears unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). Schell's argument to SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly out of date. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less well from North to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schell's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa and Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.*' Both Anders and Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" the means of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibility, would furnish a good medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theory of an earlier "high" technology). In virtue of S2, they would however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly 2. For a detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of S2, see Foley JS. 3. Thus the Last Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora's box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. 4. However, new modellings and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, the immunity of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned. In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence, has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous differences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind patterns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p.56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen have an interest in minimizing them. �66 that the notion no longer made sense. But what they seem to want to suggest with the impossibility-of-unlearning message is the inevitability of the development and eventual use of the technology - as if having learnt the means all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. Certainly such views have been floated $. But they are not tenable. There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, in particular that they do not allow "experiments . Even if this were true - it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not tell against the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories". Again they have latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects such as fireballs or firestorms, electromagnetic pulse or ozone destruction. Short of an LSN war, and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical in character. The penetration of human chauvinism, as in S2, is not something peculiar to Schell, but is a product of Western philosophy, European philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders' version of S2 being just one striking illustration(cf. AA p.252ff.). It has also deeply penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenstein's work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged implications of extinction; but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly powerful and obnoxious Kantian form. Thoughts and propositions, time and tenses, history and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings — past or future or merely potential humans are not enough, persons that are not humans are certainly not enough. Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), '... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as tt is, we^ are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the stream of human time, ... '. The thought is however perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later rational creature may well be able to have it truly. Schell erroneously denies that: there is no "later" '... outside the human tenses of past, present, and future ...' (p.140)6. Human extinction eliminates 'the creature that divides time into past, present and future': so annihilation cannot 'come to pass' (p.143). But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. 5. Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction, that if the US military has a weapon it will use it. 6. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. (etc.) is �67 Anders' argument for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no longer be even what has been', is also explicitly and narrowly verificationist: 'for what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, if there is no one to remember the things that have been' (AA p.245). There would still remain many sorts of difference; for one, the history recorded in many other organisms would be different. Temporal themes do not lack 'legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone'; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators" (p.138). The second clause goes a good distance towards refuting the first. In fact there is no great difficulty in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud's claims. The same goes for Schell's extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: '... the simple and basic fact [sic!] that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing there must be life', human life (p.171). These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas which have been exposed and criticised elsewhere?. Naturally some things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so forth. But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will accordingly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no sacrifice, no image, no song For there are, and may continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs.......... Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not worthwhile. Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both. 'The death of mankind', under SI, is reckoned a 'second death', because by S2 and SI remaining life is rendered meaningless and already 'seems to be dead' (AA p.244, S p.166) and is already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a person faces 'a second death', not merely one's own but in addition that greater death of the species and all future generations (S p.166, p.115). However even if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated, because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute doesn't differ in degree, comes the universality of peril theme that 'we are all exposed to peril in the same degree', which is accordingly 'disguised' and 'difficult to recognise', because there is no contrast (AE p.64; S p.150). This theme falls with SI. In any event, not all peoples are equally imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being 7. See, e.g., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980. 8. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. argument from �68 rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe. Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; as explained, the position is different in different countries and places. Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, an obnoxious theme, which Schell (in contrast to Anders) repeatedly infiltrates. This is the Pogo theme, according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear situation (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeruns as follows: '... the world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies' (pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated elsewhere: '... we are the authors of that extinction. (For the populations of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anything about the danger)' (p.152). But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points: '... we are potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is that it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions' (p.152). And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for everyone to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as is possible, and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor does responsibility - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone - fall on those who have done less. Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among 9. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed shortly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military weapons industry, and research and academic communities. Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument fails at its final stage. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 10. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: 'The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit' (p.186). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further 'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the (USA) nation, and against socialism. In the course of this argument yet another fallacious assumption is rolled out: 'The means to the end are not limited, for the end itself sets the limits in each case' (p.189). �69 many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to every one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person (this theme is discussed in Appendix 2). When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scattered and fragmentary. As observed (in §8), Schell arrives at the conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new political institutions more 'consonant with the global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives. At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up. Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simplistic way, from the Top Down; those who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations (such as SALT) and in world government (as with the United Nations). Given the record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more generally, of the roots of war can be found elsewhere.*2 The roots of the nuclear fix are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies. And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial feature is the drive for power and domination.^ Thus the push for [nuclear] superiority by the super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented science and technology, which involves and enables domination, in several interrelated forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, it is also important to alter key components of the state, the nation-state; and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements, namely patterns of domination, patterns manifested not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, male-female relations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short, chauvinistic relations. However not everything and especially p.227, bottom paragraph. 11. See p.225ff. 12. In Anders and elaborated in Foley, and more straightforwardly, in Martin. The incomplete list of items given above, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. �70 needs to be accomplished at once; and the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states. In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between "raison d'etat and the Socratic—Christian ethics. The teaching that 'the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort' (p.134). So 'states may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival'. Schell then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends—means argument can however be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is 13. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, ..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference—satisfaction for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisation, of the virtues. Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisation of power, as with the Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of omniscience. There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be the epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative theorems). 14. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also drives the arms race. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral science. have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix. It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out—of—control machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation. �71 claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its nuclear policies.1$ An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. So even from an expediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe criticism, for example as motivationally irrational. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation states (p.188). Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people to organise for war. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty. Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as they stand. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the macro-state system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities" of international life, which include self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred. It is on this basis that peace arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185). Schell's further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear war-making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as 'a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end' (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is right (so it is argued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different from earlier conventional wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if LSN wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games are won). It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a decision by arms. But in nuclear "war" this doesn't happen, 'no one's strength fails until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192-193). The theme depends on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda). The theme also imports the social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war" theme criticised in §2) that war has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.) and rule-less activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war" but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning". The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive nuclear arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound, 15. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell's context. �72 reasonable, rational. However this represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of decision (as presented, e.g., in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning; but it does not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically. There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency.In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very generously, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like 'rational considerations entering into the policy or strategy of'. In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term 'logic of', should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest viewpoint) of actually using them should the threat fail: 7 yet the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat of this unjustifiable and irrational use. Indeed Schell wants to go still further and locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. pp.201-2): but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,18 along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. 16. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that 'the logic of deterrence' is based on eye—for—eye and tooth—for—tooth assumptions. 17. Even the irrationality of the use has been contested, e.g. it wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix radioactive ashes. has been from the There is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of the missing motive for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. 18. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction; although involving negation they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proceed to LSN war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily i& another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. �73 APPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility and on Regional Strategies What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what means one has, as well as on what one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be. So too what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is, on national as well as on moral considerations. In present circumstances states have an evident responsibility to work out their policies. There are however some persuasive arguments that this is where all responsibility ends: these major responsibilities accrue entirely to states, and there is no individual, or (smaller scale) collective, responsibility to work out a policy or stance on such matters as nuclear arrangements and still less to act, perhaps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-responsibility or opt-out position no doubt suits many people - many for themselves, some (especially more authoritarian power-holders) on behalf of others - it does involve inadmissibly opting out of moral responsibilities, responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of certain social arrangements. Now there is no doubt that individuals and groups can do this, can opt out. They can neglect their moral responsibilities; but they are not justified in doing so. Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person's being set in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they like it or not so long as they choose to live with others, there are some neat arguments which appear to permit, or even warrant, opting out. One influential argument takes the following lines: 1. The (ordinary) individual, or group, has no possibility of making a difference to what happens. Therefore 2. Such individuals, or groups, have no obligation to try to make a difference. Hence 3. Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when things go wrong. There are two main assumptions in this argument, both of which should be resisted: firstly, in getting from 1 to 2, a variant of the "ought implies can" themel, and secondly, the assumption that individuals can't make a difference. While it is true that individuals cannot accomplish much on their own, together they can. What an individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many other individuals do. In highly competitive communities, full of hopeful free-riders, a person may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in manner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangements, rationally), at considerable personal cost, with no guarantee that others will also act M-ly. Such an impasse no longer faces so many in the West, at least as regards initial steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in ways that do make a difference. An individual is not exonerated from responsibility by the argument. While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are directed at making some difference, many individuals also have the option of more individualistic action in such forms as boycotts, go slows, political disobedience. An important form of individual resistance, already adopted in Canada and north-western USA, is refusal to pay income taxes directed towards defence or various parts thereof (e.g. nuclear weapons production and deployment), or alternatively redirection of such taxes, for instance to peace funds. Evidently, however, all these more individualistic forms of political activity work more effectively if individuals integrate their activities, since the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). As well collective action helps in distributing the impact of retribution or punitive action by state authorities. 1. Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due seriousness is bound to reject this theme. There are also independent grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme: see Routley and Plumwood. �74 There are, furthermore, arguments of some weight that individuals are under some sort of moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of action this is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether it is a nuclear power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilities, etc., and on such complicating issues as what kind of preventive action the state is likely to take in return. (Any state seriously practising deterrence is bound to take some action against effective protest, or risk losing credibility; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individual need bear.) One argument - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear weapons to, for example, providing facilities for them - proceeds from the wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is not right to be making the weapons for such war. The argument here applies connecting principles (like those of §5), while appealing to such background information as that the manufacture and deployment of such weapons increases the risk of such war. But if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a state that is doing so ought to disaffiliate themselves from such defence production, and disaffiliation includes not paying for such production through defence taxes . The argument is not without substantive assumption, but the assumptions appear morally reasonable and defensible. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be: Does one want to be, or effectively to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destruction of human populations? Or with making credible a threat to do so, or the like? What follows applies primarily to people who do not want to be, or be seen as, such people. Arguments like these not only put opt-outers and do-nothingers on the spot insofar as they contribute to national objectives; they also raise questions, perhaps even dilemmas, as to political obligation for those who would take action, even limited action such as redirection of taxes 3. For are there not political obligations to the state, such as paying due taxes and supporting the national defence effort? It is usually assumed that there are. However, no dilemma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligations to be regulated in some fashion by moral obligations; for in this case moral obligations override political obligations. In fact political obligations are already significantly limited by moral constraints. The nuclear situation does not so much bring out new limits on political obligation, as emphasize the respects in which those obligations are already limited, and introduce further moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements. An obligation to try ** to dissociate oneself from preparation for nuclear war or from nuclear-deterrence, for instance by not spending part of one's working life contributing indirectly to it, does not commit one to more than this: to an obligation, for example, to work for an alternative national defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this would be a good thing to try to contribute towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on where one lives, the level of one's commitments, e.g. to nonviolence, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorientation appropriate for different nations and regions, but there are more superficial and deeper reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, e.g. schemes that leave 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthaussen of support of his refusal to pay defense taxes. 3. This dilemma and option is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes apparently introduced to give the state interest on gross earnings, but obviously very effective in removing taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferring power from individuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little more than try, without giving up one's work and thereby one's ability to contribute to other deserving causes. For example, it may be virtually impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is investing in projects which one opposes or ought to oppose, or both. Seattle in �75 "conventional" warfare apparatus more or less intact, schemes that change that. and deeper (ecological) The US Bishops, for example, present a rather shallow set of goals for a superpower such as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and working for better control of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear situation affords an important opportunity to press however for a much deeper set of changes in the superstates. For those whose very limited political influence is exerted in considerably less powerful states, even the shallow goals may look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps those of another power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to better control. The view from the very minor powers in the Antipodes is furthermore different from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect in much of the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LSN war, while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and others). There is accordingly some obligation — an obligation little considered and not grasped by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve there in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local and regional self-interest would also suggest substantial steps towards self-preservation that (foolishly) have not been initiated. What is broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once Steps include withdrawal from the American alliance, the goals are glimpsed. which is in any case of questionable merit since its main advantages lie with the US and it affords no guarantee of local defence;$ closure of American bases and withdrawal of American access rights for nuclear—carrying equipment to ports, air bases and other facilities, especially so as to remove local nuclear targets; pursuit of a more evenhanded policy of nonalignment (something quite small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve). That much is easy, in principle; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to the American military operations in the region lacks a solid foundation; it is premissed primarily on the acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been argued (in §5ff.), lacks justification. That Australian commitment to joint Australian—US facilities and to US military operations in the region is explicitly based on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent statements of government policy. The joint facilities are 'part of a system of deterrence'. & More difficult to ensure, at least without much preparation, is that economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Secondly, then, the building of increased socio-economic independence in the Antipodes is required. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone not worth targeting militarily: the region must also have a sustainable life of its own. For a small region, that looks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand's economic independence.? For a larger region which included Australia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northern military budgets, and have the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structural readjustment were combined with the independently desirable aims of moving the 5. See the discussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.140-1. How slight the commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been emphasized again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA. Of course, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparatively minor one, of the many military treaties that should be terminated: from a European and world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact arrangements, and the removal of American and Russian forces from Europe (and elsewhere), are very much more important. A fuller discussion of Australia's defence philosophy will appear in a subsequent publication in this series. and alternatives, �76 whole region towards a multi-cultural conserver society and perhaps even diverting "defence" spending to connected self—management and social defence goals, the costs would be very considerably lessened. They only appear so great in the setting of a consumer-satellite society. In any case, where life and culture themselves are concerned, the costs do not appear excessive. In sum, Southern countries should be severing their military linkages with Northern nuclear powers^, and should be preparing now, socially and economically, for the time after the LSN war, the great Northern war. However there are serious blockages in the way of such things in the Antipodes, and indeed impeding any substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive again from the fact that present nuclear arrangements favour many of the power holders and suit strong corporate interests which wield political power. But the main blockages to more popular action are sloganised in the false dichotomy: "either it won't happen or we're all dead anyway; so why bother". One reason for blockage is then the extinction assumption (SI of Appendix 1), the unwarranted adoption of which is excessively nihilistic. A more important reason is that most people, and most of their political representatives, do not believe that major repercussions of LSN war are going to befall them. These are events which, like starvation and torture, happen to other (remote) people, not them. It is not that LSN war is unthinkable: rather it is that it seems unbelievable that it should make any difference. Most people in the Antipodes really do not believe that their lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear war. Waking up and mobilising these people is a major part of the problem in 6. See the letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Minister, replying to a symposium on consequences of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, 1983. The point is also made by the Foreign Minister in his Evatt Memorial Lecture, as Hawke notes. The point is softened by representing the facilities as also having a role in verification, as well as deterrence, 'that makes arms control and reduction feasible': the known role of the facilities in war fighting is not alluded to, and nor is the fact that any verification role can be alternatively accomplished using satellites. However the matter is not in any doubt: 'successive Australian governments ... have taken the view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the United States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence; quoted in Threats to Australia's Security, p.17). Government representatives (e.g. Hawke) concede that the joint facilities put Australia at nuclear risk. 'However it is the judgement of this Government that the benefits to Australia in terms of its immediate interest and global strategic consideration outweigh potential risks'. A proper decision-theoretic analysis would not support Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclear target because of American bases (cf. Ball, pp.130-8), the potential risks given that an LSN war has a non-negligible probability far outweigh any immediate benefits. Since Australia has only a regional strategic role, the global strategic considerations are, as could be otherwise inferred, primarily those of the main user of the facilities, the USA. The Government is prepared to put Australia, its peoples and ecosystems, at what is decidedly serious risk for immediate and American interests. A worthwhile representative government does not hold its peoples hostage for such reasons. Not only is that short-sighted expediency decision making: it seems virtually certain that the details of the decision making, were they ever revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, but would turn on such things as present trade advantages and short-term commercial considerations. 7. As to the economic and social problems Australia would face in the event of an LSN war, see Coombs for a preliminary assessment. 8. Ideally the removal of significant nuclear targets should take place across the whole Southern Hemisphere, because this is the zone that is relatively insulated, atmospherically, from the Northern Hemisphere. �77 achieving requisite social and political adjustment. Even those who believe that LSN war is not improbable (but may well not be totally destructive of life) do little to reorganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessment. Richard Routley* 9. Again, for some of what to do, for some ways to reorganise, see e.g. Martin. There is also much intellectual work to be undertaken, for example, searching out details of alternative arrangements, and also discrediting establishment experts, especially economists and political scientists, who intellectually underwrite present nuclear arrangements. * The text has been much improved as a result of detailed comments by C. Pigden, R. Goodin, N. Griffin, B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through correspondence with G. Foley. J. Norman has helped in its final organisation. The initial outlines of the paper were worked out in Victoria, Canada; and an early version was read at Simon Fraser University in 1982. �78 REFERENCES G. Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, toasAA. G. Anders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken zur atomaren Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. 1956; Situation, referred C.H. Beck, I. Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on Human Rights, Oxford, 1971. D. 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Lackey, 'Missiles and morals: a utilitarian look at nuclear deterrence', Philosophy and Public Affairs 11 (1982) 189-231; referred to as MM. D.P. Lackey, 'Disarmament revisited: A reply to Kavka and Public Affairs 12 (1983) 261-64. and Harden', Philosophy B. Martin, Grass Roots Strategy Against War, Freedom Press, Nottingham, 1984, to appear. A. A. Mazrui, A World Federation of Cultures: An African Perspective, Free Press, New York, 1976. J.C. Murray, Morality and Modern War, Affairs, New York, 1959. Council on Religion and International T. Nagel, 'War and Massacre', in Cohen et al, pp.3-24. J. Narveson, 'Violence and War', in Regan, pp.109-146. National Conference of Catholic Bishops, Committee on War and Peace, 'The challenge of peace: God's promise and our response', Origins 12 (20) (1982) 306-328; referred to as PL, for 'New Draft of Pastoral Letter'. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford, 1971; referred to as OED. B. Paskins and M. Dockrill, The Ethics of War, Duckworth, London, 1979. G.F. Preddey and others, Future Contingencies 4. Nuclear Disasters, A Report to the Commission for the Future, Government Printer, Wellington, New Zealand, 1982. P. Ramsay, The Just War: force and political responsibility, Scribner, New York, 1968. J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge Mass., 1971. T. Regan (ed.), Matters of Life and Death, Random House, New York, 1980. R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #3, Australian National University, Canberra, 1982. R. Routley and V. Routley, 'The Alternatives 2 (1982), 23-8. irrefutability of anarchism', Social �80 R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest, and others), Philosophia Verlag, 1984. R. Scheer, With Enough Shovels: Reagan, Bush and Nuclear War, Random House, York, 1982. New J. 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Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Military Profession, Westview, Colorado. 1979. Boulder, M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. R. A. Wasserstrom (ed.) War and Morality, Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 1970. B. Williams, 'How to think sceptically about the bomb', New 1982). Society S. Zuckermann, Nuclear Illusion and Reality, Collins, London, 1982. (Nov. 18, �OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY School Publications R. and V. Routley, The Fight 1974, Third edition 1975. for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second edition Departmental Publications M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley, editors, Environmental Philosophy, 1980. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980. Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979. R.K. Meyer, A note on R matrices, 1979. R.K. Meyer and J. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980. C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM*, 1980. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and Ci, 1981. R.K. Meyer and J. Slaney, De Morgan monoids, 1983. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment can be correctly used, and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 1983. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983. R.K. Meyer, S. Giambrone and R. Brady, Where gamma fails. R. Brady, R.K. Meyer, C. Mortensen and R. Routley, Algebraic analyses of relevant affixing logics, and other Polish connections, 1983. Green Series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy) 1. R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action, 1982. 2. R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and inadmissible cannibalism, 1982. 3. R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meanings of life?, 1982. 4. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics, 1983. 5. R. Routley, War and peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out, 1984. 6. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions. 7. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism. 8. N. Griffin, Lifeboat U.S.A., 1984. 9. R. Routley, War and peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism, 1983. ���n w w [j � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Self-published Papers Description An account of the resource <span>Sylvan favoured the </span><span lang="EN-GB">highly-unorthodox practice of self-publishing a vast amount of his work<span>—</span><span></span>quite literally, using his own printing press!</span> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Discussion Papers in environmental philosophy Philosophy Departments The Australian National University PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600. NUMBER 5 WAR AND PEACE Zgt ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT < RICHARD ROUTLEY FOR CIRCULATION AND EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT WAR AND PEACE. I ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT by R. Routley Number 5 Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy Department of Philosophy Australian National University 1984 INTRODUCTION. Virtually all the philosophical literature on nuclear war is written from either a superpower (predominantly American) or else European (mainly German, British or French) viewpoint. This article, after connecting in initial sections with Northern Catholic literature, adopts a very different Antipodean stance. Such regional perspectives, while the should not affect the morality of the matter, are highly politically relevant. Much of the philosophical literature, especially that emanating from the USA, also fails the test of morality. It is concerned only or primarily with what is good or "rational" or prudential for Americans, or for the American state, to do - whereas morality is independent of place, race, nationality and the like. This article tries to take the morality of the matter, and the resulting redistribution of moral and political obligations, seriously. It concludes, among other things, that the American and Russian states have no moral business putting nonaligned peoples at such grave risk as present nuclear arrangements involve. CONTENTS AND OUTLINE: Italicised headings §3-§8 indicate the main structure of the argument Page No §0. Introduction. Nuclear vs conventional wars, and new moral issues. Large-scale (LSN) vs limited nuclear wars, the focus on the former, but the implications for the latter. §1. How nuclear wars differ from other wars; wars and states, and the resulting limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war. War characterised. The essential role of the state. New and different features of nuclear wars. §2. The moral situation: the recent tendency of moral considerations to become entirely submerged in the context of war. The ancient distinction of morality and expediency. Strategic planning based on expediency. Arguments that war must be expediency-based refuted. Morality does not have to, and ought not to, give way to expediency. Utilitarianism and expediency distinguished. Limits to consensus: supermen and superhawks. National interest and expediency assimilated. Limits of state entitlement. §3. The initial argument to the immorality of LSN wars. One key argument, from the wrongness of killing noncombatants in mass, is presented, assessed, and criticisms met. Arguments for the premisses of the key argument elaborated. §4. Arguments from historical requirements on just wars, the important argument from convergence, and environmental arguments. Arguments from just war requirements: discrimination, proportionality, prospect of success. The detailed convergence argument, from rival moral positions. Arguments from environmental principles. §5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: arguments to its immorality. Deterrence seen as the only practical way to satisfy major desiderata: prevention of war and maintenance of prudential values. Pure deterrence not the policy. Deterrence as practiced has increased the probability of nuclear war. The first argument to immorality of deterrence, from the plausibility of probability of immorality. Further arguments through deontic connecting principles: the probability linkage. Refuting the counterargument from the success of deterrence. The way the onus of 1 2 5 11 14 17 Page No proof falls on deterrence policy, which cannot meet evidential require­ ments. The second connecting principle: the wrongness of serious preparation for nuclear war. The general form of connecting principles; separating out those that are correct. The third connecting principle: the wrongness of serious threats of nuclear devastation. Criticism of this principle leads to further connecting principles, through intention and through commitment. Meeting counterarguments from utilitarianism. Applying the connecting principles to argue to the immorality of deterrence. Arguments from limited convergence: pro- and anti-utilitarian versions. Other reasons for deep dissatisfaction with deterrence. §6. Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from national dangers to nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas. The arguments from nuclear blackmail and foreign domination, and from risk of nuclear destruction. The crucial argument from basic rights and fundamental values. The argument from isolated people to superstate immorality. The superstate theme, and reasons for its appeal. The much less persuasive dependent state theme. Challenging the assumptions of the underlying relatiatory model. §7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas - for aligned states and their supporters. Character of the nuclear fix. Subsidiary dilemmas: national security vs freedom and democratic arrangements; personal and role dilemmas. Features of deontic dilemmas. Deterrence presented as second-best escape from the nuclear fix. The nuclear fix a fix of states' own making. Interconnections between the nuclear fix and nation-state arrangements. §8. Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: initial political fall-out from the ethical results. The inevitability of limitations on national sovereignty. Interstate and extrastate approaches. The Way Up and the Way Down of extrastate approaches. Arguments for the Way Up, and the decisive case against it. Failure of international agreements, especially on human rights and genocide. Exclusion of nuclear deterrence under the Genocide Convention. Need for the reexamination of current political arrangements imposed by the nuclear fix. Deficiencies in present antiquated political arrange­ ments revealed by nuclear problems. Further arguments from the nuclear fix for political reassessment. The weak link: the sovereign nation­ state. Forfeiture of political obligation by many states. Alternative political arrangements vs nuclear time horizons. The multi-track Way Out of the nuclear dilemma. The main political means lie outside state governmental apparatus. Laying the spectre of ideological domination. Social restructuring and devolution of power. Graduated disarmament and transarmament, and letting state sovereignty go. Dissolving the arguments from national dangers. State resistance to loss of power. Further lines of organised action against nuclear states. Appendix 1: On the fate of mankind and the earth, according to Schell and Anders. Nuclear prophets and prophetic rubbish. The extinction assumption. Common emerging themes of Schell and Anders. The extravagant anthro­ pocentric assumption, and some of what is wrong with it. Second death dismissed. The universality of peril. The alleged universality of responsibility: the Pogo theme. The correct, but undeveloped, whole earth theme. Ultimately Schell offers little hope and superficiality. Nuclear war is war. The logic and illogic of deterrence. ii 37 43 49 Page No Appendix 2: On matters of collective and individual responsibility and on regional strategies. Individual and state responsibility. Opt-out positions, and arguments to them. Failure of the arguments, and the impact of group cooperation. Arguments to direct obligations of individuals to the nuclear dissociation. Limitations of rival political obligations. Different policy reorganisation for different regions. Shallower and deeper goals. The important opportunity for deeper reorganisation afforded by nuclear dilemmas. Obligations of those in the Antipodes: what is required, and justified. Social and economic reorganisation in the Antipodes, and reducing costs involved. Blockages to social and political adjustment. iii 73 ON THE ETHICS OF LARGE-SCALE NUCLEAR WAR AND NUCLEAR DETERRENCE AND THE POLITICAL FALL-OUT Large-scale nuclear wars raise ethical questions not generated, either at or nearly so forcefully, by previous human military encounters.This is at all bottom because of their projected effects, which are often to said differ so those of even the largest conventional wars (the World Wars) as to yield a from difference in kind of war. involve, and threatened Certainly massive exchanges such as nuclear exchanges such as nuclear deterrence presupposes, are neither envisaged nor fully accommodated by traditional theories of Much wars just wars. new philosophical reflection and investigation is required, even if rather well-tested and old-fashioned moral principles will serve as initial ethical base. Although nuclear wars are, thus nonexistent objects, nuclear wars (extrapolated from a very limited varieties. In far, only a decidedly class menacing of proper have several distinctive properties nuclear experience^) and come in several particular, confined or limited nuclear wars, of which tactical or strategic are subvarieties, contrast with Idrge-scale nuclear wars (LSN wars) 1. The US Catholic Bishops in their Pastoral Letter (PL) make the point forcefully: 'Nuclear weapons ... and nuclear warfare ... are new moral issues ... There exists a capacity to do something no other age could imagine: we can threaten the created order ... We could destroy [God's] work' (PL, p.312). While the independent analysis offered in what follows has a great deal in common with the Bishop's position, it differs significantly in removing the religious backdrop and associated features and, it is hoped, in bringing out the logical structure of the argument more clearly and sharply. To illustrate the differences that emerge with removal of the religious backdrop and its the associated unity-of-evil theme, consider what happens to two examples from PL, p.323:- Firstly, peace is possible without religious enlightenment if it is possible with it: religious enlightenment is not an essential condition as there implied. Secondly, violence does not take all the forms the Bishops try to give it, e.g. sexual discrimination is hardly a form of violence, pornography can operate without it, etc. It is a serious mistake to try to heap so many diverse and independent issues together under the one heading (forms of violence) along with war as if they stood and fell together, e.g. abortion and nuclear war. Note that referencing, where not through an author's name, is by way of acronym explained in the references at the end. 2. an The isolated, and unnecessary, bombing of two Japanese cities at the very end of World War II did not render that war a genuine nuclear war. Nuclear wars proper will be very different and very much more horrifying. Nuclear wars proper, though elements of uncomfortably adjacent possible worlds, ought therefore to be confined to merely possible worlds. Enough of their features we can appreciate without their being brought to actuality. 2 A large-scale nuclear which need not however be unlimited 3. explosion war it is of large quantities of nuclear devices over a sizeable region; a function of two main parameters: distribution. war strategic) nuclear of quantities war a Such quantity markedly differs which limited, is where and explosives, (megatonnage a from targets to are and explosive) limited assumption, by the of the involves (tactical much or smaller characteristically circumscribed, for instance confined in principle to military installations in a given region. Though focus the in what follows is upon LSN wars and their prevention, limited nuclear wars are by no a separate wars to LSN wars are high (given usual reasonable assumptions second strike, since issue, a is a prerequisite, and the probabilities of escalation of such arsenal nuclear means etc.).^ Because of these of follow-up or connections, much of the case made against LSN wars transfers to more limited wars, as will become evident. §1. How nuclear wars resulting differ from other wars wars: and party and limited appropriateness of older models and theories of war. of war that has dominated much thinking, including strategic two states (or thinking, the A model is the several person) game or, as a complication of that, the clan or tribe battle3. A picture of war thus on requirements for legitimate and just wars, which technological reflection advances have traditional now theory rendered of war, emerged, inappropriate hardly and especially sometimes surprisingly, as a result inapplicable. of The made no allowance for such 3. Another dimension of variation concerns the sequence of the war, especially the type of strike involved. Though the sequence is important for the moral assessment, for example of the main actors, it in no way alters the immorality of LSN wars, as will emerge. 4. 'The overwhelming probability [is] that a nuclear exchange would have no limits' (PL, p.314). Hence a major argument against limited nuclear wars: that any such war risks, indeed renders highly probable, an unlimited war, and the risk is far too large to take. The point in fact follows by straightforward application of decision theory, multiplying the massive undesirability (moral and otherwise) of an LSN war by its probability given a limited nuclear war. Given the character of weapons development and present communication arrangements, the idea of a highly circumscribed purely nuclear exchange between the superpowers, perhaps in the European "theatre", is really a myth. 5. There was a substantial element of sport (and connected features of prowess) in traditional wars that has been eroded in modern technological wars. Nuclear wars may be not just unsporting, in that no notice is given, etc., they are also remote and impersonal, and differently unjust, in a much deeper way. 3 phenomena as mass bombing of large cities, such as with Dresden and nuclear bombing, with its many further crucial effects beyond mass And Tokyo. occurred bombing, adds further new dimensions. Yet it is important for the argument anchors, retain historical were accounted unjust war is essentially a matter of states and their control: the Oxford English Dictionary account, war is 'hostile contention armed protagonists, antagonists or players; of contention or combat; exchange is the actual experience. but other are not literal, but transferred, metaphoric, etc.8 'war' means and or wrong. to elaborate by means of forces, carried on between nations, states, or rulers, or between parties in the same nation or state' for control of the state?; noun linkages to be aware of what counted as war (the semantics of the matter^), and of when, and why, wars and military actions Firstly, to always a function of senses of the States are the forces comprising armed soldiers are the and combat or forceful and typically violent Thus wars are external or internal states or their rule. (civil), Thus too wars have grown in quantity and frequency as states have expanded, wars have changed as states have transformed, and nuclear war has emerged 'with nuclear states. theoretical way then to eliminate wars is to remove states: An obvious in short, wars are 6. There are interesting sidelights concerning even the etymology of the term 'war', which was derived from a term meaning 'confusion'. In particular, 'it is a curious fact that no Germanic nation in early historic times had in living use any word properly meaning 'war'': Oxford English Dictionary (OED) on war. 7. But of course there can be something quite analogous to war waged between clans, gangs, multinational firms, even against Nature, and still more metaphorically against poverty, etc. To this extent, a strict definition of 'war' is being insisted upon. Even so the diffusion of power structures the argument will direct us to, has to extend beyond just the break-down of nation-states . 8. Into this category (since Nature is no nation) falls the ubiquitous and unwarranted war against Nature of modern times, which features just as large in Marxism as in capitalism. As could have been guessed, someone it was James - suggested channelling all war into "war" in the metaphorical sense against that unarmed and nonaggressive "opponent", Nature. James proposed as a substitute for war proper, conscription of the youth for a war against Nature (see Wasserstrom, p.12). What it boiled down to, however, was that youth was to be channelled into all the dirty work, in that way to acquire manly virtues military activities "rightly" instil, especially discipline, but also service, devotion, physical fitness, constructive exertion, responsibility, and order. Another less diabolical substitute for wars proper (in American ecotopian literature) is through war games and other games of competitive cast. Again specious arguments enter for those bringing out the "best" in human males, etc. 4 an outcome of political and associated technological structure, and are by structure. the altering state arrangements, arrangements. be to can thus be seen as a structural problem of War from along defective) political organisation of states; they are a helps these This semantically based picture situational fix, a structural malformation. war with (otherwise removed arise Wars of explain why the radical argument against nuclear wars and deterrence argument devolves into an war-makers, against against In states. the fact (self-legitimised) on and war-declarers traditional theory, wars were the restricted to external wars, which were construed as the right or states of rulers (princes) to conduct for certain political purposes; their removed the argument was that private persons with grievances had access to the courts^, while states did not (wars were, so to speak, the international analogue of the law courts). But this is itself a very statist conception of the legitimate place of wars; the semantics is not so restrictive and permits internal wars within states, for example to end wars, injustice, etc. Let us however - to bring out what is different now - confine attention a basic and most familiar case, external wars between two states or sets (axes) of states, two-player external wars, games, competitive could be won, attentuated form for some "victors") the World Wars. agglomerations surrounding traditionally firstly for massive armed like wars, such exchanges as there may well be no winning in areas Northern the of very hemisphere countryside. Thus, and the secondly, for waste laying the point of of substantially substantially obliterated^, (exercised and most as nothing all worse off than at the outset of the "play". are huge war seen, to settle serious interstate disputes, is removed: another point of difference, the phenomenon of wars that prepared that That assumption still held good (though in With LSN wars it no longer holds; is settled with main protagonists players It was assumed An LSN war could involve destruction of all main Western metropolitan strategy. 9. to main Hence elaborately for, etc.), but which can never be pointfully fought; Thus Aquinas and Grotius for example (see Barnes, p.776, top). The argument presupposes rather a lot, including a neat public/private distinction. Put Aquinas's way, it looks as if it could be readily transferred into an argument for international government, or at least effective law-courts. Yet all Christendom was supposed at that time to be one state! 5 hence the inevitable emphasis on pure deterrence. and the other elements of gamesmenship had a role in earlier wars, but it was not pure deterrence. military to Certainly, deterrence, bluff, Lastly, traditional wars could be confined in targets and military principle This feature is fundamental as exchanges. for, as will appear, wars that spill over in gross regards just wars; ways to The special effects of uninvolved parties sacrifice any pretension to morality. nuclear explosives, especially operated in mass, mean however that large nuclear cannot wars be legitimately horrifying detail in popular sources ozone destruction, These confined. shockwaves, such effects gigantic fumigations and become entirely rapid speed include pulses, fireball or firestorm etc., etc. As a result of these of exchange, LSN wars will resemble the recent tendency submerged in the context of war. of moral and expediency. considerations to It is particularly important in the case of war to maintain a firm grasp on the ancient morality radioactivity, more than they resemble older-style wars. The moral situation: §2. the Schell) electromagnetic devastation, rogue bacteria and viruses, ... compounded as special effects (presented in distinction between What is done in war, especially for local or national advantage, may be very different from what ought morally to be done, whether the 10. There is however the degenerate idea of war as involving annihilation or extinction, and of winning a nuclear war as annihilation of the enemy while not being entirely annihilated oneself: the side that somehow "survives" sufficiently to rebuild is said to "win". But this is, at best, an extremely tenuous sense of winning, which in any case neglects the medical evidence concerning nuclear destruction. Recent talk about winning or even surviving a nuclear war must reflect a failure to appreciate a medical reality: Any nuclear war would inevitably cause death, disease and suffering of pandemonic proportions and without the possibility of effective medical intervention ... (PL, p.313). Moreover any such phoenix war is radically unjust, because of violation of the traditional requirement of proportionality, and for other reasons developed in the text. Unfortunately as documented in Scheer, significant officials who are responsible for the nuclear destiny of the USA - and so of the world think that the devastation of nuclear war can be survived by Americans and that a global nuclear war can actually be "won"! They rely, among other things, on an incredibly low, and unacceptable, redefinition of "winning". 11. In practice they often were not,they drained limited economies, they layed waste countryside (though to a minor extent compared with nuclear or chemical warfare or modern mining), impoverishing inhabitants, etc. 6 latter is determined using the codes and conventions Much not to be done in war i^ done, for one (alleged) advantage or ought that otherwise^. or war, of another, despite modern military codes and conventions and the like. we not live go a rather barbarous age: in unremarked, the if Militarily the horrors of the twentieth century will history gets written that (accurately) is. Furthermore military thinking and strategic planning tend (as Nagel explains) to induce a certain moral numbing, so that a range as such wiping rural populations, become real possibilities, included in out calculations. consequentialist characteristically based on is that strategic Each side in a military encounter reasont The expediency only disadvantages, its own gains and own its planning advantages is and losses as a result of alternative possible it ought, morally, to consider those of the other side(s) as moves: actions, excluded morally of well. In this way strategic planning displaces morality. Indeed it has been contended that war should be planned and conducted way, a no-holds barred combat fought to the maximal (local) advantage, without limits, moral or other (except insofar as technology limits the means of etc.). Such the classical through "bald an incremental limit) escalation distinct argument terms. from an that the It would And (but The externally will be broken by each player in turn for advantage. an extraordinarily narrow motivational base is assumed. the argument man" fallacy *3), that there can be no limit. assumption is that any merely selected limit (as enforced force, is the so-called "classic" view of Clausewicz, oft repeated. Clausewicz tries to argue, really this Thus too follow from idea of a limited war is some sort of contradiction in But it is not, though breaking off in the heat of war, or the of a supposedly limited nuclear exchange, may be singularly improbable. confusion Nuclear 12. For as Nagel contends (early on), there are moral restrictions on the conduct of warfare which are not legalistic only and which are neither arbitrary nor merely conventional, nor a matter of usefulness. These themes run entirely counter to the classic theory of war of Clausewicz - a theory outlined in Walzer. 13. As one less hair doos not, at any stage, distinguish a bald man from a hirsute man, there are, starting from the hirsute end, no bald men. The progressive escalation argument concerning war is an incremental argument like the technical Sorites syllogisms, formalising the type of fallacious argument which shows that one more straw never makes a heap. The fallacious escalation argument is part of the so-called "logic of war", for more on which see the conclusion of Appendix 1. 7 wars thus appear decidedly Clausewiczian. the for players Still the argument inconclusive; is can choose, at least in smaller calmer wars, not to escalate, and, for example, agree to abide by arranged practices, types of weapons, etc.^ A state engaged in war seldom sees itself as entirely bound by of morality: it is taken to be mere prudence on the part of those attacked to take account of the no-immoral-holds-barred approach they from the other side. especially constraints the question not only as to may encounter, well So each group potentially engaged in war faces ought it what do to in permissible morally situations, but also both what it ought really do, and what it can morally do in the morally flawed situations it finds itself. not, But the last question does in that case, reduce to one of expediency. There is no question, then, of morality giving or having even expediency, For it is not as if shaky considerations of involves. give bound are morality theoretical fact is that miraculously deliver us from value the theory. to Expediency fact, but that local values - of self, family, clan, class, or nation - are considerations. proper characterisation, a therefore, much universalizable more universal fairness, equitability and principles, justice. distribution value of and, And morality thereby imposes, through principles. intersubstitutivity certain requirements of general Expediency yields an unfair, inequitable value system, one that subscribers would not adhere to if differently placed \ deep theoretical unsatisfactoriness of expediency, and associated strategic thinking, also derives from this failure evaluations 14. remote By contrast, morality requires, as a matter of its resultant The takes It assumes, or what really count, and override or are to be maximized at the expense of foreign not does simply narrowly-construed local advantage or power as what is valuable. urges, crucial But the morality and* expediency fall within the same, both equally shaky or equally solid, domain of value or to to the firm ground of expediency when the chips are down, since often way enough such moral erosion does not occur in crisis situations. even to circumstances such as the prospect of LSN war extreme under way give to of interreplacement, from the same and results not holding when persons X and Y are interchanged under As Walzer argues, p.24. An historical example is the era of genuinely limited wars in Europe following the barbarism of the Thirty Years war. 8 For expediency does not elude expediency assessments^. it deontic presentation: be presented as through such popular slogans as "local might is right", can or given tight formal characterisation. The will characterisation normally that of utilitarianism, except that utilities are only assigned to, or resemble are biassed in favour of, certain individuals. However, theories of utility not have to be positions of expediency if utility is not locally confined. do Thus utilitarianism proper is not to be dismissed as considering only expediency; meet intersubstitutivity requirements of morality; can it it does not, unlike the methods of war game theory, assign different weights to the individual utility of (certain) Americans, as opposed to Russians, say. are There especially, deontologists regarding war^. which differences, between or justify, ugly strategies and practices as regards to some render to seemed enemy civilians, that deontological principles would not permit. effect and utilitarians serve to further complicate the moral picture In particular, utilitarian approaches have permissible, morally significant however utilitarians this But is would reject the description of practices permitted under their principles as 'ugly'; whereas an to already in aim what follows since partisanship, is to avoid meta-ethical meta-ethical neutrality, though of course not there is a moral partisanship, neutrality. to achieve And morally large area of consensus, or at least moral convergence, from which argument can begin. Virtually all positions agree that obliteration of several major cities in a LSN war would be wrong, indeed morally outrageous. If the there is dissension, as there may be among nuclear strategists who seem to feel no qualms when it comes to trading loss of some American cities for some Russian ones, simply increase the costs involved, up to loss of whole nations if 15. The severe limitations of those lesser "virtues", nationalism and patriotism, also come from the failure of replacement which excessive applications of nationalism easily engender. Try for example swapping a person from inside the homeland with one from outside as regards treatment. The point of, and reasons for, intersubstitutivity as a requirement of morality, is well explained in Hare, p.78ff. Hare applies the requirement to make a telling case against nationalism (a case which extends to strategic decision-theory). Nationalism, along with fanaticism, is the main cause of war, so Hare contends, p.72. 16. The case against expediency was developed in detail especially the criticism of Thrasymachus in The Republic. 17. Thus the differences between Nagel on the one side, and Brandt and Hare the other, in Cohen et al. by Plato; see on 9 then try to work down necessary, until moral repugnance ijs encountered; The again. fact remains however that in the nuclear area things have got substantially abandon tended Strategic thinking, in particular, has out of perspective, morally. to suppress moral considerations (as indeed theories of the state also or do, sometimes flamboyantly, in favour of partisan values). Naturally the fact of broad consensus as to the morality of the matter does mean that there are none who would welcome such outrageous happenings, that not total nuclear destruction of the North even, would be Consider the rising world empire. be southern (hemisphere) no advantage. one's strongman, SS, who has visions of While the superpowers of the north remain, SS's dream can realised. Thus his best strategy, having rid submarines and southern lands of US bases, is to try nuclear to exchange in the North. There be would waters southern to encourage a hardly of US all-out an point then in securing institutional arrangements so that potential SS's do not accumulate much given especially the apparent instability of crucial world arrangements. that is to anticipate: the present point is that (the fact of) moral has and its power, limitations, is an inadequate But consensus constraint without accompanying structural adjustments. national For, typically, differently to impose interest is taken hostages or override morality, even holding civilian populations as of those those of Eastern Europe. things. substitution of justification; fails in The first, expediency classes regimes, But morally national interest can do neither the overriding for morality, of morality, which the second, the alleged moral dominance of important And, killing millions in the national interest*8). unfortunately, these assumptions are not confined to more totalitarian such or irresistible ethical claims that dominate more ordinary ethical considerations (such as those concerning nuclear to is entirely national simply lacks the moral interests, of cases, including, so the argument will go, the case of LSN war. 18. As Schell bluntly puts it, 'What is being claimed is that one or two countries have the right to jeopardise all countries and their descendents in the name of certain beliefs' (p.132). However this way of putting it leaves room for ambiguity, since the beliefs may be morally grounded rather than based on national interests. 10 States may insist upon operating on a selfish national interest basis, let it not be that pretended expediency (namely, that of is it a moral basis as distinct from one of There egoism"). "group but moral special no is dispensation for governments. individuals: there is no logical difference in the pattern of justification, or analysis of obligation. Morality works in the same way for groups as for For example, what ought to be as regards X is (analysed semantically) what would happen as regards X in all ideal worlds; no whether difference is an reasons aside, just behaving as system, group or individual or individual States such as Israel (in its recent invasion organisation. extenuating X immorally of as brigands or mass Certainly there are grounds on which states or their agents conceded, special moral dispensations; been more than that and do not stand up to criticism. cannot furnish two (incompatible) claimed, have but the excuses offered are no A moralities, satisfactory a state theory moral or public one and a private or individual citizen one — state expediency and individual morality because this would lead to violations of substitutivity, neutrality, etc. instance, a state operative X could use state cover morally impermissible ways, ways ruled out (e.g. Y are permuted. special are, Lebanon) there is no moral difference. killers: or makes and it to considerations citizen * For Y in by state interests) when X and A group or organisation or person can be derivative damage 19 bound of course by in virtue of role, but these are derivative principles - good for any such institution - which fit within and answer back to general moral principles. So it is also with a state which is an institutional arrangement justified (insofar as it is) by the way it answers back to some least) of its citizens: its charter does not legitimate emergent allegedly moral principles which conveniently coincide with those of state expediency. particular, a survival. In state is not (morally) entitled to risk the lives of many of its own citizens and of other peoples and creatures for its own ends, even own (at for its Thus it is not entitled to do what both nuclear war and nuclear deterrence require, as will emerge. 19. There are also other arguments against two (or see Routley and Plumwood. multiple) morality lines: 11 §3. The initial argument pacifism yield arguments to the immorality of to the immorality of war. controversial in an area where there is no LSN for But such arguments are be to reason good Arguments wars. controversial. Pacifism can accordingly be set aside as a special case, since the immorality of LSN wars follows. All but pacifist positions concede that war in itself is not a crime. all wars are immoral, though even inoffensive wars may be pointless or inferior Among more or less admissible ways of settling political issues between states. wars who Not are the international "tournaments" of aristocratic young men or warriors volunteer as and soldiers action whose not does spill over onto noncombatants, and some early and medieval wars, where few or even no combatants were killed in war. conscription, Since the establishment press-gangs and recruitment of such of the largely ceased to take these less offensive forms; induction practices as near-destitute, wars have modern massive wars are far removed from the ideal war-tournament types (which feature now only in ecotopian portrayals, in ways that are increasingly dubious). immoral, sorts Most of wars are because of what is done to the essentially uninvolved, but few to such an extent as LSN wars. The first argument to the immorality of LSN and wars sufficiently of large-scale wars generally, takes the following form: Pl. The (deliberate) killing in mass of noncombatants is wrong. P2. LSN wars involve the killing in mass of noncombatants. P3. What involves what is wrong is wrong. - (KA) LSN wars are wrong. The particular argument given is just one representative of a set of this type. taken off killing: the on (KA) replaces But the quite 'killing sufficiently evil. creatures'. can Thus a first in mass of noncombatants' by a suitable clause concerning 'huge destruction of lifestyle of uninvolved or involved focus destruction of lifestyle of nonhumans and humans alike that an LSN war will bring is variation arguments Characteristically, in Western culture, it is thought that mass killing of humans is about the worst thing that can happen. be of not directly Other variations will emerge in the discussion (including that where the bracketed 'deliberate' figures). but The argument is valid, attacked) on the of basis be may attacked (and of its premisses. each has in effect been Let us consider these in reverse order. The principle, P3, used in the argument, that what involves "what is wrong" is wrong, has been challenged on rather Scholastic grounds. There are, in particular, problems like those generated by Good Samaritan arguments, purport to show that some proper obligations involve wrongdoing. assisting an injured robbed person is said robbed; but, since the robbing is wrong, "involve" to providing For which instance, that person's assistance being is also wrong. But these problems derive from too slack a notion of involvement; with a tighter account of involvement the problems disappear and P3 stands. As against P2, it may legitimately directed be argued against that military nuclear targets. 20 can wars be encounters But given the character of There is nuclear weapons, LSN wars could in no way be confined to such targets. not merely the likelihood that many missiles explode off target, there are all the other effects of large-scale nuclear bombings. fallout down-wind from military people, especially in the case of targets US and For example, the radioactive will affect large concentrations of European targets, and may affect uninvolved countries such as Canada. There may be an attempt to avoid the problem of massive civilian casualties by appeal effect)21. to such dubious principles as the doctrine of double effect (or side if missiles were characteristically reliably on target, and one 20. The challenge to P3, which is often expanded to a "distribution of obligation over entailment" principle, can be removed by a tighter involvement connective, linked to a good paradox-free entailment. For details see Routley and Plumwood, where Good Samaritan problems are diagnosed. 21. According to the doctrine, which is one concerning responsibility, we are responsible only for the intended effects or consequences of our freely-chosen actions, and not for other (side) effects or consequences, even if these are foreseen and/or intimately tied to the intended consequences. Unless carefully hedged, the doctrine is pernicious, allowing those who suitably adjust their intention to escape responsibility for evil they knowingly perpetrate. Thus, for instance, a Russian supreme command which intended only to take out US military targets would, under double effect, have no responsibility for the resultant effect on American and Canadian cities! Taking the issues concerning double effect to a more satisfactory conclusion would however require a larger theory of action, which duly distinguished acts (what is done) and outcomes from attached intentions. 13 which was intended unfortunately went only off to destroy an underground unmanned course and destroyed a large city, it could be claimed that the (unintended) mass destruction is legitimised under principle. a make Nonetheless effect double the circumstances difference, for they may mitigate attitudes to those responsible for firing the missile, since it was not as if they had deliberately aimed at The double effect principle conflates [diminution of] responsibility city. the the the action would be wrong, and the Such claims should be rejected: wrongness not lessened by the given intention. could silo missile assigned for an act with the [diminution of] wrongness of the act. As against Pl, and as regards the middle term of argued that there is an important equivocation. While it will the bracketed term, 'deliberate'. killing and Pl P2, may it be The equivocation is induced by conceded be that deliberate of genuine innocents is impermissible, two challenges will be made. It will be charged firstly that noncombatants, insofar as they are distinguishable, are no means all innocent, many being directly involved in military effort, by whether just as taxpayers or as suppliers of military, e.g. farmers or goods or services bootmakers or entertainers. as innocent. The second defensible — version of premiss P2. and for other reasons, it properly point concerns a much narrower - and less Because P2 so amended is is best to leave out the less defensible, "modifier" 'deliberate'. What is important for the present purposes is the moral status of what is not a mixture that with the motives of the perpetrators. of require the qualification 'deliberate' or done, So 'deliberate' gets left out, equivocation is avoided, P2 stands, and so does Pl. not the Secondly, it will be contended that LSN wars do not involve the deliberate killing of those excluded by used For Pl does 'intentional' or the like.22 Admittedly also 'noncombatant' is a fuzzy term, but none the worse for that, and there is noserious people who are is, moreover, problem in marking out a class of notdirectly involved in the command and action no need to adopt the practice, deriving stating an initialversion of Pl in terms of innocents - 22. clear noncombatants, at chains. There from Catholicism, of least as problematic Despite Nagel's suggestion that it does (p.158). The suggestion depends upon similar mistaken assimilations, of act with intention, and wrongness with responsibility, to those of the double effect doctrine. 14 a class as that of noncombatants to try to characterize - and then endeavouring to make the difficult transition to noncombatants. Not only can arguments against the premisses of the argument be met, are arguments the for there premisses, though for the substantive moral premiss Pl they are of the characteristically nonconclusive moral sort and tend will For example, one argument for vary somewhat with the underlying ethical theory. Pl, and for objecting to the killing of noncombatants, is the Kantian one, (to seriously understate point) the doing to that fails to treat them with the so minimal respect owed to them as persons 2 3. §4. Arguments from historical requirements on just argument from convergence, and environmental arguments. wars, The conclusion that LSN wars cannot be justly waged - and accordingly are unjustified something dreamed up by contemporary "free-enterprise" capitalist state (and opponents communist important the of is America inspired, merely not or the of The etc). same conclusion falls out of various traditional requirements, worked out in medieval times, for just wars. One of the requirements gives but a variant on the first argument (KA). 2** For a necessary condition for fighting a war justly was that it not be the case that large numbers of [innocent] noncombatants are bound killed (cf. to be Barnes, p.775). A just war requires just means, that the war should be means, fought by morally which implies in particular that there is no indiscriminate killing of noncombatants. The implied principle was escapsulated in a principle legitimate of discrimination (between combatants and others) which 'prohibits all actions directly intended to take the lives of p.312) 25 . civilians and of noncombatants' (PL, LSN wars, where not only military installations are targeted, violate this requirement 2 6. 23. Of course there are counterarguments too, and not merely from the military angle in the case of small numbers of obstructive noncombatants. One favored argument is a variation on the Bald Man: there is no clear line between combatants and noncombatants. However as Nagel argues (p.20) there are distinctions between them, firstly in terms of their roles, e.g. in carrying or using arms or directing those who do, and secondly in terms of their harmfulness, the threat they offer. See also PL, p.312, where a simple and effective paradigm case argument is applied. 24. Note that throughout, the text adopts the OED equations, reflecting common usage, of just with morally right or correct, and unjust with morally 15 Overlapping the requirement of just means is that of being that of net evil to net good: proportion proportionality , 'the damage to be inflicted and costs incurred by the war must be proportionate to the good expected up arms' (PL, requirement: the damage and costs, to goods moral proportionality requirement is of the achieved nationally not that in doctrine through war. "improvement" are which way. overall consequences of war conditions way bad, (Barnes, p.782). 'a nation wages war justly the than Similarly only if the for that nation or the wronged nation it is supporting have a decent chance of being better after the fighting ends' (Wakin, p.20). no and According to the first, 'X wages war abstaining from war' improvement "puts wrongs to rights": are Entangled with the "ameliorative" of confined, justly upon Y if the overall consequences of war are better, or less the taking by p.312).2? It is not difficult to see that LSN wars violate this disproportionate criterion the satisfy LSN wars can in these conditions, as scenarios depicting the aftermath of such wars reveal. Some of the lesser requirements for a just war are also wars, for example that of infringed reasonable expectation of success. by LSN It seems that there can be no reasonable expectation of state success in an LSN war - whatever the very differently, exchanges. limited prospects of success for some whatever the prospects of success in What small strictly state limited elite, or nuclear is less clearcut is the question of whether LSN wars conflict with the requirements of just cause or due fault, and of right intention. For 25. The principle can be argued to in various ways. One (by no means conclusive) way is Nagel's way, from the requirements of directness and relevance in combat, the underlying (controversial) principle being that, 'whatever one does to another person intentionally must be aimed at him as a subject, with the intention that he receive it as a subject' (p.15). 26. The situation with strictly limited nuclear wars where the targets are essentially military ones, and noncombatants are unaccountably killed "indirectly",would be different. Such wars are not however excused by the pernicious doctrine of double effect. For such wars remain unjust on several counts, e.g. they inflict disproportionate damage, e.g. on life systems, etc. As Zuckermann says, 'It is still inevitable that were military installations rather than cities to become the objectives of nuclear attack, millions, even tens of millions of civilians would be killed ...' (quoted in Thompson and Smith, p.14, where the italics are added). 27. This is not to be confused with what is very different, the vicious ancient doctrine of proportional response - an eye for eye, tooth for tooth, and so on - recently adapted by the Americans in their latest official policy of flexible response, adjusted to the level of attack. 16 this depends on the sensitive issue of the weight assigned to what are seen as basic human rights and fundamental values, and the extent to which just wars can While the mainstream position be ideologically justified. theory medieval opposed to ideologically justified wars and "humanitarian" wars, these were was not definitively excluded by the traditional theory (cf. is of merit, little when (and issues will arise again subsequently). historical requirements are arguments not do simply not There in puzzling over dubiously effective requirements, however, when so many are decisive against LSN wars sensitive Barnes, p.778). commit arguments any from matters the underlying Finally, these arguments from prescriptive fallacy; historical authority for to the moral conclusions, but use also premisses to the effect that the requirements imposed, and sometimes applied, were justified. As they are. In the Christian tradition there were two main strands of reflection on the moral rightness justness of wars, the just war theory and a rival pacifist or strand, prominent in early Christianity, but largely submerged from Augustine on contemporary until times. Both exclude nuclear wars, one strand because they are inevitably unjust, the other because they are wars and This is the beginning of the convergence argument against nuclear wars: that is duly expediency such wars are excluded from all ethical perspectives, once removed (and even, very frequently, when it is not). however you look at it morally. consensus violence^^. involve argument; it The argument is not proceeds They are morally wrong the same as the weaker from similar results from the full sweep of genuinely ethical positions, not from massive agreement of opinion. The detailed convergence argument is an exhaustive case by case each type of moral theory. Fortunately details can be deontological and contractual theories lead back to requirements 28. one, from shortcut. For for just war These alternatives are not as far removed practically as may appear. For the aim of just war theory is not 'to legitimize war but to prevent it. The presumption is against the use of force' (PL, p.312). And most types of wars are ruled out by the theory. However not all wars or violent revolutions are excluded, and that is enough to guarantee the distinction between the alternatives. In particular, defensive wars are allowed - at least for the defending side, though from a wider viewpoint these too may be condemned 'the classic case [of the just war] ... was the use of lethal force to prevent aggression against innocent victims' (PL, p.311). Under recent international law, defence, narrowly construed, is the only legitimate basis for war; Roman law was only slightly more generous, in allowing for the restitution of goods (see Barnes, p.780). 17 which, it has already been shown, LSN wars violate. war arrived sometimes were defended through principles of such moral or at In fact conditions for just work theories, so that a good deal of the requisite argumentative been The latter point holds also as regards utilitarianism, where it has done. in effect been shown that whatever brand of utilitarianism is maximisation utility already has is finally LSN accomplished, adopted, wars however excluded are utilitarian grounds.The reason for such convergence is not far to seek; LSN such massive infliction of pain and colossal removal of pleasure, involve wars on that this dominates in assessments however they are accomplished in utilitarian Thus any genuine alternative to LSN war is better30. fashion. The arguments so moral overwhelming far case outlined against principles are derivable some from war worse substantially are of the theories just considered). These the obligation to maintain to accountable, condition than the these we violate would earth in proper shape and not degrade its systems: we exhaust not (again LSN principles include environmental ones, such as: generations, to whom do wars For there are other significant wars. such moral principles which the waging of an LSN against the the responsibility to future the world it". Such "pass "received on" not in conservative bound principles - however they are finally satisfactorily formulated - are to be violated in the event of an LSN war. §5. The shift to nuclear deterrence: support nuclear arguments to its immorality. Those arrangements have had a way of halting - and if not defeating, certainly turning and deflating - arguments from the immorality of LSN wars, engagement done is, it is claimed, quite different from is most important precisely in preventing LSN in such war: is continued, deterrence is the only practical desiderata, prevention of war and maintenance of values. way indeed wars from ever occurring, as well as in maintaining other fundamental Western values. it by What is being pointing out that there is no actual engagement in any such wars. deterrence who Indeed, of obtaining both Similar arguments are But compare Hardin. 29. For details see, e.g., Lackey, especially MM. 30. An argument of this sort is developed in more detail, complete generality, in Goodin, especially 'Disarmament'. though not in 18 advanced for all the various guises that deterrence is presented in: mutually assured destruction as formerly, flexible response as latterly, or otherwise. Such claims as to the roles and dubious, several for reasons. objectives of If it were, "sufficiency" to deter would be an adequate goal. superiority. than this, and sometimes goal. In fact there has renewed a even military drive for Pure deterrence can account neither for actual nuclear weapons nor for orthodox Western military strategy32. process decidedly A first reason is that there is much evidence, despite pronouncements, that deterrence is not the - the only - been a quest for more are deterrence Nor has deterrence set in motion the of disarmament to be expected to reduce armaments to levels appropriate f<?r deterrence. On the contrary, under "its" impulse there has been almost unlimited acceleration in building arms (to paraphrase PL p.318). Another major reason for serious doubt about what sold 31. is being under "deterrence" labels concerns the probability factor: marketed and deterrence has It is important to observe that the discussion is not restricted to one form of deterrence, such as that of mutually assured destruction (MAD), but applies to all forms of response likely to engender LSN war. This includes "flexible response", since the likely further development is massive retaliation to an initial Soviet nuclear raid. Part of the reason for this is the extreme vulnerability of the US defence systems, especially the communication systems, e.g. to early strikes and to electromagnetic pulses. In the resulting great confusion, escalation appears the likely outcome. In any case, flexible response includes massive retaliations, as part of its range and is ultimately backed by it. It is also important to observe that deterrence as practised is not confined to responses to (nuclear) attack. The threat of nuclear action has been made in cases where a rival encroaches on a zone of interest of a nuclear power. It is in part because deterrence includes nuclear responses to what is construed as serious misbehaviour of rivals that the practice of deterrence raises the probability of LSN war to the extent it does. 32. As to the first point, there is not only overkill capacity and the drive for superiority (often represented as "negotiating" strength) but the matter of counterforce weapons which are offensive weapons. As regards the second point, US policy has been decidedly expansionist with regular intervention in other nations; there have been repeated US threats to use nuclear weapons, especially to deal with revolutionary activities in the third world, but also in Europe in "limited" nuclear war; and in official military strategy no sharp line has been drawn between conventional and nuclear weapons: on these and other related points see further Lackey MM, p.l91ff., and also Thompson and Smith. The argument can be pressed further, to the alarming conclusion that deterrence is largely a front, which plays only a minor, but justificatory, role in actual US policy. Among further evidence is behavioural data: a government with a genuine deterrence policy would repeatedly emphasize its strength (even when it lacks strength), whereas the US government often parades its vulnerability and weakness in public. For other evidence see Smith, e.g. p.46ff. 19 of increased the probability type arms-race that war. LSN deterrence precisely, More of the is being practised, which involves full-scale preparation for total nuclear war, has prepared the conditions for nuclear war to occur, and has to that extent reasons also, connected with pure the last 30 years. deterrence with and (its war" "cold the probability of a LSN war has increased considerably in the setting), original For other least enhanced its prospects of occurring. at The reasons include the threatening posture called for by deterrence, the propaganda, which comes to be believed, that must be promulgated to maintain credibility overridden or with "sacrificed a for etc. many there analysts century, i.e think before 2000. real The situation has is a high There are several are interests being the dangerous and risky military objectives! state of military readiness; sober whose population now where reached been probability of an LSN war this routes to a such probability assignment.33 It would only require one incident with a 20% chance of leading to an escalating war every 8 years between 1960 and 2000. alerts, Cuban missile crisis, carry a considerably higher chance been have lucky already. In of nuclear For markedly. the years ahead it appears likely that the the danger supplicant nations resources declines. and the worsens and the extent The danger is enhanced by connected increasing chance of the lot. 33. Cox). easily as the plight extractable continuation of of crucial the arms of nuclear accident and human or technical error, none of them negligible factors as (cf. increase zones separating the superstates are increasing in size and number, with Soviet and American expansionism, and reveals the exchange. number of incidents with a real chance of engendering nuclear war will race, on side alone, have been at least as frequent, and sometimes, as with the American We Full past experience copiously Such a sketch can of course be elaborated and tidied up a Even so every substantial point involved can be contested, and many are Another route to a more than subjective assessment is to apply Delphi methods: weigh up the experts' assessments. In this regard it is worth noting that it is not only "nuclear doves" who consider the probability of nuclear war has increased in recent years. American officials have themselves admitted that the policies of realising the strategic potential of counterforce attacks and of selective and flexible responses have increased the probability of nuclear war (Ball, p.128). 20 For better contentious (though not always for good reasons). way no seems worse, or there to make such an overall probability argument particularly tight; and there are plausible arguments, from the complexity of the data concerned and the contingency of the future, that it cannot be made tight. It is bad enough however that it is decidedly plausible that it that probable LSN an war distribution principles) that it probable that century. And that is enough grossly a is immoral to decidedly morally on moral grounds, to change deterrence as policy is immoral. that plausible it highly is sequence of events will be perpetrated this evasive warrant morally to take action to avert the outcome. deterrence highly For then it follows (by occur this century. will is action. ought We That in turn implies taking steps, presently practised. Thus present That is but the first of several ways we shall arrive at that damaging conclusion for present super-state deterrence policies. The plausibility of claims as to the high or increasing probability of war has of course been disputed. * The main counterargument runs as follows: Nuclear war is unlikely, because the consequences are too horrifying. The underlying assumption is that wars and the like, with are LSN improbable. assumption. Unfortunately however horrifying outcomes, much available evidence counters this More than enough humans have not shrunk from brutal exchanges horrifying wars, or even from genocide, as human history attests (cf. Kuper). What is less assailable than the high probability claim, what the certainly have already got into since LSN thereby perhaps helping to bring it about, in the sense war, the probability. immoral of raising The more detailed underlying arguments, then,to the immorality of nuclear deterrence proceed by LSN an deterrence operates by the perverse practice of preparing for situation, against evidence seems to support, is that there is a non-negligible probability of an Thereby, through deterrence, we LSN war. and way of principles mapping war into arguments against deterrence of LSN war might appropriately be called deontic connecting principles moral arguments Such principles The first of these principles takes the following preliminary form: Cl. should If it is wrong that X should occur, then not only be probable is it wrong that it that X occur, but, more important, it is wrong to directly 21 increase the probability that X occur. Thus, for example, it since wrong is to kill large a noncombatant population in LSN war (by §4) it is also wrong to put the population at risk and wrong to increase the chance that the hostage population is wiped out, which both of For similar reasons a superstate is not morally nuclear deterrence does. entitled to impose nuclear risks upon uninvolved noncombatants, especially those of third party nonaligned states. most Like situations. defeat by example, substantive moral Unless counterexamples, X that in and of accordingly, Cl encounters to into runs require dilemma For complication. apparent trouble where clash of order to that the passenger he plane is flying sure that the troubled aircraft does not hit city make Such a defeating condition does not apply in the case of where deterrence, Consider for example the to avoid a greater evil. occurs apartment buildings 3**. nuclear Cl dilemmas are duly allowed for, Cl appears liable to pilot who increases the probability crashes, ethics, in Thus it may be argued that it is permissible to increase the principles occurs. probability part second the principles (though there explains) wrongness of a practice is not is a offset or principles, as §6 of clash removed by its role in avoiding greater evil. It can be argued that it is: argument the from previous argument deserves little perhaps from more such is part of success credence the deterrence. than the of the popular However this inductive driver's racing world As Barnett argues, argument, 'the happy accident has survived the first thirty-five years of the nuclear era is unimpressive evidence that we can avoid nuclear war 34. point a similar time base, that because he hasn't had a fatal crash yet (despite some close calls), he won't. that of the in the coming era, ...' This dilemma example was supplied by D. Johnston. There are more difficult putative counterexamples. For example, in inciting people to civil disobedience, the risk of state violence in retaliation is increased. Thus, to take C. Pigden's example, in encouraging disobedience, Gandhi increased the probability of wrongdoing by the British Raj. But surely Gandhi, unlike the Raj, did not act wrongly? It can be claimed that Gandhi did not directly increase the probability of violence. But spelling out what 'directly' means - in terms of short causal chains over which responsibility can be distributed - is not only problematic but leads on to other connecting principles. 22 (p.100). He offers familiar reasons such as the changing power increase in Russian the strength, rise the relations, of other nuclear powers, etc. (cf. similarly Cox). There are, accordingly, powerful reasons for concluding that Deterrence will not continue to work, DI. and, more important for the present argument, that Deterrence does increase the probability of LSN war. D2. The themes are of course interrelated, and the reasons for them (which are again persuasive but inconclusive) can be taken together: some respects) weaker D2 - the probability factor. proliferation, the but the focus is on the (in An initial of lesser nuclear powers. emergence reason concerns As a result there are many more ways of starting a nuclear conflagration, and so enhanced prospect it.3$ Some analysts consider that a very likely route to LSN war is the initial use of nuclear weapons by confrontation a lesser state. Moreover scarcity the growing and weapon systems, more or terror situations, deterrence power involves 36, being maintained: balance of have an exceedingly bad historical track record. increasing as the race proceeds. of With so many more Arms races, and interwoven There is substantial inductive evidence that present costs widely distributed, the probability of war through accident or error is increased. power resource A second group of reasons concerns the of cheaper supplies, etc. nuclear arms race which deterrence, as practised, is tied to. weapons for opportunities to lead on to war are increasing, with increasing world political instability, relating to third world economic decline, and of lead escalating eventually to races, arms war, with such as probability Next, deterrence depends on a certain balance if that balance is unduly disturbed, as can happen during escalation, deterrence may well fail. A related reason for supposing that deterrence practice increases the 35. It can be theoretically argued that the fewer the nations nuclear weapons, the less the chance of nuclear war: cf. p.230n. 36. The standard argument for deterrence as significantly decreasing the probability of war,would be decidedly better if the arms race were abandoned, and weapons held at the much smaller levels required just for deterrence. Of course such a probability-well assumption is only one of several things required if deterrence is to be justified. armed with Lackey, MM, 23 probability of war concerns the continuing shifts in US policy, especially the renewed quest for superiority which is increasing the incentive of both sides to resort to nuclear war, the USSR to avoid being of advantage the overwhelmed, USA to take superiority achieved.3? Recent dangerous shifts in US policy the towards war fighting are in part induced by a much increased accuracy of nuclear missiles, which both weakens the case for MAD deterrence (since military targets can be selected for strike and cities to some extent removed as thereby also weakens against case the resort to leaders, and even some nuclear shared understanding, mutual principles, and cooperation Finally, level judgement among information of and important) of soundness transmission war. nuclear deterrence requires a certain (admittedly rather minimal, yet of hostages), between It is not just that the increasing numbers of operators super-states. in a position to launch nuclear weapons must remain of "sound mind" and not, for through on delusions of one sort or another. follow instance, deterrence depends upon judgements seriously mistaken: 'each is regarding other the It is also that which side, side's is to the other' (PL, p.313). threat we But think'.38 about what the other considerable, and perhaps catastrophic, margin of evidence, that one perception of what is possible result As side thinks side error. Not thinks, there only not can be a is there side (the USA) has misjudged the other side's (the USSR's) rational, as regards limited nuclear war, of a first strike countered by massive retaliation; must now be severe doubts effectively. "convincing" There is a grain of truth in the claim that 'deterrence is primarily about what the other what be at the mercy of the other's perception of what strategy is "rational", what kind of damage is "unacceptable", how one may as to whether rational principles are with the but there operating to the last consider, to take just one example, the erroneous 37. The point is discussed in Dahlitz, e.g. p.213, where the US quest for superiority is documented. The vicissitudes of US "defence" policy - not to say its shiftiness and occasional incoherence (as in strategic forward defence) - have confused many of its supporters even. Perhaps there is some advantage in the very incomplete and limited exposure of USSR war and imperial policies: we don't see, with alarm, their incoherence and irrationality. 38. Pym, quoted in Thompson, p.19. Yet a fundamental problem Russia and the West face, it is sometimes claimed, is not merely that they do not understand one another but that 'there is a lack of a wish to understand'. This casts into doubt the psychological basis of nuclear deterrence. idea (already alluded to, as held in high places of power in USA and in UK) that LSN war can be survived in rudimentary shelters, and also won. The supporter of deterrence connecting such principles has not defeat to only arguments Cl, but, more difficult, to field a convincing as For the onus of proof lies in showing that the costly rival case. deterrence is justified. through practice of But far from the fairly decisive case that is required (to contrast with the argument through Cl), feeble a only through case the questionable obverse of Cl, Clt. If X is wrong then it is right to reduce the probability of X, For it has to be shown that appears open. * deterrence (substantially) reduces the probability of LSN war, and strictly (this indicates part of the trouble with Clt) that * deterrence does this better (more morally) than available options. The latter uniqueness condition certainly fails, so it will be argued. reasons already given, does the probability claim. up the very conditions probability of such for a LSN an war, it So, for When nuclear deterrence sets can hardly reduced have the war, especially over the situation a mere 25 years ago when such an LSN war was not technically possible. More generally, in showing that nuclear deterrence is justified, it is refute the theme that deterrence is wrong. enough to out that deterrence is permissible, or alright. alternative permissible courses action of deterrence, which appear more morally satisfactory. uniqueness condition has to be established; to be not merely alright, but right. But It is not enough to make For there certainly seem to without not be the costs or problems of To surpass these options, a nuclear deterrence has to be shown establishing such a claim, to fear or acceptable evidential standards, is virtually impossible.39 Deterrence consists in preventing something (often some wrong) by threats including fright OED)**°. (cf. For most people, portraying the horror of LSN wars would serve adequately enough from 39. LSN wars, without all the enormous expense, trouble vivid scenarios to deter them and wastage of An analogous point will appear when it is asked whether deterrence is the way out of the nuclear fix, the thing to persist with in the circumstances. Given that there are apparently superior, less dangerous procedures, the answer has to be, No. 25 preparing to engage in them. deterrence And deterrence by such means (which in any case depends upon) is of course not immoral. military (Schell was not immoral in publishing his graphic descriptions of the nuclear destruction of New York.) But though deterrence per se is permissible, nuclear deterrence, that is deterrence by complete preparation for the object to be prevented, is not, where this object, a war, itself is not permissible. LSN The argument for this is through the principle If X is wrong then complete preparation for (carrying out) X is wrong. C2. Hence since preparation, LSN wars nuclear are wrong and nuclear deterrence deterrence of LSN wars is wrong. claimed that preparing for X is just as bad as doing X: wrong and Z (much) worse than Y. complete It is not however being Y and may Z both What is wrong is by no means uniformly evil In 1945 there would have been little doubt that LSN war was wrong. implies complete preparation be 41 for Among the three types of crime specified in Article 6 of the Charter for the International Military Tribunals (which tried the major war criminals at Nuremburg) were Crimes against peace: namely planning, preparation, initiation or waging of a war of aggression, or a war in violation of international treaties, agreements or assurances, or participation in a common plan or conspiracy for the accomplishment of any of the following (cited in Kuper, p.21; italics added). But after many years of nuclear deterrence, the become increasingly liable to question. wrongness implied in C2 has However the doubts mainly come from 40. Deterrence also commonly includes elements of mendacity, deception, misinformation, that is elements of what are, for the most part, morally undesirable traits. 41. Nor are ordered because wrong, equally degrees of wrongness required: wrongs can simply be partially as regards relative worseness. The point requires some labouring it has been quite erroneously assumed that if Y and Z are both categorically or absolutely, then they must be equally "wrong" or evil. Thus, e.g. Williams: there is no moral difference between running a deterrent strategy on the one hand, and intentionally - indeed wantonly - starting a nuclear war on the other; so that the first is as totally evil as the second. This is because both are held to be absolutely forbidden. Not at all. The arguments from "Y and Z are both absolutely forbidden" to "So Y is as totally evil as Z" and to "Therefore Y and Z do not differ morally" are both entirely without validity. Compare: 2 is a number, and 3 is a number; so 2 is the same number as 3, or does not differ numerically from 3! 26 assuming that complete preparation includes less than it needs to or does. Complete preparation for something, such as several other LSN war, already writes in In particular, it presupposes the preparation is not features. half-hearted but is serious, is not merely for show and is not simply pretence. Observe that mere pretence, or other more psychological ploys, cannot substitute for complete preparation in nuclear deterrence. too sophisticated bluff for alone to there succeed: preparation for war accompanying the threats involved in the other has is now be serious to deterrence. But, on complete preparation does not imply that what is prepared for hand, will be attempted other than conditonally: imply attempted X. complete preparation for X does not It does however involve a conditional undertaking to proceed with what is prepared whether intelligence Military under for certain Complete conditions. preparation, for a wedding or murder or whatever, would be pointless otherwise, so a (proclaimed) commitment to proceed under given circumstances can for be taken of connecting granted. Principle C2 A principles. is part way not the in line a series principle of the same sort that is higher in the series is that if X is wrong then attempted X is wrong connecting X with attempted X: perhaps down as bad), whether X succeeds or not. But the series ends; off well before the lower limits of intensionality, contrary to various religious positions. then the contemplation consideration of of it cuts claims of For example, it does not follow that if X is wrong X is wrong carrying out X is wrong. or that mere non-action-oriented The point applies equally to sexual fantasies, power fantasies, and nuclear nightmares. nothing the (though In particular, there is wrong with contemplating nuclear war, or reflecting upon it, as we are: nuclear wars, even if their horrors don't bear thinking on, are not unthinkable, and in some senses are all too thinkable. Indeed one of the reasons why the connecting principles appeal is that each commonly involves it connects with. decidedly increased probability of the wrongdoing or outcome Accompanying the increased probability are certain reprehensible attitudes tied to the action the evil outcome involves; not those of mere passive contemplation*^. However all the sets of these are connecting 27 principles except Cl hold, where they do, even when the probability of invoked wrongdoing eventuating is not increased. One reason for this is that the means to reprehensible ends may be inefficacious, for instance intending to do chosen someone harm using witchcraft. The increased probability evil an of outcome simply makes things worse. announcement Nuclear deterrence involves not only war preparation, but this threats by accompanied and a threatening posture. For some party, the if potential enemy, has to be suitably frightened or moved, of deterrence succeed: the threat must be recognised as such and be credible. nuclear deterrence yields a further connecting principle: is to This aspect of If X is wrong then serious threatening of X under given conditions is also C3. or, in brief, If X is wrong then conditional threatening of X is wrong. wrong; The remaining connecting conditions invoked all take this general form CG. If X is wrong so is a conditional requires further some explanation. intension to is some intensional functor, threatening from Apart intentions that). C to 'the the most is the not are impossible or even remote or improbable: claim in what (specifically those involving commitment) for follows certain is that sorts there of discussed an conditions the conditions typically concern those specifying a nuclear strike by a potential fundamental credible functor: To remove complication it can be assumed henceforth that the involved which it is obligatory in propositional rather than event style: (or form a e.g. themselves, conditional intensions are conditional obligations where obligation - A conditional intension is a judgement of the form, ^(X if C), where of'.**3 X do enemy. The are intensional functors threatening, intending, and which CG holds, and that these versions suffice to demonstrate of Naturally again many the immorality 42. There is plenty of scope for further elaboration here. Passive spectatorship of evil events where one is in an appropriate position to make a difference is quite another thing, from contemplation of other worlds where evil occurs. 43. The conditional intension, ^(X if C), which is an intension, should not be confused with the provisional form, if C then^X, which is not. The Americans are threatening the Russians with retaliatory action if they strike: it is not that if the Russians strike the Americans will threaten them with retaliatory action. Such confusion has arisen because of the problems of formalising conditional obligation given usual defective theories of conditionality. nuclear deterrence. there are 28 non-action-oriented functors for which versions contemplation, thinking, dreaming, etc. GC of fail, of those e.g. There is also an interesting group of more borderline functors, those of hoping (for), expecting, the and awaiting like, for which CG is only dubiously correct. Connecting principle C3 evolved from the simpler principle, if X then threatening to do... into X is also wrong, or, as formulated by Ramsay: is wrong to threaten...'**** The reason is that practice (e.g. 'What is wrong putting if wrong is something committing rape) is wrong then so also is what goes into threatening to put that into practice, in particular the declared intent to that into practice. beginning as follows: The point can if worlds where alternatively X are happens be put argued semantically, excluded so then are adjacent worlds where X is poised to happen. The complication of the simple form is required for two reasons. only conditionally threatened, i.e. is should certain conditions nuclear war obtain. However the required conditional form can be derived through form, the following argument:- which is perfectly general, X if C. particular, by earlier arguments 44. so also is the simple Observe, furthermore that if something X is if it weren't it wouldn't (The converse route fails (of §§3-4) LSN opposition has struck, or not, and so wrong when it wrong, from substitute for X in the simple form, wrong, it is also wrong under restrictive conditions; have been wrong in the first place. Firstly, threatening X if C. war has. of course.) In is wrong whether the Hence, where X is More generally, to establish CG it is Ramsay's formulation of simplified C3 is considered in Walzer, p.272. It is this principle especially that forces Ramsay, a Protestant theologian who is a nuclear hawk, into the awkward position he ends in, which as Walzer explains, really leaves no room to move. For in virtue o simplified 03 it must be allowed that the threatened wars are permissible to carry out. Ramsay tries to limit these to military exchanges. But to be effective as a deterrent, the exchange permitted must both threaten a also in view of C3, not threaten nonmilitary targets, collateral non-combatant populations. It appears that Ramsay's position, if worked out, would be inconsistent. see Simplified principle C3 is also invoked by the US Catholic Bishops: PL p.316. They put the point both in terms of threat and of declared intent to use nuclear weapons, which they pronounce morally wrong. simplified C3 is rejected by Hare and Joynt (pp.106-7), who want to However the moral status of a threat by way of expected utility. This is assess all the objections to expected utility as a test of morality open to mentioned below. 29 enough to establish the simpler If X is wrong so is an intension to do X. CG'. The second complication in C3, modifying the threat to causes threat, Some modification appears required, because it is often trouble. more serious a contended that empty threats or bluff are warranted on occasion even where is wrong, to prevent the occurrence of something worse .**$ And in threatened is what fact one way of trying to vindicate deterrence, as morally permissible, has been by presenting deterrence as involving threats which do not involve any intention at all to proceed to action on plausible threats. it the support removes basis for of simplified C3. sense one that is not a pretence, empty or a bluff, but credible. says which intended, consider a For the challenge immoral grossly where case conduct under certain not and calls for moral double-think. the circumstances* result To bring this an from improbable intricate Either the threat is followed through, automatically (as ordered, by Doomsday Machine circuitry, etc.) or with further choice, or - somehow - not. is Principle C3 is not simplified and unqualified C3. is unconvincing, conditions, accident. is in effect that itis perfectly morally permissible to issue serious threats to undertake out this Hence the shift to serious A serious threat then, in the slightly technical open to thesame challenges as as Insofar threats. Either it is way the outcome is morally wrong, in the first case obviously, in the second case because the intermediate reconsideration makes it plain that the threat nor ought not to have been issued at all, being justifiable on neither moral more "practical" representatives Furthermore, grounds. natures, to the kinds of themselves to be (as Benn explains). insignificant their and may accept moral double attitudes, such as morally assenting to immoral threats, less corrupt agents cannot: moral states while proportion morally it would run counter to their principled agents they are or take For such agents, who may comprise a not of the electorate of a nuclear state, principles such as C3 are not in doubt. The argument against nuclear deterrence using C3 is as follows:- Either the 45. For a discussion of threats where the threatener has no intention of carrying out the threat, or incentive to do so, see Schelling, p.35ff. The question of the morality of these threats, where the item threatened is immoral, can be left open. 30 threat involved in deterrence is serious or it is not. is then by C3 deterrence wrong. The sub-argument depends on serious threats is a practical one: not is it inadequate, so deterrence is not maintained. is it then If serious But if it is serious nuclear that deterrence namely, that if the threats were not serious, but merely gave the impression that they would be followed through, then would find out, in one way or another. opposition the could not be endorsed in an open or democratic political A policy of bluff system, for example, gaining some discussion, and so giving the game away to the opposition. without Even in closed non-democratic systems maintaining a such policy weapons, especially during there the down of times would be major difficulties in chains of command involved with nuclear in change governing elites, and the opposition intelligence. But then, since the bluff could be called, deterrence would not have succeeded. There are as likely would information through escape well other arguments that the threats involved must be serious. One is that nuclear deterrence already faces a credibility problem, namely that doubts about the rationality of carrying out the big nuclear threat weaken the credibility essential to its effectiveness. To be effective then it must serious be (cf. Benn). Meeting objections to principle C3 leads on to two further versions of one centred on intention, one on commitment. CG, Principle C3 is intimately linked with, and it sometimes considered but a variant upon, the principle C4. If X is wrong then to conditionally intend to do X [knowing it is wrong] is also wrong. The principles are intimately associated because a threat is, according to dictionaries, etc.'. of 'a declaration of intent to inflict punishment, loss, injury, It is their interconnection which lies at the bottom of which deterrence, intending to go to war. principle, that turn C4 is some paradoxes on the problem of credibly threatening war without Principle 04 is justified through the simplified intending to do wrong is wrong, and so also is intending to do wrong unless favourable circumstances for one's principle some an extremely position prevail. Simplified widely assumed moral thesis,*^ perhaps for the excellent reason that it holds analytically. Its elaboration C4 can be used to 31 since proceeding to LSN war when against nuclear deterrence, as follows: argue the enemy duly misbehaves is wrong (by §§3-4), by C4, intending to go to LSN war the enemy duly misbehaves is also wrong. when Nuclear deterrence involves such Hence an intention, all the available evidence shows. deterrence nuclear is wrong. But like virtually every utilitarian themselves, principles utilitarian grounds. deontic principle, principles For it is not difficult to those except from flowing C3 and C4 can be challenged on outline strategic situations where maximum expected utility results from a policy of nuclear deterrence. But on its own this concession casts but little doubt upon C4. For it likewise is not principles difficult to outline situations where the hanging of innocent people, or other injustices, are sanctioned or enjoined by maximum expected and C3 utility. pursuit Those who appeal to utilitarian assumptions try to avoid such more obvious difficulties with reliance upon utilitarianism, scrapping the spots not by doctrine, but by hedging applications of their principles around with qualifications, which, they hope, will trouble of with utilitarianism. enable it So them evade to the worst is with Kavka, whose work nicely illustrates that whatever (little) deterrence has in its moral favour depends upon utilitarian assumptions. Kavka 'begin[s] by noting that any reasonable system of substantial utilitarian elements' (PD, p.287). Even observation were correct — it is not, depending for one consequential elements systems include must infiltrate, an with the 'assumption if thing ethics this upon must have astonishing conflating utilitarian - it would not follow that reasonable particular that assumption produces normative assumption involved is that the act Kavka thereupon tries the paradoxes of deterrence'. with maximum expected to The utility '(the most useful act) should be performed whenever a very great deal of utility 46. Kavka, who labels simplified C4 the Wrongful Intentions Principle (PD, p.289), attributes the principle to Abelard, Aquinas, Butler, Bentham, Kant, Sidgwick, Kenny and Narveson. Kavka also gives reasons as to why the principle appears 'so obviously true'. Kenny and others apply C4 to argue, like the US Catholic Bishops, that 'nuclear deterrence is immoral' (cf. Kavka p.291). It is the clash of C4 with certain utilitarian principles (especially the maximisation principle of p.287) that directly generates Kavka's first paradox of deterrence and lies behind his other "paradoxes": see PD. 32 is at stake' (p.287). objections This assumption is open to essentially the same batch utilitarianism as it is mainly a matter of increasing or itself: varying the stakes involved sufficiently in any counterexample. strategy usual of Kavka tries the weakening and fudging the normative assumption to avoid the of worst problems of distributive injustice, and the like, that maximising utility can morally enjoin. But the crucial defect in Kavka's argument lies follow normative the from overridden supposed to assumptions utilitarian by way, as if it dominated C4 (see especially p.290), what C4 is Though Kavka tends to apply the fudged normative assumptions in this (p.287).**? and what assumption however fudged, namely that 'this means other moral assumptions are that ... in when produce, situations, are moral combined situations in dilemmas. These are the cases assumption special as such not fudged deterrent one where deontic principle, that yielded by utilitarianism, overrides others, but where there are competing, even contradictory deontic principles, such as that it is right to to proceed to LSN war when the enemy misbehaves (on specious utilitarian intend grounds) and also wrong to intend to do so (by C4). that judgement is not overriden. wrong: remains Nuclear deterrence Nor does it in any way follow that C4 is in need of qualification as a result (Kavka's assumption, p.290). situations, However, there are countervailing utilitarian considerations suggesting different imperatives. For what is in these is wrong. the also case is that these in special special circumstances a greater utility can be realised by doing what However it is hardly news, but a objection, standing that utilitarianism sometimes enjoins what is wrong. Special sponsonship deterrent may appear situations, where under utilitarian to get a foot in the moral door, are very special. characterised by Kavka, they are such that the 47 deterrence deterrence is very likely As to Lackey's utilitarian approach rests on a similar fallacy, that utilitarian considerations predominate where stakes are large enough: see his argument for the approach in MM p.192. What happens is not that important consequences override moral principles, but that application of one principle with important consequences conflicts with that of another principle with less significant consequences, and in the weigh-up of what to do in the problematic circumstances the principle with important consequence prevails. 33 succeed, and nothing else is likely to succeed (see p.286), i.e. is deterrence This is very far removed from the real world lodged in a deep probability-well. situation where nuclear deterrence appears to be increasing the probability of LSN war, and where other procedures such as graduated nuclear disarmament are at least as likely to succeed as deterrence. that principles deontic Even if it were supposed mistakenly to real-life dilemmas should be qualified to subject avoid dilemmas, there is little point in qualifying working deontic principles such as C4, given the remoteness of the special deterrent situations. Instead of pulling nuclear deterrence down though the immoral intentions it involves, it can be criticized more broadly through the commitments it requires, by way of the following principle: If X is wrong then a conditional commitment to carry out X is also wrong. C5. The reason is that the commitment is a commitment and circumstances; that commitment is to act in wrongly certain Nuclear deterrence is itself wrong. however a policy which commits states to war under certain conditions. with conditional intention, that superstates and and commitment controlling to use representatives nuclear weapons. not did occur) is to enough establish have relevant the The dangerous strategy of launch-on-warning (which could, for instance, result in a that as so with conditional commitment, there is no doubt their intention And response to attacks the point, for which there is otherwise quite sufficient factual evidence. are Now the connecting principles suffice but logically, nuclear deterrence, for weighty case. instance conditional commitment to LSN war, is wrong. This one principle would By detachment from the by complete preparation for and Deterrence of this type is wrong. also reveals why the suggestion, that the morality of the whole deterrence trip depended on war itself never occurring, was so paradoxical: deterrence. itself sound when all are liable to be disputed, several defensible ones, ideally in concert, make for a principles applied: it out the connections between and not be engaged in (unless its has appeared nuclear war and nuclear Nuclear deterrence should not be practised given that should changed, e.g. left bizarre nuclear war direction can be drastically at least limited, per impossibile in the case of nuclear warfare, 34 to purely military targets). The arguments through connecting principles, can be reinforced by different sorts arguments against the moral correctness of nuclear deterrence. of There are arguments from limited convergence of ethical theories, which start from the commonplace observation that All the ethical arguments in * favour of nuclear deterrence broadly are utilitarian. In fact most of the arguments in favour of deterrence, including many that infiltrated have the ethical literature, are of those generally drawn from game theory, and primarily interested in the one player, the USA. Utilitarianism, though still looking of those expediency advantage of basically at advantages, interests and (typically individual) utilities, has to take a partisan pain of position, and forfeiting its claim to morality supported by other consider nationalities otherwise. The as well, commonplace on less observation is the fact that such qualified moral support as deterrence obtains, derives from utilitarianism. 48 There are two directions on to a general claim against deterrence, either by way of the pro-utilitarian theme * Utilitarianism properly applied also comes out against deterrence or, more strongly, by way of the anti-utilitarian theme, * Utilitarianism does not furnish satisfactory moral arguments. Then, by the anti-utilitarian theme, there are no satisfactory in favour direction: 48. of deterrence. moral arguments Naturally, it would be easy to strengthen the second after all it is widely thought that utilitarianism is a false, Thus the hedged utilitarian defences of Kavka and of Hare and Joynt, and Showing that cogent also within the broadly utilitarian range, of Gautier. ______ defences of nuclear deterrence have to take a utilitarian route would be a Though it is a reasonable conjecture that the much tougher enterprise. T' ' , much would depend on what was enterprise could be carried through, For certainly bizarre principles, e.g. obverses of the connecting principles, can be introduced, which afford deontological routes to deterrence. despite some backsliding by bishops, all other ethical positions; can A deontological made to speak against deterrence and its continuation, be 1___ — . connecting deontic case against deterrence, primarily the way of principles, has been argued in some detail. In the light of these principles, it is not difficult to see how cases from other ethical 2 go.. After all C4 has been defended from a wide range of positions would Af--- -1...... And stances, e.g. contractual, natural law, utilitarian even. <— 35 seriously astray, or even shabby ethical position. political which system depends in some utilitarian arguments for its policies. It hardly does measure for then a upon consensus, to rely on Yet with nuclear deterrence just that appears to be happening, with readily overturned arguments at that. For whether even utilitarianism supports deterrence depends essentially on: it how with applied; is which maximisation recipes; along with what other restrictive assumptions (such as those of a deep probability-well); are generous With sovereignty, national security, etc. or assumptions, different arguably (and superior) varying the guestimation methods, very different results upon The emerge, opposing deterrence and favouring unilateral nuclear disarmament. reason for this is straightforward (and like that ending §4). basic LSN war has an extremely large negative utility. deterrence out to recipes Any policy such It is that as nuclear which increases the probability of this, or even risks it, must lose feasible other of how for such things as preservation of national assignments utility and on a alternatives, consequentialist type whatever are initially applied (e.g. plausible decision Minimax, Dominance, Disaster Avoidance, Expected Value). The anti-utilitarian theme can be defended either by a full-scale criticism of utilitarianism, beginning for instance with its well-known justification of localised injustices, $0 or else utilitarianism when applied One obvious deficiency is this: by to addressing some of the inadequacies of issues like that at hand, nuclear deterrence. on standard utilitarianism, what to do, whether to proceed with deterrence, depends on the probability of its success and on the improbability of other options working. deep, utilitarianism If the deterrence probability-well is morally requires deterrence, otherwise not.$* But what is morally required, or wrong, does not fluctuate with what outcomes are probable. 49. The instability of utilitarianism is illustrated by the discussion involving Kavka, Lackey and Hardin, continued in Philosophy and Public Affairs 12(3), 1983, where, on the basis of utilitarianism, diametrically opposed conclusions are reached. (Hardin's approach tends however to expediency reasoning of the strategic type.) 50. Such wider criticisms of utilitarianism, in all its forms, as an ethical theory are too well-known to repeat. Some of the main defects are considered in another article in this series, 'An expensive repair kit for utilitarianism' . The point that utilitarianism gives no firm place to stand comes from L. Mirlin. 36 Whether deterrence is morally wrong or not, is likely work to independent it is are princip]gs Moral not through expected values, whether utilities or otherwise - though how determined bad some outcome is may be. are deterrence decidedly essentially nowhere whether If nuclear deterrence is wrong where it increases the or not. probability of war, then is it wrong, simpliciter. depend of upon firm to stand. Worse, since the expected utilities in the case uncertain, these of the results utilitarianism delivers and uncertainty measures, offers utilitarianism In contrast with the solid deontic ground of principle, utilitarianism provides only shifting sand. The objections made apply especially against act utilitarianism. form shows special interests, such as conditions security (the probability-well state, of estimation rules are pulled in). high have is deep, utilities, nation-state and special It does not yield a deterrence policy; indeed hardly yields policies at all (other than act utilitarianism itself). and certain other difficulties may be avoided by considering instead a of act most that nuclear deterrence is "wrong" according to its lights at under very it The acts.52 But the method lacks stability; These sequence different prescriptions will result depending upon how the sequence is selected, what is included and what left (as also associated probabilities depend critically on the sequence selected). No unequivocal recipe is delivered. selected out to To see this, suppose the sequence is include worst cases, for instance cases where deterrence fails and war breaks out. In this event it can hardly be argued that deterrence is the policy that maximizes utility over the sequence. Along with the arguments, there are dissatisfaction with nuclear deterrence. other conventional wars. for Firstly, the peace it has provided only nuclear peace, or rather lack of nuclear war, as there smaller-scale reasons concomitant is deep is shortage of no And the "peace" provided is at best a tenuous peace, which is not stable, but liable to upset at any stage by a range of 51. Though this is to oversimplify, the points made are not affected by the simplification. In any case the simplified picture reflects well enough the differences between Kavka and Lackey that matter in their debate (referred to in footnote 49). 52. Whether this is rule utilitarianism, or still act utilitarianism the sequence can be construed as one long act, may be left open. because 37 factors, including error, both human and technical. It does not genuine offer of the sort required for a stable international life, but only a fragile Peace, peace of a sort opportunity is enormous the cost, moral cost of deterrence, because expenditure on it excludes other urgent moral priorities. way, Marxist Secondly, there (PL, p.316). in The US Bishops put this familiar terms of 'the destructive capacity and what is for in between contradiction needed point, spent is what constructive surprisingly a for (PL, development' p.316). §6 - Practical, prudential and more moral arguments from dangers national nuclear build-up of the superstates, and the genesis of nuclear dilemmas. to While there are arguments to the immorality of nuclear war preparation, there are also counter-arguments, that have Americans), to the moral proved justifiability persuasive remarkably of nuclear war (especially preparation in to the present circumstances . The underlying style of argument is simply an elaboration, or state-uplift, of that for the escalation of weapons at the local level, for acquiring a gun or for stocking-up the neighbourhood armoury - and every bit argument from local dangers. and domination; dubious first of all second of nuclear destruction. atomic surrender and so avoid the destruction' (Walzer, p.273). preparation is supposed to guard against more than these; third element, namely, loss of basic rights there with these. blackmail of foreign appeasement In fact nuclear is a crucial of ways life This further set of elements is linked to the danger of foreign domination - which is really a separate element from risk of Though and (freedom, equality, etc.) and fundamental values (upholding of truth, human dignity, etc.) and integrated that The two go together, since if we did not fear the blackmail, we might adopt a policy or as It is that nuclear preparation, 'so we have been told, guards against the double danger: foreign as blackmail. domination need not imply the loss of most basic values it does imply the loss of at least of one, self-determination, freedom to choose various national objectives; conversely loss or erosion or infringement of basic values can occur without foreign domination, for instance, as is commonplace in the 38 "free" world, by internal change of government or governmental approach, through the increased security and control a nuclear risks, increasingly preparation state nuclear demands, But etc. what nuclear destruction, also extensive involves loss of basic rights and values, through destruction of the material of the cherished life-style.^ So nuclear preparation is hardly a clearcut base means of guaranteeing basic values.5^ In other respects too the argument from loss of lacks cogency rings and It hollow. is basic values and rights hard to avoid the feeling that the oft-appealed-to basic values often function as something of a front, like citation values at political ceremonies; religious of clean cover for economic consideration of one sort demands from of of wealth private appealed to category: in and them to having arising with do the an argument isn't, or However associations. And rights the and But not all the values commonly appealed to fall into particular nationalistic ones do not. And one of the main alleged values of deterrence, the resistance to and containment or many another, are, mostly, of the utmost importance, indeed fundamental, and worth much sacrifice. this of power. and oughtn't to be, defeated by its unsavoury values that the argument is a military-industrial complex, many concerned with foreign the domination of other lesser states, and many concentration pious "communism" of of "socialism", can hardly be accounted fundamental, any more than retention of capitalism. communism has happened What has been here with confused of (the totalitarianism, which does remove certain more freedoms (of opinion, association, is course that reality basic information, of) values, etc., (the ideal of) socialist state namely certain and so does etc.), derivatively threaten basic values. One critical question, then, is whether extensive nuclear LSN war, and indeed for rational way of preserving nuclear those holocaust, fundamenmtal preparation for is a good or effective or even values, which we have left. 53. The converse obviously does not hold. Basic values and cherished life-style can be lost without nuclear destruction, or nuclear preparation, as when a more powerful state imposes its values and way of life. 54. The argument from freedom, advanced by Jaspers and repeatedly rolled out by state representatives, is further considered early in Appendix 1. 39 arise Similar questions and domination as regards arguments the preparation depends essentially on an arrangement of hostile structure which itself is open questioned (in §8), both from the serious to question, view of point foreign of danger of the methods of extensive nuclear Justification blackmail. from and basic of states, nation a is subsequently values, such as freedom, and otherwise. But whether ultimately justified or dangers not, these national those that have been taken to morally underwrite extensive nuclear are preparation, and have They justification. been accepted outlook. moral by policy Within particular, that extensive nuclear the as affording moral arguments preparation do not such Northern conventional a It is within such a framework, in framework the moral justification holds good. however, makers fact been widely accepted, and undoubtedly form in have part of many people's others, from arguments engenders establish moral a fix. For the morality of extensive nuclear preparation, but only make a prudential case for such preparation. people face a nuclear dilemma, but, though evaluative in character, it is also not a specifically moral one. And for many others and their respective rights and freedoms, there is no serious dilemma. people who not are who again, so or as familiar with Soviet and American culture and ways of life, by impressed Such beyond live For such the "beneficial" reach of the superstates, prudential counter-arguments from national dangers carry little weight, and the moral case against deterrence is not offset but stands unchallenged. This is the genesis of the argument from isolated people who Consider some a comparatively remote area, whose freedoms are not (yet) in live people. under threat from superpower expansionism, but whose lifestyle is put at risk by nuclear (as under principle Cl). deterrence For such isolated people, who may have little interest in the preservation of nuclear states, there is no nuclear dilemma, and nuclear locations may have problems to national is wrong. dangers, People in less fortunate but in meeting these they are not entitled to impose grave risks on the uninvolved isolated problems people. as deterrence genuine In doing so immorally; and for through similar nuclear reasons deterrence, superstates the are proceeding conventional Northern framework is 40 The same conclusion can be alternatively reached impugned. argument: a put isolated person, and check the resulting substitution Russian in the position of such an or American reflective a by assessment of nuclear deterrence. it would be the same as that of a reflective isolated person, stripped of Since superstate bias, morally opposed to deterrence and not morally transfixed, the conventional framework fails to satisfy requirements of morality. The outcome of the arguments from dangers is, then,very different depending on the whether are arguments applied regards a superstate or not. as The superstate theme which emerges is, in brief, SST. Because of multiple connected dangers from other states which have nuclear weapons, a state - any state that is too large to rely upon other states - is obliged to invest in at least matching nuclear weapons. Hence, by detachment, a super-nation-state, such as USA, ought to have something in the the nuclear armoury that it has. of order meet objections concerning excess, a least at retain Or, weakening the theme to "overkill" capacity, it core of the nuclear devices it has. solid [morally] ought to For subsequent argument it can be left open whether the obligation involved is a moral one, for instance of because the character of the protected, or only (as argued above) one of to grounds supporting those against disarmament a the SS reason $5. prudential theme nuclear dangerous Northern values supposedly being on similar it can be argued that unilateral opponent would be prudentially irrational. It will be freely admitted that what is prudentially or morally required is a suboptimal strategy, like the familiar strategies of the prisoners' dilemma situations and of certain related competitive games. that like could be achieved, would agreement would be cooperative draining of For such resources, the details are well-enough known. future 55. admitted arrangements. Cooperation and be better not merely in removing the nuclear dilemma, but in a range of other respects. expensive, be strategy for nuclear adversaries, if sufficient trust and the superior a So it should arrangements would be much less risky, destructive of the environment, and so on; However for the present and the foreseeable the prospects of cooperation appear - so we are repeatedly told by state It can still, and presumably does, amount to more than mere expediency, since the 'freedom of Europe' is part of what is at issue. local 41 representatives, who are (not always wittingly) helping to make true - unfortunately rather remote: only the policies their sure insurance is extensive nuclear preparation and full preparedness to apply nuclear force. At least this is so where one is a superstate: proceed, largely unabated. nuclear preparation Where one is not a superstate, but a lesser state one must, the representatives continue, rely on a larger ally who has a arsenal, one's nuclear preparation, one under huddles and which contrasts the lack of trust displayed, and encouraged elsewhere. Does a state, one which relies for its nuclear cover on a super-ally, ground for another's But here a level of trust and cooperation is^ called for, by umbrella. dependent states, which is far from foolproof, with nuclear insurance (which is presumably not free) is obtained indirectly through some superstate's nuclear confidence in its rather super-ally strangely dependent have exchange on its territory? much that its ally's opponent? than Confidence, for instance, that its ally will not render it a target or nuclear must stage a Given the proclivity of states, especially large states, to resort to expediency, and given the recent historical record of superstates and their leaders, too much faith would.be misplaced. Thus, whatever the limited force of the argument for the superstate it does theme, not extend to the analogous theme for a dependent state, which differs from SST and ends as follows: DST. Because ..., a state without adequate (or any) nuclear weapons is obliged to rely upon a superstate ally, and within that arrangement, to accommodate the facilities and nuclear installations of the protecting ally. In part for reasons already given, principle DST is not very plausible (and same goes for more obvious variants upon it). Nor do the arguments offered for SST transpose particularly well to direct arguments strikingly illustrated by the case the for DST.56 This is more of more remote nuclear dependent states. Consider the argument from basic values, for instance, from the angle of nuclear dependent Australia. Basic values in Australia are not threatened by, or put in jeopardy through, the actions or plans of the Soviet Union. Nor are they threatened by the other superstate, the USA, the only country with 'the physical 56. As is widely known, inadmissible and usually much overrated considerations of expediency frequently enter into reasons why states allow foreign nuclear facilities upon their territories, e.g. economic considerations such as trade or local revenue and short-term jobs. 42 capacity to launch a full scale invasion of Australia', but 'clearly lack[ing] motive to do so', so far.5? Clearly the argument from basic values does not any look convincing. carries reasons For similar In weight. little the with fact, from argument little care, the present level of a economic and political domination could be much reduced. of force For there only is questionable of because danger such superstate In this way too, nuclear umbrella, and facilities superstate the that would be removed with danger non-aligned practices.$8 With less remote dependent European states these of the from danger of nuclear destruction could be nullified. argument the domination foreign sorts arguments from national dangers are only marginally more convincing, and may be defeated along analogous lines. The differences in the situations of states, and peoples, break the theme of a of situated differently This is a theme especially monolithic West. favoured by US and the West European representatives, who present the West, its freedom, as threatened by Soviet domination. undifferentiated unit. dependent states with But this leading idea, NATO designed powers, and In this the West is a single in part to align lesser to justify putting them at and nuclear risk is as much a myth as the idea of the Golden West. not The West is so monolithic, it is not so comprehensive, some of it is not so free, much of it (including the Antipodes) is not threatened by Soviet domination. Principle DST - likewise what it depends upon, SST - is now under coming attack by European disarmament groups, who challenge the core assumptions of the underlying retaliatory model that * Safety lies in weapons, * More weapons imply more securityS9. Certainly, for more isolated states, such as New Zealand, safety from nuclear attack lies not in weapons but in excluding nuclear facilities (including visits from nuclear submarines). present system is more Europeans are arguing in of a similar way, that the a risk, indeed liability, than a protection (e.g. 57. For the quoted claim, and some of the Australia's Security, p.94. 58. The issue is further pursued in Appendix 2. 59. See, for example, the last article in Thompson. argument for it, see Threats to 43 envisaged the and that without nuclear installations, Europe cannot be Thompson, p.251); theatre limited nuclear war, in the way it is now seen by US a for (but not Soviet) strategists. Once the weapons assumptions are questioned, other the assumptions of and its variants come up for examination, namely retaliatory model * Whether the proper response to danger is armament, in particular , Whether the proper response is through nuclear armament, asopposed, say, to other military responses, such as conventional arms, or, taking off from the previous point, Whether military approaches and procedures (through * are proper methods, etc.) armaments, or should be such dominant methods, of conflict resolution at the international level. It is plausibly argued, against military procedures, that at no level ordinary do we sensibly set about meeting danger or settling disputes by acquiring lethal weapons and threatening to use them - except perhaps on an out-dated, and really frontier warranted, ethics. This leads into the issue of alternative defence systems, a vital matter beginning to obtain the contemporary6° and explanation it deserves, questioning of the framework of but never one that nation-states. already While emphasis anticipates subsequent the state system is intact, force is far from exceptional and military procedures are to be expected and are likely inevitable. nation-state system': For 'force has [a] ... permanent place the in thus Ramsay (on p.xv), who uses this as part of his very orthodox case for nuclear war arrangements. §7. The resulting nuclear dilemmas for aligned states Assembling referred the to as themes the so far nuclear developed fix:- States war-deterrence, because (as argued in §3-§5) to engage in war-deterrence, at least 60. the yields both and__ their—supporter^. deontic dilemma, often ought not for prudential reasons (as conversion to such arrangements. engage in it is immoral, and also ought Alternative defence systems were considered long ago in Mohists. For contemporary work on alternative systems, see survey in Sharp. There is in fact a considerable literature and social defence arrangements, and a growing literature on i.e. to argued using China by the especially the on non-violent transarmament, 44 SST and DST). the This dilemma is no idle construction paraconsistent of virtues but logic), (concocted to demonstrate a serious real-life dilemma, the outlines of which are repeatedly encountered in texts on nuclear and war its aspects 61, as well as being virtually ubiquitous in nuclear war discussions. The nuclear fix is in part simply a more intense dilemma produced by the deontic war itself &2, or at least war which spreads beyond purely military targets, as larger wars inevitably do (since military arrangements, The main dilemma arises rail transport, typically rely on civilian ones). e.g. of version from a combination of the retaliatory model with the features of War war. is required for defence of the state and values it upholds (or pretends to uphold); but war also involves immoral acts and evil consequences. can war" under certain justified. be also seen as attempting a reconciliation by trying to show that circumstances Thus 'some these really justifications evil consequences aegis of war' (Walls, p.260). acceptable than fallacious asymptotic are morally of war aim to show that actions deemed normally forbidden by moral mandates are now permissible the The doctrine of "just But this arguments when under performed is no better or more morally for utilitarianism being as correct when the stakes are large. War and preparedness for 61. war also generate subsidiary dilemmas - for Thus Green, along with many others, 'find[s] nuclear deterrence ... the best of practical policies available to us now ... given the realities of world politics' but 'still demur[s] because of moral qualms' (p.xii). Green also represents both Morgenthau and Halle as having 'rather agonisingly presented a ... case for a deterrence strategy, even while asserting that the strategy is morally indefensible according to the traditional ethical codes' (p.252). Walzer ends in a similar dilemma (he is committed to a stronger and less qualified form of it than he sets down): '... though it [deterrence] is a bad way, there may well be no other that is practical in a world of sovereign and suspicious states' (p.274) - an indictment of the state system that Walzer does not pursue. Similarly the US Catholic Bishops dilemma; they speak of 'the dilemma of how to prevent the use Paskins and Dockrill and in Benn terms of moral dilemmas. present the situation in terms of a moral political paradox of deterrence ... the of nuclear weapons ...' (PL, p.313). In too the nuclear situation is presented in The nuclear dilemma is of course not a dilemma for everyone, for those who think they have seen the clear admissibility of deterrence, or differently for those who have seen through the arguments from national dangers. But it is a dilemma for those locked into the conventional framework. 62. Situations in war are also a major source of moral dilemmas: see Routley and Plumwood where several examples are given. A general logical account of and theory of moral dilemmas is elaborated therein. 45 authority: instance, a severe tension between freedom and difficult 'one of most the of war involves defending a free society without destroying problems p.324). the values that give it meaning and validity' (PL, The problems are greatly enhanced by modern nuclear arrangements. The nuclear fix not only intensifies and complicates other dilemmas induced by the contemporary sovereign state^^, in particular the deep tensions between national security and the operation of liberal-democratic arrangements (such individual liberty, popular control of institutions, etc). other more personal subsidiary dilemmas, as for (political) obligations to example question (the It also accentuates the extent one's of a nuclear state, and role-induced dilemmas such as one's conflicting obligations as a doctor or a nuclear researcher as of political obligations armaments and their processor or evasion is considered further in Appendix 2). At the more personal level, that of individual and group action, there several questions be disentangled - questions different from the key issue to 'What should my state be doing and influence, depending on who one is. do?', on which one may exert lives, and influences, i.e. in what little There is not only the question 'What should I do?' - a question which will have a quite different force depending one are on where sort of state, where one works, what one controls or on who one is and one's roles - but also the questions 'What sort of person do I want to be?', 'What am I prepared to answer for morally?'^" Answers to these latter character questions will feed back to influence those to action-oriented questions. Each of those questions can, in given situations, induce subsidiary dilemmas. The essential feature of a deontic dilemma is that both A and the of A are wrong (or differently, pursuing a nuclear defence policy. obligatory), negation for some suitable A, such as The place and essential role of deontic and 63. The nuclear dilemma is not alone responsible for these other dilemmas. Large-scale nuclear power generation, and other types of warfare and security arrangements, also contribute. But a conflict of ree om a authority is already an outcome of the large central state. 64. For group formulation of the questions replace 'I' by 'my group', etc. The importance of distilling out these questions, and the moral undesirability of deterrence in terms of what it does to people morally, are brought out in Benn, where however the issues are made to look somewhat more separate than they are. 46 moral dilemmas are not widely well or particularly understood, ethical in This is partly because currently dominant ethical positions like literature^^. utilitarianism cannot at all easily accommodate moral dilemmas or the data which gives to rise them then such positions do not really offer reportive but - accounts of wrong and obligation anyway. Contrary to utilitarian perceptions a dilemma does not necessarily have any moral solution, though there may be better and worse ways out. By assessments, form which contrast the with ethical such preanalytical theories, of sensitive theories, do recognise moral basis dilemmas and reflect their features. Reactions and responses that are characteristic of deontic dilemmas the from There is an unsteadiness, an uncertainty as to what to fix. nuclear do, which way to proceed, which principles in watered-down form to temporary crutch. for Thus, as way a of never exercising "morally our world'66, that is in a morally-strapped world. best" ethical Bishops who the of A similar 'strictly conditional' Deterrence has a strictly temporary role the object must and deterrence circumstances. deterrence, is "morally in a fallen acceptability' certainly one strictly wrong, is of from the conditional option as to of what nuclear the to do nevertheless the policy to fix. awkward in Thus Walzer, for example, struggles to the conclusion though "second a to be to move beyond deterrence, 'towards a world free of the threat of deterrence' (PL, p.317), out And be try to escape 'the paradox of deterrence', i.e. moral fix. but shift 'moral while acceptability, can good", responsibility moral deterrence we a (as from good to acceptable) is made by the US Catholic functor speak as grasp example, the Bishop of London contends that the possession of nuclear weapons 'while acceptable" emerge that war in the pursue circumstances (p.274).6? However as more than an immediate stepping stone to a 65. There are exceptions of course, e.g. in the Catholic educated such as Sartre; and Nagel's final example is very instructive. For a fuller theory of moral dilemmas see however Routley and Plumwood. 66. Reported in The Economist; reprinted in 1983, Weekend Magazine p.2. 67. As a response to a moral dilemma, Walzer's approach is perfectly in order logically. Those who, like Benn, 'find it neither coherent nor acceptable' The have not grasped the logic of moral dilemmas. Australian, February 12-13 47 superior it policy, (in assembled is reasons §5-§6), of option, poor decidedly a the sort reasons for are that decisive for those, outside the conventional Northern framework, who find sufficiently already no genuine of nuclear nuclear dilemma. To make matters worse the nuclear fix is, furthermore, own making. states' a fix It is not something they blundered into, by accident. initial nuclear involvement was deliberately chosen, primarily by the the the USA and the USSR in interaction. and In these respects the situation is like people who deliberately let themselves be involved in two incompatible of relationships, and build up conflicting obligations though USA, has by and large also been deliberately chosen, again mainly by escalation that The build-up, in North America occurred on a defensive basis in response nuclear to Soviet The fact is that the USA initiated nuclear armament, and has build-up. frequently led escalation, and apparently still does. programme is to be in addition to existing resources myth, a is some currency, that adoption of nuclear weaponry, and nuclear with one It thereby. are (which agreed generally The recent (1980) United States' strategic be already in excess of to Russia's, and which always have been so) (Thompson, p.21). The present dilemma, that many people feel acutely, is then a direct outcome state policy, allies, and Naturally not the USSR policies. that indicates especially a merely route by taken advanced response to capitalist the USA and its NATO nations, Soviets (or of socialism). state would not have been feasible without complementing And independent evidence, such as Soviet-Sino confrontation, is a strong internal military dynamic in state socialist there nations. There is a two-way connection between world political arrangements nation-states the and nuclear fix. arrangements are an evident source of the nuclear situation is increasingly present world political structure. is widely promulgated arrangements: it is '... seen On the dilemma as one hand, with the these result through political that the indicating the inadequacy of the Indeed it is no longer a radical theme but that the source of the nuclear problem comes from state a world of sovereign states ... which brought the 48 world the present dangerous situation' (PL, p.313). to nuclear fix tends to lock political arrangements into On the other hand, the the statist form, into The arrangements of an increasingly authoritarian and centralist cast. statist espoused purpose of nuclear weapons may be to keep the national defend to and security, interests, reasons such as perpetuating the system state advantageous confrontation, and provide to but underneath there are other sovereign of (!), peace and states of framework the military-industrial interests, dependent state exploitation, and politically favoured inequality it supports. The emerging theme is then that the very nuclear situation arising from the statist and arrangements interrelations (economic ideologies, etc.) tends to, and is used to, lock arrangements of states and zones of interest. sovereign theme is a piecemeal practical one. where side the pattern world the conflicting rivalries, into the present The argument to this Consider first, the matter from the Soviet of national control and progressive military-economic reorientation common to all nuclear states is clearer. The threat from the West, whether it exists or not (and in Soviet perception it certainly does), has become a necessary legitimation for the power of the ruling elites, an excuse for their many economic and social failures, and an argument to isolate and silence critics within their own borders. In the West we have ... carefully controlled ... and selective release of 'official information' (Thompson, p.20). "We" in the West, especially the Americans, also integrated with state apparatus, have, in forms increasingly the military-industrial complex, which is a major beneficiary and promoter of the nuclear arms race.68 Secondly, there is evidence of entrenchment of the arrangements, by things such as the SALT negotiations; there are fixed superpowers and a (growing) nuclear club of nations all governed by a rules, partly held in place by deterrence. shown as flimsy negotiated set Connected with this, there are cases revealing the fixing of zones of interest, such as the Afghanistan example. Soviet US is 68. of The invasion is not regarded as threatening US "vital interests", and so the not overduly worried about Afghanistan and its people. What was The role of the military-industrial complex in present US escalation is sketched in Cox. Marxists, with their dogma of economic determinism, would assign even more weight to this point. As some of them would freely concede, a similar complex has figured prominently in USSR escalation. 49 different, what it was worried about and made nuclear threats adjacent Western oil supplies: were concerning, these lay within the US zone of interest (cf. the discussion in Schell, p.212). §8. initial political fall-out from the ethical Ways out of nuclear dilemmas: Virtually all the ways are ways of limitation, and they all involve in results. one way or another limitations on nuclear arms or the way they are deployed, and limitations the on thus inevitable. and more powers of states. Limitations on national sovereignty are The limitations may be reached by agreement and negotiation, less voluntarily agreed to^^, or they may be imposed, or possibly or worst of all, they may emerge from an initial war. As with other fixes produced by are there suggested the structural arrangements of states, out which do not interfere with these arrangements, ways interstate approaches, and there are ways which do seriously alter the structure and power relations extrastate approaches. of states (and, in the limit, remove them altogether), All the familiar, allegedly practical and realistic , attempts to resolve the nuclear problem, for instance disarmament by mutual arms limitations, etc., are interstate; sovereign state. The same goes (graduated) unilateral disarmament. about the nation-state; they do not tamper with that sacred cow, the for less "realistic" But in fact there is proposals, nothing or empirical fact, is it particularly a stable one. nor, and its replacement by alternative arrangements. as a We are certainly free - in more liberal states, it should be everywhere - to theorise as demise sacred it is not a particularly well justified political form; it is not even a very long-standing form of political arrangement; matter very such as to its And nuclear dilemmas should have encouraged such reflection. 69. In principle it would be relatively easy for states to agree to settlement of their disputes by less damaging and expensive contests than military ones, e.g. by contests of selected representatives, and not just through fighting in some form, but by contests of footballers, singers, dancers, lawyers, or etc. In practice, however, such more civilized alternatives are never much considered in these days of superstates. Animals, by contrast, are smart enough to settle disputes by means much more like these. Even the ancient Greeks - though they had a clear appreciation of limits, which has been lost by post-Enlightenment leaders - regarded the institution of war as final (allegedly inevitable) means of arbitration between city-states, not seeing its social, structurally-emergent, character. 50 Extrastate approaches take one of international of states. routes, the way up, to genuine power, or the way down, through fractionation or deunionisation The ways up and down are by no means one and the same; but they are Some of the important machinery, for a way up to necessarily incompatible. not two world government,is already there in the international Were law-courts. the courts assigned sufficient authority and power, the remedy, namely through legal action, that medieval theorists saw all to intrastate and T superseded by the just case of S versus T. sufficient war deterrence, though Law courts, as usually conceived, are not equivalent super—statist But if the law courts were power then their authority and efficacy would likely rely (at upon least initially) their in could be extended to interstate disputes, and the just war between states S principle given disputes, back-up equivalent for of economic perhaps not by military means. effective without police and jails or and other penalties; and the either will involve the capacity to inflict quite substantial amounts of damage on "delinquents" - which, because delinquents will be typically organisations, will also involve damage to innocent, and perhaps dissenting, participants in those organisations, as well as to other In parties. uninvolved short, such an approach does not resolve the problem but tends to repeat it. The Way Up is one more statist, legalistic, authoritarian way of trying get to grips with the nuclear though mostly in passing to be 70. to problem, and accordingly is often mentioned, dismissed in orthodox strategic texts on Americans, for example, tend to forget that their state (like the USSR) is a union, of fairly recent origin, and that a differently-oriented State of the Union message could well consider dissolution of the union. Regional movements in USA unfortunately lack much popular support at present. By contrast, there are significant separation movements, some deserving aid and encouragement, which affect most other nuclear states, especially USSR, UK and France. The USSR already has trouble in holding its (supposedly voluntarily integrated) satellite empire together; and the one recent attempted addition right on its frontier is proving extremely recalcitrant. Nor should powerful political unions under centralised state apparatus be fostered elsewhere. The same applies to state empire expansion, as illustrated in contemporary Indonesia. Most important, the reunification of Germany should be resisted; instead a more rational regional deunification than the present East-West division of post-war Germany should be sought, along with removal of nuclear weapons from the border region, and so on. 71. Thus for example, Kahn, where such a "solution" is quickly dismissed as, impractical, etc. Hardly necessary to say the Way Up has won most favour with the legal fraternity, and from more authoritarian organisations. 51 the By contrast, the Way Down, though like thermonuclear war. an appearance (a comeback) in some more radical discussions, with the Way Up (in "world order" models: combined unlike the Way Down, is considered however beginning is and more much international system'; and 'the 'towards a no sometimes sympathetically There is by those who take a moral rather than strategic viewpoint. a renewed emphasis on world order, in reaching by The Way Up, Galtung). cf. be to Up but it is making new, is scarcely mentioned in the orthodox discussions; means Way integrated morally missing element of world order today is the absence of a properly constituted political authority' (PL, p.320). A main argument for the Way Up is just repetition a that of which is commonly supposed to underpin statist arrangements in the first place, namely an argument from (generous) variations upon the Prisoners' of the Commons. Tragedy traditionally, ecological order. not as best regards problems to solutions nation-states, of superstate. of organisation, and one of the prospects is destruction of a said to be some Of course, this begins to undermine an earlier application of the "tragedy" argument, since states will lose their sovereignty and some their order—imposing correspondingly weakened. arguments role, and But all obligation political this is assume to , only sound under quite restrictive assumptions. There are, then, many problems through that states will these tragedy A further theoretical with the hitch is Way Up, that a both theoretical and the Way Up merely repeats arrangements. It is contingency, of there being no rival intelligent civilisations nearby, that the problems of interstate relations are not repeated 72. be 72 statist arrangements at a level up, by way of superstate only to of good ones in the first place, when in fact they are not, but are are practical. the public order and, more recently, as to good part of the commons by nuclear war, the solution is now sort as So with the "tragedy of nation-states", where the players are but herdsmen such It is that authority and coercion - in the form of the state * are required to ensure especially, Dilemma, See further Routley and Routley and material referred to a level therein, up and especially Griffin. The real reasons for the state are of course very different from the theoretical cover such arguments afford. Among other things, the state enables and guarantees the accumulation of power, privilege and capital. The major practical hitch is that there is no prospect at all of getting again. such a "solution" to work in time to serve its intended purpose. In reality, we are no nearer a world government than we were a century ago, .... In fact, it is even arguable that since World War II we have moved further away from a world government than we were before World War II. The disintegration of empires has multiplied sovereignties. It is true that we have something called the United Nations, but even the United Nations has declined in power as it has grown in membership. By the beginning of the 1970's the United Nations had become, in some ways, a less powerful and even less influential organisation than it was at the end of the 1950's (Mazrui, pp.2-3). For The reasons for this Mazrui goes on to outline. future foreseeable the nuclear ideological differences between states, including especially differences as to how political arrangements should be effected, exclude any prospect of an world government or a world legal system capable of resolving nuclear operative In some ways, this is just as well. hostilities. monolithic, extremely would World would government foster economism, would entrench bureaucracy with all its damaging features, and could easily tend to totalitarianism. whatever certainly, its be (gray?) colour, political exploitative economic system which would do immense impose damage It would the world an on many remaining crucial respects, to natural systems.?3 The Way Up thus presupposes an unlikely undesirable ideological, requisite of level indeed unity political cannot be economic and paradigmatic, and, separation in some Moreover, unity. of main Northern within nuclear deadlines. expected given cultures, When not even nuclear weapons limitations can be worked out, how much less likely is more much sovereignty, could blockages agreements, sweeping and be negotiated? deadlocks in the involving genuine There an way is endless (e.g. of of state series of such state reconciliation. applies to interstate arrangements, which may make limited use that it limitations almost the the of The same Way Up negotiations or other conciliation procedures within a framework arranged through the United Nations) .?** 73. For a more detailed (but decidedly mediocre) critique of the idea of a world government, see Galtung. Naturally the objections to world government, and difficulties in the way of obtaining it, do not extend to more flexible world arrangements, such a world federation of cultures (cf. Mazrui). Such a pluralistic anarchistic Way Up can be genuinely synthesized with the Way Down. 53 There is regrettably and arrangements much also conventions are evidence frequently concerning war and human rights?$), and are sentiments smoothly not not observed (especially those worth into despicable deeds. not bode convention in great a deal: Even agreements states have openly violated. Indeed there already appears to be at least one any force, of It to which international all the major nuclear states are signatories, which would rule out LSN war and nuclear deterrence, that on genocide. includes lofty for nuclear arms limitations, should sufficient agreement well ever be reached. treaties, international are often enough disregarded, skirted around, or signed does slide that the following Genocide acts committed, in time of peace or war, with intent to destroy in whole or part a natural, ethical, racial or religious group killing members of the group, causing serious bodily or mental harm to as such: the members of the group, deliberately inflicting conditions of life to bring about physical destruction direct and public shall conspiracy to commit be Persons committing genocide or any of punished, whether they are the other acts responsible rulers, private individuals or public officials.?6 it is not difficult to argue nuclear genocide, incitement to commit genocide, attempts to commit genocide, complicity in genocide. mentioned Beside genocide the in whole or in part. following associated acts are also punishable: calculated that larger a strike (such as deterrence policy requires as a back-up response) would almost certainly constitute an act of genocide, through what minority groups. to does some But then, by virtue of connecting principles like 05, nuclear deterrence stands indicted particular it conspiracy representatives of the and as involving incitement. nuclear states acts associated with genocide, in Some well-known political and military would thus appear to be liable to indictment and punishment under international law. 74. Even Dahlitz, who gives a detailed and sympathetic account of nuclear arms control attempts and lost opportunities, is by no means confident that suitable arrangements can now be achieved (see pp. 210-13). Reasons include technological advances now taking place, and the renewed American drive for strategic superiority. 75. See Brownlie, Kuper, and Amnesty International reports. in this paragraph were suggested by C. Pigden. 76. The account of genocide given is taken directly from the Genocide Convention, which is reproduced in Kuper, p.210ff. Most of the points text of the 54 The nuclear fix emerging from nation-state arrangements - combined with the impotence apparent interstate relations to alleviate the situation, indeed of with the apparent ability only to push the world further into the situation nearer to the nuclear "brink" — taken now is to contemporary angle) the inadequacy of nation-state political has given new impetus sovereignty the best-seller and to consideration of other extrastate resolutions. The the indicates the namely nuclear in The Schell's situation should reexamination of the foundations of political thought' world's political unsatisfactoriness radical of the present system of nation states has even reached stands Schell to According and book a new arrangements, thesis that the nuclear problem national (from indicate and of Fate lead to required Earth. the a full-scale to make 'the consonant with the global reality in which institutions ... they operate ...' and in 'work[ing] out the practical steps by which mankind ... can reorganise political its life' (p.219). However Schell himself tries to avoid these 'awesome urgent tasks, which, imposed on us by the political work of our age' ??. else overimpressed by the history, constitute So, not feeling the pressures of history or realities of (unstable) nation-states, do most But there is no good reason to avoid the task of political political theorists. reassessment, made so much more urgent by the nuclear situation. There is little doubt but that we live (too unthinkingly) with an antiquated system many present state arrangements, communications condition; especially, were in a of (allegedly when 17th century very different and the main outlines of the modern totalitarian state and its manifold deficiencies recognised, even earlier. 77. willingly, The features representative government, were largely fashioned in the us even of political arrangements which the nuclear impasse, among others, calls into question. best of even democratic) technology, more were the and primitive discerned, In the briefs presented A similar theme, similarly questioning 'such sacred traditions as absolute national sovereignty', was pressed by Bradley, a significant US general (see Cox, p.225). Schell (like Bradley) does not make it entirely clear whether he is thinking of the Way Up or the Way Down, but the names he drops suggest the Way Up. So does the main thrust of what he says, e.g. 'Thus the peril of extinction is the price that the world pays not for "safety" or "survival" but for its [sic!] insistence on continuing to divide itself up into sovereign nations' (p.210), as if the natural or original state were an undivided one? On Schell's position, see further Appendix 1. 55 for political arrangements such as representative government, the excessive size and complexity of modern states was not envisaged. But such systems continue to operate, insufficiently questioned, though their justificatory bases undermined. present Nuclear representative emphasized have problems political have been several other deficiencies in arrangements. particular, In they have revealed how governments can thwart popular opinion, and act against the evident will of the people on an issue, for instance in installing US missiles European Now that modern communications and information-processing countries. make it feasible to determine the mix of public positions on major case for representative procedures is dissolved. century 19th issues, a issues. The reduced power excessive back at developments, issue-regulated and large imposes complex other modern What requirements. by states government recent technological Firstly, smaller initial grouping than giant states, integration of groups by principles of federation. as it is to informed citizens of satisfactory a approximate goodwill. As there are serious deficiencies in the information in present progressive and procedure, depends control, nation-states, even and release the distribution information, channels, and so forth. acceptable the from These distortion restrictive of most liberal of them (and Again, especially with new and less But there are evidently vested interests which stand to benefit from the limited of upon nuclear problems have again made patent, systems, there is little excuse for this. information upward Secondly, democracy, insofar political related deficiencies as regards education). publicly democratic like many other social arrangements, appear to function better with procedures, flow and called for are smaller are groupings, information flow, communication and education. and major on governmental power to more participatory democratic forms, a route made possible even in expensive least of governments would, to that extent at But the route down through least, be reduced. much elected way that is thoroughly ambiguous on most issues) are not given an almost free hand on every issue, but are required to answer policy the It is past time for more issue-controlled democratic procedures, where governments once (in some in of data features in have availability major communication helped in making present deliberately fostered pattern of nation-state 56 confrontation, and in establishing the prisoner's superstates nuclear are often seen to be dilemma type the situation locked into (on which see, e.g., Hardin). A central argument, arising from the nuclear fix, for current questioning arrangements and seriously considering their adjustment (in theory at political least), takes the following shape:e Political arrangements should answer back to certain in justified terms doing of at where least are so.These requirements include such things as enabling good and meaningful and moral lives for those arrangements, and requirements (as certainly in who under operate the much of the West) the basic material conditions for such lives are met. * Because of the nuclear fix, nation-state arrangements have these requirements. For guarantee the prospect of arrangements. nation-states, good and at least in the North, can no longer meaningful to lives their yet there is a non-negligible probability that person's morality is jeopardised if the person is obliged a under those such lives may terminate, less than fulfilled, in this way. support meet A life's meaningfulness is certainly diminished if it ends before its prime in a nuclear disaster; many to ceased state to Furthermore a in acquiesce or engaged in nuclear war preparation or nuclear deterrence (cf. Benn). Therefore, nation-state arrangements have should be not all) nation-states: have their justification, and Variations on this type of argument apply to many (though amended. nation-states forfeited it is not only because of the forfeited their mandate. nuclear Political fix that some obligations to such states are correspondingly dissolved. There is enough evidence that power-brokers who control sight of, or worse have lost don't care about, the point of political arrangements, of what justifies or is supposed to justify their states. 78. states This applies both to How they answer back admits of expansion in various ways, depending on the underlying political theory. Rawls, for example, puts it in familiar contractual form: that the political order is 'a cooperative venture for mutual advantage' (p.4). Mao puts it in a standard democratic way: 'since the purpose of all political processes is nothing but to serve the people and their interests, it is the people who should control in a meaningful way, the government' (see Soo, p.68). 57 more powerful states and to lesser states, both claim popular to a put value higher on military situations: sovereignty they do on human than for copious evidence see principles the just of warfare repeatedly, as have many other principles. violated 'nuclear where Kuper). This by Israel, Vietnam and many other states in nonnuclear illustrated already some have more often, they act without it or as national survival' (Schell's conclusion, p.210; is brokers The situation has been reached against the will of the people. powers where, and mandate the where blatantly been have Such states have forfeited much of what claim they had to external respect or internal political obedience; so, on other grounds, have many other states. It could just be, of course, as is often alternatives, that have or been insinuated, though effort little but option of world government). for dismissed, As to all whether little opportunity not do to and work, appear to we Down. There working towards the weakening especially on the alternatives can be may and have given been know very little about how humans sufficient give organising and trying out alternative Way such alternatives But, operate under substantially different arrangements. accessible expended been has instance as lacking feasibility, it is difficult to be entirely sure without taking the risk of being dogmatic; deadlines no the range of alternatives or their features (except perhaps for the researching very are there But alternatives there are, no possibly better alternatives. glimpsed, that to time arrangements, even again, once very far on proceed those nuclear of the more be time to proceed a little way however, in breakdown of the larger superunions, which are the immediate problem. invalid to simply conclude that alternative political and nuclear states, Thus it would be social arrangements, theoretically feasible and certainly a longer-term goal, do not presently while offer a part of the practical response to the nuclear fix. But there is no need to insist upon a single-track Way Out of dilemma to the exclusion of all others: quite the contrary. the nuclear We can not only afford to be fairly catholic about "second best" approaches and embrace whatever seems to be working or looks like helping, within recognised ethical (and other) constraints; indeed, given the urgency, the direness of the situation, we 58 should as fairly catholic and not inflexibly committed to narrow methods, such be bogged down (and very on arms limitations negotiations should methods perservered be unrepresentative) certainly and between main nuclear states. made attempts and with, No-first-use declaration, a ban on weapons in space, etc. But even such to e.g. superstates, the from concessions significant undemocratic further wring jointly a signed The direction of most hope for progress has however come into view, a direction that is not especially The political means of the Way Out are what they have new. larger every liberal on issue that has mattered: humanitarian or been from outside state governmental apparatus by organised pressure from within or and it, characteristically Bottom-Up methods are considerations familiar alternatives self-organising furnishing by and practically virtually upon without bypass which it, Top-Down. never Such but part of the more general, and very effective, case against reliance upon states for a range of things they are now supposed to but supply, which can almost that effectively and for invariably matter be obtained, where required, more expensively less without (and them their monopolies). In the case of security it is states, with very few exceptions, imposed, or frequently The opposition to the local from have in, military solutions involving nuclear installations acquiesced and nuclear weapons. that neighbourhood and escalating groups, fix nuclear has come some of them now federated across nations (so the direction is not really interstate). These have groups been successful in blocking some nuclear installations and establishing, for the time being, against movement nuclear-free some nuclear neighbourhoods. equipment The patchwork grass-roots is strongest in Europe, which is - as the movement realised, and what gave it impetus - a leading theatre, on US strategic thinking, for a limited nuclear war not touching extremely doubtful that increasing NATO and American Europe will make it a safer place: American shores. nuclear installations removed installations in on the contrary it seems probable that Europe will become much safer if the anti-nuclear movements these It is succeed and Europe rendered nuclear-free. grossly immoral conduct will thereby also be considerably reduced. in having The chances of 59 What of the spectre of Soviet domination, military, ideological and in Except case the Europe, of other? where the inexcusable suppression of Eastern Europe all too evidently persists, this is an obvious fabrication. Does anyone expect the united Soviets to absorb China, let alone take over Canada seriously or Brasil say? And even in Western Europe the spectre is failing partly giant fashioned financially dominated and economically politically and ideologically, by the USA. ideologically, dominated propped exaggerated, up by the NATO powers' and some in and, some measure, Indeed much of the "free" world is adequately not countered military by The means. domination to which nuclear weapons are considered relevant insofar as is basic any in mode of But military. military, and associated political, domination of Western Europe by the Soviets is a problem, there are several ways other predominantly American nuclear weapons to mitigate it. only local defence arrangements - whether top-down alternative is it dominated economically, by the USA. of That is not generally considered so much of a problem (as it is?9), and case a Since the last World War, Western Europe has been military-industrial alliance. increasingly largely and much methods social — but also some on methods, or restructuring, such as social power to dispersed local more cooperation and interchange with the Soviets and much and reliance These should include not state-supplied decentralisation, regionalisation and devolution of organisations, than Eastern Europe. Part of the point of whether external or restructuring internal, so is especially situations, is to state-contrived 79. break make military any takeover, much more difficult and pointless, and the restoration of local control easier.Part of interchange, to the point of cooperation and at the level of more ordinary people, in more ordinary down conditions of hostility and distrust and to sabotage the West-East confrontations, and thereby to remove For many peoples of the world, and in its impact on the natural world, advanced corporate capitalism is an oppressive and damaging doctrine. But, in contrast with austere Marxism-Leninism which would improve the lot of some of the oppressed world while even worsening the impact on the natural world, corporate capitalism admits a certain pluralism, and recognises many more individual rights and liberties. Certainly Marxism-Leninism which appears to degenerate in practice to an authoritarian and totalitarian position is a less welcome alternative. It is fortunate, then, that we need be saddled with neither: there are superior options. 60 other expenditures.81 popular and for, motives Western support Europe, for for, long military much too adventures partial to and military adventures, should now be helping itself rather than relying on a leaky American nuclear umbrella for its defence. Moreover it ought to be, at the very least, uncomfortable about the risks of catastrophically damaging the world in the of interests its own security. extensive parts of Nor should other "nuclear dependent" states be prepared to acquiesce in this not uncharacteristic European imposition. world, what There LSN is war no risks, enormous for virtue Western in sacrificing other parts of the Europe, military-based domination to other parts of the world. which has long exported There are better options than dubious and risky nuclear shields for Europe. 80. Thus, for example, to the extent that local defence groups are integrated under more centralised direction, it would be a built-in principle that surrender of the central directing section absolved the federated groups from following suit or following further directions. That is, through devolution of power, surrender becomes structurally impossible (though individuals or basic groups may surrender). Moreover, the central section would hold only limited information about the federated units it integrated. The locally organised groups themselves, which would merge with local populations, would be trained in tactics of passive resistance, sabotage, (nonviolent) guerilla warfare, etc. The net effect (as C. Pigden, who made most of these points, argues) would be to make the cost of military conquest, occupations and exploitation prohibitively high. One reason why the Japanese Army High Command decided against invasion of Australia in March 1942 was the character of Australians and the fact that they 'would resist to the end' (Threats to Australia's Security, p.62). Yet the 1942 (war reduced) Australian population was substantially untrained and unorganised for locally—based defence. With such a defence restructuring, Australia would not only much reduce its vulnerability to military adventures, but remove standard reasons for succumbing to threats of outside military domination, blackmail, and the like. 81. In particular, with sufficient cooperation and trust, competitive prisoner's dilemma situations, which depend on the prisoners being kept separate, are removed. So too a main model supporting deterrence policy would be undercut. And the arguments from national dangers would be further corroded. In the same direction, it is important to extend cooperation between USA and USSR down below the level of state trade deals, e.g. in grain and gas, to communication and cooperation between people. For such commercial deals there is sufficient trust, even in periods of intensive confrontation: why should it not be so also at more significant people-to-people levels? Many further sorts of interrelationship are feasible, and inexpensive by military standards, e.g. sister cities, common clubs, worker exchanges, gift projects. If, for instance, 100,000 or more ordinary Americans were living, working or holidaying in USSR (and vice versa), Americans would feel less enthusiasm for hurling nuclear missiles into Russia (or vice versa). Only quite inadequate efforts have been made to build up mutual respect and trust; on the contrary, a lot of resources have been expended to encourage precisely the opposite attitudes, e.g. as part of the strategy of the "cold war". 61 What the anti-nuclear movements must press for and disarmament (and, on the more perceptive transarmament, to conversion i.e. outer of edges graduated movements, the alternative social defence arrangements). But the argument also makes it clearer how far this should go, through in in part it is what they have been pushing for, nuclear reduction broad outline: way clear accordingly is namely all the disarmament^^ to total nuclear disarmament, unilateral certainly to local disarmament across progressively larger parts of the planet's surface, including especially Europe. For once state is demoted, its the importance and the necessity of its maintenance properly downgraded and reliance on decision-making its diminished decision-making - once all that is happen), in duly of favour more localised control and for allowed not does (it need to major component in the nuclear fix is removed, namely the problem one of reduction or even loss of state sovereignty. Maintenance of that sovereignty has been assigned a mistaken importance, which in turn accounts for the mistaken weight assigned to the arguments from national dangers. What is and important worth preserving is not the sovereign state, but certain ways of life within the state. The nation-state and dangers to it, and accompanying features such as misplaced nationalism, are the weakest links in the nuclear fix situation. Once the demise of the sovereign nation-state is allowed for, the arguments from national concerning particular. dangers individual also and group rights and In freedoms, by the that nation-state. matter The are 82. to arguments liberties in for them, as smaller exclusively or nation-state is neither sufficient for are disappearing, nor community arrangements can ensure them. But arguments from individual and group dangers remain, do they not? risks are civil necessarily them, since in increasingly many states these liberties necessary place their None of these require national sovereignty or even a national life. None of the rights and freedoms guaranteed disintegrate. individuals and groups remain: To be sure, that has always been so,83 and is not The initial but important steps are at zero cost as regards deterrence. Were deterrence really the policy there would be little case for more than a fraction of present nuclear arsenals. The steps to disarmament are well-known, e.g. the scrapping of obsolete weapons, and an end to modernisation, the removal of nuclear weapons in crucial theatres such as Europe, etc. 62 being changed but only worsened in this age of mostly to want that sure be or other outsiders. People their lives will continue to run their course, ideally in a flourishing fashion, and will not be Russians nation-states. nuclear controlled Americans by or Nuclear arrangements which threaten their lives are not a rational route to these ends. In the weigh-up that should occur in charting a way as dilemmas the out of deontic such fix and its subsidiary dilemmas, there are then much nuclear more important elements than features of the nation-state, namely some of those the state is supposed to safeguard, such as individual and local welfare things and autonomy; weapons. but those things are better ensured by main reasons are familiar: The threaten the loss of basic values, such removal the nuclear of in particular, nuclear circumstances as and welfare autonomy, many for creatures and regions, and the potential loss is in general much greater than in a nuclear-free situation (even should another with example, the production of nuclear weapons reduces both local of the opportunity remain armed There are also well-known supplementary reasons; weapons). nuclear party ideological welfare for (because costs of weapons manufacture) and autonomy (because of the accompanying security measures). Thus the appropriately devices and fix nuclear resolved, it can deploy, and considerable reduction of state sovereignty. how), and since rate, any by by allowing for the But, although that is a reasonable Way Out, at little cost in the circumstances, it will be practice, at theoretically sovereignty of the state (especially as to what nuclear limiting weapons is strongly resisted in those who hold power hold it, in one way or another, under the auspices of the state. This is a main reason why people must organise and act against the state. Again the resolution also looks practical enough, since sovereignty reduction in need apply essentially only to the the production and deployment of nuclear weapons. 83. the Indeed it could in principle be obtained by negotiated It will remain so under any satisfactory political arrangements. Until human social arrangements change substantially, there is no substitute for on-going vigilance to ensure or maintain political liberty. 63 agreement (at the top levels of state). However to get this far with the superstates, the limitations of state-power will likely have to proceed further: for nuclear weaponry does not stand in splendid isolation. into both concerned. systems military and (civil) Rather it tied is industrial production of the states So, unsurprisingly, practical-looking resolutions are being solidly resisted by superstates. Accordingly more popular (bottom up) action against nuclear-involved states especially and the superstates, after all the states causing the most against serious dilemmas, will have to be taken much further. variety of organised forms. Once again it will take a These include a refusal to contribute to nuclear of war preparation, either directly or indirectly. widely, blockading of shipments of uranium, and the from such steps as the forms The action range refusal of supplies and services to sailors on nuclear ships and submarines, to withholding or redirection of taxes destined for nuclear security purposes. the They include as well the whole nuclear installations and range of nonviolent facilities protest which (methods methods against do exclude not incapacitation and decommissioning of equipment, and which do include new model resistance and defence organisations). 8** It is important to realise that petitioning of power state representatives and holders, for instance through letter campaigns, demonstrations and direct appeal, is far from a complete strategy, and may be ineffective or ignored, the results discouraging. and This is one reason why popular action should be based on a more comprehensive political strategy, which also involves withdrawing support from prevailing state arrangements, and working out and participating in alternative arrangements, especially alternative defence forms.Sufficient details as to what to do are already known, enough to make an immediate start. 84. For some impression of the range of methods, see again Sharp. 85. For much more on all these points, see e.g. further Appendix 2. Martin. As to what to do, see 64 APPENDIX 1. ON THE FATE OF MANKIND AND THE EARTH, according to Schell, and to Anders. A series of nuclear prophets has produced a series of philosophically-oriented works on nuclear war and the alleged implications of human extinction.^ The series is important for its deeper penetration into the nuclear dilemma, down to metaphysical levels; in this the series contrasts with the transient superficialities of much of the political commentary. The most widely circulated and influential text of the series is undoubtedly that of the slightest of the "prophets , Schell's The Fate of the Earth. This skillful piece of media—philosophy uncannily redeploys some of the apparently deep phenomenological themes of Anders. So, conveniently, main assumptions of Schell and Anders can often be considered together. To criticise their assumptions is not of course to belittle their work. In particular, Schell's little book, for all its political shortcomings, is having a significant and much needed effect in shifting attitudes towards nuclear arrangements. It is especially valuable for its vivid and horrifying scenarios of the aftermath of nuclear attack. Unfortunately it also exhibits, both philosophically and factually, severe defects. Some of it is simply garbage: to select one example, consider the claim that 'without ... a world-wide program of action for preserving the [human] species .... nothing else that we undertake together can make any practical or moral sense ... (p.173, rearranged). This should certainly be rejected philosophically; for there is no separate moral issue of such overwhelming importance that all other issues become morally neutral. Moral issues remain moral issues: they don't cease to be so when compared with more important moral issues (as Schell effectively acknowledges elsewhere, p.130). And the claim should also be junked on more factual grounds. Humans form a highly resilient species, like rabbits in Australia a survivor species, unlikely to be exterminated under presently arranged nuclear holocausts. 1. The distinguishing term is from Foley's Nuclear Prophets, where many of the leading prophets are assessed. One well-known prophet not so considered there is Jaspers, presumably because his main work (which might equally well have been translated as The Fate of Mankind) comes out in entirely the wrong direction. For it gives heavy philosophical attire to the better-dead-than-red abomination. A main argument against Jaspers so presented is simple. However bad being red might become (at present it is debatably worse than living under some of the totalitarian regimes the free West props up), it still gives humans a further chance for good lives, since regimes fall or can be toppled: but total annihilation removes that all-important opportunity. But Jaspers does not present his position so simply. Rather his contention is that there are circumstances where and principles for which a person or group of persons ought to sacrifice even their lives. Freedom is such: a life worth living is a free life. But the latter point can be granted without conceding that sacrifice is a possible means to it. While the sacrifice of one or a few lives may be a possible (if dubiously effective) way to free lives for others, certainly the sacrifice of all lives is not a possible route to free lives for all, since no human lives remain. To this extent Schell is right (on p.131) in accusing Jaspers of an each to__ all fallacy. Jasper's idea that "the free life that they try to save by all possible means is more than mere life or lives" breaks down when applied to all participating people. None can gain free lives by extinction of all: that is not a possible route to life even. 65 The example was selected however because it leads into, indeed presupposes, two of the major defective assumptions in the work of Schell and Anders: 51. Nuclear war will eliminate life, human life at least, on earth (the extinction assumption); and 52. In the absence of humans, very many notions, not only those of morality and value, but those of time and space for example, make no sense; or, to put it into a more sympathetic philosophical form, these notions depend for their sense on an actual human context (the extravagant anthropocentric assumption). It is applications of S2 which give Anders' and Schell's work ^ some of its apparent philosophical depth, and certainly induce much philosophical puzzlement through the paradoxical propositions generated. But the frequent applications of S2 depend essentially on SI. For without total extinction there will be humans about, to make past and future, good and evil, go on making sense! Granted the factual assumption SI is by no means ruled out as a real possibility; granted the technological means are now available to make it true, to render Homo sapiens extinct;^ granted the prospect of nuclear war does threaten leading centres of Western civilization with obliteration. Even so SI appears unlikely in the light of present - admittedly inadequate - information. Even in Canada, which lies on the polar route of Soviet missiles, human life should be able to continue in certain northern areas (according to Canadian medical studies). Schell's argument to SI is extremely flimsy. It depends, for example, on an unjustified extrapolation from the Northern to the Southern Hemisphere, but for the most part it does that very North American thing, of contracting the world to North America. (All that matters, all worthwhile civilization, is in USA, or at least, to be more charitable, in North America and Europe, which will also be wiped out, i.e. its human population will be eliminated in the nuclear holocaust.) Some of the data Schell relies upon, for example the effect of nuclear explosions on the ozone layer, is significantly out of date. Other effects than ozone destruction apparently transfer even less well from North to South. A factually superior study of nuclear disaster than Schell's, by Preddey and others, indicates that parts of the Southern Hemisphere, New Zealand and southern latitudes of Africa and Latin America could escape relatively unscathed from even most massive northern exchanges.*' Both Anders and Schell remark on the "impossibility of unlearning" the means of manufacturing nuclear bombs. It would seem that extinction, which they both foresee as at least a live possibility, would furnish a good medium for unlearning nuclear technology (something very like this emerges from van Daniken's theory of an earlier "high" technology). In virtue of S2, they would however exclude such a possibility as a case of unlearning, contending wrongly 2. For a detailed comparison of Schell and Anders' remarkably similar versions of S2, see Foley JS. 3. Thus the Last Man argument, important in environmental ethics, is no longer merely hypothetical, awaiting the remote death of the Sun, but assumes new urgency. It is this sort of argument that connects environmental ethics and nuclear ethics, at a deeper metaphysical level. The Bomb and Bulldozer are out of the same technological Pandora's box. Nuclear technology is not the only route to human extinction, nor the only Pandora's box. Biological and chemical means are perhaps even more effective, and certainly can be more selective in what gets extinguished. 4. However, new modellings and estimates, none so far very reliable, keep appearing, and amending the picture. On the basis of one recent scenario, generated by a computer modelling of a 5000 megaton nuclear exchange, the immunity of the Southern Hemisphere to the dire consequences of a northern LSN war has been questioned. In particular, Sagan, no doubt overreaching the evidence, has 'warn[ed] that the nuclear blasts would create enormous differences in temperature between south and north, shifting normal wind patterns and carrying smoke and radioactivity south' (Newsweek, November 7 1983, p.56). Some sections of the environmental and peace movements have a vested interest in exaggerating the probable effects of nuclear holocaust for life on earth, much as many statesmen have an interest in minimizing them. 66 that the notion no longer made sense. But what they seem to want to suggest with the impossibility-of-unlearning message is the inevitability of the development and eventual use of the technology - as if having learnt the means all else was determined, and manufacture and use ceased to be a matter of choice. Certainly such views have been floated $. But they are not tenable. There are many examples of technological advances that have not been taken advantage of, and there are even cases of technological developments that have been manufactured but not marketed or used. There is not something very special about nuclear apparatus that puts it beyond the scope of such generalisations. Both Schell and Anders do claim that there are very special things about nuclear weapons, in particular that they do not allow "experiments . Even if this were true - it is certainly not of smaller weapons - it would not tell against the previous argument against the inevitability of nuclear weapons. And in fact Anders and (even) Schell hedge their claims about testing, and the limits to nuclear scientific work, to large-scale weapons and independent experiments which do not interfere with the observers and those outside the "laboratories". Again they have latched onto major points: in particular, we have at present no way of testing the cumulative effects of large nuclear weapons in concert, e.g. for more holistic effects such as fireballs or firestorms, electromagnetic pulse or ozone destruction. Short of an LSN war, and likely enough with it, these crucial effects must remain largely untested and hypothetical in character. The penetration of human chauvinism, as in S2, is not something peculiar to Schell, but is a product of Western philosophy, European philosophy especially. This chauvinism is unfortunately alive and still well, Anders' version of S2 being just one striking illustration(cf. AA p.252ff.). It has also deeply penetrated Anglo-American philosophy, and has recently been extended by Wittgenstein's work, where even the necessary truths of mathematics are taken to be a product of human conventions, and would vanish with humans! Such are alleged implications of extinction; but the fact is that the truths of arithmetic are in no way dependent on the existence of humans or humanoids or of gods or giraffes. In Schell, human chauvinism is dished up in a particularly powerful and obnoxious Kantian form. Thoughts and propositions, time and tenses, history and memories, values and morality, all depend on the life-giving presence of human beings — past or future or merely potential humans are not enough, persons that are not humans are certainly not enough. Thus, according to Schell (p.140, e.g.), '... the thought "Humanity is now extinct" is an impossible one for a rational person, because as soon as tt is, we^ are not. In imagining any other event, we look ahead to a moment that is still within the stream of human time, ... '. The thought is however perfectly possible for humans; we can have it right now. Though we no doubt have it falsely, a later rational creature may well be able to have it truly. Schell erroneously denies that: there is no "later" '... outside the human tenses of past, present, and future ...' (p.140)6. Human extinction eliminates 'the creature that divides time into past, present and future': so annihilation cannot 'come to pass' (p.143). But it is simply false that the tenses are human; the tenses depend on a local time ordering (perceptible to many creatures other than humans, but not depending at all on that perceptibility for its viability) relating other times to the present, to now (also a human-independent location, evident to other creatures, and borne witness to by such sequences as the passing seasons). And annihilation may also too easily come to pass, for many humans in the North at least, as it came to pass in recent geological times that humans began to exist upon earth. Before that there was a time before there were any human beings. 5. Not merely by technological determinists of marxist persuasion. Hackworth, a former US general, argues by straight induction, that if the US military has a weapon it will use it. 6. The appalling theme that humans create past, present and future repeated elsewhere, e.g. p.173. (etc.) is 67 Anders' argument for the demise of time, that 'what has been will no longer be even what has been', is also explicitly and narrowly verificationist: 'for what would the difference be between what has only been and what has never been, if there is no one to remember the things that have been' (AA p.245). There would still remain many sorts of difference; for one, the history recorded in many other organisms would be different. Temporal themes do not lack 'legitimacy because not registered [or verified] by anyone'; truth, significance, still less meaning, are not matters of human verification. Here, as elsewhere, the human chauvinism is mixed with other distorting metaphysical assumptions of our Western heritage, in particular, verificationism and ontological assumptions (to the effect that there are severe difficulties in talking about what does not exist). Thus, for example, Schell takes over dubious metaphysics from Freud, according to whom "it is indeed impossible to imagine our own death; and whenever we attempt to do so, we can perceive that we are in fact still present as spectators" (p.138). The second clause goes a good distance towards refuting the first. In fact there is no great difficulty in describing counterfactual situations which undermine both Freud's claims. The same goes for Schell's extensions of human chauvinism into one of its main traditional strongholds, value theory: '... the simple and basic fact [sic!] that before there can be good or evil, service or harm, lamenting or rejoicing there must be life', human life (p.171). These are no facts, but deeply entrenched philosophical dogmas which have been exposed and criticised elsewhere?. Naturally some things will disappear with the extinction of humans: trivially there will be no more humans (unless humans re-evolve or are recreated), and thus no more human institutions, human activities, human emotions, and so forth. But it is already going too far to suggest, as Anders does, that there will accordingly be 'no thought, no love, no struggle, no pain, no hope, no comfort, no sacrifice, no image, no song For there are, and may continue to exist, other creatures than humans with emotion, struggles, songs.......... Nor will the ending of all such human ventures, if it comes to pass, show that all past human ventures have been 'all in vain', meaningless, and already so to say dead. The decay of the solar system, or the heat-death of the universe even, will not show that worthwhile human activities were not worthwhile. Several of the other notions and themes common to Schell and Anders derive from their shared assumptions SI and S2. It is these that underlie the biblical notion (in Revelations) of a Second Death, redeployed by both. 'The death of mankind', under SI, is reckoned a 'second death', because by S2 and SI remaining life is rendered meaningless and already 'seems to be dead' (AA p.244, S p.166) and is already 'overhung with death' (S p.166). Thus, too, more trivially, a person faces 'a second death', not merely one's own but in addition that greater death of the species and all future generations (S p.166, p.115). However even if nuclear extinction came to pass, the stronger notion would not be vindicated, because it depends on the fallacious inference to the meaninglessness of preceding life and on the very questionable representation of this meaninglessness as a sort of death. There is no Second Death: creatures die just once, perhaps all at about the same time. The idea of a Second Death lacks even a solid metaphysical base. From SI, together with the minor principle that extinction being an absolute doesn't differ in degree, comes the universality of peril theme that 'we are all exposed to peril in the same degree', which is accordingly 'disguised' and 'difficult to recognise', because there is no contrast (AE p.64; S p.150). This theme falls with SI. In any event, not all peoples are equally imperilled by the nuclear situation, the Indians of southern Patagonia being 7. See, e.g., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental Philosophy (edited D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980. 8. Anders is here (AA pp.244-5) relying upon a version of the perserverence, criticised in detail in Routley and Griffin. argument from 68 rather better placed than the Germans of northern Europe. Nor are all people equally locked into the situation or incapacitated by it; as explained, the position is different in different countries and places. Nor, likewise, are all people equally responsible, an obnoxious theme, which Schell (in contrast to Anders) repeatedly infiltrates. This is the Pogo theme, according to which S3. Responsibility for the present nuclear situation (fiasco, really) distributes onto everybody, it belongs to every human in the world. But there is also, mixed in, a weaker more plausible claim that gives lie to the stronger one, namely that we have some responsibility (the Nazi situation is compared). An especially blatant example of the Pogo themeruns as follows: '... the world's political leaders ... though they now menace the earth with nuclear weapons, do so only with our permission, and even at our bidding. At least, this is true for democracies' (pp.229-30). The theme is elaborated elsewhere: '... we are the authors of that extinction. (For the populations of the superpowers this is true in a positive sense, since we pay for extinction and support the governments that pose the threat of it, while for the peoples of the non-nuclear-armed world it is true only in the negative sense that they fail to try to do anything about the danger)' (p.152). But this is more of an argument indicting representative government, by revealing its insensitivity and unresponsiveness to many of the populace they allegedly govern, not to mention those affected by its activities who are not represented at all (namely foreigners). But Schell conveniently neglects all such points: '... we are potential mass killers. The moral cost of nuclear armaments is that it makes of all of us underwriters of the slaughter of hundreds of millions' (p.152). And again '[as] perpetrators ... we convey the steady message ... that life not only is not sacred but is worthless; that ... it had been judged acceptable for everyone to be killed' (p.153). Little of this is true. Those who campaign against nuclear arrangements, vote against nuclear-committed parties so far as is possible, and the like, are certainly not the authors of potential destruction, and responsibility for the nuclear situation does not simply distribute onto them. Nor does responsibility - or the unlikely opinions as to worth Schell illegitimately attributes to everyone - fall on those who have done less. Responsibility for decisions taken in "liberal democracies" even by representatives (in the unlikely event of this happening in the case of anything as important as defence) cannot be traced back to those represented, since among 9. An interesting converse of this theme is sometimes advanced, that no one is responsible, the whole thing is out of control. The technological version of this no-responsibility theme is discussed shortly. More satisfactory is the theme that nuclear arrangements are out of political control, but for reasons, in terms of vested interests in keeping nuclear things going, which enable responsibility to be distributed. The vested interests, which bear considerable responsibility, include the military weapons industry, and research and academic communities. Under pressures for re-election especially, politicians give in to these powerful groups, so losing control of political processes. The argument fails at its final stage. For many politicians either belong to or represent vested interests. Thus political processes tend rather to reflect vested interests than to run out of political control. 10. Another example of spreading the responsibility runs as follows: 'The self-extinction of our species is not an act that anyone describes as sane or sensible; nevertheless, it is an act that, without quite admitting it to ourselves, we plan in certain circumstances to commit' (p.186). Even for most of the planners, extinction is presumably not part of "the plan", but an unintended consequence; and most of us have little or no role in the planning, enough of us even campaign against the planning. Further 'the world ... chose the course of attempting to refashion the system of sovereignty to accommodate nuclear weapons' (p.194): the world? This connects of course with the ideological argument from defence of fundamentals, e.g. for liberty, for the (USA) nation, and against socialism. In the course of this argument yet another fallacious assumption is rolled out: 'The means to the end are not limited, for the end itself sets the limits in each case' (p.189). 69 many other things, a representative is only representative of a party which offers a complex and often ill-characterised package of policies, and a voter may vote for zero or more policies of this package. Only in the (uncommon) event of a clear single issue referendum, which is adopted, can responsibility, still of a qualified sort, be sheeted home, to those who voted for it, not to every one in the community. While S3 is false, there is an important related theme that is much more plausible; namely that the present nuclear situation generates responsibilities for every socially involved person (this theme is discussed in Appendix 2). When moreover the Pogo assumption is disentangled from accompanying themes, part of what results is decidedly along the right lines; namely S4. The controllers [not to be confused, in Schell's fashion, with all of us] have failed to change our pre-nuclear institutions. The sovereign system is out of step with the nuclear age, the one-earth system, etc. (the whole earth theme). Though Schell remains relatively clear about the serious defects of the state and the frequently immoral purposes for which the state is used, unfortunately he often loses sight of this important theme (indicated pp.187-8). Yet S4 forms part of Schell's critique of the state which is, by and large, scattered and fragmentary. As observed (in §8), Schell arrives at the conclusion that the nation-state has outlasted its usefulness, and that new political institutions more 'consonant with the global reality' are required as a matter of urgency. But he evades what he admits is the major task, making out viable alternatives. At most he makes some passing gestures, some pointing towards the Way Up. Solutions to the nuclear dilemma come, if not easily, in a similar simplistic way, from the Top Down; those who can must appeal to the Top (cf. p.230). Schell places his hope in treaties for arms reduction and limitations (such as SALT) and in world government (as with the United Nations). Given the record of these organisations and treaties, the negotiations and regulators, it is by now a pathetic faith. Nor is a serious need felt for further analysis of the nuclear situation, to investigate the origins of nuclear technology, to explore the roots of nuclear blindness, to consider effective changes to military-industrial organisation and ways of life. But some of the requisite deeper analysis of the nuclear situation and, more generally, of the roots of war can be found elsewhere.*2 The roots of the nuclear fix are not confined to the ideologically-aligned arrangements of nation-states, but penetrate also into key components of those states, their military, their controlling classes, and their supporting bureaucracies. And both within the arrangements of states, what accounts in part for the arrangements, and in key components of the states, a conspicuous and crucial feature is the drive for power and domination.^ Thus the push for [nuclear] superiority by the super-states, to be achieved through military-oriented science and technology, which involves and enables domination, in several interrelated forms. The main power-base is the large nation-state, where enough surplus product can be accumulated (from at home and from abroad, and bled from nature) to proceed with military and bureaucratic ambitions and to found the high-technology research and development means to ever more expendable power and energy. In changing the structural arrangements to eliminate the prospect of nuclear war, it is not ultimately enough just to downgrade the main power-base, it is also important to alter key components of the state, the nation-state; and, more sweepingly, to remove trouble-making patterns embedded in all these social and political arrangements, namely patterns of domination, patterns manifested not only in state political organisation, but in white-coloured relations, male-female relations, human-animal relations, human-nature relations; to remove, in short, chauvinistic relations. However not everything and especially p.227, bottom paragraph. 11. See p.225ff. 12. In Anders and elaborated in Foley, and more straightforwardly, in Martin. The incomplete list of items given above, to be investigated in a deeper analysis of the nuclear situation, paraphrases Foley JS p.164. 70 needs to be accomplished at once; and the cluster of damaging power and domination relations tied into war can be tackled separately. And there the problems can largely be narrowed to certain problems of states and certain key components of states. In what analysis he does offer of the problem with states, Schell repeats the familiar false contrast of state expediency with morality, as a contrast between "raison d'etat and the Socratic—Christian ethics. The teaching that 'the end justifies the means is the basis on which governments, in all times, have licensed themselves to commit crimes of every sort' (p.134). So 'states may do virtually anything whatever in the name of [their] survival'. Schell then argues however, that extinction nullifies end-means justification by destroying every end; but again the argument is far from sound, and depends on human chauvinism (as under S2) combined with ontological assumptions. Even if all humans were extinguished (as under SI) ends could remain, for instance for nonhumans such as animals and extraterrestrials, actual or not. The ends—means argument can however be repaired to remove such objections: instead it is 13. These motivating drives form part of a larger integrated package, comprising maximisation drives for power, knowledge, control, wealth, energy, speed, satisfaction, ..., for the "newer" Enlightenment (but Faustian) virtues. Frequently there are attempts (the human failing for excessive neatness and simplicity manifested) to reduce the package to one main component, preference—satisfaction for instance, or utility. And the type of drive is justified (especially for those who have it, but worry about it) not only as virtuous, which it is not, but also as rational, which again it is not. Rationality, the deeply entrenched myth has it, consists in maximisation, of the virtues. Maximisation of the objects of the drives runs, however, into limitation theorems and associated paradoxes. The maximisation of power, as with the Christian-Islamic God, encounters the paradox of omnipotence, the parallel maximisation of knowledge, paradoxes of omniscience. There are no consistent objects which are omnipotent or omniscient. The drive for maximum consistency, often taken to be the epitome of rationality, also leads to inconsistency in the case of more important theories, such as arithmetic and set theory (Godel's theorem and associated limitative theorems). 14. R & D, though directed by military requirements and the arms race, also drives the arms race. Its role is partly disguised by the myth of neutral science. have been attempts, not only by those committed to technological determinism, to involve technology more deeply as the main, or single, source of the nuclear fix. It is technology, the mega-machine, running out of control, that has brought us to this predicament, the nuclear abyss. Sometimes this serves to exonerate states and their key components and those who control them, for they are simply caught up by this out—of—control machine; but sometimes the state itself is seen as a machine also running out of control. But technological determinism, like other varieties of stronger (nonanalytic) determinism, is false. Nuclear technology was selected and proceeded with, after a well-known political dispute involving distinguished scientists; it was deliberated, funded and promoted, while other alternatives were not. Damaging technologies of the nuclear age were not inevitable, but deliberately chosen by certain components of the large nation-states. And much as they need not have been chosen, so they do not have to be persisted with. The fashionable inevitability/determinism themes admit not only of refutation by bringing out the many choices made in persisting with often recalcitrant technologies. They also admit of being made to look ridiculous. If the Bomb is determined, as part of human evolution, then if it functions (as it probably will, a matter also determined), it will serve as a human population control device, a matter also determined. That is, the Bomb has its fixed evolutionary place in human population regulation. 71 claimed that extinction nullifies ends-means justification by frustrating the realisation of every relevant end - meaning by 'relevant', in this context, those ends the realisation of which the state appeals to in justification of its nuclear policies.1$ An LSN-war, even without human extinction but with severe enough losses, would undoubtedly frustrate the realisation of relevant state ends. So even from an expediency perspective, superstate policies are open to severe criticism, for example as motivationally irrational. As to the part of the state and (state) sovereignty in war, Schell leaves us in no doubt. A sovereign state is virtually defined as one that enjoys the right and power to go to war in defence or pursuit of its interests (p.187). War arises from how things are; from the arrangement of political affairs via jealous nation states (p.188). Indeed there is a two-way linkage between having sovereignty and capacity to wage war. On the one side, sovereignty is, Schell contends, necessary for people to organise for war. On the other side, without war it is impossible to preserve sovereignty. Neither of these contentions is transparently clear as they stand. The first is damaged by civil war and the like, the second by the persistence of small nonmilitary states. Now that the macro-state system is entrenched, it is however easy for conservatives (in particular) to argue from the "realities" of international life, which include self-interest, aggression, fear, hatred. It is on this basis that peace arrangements are readily dismissed as unrealistic, utopian, even (amusingly) as extremist (cf. p.185). Schell's further theme that nuclear "war" is not war threatens, however, to undermine his case against the sovereign state; for example, his ends-means argument and the argument based on its nuclear war-making capacity. Fortunately the not-war theme needs much qualification, and starts out from an erroneous characterisation of war as 'a violent means employed by a nation to achieve an end' (p.189): but this is neither necessary nor sufficient for war. What is right (so it is argued in §1) is that nuclear wars are very different from earlier conventional wars. Schell goes on to claim that war requires an end which nuclear "war" does not have. But nuclear attacks can certainly have ends (even if LSN wars cannot be won in the older sense: but not all wars or games are won). It is also claimed that war depends on weakness; on one side being defeated on a decision by arms. But in nuclear "war" this doesn't happen, 'no one's strength fails until both sides have been annihilated' (p.190). But what these sorts of considerations contribute to showing is again not that nuclear wars are not wars, but that they are not wars of certain sorts, e.g., not just wars (because they fail on such criteria as reasonable prospect of success and improvement), not rational wars (in a good sense), and so on. That conventional wars have persisted into nuclear times does damage to Schell's argument that nuclear weapons have also ruined "conventional" wars, and his connected theme that the demise of war has left no means to finally settle disputes between nations, for the final court of appeal has been removed (pp.192-193). The theme depends on the mistaken proposition concerning the demise of conventional war and the mistaken proposition that war of some sort has to be the final "court of appeal" between nations (for, as observed, there are other types of contests that could serve, and there is also the possibility of more cooperative behaviour, e.g. joint referenda). The theme also imports the social-Darwinian assumption of Clausewicz (the "logic of war" theme criticised in §2) that war has to proceed to the technological limit - as if war and violence were thoroughly natural activities independent of recognised social settings (for winning, surrender, etc.) and rule-less activities. On the contrary, wars are parasitic on social organisations such as states and are governed by a range of understandings, conventions and rules. They are a social phenomenon, with a rule structure, if not a logic. Much capital has been made not merely from "the logic of war" but from what is now called "the logic of deterrence" and the "logic of nuclear [strategic] planning". The message that is usually supposed to emerge is that the massive nuclear arrangements the world is now entangled in are perfectly logical, sound, 15. This reformulation was proposed by N. Griffin, who suggested that the main qualification can be inferred from Schell's context. 72 reasonable, rational. However this represents little more than a cheap semantical trick. Logic in no way justifies the present arrangements, or anything like them, or renders them reasonable. There is a logic of decision (as presented, e.g., in Jeffrey) which can be applied in strategic planning; but it does not yield specific results without desirability measures being assigned to alternative outcomes, that is without values being pumped in, extralogically. There are various ways these value assignments may be determined, to meet moral requirements or not; but in nuclear strategic planning they have invariably been settled on the basis of expediency.In fact, 'logic of' tends to be used very generously, as a word of general commendation, to cover something like 'rational considerations entering into the policy or strategy of'. In these terms, Schell, who like others enjoys playing with the term 'logic of', should write of 'the illogic of deterrence', for he emphasizes (p.213) the disparity between the supposed rationality of threatening use of nuclear weapons and the irrationality (even from a national interest viewpoint) of actually using them should the threat fail: 7 yet the success of deterrence doctrine depends on the credibility of the threat of this unjustifiable and irrational use. Indeed Schell wants to go still further and locate a contradiction in deterrence (e.g. pp.201-2): but the argument depends on an interesting confusion of contradiction with cancellation,18 along with the assumption that deterrence involves cancellation. Nuclear deterrence may well be irrational, it is immoral, but it is not inconsistent. 16. Selecting the usual game theory setting sees to this almost automatically; for it is then assumed that each player plays to maximize his or her own advantage. Thus too the presumption in Walzer, p.277, that 'the logic of deterrence' is based on eye—for—eye and tooth—for—tooth assumptions. 17. Even the irrationality of the use has been contested, e.g. it wishfully thought that America will rise like a phoenix radioactive ashes. has been from the There is moreover a simple solution to Schell's problem of the missing motive for retaliating to a first strike (p.204), namely, not a retributive one, but an ideological one: eliminate the prospect of the future dominance of the rival ideology. 18. An analogous confusion of negation with cancellation or obliteration appears in recent US "star war" thinking, where US missiles are supposed to "negate" incoming USSR missiles. Moral paradoxes of deterrence take a different direction; although involving negation they depend upon perhaps questionable interconnexions of intensional functors. One type of paradox (considered in §5) derives from a policy of credibly threatening LSN war without however intending to proceed to LSN war, though credible threats [appear to] imply an intention to proceed. Another style derives from acclaimed intention to reduce the number of nuclear missiles when the persistent practice, which implies an intention, is to increase the number. This paradox is technically removed - how satisfactorily i& another matter - by a distinction between longer-term aims and immediate practice, a time-honoured method of removing contradictions by conveniently discerned temporal distinctions. 73 APPENDIX 2. On the Matter of Collective and Individual Responsibility and on Regional Strategies What one does depends, naturally, on where one lives and what means one has, as well as on what one should do and what sort of person one seeks to be. So too what strategy a state should adopt depends on where it is located and what sort of power it is, on national as well as on moral considerations. In present circumstances states have an evident responsibility to work out their policies. There are however some persuasive arguments that this is where all responsibility ends: these major responsibilities accrue entirely to states, and there is no individual, or (smaller scale) collective, responsibility to work out a policy or stance on such matters as nuclear arrangements and still less to act, perhaps against a state, on the basis of such a stance. While such a no-responsibility or opt-out position no doubt suits many people - many for themselves, some (especially more authoritarian power-holders) on behalf of others - it does involve inadmissibly opting out of moral responsibilities, responsibilities acquired by virtue of being a person within the framework of certain social arrangements. Now there is no doubt that individuals and groups can do this, can opt out. They can neglect their moral responsibilities; but they are not justified in doing so. Against this claim, which is based ultimately upon each person's being set in a web of responsibility-inducing social relations, whether they like it or not so long as they choose to live with others, there are some neat arguments which appear to permit, or even warrant, opting out. One influential argument takes the following lines: 1. The (ordinary) individual, or group, has no possibility of making a difference to what happens. Therefore 2. Such individuals, or groups, have no obligation to try to make a difference. Hence 3. Such individuals, or groups, are not morally responsible, for instance when things go wrong. There are two main assumptions in this argument, both of which should be resisted: firstly, in getting from 1 to 2, a variant of the "ought implies can" themel, and secondly, the assumption that individuals can't make a difference. While it is true that individuals cannot accomplish much on their own, together they can. What an individual can achieve depends on what sufficiently many other individuals do. In highly competitive communities, full of hopeful free-riders, a person may encounter a familiar impasse: that he or she acts in manner M (e.g. morally, against nuclear arrangements, rationally), at considerable personal cost, with no guarantee that others will also act M-ly. Such an impasse no longer faces so many in the West, at least as regards initial steps against nuclear arrangements. The individual can cooperate with others in ways that do make a difference. An individual is not exonerated from responsibility by the argument. While individuals can respond by joining organisations whose activities are directed at making some difference, many individuals also have the option of more individualistic action in such forms as boycotts, go slows, political disobedience. An important form of individual resistance, already adopted in Canada and north-western USA, is refusal to pay income taxes directed towards defence or various parts thereof (e.g. nuclear weapons production and deployment), or alternatively redirection of such taxes, for instance to peace funds. Evidently, however, all these more individualistic forms of political activity work more effectively if individuals integrate their activities, since the impacts aggregate (and appear after a certain stage to exponentiate). As well collective action helps in distributing the impact of retribution or punitive action by state authorities. 1. Any satisfactory deontic theory which takes moral dilemmas with due seriousness is bound to reject this theme. There are also independent grounds for jettisoning this Kantian theme: see Routley and Plumwood. 74 There are, furthermore, arguments of some weight that individuals are under some sort of moral obligation to take political action to disaffiliate themselves from what contributes to the prospects of nuclear war. What type of action this is depends on the sort of state one resides in, for instance, whether it is a nuclear power, whether it provides nuclear bases or facilities, etc., and on such complicating issues as what kind of preventive action the state is likely to take in return. (Any state seriously practising deterrence is bound to take some action against effective protest, or risk losing credibility; but there are limits to the amount of state coercion any one individual need bear.) One argument - it is one of a type that can be varied from making nuclear weapons to, for example, providing facilities for them - proceeds from the wrongness of nuclear war to the position that it is not right to be making the weapons for such war. The argument here applies connecting principles (like those of §5), while appealing to such background information as that the manufacture and deployment of such weapons increases the risk of such war. But if it is not morally right to be making such weapons then those who live in a state that is doing so ought to disaffiliate themselves from such defence production, and disaffiliation includes not paying for such production through defence taxes . The argument is not without substantive assumption, but the assumptions appear morally reasonable and defensible. Another effective argument proceeds from the question of the type of moral person one wants to be: Does one want to be, or effectively to be seen as, the kind of person who goes along with the nuclear destruction of human populations? Or with making credible a threat to do so, or the like? What follows applies primarily to people who do not want to be, or be seen as, such people. Arguments like these not only put opt-outers and do-nothingers on the spot insofar as they contribute to national objectives; they also raise questions, perhaps even dilemmas, as to political obligation for those who would take action, even limited action such as redirection of taxes 3. For are there not political obligations to the state, such as paying due taxes and supporting the national defence effort? It is usually assumed that there are. However, no dilemma occurs under a theory which, properly, takes political obligations to be regulated in some fashion by moral obligations; for in this case moral obligations override political obligations. In fact political obligations are already significantly limited by moral constraints. The nuclear situation does not so much bring out new limits on political obligation, as emphasize the respects in which those obligations are already limited, and introduce further moral considerations against sponsorship of national defence arrangements. An obligation to try ** to dissociate oneself from preparation for nuclear war or from nuclear-deterrence, for instance by not spending part of one's working life contributing indirectly to it, does not commit one to more than this: to an obligation, for example, to work for an alternative national defence policy which avoids nuclear elements. But no doubt this would be a good thing to try to contribute towards. Once again, what one attempts depends on where one lives, the level of one's commitments, e.g. to nonviolence, and so forth. For not only are different types of policy reorientation appropriate for different nations and regions, but there are more superficial and deeper reorientations that can be worked out and promoted, e.g. schemes that leave 2. An argument of this type was deployed by Bishop Hunthaussen of support of his refusal to pay defense taxes. 3. This dilemma and option is now removed in practice for most wage earners by Pay As You Earn taxation schemes - schemes apparently introduced to give the state interest on gross earnings, but obviously very effective in removing taxation power from most workers, and so in further transferring power from individuals to the state. 4. Given the power of institutions and the state one may be able to do little more than try, without giving up one's work and thereby one's ability to contribute to other deserving causes. For example, it may be virtually impossible for one to avoid contributing to a superannuation fund which is investing in projects which one opposes or ought to oppose, or both. Seattle in 75 "conventional" warfare apparatus more or less intact, schemes that change that. and deeper (ecological) The US Bishops, for example, present a rather shallow set of goals for a superpower such as the USA, which includes such objectives as preventing the development and deployment of destabilizing nuclear weapons systems and working for better control of already operational systems (see PL, p.317). The nuclear situation affords an important opportunity to press however for a much deeper set of changes in the superstates. For those whose very limited political influence is exerted in considerably less powerful states, even the shallow goals may look quite different: there are no nuclear weapons (except perhaps those of another power stationed on local territory) to redeploy or to better control. The view from the very minor powers in the Antipodes is furthermore different from that of the medium powers in Europe. There is some prospect in much of the Antipodes of avoiding the more immediate effects of an LSN war, while there is little such prospect in Europe (cf. Preddey and others). There is accordingly some obligation — an obligation little considered and not grasped by the power holders - on those in the Antipodes to make some effort to preserve there in the South elements of what is valuable in world civilization. Local and regional self-interest would also suggest substantial steps towards self-preservation that (foolishly) have not been initiated. What is broadly required in the Antipodes is not difficult to discern once Steps include withdrawal from the American alliance, the goals are glimpsed. which is in any case of questionable merit since its main advantages lie with the US and it affords no guarantee of local defence;$ closure of American bases and withdrawal of American access rights for nuclear—carrying equipment to ports, air bases and other facilities, especially so as to remove local nuclear targets; pursuit of a more evenhanded policy of nonalignment (something quite small powers elsewhere have managed to achieve). That much is easy, in principle; and justified. It is justified because local commitment to the American military operations in the region lacks a solid foundation; it is premissed primarily on the acceptance of deterrence, which, so it has been argued (in §5ff.), lacks justification. That Australian commitment to joint Australian—US facilities and to US military operations in the region is explicitly based on acceptance of deterrence emerges from several recent statements of government policy. The joint facilities are 'part of a system of deterrence'. & More difficult to ensure, at least without much preparation, is that economic and cultural collapse does not follow an LSN war in the North. Secondly, then, the building of increased socio-economic independence in the Antipodes is required. It is not enough to make the region a nuclear-free zone not worth targeting militarily: the region must also have a sustainable life of its own. For a small region, that looks a very costly exercise unless combined with other desirable objectives; for example, in Preddey and others it is estimated that a substantial portion of GDP would have to be diverted to build up New Zealand's economic independence.? For a larger region which included Australia, the costs would be less. They would compare favourably with many Northern military budgets, and have the advantage that much of the expenditure is genuinely productive. If furthermore - what seems unlikely - the structural readjustment were combined with the independently desirable aims of moving the 5. See the discussion in Ball, chapter 13, especially pp.140-1. How slight the commitments are, under the ANZUS treaty in particular, has been emphasized again in recent defence discussions between Australia and the USA. Of course, the ANZUS Treaty is only one, and a comparatively minor one, of the many military treaties that should be terminated: from a European and world viewpoint the winding down of NATO and the Warsaw Pact arrangements, and the removal of American and Russian forces from Europe (and elsewhere), are very much more important. A fuller discussion of Australia's defence philosophy will appear in a subsequent publication in this series. and alternatives, 76 whole region towards a multi-cultural conserver society and perhaps even diverting "defence" spending to connected self—management and social defence goals, the costs would be very considerably lessened. They only appear so great in the setting of a consumer-satellite society. In any case, where life and culture themselves are concerned, the costs do not appear excessive. In sum, Southern countries should be severing their military linkages with Northern nuclear powers^, and should be preparing now, socially and economically, for the time after the LSN war, the great Northern war. However there are serious blockages in the way of such things in the Antipodes, and indeed impeding any substantial attempts to lessen the impact of LSN war. Some of the blockages derive again from the fact that present nuclear arrangements favour many of the power holders and suit strong corporate interests which wield political power. But the main blockages to more popular action are sloganised in the false dichotomy: "either it won't happen or we're all dead anyway; so why bother". One reason for blockage is then the extinction assumption (SI of Appendix 1), the unwarranted adoption of which is excessively nihilistic. A more important reason is that most people, and most of their political representatives, do not believe that major repercussions of LSN war are going to befall them. These are events which, like starvation and torture, happen to other (remote) people, not them. It is not that LSN war is unthinkable: rather it is that it seems unbelievable that it should make any difference. Most people in the Antipodes really do not believe that their lives are likely to be shattered by nuclear war. Waking up and mobilising these people is a major part of the problem in 6. See the letter by R.G. Hawke, Prime Minister, replying to a symposium on consequences of nuclear war, Canberra Times, Saturday July 23, 1983. The point is also made by the Foreign Minister in his Evatt Memorial Lecture, as Hawke notes. The point is softened by representing the facilities as also having a role in verification, as well as deterrence, 'that makes arms control and reduction feasible': the known role of the facilities in war fighting is not alluded to, and nor is the fact that any verification role can be alternatively accomplished using satellites. However the matter is not in any doubt: 'successive Australian governments ... have taken the view that our primary concern should be to support the effectiveness of the United States deterrent to war itself' (D.J. Killen, Minister for Defence; quoted in Threats to Australia's Security, p.17). Government representatives (e.g. Hawke) concede that the joint facilities put Australia at nuclear risk. 'However it is the judgement of this Government that the benefits to Australia in terms of its immediate interest and global strategic consideration outweigh potential risks'. A proper decision-theoretic analysis would not support Hawke's claim: since Australia is known to be a nuclear target because of American bases (cf. Ball, pp.130-8), the potential risks given that an LSN war has a non-negligible probability far outweigh any immediate benefits. Since Australia has only a regional strategic role, the global strategic considerations are, as could be otherwise inferred, primarily those of the main user of the facilities, the USA. The Government is prepared to put Australia, its peoples and ecosystems, at what is decidedly serious risk for immediate and American interests. A worthwhile representative government does not hold its peoples hostage for such reasons. Not only is that short-sighted expediency decision making: it seems virtually certain that the details of the decision making, were they ever revealed, would not justify the policy in the longer term even on the basis of expediency, but would turn on such things as present trade advantages and short-term commercial considerations. 7. As to the economic and social problems Australia would face in the event of an LSN war, see Coombs for a preliminary assessment. 8. Ideally the removal of significant nuclear targets should take place across the whole Southern Hemisphere, because this is the zone that is relatively insulated, atmospherically, from the Northern Hemisphere. 77 achieving requisite social and political adjustment. Even those who believe that LSN war is not improbable (but may well not be totally destructive of life) do little to reorganise their lives in a way that would reflect their assessment. Richard Routley* 9. Again, for some of what to do, for some ways to reorganise, see e.g. Martin. There is also much intellectual work to be undertaken, for example, searching out details of alternative arrangements, and also discrediting establishment experts, especially economists and political scientists, who intellectually underwrite present nuclear arrangements. * The text has been much improved as a result of detailed comments by C. Pigden, R. Goodin, N. Griffin, B. Martin and L. Mirlin, and through correspondence with G. Foley. J. Norman has helped in its final organisation. The initial outlines of the paper were worked out in Victoria, Canada; and an early version was read at Simon Fraser University in 1982. 78 REFERENCES G. Anders, Die Antiquiertheit des Menschen, C.H. Beck, Munchen, toasAA. G. Anders, Endzeitand Zeitenende: Gedanken zur atomaren Munchen, 1972; referred to as AE. 1956; Situation, referred C.H. Beck, I. Brownlie, ed., Basic Documents on Human Rights, Oxford, 1971. D. 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Wakin (ed.), War, Morality and the Military Profession, Westview, Colorado. 1979. Boulder, M. Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars, Basic Books, New York, 1977. R. A. Wasserstrom (ed.) War and Morality, Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 1970. B. Williams, 'How to think sceptically about the bomb', New 1982). Society S. Zuckermann, Nuclear Illusion and Reality, Collins, London, 1982. (Nov. 18, OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY School Publications R. and V. Routley, The Fight 1974, Third edition 1975. for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second edition Departmental Publications M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974. D. Mannison, M. McRobbie and R. Routley, editors, Environmental Philosophy, 1980. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980. Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979. R.K. Meyer, A note on R matrices, 1979. R.K. Meyer and J. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980. C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM*, 1980. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and Ci, 1981. R.K. Meyer and J. Slaney, De Morgan monoids, 1983. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment can be correctly used, and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 1983. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983. R.K. Meyer, S. Giambrone and R. Brady, Where gamma fails. R. Brady, R.K. Meyer, C. Mortensen and R. Routley, Algebraic analyses of relevant affixing logics, and other Polish connections, 1983. Green Series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy) 1. R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action, 1982. 2. R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and inadmissible cannibalism, 1982. 3. R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meanings of life?, 1982. 4. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics, 1983. 5. R. Routley, War and peace I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear-deterrence and the political fall-out, 1984. 6. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions. 7. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism. 8. N. Griffin, Lifeboat U.S.A., 1984. 9. R. Routley, War and peace II. On the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism, 1983. n w w [j  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 149, Item 1: War and peace I - On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and nuclear deterrence and the political fallout Subject The topic of the resource Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; no. 5. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy. 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II ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM RICHARD ROUTLEY ��FOR CIRCULATION AND EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT WAR AND PEACE. II ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM by R. Routley Number 9 Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy Department of Philosophy Australian National University 1983 ��ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM Pacifism, despite its revival limited through the nonviolent action 1 movement and as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues to have a bad philosophical press. one way or another, It is commonly portrayed characteristically as inconsistent. as incoherent Even philosophical defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding pacifism is in only that consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral 2 position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive . What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic methods. §1. Slide arguments to inconsistency; from rights. an In influential and and arguments from irresponsibility and widely disseminated set of articles 3 attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence. This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory (p.408, italics added). Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would be better characterised by the more sweeping 1. According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is 'a valid Christian position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle: see Origins 12 (1982) pp.310-311. The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves from traditional pacifism. 2. In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by R. Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists' belief vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'. as "bizarre and �P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. However T2 captures the cases that orthodox opposition. separate comprehensive pacifism from main form of pacifism under investigation is called The 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual is which sense narrower restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily elsewhere. the But if violence is violence is impermissible, then it should be so what Pacifism, as a universally and not merely in war. out rule moral position, should be comprehensive. On its own showing, it is contended, proper action to preventative action commitment to prevent, what would involve, it pacifism acclaimedly in the case of pacifism. incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism: claims Narveson's or of from taking violence; But force. genuine actively defend on them, pain Hence the initial that it cannot underwrite its of inconsistency. However location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force. initial for a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action of a type logically excluded own prohibits, use sometimes, precluded is The slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely 3 J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and 'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 1970 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed. J. Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page references without further citation are to this latter article. Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed. T. Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed by 'N' are to this article. 2 �It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence - R2. and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related of R2 (e.g. It is cases from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, forbidden to violence). resist The slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out by pacifists and others, which do not involve use of violence (or perhaps force). The initial slide is however what assault on pacifism (after Narveson several clearing exploits confusions, explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). irresponsibility of in This his first main which he takes to argument, from the does not actually lead to contradiction, but it pacifism, does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method of maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible: ... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6). Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression back violence), (with unless a slide (tentatively) by is without fighting pacifism does not mean what Narveson claims it means, Nor does comprehensive made. theses on ought, T1 T2, and imply that pacifism, characterised we have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will not apply violent methods. Nor therefore does it imply that conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some, good 4. deal, of that machinery is. One hardly the all or a needs to be a comprehensive Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent. 3 �pacifist to coherently think the latter. the This provides some for confirmation key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are legitimate morally are mistaken. The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, initial slide. is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the stunt The connotation of violence or at least of force which and defending are taken to imply (use of) or force use of force is taken to by implied in R2. resist cannot proceeds Hence (p.415). and violence, so to Hence the also Narveson's assumption that against attack' (pp.417-8). to and so pacifism render a much less can be resisted, without by Force can be applied, as in opening sliding out of handcuffs and running away). a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence. force, but not vice versa; and violence. things like arrest, without violence (e.g. even be But defensible position. positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, Things a If the stunt were got away with, it would deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action resistance, be unwarranted "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever defended to Hence the conflation of T2 and excluded from among admissible pacifist methods. pacifist here Narveson Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, equate with violence. R2; the Violence implies and it is violence, not all applications of force, that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude. The attempt nonviolent to castrate practices, any case indefensible. development themselves compromise, and from pacifism, by of it depriving the range of is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in It enjoys some popularity even among those advocating expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance older mediation, pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions. The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification; for pacifism has often by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods oeen presented, (cf. even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously 4 said �pacifism of 'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by that negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the hostilities added). and of total doctrine of non-resistance non-cooperation with any form of warfare': But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether or standard, need so limit its admissible methods: to italics comprehensive nothing excludes resistance, uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. It is simply that comprehensive pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution. Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against just variations qualifier. on those pacifism are given, writing violence-involving in as an internal Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in terms of 'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the pacifist's 'opposition to If violence'. this slide were pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in case of the permissible any being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed to violence. it is Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make much of in his main inconsistency argument. 5. In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198. Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent action from pacifism; and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well. But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961, p.212. 5 �A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument inconsistency based pacifism theme, P2(R). on to notion of rights, especially as it figures in the the transformed to the claim No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418). For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in notion of The right. initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of Because very the action preventative against infringement 'a right just is a status justifying preventative action ... of it. what does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent infringements of his right' (p.419). That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide - to such incorporate things Moreover 'it is a logical truth, as social pressure. not merely a contingent one, that what might be For these necessary the against question (p.421)! nonviolent quite indefensibly strong. him be, to to or be limited to, In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is action. entitle rights with The argument accordingly To block the argument it is enough for pacifism. associated preventative action not force' logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative action must have the notion of violence built into it. begs is to For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if such action is necessary in the circumstances to prevent infringement of his right. to How the argument from rights leads inconsistency is summed thus up (p.421): SAI. 'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'. SA2. We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence done to us', as a consequence of the objection to avoid violence. But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is self-contradictory, both granting and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected. claiming Narveson that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf. 6 is mistaken p.423). in That a �right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending require that that action is violent. action does Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in by simply rejecting the Narveson not slide^. What for SAI, appears in place of SAI is something like SAI#. If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., facto, give an entitlement to the use of violence. no dilemma for the pacifist. not, does ipso Without the slide there is The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide are two aspects of the one thing. The arguments from lesser §2. violence and In evil. lesser outline the argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the violence those be would where Inconsistency some is morally use of immediate permissible violence by T2. and morally justified. would evil, of The cases are greater violence. More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have lesser much prevent use to admit both that the some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible because it involves violence. An argument like this as gets summarized as follows:- It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the 6. Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights' occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence. An account of rights which will serve is given in R. and V. Routley 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff. 7 �supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force ?. these Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches. It is to important them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the get ethical place of pacifism is to result. The from argument, basic lesser violence, goes as follows:Cl. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence. C2. One ought to minimize violence. Therefore C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in any arbitrary one of minimized. *^P2. the indicated, cases violence is Therefore It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according to it which is morally wrong, always, to use violence. All the ingredients premisses, can be of this argument, together with pulled together from Narveson's work. support for the He not only espouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects the argument with the lesser evil argument:El. (Use of) violence is an evil. E2. Evil should be minimized. The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2, E3. One ought not to undertake violence - period; that is, the level of violence ought to be zero. Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148. 7. J. 8. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78). 9. See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils. 8 �Neither argument is decisive; of that reference they both in fact begin easing pacifists into a frame resist, where moral absolutes are warped into should moral relatives, where obligations give way to obligations-other-things-being- In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at equal, etc. all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one compatible got E3 it. into is directives quite different from minimization where violence is with rooting it out, which may involved, e.g. has involve nonminimization strategies. Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to C2 - a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being to prepared violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social accept justice. Nor do El and E2 entail 02; so neither does principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept 02. by commitment violence^", evil—perpetrating Narveson's such e.g. but argument some increases well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an non-violent fails to For in particular, violence is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by in pacifists for dictator. similar reasons. Regan's reconstruction of Regan argues from premisses concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically 3. The use of force is a substantive evil. 4. Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must quantity of force (Rp.79). The argument is invalid: be preferred to a great an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering force, even when force is an evil. of It is enough to observe that increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable. Resort to the theme that Elt. Violence is an irredeemable evil (proposed by Regan in his by Narveson, defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty. subsequently considered An irredeemable evil is figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods) 10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser violence. 9 �will lighten its hue; now it always dominates. Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but What are the grounds for that? the problem with the argument shifts to Elt. As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared to countenance some small amount of violence in exchange for considerable goods. (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing it was not too Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get gross.) pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; deeper, by indeed it seems to get It does break the argument however; underwriting C2. them in for it removes Cl and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from DI. There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil. For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil, evil than that tainted with violence; requires. however pacifism is no of pacifism (see (utilitarian which Rp.80ff.), into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous' position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines But the approach greater and there are accordingly no cases such as DI This is the core of Regan's defence converts there through violence as an irredeemable evil is a . mistaken inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes are adequately expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby, as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons otherwise don't arise, or for acting other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not 11. That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations. 12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below. 10 �come what may, period. such pacifism as is Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions, at collide bottom, head-on more fashionable, highly with malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at time) were working from. The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ... is incompatible with pacifism': some one who acts for the utility 'that will be brought out by may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121) violence the according to the to utilitarian-commandment maximize doing 13 So . utility may sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles. On its own inconsistency with a false little: every position doctrine inconsistency suffers such with utilitarianism as very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism odds the with contractarianism. other ethical positions But this argument would only no deeper ecological position insidious, is however, for Firstly, as we such as pacifism. generally, have have provisional. theory-saving seen, made at also libertarianism were it and otherwise however they are not, including has which happened is more it utilitarianism, seem as climate unfavourable to incompatible There are two more specific damaging features. and consequentialist approaches more no deontic principle were firm, but all are if The theory of prima facie principles This is entirely mistaken. is a device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties such as moral dilemmas. 13. weight, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a positions What instance. presents, carry if the positions were suitably exhaustive; correct, ethical he shows Secondly, consequentialist positions tend to suggest that To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism. 11 �only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try such positions, as into pacifism, offering sometimes to rival ease incongruous consequential support for their themes. Narveson assumptions takes such procedures upon pacifists: stage a further, and utilitarian foists thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain, in the recipients' These (p.425). incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and what it does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators as well as those on whom it is inflicted. Even more astonishing, such utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following three statements, one of which however he must deny (!): [N]l. To will the end (as morally good) is to will the to it (at Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the means least prima facie). [N]2. greater. [N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425)^ . 'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist s problem , among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425). It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax out of the statements given. such consequences For implications to hold the substantive terms such as 'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds. another, in the implicans; The intended argument to the "commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of variant on the lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles , N3 to stop exceptions being made for oneself 14. and one's group, and N1 to ensure that :se may be defended on purely Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories. 12 �violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g. in Cl, in ethical an end. But, is reflected for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed, which as the begs bound morally to shun violent means. question pacifism, against Under pacifist reformulation Nl will give way to something more like To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally Nl#. means acceptable to it. For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need the three principles duly adjusted; pacifists since nothing damaging emerges; worry not they hardly leave pacifism as untenable. More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has countered. This and E2 N2 or inconsistency is of evil) comprehensive to pacifism. Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one what is the moral situation here? to not (admissibility What of these are them being violence) of difficult the Indeed the example is very similar to dilemma, situation where turns on Jim shoots one of what account is given of moral dilemmas. pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to utilitarian line N But ought The situation is that of a paradigmatic that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives if everything that and cases 15? N ought to prevent mass murder, but also kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. of a moral dilemma. moral 03 N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). person be the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil) (minimization in to yet of trying them^, almost Now What a comprehensive take the inadequate to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were prima facie, negotiable, etc., etc. No, the conflicting obligations stand. to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine What is the best 15. A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve. 16. The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82. 13 �do thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to the In circumstances. trying N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied. the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g. that B. No inconsistency in pacifism follows. evil, minimize it Suppose N had better shoot is preferable to and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized, On the contrary the situation N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had fix. a that Even granted it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence. remains to is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate, what determine in There is the real-life complication better do so^. of dilemma, moral a but no inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil. Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of rights, can now be met. the argument The question presents a dilemma: If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, justified in that case? (p.420) is its use Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where to be raped. No, it is not deonticly justified^. and amount to making out a case. But justification on proposes is solution, back-up ambiguous, in p.423). against may dilemma a another argument, taking his proposals as evident. pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not argument and just situation. the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing no It is certainly not morally The response is qualified then because some force might be consequentially justified, as a second-best presents is it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its deontic origin in 'making right'. Narveson, one Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer is a qualified No: obligatory, from pacifism - person but he As it is not - the lead to a decisive (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again. 17. This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear; also available in this Discussion Paper series. 18. An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No. 14 �The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral §3. its adherence to unexceptionable fanaticism, so Hare contends.^ principles Insofar as such Hare as manages insensitivity. P2, to Through pacifism is a form of get his remarkable accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism: the pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought, but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others (P.174). Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's dilemmas moral deceptively neat two-level thought, into intuitive Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution pacifism. himself helps moral of to, without any violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf. redefinition, a Harey-fanatic, e.g. p.175). Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism. Hare's Hare of the requisite supporting argument, according to which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time, on and pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme comprehensive But critical. classification A fanatic is a person who adheres to ideals which diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf. p.170)! Since comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson) namely tends, towards the pacifists are Harey—fanatics. This usual whether they are sense: whether The 'bigoted'. idea that violence in many situations, such does not of course make them fanatics position comprises their of appropriateness 'wild of some of pacifist principles^. the depends on the very different matter of or extravagant opinions' or (OED) is pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers, founders in fanatics, and the the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to But the relevant opinions hardly be, all of the condemned type. of such thinkers Whence the conclusion follows. are not, can By this simple syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted. 19. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, p.173. references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text. 15 All page �Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism: is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as being as Jewish, is completed, it there^^ fanaticism wearing beads Naturally, given that using of characterising or moral hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant can matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to violence: blue For however the sensitive task matter of using morally relevant. violence as morally irrelevant. relevance more earlier, those of applying this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up at the end of §4). Does it really matter then that fanatics? it Although argument that it does. homework appears pacifists, that though not Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had guess what, they their done the Thus, e.g. p.15: go over to Hare's As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ... 20. Harey- properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would utilitarianism). of are it does not matter in the least, Hare has an abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and, logic fanatics, concepts A. based [entirely] on involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict, Universitetsforlaget, ...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in defence, the exception. 21. the R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral philosophy, Macmillan, London, 1972, p.78. Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this article on peace — from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer prototype argument developed against nationalism. 16 Oslo, �crucial points. objectionable to getting Before of feature these of some theory. The a highly Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework two-level is there details, procedure adopted is methodologically Hare's of own radically unsound because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic rejected Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt. which logic, already But since that Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some to Hare's utilitarianism). important opponents of utilitarianism. In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and comprise intuitionists moral and pure Impure impure. fanatics who stick to their deontic deontologists, principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what calls 'critical thinking'. Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal clearly' Hare or inability to facts face or to think involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking, (p.170) originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion accommodating ff.). But cases this comprehensive bit intuitive principles conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28 dirty-trick philosophy can where of pacifists are presumably "pure willing to think critically, but somehow survived opinions different from here be fanatics"; the ordeal those of the utilitarian' (p.171). set aside, still holding his argument is correct argument is not correct. See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid. 17 moral They are in fact "pure to be According to Hare there cannot be inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen. any fanatics of this type, if since for they are 'able and fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out 22. of (p.171). Therefore, his �One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure to consider the possibility a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical that assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians (cf. other p.177 ff.) depends on preference reasons. substitution, preferences For which can be one, argument (e.g. Hare's requires a base class intersubstituted. Hare, chauvinistically contracts this base class representation whole of to ff.). p.176 preference-havers, in the of course There are whom among his discussion humans.Differently, certain the of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast. As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this is less an argument a than damaging charge: A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86). The smear is not without basis. applied to avert greater Regan is envisaging where situations violence and he points to what he takes to be the evident evil; moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free from an aspiring rapist' is Interestingly, (Rp.86). has Regan situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand: herself not described the there is nothing in to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the (perhaps wilful) that infliction death, by forceful means^ (cf. mere use of of damage, non-negligible Np.110); that is, which physical force or power (or energy). including pain, injury or involves much more than And it is by no means so evident that the woman is entitled to inflict violence from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way is duly separated violence upon the aspiring rapist. Once that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity. 23. On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section. 18 class, see R. and V. �But a straightforward action violence disentangling defective It is of subcase not depend force by is means no of on violence. a tight Fortunately characterisation what indicate some done, in the way of inflicting damage. constraints Firstly, presupposed. force: is legalised force, violence, so violence, a on satisfactory violence is not applied on behalf account adequately of some of violence, where no force is applied. violence.) 24. supposed that and are which distinguished as illegitimate "legitimate authority, long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated. so often mistakenly of However it is important to is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.25 Secondly, violence is not of the enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means through so Indeed the literature on nonviolent characterisations arguments developed in this paper do violence. a matter as may at first seem. with abounds as the is Violence threat (This only needs emphasizing because it is threats, intimidation and the like, involve Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live (goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different. It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds related to those that tell against violence proper. For similar reasons, "economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity. Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical practices involve violence. 19 �There can be unintentional violence, e.g. the women may have applied violent Fourthly, such matters as the distance without intending to, in escaping the rapist. at which force is applied and the indirectness of military operations, are irrelevant. modern means, the means, as instance for in The submarine operator who, by causally pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian city instigates violent a By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not act. in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent confined to action done against persons, means. but can violence Finally, be directed not is against other life-forms, as will soon emerge. Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and the from fact that one of them^ derives violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts violence greater than zero. of Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral certainly will problems. They give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2 they mean 'nontrivial violence'. Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps passivity and pacifity. to prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of Both Regan and Narveson (e.g. p.425) assume that pacifism 25. The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, op.cit., p.288n. Note however that Sharp's account of 'political violence' is defective in various other respects. It is curious, but understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action, Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence, and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with force and threat with use. 26. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action. 20 �This is far from true, as the variety of methods is a passive do-nothing position. or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain. considered Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of Otherwise, Narveson negative later Narveson's action. nonviolent hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) would way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not (p.425). Neither Regan nor doing assessment nonviolence' does not change the situation: for this of anything about' violence what calls 'positive positive he approach simply is nonviolence practised in an exemplary :.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential or effectiveness of nonviolent practices. extent when assembled^, much the reduce of and training the Fuller details of these practices, the of impact nonviolent argument from social irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity. §4. The argument corollaries. The from radical practice political corollaries by definition. But from other awkward of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war. war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. war and the position Although normally war would be excluded, Standard pacifism takes For out of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear. what of dilemma situations? War would always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) best thing 27. to do. A strange pacifism! Comprehensive The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components have been removed. As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types: protest, noncooperation and intervention; op. cit. pp.32-3. Of course pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68). 28. See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein pp.152-3, especially G. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit., (referred to as Politics) and V. Coover and others, Resource Manual for a Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981. 21 �pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism. Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to If extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence. is given a large suitably that evil weighting then second-best choices will yield the same results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war. Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that eliminate since wars, of war an as or mounted from upon rely the institutions. only obviously police and military forces but many of their institutions, most legal state arrangements, States are however desirable social institutions, typically depend on violent means. and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just comprehensive implies pacifism the of inadmissibility institutions, such as police forces and states typically are; be ruled out either individuals, as directly delegates, who violence-dispensing violence effect however exclude the replacement of such forces, by nonviolent nonviolent means. state; but it substitutes, is nonviolent methods or such organisations may else because their behalf. evolved will Pacifism institutions concerned with does not public that order have Pacifism does not organisations maintain they by fully as police alternative nonviolent will be applied, where necessary, to The force of the objection should thus not entail order, sweeping charges of social irresponsibility. 22 the and are coercive actively Law and authority can still operate then in the back-up authority and "enforce" laws. overestimated. on recently which wars, A more telling objection, then, is no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils). that which violence-underpinned these of directly less institutions and a more general argument may be and nation-states particular, or arrangements social inevitability, or not without much further ado. least extensively: violence desirability, In at institution, However wars are by no means the dispense exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the reasonable costs; desirability are wars would it elimination accordingly of does Nor is it true that prominent not be social succumb to �pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is, the illegitimacy of government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the sense that defines a state at all (Np.127). A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent, noncoercive, arrangements. political arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible. imply the absence or illegitimacy of government, political community organised under a government. state with authority and not necessarily pacifism does not entail anarchism. main implies it Accordingly, that not does or therefore of a state, of a Nor does it even that imply a certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral dilemmas of political organisation. and only pacifism Comprehensive or (differently) objective, attained, not was Since it admits of states with frameworks of law based on the free agreements of individuals, Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample: a nonviolent Indian genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism simple as derivability. Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a it was not the state; replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society. moral his Granted there are they are not so so ideal easily brought down by its political corollaries. Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than concerning like: external and internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the it also tells against the received treatment of example. While other species, animals for it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals. 29. those At least it does this so long Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied (see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit, anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state authority) and restrictions on liberty, to a limit. Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi: 'The ideally nonviolent state will be an ordered anarchy' (unreferenced citation at the end of the Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24). 23 �as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as is humans (or persons). restriction. 30 controversial euthanasia, the category by restriction of the application of violence to from removed not There is little good basis in And, humans, of violence? At the suicide, But must creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms. simply the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature killing of No force need be applied: in a eats and dies painlessly and without a struggle. The or pill given is life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence? technical purely arrangements pacifist will to objections in solve, eating meat worthwhile On the face of obtained. so New any rate, the disruption of at principle an Then the proper objections to such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that it, there are no they risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing. injection several into e.g. So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices. involve chauvinistic spread corollaries killing a such indeed wherever violence plays a significant role. punishment, capital the concerning for however similar case, any areas moral and violence, practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries. But suppose now that the new technology is as the anti-neutron bomb, which selectively destroys which by further clever newly devised "weapons", such scientists, working in their accustomed military role: devices much extended property but not people, or "dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence. just Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid these reaches of technological For "dissolving" people requires energy, fantasy. which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in violence: Was (upgraded) account of that is, the new wars will still involve violence. there old-fashioned however violent anything methods wrong so such as with hunting eating meat obtained by more or raising and killing one's own? Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural" iO. an behaviour of creatures to cit. See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op. Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g. Politics, p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and predation. 24 �which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly common feature of and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made animal out) erupts in violence. ways, various for The force of the example along these argument can however Aggression lines. is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for (of their offspring) in their natural environment. and themselves ir mitigated be survival But most humans now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations which evolution for gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance). Much humans as have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent practices, now ill-adapted to their and mostly counterproductive. situation So argues the pacifist. is a residual problem, There like that of and tribal people, to be condemned as morally Sometimes, yes, Are wrong when predators involve these the violence? when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to Though a way but always? can it is a rather unsatisfactory way. problem vegetarianism. creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as practices be attained: confronting beaten be the around of edge this What this suggests is that nonviolence is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal. The arguments for nonviolence - which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings - sort of But conclusion. exclude. nonviolent what is called charge for state, is is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at This is^ to concede an of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains unqualified. 31. would The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2. attentuated similar approaches thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive that a the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least, since it opens the door a chink to other options which categorically suggest The sheer moral power of such pacifism As Singer has in the analogous case of Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975. 25 vegetarianism: is one see reason e.g., for Animal �There is no reason however why giving its adoption some pause. a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules out such a genuine and more sensitive pacifism. There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as In particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts similar to those using violence: This is a requirement of otherwise they could have a case made against them. in a different sense from the pure logical consistency sense, namely that of keeping to the same story. for well. pacifism, Again there need be no deep problem so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must be a single principle (e.g. just P2) - as distinct from a bundle of moral principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving violence.32 To meet the rationality requirement the position should, be integrated into a in larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g. mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic and oceans. In an does not destructive such things as strip wastes in streams extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism. vandalism particular, cover violence But even metaphorically, against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence such as "psychological violence"). What is sought then is an appropriate of these notions covering destructive practices; and also an accompanying synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'. Then P2 is superseded by synthesis an appropriately qualified P2#. It is morally wrong to use vandolence. It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks. 32. It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences. Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter. 33. The position has been called 'pacifism. 26 �APPENDICES § 5. from arguments The and pacifism in the real world. of impracticality impracticality reality: social the alleged_ Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will be contested - despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. to be that admitted the pacifism to severe tests. real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put But in this regard pacifism is not an exception. Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less than in replacing war^. prepared for to likely succeed Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they properly And it has or given a have been never The prospects for success of dress rehearsal. nonviolent defence of a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war convention is observed or not. If the convention is observed then pacifism stands reasonable prospects of success. The difficult cases are where the war convention perhaps unleashed, in broken, is and violence is According to Walzer, in his massive ways, on noncombatants. superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance, 'success is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention - ... and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^). attained - there is conventions are flouted. reasons, some got homesick. ruthless of This is presumably be never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some The invaders may give them irrelevant, e.g. up and depart for all sorts or they needed a quick decisive victory, they What Walzer no doubt means is something like this: invaders may Success false. that sufficiently in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support 34. The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit 35. Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op.cit. references given there. 36. All page references prefixed by 'W' are to Allen Lane, London, 1977. 27 See also M. Walzer, Martin, Just and of war) op.cit., Unjust is and Wars, �But that sort of thing is also true even if the lines, etc., can eventually succeed. defending to violence. resorts side The difference lies in the pattern of events; is if the defence "forces" are well-armed it invaders to easier and with start difficult more than afterwards and with costly the for civil well -prepared resistance. Walzer is nonviolent the of model the in way enslaved Jews, misleading The way.The Nazis, many like who to jump that conclusion the cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of defence inappropriate examples. command, however, thinking, who He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian the in state, total Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the the population, by The "resistance" picture is highly and large, did not resist extermination in an organised invaded never Germany, were in control the all or For infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population. Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army took over and managed all key Australia it is not even so clear largely united and actively With island territories such as infrastructure. that resisting this is which logistically population. Walzer's feasible against impression resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g. a of the Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave. Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate No state would be prepared to risk way in 37. It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish, opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue, R.L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: the Holocaust and the American Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5. 38. The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars. present state-determined circumstances. 28 �training its populace different). It in would full techniques defence (civil all too easy for them to "rout" the police: be then action nonviolent is civil obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means. The argument thus far §6. On the positive case for pacifism: has been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism. That in itself is revealing. deviations from it are initial sketchings. Pacifism is the what require rest position explanation. (inertial and state) The reason for this is simple violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of enough: it is what has to be justified. Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of and merely justified. case try privileged dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be to in that the defender (person or nation) is morally—excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral the position The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent: curious is its the in already a Still bounds. defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have situation. to use it, he should not resort to it. An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:- Violence is (intrinsically) wrong Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong. Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin. None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are deductively tight assumptions can be challenged arguments for pacifism particularly good ones. for pacifism, (as above). Nor One of the poorer positive are all the arguments for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory 29 �of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, that nuclear or chemical case is overstated. hope weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an illusion, escalation is inevitable. are bound to be overstepped. the e.g. The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are - Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible. Wars are much more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows. Wars can, for example, be started and stopped things intervene (e.g. (as support more should midstream for first the those inevitably, premiss above) for mixture a suffering and anguish of violent the methods, They nonviolence. of consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. pain, important a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states). The main reasons for pacifism are, include in injustice characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of means-ends cost the in violence that violence within the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as more less furtive, society. open, the why of pacifism) considerable. These are None of these well-known types of reason (giving separately decisive, but their cumulative affords a model for one way of proceeding^: Mill's defence Mill's procedure works (st least As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion. 30 of liberty nonviolence, it works as well as it works for liberty). 39. is it is enough (a nonelementary exercise) to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for otherwise effect reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence. as a �A decisive more consequentialist data., argument, takes a but making semantical preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds modelling nonviolence Again principles. use and The data is used to arrive at route. are practical similar of then pacifism in applied is derived semantically principled as nonviolence.0 R. 40. Routley* * The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R. and V. Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear. * With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. The main outlines of the paper were drafted associate at Simon Fraser University. 31 while the author was a research �OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY School publications: R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second edition 1974, Third edition 1975. Departmental publications: M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974. D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental Philosophy, 1980. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980. Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. and 13. 14. 15. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979. R.K. Meyer, A note on R_ * matrices, 1979. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980. C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used, N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 1983R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983. R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983. Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 10. R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action, 1982. R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and inadmissible cannibalism, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning$of life?, 1982. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics. R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war—deterrence and the political fall-out. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism. R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in rational behaviour under rival paradigms. ����/ /- ' nw^4) 4 ---------- =^A,W7/7/////7//7777 r/ )r % ./ � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Self-published Papers Description An account of the resource <span>Sylvan favoured the </span><span lang="EN-GB">highly-unorthodox practice of self-publishing a vast amount of his work<span>—</span><span></span>quite literally, using his own printing press!</span> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Discussion Papers in environmental philosophy Philosophy Departments The Australian National University PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600 NUMBER 9 WAR AND PEACE. II ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM RICHARD ROUTLEY FOR CIRCULATION AND EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT WAR AND PEACE. II ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM by R. Routley Number 9 Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy Department of Philosophy Australian National University 1983 ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM Pacifism, despite its revival limited through the nonviolent action 1 movement and as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues to have a bad philosophical press. one way or another, It is commonly portrayed characteristically as inconsistent. as incoherent Even philosophical defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding pacifism is in only that consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral 2 position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive . What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic methods. §1. Slide arguments to inconsistency; from rights. an In influential and and arguments from irresponsibility and widely disseminated set of articles 3 attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence. This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory (p.408, italics added). Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would be better characterised by the more sweeping 1. According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is 'a valid Christian position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle: see Origins 12 (1982) pp.310-311. The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves from traditional pacifism. 2. In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by R. Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists' belief vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'. as "bizarre and P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. However T2 captures the cases that orthodox opposition. separate comprehensive pacifism from main form of pacifism under investigation is called The 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual is which sense narrower restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily elsewhere. the But if violence is violence is impermissible, then it should be so what Pacifism, as a universally and not merely in war. out rule moral position, should be comprehensive. On its own showing, it is contended, proper action to preventative action commitment to prevent, what would involve, it pacifism acclaimedly in the case of pacifism. incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism: claims Narveson's or of from taking violence; But force. genuine actively defend on them, pain Hence the initial that it cannot underwrite its of inconsistency. However location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force. initial for a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action of a type logically excluded own prohibits, use sometimes, precluded is The slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely 3 J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and 'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 1970 pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed. J. Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page references without further citation are to this latter article. Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed. T. Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed by 'N' are to this article. 2 It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence - R2. and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related of R2 (e.g. It is cases from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, forbidden to violence). resist The slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out by pacifists and others, which do not involve use of violence (or perhaps force). The initial slide is however what assault on pacifism (after Narveson several clearing exploits confusions, explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). irresponsibility of in This his first main which he takes to argument, from the does not actually lead to contradiction, but it pacifism, does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method of maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible: ... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6). Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression back violence), (with unless a slide (tentatively) by is without fighting pacifism does not mean what Narveson claims it means, Nor does comprehensive made. theses on ought, T1 T2, and imply that pacifism, characterised we have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will not apply violent methods. Nor therefore does it imply that conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some, good 4. deal, of that machinery is. One hardly the all or a needs to be a comprehensive Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent. 3 pacifist to coherently think the latter. the This provides some for confirmation key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are legitimate morally are mistaken. The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, initial slide. is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the stunt The connotation of violence or at least of force which and defending are taken to imply (use of) or force use of force is taken to by implied in R2. resist cannot proceeds Hence (p.415). and violence, so to Hence the also Narveson's assumption that against attack' (pp.417-8). to and so pacifism render a much less can be resisted, without by Force can be applied, as in opening sliding out of handcuffs and running away). a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence. force, but not vice versa; and violence. things like arrest, without violence (e.g. even be But defensible position. positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, Things a If the stunt were got away with, it would deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action resistance, be unwarranted "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever defended to Hence the conflation of T2 and excluded from among admissible pacifist methods. pacifist here Narveson Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, equate with violence. R2; the Violence implies and it is violence, not all applications of force, that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude. The attempt nonviolent to castrate practices, any case indefensible. development themselves compromise, and from pacifism, by of it depriving the range of is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in It enjoys some popularity even among those advocating expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance older mediation, pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions. The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification; for pacifism has often by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods oeen presented, (cf. even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously 4 said pacifism of 'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by that negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the hostilities added). and of total doctrine of non-resistance non-cooperation with any form of warfare': But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether or standard, need so limit its admissible methods: to italics comprehensive nothing excludes resistance, uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions. It is simply that comprehensive pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution. Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against just variations qualifier. on those pacifism are given, writing violence-involving in as an internal Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in terms of 'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the pacifist's 'opposition to If violence'. this slide were pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in case of the permissible any being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed to violence. it is Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make much of in his main inconsistency argument. 5. In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198. Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent action from pacifism; and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well. But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961, p.212. 5 A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument inconsistency based pacifism theme, P2(R). on to notion of rights, especially as it figures in the the transformed to the claim No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418). For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in notion of The right. initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of Because very the action preventative against infringement 'a right just is a status justifying preventative action ... of it. what does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent infringements of his right' (p.419). That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide - to such incorporate things Moreover 'it is a logical truth, as social pressure. not merely a contingent one, that what might be For these necessary the against question (p.421)! nonviolent quite indefensibly strong. him be, to to or be limited to, In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is action. entitle rights with The argument accordingly To block the argument it is enough for pacifism. associated preventative action not force' logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative action must have the notion of violence built into it. begs is to For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if such action is necessary in the circumstances to prevent infringement of his right. to How the argument from rights leads inconsistency is summed thus up (p.421): SAI. 'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'. SA2. We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence done to us', as a consequence of the objection to avoid violence. But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is self-contradictory, both granting and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected. claiming Narveson that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf. 6 is mistaken p.423). in That a right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending require that that action is violent. action does Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in by simply rejecting the Narveson not slide^. What for SAI, appears in place of SAI is something like SAI#. If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., facto, give an entitlement to the use of violence. no dilemma for the pacifist. not, does ipso Without the slide there is The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide are two aspects of the one thing. The arguments from lesser §2. violence and In evil. lesser outline the argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the violence those be would where Inconsistency some is morally use of immediate permissible violence by T2. and morally justified. would evil, of The cases are greater violence. More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have lesser much prevent use to admit both that the some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible because it involves violence. An argument like this as gets summarized as follows:- It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the 6. Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights' occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence. An account of rights which will serve is given in R. and V. Routley 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff. 7 supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force ?. these Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches. It is to important them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the get ethical place of pacifism is to result. The from argument, basic lesser violence, goes as follows:Cl. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence. C2. One ought to minimize violence. Therefore C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, since in this way, in any arbitrary one of minimized. *^P2. the indicated, cases violence is Therefore It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according to it which is morally wrong, always, to use violence. All the ingredients premisses, can be of this argument, together with pulled together from Narveson's work. support for the He not only espouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects the argument with the lesser evil argument:El. (Use of) violence is an evil. E2. Evil should be minimized. The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2, E3. One ought not to undertake violence - period; that is, the level of violence ought to be zero. Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148. 7. J. 8. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78). 9. See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils. 8 Neither argument is decisive; of that reference they both in fact begin easing pacifists into a frame resist, where moral absolutes are warped into should moral relatives, where obligations give way to obligations-other-things-being- In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at equal, etc. all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one compatible got E3 it. into is directives quite different from minimization where violence is with rooting it out, which may involved, e.g. has involve nonminimization strategies. Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to C2 - a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being to prepared violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social accept justice. Nor do El and E2 entail 02; so neither does principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept 02. by commitment violence^", evil—perpetrating Narveson's such e.g. but argument some increases well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an non-violent fails to For in particular, violence is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by in pacifists for dictator. similar reasons. Regan's reconstruction of Regan argues from premisses concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically 3. The use of force is a substantive evil. 4. Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must quantity of force (Rp.79). The argument is invalid: be preferred to a great an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering force, even when force is an evil. of It is enough to observe that increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable. Resort to the theme that Elt. Violence is an irredeemable evil (proposed by Regan in his by Narveson, defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty. subsequently considered An irredeemable evil is figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods) 10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser violence. 9 will lighten its hue; now it always dominates. Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but What are the grounds for that? the problem with the argument shifts to Elt. As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared to countenance some small amount of violence in exchange for considerable goods. (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing it was not too Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get gross.) pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; deeper, by indeed it seems to get It does break the argument however; underwriting C2. them in for it removes Cl and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from DI. There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil. For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil, evil than that tainted with violence; requires. however pacifism is no of pacifism (see (utilitarian which Rp.80ff.), into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous' position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines But the approach greater and there are accordingly no cases such as DI This is the core of Regan's defence converts there through violence as an irredeemable evil is a . mistaken inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes are adequately expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby, as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons otherwise don't arise, or for acting other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not 11. That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss '5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A.' While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations. 12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below. 10 come what may, period. such pacifism as is Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions, at collide bottom, head-on more fashionable, highly with malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at time) were working from. The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ... is incompatible with pacifism': some one who acts for the utility 'that will be brought out by may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121) violence the according to the to utilitarian-commandment maximize doing 13 So . utility may sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles. On its own inconsistency with a false little: every position doctrine inconsistency suffers such with utilitarianism as very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism odds the with contractarianism. other ethical positions But this argument would only no deeper ecological position insidious, is however, for Firstly, as we such as pacifism. generally, have have provisional. theory-saving seen, made at also libertarianism were it and otherwise however they are not, including has which happened is more it utilitarianism, seem as climate unfavourable to incompatible There are two more specific damaging features. and consequentialist approaches more no deontic principle were firm, but all are if The theory of prima facie principles This is entirely mistaken. is a device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties such as moral dilemmas. 13. weight, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of ethical thought, thus helping to establish a positions What instance. presents, carry if the positions were suitably exhaustive; correct, ethical he shows Secondly, consequentialist positions tend to suggest that To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism. 11 only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try such positions, as into pacifism, offering sometimes to rival ease incongruous consequential support for their themes. Narveson assumptions takes such procedures upon pacifists: stage a further, and utilitarian foists thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain, in the recipients' These (p.425). incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and what it does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators as well as those on whom it is inflicted. Even more astonishing, such utilitarian-style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following three statements, one of which however he must deny (!): [N]l. To will the end (as morally good) is to will the to it (at Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the means least prima facie). [N]2. greater. [N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425)^ . 'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist s problem , among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425). It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax out of the statements given. such consequences For implications to hold the substantive terms such as 'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds. another, in the implicans; The intended argument to the "commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of variant on the lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles , N3 to stop exceptions being made for oneself 14. and one's group, and N1 to ensure that :se may be defended on purely Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories. 12 violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g. in Cl, in ethical an end. But, is reflected for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed, which as the begs bound morally to shun violent means. question pacifism, against Under pacifist reformulation Nl will give way to something more like To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally Nl#. means acceptable to it. For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need the three principles duly adjusted; pacifists since nothing damaging emerges; worry not they hardly leave pacifism as untenable. More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has countered. This and E2 N2 or inconsistency is of evil) comprehensive to pacifism. Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one what is the moral situation here? to not (admissibility What of these are them being violence) of difficult the Indeed the example is very similar to dilemma, situation where turns on Jim shoots one of what account is given of moral dilemmas. pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to utilitarian line N But ought The situation is that of a paradigmatic that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives if everything that and cases 15? N ought to prevent mass murder, but also kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. of a moral dilemma. moral 03 N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). person be the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil) (minimization in to yet of trying them^, almost Now What a comprehensive take the inadequate to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were prima facie, negotiable, etc., etc. No, the conflicting obligations stand. to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine What is the best 15. A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve. 16. The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82. 13 do thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to the In circumstances. trying N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied. the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g. that B. No inconsistency in pacifism follows. evil, minimize it Suppose N had better shoot is preferable to and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized, On the contrary the situation N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had fix. a that Even granted it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence. remains to is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate, what determine in There is the real-life complication better do so^. of dilemma, moral a but no inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil. Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of rights, can now be met. the argument The question presents a dilemma: If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, justified in that case? (p.420) is its use Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where to be raped. No, it is not deonticly justified^. and amount to making out a case. But justification on proposes is solution, back-up ambiguous, in p.423). against may dilemma a another argument, taking his proposals as evident. pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not argument and just situation. the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing no It is certainly not morally The response is qualified then because some force might be consequentially justified, as a second-best presents is it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its deontic origin in 'making right'. Narveson, one Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer is a qualified No: obligatory, from pacifism - person but he As it is not - the lead to a decisive (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again. 17. This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear; also available in this Discussion Paper series. 18. An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No. 14 The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral §3. its adherence to unexceptionable fanaticism, so Hare contends.^ principles Insofar as such Hare as manages insensitivity. P2, to Through pacifism is a form of get his remarkable accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism: the pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought, but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others (P.174). Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's dilemmas moral deceptively neat two-level thought, into intuitive Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution pacifism. himself helps moral of to, without any violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf. redefinition, a Harey-fanatic, e.g. p.175). Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism. Hare's Hare of the requisite supporting argument, according to which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time, on and pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme comprehensive But critical. classification A fanatic is a person who adheres to ideals which diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf. p.170)! Since comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson) namely tends, towards the pacifists are Harey—fanatics. This usual whether they are sense: whether The 'bigoted'. idea that violence in many situations, such does not of course make them fanatics position comprises their of appropriateness 'wild of some of pacifist principles^. the depends on the very different matter of or extravagant opinions' or (OED) is pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers, founders in fanatics, and the the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to But the relevant opinions hardly be, all of the condemned type. of such thinkers Whence the conclusion follows. are not, can By this simple syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted. 19. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, p.173. references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text. 15 All page Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism: is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as being as Jewish, is completed, it there^^ fanaticism wearing beads Naturally, given that using of characterising or moral hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant can matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to violence: blue For however the sensitive task matter of using morally relevant. violence as morally irrelevant. relevance more earlier, those of applying this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up at the end of §4). Does it really matter then that fanatics? it Although argument that it does. homework appears pacifists, that though not Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had guess what, they their done the Thus, e.g. p.15: go over to Hare's As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ... 20. Harey- properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would utilitarianism). of are it does not matter in the least, Hare has an abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and, logic fanatics, concepts A. based [entirely] on involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict, Universitetsforlaget, ...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in defence, the exception. 21. the R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral philosophy, Macmillan, London, 1972, p.78. Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this article on peace — from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer prototype argument developed against nationalism. 16 Oslo, crucial points. objectionable to getting Before of feature these of some theory. The a highly Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework two-level is there details, procedure adopted is methodologically Hare's of own radically unsound because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic rejected Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt. which logic, already But since that Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some to Hare's utilitarianism). important opponents of utilitarianism. In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and comprise intuitionists moral and pure Impure impure. fanatics who stick to their deontic deontologists, principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what calls 'critical thinking'. Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal clearly' Hare or inability to facts face or to think involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking, (p.170) originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion accommodating ff.). But cases this comprehensive bit intuitive principles conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28 dirty-trick philosophy can where of pacifists are presumably "pure willing to think critically, but somehow survived opinions different from here be fanatics"; the ordeal those of the utilitarian' (p.171). set aside, still holding his argument is correct argument is not correct. See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid. 17 moral They are in fact "pure to be According to Hare there cannot be inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen. any fanatics of this type, if since for they are 'able and fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out 22. of (p.171). Therefore, his One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure to consider the possibility a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical that assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians (cf. other p.177 ff.) depends on preference reasons. substitution, preferences For which can be one, argument (e.g. Hare's requires a base class intersubstituted. Hare, chauvinistically contracts this base class representation whole of to ff.). p.176 preference-havers, in the of course There are whom among his discussion humans.Differently, certain the of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast. As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this is less an argument a than damaging charge: A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86). The smear is not without basis. applied to avert greater Regan is envisaging where situations violence and he points to what he takes to be the evident evil; moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free from an aspiring rapist' is Interestingly, (Rp.86). has Regan situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand: herself not described the there is nothing in to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the (perhaps wilful) that infliction death, by forceful means^ (cf. mere use of of damage, non-negligible Np.110); that is, which physical force or power (or energy). including pain, injury or involves much more than And it is by no means so evident that the woman is entitled to inflict violence from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way is duly separated violence upon the aspiring rapist. Once that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity. 23. On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section. 18 class, see R. and V. But a straightforward action violence disentangling defective It is of subcase not depend force by is means no of on violence. a tight Fortunately characterisation what indicate some done, in the way of inflicting damage. constraints Firstly, presupposed. force: is legalised force, violence, so violence, a on satisfactory violence is not applied on behalf account adequately of some of violence, where no force is applied. violence.) 24. supposed that and are which distinguished as illegitimate "legitimate authority, long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated. so often mistakenly of However it is important to is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.25 Secondly, violence is not of the enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means through so Indeed the literature on nonviolent characterisations arguments developed in this paper do violence. a matter as may at first seem. with abounds as the is Violence threat (This only needs emphasizing because it is threats, intimidation and the like, involve Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live (goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different. It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds related to those that tell against violence proper. For similar reasons, "economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity. Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical practices involve violence. 19 There can be unintentional violence, e.g. the women may have applied violent Fourthly, such matters as the distance without intending to, in escaping the rapist. at which force is applied and the indirectness of military operations, are irrelevant. modern means, the means, as instance for in The submarine operator who, by causally pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian city instigates violent a By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not act. in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent confined to action done against persons, means. but can violence Finally, be directed not is against other life-forms, as will soon emerge. Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and the from fact that one of them^ derives violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts violence greater than zero. of Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral certainly will problems. They give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2 they mean 'nontrivial violence'. Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps passivity and pacifity. to prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of Both Regan and Narveson (e.g. p.425) assume that pacifism 25. The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, op.cit., p.288n. Note however that Sharp's account of 'political violence' is defective in various other respects. It is curious, but understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action, Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence, and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with force and threat with use. 26. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action. 20 This is far from true, as the variety of methods is a passive do-nothing position. or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain. considered Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of Otherwise, Narveson negative later Narveson's action. nonviolent hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) would way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not (p.425). Neither Regan nor doing assessment nonviolence' does not change the situation: for this of anything about' violence what calls 'positive positive he approach simply is nonviolence practised in an exemplary :.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential or effectiveness of nonviolent practices. extent when assembled^, much the reduce of and training the Fuller details of these practices, the of impact nonviolent argument from social irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity. §4. The argument corollaries. The from radical practice political corollaries by definition. But from other awkward of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war. war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. war and the position Although normally war would be excluded, Standard pacifism takes For out of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear. what of dilemma situations? War would always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) best thing 27. to do. A strange pacifism! Comprehensive The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components have been removed. As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types: protest, noncooperation and intervention; op. cit. pp.32-3. Of course pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68). 28. See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein pp.152-3, especially G. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit., (referred to as Politics) and V. Coover and others, Resource Manual for a Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981. 21 pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast to extreme pacifism. Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to If extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence. is given a large suitably that evil weighting then second-best choices will yield the same results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war. Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that eliminate since wars, of war an as or mounted from upon rely the institutions. only obviously police and military forces but many of their institutions, most legal state arrangements, States are however desirable social institutions, typically depend on violent means. and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just comprehensive implies pacifism the of inadmissibility institutions, such as police forces and states typically are; be ruled out either individuals, as directly delegates, who violence-dispensing violence effect however exclude the replacement of such forces, by nonviolent nonviolent means. state; but it substitutes, is nonviolent methods or such organisations may else because their behalf. evolved will Pacifism institutions concerned with does not public that order have Pacifism does not organisations maintain they by fully as police alternative nonviolent will be applied, where necessary, to The force of the objection should thus not entail order, sweeping charges of social irresponsibility. 22 the and are coercive actively Law and authority can still operate then in the back-up authority and "enforce" laws. overestimated. on recently which wars, A more telling objection, then, is no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils). that which violence-underpinned these of directly less institutions and a more general argument may be and nation-states particular, or arrangements social inevitability, or not without much further ado. least extensively: violence desirability, In at institution, However wars are by no means the dispense exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the reasonable costs; desirability are wars would it elimination accordingly of does Nor is it true that prominent not be social succumb to pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is, the illegitimacy of government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the sense that defines a state at all (Np.127). A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent, noncoercive, arrangements. political arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible. imply the absence or illegitimacy of government, political community organised under a government. state with authority and not necessarily pacifism does not entail anarchism. main implies it Accordingly, that not does or therefore of a state, of a Nor does it even that imply a certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral dilemmas of political organisation. and only pacifism Comprehensive or (differently) objective, attained, not was Since it admits of states with frameworks of law based on the free agreements of individuals, Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample: a nonviolent Indian genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism simple as derivability. Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a it was not the state; replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society. moral his Granted there are they are not so so ideal easily brought down by its political corollaries. Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than concerning like: external and internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the it also tells against the received treatment of example. While other species, animals for it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals. 29. those At least it does this so long Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied (see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit, anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state authority) and restrictions on liberty, to a limit. Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi: 'The ideally nonviolent state will be an ordered anarchy' (unreferenced citation at the end of the Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24). 23 as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as is humans (or persons). restriction. 30 controversial euthanasia, the category by restriction of the application of violence to from removed not There is little good basis in And, humans, of violence? At the suicide, But must creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms. simply the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature killing of No force need be applied: in a eats and dies painlessly and without a struggle. The or pill given is life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence? technical purely arrangements pacifist will to objections in solve, eating meat worthwhile On the face of obtained. so New any rate, the disruption of at principle an Then the proper objections to such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that it, there are no they risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing. injection several into e.g. So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices. involve chauvinistic spread corollaries killing a such indeed wherever violence plays a significant role. punishment, capital the concerning for however similar case, any areas moral and violence, practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries. But suppose now that the new technology is as the anti-neutron bomb, which selectively destroys which by further clever newly devised "weapons", such scientists, working in their accustomed military role: devices much extended property but not people, or "dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence. just Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid these reaches of technological For "dissolving" people requires energy, fantasy. which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in violence: Was (upgraded) account of that is, the new wars will still involve violence. there old-fashioned however violent anything methods wrong so such as with hunting eating meat obtained by more or raising and killing one's own? Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural" iO. an behaviour of creatures to cit. See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op. Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g. Politics, p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and predation. 24 which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly common feature of and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made animal out) erupts in violence. ways, various for The force of the example along these argument can however Aggression lines. is assumed to be an evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for (of their offspring) in their natural environment. and themselves ir mitigated be survival But most humans now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations which evolution for gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance). Much humans as have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent practices, now ill-adapted to their and mostly counterproductive. situation So argues the pacifist. is a residual problem, There like that of and tribal people, to be condemned as morally Sometimes, yes, Are wrong when predators involve these the violence? when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to Though a way but always? can it is a rather unsatisfactory way. problem vegetarianism. creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as practices be attained: confronting beaten be the around of edge this What this suggests is that nonviolence is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal. The arguments for nonviolence - which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings - sort of But conclusion. exclude. nonviolent what is called charge for state, is is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at This is^ to concede an of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains unqualified. 31. would The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2. attentuated similar approaches thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive that a the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least, since it opens the door a chink to other options which categorically suggest The sheer moral power of such pacifism As Singer has in the analogous case of Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975. 25 vegetarianism: is one see reason e.g., for Animal There is no reason however why giving its adoption some pause. a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules out such a genuine and more sensitive pacifism. There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as In particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts similar to those using violence: This is a requirement of otherwise they could have a case made against them. in a different sense from the pure logical consistency sense, namely that of keeping to the same story. for well. pacifism, Again there need be no deep problem so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must be a single principle (e.g. just P2) - as distinct from a bundle of moral principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving violence.32 To meet the rationality requirement the position should, be integrated into a in larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g. mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic and oceans. In an does not destructive such things as strip wastes in streams extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism. vandalism particular, cover violence But even metaphorically, against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence such as "psychological violence"). What is sought then is an appropriate of these notions covering destructive practices; and also an accompanying synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'. Then P2 is superseded by synthesis an appropriately qualified P2#. It is morally wrong to use vandolence. It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks. 32. It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences. Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter. 33. The position has been called 'pacifism. 26 APPENDICES § 5. from arguments The and pacifism in the real world. of impracticality impracticality reality: social the alleged_ Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will be contested - despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. to be that admitted the pacifism to severe tests. real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put But in this regard pacifism is not an exception. Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less than in replacing war^. prepared for to likely succeed Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they properly And it has or given a have been never The prospects for success of dress rehearsal. nonviolent defence of a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war convention is observed or not. If the convention is observed then pacifism stands reasonable prospects of success. The difficult cases are where the war convention perhaps unleashed, in broken, is and violence is According to Walzer, in his massive ways, on noncombatants. superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance, 'success is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention - ... and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^). attained - there is conventions are flouted. reasons, some got homesick. ruthless of This is presumably be never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some The invaders may give them irrelevant, e.g. up and depart for all sorts or they needed a quick decisive victory, they What Walzer no doubt means is something like this: invaders may Success false. that sufficiently in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support 34. The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit 35. Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op.cit. references given there. 36. All page references prefixed by 'W' are to Allen Lane, London, 1977. 27 See also M. Walzer, Martin, Just and of war) op.cit., Unjust is and Wars, But that sort of thing is also true even if the lines, etc., can eventually succeed. defending to violence. resorts side The difference lies in the pattern of events; is if the defence "forces" are well-armed it invaders to easier and with start difficult more than afterwards and with costly the for civil well -prepared resistance. Walzer is nonviolent the of model the in way enslaved Jews, misleading The way.The Nazis, many like who to jump that conclusion the cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of defence inappropriate examples. command, however, thinking, who He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian the in state, total Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the the population, by The "resistance" picture is highly and large, did not resist extermination in an organised invaded never Germany, were in control the all or For infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population. Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army took over and managed all key Australia it is not even so clear largely united and actively With island territories such as infrastructure. that resisting this is which logistically population. Walzer's feasible against impression resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g. a of the Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave. Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate No state would be prepared to risk way in 37. It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish, opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue, R.L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: the Holocaust and the American Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5. 38. The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars. present state-determined circumstances. 28 training its populace different). It in would full techniques defence (civil all too easy for them to "rout" the police: be then action nonviolent is civil obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means. The argument thus far §6. On the positive case for pacifism: has been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism. That in itself is revealing. deviations from it are initial sketchings. Pacifism is the what require rest position explanation. (inertial and state) The reason for this is simple violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of enough: it is what has to be justified. Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of and merely justified. case try privileged dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be to in that the defender (person or nation) is morally—excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral the position The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent: curious is its the in already a Still bounds. defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have situation. to use it, he should not resort to it. An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:- Violence is (intrinsically) wrong Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong. Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin. None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are deductively tight assumptions can be challenged arguments for pacifism particularly good ones. for pacifism, (as above). Nor One of the poorer positive are all the arguments for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory 29 of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, that nuclear or chemical case is overstated. hope weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an illusion, escalation is inevitable. are bound to be overstepped. the e.g. The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are - Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible. Wars are much more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows. Wars can, for example, be started and stopped things intervene (e.g. (as support more should midstream for first the those inevitably, premiss above) for mixture a suffering and anguish of violent the methods, They nonviolence. of consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. pain, important a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states). The main reasons for pacifism are, include in injustice characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of means-ends cost the in violence that violence within the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as more less furtive, society. open, the why of pacifism) considerable. These are None of these well-known types of reason (giving separately decisive, but their cumulative affords a model for one way of proceeding^: Mill's defence Mill's procedure works (st least As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion. 30 of liberty nonviolence, it works as well as it works for liberty). 39. is it is enough (a nonelementary exercise) to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for otherwise effect reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence. as a A decisive more consequentialist data., argument, takes a but making semantical preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds modelling nonviolence Again principles. use and The data is used to arrive at route. are practical similar of then pacifism in applied is derived semantically principled as nonviolence.0 R. 40. Routley* * The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R. and V. Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear. * With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. The main outlines of the paper were drafted associate at Simon Fraser University. 31 while the author was a research OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY School publications: R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second edition 1974, Third edition 1975. Departmental publications: M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974. D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental Philosophy, 1980. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980. Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. and 13. 14. 15. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979. R.K. Meyer, A note on R_ * matrices, 1979. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980. C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used, N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 1983R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983. R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983. Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 10. R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action, 1982. R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and inadmissible cannibalism, 1982. R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning$of life?, 1982. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics. R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war—deterrence and the political fall-out. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, An expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism. R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in rational behaviour under rival paradigms. / /- ' nw^4) 4 ---------- =^A,W7/7/////7//7777 r/ )r % ./  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 149, Item 2: War and peace II : on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism Subject The topic of the resource Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; number 9. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy. Published under Richard Sylvan's previous name Richard Routley. Description An account of the resource One of two copies in collection. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 149, Item 2 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1983 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves; 25 cm. 58.22 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:cde8c5d">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:cde8c5d</a> Box 149: Publications (to como) https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/4bdf0fc19be362d2a697b5695b65a2df.pdf 533596ed2c0f2e3fff873e709de97e2c PDF Text Text Discussion Papers in environmental phiiosophy _. Phitosophy Departments The Australian National University PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600. NUMBER 9 WAR AND PEACE. II ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY RICHARD ROUTLEY ��FOR CIRCULATION AND EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT WAR AND PEACE. II ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM by R. Routley Number 9 Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy Department of Philosophy Australian National University 1983 ��ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM Pacifism, despite its limited revival through the nonviolent action 1 movement and as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues to have a bad philosophical press. one way or another, It is commonly portrayed characteristically as inconsistent. as incoherent Even philosophical defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding pacifism is in only that consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral 2 position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive . What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic methods. §1. Slide arguments to inconsistency; from rights. an In influential and and arguments from irresponsibility and widely disseminated set of articles 3 attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence. This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory ... (p.408, italics added). Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would be better characterised by the more sweeping 1. According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is 'a valid Christian position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle: see Origins 12 (1982) pp.310-311. The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves from traditional pacifism. 2. In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by R. Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists' belief vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'. as "bizarre and �P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. However T2 captures the cases that orthodox opposition. The separate comprehensive pacifism from main form of pacifism under investigation is called 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual sense which is narrower restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily elsewhere. the But if violence Pacifism, as a universally and not merely in war. violence is impermissible, then it should be so what is out rule position, moral should be comprehensive. On its own showing, it is contended, proper action to preventative action commitment to prevent, what would involve, it use in the case Narveson's or of pacifism. of incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism: claims prohibits, acclaimedly sometimes, precluded from taking violence; But force. genuine actively defend on them, pain Hence the initial that it cannot underwrite its of inconsistency. However location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force. initial for a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action of a type logically excluded own is pacifism The slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and 'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 1970, pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed. J. Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page references without further citation are to this latter article. Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed. T. Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed by 'N' are to this article. 2 �It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence - R2. and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related of R2 (e.g. It is cases from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, forbidden to resist The violence). slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out pacifists by and others, which do not involve use of violence (or 4 perhaps force). The initial slide is however what assault on pacifism Narveson clearing (after several exploits confusions, explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). irresponsibility of in This his first main which he takes to argument, from the does not actually lead to contradiction, but it pacifism, does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method of maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible: ... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6). Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression back violence), (with unless a slide (tentatively) by is without fighting pacifism does not mean what Narveson claims it means, Nor does comprehensive made. theses on ought, T1 T2, and imply that pacifism, characterised we have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will not apply violent methods. Nor therefore does it imply that all conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some, good 4. deal, of that machinery is. One hardly the or a needs to be a comprehensive Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent. 3 �pacifist to coherently think the latter. the This provides confirmation some for key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are legitimate morally are mistaken. The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, initial slide. The is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the stunt connotation of violence or at least of force which equate with violence. use of force is taken to by implied in R2. cannot here resist Hence (p.415). violence, or force and to so Hence the against attack' (pp.417-8). also Narveson's and so to a much less can be resisted, But without violence. things like arrest, without violence (e.g. even by Force can be applied, as in opening sliding out of handcuffs and running away). a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence. force, but not vice versa; and defensible position. positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, Things be If the stunt were got away with, it would pacifism render a unwarranted deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action resistance, be that assumption "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever defended to proceeds Hence the conflation of T2 and excluded from among admissible pacifist methods. pacifist Narveson Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and defending are taken to imply (use of) R2; the Violence implies and it is violence, not all applications of force, that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude. The attempt nonviolent to castrate practices, any case indefensible. development and themselves from compromise, pacifism, by depriving it of the range of is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in It enjoys some popularity even among those advocating expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance older mediation, pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions. The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification; for pacifism has often by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods jeen presented, (cf. even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously 4 said �of pacifism 'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by that negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the hostilities added). and of total doctrine of non-resistance non-cooperation with any form of warfare': But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether or standard, need so limit its admissible methods: to italics comprehensive nothing excludes resistance, uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.^ It is simply that comprehensive pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution. Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against just variations qualifier. on those pacifism are given, writing violence-involving in as an internal Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in terms of 'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the pacifist's 'opposition to If violence'. this slide were pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in case of the permissible any being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed to violence. it is Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make much of in his main inconsistency argument. 5. In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198. Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent action from pacifism; and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well. But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961, p.212. 5 �A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument on based inconsistency pacifism theme, the to notion of rights, especially as it figures in the transformed to the claim No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418). P2(R). For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in notion The right. of very initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of Because the against action preventative infringement 'a right just i_s a status justifying preventative action ... it. of what does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent infringements of his right' (p.419). That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out to to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide such incorporate things as social pressure. Moreover 'it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be For action must have the notion of violence built into it. the against question nonviolent (p.421)! quite indefensibly strong. him To block the argument it is enough for rights with The argument accordingly to be, to or be to, limited In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is action. entitle pacifism. associated preventative action not force logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative these begs is necessary to For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if such action is necessary in the circumstances to prevent infringement his of right. to How the argument from rights leads inconsistency is summed up thus (p.421): SAI. 'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'. SA2. We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence done to us', as a consequence of the.o&f^e&i^fi to avoid violence. But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is self-contradictory, both granting and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected. claiming Narveson that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf. 6 is mistaken p.423). in That a �right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending require that that action is violent. action does Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in by simply rejecting the Narveson not slide^. What for SAI, appears in place of SAI is something like If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. SAI#. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., give facto, an entitlement to the use of violence. no dilemma for the pacifist. not, does ipso Without the slide there is The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide are two aspects of the one thing. The arguments from lesser §2. violence and In evil. lesser outline the argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the violence would where those Inconsistency be some is morally use of immediate permissible violence by T2. and morally justified. would prevent evil, of The cases are greater violence. More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have lesser much use to admit both that the some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible because it involves violence. An argument like this as gets summarized as follows It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the 6. Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights' occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence. An account of rights which will serve is given in R. and V. Routley 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff. 7 �supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force . these Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches. It is important to them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the get ethical place of pacifism is to The result. from argument, basic lesser violence, goes as follows:— Cl. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence. C2. One ought to minimize violence. Therefore C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, the since in this way, in any arbitrary one of minimized. ""P2. indicated, cases violence is Therefore It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according to it which is mora y wrong, always, to use violence. All the ingredients premisses, can be of this argument, together with pulled together from Narveson's work. support for the He not only espouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects the argument with the lesser evil argument:- El. (Use of) violence is an evil. E2. Evil should be minimized. The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2, E3. One ought not to undertake violence - period; that is, the level of violence ought to be zero. J. 8 9. Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78). See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils. 8 �Neither argument is decisive; of reference that they both in fact begin easing pacifists into a resist, where moral absolutes are warped into should moral relatives, where obligations give way to obligations-other-things-being- In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at equal, etc. all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one compatible frame got into it. E3 is directives quite different from minimization where violence is with involved, e.g. has rooting it out, which may involve nonminimization strategies. Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to 02 - a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being to accept prepared violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social justice. Nor do El and E2 entail 02; so neither does principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept C2. by commitment evil-perpetrating Narveson's such e.g. violence but argument some increases well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an dictator. non-violent fails to For in particular, violence is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by in pacifists for similar reasons. Regan's reconstruction of Regan argues from premisses concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically 3. The use of force is a substantive evil. 4. Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must quantity of force (Rp.79). The argument is invalid: be preferred to a great an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering force, even when force is an evil. of It is enough to observe that increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable. Resort to the theme that Elt. Violence is an irredeemable evil (proposed by Regan in his "defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and by Narveson, Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty. subsequently considered An irredeemable evil is figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods) 10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser violence. 9 �will lighten its hue; now it always dominates. Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but What are the grounds for that? the problem with the argument shifts to Elt. As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared to countenance some small amount of violence in exchange for considerable goods. (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing it was not too Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get gross.) pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; deeper, It does break the argument however; underwriting C2. by indeed it seems to get them in for it removes Cl and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from DI. There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil. For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil, evil than that tainted with violence; requires. however pacifism is no of pacifism (see into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous (utilitarian through as violence an irredeemable evil which Rp.80ff.), position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines But the approach greater and there are accordingly no cases such as DI This is the core of Regan's defence converts there is a . mistaken inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes are adequately expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby, as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons otherwise don't arise, or for acting other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not 11. That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss 5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A. While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations. 12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below. 10 �Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions, come what may, period. such is pacifism as collide bottom, at more fashionable, highly with head-on malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at time) were working from. The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ... for the utility 'that will be brought out is incompatible with pacifism': some one who acts by may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121) violence the according to the to utilitarian-commandment maximize doing 13 So . utility may sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles. On its own inconsistency with a false little: position every doctrine inconsistency suffers such with very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism odds the with contractarianism. correct, other ethical positions But this argument would only position insidious, is however, for have Firstly, as we generally, have provisional. theory-saving seen, made also libertarianism were it at and otherwise however they are not, including has which happened is more it utilitarianism, seem as climate unfavourable to incompatible There are two more specific damaging features. and consequentialist approaches more no deontic principle were firm, but all are if The theory of prima facie principles This is entirely mistaken. is a device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties such as moral dilemmas. 13. weight, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of such as pacifism. positions What instance. ethical thought, thus helping to establish a ethical carry if the positions were suitably exhaustive; no deeper ecological presents, he shows utilitarianism as Secondly, consequentialist positions tend to suggest that To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism. 11 �only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try such positions, as pacifism, into offering to ease rival incongruous consequential sometimes support for their themes. Narveson assumptions takes such procedures upon pacifists: a stage further, and utilitarian foists thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain, in the (p.425). recipients' These incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and what it does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators as well as those on whom it is inflicted. Even more astonishing, such utilitarian—style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following three statements, one of which however he must deny (!): [N]l. To will the end (as morally good) is to will the it (at Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the means to least prima facie). [N]2. greater. [N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425)^. 'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist's problem', among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425). It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax out of the statements given. consequences such For implications to hold the substantive terms such as 'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds. another, in the implicans; The intended argument to the "commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of variant on the lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles, N3 to stop exceptions being made for oneself and one's group, and N1 to ensure that 14. Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of these may be defended on purely logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories. 12 �violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g. in in Cl, ethical an end. for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least But, dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed, which is reflected as the begs bound morally to shun violent means. pacifism, against question Under pacifist reformulation Nl will give way to something more like To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally Nl#. acceptable means to it. For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need pacifists since nothing damaging emerges; worry not the three principles duly adjusted; they hardly leave pacifism as untenable. More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has countered. This and E2 N2 or inconsistency is of evil) comprehensive to pacifism Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one what is the moral situation here? to (admissibility What of are them these being of violence) dilemma, Indeed the example is very similar to the turns that on Jim shoots one of what account is given of moral dilemmas. pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to utilitarian line and where situation N But ought The situation is that of a paradigmatic that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives if everything be cases difficult N ought to prevent mass murder, but also kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. of a moral dilemma. moral 03 N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). person not to the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil) (minimization in yet of trying them^. almost Now What a comprehensive take the inadequate to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were prima facie, negotiable, etc., etc. No, the conflicting obligations stand. to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine What is the best 15. A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve. 16. The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82. 13 �thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to in the In circumstances. trying N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied. the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g. that B. No inconsistency in pacifism follows. minimize that Even granted it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence. N had better shoot is preferable to On the contrary the situation N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had fix. a it Suppose and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized, evil, remains to is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate, what determine do There is the real-life complication better do so^. of a dilemma, moral but no inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil. the Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of rights, can now be met. argument The question presents a dilemma: If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, justified in that case? (p.420) its is use Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where to be No, it is not deonticly justified^. is a qualified No: and amount to making out a case. But justification on proposes is solution, back-up ambiguous, in p.423). against may just situation. dilemma a another argument, taking his proposals as evident. pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not argument and the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing no It is certainly not morally The response is qualified then because some force might be consequentially justified, as a second-best presents is it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its deontic origin in 'making right'. Narveson, one Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer raped. obligatory, from pacifism person - but he As it is not — the lead to a decisive (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again. 17. This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear; also available in this Discussion Paper series. 18. An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No. 14 �The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral its adherence to principles unexceptionable Insofar fanaticism, so Hare contends. such manages Hare as as insensitivity. P2, to Through pacifism is a form of get his remarkable accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism: the pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought, but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others (p.174). Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting moral stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's dilemmas deceptively neat two-level critical. thought, into intuitive himself to, without any Hare of the requisite supporting argument, according to which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time, violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf. Hare s redefinition, a Harey—fanatic, e.g. p.175). Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism. on and pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution pacifism. helps comprehensive But moral of classification A fanatic is a person who adheres to ideals which diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf. Since p.170)! comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson) tends, namely the towards pacifists are Harey—fanatics. usual sense: whether position their bigoted . they whether The idea appropriateness violence This does not of course make are 'wild in many situations, such them or extravagant opinions' of some pacifist principles of . the or (OED) is pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers, founders in fanatics, depends on the very different matter of fanatics comprises that of and the the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to But the relevant opinions hardly be, all of the condemned type. of such thinkers Whence the conclusion follows. are not, can By this simple syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted. 19. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, p.173. references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text. 15 All page �Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism: is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as being Jewish, as relevance is completed, it there^ fanaticism wearing beads Naturally, given that using of characterising can or moral hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to violence: blue For however the sensitive task matter of using morally relevant. violence as morally irrelevant. more earlier, those applying of this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up at the end of §4). Does it really matter then that fanatics? it Although argument that it does. homework appears pacifists, that though Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had guess what, they their done the Thus, e.g. go over to Hare's As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ... 20. Harey- properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would utilitarianism). of are it does not matter in the least, Hare has an abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and, logic fanatics, not concepts A. based [entirely] on involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict, Universitetsforlaget, p.15: ...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in defence, the exception. 21. the R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral Philosophy, Macmillan, London, 1972, p.78. Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this article on peace - from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer prototype argument developed against nationalism. 16 Oslo, �crucial points. objectionable getting Before feature some to these of The theory. highly a Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in of which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework two-level is there details, procedure adopted methodologically is Hare's of own radically unsound because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way rejected above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt. which logic, already But that since Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some to Hare's utilitarianism). important opponents of utilitarianism. In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and comprise moral intuitionists and pure impure. deontologists, fanatics Impure who stick to their deontic principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what calls 'critical thinking'. Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal clearly' Hare or inability to face facts or to think involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking, (p.170) originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion accommodating ff.). But cases this comprehensive bit intuitive principles conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28 dirty-trick philosophy can where of pacifists are presumably "pure willing to think critically, but somehow survived opinions different from be here fanatics"; the ordeal those of the utilitarian' (p.171). set inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen. any fanatics of this type, if his argument is for they are 'able and still holding moral They are in fact "pure to be According to Hare there cannot be correct argument is not correct. See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid. 17 since aside, fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out 22. of (p.171). Therefore, his �One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure to consider the possibility that a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians reasons. other substitution, preferences For which can be one, argument (e.g. Hare's requires a base class intersubstituted. representation to ff.). are There p.177 ff.) depends on preference the of course whom among preference-havers, in Hare, chauvinistically contracts this base class whole of p.176 (cf. his discussion humans.Differently, certain the of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast. As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this an less is argument a than damaging charge: A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86). The smear is not without basis. applied to avert greater Regan is envisaging violence where situations and he points to what he takes to be the evident evil; moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free from an aspiring rapist' is Interestingly, (Rp.86). has Regan situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand: herself not described the there is nothing in to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the (perhaps wilful) that infliction death, by forceful means^ (cf. mere use of of damage, non-negligible Np.110); that is, which physical force or power (or energy). including pain, injury or involves much more than And it is by no means so evident that the woman is entitled to inflict violence from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way is duly separated violence upon the aspiring rapist. Once that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity. 23. On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section. 18 class, see R. and V. �But a straightforward action violence disentangling abounds as It with is subcase matter as may at first seem. defective of not depend force is by means no violence. of on tight a Fortunately characterisation what indicate some done, in the way of inflicting damage. constraints Firstly, presupposed. force: is legalised force, violence, so violence, a on satisfactory violence is not applied on behalf adequately of of account some violence, where no force is applied. violence.) 24. supposed that and are which distinguished as illegitimate "legitimate" authority, long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated. so often mistakenly of However it is important to is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.2$ Secondly, violence is not of the enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means through so Indeed the literature on nonviolent characterisations arguments developed in this paper do violence. a the is Violence threat (This only needs emphasizing because it is threats, intimidation and the like, involve Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live (goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent" destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different. It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds related to those that tell against violence proper. For similar reasons, "economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity. Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical practices involve violence. 19 �There can be unintentional violence, e.g. the women may have applied violent without intending to, in escaping the rapist. Fourthly, such matters as the distance at which force is applied and the indirectness of military operations, are irrelevant. modern means, the for as means, instance in The submarine operator who, by causally pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian city instigates a violent By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not act. in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent confined to action done against persons, means. but can violence Finally, be directed not is against other life-forms, as will soon emerge. Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and from the fact that one of derives them^ violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts violence greater than zero. of Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral will certainly problems. They give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2 they mean 'nontrivial violence'. Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps passivity and pacifity. to prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of Both Regan and Narveson (e.g. p.425) assume that pacifism 25. The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, op.cit., p.288n. Note however that Sharp's account of 'political violence' is defective in various other respects. It is curious, but understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action, Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence, and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with force and threat with use. 26. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action. 20 �is a passive do-nothing position. This is far from true, as the variety of methods or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain. considered Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of Narveson Otherwise, would negative later Narveson's nonviolent action. hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not (p.425). Neither Regan nor doing assessment nonviolence' does not change the situation: for this of anything about' violence what calls 'positive he positive is approach simply nonviolence practised in an exemplary ;.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential or effectiveness of nonviolent practices. extent when reduce assembledmuch the of training and the Fuller details of these practices, of impact nonviolent the argument from social irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity. §4. The argument from corollaries. The radical practice political by definition. But from other awkward of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war. For Standard pacifism takes out war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. war and corollaries the position Although normally war would be excluded, of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear. what of dilemma situations? War would always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) best thing 27. to do. A strange pacifism! Comprehensive The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components have been removed. As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types: protest, noncooperation and intervention; op. cit. pp.32-3. Of course pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68). 28. See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein pp.152-3, especially G. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit., (referred to as Politics) and V. Coover and others, Resource Manual for a Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981. 21 �pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast extreme to pacifism. Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence. is given a large suitably If that evil weighting then second-best choices will yield the same results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war. Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that eliminate since wars, are war of an as or mounted from rely the institutions. exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all upon only arrangements social and nation-states particular, obviously police and military forces but of violence-underpinned many of their institutions, most state legal arrangements, States are however desirable social institutions, typically depend on violent means. and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just comprehensive pacifism implies the of inadmissibility institutions, such as police forces and states typically are; be ruled out either individuals, directly delegates, as violence-dispensing effect who forces, by nonviolent nonviolent means. state; but it substitutes, recently or such organisations may because else their behalf. evolved will which is nonviolent methods Pacifism institutions concerned with does not public that order have Pacifism does not organisations maintain they by fully as police alternative nonviolent will be applied, where necessary, to The force of the objection should thus not entail order, sweeping charges of social irresponsibility. 22 the and are coercive actively Law and authority can still operate then in the back-up authority and "enforce" laws. overestimated. on violence however exclude the replacement of such wars, A more telling objection, then, is no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils). that which institutions these directly less or and a more general argument may be inevitability, or not without much further ado. least extensively: violence desirability, In at institution, However wars are by no means the dispense would nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the reasonable costs; desirability wars it elimination accordingly of does Nor is it true that prominent not be social succumb to �pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is, the illegitimacy of government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the sense that defines a state at all (Np.127). or (differently) A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent, political noncoercive, arrangements. arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible. imply the absence or illegitimacy of government, political community organised under a government. state with authority and not necessarily pacifism does not entail anarchism. main Accordingly, that implies not does it or therefore of a state, of a Nor does even it that imply a certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral dilemmas of political organisation. and only pacifism Comprehensive objective, not attained, was Since it admits of states with frameworks of law based on the free agreements of individuals, Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample: a nonviolent Indian state; replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society. his it was not the Granted there are genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism 2", they are not so simple as derivability. Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a moral so ideal easily brought down by its political corollaries. Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than concerning like: external and internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the it also tells against the received treatment of example. While other species, animals for it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals. 29. those At least it does this so long Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied (see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit, anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state authority) and restrictions on liberty, to a limit. Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi: 'The ideally nonviolent state will be an ordered anarchy' (unreferenced citation at the end of the Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24). 23 �as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as is There is little good basis humans (or persons). restriction.^ controversial euthanasia, any in And, moral areas concerning the corollaries killing a such for however similar case, spread humans, of At violence? the suicide, But must creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms. the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature simply killing of No force need be applied: in a eats and dies painlessly and without a struggle. The or pill is given life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence? technical purely arrangements pacifist will to objections solve, in eating meat worthwhile On the face of obtained. so New any rate, the disruption of at principle an Then the proper objections to such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that it, there are no they risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing. injection several into e.g. So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices. involve chauvinistic indeed wherever violence plays a significant role. punishment, capital and the category by restriction of the application of violence to from removed not violence, practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries. But suppose now that the new technology is extended scientists, working in their accustomed military role: as the anti—neutron bomb, which selectively destroys devices which much but clever 'weapons , such newly devised property by further not people, or "dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence. just Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid these reaches of technological fantasy. For "dissolving" people requires energy, which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in violence: Was (upgraded) account of that is, the new wars will still involve violence. there old-fashioned however violent anything methods so such wrong as with hunting eating meat obtained by more or raising and killing one's own? Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural" M. an behaviour of creatures to See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op. cit. Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g. Politics, p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and predation. 24 �which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly common feature of and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made animal The force of the out) erupts in violence. various for ways, example along these argument lines. can however Aggression assumed to be an is evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for themselves (of their offspring) in their natural environment. and ir mitigated be survival But most humans for now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations which evolution gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance). as Much humans have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent practices, ill-adapted now to their and mostly counterproductive. situation So argues the pacifist. There is a residual problem, practices like that vegetarianism. the Are creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as predators of and tribal people, to be condemned as morally Sometimes, confronting yes, be attained: when wrong these violence? involve when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to Though a way but always? can problem 3 1, it is a rather unsatisfactory way. be beaten the around of edge this What this suggests is that nonviolence is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal. The arguments for nonviolence - which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings - sort of But conclusion. exclude. nonviolent what is called charge for state, is is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at This is^ to concede an of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains unqualified. 31. would The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2. attentuated similar approaches thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive that a the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least, since it opens the door a chink to other options which categorically suggest The sheer moral power of such pacifism As Singer has in the analogous case of Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975. 25 vegetarianism: is one see reason e.g., for Animal �There is no reason however why giving its adoption some pause. a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules out such a genuine and more sensitive pacifism. There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as In particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts similar to those using violence: This is a of requirement otherwise they could have a case made against them. in a different sense from the pure logical consistency sense, namely that of keeping to the same story. for well. pacifism, Again there need be no deep problem so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must be a single principle just (e.g. P2) - as distinct from bundle a of moral principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving violence.32 io meet the rationality requirement the position should, be integrated into a in larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g. mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic and oceans. In an does not destructive such things as strip wastes in streams extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism. vandalism particular, cover violence But even metaphorically, against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence such as "psychological violence"). What is sought then is an appropriate of these notions covering destructive practices; and also an accompanying synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'. Then P2 is superseded by synthesis an appropriately qualified P2#. It is morally wrong to use vandolence. It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks. 32. It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences. Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter. 13. The position has been called 'pacifism. 26 �APPENDICES §5. The from arguments impracticality impracticality and pacifism in the real world. of the reality: social alleged Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will be contested - And it has despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. to be admitted the that real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put But in this regard pacifism is not an exception. pacifism to severe tests. Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less than in replacing war^. prepared or for succeed Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they properly to likely given a dress rehearsal. have been never The prospects for success of nonviolent defence of,a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war is convention observed or not. If the convention is observed then pacifism stands reasonable prospects of success. The difficult cases are where the war convention perhaps unleashed, in broken, is massive ways, on noncombatants. and violence is According to Walzer, in his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance, 'success is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention - ... and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^). attained - there is conventions are flouted. reasons, some got homesick. ruthless of This is presumably be never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some The invaders may give them irrelevant, e.g. up and depart for all sorts or they needed a quick decisive victory, they What Walzer no doubt means is something like this: invaders may Success false. that sufficiently in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support 34. The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source of considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit. 35. Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op. cit. references given there. 36. All page references prefixed by 'W' are to Allen Lane, London, 1977. 27 See also M. Walzer, Martin, Just and war) op.cit., Unjust is and Wars, �lines, etc., can eventually succeed. defending The difference lies in the pattern of events; to violence. resorts side But that sort of thing is also true even if the is if the defence "forces" are well-armed it to invaders start and with difficult more civil well -prepared with than afterwards easier the for costly and resistance. Walzer is inappropriate examples. in command, model the of way the Jews, The way.The Nazis, to jump who that conclusion the He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian the enslaved misleading many like cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of defence nonviolent however, thinking, who in state, total Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the the population, by The "resistance" picture is highly and large, did not resist extermination in an organised never invaded Germany, were in control all or the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population. Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army took over and managed all key Australia it is not even so clear largely united and actively resisting this is which With island territories such as infrastructure. that For logistically population. Walzer's feasible against impression resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g. a of the Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave. Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate present state-determined circumstances. No state would be prepared to risk way in 37. It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish, opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue, R.L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: the Holocaust and the American Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5. 38. The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars. 28 �training its populace different). It full in techniques (civil is defence all too easy for them to "rout" the police: be then would action nonviolent civil obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means. thus The argument initial sketchings. far §6. On the positive case for pacifism: has been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism. That in itself is revealing. deviations from are it Pacifism is the require what rest position (inertial and state) The reason for this is simple explanation. violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of enough: it is what has to be justified. Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of and merely justified. case try dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be in that the defender (person or nation) is morally-excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral the position privileged The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent: curious is to its already the in bounds. a Still defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have situation. to use it, he should not resort to it. An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:- Violence is (intrinsically) wrong Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong. Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin. None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are deductively tight assumptions can be challenged arguments for pacifism particularly good ones. for pacifism, (as above). Nor One of the poorer positive are all the arguments for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory 29 �of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, nuclear that or chemical hope weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an illusion, escalation is inevitable. are bound to be overstepped. case is overstated. the e.g. The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are - Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible. Wars are much more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows. Wars can, for example, be started and stopped things intervene (e.g. support (as midstream more should the for first inevitably, premiss for those mixture a above) suffering and anguish violent of methods, the They nonviolence. injustice characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of means-ends of the consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. pain, important a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states). The main reasons for pacifism are, include in cost that in violence violence within the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as more less furtive, society. open, the why of pacifism) considerable. These are None of these well-known types of reason (giving separately decisive, but their cumulative affords a model for one way of proceeding^; Mill's defence Mill's procedure works (at least As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion. 30 of liberty nonviolence, it works as well as it works for liberty). 39. is it is enough (a nonelementary exercise) to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for otherwise effect reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence. as a �A more decisive consequentialist data , argument, takes a but making semantical preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds modelling nonviolence Again principles. use of route. are similar practical and The data is used to arrive at then pacifism in applied is derived semantically as principled nonviolence.^0 R. 40. Routley* * The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R. and V. Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear. * With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. The main outlines of the paper were drafted associate at Simon Fraser University. 31 while the author was a research �OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY School publications: R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second edition 1974, Third edition 1975. Departmental publications: M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974. D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental Philosophy, 1980. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980. Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group): 1. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978. 2. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979. 3. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979. 4. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979. 5. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979. 6. R.K. Meyer, A note on R-^ matrices, 1979. 7. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980. 8^ C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980. 9. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980. 10. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981. 11. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983. 12. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used, and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983. 13. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 198314. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983 15. R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983. Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action, 1982. R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and inadmissible cannibalism, 1982. moo R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning of life?, 1982. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics. R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war-deterrence and the political fall out. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deonti R°"ouU.y and V. Plumwood, A. expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism. 7. 10. R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: rational behaviour under rival paradigms. the difference 1 ����� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Self-published Papers Description An account of the resource <span>Sylvan favoured the </span><span lang="EN-GB">highly-unorthodox practice of self-publishing a vast amount of his work<span>—</span><span></span>quite literally, using his own printing press!</span> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document Discussion Papers in environmental phiiosophy _. Phitosophy Departments The Australian National University PO Box 4, Canberra, Australia 2600. NUMBER 9 WAR AND PEACE. II ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY RICHARD ROUTLEY FOR CIRCULATION AND EVENTUAL LIBRARY DEPOSIT WAR AND PEACE. II ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM by R. Routley Number 9 Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy Department of Philosophy Australian National University 1983 ON THE ALLEGED INCONSISTENCY, MORAL INSENSITIVITY AND FANATICISM OF PACIFISM Pacifism, despite its limited revival through the nonviolent action 1 movement and as a respectable tradition within the Catholic church , continues to have a bad philosophical press. one way or another, It is commonly portrayed characteristically as inconsistent. as incoherent Even philosophical defences of pacifism are liable to be extremely defensive, conceding pacifism is in only that consistent, but insisting otherwise that it is as false as a moral 2 position can be, bizarre, and morally insensitive . What follows challenges the prevailing wisdom put out in the philosophical press, but using its own analytic methods. §1. Slide arguments to inconsistency; from rights. an In influential and and arguments from irresponsibility and widely disseminated set of articles 3 attacking pacifism , Narveson says that the pacifist's position is not only that [Tl] violence is evil but also that [T2] it is morally wrong to use force [violence] to resist, punish, or prevent violence. This further step makes pacifism a radical moral doctrine. What I shall try to establish below is that it is, in fact, more than merely radical - it is actually incoherent because self-contradictory ... (p.408, italics added). Subsequently (p.414) he characterises pacifism by way of T2, though it would be better characterised by the more sweeping 1. According to the US Catholic Bishops, pacifism is 'a valid Christian position', with a long tradition going back to Christ and the early Christians who were committed to a nonviolent lifestyle: see Origins 12 (1982) pp.310-311. The revival in the nonviolent action (NVA) movement is a somewhat qualified one (as will emerge), many in that movement wishing to distance themselves from traditional pacifism. 2. In particular, T. Regan 'A defence of pacifism', Canadian Journal of Philosophy 11 (1972) 73-86. Page references to this article are prefixed by R. Regan ends by saying 'To regard the pacifists' belief vaguely ludicious" is, perhaps, to put it mildly'. as "bizarre and P2. It is morally wrong to use violence. However T2 captures the cases that orthodox opposition. The separate comprehensive pacifism from main form of pacifism under investigation is called 'comprehensive' to distinguish it from standard pacifism, in the usual sense which is narrower restricted to certain theses concerning (state) order, notably opposition to (violence in) war, which does not necessarily elsewhere. the But if violence Pacifism, as a universally and not merely in war. violence is impermissible, then it should be so what is out rule position, moral should be comprehensive. On its own showing, it is contended, proper action to preventative action commitment to prevent, what would involve, it use in the case Narveson's or of pacifism. of incoherence Narveson and others find in pacifism: claims prohibits, acclaimedly sometimes, precluded from taking violence; But force. genuine actively defend on them, pain Hence the initial that it cannot underwrite its of inconsistency. However location of incoherence in pacifism depends, essentially, on several connected slides, all of which the pacifist should resist - without force. initial for a moral position must allow action to back up commitment, action of a type logically excluded own is pacifism The slide is from the theme T2 italicised above to what results by deletion of the crucial phrase 'to use force', or as it should be 'to use violence', namely J. Narveson 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Ethics 75 (1968) and 'Is pacifism consistent', Ethics 78 (1968). The first article is reprinted in War and Morality (ed. R. Wasserstrom) Wadsworth, Belmont, California, 1970, pp.63-77. The first article is also rewritten and combined with part of the second in 'Pacifism: a philosophical analysis', Moral Problems (ed. J. Rachels), Third Edition, Harper & Row, New York, 1979, pp.408-425. Page references without further citation are to this latter article. Narveson's theme that pacifism is incoherent is headlined and further elaborated in his 'Violence and war', Matters of Life and Death (ed. T. Regan), Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1980, pp.109-147. Page references prefixed by 'N' are to this article. 2 It is morally wrong to resist, punish, or prevent violence - R2. and similarly from special and related cases of T2 to special and related of R2 (e.g. It is cases from T2S, It is forbidden to use force to resist violence, to R2S, forbidden to resist The violence). slide is illegitimate because commitment to T2 does not entail commitment to the rejected proposition R2; for one thing there are many ways of confronting, reducing and controlling violence, worked out pacifists by and others, which do not involve use of violence (or 4 perhaps force). The initial slide is however what assault on pacifism Narveson clearing (after several exploits confusions, explain the popularity of pacifism, out of the way). irresponsibility of in This his first main which he takes to argument, from the does not actually lead to contradiction, but it pacifism, does suggest that there is a serious tension between pacifism and any method of maintaining social order, so serious that pacifism is socially irresponsible: ... to hold the pacifist position as a genuine full-blooded moral principle is to hold nobody has a right to fight back when attacked ... It means that we are all mistaken in supposing that we have the right of self-protection ... It appears to mean, for instance, that we have no right to punish criminals, that all our machinery of criminal justice is, in fact, unjust. Robbers, murderers, rapists, and miscellaneous delinquents this [irresponsible] theory, to be let loose (pp.415-6). Since one can protect oneself and avoid and resist aggression back violence), (with unless a slide (tentatively) by is without fighting pacifism does not mean what Narveson claims it means, Nor does comprehensive made. theses on ought, T1 T2, and imply that pacifism, characterised we have no right to punish criminals, but simply that such punishment (or the imposition of penalties) will not apply violent methods. Nor therefore does it imply that all conventional machinery of criminal justice is unjust, but only that some, good 4. deal, of that machinery is. One hardly the or a needs to be a comprehensive Pacifism, as involving the active use of defensive methods, can be traced back as far as the Mohist philosophers of ancient China. On modern methods see especially G. Sharp, Exploring Nonviolent Alternatives, Boston, 1971. As will emerge, there is a point in distinguishing (as Narveson does not in his earlier work) force from violence; they are not equivalent. 3 pacifist to coherently think the latter. the This provides confirmation some for key point which is that there is, so far at least, no inconsistency evident in maintaining that those who hold that violent methods are legitimate morally are mistaken. The next slide is closely connected with, and really generalises upon, initial slide. The is to imbue a range of more neutral terms with the stunt connotation of violence or at least of force which equate with violence. use of force is taken to by implied in R2. cannot here resist Hence (p.415). violence, or force and to so Hence the against attack' (pp.417-8). also Narveson's and so to a much less can be resisted, But without violence. things like arrest, without violence (e.g. even by Force can be applied, as in opening sliding out of handcuffs and running away). a jam jar or pulling a person out of danger, without violence. force, but not vice versa; and defensible position. positions can be defended, as in this paper or on the field, Things be If the stunt were got away with, it would pacifism render a unwarranted deprive pacifism of, for instance, the general methods of nonviolent action resistance, be that assumption "recharacterisation" of pacifism as the position that 'no one ought ever defended to proceeds Hence the conflation of T2 and excluded from among admissible pacifist methods. pacifist Narveson Thus such activities as resisting, punishing, preventing, and defending are taken to imply (use of) R2; the Violence implies and it is violence, not all applications of force, that comprehensive pacifists are bound to exclude. The attempt nonviolent to castrate practices, any case indefensible. development and themselves from compromise, pacifism, by depriving it of the range of is not confined to those who (want to) think pacifism in It enjoys some popularity even among those advocating expansion of nonviolent methods, who no doubt want to distance older mediation, pacifism, whose methods they see as confined to negotiation, and involving the granting of concessions. The newer (nonviolent) activists have justification; for pacifism has often by an unsympathetic opposition, as confined to passive methods jeen presented, (cf. even the Concise English Dictionary account, where it is erroneously 4 said of pacifism 'positively, it holds that all disputes should be settled by that negotiation', and, negatively, that it is 'the hostilities added). and of total doctrine of non-resistance non-cooperation with any form of warfare': But nothing in the characterisation of pacifism, whether or standard, need so limit its admissible methods: to italics comprehensive nothing excludes resistance, uncompromising methods, and imposition of sanctions which offer no concessions.^ It is simply that comprehensive pacifism has not yet developed its fuller potential, especially in conflict resolution. Subsequent slides in the development of the argument against just variations qualifier. on those pacifism are given, writing violence-involving in as an internal Thus the measure of a person's opposition to something in terms of 'the amount of effort he is willing to put forth against it' is taken - somewhat perversely - to be violence-involving effort or opposition in the pacifist's 'opposition to If violence'. this slide were pacifist would be caught in an elementary inconsistency since in case of the permissible any being opposed to violence, by definition, he is prepared to use violence and so is not opposed to violence. it is Even Narveson 'cannot make too much' of this inconsistency, though not so far removed from the alleged inconsistencies he does want to make much of in his main inconsistency argument. 5. In the way Sharp, for example, has illicitly assumed in several works: see for instance the unduly narrow definition of pacifism given in his Social Power and Political Freedom, Porter Sargent Publishers, Boston, 1980, p.198. Again, however, there is some historical basis for dissociating nonviolent action from pacifism; and given the difficulties comprehensive pacifism can lead to, there are philosophical reasons as well. But even without much in the way of organised sanctions, worthwhile positive results can often be obtained, as the case of international law reveals: cf. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law, Oxford University Press, 1961, p.212. 5 A similar slide, together with a further slide, is made in the argument on based inconsistency pacifism theme, the to notion of rights, especially as it figures in the transformed to the claim No one has a right to indulge in violence (p.418). P2(R). For Narveson tries to incorporate the right to indulge in violence in notion The right. of very initial move is to work in assumptions of defence from breaches of a right and of Because the against action preventative infringement 'a right just i_s a status justifying preventative action ... it. of what does follow logically is that one has a right to whatever may be necessary to prevent infringements of his right' (p.419). That 'whatever may be necessary' turns out to to include force, now very generously construed - here is the further slide such incorporate things as social pressure. Moreover 'it is a logical truth, not merely a contingent one, that what might be For action must have the notion of violence built into it. the against question nonviolent (p.421)! quite indefensibly strong. him To block the argument it is enough for rights with The argument accordingly to be, to or be to, limited In any case the 'whatever may be necessary' requirement is action. entitle pacifism. associated preventative action not force logical transformations to work, however, the notion of preventative these begs is necessary to For example, D'Agostino's right to his umbrella does kill a person who is trying to steal the umbrella even if such action is necessary in the circumstances to prevent infringement his of right. to How the argument from rights leads inconsistency is summed up thus (p.421): SAI. 'If we have any rights at all then we have a right to use force to prevent the deprivation of the thing to which we are said to have a right'. SA2. We have, according to the pacifist's 'the right not to have violence done to us', as a consequence of the.o&f^e&i^fi to avoid violence. But, therefore, we have the right to use violence, so the pacifist's position is self-contradictory, both granting and not granting the right to use violence. The argument fails because SAI is readily rejected. claiming Narveson that 'our standard concept of rights' yields SAI (cf. 6 is mistaken p.423). in That a right can be sustained by right-supporting or right-defending require that that action is violent. action does Pacifists can provide an adequate analysis of rights - essentially the usual one - without letting themselves in by simply rejecting the Narveson not slide^. What for SAI, appears in place of SAI is something like If we have any rights at all then we have a right to uphold them. SAI#. But the right to uphold them, defend them, protect them, etc., give facto, an entitlement to the use of violence. no dilemma for the pacifist. not, does ipso Without the slide there is The "pacifist's dilemma" and Narveson's slide are two aspects of the one thing. The arguments from lesser §2. violence and In evil. lesser outline the argument - which is independent of the notion of rights - is that pacifists must admit, in terms of their own principles, that there are cases where the violence would where those Inconsistency be some is morally use of immediate permissible violence by T2. and morally justified. would prevent evil, of The cases are greater violence. More explicitly, and in (Narveson's) terms which also import the notion of evil, pacifists have lesser much use to admit both that the some use of force, is admissible, in preventing greater evil, and that it is not admissible because it involves violence. An argument like this as gets summarized as follows It seems to me logically true, in any moral theory whatever, that [E2'J the lesser evil must be preferred to the greater. If the use of force by me, now is necessary to avoid the use of more physical force (by others, perhaps) later, then to say that physical force is the 6. Narveson, in responding to a suggestion of Armour (pp.423-4), sees nothing between (1) forceful defence of rights, with the slide to violence in, and (0) nothing really answering to rights at all, where words like 'rights' occur without stuffing. This shows a serious blindspot. What lies in between are a range of notions which do not guarantee the slide to violence. An account of rights which will serve is given in R. and V. Routley 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1980; see especially p.l75ff. 7 supreme (kind of) evil is precisely to say that under circumstances I am committed to the use of physical force . these Now there are several somewhat different arguments snarled up in these sketches. It is important to them unsnagged 8, especially if a clearer view of the get ethical place of pacifism is to The result. from argument, basic lesser violence, goes as follows:— Cl. There are cases where use of violence would prevent greater violence. C2. One ought to minimize violence. Therefore C3. There are cases where one ought to use violence, the since in this way, in any arbitrary one of minimized. ""P2. indicated, cases violence is Therefore It is not (always) morally wrong to use violence, contradicting the pacifist principle, P2, according to it which is mora y wrong, always, to use violence. All the ingredients premisses, can be of this argument, together with pulled together from Narveson's work. support for the He not only espouses C2, but suggests two distinct arguments for it, the first of which connects the argument with the lesser evil argument:- El. (Use of) violence is an evil. E2. Evil should be minimized. The second argument to C2 is simply from the pacifist premiss, varying P2, E3. One ought not to undertake violence - period; that is, the level of violence ought to be zero. J. 8 9. Narveson, 'Is pacifism inconsistent', Ethics 78 (1968) p.148. Without getting into the level of complication, not to say epicycling, that Regan lands himself in: he is obliged to distinguish three mirage-like senses of 'lesser evil': quantitative, qualitative, and resultant (Rp.78). See Np.127 where it is asserted that violence as a source of evil should be minimized, and Np.119, where the point is put in terms of absolute evil. That way of putting it already starts to give the game away, since Narveson is all too evidently interested in negotiable evil which can be traded off against other evils. 8 Neither argument is decisive; of reference that they both in fact begin easing pacifists into a resist, where moral absolutes are warped into should moral relatives, where obligations give way to obligations-other-things-being- In any event E3 only directs one not to get involved in violence at equal, etc. all, and says nothing about minimizing it when one compatible frame got into it. E3 is directives quite different from minimization where violence is with involved, e.g. has rooting it out, which may involve nonminimization strategies. Thus E3 does not entail E2, and commitment to E2 does not commit pacifists to 02 - a principle nonviolent activists usually do not accept either, being to accept prepared violence perpetrated against them, for example, as a means to social justice. Nor do El and E2 entail 02; so neither does principles like El and E2 oblige them to accept C2. by commitment evil-perpetrating Narveson's such e.g. violence but argument some increases well-known hypothetical cases as the slaying of an dictator. non-violent fails to For in particular, violence is not the only evil, and (so) evil may sometimes be reduced by in pacifists for similar reasons. Regan's reconstruction of Regan argues from premisses concerning the ranking of evil and a premiss like E2', specifically 3. The use of force is a substantive evil. 4. Therefore, a lesser quantity of force must quantity of force (Rp.79). The argument is invalid: be preferred to a great an ordering of evils does not induce a similar ordering force, even when force is an evil. of It is enough to observe that increasing force may still reduce evil, and so, on Regan-Narveson assumptions, be preferrable. Resort to the theme that Elt. Violence is an irredeemable evil (proposed by Regan in his "defence" of pacifism, Rp.80, and by Narveson, Np.118) promises a way around the difficulty. subsequently considered An irredeemable evil is figuratively so black that no combination with grays (lesser evils) or whites (goods) 10. An argument like the argument from lesser violence itself would appear to undercut the argument from El and E2 to premiss C2 for the argument for lesser violence. 9 will lighten its hue; now it always dominates. Elt together with E2 will yield C2, but What are the grounds for that? the problem with the argument shifts to Elt. As Narveson points out (Np.119), it is not widely acceptable, most people being prepared to countenance some small amount of violence in exchange for considerable goods. (But then, not so long ago, most people were tolerant of cruelty to animals providing it was not too Moreover, so Narveson implies, appeal to Elt does not get gross.) pacifists out of the argument from lesser violence; deeper, It does break the argument however; underwriting C2. by indeed it seems to get them in for it removes Cl and, more importantly, the corresponding premiss of the more difficult argument from lesser evil, which starts from DI. There are cas^s where the use of violence would avoid greater evil. For given, by Elt, that use of violence is irredeemably evil, evil than that tainted with violence; requires. however pacifism is no of pacifism (see into a 'bizarre and vaguely ludicrous (utilitarian through as violence an irredeemable evil which Rp.80ff.), position (Rp.86), extreme pacifism, some of the (problematic) features of which Regan outlines But the approach greater and there are accordingly no cases such as DI This is the core of Regan's defence converts there is a . mistaken inspired) attempt to get at moral absolutes, which is what pacifism is, like other deontological positions, grounded upon. But such absolutes are adequately expressed in such commandments as, One ought not to commit violence, meaning thereby, as it says ought not, not just for the time being, or so long as reasons otherwise don't arise, or for acting other things being equal, or prima facie, but ought not 11. That is by no means the only element in Regan's torturous reformulation of Narveson's argument that can be faulted. Consider, for example, premiss 5. If any given action, A, is necessary to bring about a lesser rather than a greater quantity of qualitatively equivalent evil, then one's obligation is to do A. While the premiss has considerable appeal as a principle of supererogation, there is little reason to accept it as one supplying obligations. 12. Extreme pacifism can be seen as taking the rule that one ought never to use violence as having priority over all other moral rules - which is indeed an extreme position even if a consistent one. Such a priority rule is an unsatisfactory way to deal with moral dilemmas: see further below. 10 Such old-fashioned deontological, moral absolutist positions, come what may, period. such is pacifism as collide bottom, at more fashionable, highly with head-on malleable moral positions like utilitarianism, which both Narveson and Regan (at time) were working from. The reason for collision is simply that 'utilitarianism ... for the utility 'that will be brought out is incompatible with pacifism': some one who acts by may be greater than that produced by any alternative' (Np.121) violence the according to the to utilitarian-commandment maximize doing 13 So . utility may sometimes commit violence, contravening pacifist principles. On its own inconsistency with a false little: position every doctrine inconsistency suffers such with very many false doctrines. Narveson does have another (small) argument to the effect that pacifism odds the with contractarianism. correct, other ethical positions But this argument would only position insidious, is however, for have Firstly, as we generally, have provisional. theory-saving seen, made also libertarianism were it at and otherwise however they are not, including has which happened is more it utilitarianism, seem as climate unfavourable to incompatible There are two more specific damaging features. and consequentialist approaches more no deontic principle were firm, but all are if The theory of prima facie principles This is entirely mistaken. is a device, designed to get consequentialist positions out of difficulties such as moral dilemmas. 13. weight, is that utilitarian thinking has permeated much of the rest of such as pacifism. positions What instance. ethical thought, thus helping to establish a ethical carry if the positions were suitably exhaustive; no deeper ecological presents, he shows utilitarianism as Secondly, consequentialist positions tend to suggest that To show what Narveson goes on to claim that people are sometimes justified in using force rather more is required, as Regan points out, Rp. 85, n.18. It has also to be shown that there are cases of these types (as in Cl) and that agents can know that use of force will increase utility, reduce evil, etc. A pacifist, rightly sceptical of utilitarian tracing of consequences, and fond of noting that violence begets violence, could, with a small dose of scepticism also, dig in at this point and claim that because no one can be sure that use of force will reduce evil, so no one is justified in using force. This is sceptically-based pacifism. 11 only consequentialist reasons carry argumentative weight, and so try such positions, as pacifism, into offering to ease rival incongruous consequential sometimes support for their themes. Narveson assumptions takes such procedures upon pacifists: a stage further, and utilitarian foists thus he says that the pacifist's 'objection to violence is that it produces suffering, unwanted pain, in the (p.425). recipients' These incongruous utilitarian grounds are something of a travesty of pacifists' reasons for objecting to violence, which concern rather the type of action involved and what it does - though not only or always at all in the way of suffering - to the perpetrators as well as those on whom it is inflicted. Even more astonishing, such utilitarian—style considerations are supposed to commit the pacifist to the following three statements, one of which however he must deny (!): [N]l. To will the end (as morally good) is to will the it (at Other things being equal, the lesser evil is to be preferred to the means to least prima facie). [N]2. greater. [N]3. There are no "privileged" moral persons ... (p.425)^. 'These three principles' which feature in the summation of 'the pacifist's problem', among them imply, as far as I can see, both the commitment to force when it is necessary to prevent more violence and also the conception of a right as an entitlement to defense. And they therefore leave pacifism, as a moral doctrine, in a logically untenable position (p.425). It would take not merely logic, but a good deal of magic, to coax out of the statements given. consequences such For implications to hold the substantive terms such as 'violence' and 'right' must also figure, in one way or otherwise the implications fail just on formal grounds. another, in the implicans; The intended argument to the "commitment to force" conclusion appears however to be some sort of variant on the lesser evil argument, with N2 replacing E2' (N3 and N1 have more oblique roles, N3 to stop exceptions being made for oneself and one's group, and N1 to ensure that 14. Narveson also wants to contend that 'all of these may be defended on purely logical or "meta-ethical" grounds'. This is likely false, especially the claim as to logical status, since some of the principles are rejected in substantive ethical theories. 12 violence adopted or even required as a means has its full import, e.g. in in Cl, ethical an end. for one thing, principle Nl, which is at least But, dubious unless 'prima facie' is unbracketed, which is reflected as the begs bound morally to shun violent means. pacifism, against question Under pacifist reformulation Nl will give way to something more like To choose an end as morally good is to choose (only) morally Nl#. acceptable means to it. For another, without much further construction work the suggested arguments need pacifists since nothing damaging emerges; worry not the three principles duly adjusted; they hardly leave pacifism as untenable. More threatening is the argument from lesser evil itself, which has countered. This and E2 N2 or inconsistency is of evil) comprehensive to pacifism Narveson's stock examples concern murder, one what is the moral situation here? to (admissibility What of are them these being of violence) dilemma, Indeed the example is very similar to the turns that on Jim shoots one of what account is given of moral dilemmas. pacifist does not do, unless he wants coherence trouble, is to utilitarian line and where situation N But ought The situation is that of a paradigmatic that of Pedro and Jim, where Pedro volunteers to call off his firing squad about to shoot several captives if everything be cases difficult N ought to prevent mass murder, but also kill B, because that is murder and involves violence. of a moral dilemma. moral 03 N (Narveson in fact) must kill the (potential) mass-murderer B (Np.119). person not to the argument from DI (cases of violence to avoid greater evil) (minimization in yet of trying them^. almost Now What a comprehensive take the inadequate to explain moral dilemmas away, as if they didn't ever occur (at least at other than an initial intuitive level), as if all obligations were prima facie, negotiable, etc., etc. No, the conflicting obligations stand. to be done is however a very consequentialist thing, to try to determine What is the best 15. A surprising feature of Narveson's argument, also Regan's "reconstruction", is that these cases are usually nowhere in sight, as if again one got to conclusions logically out of the air, without any of the hard work the cases involve. 16. The example was first discussed in B. Williams, 'Conflict of values', reprinted in his Moral Luck, Cambridge University Press, 1981, 71-82. 13 thing (or a sufficiently good thing) to in the In circumstances. trying N2M, that it is preferrable to minimize evil, will presumably be satisfied. the best course in the circumstances is a violent one, e.g. that B. No inconsistency in pacifism follows. minimize that Even granted it does not follow that N ought to resort to violence. N had better shoot is preferable to On the contrary the situation N ought not to shoot B, but in the appalling circumstances, he had fix. a it Suppose and that in this sense (not a deontic one) evil should be minimized, evil, remains to is the appropriate course of action principles like N2 and its mate, what determine do There is the real-life complication better do so^. of a dilemma, moral but no inconsistency through arguments like that from lesser evil. the Narveson's jackpot question, entangled in his discussion of rights, can now be met. argument The question presents a dilemma: If force is the only way to prevent violence in a given case, justified in that case? (p.420) its is use Narveson is thinking of cases where one is about to be murdered, Regan where to be No, it is not deonticly justified^. is a qualified No: and amount to making out a case. But justification on proposes is solution, back-up ambiguous, in p.423). against may just situation. dilemma a another argument, taking his proposals as evident. pacifist can simply dispute it - the jackpot question does not argument and the contrary, that enough violence for the given occasion is morally justified - it can go at least as far as killing no It is certainly not morally The response is qualified then because some force might be consequentially justified, as a second-best presents is it is not justified, in the sense of 'justified' which reflects its deontic origin in 'making right'. Narveson, one Given that such force again presupposes violence, the pacifist answer raped. obligatory, from pacifism person - but he As it is not — the lead to a decisive (though Narveson gives the impression that it does, e.g. What it can lead to is the argument from lesser evil over again. 17. This corresponds to the account of moral dilemma, given in much more technical detail in R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'Moral dilemmas and the logic of deontic notions' in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others) 1983, to appear; also available in this Discussion Paper series. 18. An extreme pacifist would answer with an unqualified No. 14 The accusation of fanaticism, and the charge of moral its adherence to principles unexceptionable Insofar fanaticism, so Hare contends. such manages Hare as as insensitivity. P2, to Through pacifism is a form of get his remarkable accusation off the ground, he does by conflating pacifism with extreme pacifism: the pacifist ... solves the conflict of principles, not by critical thought, but by elevating one principle quite irrationally, over all the others (p.174). Comprehensive pacifism in not always resolving the conflict of principles, in letting moral stand, does neither of these things, and so does not fit into Hare's dilemmas deceptively neat two-level critical. thought, into intuitive himself to, without any Hare of the requisite supporting argument, according to which pacifist principles are inappropriate in many places at the present time, violence is apparently fine for countries like Israel (cf. Hare s redefinition, a Harey—fanatic, e.g. p.175). Hare's accusation turns on an extravagant redefinition of fanaticism. on and pacifism is not, as standard pacifism is not, extreme Nor it is the particular "critical thinking", anti-pacifist solution pacifism. helps comprehensive But moral of classification A fanatic is a person who adheres to ideals which diverge from what utilitarianism (in approved form) recommends (cf. Since p.170)! comprehensive pacifism is committed to principles and ideals of nonviolence which, as already observed, diverge from where utilitarianism (as massaged by Hare or Narveson) tends, namely the towards pacifists are Harey—fanatics. usual sense: whether position their bigoted . they whether The idea appropriateness violence This does not of course make are 'wild in many situations, such them or extravagant opinions' of some pacifist principles of . the or (OED) is pacifism consists of such opinions can be removed by an appeal to history:- A great many of the sages, especially Eastern thinkers, founders in fanatics, depends on the very different matter of fanatics comprises that of and the the world's main religions, have been pacifists, committed to But the relevant opinions hardly be, all of the condemned type. of such thinkers Whence the conclusion follows. are not, can By this simple syllogism, the accusation of fanaticism is rebutted. 19. R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1981, p.173. references to Hare's work without further citation are to this text. 15 All page Nor do comprehensive pacifists come out at fanatics under Hare's satisfactory, though seriously incomplete, account of fanaticism: is treating something that is not morally relevant, such as being Jewish, as relevance is completed, it there^ fanaticism wearing beads Naturally, given that using of characterising can or moral hardly exclude the violence is a morally relevant matter, so are other procedures with similar damaging results to violence: blue For however the sensitive task matter of using morally relevant. violence as morally irrelevant. more earlier, those applying of this does lead to a residual problem for comprehensive pacifism (taken up at the end of §4). Does it really matter then that fanatics? it Although argument that it does. homework appears pacifists, that though Harey-fanatics are bigots, inasmuch as had guess what, they their done the Thus, e.g. go over to Hare's As one might anticipate, Hare's argument, upon which he sets great store, 'from universal perscriptivism to utilitarianism ... 20. Harey- properly, had they performed their critical thinking adequately, they would utilitarianism). of are it does not matter in the least, Hare has an abandon the principle they are fixated upon (and, logic fanatics, not concepts A. based [entirely] on involved' (p.176), is unsound, and in fact fails at several Naess, Gandhi and Group Conflict, Universitetsforlaget, p.15: ...among the generally acknowledged moral leaders from the time of ancient China and India down to present day, the principle of nonviolence has been the rule, and the condoning of violence, even in defence, the exception. 21. the R.M. Hare, Applications of Moral Philosophy, Macmillan, London, 1972, p.78. Note that the elegant prototype argument Hare develops in this article on peace - from universalisation, directed against fanaticism and nationalism, there presented as the main causes of war - does not lead to utilitarianism (though the seeds of the later, more obscure, route are present, e.g. on p.79) and does not tell against pacifism. What has gone wrong in Hare's later argument to the much more sweeping conclusions just alluded to, can be seen by comparing the later argument with the clearer prototype argument developed against nationalism. 16 Oslo, crucial points. objectionable getting Before feature some to these of The theory. highly a Hare's procedure that deserves comment, namely the way in of which the whole highly informal argument is set within the framework two-level is there details, procedure adopted methodologically is Hare's of own radically unsound because it takes for granted the adequacy of Hare's theory, a matter that is open, at the very least, to serious doubt, since it supposes a quite particular, and eminently rejectable (utilitarian) way of handling and resolving moral dilemmas, a way rejected above.With that rejection goes a rejection of the standard deontic logic Hare presupposes, which he assumes any serious opponent must adopt. which logic, already But that since Hare assumes uniquely determined, rules out any approach what, go over As one might anticipate, Hare's the question against some to Hare's utilitarianism). important opponents of utilitarianism. In his arguments Hare divides fanatics into pure and comprise moral intuitionists and pure impure. deontologists, fanatics Impure who stick to their deontic principles, who 'cling to their intuitions' (p.176), and do not advance to what calls 'critical thinking'. Hare's dismissal of "impure fanatics", such as extreme pacifists, 'because of [their] refusal clearly' Hare or inability to face facts or to think involves a quite illicit shift in the notion of critical thinking, (p.170) originally introduced to account for a particular (primarily utilitarian) fashion accommodating ff.). But cases this comprehensive bit intuitive principles conflict, of moral dilemmas (p.28 dirty-trick philosophy can where of pacifists are presumably "pure willing to think critically, but somehow survived opinions different from be here fanatics"; the ordeal those of the utilitarian' (p.171). set inconsistent with utilitarianism, as we have seen. any fanatics of this type, if his argument is for they are 'able and still holding moral They are in fact "pure to be According to Hare there cannot be correct argument is not correct. See further, again, Routley and Plumwood, ibid. 17 since aside, fanatics of the first type", since they go on holding opinions which turn out 22. of (p.171). Therefore, his One sufficient reason for incorrectness we have already glimpsed, namely failure to consider the possibility that a Harey-fanatic operates with different logical assumptions and concepts from those of utilitarians reasons. other substitution, preferences For which can be one, argument (e.g. Hare's requires a base class intersubstituted. representation to ff.). are There p.177 ff.) depends on preference the of course whom among preference-havers, in Hare, chauvinistically contracts this base class whole of p.176 (cf. his discussion humans.Differently, certain the of moral matters by way of preferences of this type is open to familiar objection, even by utilitarians of a different cast. As to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, this an less is argument a than damaging charge: A person committed to an extreme pacifism, though he need make no logical mistake, yet lacks a fully developed moral sensitivity to the vagaries and complexities of human existence (Rp.86). The smear is not without basis. applied to avert greater Regan is envisaging violence where situations and he points to what he takes to be the evident evil; moral permissibility of a woman's using 'what physical power she has to free from an aspiring rapist' is Interestingly, (Rp.86). has Regan situation in a way which is incompatible with a pacifist stand: herself not described the there is nothing in to prevent a woman wriggling free (even in a way that involves some force) and fleeing. What is at issue is the permissibility of using violence, which implies the (perhaps wilful) that infliction death, by forceful means^ (cf. mere use of of damage, non-negligible Np.110); that is, which physical force or power (or energy). including pain, injury or involves much more than And it is by no means so evident that the woman is entitled to inflict violence from force, a pacifist can hardly be accused, in a way is duly separated violence upon the aspiring rapist. Once that can be made to stick, of crass moral insensitivity. 23. On the defectiveness of such contractions of the base Routley, op. cit., especially the concluding section. 18 class, see R. and V. But a straightforward action violence disentangling abounds as It with is subcase matter as may at first seem. defective of not depend force is by means no violence. of on tight a Fortunately characterisation what indicate some done, in the way of inflicting damage. constraints Firstly, presupposed. force: is legalised force, violence, so violence, a on satisfactory violence is not applied on behalf adequately of of account some violence, where no force is applied. violence.) 24. supposed that and are which distinguished as illegitimate "legitimate" authority, long as it is physically similar to acts not so legitimated. so often mistakenly of However it is important to is not removed by the imprimatur of the law.2$ Secondly, violence is not of the enough, for main purposes, that violent actions are a subclass of actions by forceful means, a subclass picked out both through the forcible means through so Indeed the literature on nonviolent characterisations arguments developed in this paper do violence. a the is Violence threat (This only needs emphasizing because it is threats, intimidation and the like, involve Thirdly, violence can be perpetrated without intention to inflict damage. Directed against other creatures and more generally against ecological systems such as ecosystems which can be hurt. There is a difference here between live (goal-directed) systems and property, and comprehensive pacifism does not necessarily exclude wilful damage to property. Thus eco-pacifists may destroy, or at least disable, bulldozers but not harm those who use bulldozers to destroy habitat. However sensitive eco-pacifists will not condone sabotage or "violent" destruction of property either: disabling of equipment may be different. It follows from the account of violence sketched that intimidation, threats of violence, and "psychological violence" are not violence, because they do not involve forcible means: violence is physical violence. Naturally, intimidation and psychological violence are open to moral criticism and censure on grounds related to those that tell against violence proper. For similar reasons, "economic violence" and "structural violence" are also not violence: such procedures are generally open to criticism on other grounds and hardly need to be covered under the blanket charge of violence. Nor is poverty, e.g., violence or violence-involving, except figuratively, in the way that war is an obscenity. Even given the warranted restriction of violence to physical force, many difficult cases remain; e.g. questions as to when usually approved surgical practices involve violence. 19 There can be unintentional violence, e.g. the women may have applied violent without intending to, in escaping the rapist. Fourthly, such matters as the distance at which force is applied and the indirectness of military operations, are irrelevant. modern means, the for as means, instance in The submarine operator who, by causally pressing a button, fires a missile at a distant Russian city instigates a violent By contrast, an adjacent blockade of a city, which results in hardship but not act. in direct damage, may be affected by nonviolent confined to action done against persons, means. but can violence Finally, be directed not is against other life-forms, as will soon emerge. Pacifism, like most positions, has its weaknesses, and from the fact that one of derives them^ violence (like pain) is a partly quantitative matter, and that there is no sharp cut-off point at the bottom end of the scale with small amounts violence greater than zero. of Yet minute (non-foot-in-the-door) amounts do not seem to matter all that much morally, at least compared with the gross evils that confront us on most sides when we look. Morally sensitive pacifists will not focus or fixate on small quantities of violence to the undue exclusion of larger moral will certainly problems. They give it to be understood that by 'violence' in principles such as P2 they mean 'nontrivial violence'. Arguments to the moral insensitivity of pacifism, on the basis of pacifists' not taking obvious steps passivity and pacifity. to prevent evil occurrences, depend also upon a confusion of Both Regan and Narveson (e.g. p.425) assume that pacifism 25. The point is explained in more detail in G. Sharp, Social Power and Political Freedom, op.cit., p.288n. Note however that Sharp's account of 'political violence' is defective in various other respects. It is curious, but understandable, that in his major, and massive, texts on nonviolent action, Sharp never really gets to grips with the problem of characterising violence, and indeed appears tempted by such defective equations as that of violence with force and threat with use. 26. Another comes from the necessary circumscription of permissible nonviolent action, to ensure that it does not include actions worse than nontrivial violent action. 20 is a passive do-nothing position. This is far from true, as the variety of methods or adopted by nonviolent action groups has made plain. considered Narveson correctly comprehend the real scope or possibilities of Narveson Otherwise, would negative later Narveson's nonviolent action. hardly b<- able to assert, in the automatic (but carping) way he does, that the pacifist is standing by 'not (p.425). Neither Regan nor doing assessment nonviolence' does not change the situation: for this of anything about' violence what calls 'positive he positive is approach simply nonviolence practised in an exemplary ;.&y, as by Christ, in the hope that others will follow suit, and fails to recognise the potential or effectiveness of nonviolent practices. extent when reduce assembledmuch the of training and the Fuller details of these practices, of impact nonviolent the argument from social irresponsibility, which is part of what lies behind the charge of insensitivity. §4. The argument from corollaries. The radical practice political by definition. But from other awkward of pacifism would certainly tend to eliminate war. For Standard pacifism takes out war involves violence, typically on an extensive scale. war and corollaries the position Although normally war would be excluded, of comprehensive pacifism is not so clear. what of dilemma situations? War would always be counted morally impermissible, but in exceptional extenuating circumstances it might be the (second-) best thing 27. to do. A strange pacifism! Comprehensive The methods also include anticipatory action, for instance, the policemen going off to enact violence find their vehicles won't start, e.g. because components have been removed. As to variety, Sharp has distinguished 197 methods falling into 3 broad types: protest, noncooperation and intervention; op. cit. pp.32-3. Of course pacifisms and nonviolent action postions need not coincide: the interrelations are those of overlap (see. e.g. Sharp, Politics, p.68). 28. See e.g. B. Martin 'How the peace movement should be preparing for nuclear war' Bulletin of Peace Proposals 13 (1982) 149-159, and references cited therein pp.152-3, especially G. Sharp, The Politics of Nonviolent Action, op.cit., (referred to as Politics) and V. Coover and others, Resource Manual for a Living Revolution, New Society Publishers, Philadelphia, 1981. 21 pacifism thus does not include standard pacifism, in contrast extreme to pacifism. Comprehensive pacifism can of course be brought progressively closer, in practice, to extreme pacifism through principles emphasizing the evil of violence. is given a large suitably If that evil weighting then second-best choices will yield the same results as extreme pacifism does (deontically), and entirely exclude war. Now it can hardly be cogently argued as telling against pacifism that eliminate since wars, are war of an as or mounted from rely the institutions. exchanges that should certainly be avoided at all upon only arrangements social and nation-states particular, obviously police and military forces but of violence-underpinned many of their institutions, most state legal arrangements, States are however desirable social institutions, typically depend on violent means. and war is a by-product of nation-state arrangements (in the case of just comprehensive pacifism implies the of inadmissibility institutions, such as police forces and states typically are; be ruled out either individuals, directly delegates, as violence-dispensing effect who forces, by nonviolent nonviolent means. state; but it substitutes, recently or such organisations may because else their behalf. evolved will which is nonviolent methods Pacifism institutions concerned with does not public that order have Pacifism does not organisations maintain they by fully as police alternative nonviolent will be applied, where necessary, to The force of the objection should thus not entail order, sweeping charges of social irresponsibility. 22 the and are coercive actively Law and authority can still operate then in the back-up authority and "enforce" laws. overestimated. on violence however exclude the replacement of such wars, A more telling objection, then, is no doubt further evils to prevent greater evils). that which institutions these directly less or and a more general argument may be inevitability, or not without much further ado. least extensively: violence desirability, In at institution, However wars are by no means the dispense would nor therefore can an argument be mounted against pacifism from the reasonable costs; desirability wars it elimination accordingly of does Nor is it true that prominent not be social succumb to pacifism ... would also entail anarchism, that is, the illegitimacy of government. For a purely voluntary "government" is not a government in the sense that defines a state at all (Np.127). or (differently) A government or administration can certainly operate by nonviolent, political noncoercive, arrangements. arrangements not of this sort are morally impermissible. imply the absence or illegitimacy of government, political community organised under a government. state with authority and not necessarily pacifism does not entail anarchism. main Accordingly, that implies not does it or therefore of a state, of a Nor does even it that imply a certain coercive institutions may not be a second-best solution to moral dilemmas of political organisation. and only pacifism Comprehensive objective, not attained, was Since it admits of states with frameworks of law based on the free agreements of individuals, Gandhi's practice affords a counterexample: a nonviolent Indian state; replacement of British India by a stateless or anarchist society. his it was not the Granted there are genuine interconnections between pacifism and nonviolent anarchism 2", they are not so simple as derivability. Nor is comprehensive pacifism as a moral so ideal easily brought down by its political corollaries. Comprehensive pacifism upsets other widely accepted social practices than concerning like: external and internal state relations, such as war, civil order and the it also tells against the received treatment of example. While other species, animals for it does not entail vegetarianism, while it does not prohibit eating of meat, it does morally forbid violence to animals. 29. those At least it does this so long Both hold that the coercive state which relies upon violent methods is without moral basis or legitimacy. Both involve pretty tall orders, the replacement of violence-dispensing political organisations by alternative arrangements (on replacement in the case of anarchism, see R. Routley and V. Plumwood 'The irrefutability of anarchism', Social Alternatives, 2(3) (1982) 23-8). But they differ as to what justifies these arrangements and what means can be applied (see further Sharp, op. cit., under index headings to anarchism, especially Politics, p.67). Roughly, while pacifism pushes removal of violence to a limit, anarchism pushes removal of authority (especially state authority) and restrictions on liberty, to a limit. Naturally the interconnections did not escape Gandhi: 'The ideally nonviolent state will be an ordered anarchy' (unreferenced citation at the end of the Ecophilosophy Newsletter, #5, p.24). 23 as what normally counts as violence, to animals, continues to rank as is There is little good basis humans (or persons). restriction.^ controversial euthanasia, any in And, moral areas concerning the corollaries killing a such for however similar case, spread humans, of At violence? the suicide, But must creatures does not have to take overtly violent forms. the new "abattoirs" or hospitals a creature simply killing of No force need be applied: in a eats and dies painlessly and without a struggle. The or pill is given life is extinguished, are not pacifist ones, which focus on violence? technical purely arrangements pacifist will to objections solve, in eating meat worthwhile On the face of obtained. so New any rate, the disruption of at principle an Then the proper objections to such practices, for example that consent may not have been obtained, that it, there are no they risk of opening a hornet's nest, consider what examples like euthanasia may suggest, the possibility of nonviolent killing. injection several into e.g. So long as these involve violence, pacifism excludes such practices. involve chauvinistic indeed wherever violence plays a significant role. punishment, capital and the category by restriction of the application of violence to from removed not violence, practices threatened by vegetarian corollaries. But suppose now that the new technology is extended scientists, working in their accustomed military role: as the anti—neutron bomb, which selectively destroys devices which much but clever 'weapons , such newly devised property by further not people, or "dissolve" people, enable "wars" to be fought without violence. just Even a pacifist who goes as far as countenancing nonviolent killing can however avoid these reaches of technological fantasy. For "dissolving" people requires energy, which (since reflecting force) can stand in for force in violence: Was (upgraded) account of that is, the new wars will still involve violence. there old-fashioned however violent anything methods so such wrong as with hunting eating meat obtained by more or raising and killing one's own? Pacifism, like vegetarianism, runs counter to "natural" M. an behaviour of creatures to See R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', op. cit. Such a restriction to persons is however imposed by Sharp, op. cit. (e.g. Politics, p.608), and it does remove the problems of vegetarianism and predation. 24 which the principles are supposed to apply. Aggression is a fairly common feature of and human behaviour, and it sometimes (though by no means so often is as made animal The force of the out) erupts in violence. various for ways, example along these argument lines. can however Aggression assumed to be an is evolutionary adaption developed to enable creatures to be better fitted for themselves (of their offspring) in their natural environment. and ir mitigated be survival But most humans for now live in rather artificial environments substantially removed from situations which evolution gradually adapted their features (there is no way they are going to adapt in time to absorb massive doses of radiation, for instance). as Much humans have adjusted their living environment in nonevolutionary ways, so along with it they should substantially adjust their social practices - including aggressive and violent practices, ill-adapted now to their and mostly counterproductive. situation So argues the pacifist. There is a residual problem, practices like that vegetarianism. the Are creatures living in (relatively) natural conditions, such as predators of and tribal people, to be condemned as morally Sometimes, confronting yes, be attained: when wrong these violence? involve when the violence grossly exceeds what is required given the end to Though a way but always? can problem 3 1, it is a rather unsatisfactory way. be beaten the around of edge this What this suggests is that nonviolence is not an absolute, but at best a qualified ideal. The arguments for nonviolence - which are mostly practical arguments which do not exclude occasional uses of violence and do not strictly apply to creatures in natural surroundings - sort of But conclusion. exclude. nonviolent what is called charge for state, is is much more investigation aimed, among other things, at This is^ to concede an of moral insensitivity against comprehensive pacifism so long as P2 remains unqualified. 31. would The further suggestion that emerges upon granting that moral sharper, more sensitive, and less blanket principles than P2. attentuated similar approaches thinking and associated principles in this area are in a pretty primitive that a the suggestion is a dangerous one, practically at least, since it opens the door a chink to other options which categorically suggest The sheer moral power of such pacifism As Singer has in the analogous case of Liberation, Jonathan Cape, London, 1975. 25 vegetarianism: is one see reason e.g., for Animal There is no reason however why giving its adoption some pause. a genuine pacifism (making for real peace) should not be built on a modified version of P2 which permits such natural phenomena as predation. Nothing logically rules out such a genuine and more sensitive pacifism. There are other requirements the position to be worked out should meet as In particular, a rationality requirement implies that pacifists go on to oppose acts similar to those using violence: This is a of requirement otherwise they could have a case made against them. in a different sense from the pure logical consistency sense, namely that of keeping to the same story. for well. pacifism, Again there need be no deep problem so long, this time, as it is not erroneously supposed that there must be a single principle just (e.g. P2) - as distinct from bundle a of moral principles, others of which serve to oppose acts accounted similar to those involving violence.32 io meet the rationality requirement the position should, be integrated into a in larger framework of nondestructive practices, which are of a piece with nonviolent practices.33 For, except metaphorically, practices to the environment, for instance, do not involve violence, e.g. mining in a fertile valley, damaging a wild river, dumping toxic and oceans. In an does not destructive such things as strip wastes in streams extended sense, which gets beyond the confines of the property picture, all these practices are environmental vandalism. vandalism particular, cover violence But even metaphorically, against persons (and certainly not nonphysical violence such as "psychological violence"). What is sought then is an appropriate of these notions covering destructive practices; and also an accompanying synthetic term, better than the umbrella term 'vandolence'. Then P2 is superseded by synthesis an appropriately qualified P2#. It is morally wrong to use vandolence. It remains to characterise the cluster of destructive practices that count as vandolence and to try to justify the principle - no easy tasks. 32. It is important that pacifism, like other deontological positions, reject assessments of similarity simply in terms of similar damaging consequences. Features of the means deployed, for example, also matter. 13. The position has been called 'pacifism. 26 APPENDICES §5. The from arguments impracticality impracticality and pacifism in the real world. of the reality: social alleged Even if it is conceded that pacifism is a viable moral ideal, that it does not fall down as incoherent or ludicrous, still the feasibility of pacifism as a sensible practice to live by will be contested - And it has despite, or perhaps because of, major examples such as Christ and Gandhi. to be admitted the that real world, with all its horror and squalor, does put But in this regard pacifism is not an exception. pacifism to severe tests. Nowhere is the practice of nonviolence usually thought less than in replacing war^. prepared or for succeed Yet nonviolent social defence methods, to replace the usual violent methods, have been described in some detail^, though they properly to likely given a dress rehearsal. have been never The prospects for success of nonviolent defence of,a region can vary significantly, depending upon whether the war is convention observed or not. If the convention is observed then pacifism stands reasonable prospects of success. The difficult cases are where the war convention perhaps unleashed, in broken, is massive ways, on noncombatants. and violence is According to Walzer, in his superficially sympathetic sketch and assessment of nonviolent defence and resistance, 'success is possible only if the invaders are committed to the war convention - ... and they won't always be' (Wp.331^^). attained - there is conventions are flouted. reasons, some got homesick. ruthless of This is presumably be never any guarantee of it, without or with war - even if some The invaders may give them irrelevant, e.g. up and depart for all sorts or they needed a quick decisive victory, they What Walzer no doubt means is something like this: invaders may Success false. that sufficiently in sufficient numbers with sufficient time and sufficient support 34. The more sweeping replacement of the state (of the main source of considered in Routley and Plumwood, in Social Alternatives, op.cit. 35. Again for example, in Sharp, Politics, op. cit. references given there. 36. All page references prefixed by 'W' are to Allen Lane, London, 1977. 27 See also M. Walzer, Martin, Just and war) op.cit., Unjust is and Wars, lines, etc., can eventually succeed. defending The difference lies in the pattern of events; to violence. resorts side But that sort of thing is also true even if the is if the defence "forces" are well-armed it to invaders start and with difficult more civil well -prepared with than afterwards easier the for costly and resistance. Walzer is inappropriate examples. in command, model the of way the Jews, The way.The Nazis, to jump who that conclusion the He is thinking of an extreme totalitarian the enslaved misleading many like cannot succeed when the war convention is abandoned, in terms of defence nonviolent however, thinking, who in state, total Nazis were in Germany, the Jews of Germany providing the the population, by The "resistance" picture is highly and large, did not resist extermination in an organised never invaded Germany, were in control all or the infrastructure and had the cooperation (at least) of the bulk of the population. Walzer's comparison to work, there would have to be an enormous occupying army took over and managed all key Australia it is not even so clear largely united and actively resisting this is which With island territories such as infrastructure. that For logistically population. Walzer's feasible against impression resistance fragmenting and the populace moving into dulled acquiscence (e.g. a of the Wp.332) might have got things the wrong way around, with disbelieving and frustrated soldiers ready to leave. Non violent resistance is however unlikely to be put to the test in any adequate present state-determined circumstances. No state would be prepared to risk way in 37. It has been argued, moreover, that when church leaders, Christian or Jewish, opposed the deportations, most of the Jews were saved (when country by country comparisons are made). See, for one of many treatments of this sensitive issue, R.L. Rubenstein, The Cunning of History: the Holocaust and the American Future, Harper, New York, 1978, chapter 5. 38. The argument suggested in Walzer (e.g. p.333) that nonviolent methods would increase evil, or at least its distribution, is weak. It is countered by Sharp's observation that the suffering likely to be induced is less than in comparable wars. 28 training its populace different). It full in techniques (civil is defence all too easy for them to "rout" the police: be then would action nonviolent civil obedience, for example, could no longer be ensured by the customary violent means. thus The argument initial sketchings. far §6. On the positive case for pacifism: has been largely defensive, meeting a range of objections to comprehensive pacifism. That in itself is revealing. deviations from are it Pacifism is the require what rest position (inertial and state) The reason for this is simple explanation. violence is, on most ethical systems, at least a prima facie evil, so use of enough: it is what has to be justified. Positive arguments for pacifism can take advantage of and merely justified. case try dispose of "exceptional cases" where violence is supposed to be in that the defender (person or nation) is morally-excluded situation, since the attacker has overstepped moral the position privileged The favourite exception is self-defence against a violent opponent: curious is to its already the in bounds. a Still defender is not morally committed to violence whatever he does - as in a dilemma And since it is at least prima facie wrong, and he does not have situation. to use it, he should not resort to it. An elementary syllogistic argument, given by Narveson (Np.117), can be adapted to give a similar result:- Violence is (intrinsically) wrong Violence in any excepted cases (e.g. self-defence) is still violence Violence in any excepted cases is still (intrinsically) wrong. Naturally those opposed to pacifism will challenge the first premiss, and a dialectic already glimpsed will begin. None of the arguments for pacifism is conclusive, since even where arguments are deductively tight assumptions can be challenged arguments for pacifism particularly good ones. for pacifism, (as above). Nor One of the poorer positive are all the arguments for example, makes similar assumptions to those of the classic theory 29 of war, namely that once war is embarked upon it cannot be limited, nuclear that or chemical hope weapons will be used selectively and restrictively is an illusion, escalation is inevitable. are bound to be overstepped. case is overstated. the e.g. The (moral) limits in war - whatever they are - Although the chances of escalation are real enough, the Limited exchanges and confrontation are possible. Wars are much more social arrangements and much more conventional than the classical theory allows. Wars can, for example, be started and stopped things intervene (e.g. support (as midstream more should the for first inevitably, premiss for those mixture a above) suffering and anguish violent of methods, the They nonviolence. injustice characteristically works, the futility and counterproductiveness of means-ends of the consideration, a range of consequentialist and practical reasons, e.g. pain, important a pollution crisis affecting other neighbouring states). The main reasons for pacifism are, include in cost that in violence violence within the setting of modern industrial societies, the broader popular support base obtained by avoidance of violence, the desirable social consequences of nonviolence such as more less furtive, society. open, the why of pacifism) considerable. These are None of these well-known types of reason (giving separately decisive, but their cumulative affords a model for one way of proceeding^; Mill's defence Mill's procedure works (at least As was pointed out by F. D'Agostino in discussion. 30 of liberty nonviolence, it works as well as it works for liberty). 39. is it is enough (a nonelementary exercise) to adapt Mill's consequentialist arguments for liberty to arguments for otherwise effect reasons can be put together, in various ways, to make a strong positive case for pacifism, as principled nonviolence. as a A more decisive consequentialist data , argument, takes a but making semantical preference rankings on worlds, and these worlds modelling nonviolence Again principles. use of route. are similar practical and The data is used to arrive at then pacifism in applied is derived semantically as principled nonviolence.^0 R. 40. Routley* * The details of such an esoteric defence of moral principles are outlined in R. and V. Routley, op.cit.: a fuller account may be found in their 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous (1983), to appear. * With thanks to R. Beehler, F. D'Agostino, B. Martin, L. Mirlin, R. Goodin, and participants in the Philosophy Seminar, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. The main outlines of the paper were drafted associate at Simon Fraser University. 31 while the author was a research OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE PHILOSOPHY DEPARTMENT, RESEARCH SCHOOL OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, AUSTRALIAN NATIONAL UNIVERSITY School publications: R. and V. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, First edition 1973, Second edition 1974, Third edition 1975. Departmental publications: M.K. Rennie, Some Uses of Type Theory in the Analysis of Language, 1974. D. Mannison, M.A. McRobbie, and R. Routley, editors, Environmental Philosophy, 1980. R. Routley, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, 1980. Yellow series (Research Papers of the Logic Group): 1. R.K. Meyer, Why I am not a relevantist, 1978. 2. R.K. Meyer, Sentential constants in R, 1979. 3. R.K. Meyer and M.A. McRobbie, Firesets and relevant implication, 1979. 4. R.K. Meyer, A Boolean-valued semantics for R, 1979. 5. R.K. Meyer, Almost Skolem forms for relevant (and other) logics, 1979. 6. R.K. Meyer, A note on R-^ matrices, 1979. 7. R.K. Meyer and J.K. Slaney, Abelian logic (from A to Z), 1980. 8^ C. Mortensen, Relevant algebras and relevant model structures, 1980. 9. R.K. Meyer, Relevantly interpolating in RM , 1980. 10. C. Mortensen, Paraconsistency and C^, 1981. 11. R.K. Meyer, De Morgan monoids, 1983. 12. R. Routley, Relevantism and the problem as to when Material Detachment and the Disjunctive Syllogism Argument can be correctly used, and N. da Costa, Essay on the foundations of logic, 1983. 13. R. Routley and G. Priest, On Paraconsistency, 198314. R. Routley, Research in logic in Australia, New Zealand and Oceania, 1983 15. R.K. Meyer, Where y fails, 1983. Green series (Discussion papers in environmental philosophy): 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. R. Routley, Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action, 1982. R. Routley, In defence of cannibalism I. Types of admissible and inadmissible cannibalism, 1982. moo R. Routley and N. Griffin, Unravelling the meaning of life?, 1982. R. Routley, Nihilisms, and nihilist logics. R. Routley, War and Peace. I. On the ethics of large-scale nuclear war and war-deterrence and the political fall out. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, Moral dilemmas and the logic of deonti R°"ouU.y and V. Plumwood, A. expensive repair-kit for utilitarianism. 7. 10. R. Routley, Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: rational behaviour under rival paradigms. the difference 1  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 149, Item 3: War and peace II - on the alleged inconsistency, moral insensitivity and fanaticism of pacifism Subject The topic of the resource Series: Discussion papers in environmental philosophy ; number 9. Published by Australian National University. Department of Philosophy. Published under Richard Sylvan's previous name Richard Routley. Description An account of the resource One of two copies in collection. Annotation on cover: Part corrected. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 149, Item 3 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1983 Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves ; 25 cm. 58.71 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4d46fce">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:4d46fce</a> Box 149: Publications (to como) https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/5920bc40eda84ef7c51d0a551039383b.pdf 6aa8131b8382bef6992e275a7bff05a8 PDF Text Text 1031 /&J 29.5.95 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. �2 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS of ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Broaching focal questions, and searching for deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate (liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modern times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation. Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering; many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so on). Whence arises an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise^ For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, diverse paradigms but all displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or impoverish their own environments. Introduced “pest” species, such as rabbits and mynahs in Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well. �3 pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood­ production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”, and market ideology does economic practice, even so-called “environmental economics”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new topography on action space. species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this even feasible, but of getting right paradigms. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single 2 3 4 For more on this style of explanation, see further RP. It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies. What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial explanation, of them. ; As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which paradigms are, serve in explanation justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson. /. / �4 role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural. As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned, those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes. Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics. What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors of roots and sources . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism. Although this text presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor/which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for �5 roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above them, and so on. Both differ from another popular basis-beginning buried metaphor, that of foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely passively support, not sustain supported superstructure). So foundations, for all their importance in epistemology and elsewhere iffoundationalism is correct, can be set aside.5 So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short listing for the figurature use of ‘root’ runs: ‘the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained. Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source­ book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may have further sources (hence the search for “deeper”, even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system, gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix of buried metaphors. Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning environmental problems. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. 5 Despite a referee’s suggestion that discussion of “roots” ‘could be improved by a contrast of the “roots” metaphor with the “foundations” metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying interpretations offoundations, an emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm. �6 Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. Definitions of ‘environmental problem’, and classifications of such problems, have already been ventured.6 What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, ones here taken as serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.7 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There would be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.8 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to the questions are however important, because if we fail to get to bottom of the issues, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a difficult and deterioration situation^. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.9 See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and proximate solutions. As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained. ry) �- That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to be faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, or whatever. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs,.... An ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideasA system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation J1 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, through Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans It resembles a structured universal; compare e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of paradigmatic sort. This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. �8 Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modern ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather consciousnesses) have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers (7) and suggested remedies. Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is wrong. TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies, in three stages. D. Defective practice answers Source Remedy Objections 7 �9 DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage D3a a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory, or push it back to paradigmatic features. Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Pl. Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism P. Defective paradigm answers Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism P2b Mechanism Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Organicism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business P6. Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment Anti-materialism �10 P6a Materialism Spiritualism P8. P9 Patriarchy, andocentrism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have been as sources; remedies proposed tend to share defects of sources. PS. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Source Platonism Typical remedy suggested New metaphysics Leibnitzianism New metaphysics Kantianism Anglo-American philosophy12 Consequentialism Utilitarianism Economism (economic imperialism as Alternative ethics Continental philosophy New social science; ethics contrasted with straight economic roots) Contractarianism Domination transfer Consequentialism Domination removal Human nature (esp. aggression) Adolescencism Maturation Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say most—entries in that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e. reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard's challenging answer. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon ‘mental maladaptation’). The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism. /s ' �11 Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick —in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something toyheme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of modem institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White.14 One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns , namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, 13 14 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix . White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. �12 a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.15 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.16 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.17 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.18 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes 15 16 17 18 Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continuejto be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent contribution to the debate see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask, not merely what they say, but what they do, and would do. For an outline of just such a telling criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. [S �13 denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.19 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modern ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial traSces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.20 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining b rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.21 For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘rejecting] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies’ (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. �14 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.22 But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility, no doubt a relative of capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. • Modern industrial society or industrialism. Modern industrialism (‘the smooth­ superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.24 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modern industrial society’25 Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’26 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated metaphysics meant thereby paradigm or paradigms or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they tend to lose in confusion. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature’”, a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself’ (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modern problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case. For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. �15 less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Economic growth or economic development. ‘According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots One widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems. The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause, itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy, such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay for continuing employment). No doubt though, stock economic growth is intimately intricated with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations). Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that ‘the Western model of economic development, far from being the solution to’ environmental and social problems, is ‘actually fuelling’ them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the problems.27 28 • Human nature. "... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature itself.’29 What such “nature” amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false 27 28 29 Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: ‘the problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. All that is true, too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals’ (p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm. Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis. Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: ‘Less luxury, less wastage. Otherwise it will be too late’. Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in Forest and Bird 273 (August 1994) pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that only economic growth will solve environmental problems. Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant problems. Callicott and Ames, ‘Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action’ p.282 (see also p.281), in a desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much improved treatment for natural and built environments, with ‘the deplorable environmental conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia’ (p.280). �16 hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. 0 • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.30 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.31 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this?the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.32 A 15 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans'. It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships —domination of nature thus following from human domination’. ... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a 30 31 32 33 /n Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see the sequel to GE. See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from humans’ domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. f/e. orths Jwy JHcA a ztci/uvC-., <‘oi»rW «L , as fw (Aibttnte qfndw hiasseX. Jrn. ; rvuzcC. cf �17 harmonious man-nature relationship.34 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.35 • Modern educational systems'. Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.36 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. A selective commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation. ad D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While “consequences” or outputs such things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a rotten joke, itself with serious consequences. Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.37 Where they Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms ifl at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. �18 usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.38 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization and Agricultural Origins and Dispersal) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. ad P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, 38 It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have their property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). �19 business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another. Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect appropriately with practice. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on39)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related virtual histories (concerning what would have happened)—enter decisively. For instance, Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms.40 An important example (much less speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. Ponting’s valuable/ though rather simple/ book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is Hillel’s, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale, Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historian do not dig deep enough, to paradigmatic roots. /3 �20 some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively outside) the rise of modern Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non­ Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond. The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Western paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 5. A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated, and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the 41 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna worldwide. �21 counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration concerns patriarchy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial independence of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class, etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human domination of humans as^supposed source of all problems. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life­ forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and of third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Nor are major inflators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin­ �22 off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run in less favourable settings. Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms. Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war, through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by­ products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Western. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological “break throughs” were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises. The picture of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). �Ti sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises conditions, include those now tabulated: TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Jainism Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians. Western philosophies: under certain favourable interpretations old Stoicism new Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology. Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class43 lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions. Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appear, to mean, what a functional break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual, goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what would be done in certain other sorts of situations. Certainly a culture that manifests unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various “primitive” cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice. It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. In logical terms neither, perhaps as well as another residue class, both. Certain family �24 characteristics, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating: * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism. More generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’44 The outside world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts’”.45 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it, typically little or none. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it. It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans. Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’.46 Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link principles, reminiscent of “correspondence rules” used in explaining applications of scientific theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives, such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP. * Indirect combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz’s fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,47 in short, to Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan’s investigations. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides—just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain. See Descartes, Discourse VI. For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel. �25 precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz’s metaphysics, his monadology, may have been—by contrast with Plato’s or Descartes’, both of which explicitly devalued much or all of the natural world—Leibnitz’s wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to damaging effects. Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes, can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray.48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example, depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of “creation”. Such extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread, under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change. As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a basically neutral world. All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness. Shallowness will work out satisfactorily environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such familiar features as * short-term framework. * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also preferred in deep ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead to paradigmatic roots, to Naess’s “total views”. Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification. �26 human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * appropriation of nature, its conversion to property. * maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size, coupled with grand projects. * technofix approach to environmental problems. Friendly paradigms will tend to invert these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following samples: * an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. * a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms. * a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way. As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news. It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to �27 such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy. Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* APPENDIX. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s intriguing books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,50... . He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feel no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms. A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement zs simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. �28 facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots51) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocations at the root of modern society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of th'e alleged sickness.52 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters' (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. �29 person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.53 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.54 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘small- group, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. 53 54 A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of ' society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery’ (p. 16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p. 15)! �30 R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. R. Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1989. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ ReVision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. R. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, Topsoil and Civilization, Revised edition by V.G. Carter, University of Oklahama Press, Norman, 1974. A Dobson (ed.), Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. W. Fox, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology, Shambala, Boston, 1990. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore, 1993. C. J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. R. Goodin, ‘Selling environmental indulgences’, Kyklos 47(1994) 573-596. N. R. Hanson, Patterns of discovery: an inquiry into conceptual foundations of science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. E. C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. D Hillel, Out of the Earth: Civilization and the Life of the Soil., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991. M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. K. Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy, Harmondsworth, England 1973. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Routledge, London, 1991. A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology , SUNY Press, Albany N. Y., 1993. P. Marshall, Nature’s Web, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993. A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, Ecology, community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974. D. Pearce and others, Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. �31 R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982; also, modified, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP. C. O. Sauer, Agricultural Origins and Dispersal, American Geographical Society, New York, 1952. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. P. Shepard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994; referred to as GE. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. Y.F. Tuan, ‘Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from Europe and China’, The Canadian Geographer 12(1968) 176-91. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. L. White Jr., ‘Historic roots of our ecologic crisis’, Science 155(1967) 1203-7. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred to as EP3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 1031 /&J 29.5.95 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 2 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS of ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Broaching focal questions, and searching for deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate (liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modern times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation. Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering; many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so on). Whence arises an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise^ For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, diverse paradigms but all displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or impoverish their own environments. Introduced “pest” species, such as rabbits and mynahs in Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well. 3 pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood­ production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”, and market ideology does economic practice, even so-called “environmental economics”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new topography on action space. species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this even feasible, but of getting right paradigms. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single 2 3 4 For more on this style of explanation, see further RP. It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies. What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial explanation, of them. ; As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which paradigms are, serve in explanation justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson. /. / 4 role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural. As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned, those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes. Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics. What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors of roots and sources . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism. Although this text presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor/which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for 5 roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above them, and so on. Both differ from another popular basis-beginning buried metaphor, that of foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely passively support, not sustain supported superstructure). So foundations, for all their importance in epistemology and elsewhere iffoundationalism is correct, can be set aside.5 So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short listing for the figurature use of ‘root’ runs: ‘the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained. Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source­ book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may have further sources (hence the search for “deeper”, even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system, gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix of buried metaphors. Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning environmental problems. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. 5 Despite a referee’s suggestion that discussion of “roots” ‘could be improved by a contrast of the “roots” metaphor with the “foundations” metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying interpretations offoundations, an emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm. 6 Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. Definitions of ‘environmental problem’, and classifications of such problems, have already been ventured.6 What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, ones here taken as serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.7 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There would be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.8 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to the questions are however important, because if we fail to get to bottom of the issues, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a difficult and deterioration situation^. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.9 See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and proximate solutions. As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained. ry) - That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to be faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, or whatever. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs,.... An ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideasA system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation J1 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, through Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans It resembles a structured universal; compare e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of paradigmatic sort. This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. 8 Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modern ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather consciousnesses) have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers (7) and suggested remedies. Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is wrong. TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies, in three stages. D. Defective practice answers Source Remedy Objections 7 9 DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage D3a a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory, or push it back to paradigmatic features. Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Pl. Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism P. Defective paradigm answers Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism P2b Mechanism Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Organicism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business P6. Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment Anti-materialism 10 P6a Materialism Spiritualism P8. P9 Patriarchy, andocentrism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have been as sources; remedies proposed tend to share defects of sources. PS. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Source Platonism Typical remedy suggested New metaphysics Leibnitzianism New metaphysics Kantianism Anglo-American philosophy12 Consequentialism Utilitarianism Economism (economic imperialism as Alternative ethics Continental philosophy New social science; ethics contrasted with straight economic roots) Contractarianism Domination transfer Consequentialism Domination removal Human nature (esp. aggression) Adolescencism Maturation Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say most—entries in that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e. reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard's challenging answer. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon ‘mental maladaptation’). The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism. /s ' 11 Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick —in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something toyheme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of modem institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White.14 One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns , namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, 13 14 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix . White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. 12 a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.15 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.16 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.17 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.18 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes 15 16 17 18 Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continuejto be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent contribution to the debate see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask, not merely what they say, but what they do, and would do. For an outline of just such a telling criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. [S 13 denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.19 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modern ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial traSces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.20 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining b rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.21 For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘rejecting] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies’ (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. 14 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.22 But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility, no doubt a relative of capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. • Modern industrial society or industrialism. Modern industrialism (‘the smooth­ superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.24 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modern industrial society’25 Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’26 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated metaphysics meant thereby paradigm or paradigms or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they tend to lose in confusion. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature’”, a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself’ (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modern problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case. For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. 15 less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Economic growth or economic development. ‘According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots One widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems. The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause, itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy, such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay for continuing employment). No doubt though, stock economic growth is intimately intricated with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations). Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that ‘the Western model of economic development, far from being the solution to’ environmental and social problems, is ‘actually fuelling’ them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the problems.27 28 • Human nature. "... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature itself.’29 What such “nature” amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false 27 28 29 Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: ‘the problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. All that is true, too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals’ (p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm. Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis. Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: ‘Less luxury, less wastage. Otherwise it will be too late’. Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in Forest and Bird 273 (August 1994) pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that only economic growth will solve environmental problems. Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant problems. Callicott and Ames, ‘Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action’ p.282 (see also p.281), in a desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much improved treatment for natural and built environments, with ‘the deplorable environmental conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia’ (p.280). 16 hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. 0 • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.30 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.31 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this?the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.32 A 15 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans'. It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships —domination of nature thus following from human domination’. ... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a 30 31 32 33 /n Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see the sequel to GE. See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from humans’ domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. f/e. orths Jwy JHcA a ztci/uvC-., <‘oi»rW «L , as fw (Aibttnte qfndw hiasseX. Jrn. ; rvuzcC. cf 17 harmonious man-nature relationship.34 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.35 • Modern educational systems'. Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.36 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. A selective commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation. ad D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While “consequences” or outputs such things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a rotten joke, itself with serious consequences. Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.37 Where they Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms ifl at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. 18 usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.38 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization and Agricultural Origins and Dispersal) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. ad P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, 38 It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have their property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). 19 business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another. Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect appropriately with practice. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on39)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related virtual histories (concerning what would have happened)—enter decisively. For instance, Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms.40 An important example (much less speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. Ponting’s valuable/ though rather simple/ book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is Hillel’s, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale, Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historian do not dig deep enough, to paradigmatic roots. /3 20 some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively outside) the rise of modern Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non­ Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond. The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Western paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 5. A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated, and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the 41 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna worldwide. 21 counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration concerns patriarchy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial independence of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class, etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human domination of humans as^supposed source of all problems. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life­ forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and of third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Nor are major inflators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin­ 22 off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run in less favourable settings. Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms. Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war, through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by­ products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Western. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological “break throughs” were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises. The picture of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). Ti sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises conditions, include those now tabulated: TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Jainism Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians. Western philosophies: under certain favourable interpretations old Stoicism new Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology. Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class43 lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions. Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appear, to mean, what a functional break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual, goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what would be done in certain other sorts of situations. Certainly a culture that manifests unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various “primitive” cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice. It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. In logical terms neither, perhaps as well as another residue class, both. Certain family 24 characteristics, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating: * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism. More generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’44 The outside world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts’”.45 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it, typically little or none. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it. It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans. Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’.46 Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link principles, reminiscent of “correspondence rules” used in explaining applications of scientific theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives, such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP. * Indirect combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz’s fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,47 in short, to Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan’s investigations. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides—just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain. See Descartes, Discourse VI. For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel. 25 precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz’s metaphysics, his monadology, may have been—by contrast with Plato’s or Descartes’, both of which explicitly devalued much or all of the natural world—Leibnitz’s wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to damaging effects. Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes, can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray.48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example, depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of “creation”. Such extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread, under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change. As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a basically neutral world. All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness. Shallowness will work out satisfactorily environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such familiar features as * short-term framework. * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also preferred in deep ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead to paradigmatic roots, to Naess’s “total views”. Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification. 26 human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * appropriation of nature, its conversion to property. * maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size, coupled with grand projects. * technofix approach to environmental problems. Friendly paradigms will tend to invert these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following samples: * an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. * a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms. * a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way. As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news. It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to 27 such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy. Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* APPENDIX. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s intriguing books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,50... . He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feel no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms. A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement zs simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. 28 facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots51) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocations at the root of modern society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of th'e alleged sickness.52 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters' (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. 29 person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.53 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.54 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘small- group, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. 53 54 A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of ' society. 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Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. R. Goodin, ‘Selling environmental indulgences’, Kyklos 47(1994) 573-596. N. R. Hanson, Patterns of discovery: an inquiry into conceptual foundations of science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. E. C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. D Hillel, Out of the Earth: Civilization and the Life of the Soil., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991. M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. K. Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy, Harmondsworth, England 1973. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Routledge, London, 1991. A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology , SUNY Press, Albany N. Y., 1993. P. Marshall, Nature’s Web, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993. A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, Ecology, community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974. D. Pearce and others, Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. 31 R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982; also, modified, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP. C. O. Sauer, Agricultural Origins and Dispersal, American Geographical Society, New York, 1952. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. P. Shepard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994; referred to as GE. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. Y.F. Tuan, ‘Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from Europe and China’, The Canadian Geographer 12(1968) 176-91. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. L. White Jr., ‘Historic roots of our ecologic crisis’, Science 155(1967) 1203-7. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred to as EP3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 15, item 1031: Paradigmatic roots on environmental problems Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-05-29. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Subject The topic of the resource Typescript dated 29.5.95. With handwritten emendations. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Paradigmatic Roots of Environmental Problems. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 15, item 1031 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves. 33.04 MB. 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Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Desk Pile 1: Theories for Everything Box 15: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Desk Pile 1: Theories for Everything https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/6bab0d18beee166ea031a307db35fde6.pdf 8d1d1523a5c6a5d9d27993a547fd14f8 PDF Text Text 1161 • I 3.7.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: an initial report.1 Much of what follows is organised around the following anti-mainstream thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and to support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socio- environmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. Mainstream, because there are lesser or recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. Grander, because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). Western, because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.2 However the qualification Western is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of crises, one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even critical, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe degradation or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main title evolved from that of Caldera, Philosophy and Crisis, who was searching (rather unsuccessfully) for a Latin-American philosophy. Some of this report was thought through in Brasil, under the partial support of FASPEC. 2 See, for instance, the explication of Taoism in UTD. �2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.3 There are crises conditions in many places in many regards (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine ‘that we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume efforts to control environmental and social problems.4 They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be ‘better off persists, conveniently buttressed by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non-European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does not have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks, women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. �3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: • the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set.5 Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example • the dominant modern paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. • the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schema, was contrasted, by Cotgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example • a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises {environment construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so.7 But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates around ‘the current development model’, what went wrong with it and what might replace it, Paleocrassus never bothers to explain that model or For �4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.8 It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.9 Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and ‘the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment’. In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover,10 or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.11 To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy — or some such, with -* technological mastery (supremacy, dominance) -» environmental destruction ’ symbolising leads to, or yields (granted leads to faces a validity issue). to supply its components. But what can be gleaned indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as ‘expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods’ (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism coupled with heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. �5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a different thesis: Western philosophy should end.12 That argument is by contraposition, and then should transmission from an evident premiss. (Thatcherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasimystical “thought”—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposed that modern German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however, in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artificial dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of and preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestant philosophy, in particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared: the further development of highly exploitative Christian attitudes to nature (and to pagans) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modern appropriation theories of property (notably by Locke), which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in colonized lands, and are now ceding undue power to exploitative corporations. Consider its less direct role in the preparing ground for industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants, its natural landforms and its matter were and are of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore’s end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger’s later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p. 17?). For the second linkage, Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructive technology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy of the ancient fallacy of equivocation. �6 many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where for instance philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). Unfortunately such examples are exceptions; as a rule, noticed philosophy appears to have helped in underwriting, shaping and even fostering dominant practices. It could regularly have been different: wherever theory operated to influence practice, philosophy could have served negatively, as a prime element of resistance.13 That too could be a significant role for philosophy today. Whatever the extent—arguably, then, very substantial—to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources.14 For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in uneven detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy in a region). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously’:Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are 13 On the place in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman’s preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, in EE, p,146ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. �7 philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: • minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. • figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. • medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.16 Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.17 The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory, and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that what Attfield pronounces as Hargrove’s historical “excess” needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. �8 ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.18 A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into “process” philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as mainstream! How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of ‘mainstream’ in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy—Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy.19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought For requisite 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell’s Wisdom of the West, a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. �9 mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a supervaluational fashion, the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is independently grasped by Singer . in his account of the dominant Western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotelianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of ‘dominion’; and those concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God’s behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant of dominion in more ominous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper; it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man’s dominion was to be understood. ‘Doth God care for oxen?’ asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one’s ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that ‘to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition’. It is a little surprising, too, that the usual uncritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell’s work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis Power. �10 When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the Summa Theologica, Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God’s command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of mainstream Christianity for at least its first eighteen centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom, and Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this dominant Western tradition, because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God gave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.20 Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history it has not included much concern. Moreover, lesser Christian alternatives, notably stewardship and perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural world, offer little improvement upon longer term invidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of now emphasized desiderata: retention of wilderness, and maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity. As disturbingly, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers tradition discourse to the substantially equivalent (historical linkage diminished) paradigm discourse. �11 Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard piecemeal work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modern rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes’ significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental piece.21 Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza’s contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza’s theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the Ethics where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued that although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: “Spinoza’s contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable.” Arne Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a “speciesist”, his system is not speciesist.22 If Spinoza’s system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Naess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza’s contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding ‘double standards’ in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly anthropocentric is consistently ignored by deep 21 Thus for example by Drengson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. �12 ecologists, as far as I have been able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza’s extraordinary statement: “Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may.”23 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re­ appraisal (in an overdue green history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz’s position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz’s overall position does just that. Consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).24 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the characteristica universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.25). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza’s Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin. 24 For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. 25 ‘Leibnitz’s interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’, Cottingham p. 193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. �13 more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appears due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not ‘cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infallibility-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. �14 metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life­ styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.29 Things even deteriorated on many fronts under the main philosophical movements that succeeded Leibnitz in Germany, and overwhelmed European and much of Western philosophy for more than a century, namely Kantianism and subsequent German idealism. Virtually all the prominent positions in this philosophical galaxy, in the main strongly supportive of a supposedly enlightened Protestantism, presumed and imposed a blanketing human chauvinism and associated social reductionism. For example, the universal universe of Kantian ethics comprosed the circle of humans (and perhaps super humans) only; nothing else counted, and even the proper treatment of animals (which was at least not entirely neglected) was supposed reduced to that of interhuman relations. Regrettably human chauvinistic assumptions also underlay and handicapped more benign reccessive alternatives in Germany, such as those afforded by Herder and through the much heralded nature romanticism movement. As is widely appreciated now, later parts of the broad German mainstream flowing on from Kant were much more deleterious, neglecting Enlightenment advances and sponsoring elements of Aryan or super-race chauvinism. Things were certainly rather different off the Continent in modem England, but in most environmental respects hardly better. But no doubt a different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced most of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and also otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, a reductionistic ideas, impressions or sense-data empiricism characteristically sharing the anthropocentrism of idealism,. Worse, this empiricism normally expands through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism.30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been comparatively little improvement in recent times. For positivism and its irrationalist successors, all ecologically shallow, all committed to technofix and for the most part to social engineering, have been prime 29 Leibnitz’s standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incomputable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see Sylvan 94. �15 philosophical inputs into the physical sciences and also into mainstream economics. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main philosophical informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory, and so on. Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these places are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-information factories. Unfortunately, the other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as conceptual analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, as environmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many respects worse. Anthropocentric emphases remain heavy in both French and German philosophy, which are the predominant forms. Both existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mired in human chauvinism. Social criticism, which has at least seriously addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communicational theory of Habermas is heavily biassed in favour of articulate humans, and excludes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-fall. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of change—or end in present dominant form—with end, end period. Similarly, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy that leads to disaster, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, gray and brown sorts, which accordingly are liable to critical rejection. No end is implied to less grand and greener regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. 31 Such a theme is developed, though poorly and in a social setting, by Gellner. His case applies, with even more force, to environmental matters. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments for his floated claims. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet “communism”. And so on; see also above. �16 Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stoked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. “Great thinker” and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspects of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their arguments are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, different in different regions, with their own pantheons ofprominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. There would be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in the South. Consider French philosophy, which along with Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is not established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability. Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place of tribally recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [integrated destruction] projects. Through a 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions on Latin-American philosophy. �17 regional network, a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. Naturalism regionalism does not preclude global linkages; what it should resist are forms of imperialism.34 None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’, Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., ‘Rediscovering evolution’, Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Filosofia e Crise, Pela filosofia iatino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 1985. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocratic to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Gellner, E., Words & Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a study of ideology, V. Gollancz, London, 1959. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. 34 Fortunately we have not yet ascended to an edified world philosophy, any more than the world car (despite American efforts at globalization, including Solomon and Higgins), but the number of mainstream models is now rather small, and almost all so far are noisy and polluting. �Hruschka, J., ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., ‘The end of philosophy’, address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historical survey of western philosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959. Routley, R., ‘Roles and limits ofparadigms in environmental thought and action ’,Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds.), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., ‘Dominant British ideology, with relevant environmental corollaries’, typescript, Canberra, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Impact of alternative systems on the Enlightenment Project’, typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Green Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Self-published Papers Description An account of the resource <span>Sylvan favoured the </span><span lang="EN-GB">highly-unorthodox practice of self-publishing a vast amount of his work<span>—</span><span></span>quite literally, using his own printing press!</span> Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 1161 • I 3.7.95 GRAND PHILOSOPHIES AND ENVIRONMENTAL CRISES: an initial report.1 Much of what follows is organised around the following anti-mainstream thesis, which it aims to further, to sharpen and to support: mainstream Western philosophy is dismal environmental news, or still more colloquially and generally, mainstream philosophy continues to be bad socio- environmental news. Presumably that expands, in turn, to something like: grander mainstream Western philosophy continues to be a significant factor in the ideologies (or paradigms) that inform destructive social and environmental practices. There are some striking corollaries, among them that, like dialectical material in Eastern Europe, such Western philosophy should be substantially abandoned, its furthering and frequent celebration in the schools and universities discontinued, its place taken by more benign humble alternatives. Sharpening the anti-mainstream thesis. All the qualifications prove to be important. Mainstream, because there are lesser or recessive traditions that are comparatively benign. Grander, because small-scale analytic philosophy for example, while likely operating within a damaging paradigm, may have little or no impact on its own (consider the impact of a philosopher who spends all research time on the unexpected examination problem). Western, because classical Taoism affords a counter­ example to the anti-mainstream thesis, virtually however it is sharpened.2 However the qualification Western is decidedly narrower than need be, and moreover gives a misleading impression. For conspicuous non-Westem philosophy, such as Confucianism and Islam, is also dismal news. Other major philosophies can, and do, drive environmental destruction as well. Accordingly too what uniqueness there is to the Western role has to be differently made out, in terms of its special (though perhaps inessential) linkage to industrialization. Although it is expositionally advantageous to highlight present serious predicaments in terms of crises, one thing should be clarified at the outset. It is not essential, or even critical, to the main arguments outlined that there should be environmental or other crises. It is enough that severe degradation or the like is occurring. Some sort of responsibility for this will afford a solid basis for criticism of a doctrine or practice. 1 The main title evolved from that of Caldera, Philosophy and Crisis, who was searching (rather unsuccessfully) for a Latin-American philosophy. Some of this report was thought through in Brasil, under the partial support of FASPEC. 2 See, for instance, the explication of Taoism in UTD. 2 But, as it happens, conditions for crises are satisfied.3 There are crises conditions in many places in many regards (some of which we will simply allude to, as there is copious documentation). Elsewhere, where crises have not yet broken, there are often near crises conditions. Many there are, of course, conspicuously politicians and economists, still labouring under the impression that the current dominant ideology and its development model is not obsolete, that all is more or less well. They imagine ‘that we are passing through an unusually severe but still cyclical crisis. That all we have to do is stimulate demand through public investment and build up enough business confidence so that there is a recovery of private investment and production. Then we can afford to resume efforts to control environmental and social problems.4 They have misread the signs. The problems are not merely cyclic or temporary; they are intensifying (if in a wavelike pattern, with deterioration surging in, then ebbing somewhat before the next bigger wave). Nor are larger ideological cycles quite the same, though much of the rhetoric is similar from cycle to cycle. No longer is it imagined that social or environmental problems can be substantially resolved next times around business cycles (though the illusion that most of us will be ‘better off persists, conveniently buttressed by loaded statistics). Comparisons, features and pedigree. Of course European civilization has more to answer for than its environmental practice, and its extraordinarily destructive impact on natural systems, especially non-European systems. It has to answer also for its impact upon humans, in particular classes, cultures or races marked out as inferior (persisting prominently into this century, emanating from sources of high Western culture). But for many of these human impacts Western philosophy does not have to answer, by contrast with other impacts. Indicative of dominant environmental attitudes are attitudes towards and treatment of what were, and often still are, seen as lesser humans: slaves, blacks, women, yokels, children, or so on. Take women. Among significant philosophers, virtually the only exception before contemporary times is J.S. Mill, who, under feminine influence, deplored the subjection of women. Unfortunately, for all the brilliant and oft-quoted Millean anti-mainstream passages, Mill himself did not swim far out of the mainstream. Most notably he did not amend his utilitarianism in the direction already contemplated by Bentham, to take passing account of the 3 For definitional details, see GE. For one of numerous summaries of present dire circumstances, see Paleocrassas. 4 Paleocrassas p. 12: one among many voices. 3 interests and sufferings of other animals. Human chauvinism survived, relatively unscathed, for all that Mill deplored loss of flowers and habitats, throughout his works. Features of the anti-mainstream thesis, its justification and relevant qualifications, can be brought out by considering its pedigree. Partial versions of, or variations upon, an anti­ mainstream thesis can be found in several sources; for instance in the deeper-environmental and rival-paradigms productions of the 70s. Consider the following examples: • the contrast of the Cartesian technocratic paradigm with the person planetary paradigm, where destructive environmental attitudes and practices are ascribed to adherence to the CartesianEnlightenment analytic-reductionist mind-set.5 Similar related clusters of contrasts appeared across social sciences, in political science, sociology and economics. For example • the dominant modern paradigm, essentially the same as the Cartesian technocratic paradigm was contrasted, by Rodman, with a benign classical paradigm. • the dominant social paradigm, another version of the same environmentally oppressive schema, was contrasted, by Cotgrove and Duff, with the alternative environmental paradigm. All these and other similar examples were duly elaborated in work on the roles (and limits) of paradigms in environmental thought and action.6 A critical point is that what social scientists were digging up (and reditching) was pretty much what mainstream philosophy was espousing or assuming (and, despite the new global wave of environmentalism, not that much has changed philosophically). It is worth recording that restricted versions of these contrasts (which do not touch basic shallow utilitarian assumptions) are now being presented and considered not only by academic theorists but by bureaucrats and working politicians and economists. Thus for example • a new development model, as contrasted with the current development model, outlined by a member of the European Commission (I. Paleocrassus)—who incidently devotes much space to documenting the present environmental crises {environment construed in a wide sense, to encompass decaying and dangerous urban environments often unfit for human habitation). Many features of the crisis are attributed to a faulty development model, portrayed as once perhaps appropriate, but no longer so.7 But there is more, much more to it than that. 5 Just such a contrast was elaborated by Drengson, drawing heavily upon Roszak. documentation then, see their work. 6 Thus Routley in an exercise with just that title. Needless to add, paradigms are rough and uneven. Some components of them have much more to answer for than others. For example, possessive individualism with its self-interest hypothesis, has been a particularly damaging part of dominant social ideology. 7 Curiously, though his entire discussion circulates around ‘the current development model’, what went wrong with it and what might replace it, Paleocrassus never bothers to explain that model or For 4 The current ubiquitous development model did not derive from nothing, but is, in main, an Enlightenment parcel, fuelled by ideals of material progress and the like, which is duly underpinned by the dominant social paradigm.8 It is not enough to simply change the development model; what drives it has also to be changed, namely the supporting philosophy. Development of anti-mainstreamism in recent critical philosophy. Differently, impacts of thorough-going (deep) environmental ethics, and of deep ecology, on philosophy and social theory were being assessed. It was observed that very much in mainstream philosophy would have to be jettisoned or substantially modified.9 Heavily targetted were forms of idealism, including phenomenalism and existentialism, and forms of empiricism. But the criticism swept much further, to prevailing metaphysics and ‘the limiting ideological principles of both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment’. In effect the criticisms extended to mainstream Western civilization. But no doubt claims here are technically different, because, for all the merits of deep positions, it is not usually being suggested that environmental storms could not be weathered to some extent under shallow cover,10 or that duly environmental but shallow philosophies are in some way responsible for gathering environmental crises. More sweeping anti-mainstream theses have been stated however by Hargrove, by Gare, and by others, including famous philosophers in their latter days.11 To the late Heidegger we appear to owe a rather interesting (if abominable) argument, which runs as follows: Western philosophy — or some such, with -* technological mastery (supremacy, dominance) -» environmental destruction ’ symbolising leads to, or yields (granted leads to faces a validity issue). to supply its components. But what can be gleaned indicates that it is a submodel of the dominant social paradigm. For instance, we are informed that natural resources are treated as ‘expendable raw materials or even worse as free goods’ (p.24), in effect as without initial value. 8 For details see DP, and in condensed form Sylvan 95. 9 Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 10 Deep positions divide significantly on this issue. For it is now widely argued that shallow environmentalism coupled with heavy technofix— a common position among scientists—is not going to succeed. 11 See Hargrove and Gare, and the ensuing discussion below in the text. It is a little tempting to suggest that Hargrove presents his thesis as it were by accident, given how little he actually does to defend it. In the main, Hargrove looks as if he is repeating Roszak and Drengson rather than proceeding to a larger sounder claim. 5 If something like this enjoyed plausibility, it would support a different thesis: Western philosophy should end.12 That argument is by contraposition, and then should transmission from an evident premiss. (Thatcherites and Wittgensteinians and others of a decidedly mixed company, reached a similar conclusion, that philosophy should end, by entirely different, very dubious by-roads.) There are several problems with the Heidegger schema. For one thing, the argument leaves out other critical components of an important environmental impact equation: notably excess human population and excess human consumption. In any event, Heidegger certainly thought that philosophy—as distinct from a quasimystical “thought”—should end. But he exaggerated the importance of such an outcome by exaggerating, in characteristic German style, the importance of philosophy, the importance of German philosophy above all. For example he supposed that modern German philosophy influenced the rise of industrialism and all it brought in train. It can be plausibly contended, however, in characteristic disparaging British style, that philosophy had comparatively little influence in such ultimately damaging development as European agricultural and industrial revolutions (for example, technology, but not philosophy, played a role in the invention of artificial dyes, a development which can be seen as setting European industrialization in train:) But such examples do not penetrate deep enough to the conditions of and preparation for change. There are myriad ways in which philosophy has shaped historical developments: through its major input into (other) ideologies such as religions, through its place in politics and law. With Protestant philosophy, in particular, basic ground for industrialism was prepared: the further development of highly exploitative Christian attitudes to nature (and to pagans) and of appropriate attitudes to technology, disciplined education and inculcation of a work ethic, and so on. Or consider, for instance, the fairly direct role of philosophy in the formulation of modern appropriation theories of property (notably by Locke), which enabled dispossession and displacement of native peoples in colonized lands, and are now ceding undue power to exploitative corporations. Consider its less direct role in the preparing ground for industrialization, the presumption that the earth, its habitats and other inhabitants, its natural landforms and its matter were and are of no value, but of value only as transformed by industrial activity, that entrepreneurs were free to do whatever they liked with them. No doubt 12 The form of the argument is extracted from Passmore’s end-of-philosophy address (thanks to Passmore too for further comments). The argument is much harder to find in Heidegger’s later work. But rudiments are present. The first linkage of philosophy and technology is managed by an extraordinary redefinition of technology (see p. 17?). For the second linkage, Heidegger was presumably reflecting upon high destructive technology of war, nuclear weapons and so on. Note however that the middle term has changed; so the argument fails, courtesy of the ancient fallacy of equivocation. 6 many untoward things would have happened without much philosophy, where for instance philosophy had little influence (as with habitat destruction by excessive populations of animals). Unfortunately such examples are exceptions; as a rule, noticed philosophy appears to have helped in underwriting, shaping and even fostering dominant practices. It could regularly have been different: wherever theory operated to influence practice, philosophy could have served negatively, as a prime element of resistance.13 That too could be a significant role for philosophy today. Whatever the extent—arguably, then, very substantial—to which they actually impinge, main philosophical traditions and ideologies do have very negative implications for environmental theory and practice. So much has been argued or alleged, in one fashion or another, in several contemporary sources.14 For example, Hargrove has recently investigated, in uneven detail, negative implications of mainstream philosophy for three environmental reaches: environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation, and with development of a proper ecological perspective. However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy in a region). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously’:Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others that Attfield alludes to are 13 On the place in philosophy, and in environmental thought in particular, of resistance, see the discussion of Rodman’s preferred fourth ideal type, Ecological Resistance, in EE, p,146ff. 14 For example, see Hargrove, p.21. 7 philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy. Consider the sorts of exceptions: • minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Theophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. • figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. • medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and in fact were usually not committed to nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.15 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship). And in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as that can be ascertained), often telling against substantial environmental sensitivity and concern. As regards the latter matter, there are, inversely, isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil quality in Greece during his own lifetime.16 Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.17 The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural­ world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value; denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory, and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic 15 In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern. A more detailed criticism of these claims will be attempted elsewhere. 16 Hargrove, p.29. 17 This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that what Attfield pronounces as Hargrove’s historical “excess” needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. 8 ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value— rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter. That is a matter of indifference.18 A significantly better critical exercise, as regards not merely Plato, but the extensive and important neo-Platonic tradition, is effected by Gare, who also advances however an insufficiently specified version of the anti-mainstream thesis. In fact Gare tends to slide back and forth from Western civilization and metaphysics, both of which are too wide, to mechanistic materialism (and social Darwinism), which is much too narrow, particularly if social Darwinism is included (about which Gare vacillates). The latter leaves out such damaging sources as Cartesianism and contemporary idealism; the former would include the recessive Western metaphysical tradition Gare wants to refurbish, what has grown into “process” philosophy. So while there is a great deal of worthwhile historical documentation to be found in Gare, the target thesis has so far eluded his critical exercise. While the restriction of the anti-mainstream thesis to Western doctrine is both somewhat misleading and more confining than need be, that to mainstream is different. Something of the sort is essential. But it itself raises other difficulties, beginning with: what counts as mainstream! How is the image cashed out? A contextual explication is conveniently straightforward, an abstract definition of ‘mainstream’ in terms of the principal course or flow less helpful. By mainstream Western Philosophy—Western philosophy providing the context—is meant the principal movements in that philosophy, the chief philosophers and schools and their relevant philosophical interrelations. And who and what these are gets shown, nearly ostensively in some cases (with portraits and diagrams), in histories of Western philosophy.19 Shorter and less encyclopaedia histories in fact tend to portray just the sought For requisite 18 On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. elaboration, see Gare. 19 One admirable example in this regard is B. Russell’s Wisdom of the West, a popular work with a title that should be viewed henceforth, given that Russell was serious, with some incredulity. 9 mainstream (that they differ somewhat in coverage does not matter, but emphasizes, in a supervaluational fashion, the blurred edges of this typically vague mainstream). Long histories usually indicate the mainstream both by the way they apportion their space, and also in their judgements as to what is important, which were principal movements, and so on. The essential qualification, to mainstream or similar, is independently grasped by Singer . in his account of the dominant Western paradigm and his brief but pointed criticism of Aristotelianism and mainstream Hebrew and Christian philosophy. The biblical story of creation, in Genesis, makes clear the Hebrew view of the special place of human beings in the divine plan: And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. And God blessed them, and God said upon them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it; and have dominion over the fish of the sea and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth. Today Christians debate the meaning of this grant of ‘dominion’; and those concerned about the environment claim that it should be regarded not as a license to do as we will with other living things, but rather as a directive to look after them on God’s behalf, and be answerable to God for the way in which we treat them. There is, however, little justification in the text itself for such an interpretation; and given the example God set when he drowned almost every animal on earth in order to punish human beings for their wickedness, it is no wonder that people should think the flooding of a single river valley is nothing worth worrying about. After the flood there is a repetition of the grant of dominion in more ominous language: And the fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every fowl of the air, upon all that moveth upon the earth, and upon all the fishes of the sea; into your hand are they delivered. The implication is clear: to act in a way that causes fear and dread to everything that moves on the earth is not improper; it is, in fact, in accordance with a God­ given decree. The most influential early Christian thinkers had no doubts about how man’s dominion was to be understood. ‘Doth God care for oxen?’ asked Paul, in the course of a discussion of an Old Testament command to rest one’s ox on the sabbath, but it was only a rhetorical question—he took it for granted that the answer must be negative, and the command was to be explained in terms of some benefit to humans. Augustine shared this line of thought; referring to stories in the New Testament in which Jesus destroyed a fig tree and caused a herd of pigs to drown, Augustine explained these puzzling incidents as intended to teach us that ‘to refrain from the killing of animals and the destroying of plants is the height of superstition’. It is a little surprising, too, that the usual uncritical apriorism about the natural world and its other inhabitants, should pervade Russell’s work. But consider, to take just one example, the inaccurate and demeaning comparison of animals with humans that fires up his neglected analysis Power. 10 When Christianity prevailed in the Roman Empire, it also absorbed elements of the ancient Greek attitude to the natural world. The Greek influence was entrenched in Christian philosophy by the greatest of the medieval scholastics, Thomas Aquinas, whose life work was the melding of Christian theology with the thought of Aristotle. Aristotle regarded nature as a hierarchy in which those with less reasoning ability exist for the sake of those with more: Plants exist for the sake of animals, and brute beasts for the sake of man—domestic animals for his use and food, wild ones (or at any rate most of them) for food and other accessories of life, such as clothing and various tools. Since nature makes nothing purposeless or in vain, it is undeniably true that she has made all animals for sake of man. In his own major work, the Summa Theologica, Aquinas followed this passage from Aristotle almost word for word, adding that the position accords with God’s command, as given in Genesis. In his classification of sins, Aquinas has room only for sins against God, ourselves, or our neighbours. There is no possibility of sinning against non-human animals, or against the natural world. This was the thinking of mainstream Christianity for at least its first eighteen centuries. There were gentler spirits, certainly, like Basil, John Chrysostom, and Francis of Assisi, but for most of Christian history they have had no significant impact on the dominant tradition. It is therefore worth emphasising ... major features of this dominant Western tradition, because these features can serve as a point of comparison when we discuss different views of the natural environment. According to the dominant Western tradition, the natural world exists for the benefit of human beings. God gave human beings dominion over the natural world, and God does not care how we treat it. Human beings are the only morally important members of this world. Nature itself is of no intrinsic value, and the destruction of plants and animals cannot be sinful, unless by this destruction we harm humans beings.20 Singer goes on to labour the familiar point that anthropocentrism of this harsh tradition need not exclude some concern for the preservation of nature. But for most of recorded history it has not included much concern. Moreover, lesser Christian alternatives, notably stewardship and perfectionism, while they lessen some of the brutal impact of domination upon the natural world, offer little improvement upon longer term invidious environmental erosion, or as regards retention of now emphasized desiderata: retention of wilderness, and maintenance and enhancement of biodiversity. As disturbingly, the rival humanist paradigm of modem times, running from the French enlightenment through 20th century Anglo-American empiricism, as exemplified in Russell, Ayer and Quine among many other luminaries, differs from mainstream Christianity only in leaving God out of the account (as He does not exist, He is utterly impotent, so to illicitly say). Exceptional human features themselves, naturalistically achieved, justify dominion and domination. 20 Singer pp.265-8, itals added. Singer prefers tradition discourse to the substantially equivalent (historical linkage diminished) paradigm discourse. 11 Outline of a main argument Detailed argument for the anti-mainstream thesis, as refined, is, so to say, case by case, through cases in the mainstream history, considering main philosophers and main schools. Some of this hard piecemeal work, some already illustrated, has been carried out, in more or less detail by others: Drengson, Gare, Hargrove, Heidegger and Passmore, among many others. But, within that uneven treatment, there remain conspicuous gaps. For example, among the principal 17th century rationalists, while there is much material upon Descartes (along now with a conservative back-lash defending Descartes), and some increasingly divisive material upon Spinoza, there is little at all on Leibnitz. As there is no prospect here of reworking the dismal history of Western philosophy, case by case, let us consider a few illustrative examples, which help plug some obvious gaps. Take again the distinguished early modern rationalists—Descartes, Leibnitz and Spinoza— as examples. Descartes’ significant negative contribution is now well-known, so much so that Descartes is sometimes represented as the main villain of the environmental piece.21 Owing to the premature enthusiasm of various deep ecologists for Spinoza’s contribution, the blacker environmental feature of Spinoza’s theory have been enthusiastically exposed to view by a jubilant opposition. As a result, some deep ecologists have back-tracked, but only a little: Some Spinoza scholars have recently claimed that an ecological interpretation of Spinozism is not justified. There are notes in the Ethics where Spinoza says that we can treat other animals in any way which best suits us. [These authors] have argued that although the metaphysics is nonanthropocentric, the ethics is rightfully anthropocentric. Schopenhauer, who was steeped in Eastern philosophy, was quick to pick up on the anomolous attitude of Spinoza toward other animals: “Spinoza’s contempt for animals, as mere things for our use, and declared by him to be without right, is thoroughly Jewish, and in conjunction with pantheism is at the same time absurd and abominable.” Arne Naess and I agree that Schopenhauer was correct in his criticism of Spinoza. Naess admits that although Spinoza himself was what we would now call a “speciesist”, his system is not speciesist.22 If Spinoza’s system includes his anthropocentric ethics (and is not illegitimately restricted to an ecologically convenient selection from his holistic metaphysics), then it seems Naess is astray. The negative character of Spinoza’s contribution was rediscovered by Bookchin (unversed in basic deep ecological texts), who applies this finding to lambast deep ecology regarding ‘double standards’ in its one-sided treatment of philosophers and philosophical traditions. Spinoza, for example is cast frequently as a nouveau Taoist and is interpreted more in the romantic tradition than in the scholastic one to which he has more affinities, despite his many differences with medieval thinkers. That this great thinker was militantly anthropocentric is consistently ignored by deep 21 Thus for example by Drengson. 22 Session, in Appendix D to Devall and Sessions, p.240. 12 ecologists, as far as I have been able to ascertain. I have yet to encounter any attempt to explain Spinoza’s extraordinary statement: “Besides man, we know of no particular thing in nature in whose mind we may rejoice, and whom we can associate with ourselves in friendship or any sort of fellowship; therefore, whatsoever there be in nature besides man, a regard for our advantage does not call on us to preserve, but to preserve or destroy according to its various capabilities, and to adapt to our use as best we may.”23 So much for sensitive treatment of natural environments and their other inhabitants! Spinoza appears to have irreparably damaged any claim to exceptional positive standing. So far the third of the great rationalist trio, Leibnitz, appears to have escaped critical re­ appraisal (in an overdue green history of philosophy). Yet, as it happens, Leibnitz’s position can be applied to illustrate features of considerable green generality. In brief, any philosophy is liable to be environmentally unfriendly that guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. Leibnitz’s overall position does just that. Consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the familiar impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all­ round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).24 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the development and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. not only the characteristica universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, but as well numerous technological projects.25). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the 23 Bookchin, p.261. The quotation from Spinoza’s Ethics is fully cited in Bookchin. 24 For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. 25 ‘Leibnitz’s interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’, Cottingham p. 193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. 13 more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.26 No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy—of a different unauthentic subphilosophy—do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily. Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness appears due rather to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not ‘cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.27 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal stimulus ... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.28 An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new partial metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral 26 Cottingham p.24, p.26. 27 Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. The preposterous infallibility-in-practice assumption has resurfaced recently in a less attractive aspect of the Gaia hypothesis as peddled by Lovelock. 28 Glacken p.506. 14 metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging philosophies, social theories and life­ styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories and practices, commitments and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.29 Things even deteriorated on many fronts under the main philosophical movements that succeeded Leibnitz in Germany, and overwhelmed European and much of Western philosophy for more than a century, namely Kantianism and subsequent German idealism. Virtually all the prominent positions in this philosophical galaxy, in the main strongly supportive of a supposedly enlightened Protestantism, presumed and imposed a blanketing human chauvinism and associated social reductionism. For example, the universal universe of Kantian ethics comprosed the circle of humans (and perhaps super humans) only; nothing else counted, and even the proper treatment of animals (which was at least not entirely neglected) was supposed reduced to that of interhuman relations. Regrettably human chauvinistic assumptions also underlay and handicapped more benign reccessive alternatives in Germany, such as those afforded by Herder and through the much heralded nature romanticism movement. As is widely appreciated now, later parts of the broad German mainstream flowing on from Kant were much more deleterious, neglecting Enlightenment advances and sponsoring elements of Aryan or super-race chauvinism. Things were certainly rather different off the Continent in modem England, but in most environmental respects hardly better. But no doubt a different example is furnished by mainstream British philosophy, a philosophy which has influenced most of the English speaking world for the worse, environmentally and also otherwise. This philosophy is highly empiricist in orientation, a reductionistic ideas, impressions or sense-data empiricism characteristically sharing the anthropocentrism of idealism,. Worse, this empiricism normally expands through ethics and social theory in the form of utilitarianism, typically a possessive individualistic human chauvinistic utilitarianism.30 Despite appearances and propaganda, there has been comparatively little improvement in recent times. For positivism and its irrationalist successors, all ecologically shallow, all committed to technofix and for the most part to social engineering, have been prime 29 Leibnitz’s standing in the history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incomputable) metaphysics, of which only tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. 30 For elaboration and defence of these stark claims, see Sylvan 94. 15 philosophical inputs into the physical sciences and also into mainstream economics. Shallow utilitarianism persists as the main philosophical informant of and input into social sciences, including fashionable new areas such as ecological economics, public choice theory, and so on. Incidentally, not much is to be expected in the way of deeper change from contemporary universities and research institutions from where these new fashions emanate. For these places are, by and large, part of the advanced industrial problematic; they are, almost without exception, urbanocentric conjectural-information factories. Unfortunately, the other main movements in Anglo-American philosophy are even more conservative, for example analytic philosophy and its variants, such as conceptual analysis, and Wittgensteinianism. For they leave almost everything as it is, as environmentally unsatisfactory as it is.31 Nor is recent Continental philosophy, a main contrast class, any better, but in many respects worse. Anthropocentric emphases remain heavy in both French and German philosophy, which are the predominant forms. Both existentialism and phenomenalism, as well as passe-isms such as Marxism, are mired in human chauvinism. Social criticism, which has at least seriously addressed wider environmental problems, remains shallow. For example, the communicational theory of Habermas is heavily biassed in favour of articulate humans, and excludes other animals and the rest of creation from any but very secondary roles. Modest out-fall. No doubt the anti-mainstream thesis is not the sort of proposition that most philosophers care to encounter. For one reason, it may seem like offering free ammunition to those who would like to put an end to philosophy, for political or ideological purposes. But it does not: not without a serious confusion of change—or end in present dominant form—with end, end period. Similarly, it may appear to give reinforcement to those who, with scant justification, have prematurely pronounced the end of philosophy.32 But this makes a similar confusion. Spectacular conclusions such as those that have sometimes been drawn from considerations like those assembled—such as, again, the end of philosophy, the demise of grand philosophy, the deconstruction of metaphysics— do not then emerge. For one reason, it is not philosophy that leads to disaster, but only certain sorts of grand philosophy, gray and brown sorts, which accordingly are liable to critical rejection. No end is implied to less grand and greener regional philosophies, recessive metaphysics, or the like. 31 Such a theme is developed, though poorly and in a social setting, by Gellner. His case applies, with even more force, to environmental matters. 32 Later authors tend to appeal back to earlier false prophets, notably Heidegger, who really had no viable arguments for his floated claims. There are other, quite different, equally poor, arguments to an end to philosophy, for instance those to an end of ideology, from the fall of one awful alternative, soviet “communism”. And so on; see also above. 16 Development of some recessive alternative or other—different ones—is now a favoured alternative idea (thus Gare and others advocating elaboration of process philosophy, environmentalists favouring ecological paradigms, etc.). But a more effective course, duly pluralistic, looks to locally and regionally based philosophies, with worthwhile linkages with local aspirations and regional cultures.33 Once again, there are philosophies and philosophies—and appalling regional philosophies (e.g. business philosophies, as promoted by local chambers of commerce; fundamentalist philosophies stoked by organised religions). Ways out, if they can be found, lie not through reproduction of dominant destructive ideologies at local levels, but through less damaging alternatives, fitted to ecoregional circumstances. Some broad corollaries of the anti-mainstream thesis are accordingly evident. Philosophy teaching and practice should be drastically reorganised, almost everywhere. Many features of historical approaches would be transformed. “Great thinker” and like series would vanish. Celebratory aspects of philosophy approached through its history would be abandoned: both the mainstream historic emphasis and the celebration. Grand but invariably flawed figures from history would no longer be revered, or celebrated in the same way, even if some of their arguments are retained for exhibition or criticism. There would be new histories of philosophy, different in different regions, with their own pantheons ofprominent philosophers, pantheons not set in stone. Nor would systematic philosophy remain unscathed. For its usual operational framework is that of the dominant social paradigm. It would be relocated and reoriented. There would be an end to the transfer of inappropriate models, technology (including logical) and practices (as of temperate agriculture to tropical regions). There would be a reduction in borrowing and unseemly imitations. Borrowed philosophy is inappropriate for Latin America, or elsewhere in the South. Consider French philosophy, which along with Catholicism and Marxism, still tends to swamp what little happens in Latin America. The mileau in which French philosophy occurs is not established, the infrastucture is not in place, namely a variety of literary criticism and like mags, an active cafe society, and so on. French philosophy does not export that well and, by and large, should not be imported, for all its flashy fashionability. Regions should try to do their own appropriate intellectual things, importing only what they really need. Regional philosophies do not, after all, have to start from nothing or nowhere; they can draw upon and adapt what already has some local basis, perhaps a strong base. What is more, they can be directly applied to prevent or delay outside destructive incursions. For illustration, consider the place of tribally recognised values of forests in delaying grand pulpwood and integrated forestry [integrated destruction] projects. Through a 33 No doubt this is an intended idea in Caldera, for all that it is scarcely articulated or developed. Similarly in other productions on Latin-American philosophy. 17 regional network, a mesh of constraints can be introduced, controlling intrusions of unregulated or prejudically regulated international capitalism. Compare a promising strategy for trying to achieve a nuclear free world, building up by free or freed regions. Nor does a case for ideological regionalism have to start from nothing. Some of the arguments for regionalism in organisation also support or suggest regionalization in reaches of ideas, including philosophy. For example, many of the advantages of subsidizarization transfer. Naturalism regionalism does not preclude global linkages; what it should resist are forms of imperialism.34 None of this will be easy, or achieved without effort. Change is generally hard to achieve against inertia. And most intellectuals, for all their craving to be first in little approved ideas, are resistant to extensive change. Moreover the changes modestly proposed will not be simple; there is not, and cannot be, a simple uniform alternative. What is needed is fragmentation, pluralisation, regionalisation—unpopular, unfashionable ideas. References Aiton, E.J., Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. Attfield, R., ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’, Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. Attfield, R., The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. Bookchin, M., ‘Rediscovering evolution’, Environmental Ethics 12(1990) c.261. Caldera, A.J., Filosofia e Crise, Pela filosofia iatino-americana, Editora Vozes, Petropolis, Brasil, 1984. Devall, B., and Sessions G., Deep Ecology, Salt Lake City, Utah 1985. Drengson, A, Beyond Environmental Crisis: from Techocratic to Planetary Person, Peter Lang, New York, 1989. Gare, A., Nihilism Incorporated, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore N.S.W., 1993. Gellner, E., Words & Things: a critical account of linguistic philosophy and a study of ideology, V. Gollancz, London, 1959. Glacken, C.J., Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. Hargrove, E., Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1989. Heidegger, M., The End of Philosophy, Harper & Row, New York, 1973. 34 Fortunately we have not yet ascended to an edified world philosophy, any more than the world car (despite American efforts at globalization, including Solomon and Higgins), but the number of mainstream models is now rather small, and almost all so far are noisy and polluting. Hruschka, J., ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177. Passmore, J., ‘The end of philosophy’, address on the occasion of his 80th birthday, Australian National University, 1994. Paleocrassas, Y., Environmental crime and punishment. Towards a new development model, Austemb, Brussells, 1994. Plumwood, V., Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. Roszak, T., Where the Wasteland Ends, Doubleday, Garden City New York, 1972. Russell, B., Wisdom of the West: a historical survey of western philosophy in its social and political setting, Ed. P. Foulkes, MacDonald, London, 1959. Routley, R., ‘Roles and limits ofparadigms in environmental thought and action ’,Green Series #1, Research School of Social Science, Australian National University, 1982. Solomon, R., and Higgins, K., (eds.), From Africa to Zen, An Invitation to World Philosophy, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Maryland, 1993. Sylvan, R., ‘Dominant British ideology, with relevant environmental corollaries’, typescript, Canberra, 1994. Sylvan, R., ‘Impact of alternative systems on the Enlightenment Project’, typescript, Canberra, 1995. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, typescript, Canberra, 1992: referred to as DP. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., The Greening of Ethics, White Horse, Cambridge, 1994: referred to as GE. Sylvan, R. and Bennett, D., ‘Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology’, Green Series #19, Research School of Social Science Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. 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Date A point or period of time associated with an event in the lifecycle of the resource 1995-07-03. Subject The topic of the resource Typescript of paper dated 3.7.95. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Grand Philosophies and Environmental Crises. Ts (2 cops). Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 15, item 1161 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [18] leaves. 18.47 MB. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9c7973c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:9c7973c</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Box 15: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Desk Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/b621a0cc825817baa2733c0711227cea.pdf 75dfb9e06db0b9033822e454a690eaa0 PDF Text Text 1165 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. . . . A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking, philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 3.7.95 �2 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS of ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Broaching focal questions, and searching for deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate (liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation. Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering, many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so on). Whence arises an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigm?, diverse paradigms but all displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or impoverish their own environments. Introduced “pest” species, such as rabbits and mynahs in the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well. �3 pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood­ production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”, and market ideology does economic practice, even so-called “environmental economics”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this even feasible, but of getting right paradigms. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single 2 3 4 For more on this style of explanation, see further RP. It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies. What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial explanation, of them. As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which paradigms are, serve in explanation justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson. �4 role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural. As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned, those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes. Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics. What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are ‘‘A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors of roots and sources . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text, The Roots of Modem Environmentalism. Although this text presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p. 193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for �5 roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above them, and so on. Both differ from another popular basis-beginning buried metaphor, that of foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely passively support, not sustain supported superstructure). So foundations, for all their importance in epistemology and elsewhere if foundationalism is correct, can be set aside. So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short listing for the figurature use of ‘root’ runs: ‘the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc. (Concise English Dictionary). Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained. Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source­ book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may have further sources (hence the search for ’‘deeper”, even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system, gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix of buried metaphors. Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning environmental problems. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaboratedincluding a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. 5 Despite a referee’s suggestion that discussion of “roots” ‘could be improved by a contrast of the “roots” metaphor with the “foundations” metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying interpretations offoundations, an emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm. �6 Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. Definitions of ‘environmental problem’, and classifications of such problems, have already been ventured.6 What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, ones here taken as serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.7 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There would be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.8 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to the questions are however important, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to mm around a difficult and deteriorating situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.9 6 7 8 9 See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and proximate solutions. As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. See e.g. The cost of past environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained. �7 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to be faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, or whatever. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, .... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas- system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation -11 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, through Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans 10 11 It resembles a structured universal; compare e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of paradigmatic sort. This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. �8 Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather consciousnesses) have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is wrong. TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages. D. Defective practice answers Source Remedy Objections �9 DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage D3a When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory, or push it back to paradigmatic features. Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Pl. Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism Anti-dualism P2b Mechanism Organicism P. Defective paradigm answers Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Monism Modified holism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business P6. Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment Anti-materialism �10 P6a Materialism Spiritualism P8. P9 Patriarchy, andocentrism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies proposed tend to share defects of sources. PS. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Typical remedy suggested Source Platonism Leibnitzianism Kantianism Anglo-American philosophy12 Utilitarianism Economism (economic imperialism as New metaphysics New metaphysics Consequentialism Continental philosophy Alternative ethics New social science; ethics contrasted with straight economic roots) Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Domination removal Human nature (esp. aggression) Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say most—entries in that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e. reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard’s challenging answer. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon ‘mental maladaptation’). 12 The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism. �11 Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick —in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of modem institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White.14 One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’, namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, 13 14 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix . White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. �12 a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.15 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.16 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today. ... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.17 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.18 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. 15 16 17 18 The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent contribution to the debate see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask, not merely what they say, but what they do, and would do. For an outline of just such a telling criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. �13 denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.19 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: . The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources . The sources of anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.20 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.21 19 20 21 For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘rejecting] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmcntalj problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies’ (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. �14 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.22 But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ’Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility, no doubt a relative of capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. • Modern industrial society or industrialism. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth­ superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.24 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society’.2526Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, 22 23 24 25 26 It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated metaphysics meant thereby paradigm or paradigms or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they tend to lose in confusion. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature”’, a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modem problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case. For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. �15 less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Economic growth or economic development. ‘According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots’.27 One widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems. The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause, itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy, such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay for continuing employment). No doubt though, stock economic growth is intimately intricated with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations). Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that ‘the Western model of economic development, far from being the solution to’ environmental and social problems, is ‘actually fuelling’ them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the problems.28 • Human nature. "... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature itself.’29 What such “nature” amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false 27 28 29 Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: ‘the problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. All that is true, too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals’ (p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm. Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis. Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: ‘Less luxury, less wastage. Otherwise it will be too late’. Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in Forest and Bird 273 (August 1994) pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that only economic growth will solve environmental problems. Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant problems. Callicott and Ames, ‘Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action’ p.282 (see also p.281), in a desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much improved treatment for natural and built environments, with ‘the deplorable environmental conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia’ (p.280). �16 hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems, including now environmental ones, is “man’s fallen nature”. That astonishing source also comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed. • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.30 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.31 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.32 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans'. It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships 30 31 32 33 Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see the sequel to GE. See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from humans’ domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. �17 —domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a harmonious man-nature relationship.34 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.35 • Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.36 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. A selective commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation. ad D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While “consequences” or outputs such things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a rotten joke, itself with serious consequences. Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may 34 35 36 Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE �18 foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.3738Where they usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries, namely that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.3^ Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization and Agricultural Origins and Dispersal) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not 37 38 Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have their property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). �19 deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. ad P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another. Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect appropriately with practice. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on39)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related virtual histories (concerning what would have happened)—enter decisively. For instance, Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms.40 An important example (much less speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to 39 40 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. Ponting’s valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is Hillel’s, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale, Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep enough, to paradigmatic roots. �20 do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively outside) the rise of modem Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources wrongly. For nonWestem paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond. The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modem rationalism and much else. 41 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna worldwide. �5. A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated, and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration concerns patriarchy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial independence of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class, etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences in calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life­ forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and of third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Nor are major inflators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from �22 rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin­ off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run in less favourable settings. Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms. Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war, through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by­ products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Westem. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological “break throughs” were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises. The pictuie of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). �23 selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises conditions, include those now tabulated: TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Jainism Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians. Western philosophies: under certain favourable interpretations old Stoicism new Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology. Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions. Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual, goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what would be done in certain other sorts of situations. Certainly a culture that manifests unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various “primitive” cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice. 43 In logical terms neither, perhaps as well as another residue class, both. �24 It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Certain family characteristics, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating: * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism. More generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’44 The outside world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [znznJ, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts’”.45 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it, typically little or none. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it. It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans. Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’ .46 Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link principles, reminiscent of “correspondence rules” used in explaining applications of scientific theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives, such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP. * Indirect combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz’s fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population 44 45 46 Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan’s investigations. Cottingham p. 15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides—-just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain. See Descartes, Discourse VI. �25 growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,47 in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz’s metaphysics, his monadology, may have been—by contrast with Plato’s or Descartes’, both of which explicitly devalued much or all of the natural world—Leibnitz’s wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to damaging effects. Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes, can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray.48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example, depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of “creation . Such extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread, under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change. As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a basically neutral world. All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness. Shallowness will work out satisfactorily environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such familiar features as 47 48 49 For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel. As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also preferred in deep ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead to paradigmatic roots, to Naess’s “total views”. Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification. �26 * short-term framework. * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation, * entitlement to domination, dominion ove’r nature; * appropriation of nature, its conversion to property. * maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size, coupled with grand projects. * technofix approach to environmental problems. Friendly paradigms will tend to invert these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following samples: * an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. * a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms. * a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way. As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news. �27 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy. Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* APPENDIX. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s intriguing books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement, 5<\.. . He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feel no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms. A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. �28 target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots51) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocations at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is 51 52 For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) piactices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters' (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. �29 manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.55 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.* 54 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. 55 54 A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: . ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p. 15)! �30 REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. R. Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1989. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ ReVision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. R. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, Topsoil and Civilization, Revised edition by V.G. Carter, University of Oklahama Press, Norman, 1974. A Dobson (ed.), Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. W. Fox, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology, Shambala, Boston, 1990. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore, 1993. C. J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. R. Goodin, ‘Selling environmental indulgences’, Kyklos 47(1994) 573-596. N. R. Hanson, Patterns of discovery: an inquiry into conceptual foundations of science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. E. C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. D Hillel, Out of the Earth: Civilization and the Life of the Soil., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991. M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. K. Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy, Harmondsworth, England 1973. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Routledge, London, 1991. A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology , SUNY Press, Albany N. Y., 1993. P. Marshall, Nature’s Web, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993. A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, Ecology, community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974. D. Pearce and others, Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modem Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. �31 V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982; also, modified, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP. C. O. Sauer, Agricultural Origins and Dispersal, American Geographical Society, New York, 1952. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. P. Shepard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994; referred to as GE. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. Y.F. Tuan, ‘Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from Europe and China’, The Canadian Geographer 12(1968) 176-91. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. L. White Jr., ‘Historic roots of our ecologic crisis’, Science 155(1967) 1203-7. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred to as EP3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document 1165 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not deep enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these answers, fashionable or other, to the focal questions is satisfactory. Here lies the important hard, but very negative and decidedly incomplete, work of the present investigation. . . . A different more complex investigation is accordingly instigated. An initial answer is located through broader classes of paradigms : environmentally friendly and unfriendly. Further effort is expended, profitably, in trying to characterize these classes. Among significant corollaries, one is striking, philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 3.7.95 2 PARADIGMATIC ROOTS of ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Broaching focal questions, and searching for deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate (liquidation of natural forest systems affords just one striking example). In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation. Often in the past they would not have seen such transformation as mattering, many remain so programmed, regarding transformation as increasing wealth (a presumption encouraged under mainstream economics). More recently dominant human cultures have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, tax impositions, pressure to engage in cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, councils, courts, educations, missions, and so on). Whence arises an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise? For those eager to anticipate the main outcome, the unremarkable answer to be eventually found to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, remain committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigm?, diverse paradigms but all displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. Parts of any answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, and often correct as far as they go in combination, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Contrary to other sources, such as Marshall, humans are by no means the only biological species that proceed to degrade or impoverish their own environments. Introduced “pest” species, such as rabbits and mynahs in the Antipodes, also do so; perhaps some botanical species contrive to as well. 3 pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood­ production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”, and market ideology does economic practice, even so-called “environmental economics”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent s routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission—as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. But paradigms do even more; they facilitate explanation, above all they make understanding possible. In these regards, they may work for better as well as for worse. Thus it is not a matter of getting rid of them, were this even feasible, but of getting right paradigms. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, pervasive myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed in trying to answer focal questions, but through a bundle of somehow aligned paradigms. Compare how a person may be represented, in social science, not through a single 2 3 4 For more on this style of explanation, see further RP. It is not, going to be contended that religion—or a certain Abramic religion, such as Christianity—is the main villain of the environmental piece. It is now well enough appreciated that religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from ancient philosophies. What will however, be suggested is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. Further, as logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to overlap. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial explanation, of them. As well, positivistic theories show, though in an oversimplified way, how models, which paradigms are, serve in explanation justification and understanding. See e.g. Hanson. 4 role or program, but by way of a set of interconnected roles. What has been regularly overlooked in seeking deeper paradigmatic sources of environmental problems is systematic plurality. In part this neglect of plurality can be explained through countervailing propensity to seek single answers, and to try to locate uniqueness, where however causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural. As to what is going on theoretically, there is a fairly complex story to be told, an easier working image for which is appropriately ecological. That image focusses upon the structure of a perhaps impenetrable thicket or tangle, such as a dense rainforest patch, or, itself simplified, a fig or bamboo thicket. Below an emergent top layer representing the problems concerned, those raised by the focal questions, there is the canopy layer, of interlinked proximate causes. Below that again stands a plurality of stems, plural supports, which can be construed as supporting sources, and below them again, ultimately sustaining the whole structure, a multiplicity of intertwined roots, representing paradigmatic basics. What is sought are ultimate sources, and roots, not immediate causes. The cause of local pollution may be a factory that an agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. Nonetheless there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are ‘‘A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses the question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors of roots and sources . One striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text, The Roots of Modem Environmentalism. Although this text presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor on which it turns. For that matter there is no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent also that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p. 193). Such usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal conjunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Neither roots nor sources are mere beginnings or simply early occurrences; there have to be continuing connections, with directional relationships such as supply or sustenance. But for 5 roots and sources different connections and elaborations are to be expected. After all, the metaphors, and likewise what they give rise to, are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, springs and streams rise from sources, not roots, often above them, and so on. Both differ from another popular basis-beginning buried metaphor, that of foundations. Foundations bring in other features such as solidity, stability and comparative permanency, while severing critical transmission features (for foundations may merely passively support, not sustain supported superstructure). So foundations, for all their importance in epistemology and elsewhere if foundationalism is correct, can be set aside. So far dictionaries do better than popular and philosophical texts. For instance, a short listing for the figurature use of ‘root’ runs: ‘the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc. (Concise English Dictionary). Such a two component account will serve nicely, for a start. However conjunctions should substantially displace disjunctions, else roots could collapse to foundations or could collapse to mere trace element supplements. Roots both give a basis and bottom binding into a substratum and supply sustenance and means of development. Roots connections are richer as well as more specific than sources, which may merely show from where an item comes or is obtained. Further that place of derivation that may not be a basis or bottom, but for instance a source­ book. With roots, like normal foundations, a basis or bottom is reached, whereas sources may have further sources (hence the search for ’‘deeper”, even ultimate, sources). Finally, root and source connections carry explanations, at least genetic explanations—concerning how items got to be what and the way they are—because roots and sources are characteristically that from which items develop. Sometimes even more information, including a whole control system, gets transmitted. As much happens where roots are paradigmatic, to return to that strange mix of buried metaphors. Reaching deeper roots is important. Without locating them, perhaps all the roots (should they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at these, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. Such is the fate of many proposals concerning environmental problems. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaboratedincluding a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on these necessary preliminaries, because main details are already in circulation and because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. 5 Despite a referee’s suggestion that discussion of “roots” ‘could be improved by a contrast of the “roots” metaphor with the “foundations” metaphor, the fact is that we are decidedly not concerned with foundations of environmental problems; to the contrary, we do not wish to see them supported (if shoddily), established and so on. On the growing complexity and varying interpretations offoundations, an emergent bog, see for instance Chisholm. 6 Although these will be duly connected, with paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. Definitions of ‘environmental problem’, and classifications of such problems, have already been ventured.6 What problems emerge as environmental depends upon background value framework. What counts as a major problem on deeper environmental perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, ones here taken as serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.7 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise were sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these desiderata may well not be guaranteed. There would be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they might be resolved. Environmental impact equations, encountered in a more perceptive classification of problems, reveal how they can be resolved. Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.8 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not however satisfactory stopping points. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer or to be met in an extensive literative. As we will soon discover, most of these answers are too simple; and taken, as intended, as comprehensive, they are wrong. Correct answers to the questions are however important, because if we fail to get to the bottom of the issues, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to mm around a difficult and deteriorating situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships, or how many devaluing dollars uncaring humans can briefly stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm can be explicated, technically, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.9 6 7 8 9 See for example GE, which duly details connections of the problems with impact equations and proximate solutions. As to the extent of the problem (even) in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. See e.g. The cost of past environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See RP, where many environmentally relevant illustrations are given and explained. 7 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. semantical and other evaluations defined on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to be faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, or whatever. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and action theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these, mostly sketchy formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal10 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists, historians and geographers have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), discursive formations (Foucault), Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), traditions (MacIntyre), traditions of thought, cultures, perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, .... An ideology, for instance, in the non-derogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas- system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Such models are typically presented in extremely truncated form, for example through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 1: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation -11 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, through Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans 10 11 It resembles a structured universal; compare e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. Naturally there are differences between, for instance, traditions (of thought) which are historically bound, cultures, which are geographically and otherewise connected, and conceptual schemes (where a conceptual reduction is insinuated), but all are, at logical bottom, models of paradigmatic sort. This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. 8 Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) Paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; under an earlier analogy, red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem ideologies, eschews deontic judgements.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads (or rather consciousnesses) have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions: a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the extraordinary range of answers proposed supply but a single source, and are accordingly defective for this reason, usually among other reasons. Indeed it is not much of an exaggeration to assert that virtually everything proposed, in a now extensive literature, is wrong. TABLE 2. Main tabulation of answers and remedies , in three stages. D. Defective practice answers Source Remedy Objections 9 DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage D3a When pursued, objections like those noted either force defective practice out as unsatisfactory, or push it back to paradigmatic features. Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Pl. Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism Anti-dualism P2b Mechanism Organicism P. Defective paradigm answers Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Monism Modified holism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business P6. Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment Anti-materialism 10 P6a Materialism Spiritualism P8. P9 Patriarchy, andocentrism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) Observe that what some have proposed as remedies, others have seen as sources; remedies proposed tend to share defects of sources. PS. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Typical remedy suggested Source Platonism Leibnitzianism Kantianism Anglo-American philosophy12 Utilitarianism Economism (economic imperialism as New metaphysics New metaphysics Consequentialism Continental philosophy Alternative ethics New social science; ethics contrasted with straight economic roots) Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Domination removal Human nature (esp. aggression) Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then many—perhaps it is not excessive to say most—entries in that list will have been nominated, likely separately, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including, sometimes, entries like Taylorism, i.e. reorganisation of industry along lines popularized by Taylor), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other allegedly nonparadigmatic answers however, varying from interesting to crazy, that should also be taken into some account, for instance answers like Shepard’s challenging answer. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it all back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich and other gurus with insistence upon ‘mental maladaptation’). 12 The mainstream form, analytic philosophy, appears to comprise empiricism-cum-utilitarianism in Britain, tempered in America by pragmatism. 11 Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick —in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, along psychological routes, that are to be resisted. One slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something to the theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which now influences so much in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.13 No doubt, too, that maturity—but an environmental maturity—is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new compact housing, in those most wasteful of modem institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending here and there towards notes. Of course there are excuses. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was repeated in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White.14 One helpful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’, namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, 13 14 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in the Appendix . White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. 12 a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today's attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.15 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive and telling criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.16 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today. ... Religion ... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.17 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.18 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. 15 16 17 18 The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an older survey of traditions see Passmore, for a challenging recent contribution to the debate see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms: Ask, not merely what they say, but what they do, and would do. For an outline of just such a telling criticism of mainstream Christianity, see Singer esp. pp.265-8. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts of Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans, and of neo-Platonists. For a modest beginning, see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. 13 denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.19 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: . The roots of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources . The sources of anthropocentricism, imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial traces. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.20 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.21 19 20 21 For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see RP, table 5. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘rejecting] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmcntalj problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies’ (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. 14 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modern mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed), can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.22 But, as observed, a main embedded theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ’Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.23 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility, no doubt a relative of capitalism, appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. • Modern industrial society or industrialism. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth­ superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.24 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society’.2526Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, 22 23 24 25 26 It should not be overlooked that some of those who nominated metaphysics meant thereby paradigm or paradigms or an equivalent. But what they may gain thereby in verisimilitude, they tend to lose in confusion. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature”’, a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly industrialism is assumed as the source throughout McLaughlin (the theme pervades his book) and as the root of the modem problem in Marshall (p.5ff). While seriously astray as to roots and sources, those critical of industrialism have a significant case. For, as well as functioning as a major inflator of intact problems, industrialism has helped generate side problems of its own, as with new types of chemical and nuclear pollution. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. 15 less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Economic growth or economic development. ‘According to a common and currently influential diagnosis, the environmental crisis has essentially economic roots’.27 One widespread misconception is that economic growth is the source of environmental problems. The assumption is astray for several reasons. For one, growth is at best a proximate cause, itself in need of explanation. More importantly, growth may occur in sectors of an economy, such as information technology or religious or artistic services, which have little or no environmental impact. Also conversely, an economy which fails to grow, but is desperately trying to survive, may exact heavy environmental costs (e.g. the forests are clear-felled to pay for continuing employment). No doubt though, stock economic growth is intimately intricated with proximate causes of environmental problems (through environmental impact equations). Similar considerations tell against the familiar proposition that the source of the problems is economic development itself or, what is different, the entrenched model of economic development. While it is no doubt correct, and important to emphasize, that ‘the Western model of economic development, far from being the solution to’ environmental and social problems, is ‘actually fuelling’ them, it is not the sole or distinguished source of the problems.28 • Human nature. "... the roots of our ecologic crisis reach beyond the variable topsoil of intellectual history, whether Eastern or Western, into the common substrata of human nature itself.’29 What such “nature” amounts to and how it functions as roots, both commonly left obscure, turns upon background hypotheses as to the nature of this nature. Different false 27 28 29 Goodin, p.573. While not contesting the theme, Goodin does continue: ‘the problem is not just that there are too many people, or even that they are enjoying too high a standard of living. All that is true, too, of course. More fundamentally, however, problems of environmental despoliation are said to derive from skewed incentives as they pursue their various goals’ (p.573). That too will be seen to be seriously astray, though it contains large grains of truth; it presumes unchanged the prevailing economically-skewed dominant social paradigm. Both socialists and other opponents of capitalistic conspicuous consumption tend to select the living-standard component of the main environmental impact equation as the source of the crisis. Thus Cuban luminary, Castro, in a recent stunningly succinct speech: ‘Less luxury, less wastage. Otherwise it will be too late’. Quoting claims of E. Goldsmith, advanced in an interview in Forest and Bird 273 (August 1994) pp.46-7. The need for emphasis will persist while locally prominent political figures like the present Prime Minister of Australia travel around the Earth with the hackneyed message that only economic growth will solve environmental problems. Seeing growth as the problem affords only a superficial analysis, like that of pointing to overconsumption with which growth is interconnected. As deeper inquiry reveals, underlying both issues of economic growth, employment and consumption, and alternatives taken, are models, paradigmatic models. Growth is but a means to objectives assumed in the dominant paradigm. A deeper analysis shows too why more growth will not ultimately solve relevant problems. Callicott and Ames, ‘Epilogue: On the relation of idea and action’ p.282 (see also p.281), in a desperate and apparently unsuccessful attempt to reconcile the claim (repeatedly advanced in their book) that Asian traditions of thought can make a significant contribution to much improved treatment for natural and built environments, with ‘the deplorable environmental conditions prevailing in contemporary Asia’ (p.280). 16 hypotheses, that humans are invariably driven by aggression, sexual or reproductive imperatives, economic needs, yield different defective accounts. In Catholic orthodoxy such a source, human nature, comes burdened with original sin; the source of a sweep of problems, including now environmental ones, is “man’s fallen nature”. That astonishing source also comes contaminated, as for instance gender biassed. • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.30 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.31 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this is the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.32 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans'. It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend-setters, including Marcuse, Illich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.33 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships 30 31 32 33 Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see the sequel to GE. See Seed, quoted in the sequel to GE; also Salleh (e.g. in EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from humans’ domination of other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a sizeable section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. 17 —domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a harmonious man-nature relationship.34 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.35 • Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.36 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. A selective commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting a major division in the main tabulation. ad D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While “consequences” or outputs such things as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a rotten joke, itself with serious consequences. Accordingly new ecological economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings or a shifting dominant paradigm—to discover why markets may 34 35 36 Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could settle into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms is at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by a set of them in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see GE 18 foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.3738Where they usually arrive, travelling within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before ecological, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries, namely that true, or authentic, Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be little better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.3^ Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization and Agricultural Origins and Dispersal) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not 37 38 Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have their property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). 19 deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. ad P and PS. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few broad themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on its own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges, link principles, from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics of one sort or another. Such a criticism does not however extend to more comprehensive paradigms which connect appropriately with practice. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on39)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history and the like—bio-history, eco-history, and related virtual histories (concerning what would have happened)—enter decisively. For instance, Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms.40 An important example (much less speculative than some of the numerous other examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples—Polynesian, Mayan, Sumerian and others—also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to 39 40 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. Ponting’s valuable though rather simple book is but one of several bleak texts. Another is Hillel’s, and there is a succession of earlier classic works by geographers: Lowdermilk, Dale, Mallory, Thorp and others. In general however, geographers and historians do not dig deep enough, to paradigmatic roots. 20 do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did wreak, or would (given the technology and numbers, both of which some were gaining) have wreaked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established, and expanding, before (or effectively outside) the rise of modem Western paradigms, or in extensive regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far assembled, is substantially Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources wrongly. For nonWestem paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).41 Or consider Islam, with its reach across the Middle East and beyond. The main tabulation (of table 2) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in, or encouraged by, religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modem rationalism and much else. 41 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna worldwide. 5. A general method of showing the inadequacy of all the paradigmatic answers tabulated, and others, is familiar from logical theory: namely, the method of counter-models, of which the counter-examples (under head 2) provide special cases. A presently important illustration concerns patriarchy as a source of environmental woes. Counter-models reveal the substantial independence of mistreatment of women and mistreatment of environmental items such as animals or ecosystems. One the one hand, it is easy to envisage situations, not far from the actual in some regions, where the lot of women is significantly improved, but the lot of environmental items is not (e.g. men change their behaviour and attitudes relevantly as regards women, are forced to change, or whatever); just such an outcome would accord with persisting human chauvinism. More relevant, on the other, there are situations where the position of environmental items is much improved, for instance under much more careful husbandry, but that of women is not, for one reason or another (e.g. they remain other, different, second class, etc.). It follows from the elaboration of such counter-models that patriarchy is not the source of environmental problems, as there can be continuing patriarchy without the present range of environmental problems (problems can dry up while patriarchy continues to operate). There is no need to deny that patriarchy as (contingently) practised, with its sweeping supremacist attitudes which make no due distinctions between inferior items, may be a major contributing factor in present problems. Such slack contingent conjunctions do not convert to roots or sources. Similarly with other social roots of environmental problems, for instance with human domination of humans as the supposed source of all problems. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences in calibre, in environmental friendliness. For example, Cartesianism which regards animals as mere automata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life­ forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, nor somewhat more plausibly Northern, even though as a result of forces like migration, colonialism and cultural imperialism, paradigms of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and of third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Nor are major inflators of environmental problems essentially Western. Industrialization and technological advance—neither intrinsically Western, both manifested in varying degrees in other cultures—are, without much doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from 22 rather localised ones, damaging for instance islands and river catchments, to grander and even global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems, generating thereby spin­ off problems as well. But, once again, they are not deeper sources, but only means. (For again push questioning deeper, and ask: why bother or persist with industry, the effort and dirt and mess involved?) Nor, however, did they run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.42 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism or post-imperial Confucianism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transformed to run in less favourable settings. Thus inflation can escalate from a multiplicity of prepared sources, thereby intensifying problems and spreading them to larger regions. The intensification and spread is much facilitated by the joint transfer of technology, industry and coupled problems from region to region. As a result of transfer, inflation can occur within settings of quite different paradigms. Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other enthusiastic cultures. For instance, the West could in theory collapse through protracted war, through pollution and congestion, or climate change and agriculture failure (there are many unexcludible routes to catastrophic decline, outlined in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the conspicuous problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are accelerated by—what connects them—contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. However, too many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by­ products or similar of the main generators. Thus, in the illustration, the peasants displaced by agribusiness or absentee wealth-holders, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Westem. A friendly paradigm would not only ensure much more Lacking favourable ideological settings, earlier technological “break throughs” were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, dyes, gunpowder, etc. Western cultures did not enjoy a monopoly upon technology powerful enough, when massed, to induce global crises. The pictuie of development of large-scale environmental problems being sketched bears superficial resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where, to achieve presumed size, a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by huge inflationary phenomena. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). 23 selectivity and care, but would sharply limit impacts of damaging technology and industrialization. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration and they may be flawed in other respects. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises conditions, include those now tabulated: TABLE 3: Examples, some flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Jainism Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians. Western philosophies: under certain favourable interpretations old Stoicism new Deep-green theories, such as deep ecology. Given the remoteness of most of these examples from predominant contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out soon. Much much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. One upshot, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two families, the second large: environmentally friendly, and unfriendly. No doubt there is a small fuzzy residue class lying between major unfriendly and friendly divisions. Environmental friendliness means more or less what it appears to mean, what a functional break-down into components would yield: friendliness in approaches, practices and attitudes, to environments, especially more natural environments, with friendliness including, as usual, goodwill and kindliness towards (and substantially displaceable by these). As indicated, such friendliness concerns not merely actual practices, but also attitudes held, as reflected in what would be done in certain other sorts of situations. Certainly a culture that manifests unfriendliness, as a sweep of Northern cultures do, is unfriendly. But, as well, various “primitive” cultures, whose practices are not hostile, for example because they lack means or resources, energy or health, may nonetheless be unfriendly; for instance all members of a culture hold thoroughly negative attiudes which they are in fact unable to put into practice. 43 In logical terms neither, perhaps as well as another residue class, both. 24 It is not too difficult to explain in outline which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Certain family characteristics, of unfriendly paradigms are worth elaborating: * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism. More generally, direct impact is illustrated by any idea-system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and typically much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects, and whose themes are linked to practice. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’44 The outside world, the natural environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [znznJ, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts’”.45 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it, typically little or none. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans has no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could hardly matter what happens to it. It could be regarded and treated, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans. Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive, by one route or another from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further than some others. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’ .46 Untowards effects result through linkage of ideological theory to heavy practice. Link principles, reminiscent of “correspondence rules” used in explaining applications of scientific theories and normally included in comprehensive paradigms, connect the theoretic level to practice, they also serve to activate otherwise inoperative or uncoupled paradigms. Such principles may take the form of directives; familiar examples include maximization directives, such as maximize personal fun, tribal utility, national interest, or state GNP. * Indirect combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which yield satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz’s fragmentary ideology. Leibnitz was substantially committed to all of human population 44 45 46 Reese p.102 For much more on the geographic impact of Confucianism, as also compared with other (Asian) paradigms, see Tuan’s investigations. Cottingham p. 15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument (reported in Cottingham) to this divide is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides—-just as flamboyant forms of deep ecology maintain. See Descartes, Discourse VI. 25 growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption,47 in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. However neutral Leibnitz’s metaphysics, his monadology, may have been—by contrast with Plato’s or Descartes’, both of which explicitly devalued much or all of the natural world—Leibnitz’s wider ideology is linked indirectly, through impact equations, to damaging effects. Some imagine that this oblique formalistic detailing, through direct and indirect classes, can be simply cut through, retaining plurality and so forth. Surely environmental friendliness is nothing but environmental depth? While the suggestion points in the right sort of direction (for the relevant sort of depth) it too is astray.48 Depth is neither necessary nor sufficient. Take the move plausible sufficiency half, plausible because depth helps, no end. Nonetheless depth can be achieved in macho ways (as ecofeminism has emphasized against deep ecology), ways which may not be altogether friendly to less favoured species, groups or habitats. For example, depth can be satisfied through due selection and support of some super species and magnificent habitats—requisite environmental impartiality (and reflected justice), critical for friendliness as intended, being neglected.49 Still less in depth necessary. For kindliness can, both in principle and in practice, extend far beyond humans, still ranked top, to much more of “creation . Such extensive kindliness, observed in some humanistic humans, appears to be exhibited in some sects and tribes not committed to depth, and it could well be considerably more widespread, under changed but not deepened ideological conditions. Naturally, however, deepening would afford an obvious, and excellent, reason for change. As friendliness is not tantamount to depth, nor similarly is a prime part of what explains depth, recognition of intrinsic value in nature outside humans. Some animal liberationists who display high regard for creatures with capacity to suffer, show little goodwill towards forests largely unpopulated by such creatures. Conversely, though shifting ground, an environmentally friendly society may hold that value is but an anthropocentric construct, merely projected onto a basically neutral world. All the same, aspects of depth are normally reliable indicators of environmental sensitivity and friendliness, and inversely, aspects of shallowness (as investigated in authentic deep ecology) marks of unfriendliness. Shallowness will work out satisfactorily environmentally only with what is now rare (given ideological dominance), a right mix of humans; and its any longer working widely is implausible. These reliable marks include such familiar features as 47 48 49 For requisite details, see Aiton. The case against Leibnitzianism is developed in a sequel. As to the relevant sort of depth, see GE. Other accounts of depth are also preferred in deep ecology, some of which relate to the present exercise. In particular deep questioning should lead to paradigmatic roots, to Naess’s “total views”. Herein lies another reason why something like biospecies egalitarianism is essential in deep ecology; such a requirement needs, not dilution away (as has happened in American and transpersonal deep ecology), but rectification. 26 * short-term framework. * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism); and, as a corollary of heavy devaluation, * entitlement to domination, dominion ove’r nature; * appropriation of nature, its conversion to property. * maximization assumptions concerning personal or societal aggrandizement, utility and size, coupled with grand projects. * technofix approach to environmental problems. Friendly paradigms will tend to invert these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as the following samples: * an end to degrading primary production; instead ecological forestry and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. * a strong selectivity regarding industrialization, which weeds out damaging forms. * a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of unfriendly technology can go a very long way. As unfriendly paradigms are decidedly plural, so likewise are answers to questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Some of the diverse answers match answers already encountered in the main tabulation. Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with a familiar circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because, in one way or another, most agents are bound to—locked into, committed to, captured by, or just passively go along with—environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Glimpsing an entertaining corollary: an unfavourable report upon dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet. In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Predominant philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news. 27 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under-estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. The substantial point is not therefore removed through any alleged practical impotence of philosophy. Mainstream philosophy has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, dominant unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be trashed, as even defective enterprises or evil projects may include decent part or worthwhile features; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are brash new alternatives such as authentic deep ecology, and there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to peruse for suggestions, for inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* APPENDIX. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard s intriguing books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement, 5<\.. . He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feel no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended An earlier, even rougher version of this article was presented at the Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 1993. It would not have been written without its solicitation for the Conference; also it might well not been thought through in fashionable but confining and perhaps misleading paradigmatic terms. A subsequent working draft has benefitted, slightly, from comments from very unimpressed reviewers. Thanks certainly to Holmes Rolston for helpful comments. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement is simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. 28 target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of life together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots51) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocations at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.52 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is 51 52 For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) piactices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters' (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. 29 manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destructive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.55 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial humans are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies, without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.* 54 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings. ... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p.14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. 55 54 A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: . ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p. 15)! 30 REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. R. Attfield, The Ethics of Environmental Concern, Second edition, University of Georgia Press, Athens, 1991. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2, CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J.B. Callicott and R.T. Ames (eds), Nature in Asian Traditions of Thought, SUNY Press, Albany NY., 1989. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ ReVision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. R. Chisholm, The Foundations of Knowing, Harvester Press, Sussex, 1982. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, Topsoil and Civilization, Revised edition by V.G. Carter, University of Oklahama Press, Norman, 1974. A Dobson (ed.), Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. W. Fox, Towards a Transpersonal Ecology, Shambala, Boston, 1990. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bungendore, 1993. C. J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. R. Goodin, ‘Selling environmental indulgences’, Kyklos 47(1994) 573-596. N. R. Hanson, Patterns of discovery: an inquiry into conceptual foundations of science, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1958. E. C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. D Hillel, Out of the Earth: Civilization and the Life of the Soil., Free Press, Macmillan, 1991. M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. K. Marx, Grundrisse: Foundations of the critique of political economy, Harmondsworth, England 1973. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Routledge, London, 1991. A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature: Industrialism and Deep Ecology , SUNY Press, Albany N. Y., 1993. P. Marshall, Nature’s Web, in two editions, Simon and Schuster, 1992 and 1993. A. Naess and D. Rothenberg, Ecology, community and Lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1989. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974. D. Pearce and others, Blueprint for a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modem Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. 31 V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Mastery of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982; also, modified, in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, Brisbane, 1983; referred to as RP. C. O. Sauer, Agricultural Origins and Dispersal, American Geographical Society, New York, 1952. P. Singer, Practical Ethics, expanded edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. P. Shepard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994; referred to as GE. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. Y.F. Tuan, ‘Discrepancies between environmental attitude and behaviour: examples from Europe and China’, The Canadian Geographer 12(1968) 176-91. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. L. White Jr., ‘Historic roots of our ecologic crisis’, Science 155(1967) 1203-7. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis, Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1993; referred to as EP3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 15, item 1165: Paradigmatic roots on environmental problems Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. 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Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Lake George - Desk Pile 7 Box 15: Green Projects in Progress Lake George House Lake George House > Desk Pile 7 https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/adac1ea1e18dbc6bbd0afb6f54567c38.pdf 1f9efcf459d357d53c0fc4e0007d46a2 PDF Text Text �/Zr ? . —p ~r \? ^,rr C-dcOf' ’ Z/ <7 *" IT /r V *- / V-; *V / $ 7&L zz '//L Q^^^ziztix ’ / u/~ * Z ____________________________ _.__ __ i__ /LXiX^ caX /"&w€ < ��0 0 C2--7 > * # cJZZ ;/r<UL^ 7 /Uaf OL y^&J t^—-^ c / A. jfl-JZ- r^ Z< /& C^4 ydctu^ ■ /* ) ^o . t X Ifaj&S CZ--~~ f^.<..,r~.^ J* - t-*-—/'"ZO C'--' /Ah C cr^ %&x c + (J/U-'Z) So ^a, \.c^aQ^^-^- h -f^-. Al<^i & <c^e . /?7_7 ^Succx’ G f f C ’ ^lA y rw''-t/{-<-y ic^^> y i^~ re^td 7«Sc^ J Co-1 e-^--^ ) Z*! ff’zv-^- "f^ * — *—*. "fc-s £-?1'i cxj/ui&t^-r a-^f^~~ 0»c<ZJ-1 U-X-A *U \ i f-^ \ O/£ !~ -farf > /aVZ /(nJ/ ftc. 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Populations of Australia at 2040 under various assumptions as to population at 2000 and various growth rates. Population in Hypothesis as Population in millions at 2000 to growth rate millions at 2040 more \ likely) •' range /' 17-3 1.1% from 1970 26.8 17.8 1.2% from 1970 28.7 18.9 1.1% from 2000 29.2 18.9 1.2% from 2000 30.4 20.0 1.1% from 2000 30.9 20.0 1.2% from 2000 32.2 21.0 1.1% from 2000 32.5 21.0 1.2% from 2000 33.8 21.0 1.4% from 2000 36.6 22.0 1.7% from 2000 38.2 22.0 1.5% from 2000 39.6 22.4 1.87% from 2000 46.99 probable range �C C~ ^) ^co — fVX (f J) V /P' ~~ S^^C /1/^oa^ A X ex A . eu /^. C- t fdL <^2^^Z222 d^£ZZZ. *~^ <^tJO- Z^//9^ 7 s' ^y, J //t,i-rr-f (&df ) ■“?il/< ^' \<_2 TK / cz-v^ 4 - • ( Guy <k_-< Z'-X' —* t A'-r^ cr \ JQ v~<M ) W ' , 7 ����h t/Jo— i-v—^ f / 77 ! C ) 7 * —-z *- //7’Z. /£■ • Vr/(i7 .^r 6(Jo~-, Z<— /)L^i rMs. /?7/. X <sil<y/ t !A) ■ (aJ - * /?7 /f C tf btot . aJ 2-<~ LAtJ - -t)£^ < * ft /? 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H>^ .^-^t �Z>Z_-/_</j/'Z— . Zd~ *« /u^~^<-, ' Tl^ C^—zZ *-^ ?7vz) O£ . Z ‘5^ *-' 2) —- Z if-4/^. C<^V ZZtM—>«_LZZ«_J XZt-^Z-'Zt——»->—ZL /y/J<r 7/er ■Q 77 Crz> / * > z5 ?£> // r Al. 14 ■ ^C<Z>-x^ C Z-tLc /L-Z-Z-^ Z^->—^U<ZZ<^, //7 2- . % £■ <-4 -■-t>-<-^<-c-<^<—. J A /■Ic ly'.zr .Parf ^'7/. ., /-/ 2) 3 /??/. o^i>^ JLj/■■y �7. *3&-4 t-^/b (4J//y. £ * Oz ^Cff^4.7-t4-^ ? y ■ —>'— uJ^-j ^c/cXtJ yd^^x-. c^—cj'P <-4-4 7 / (./) - /3J~ CS^-C /??,). / &-O\^f &7 73 ><-C^ *Uy Z*/ . Z ^7 / . 6^7 -L- uJ^-7 — f"l— {)—&*<-. /■ '5, < £-4- ■ (J,3,^, /f73. �The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Dick Coutinho, Royal Vangorcum to Dr Richard Routley, Australian National University, 1974? re Routhley's manuscript on environmental ethics. (1 leaf) �u*^ •f-— Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? §1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environment, in Leopold's words 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ([1], p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, It is to this, to the values and evaluations moral objects. * of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral crit­ icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases,to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. 'A * A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits. �2 farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if other­ wise decent) a respected member of society.' ([1], p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad­ itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing of the argument. it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain * obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in * To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter­ minate . �3. Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ­ mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can * not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from substantial human interference, whether of �4. the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough­ going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be culti­ vated or otherwise used * for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was * If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature. �simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi­ tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ­ mental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall A new ethic is wanted. e As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between try to show. §2. a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster. * An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu­ ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights^what * A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions. �6. is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S| and S2 contain different principles then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair- ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of 4- A'/Z the modified dominance position:. A recent formulation * runs as follows ([3], p.58): 'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishesproviding (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism -because under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm * A related principle is that (modified) can operate within similar limits. t X /< > /Cy , .... r -r- free enterprise 'i- �others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient -hv being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others, 7/v It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon­ sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are �assessed over the class of ideal situations. (i) The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every The last man example. living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esot­ eric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild �9. animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv­ inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he �10. proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and product­ ivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this example to the industrial society example: looks rather like Civ) the society ours. The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the �11. blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruc­ tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ­ ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains- dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ­ mental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably * along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable - if ’r < that point has not already been passed. 7/7 / (U• ‘ In sum' class of permissible actions that /rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim­ ing that these people, those of the examples and respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? these people do is No, what to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a * For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3] . �13. /•~i'<'-^\,< /a. Z\z i>'"<’- • > Gf * —‘<-r ^~i ♦ <"- capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig­ ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic �14. morally, through obligations practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typ­ ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi­ ness, as a summum banum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule­ utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour, ive then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori­ zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing J �15. private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then "rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position.which has some vogue-obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill- disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them; that is (rough) justice. R. Routley Australian National University �REFERENCES [1] A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almenac with other essays on Conservation, [2] J. Passmore, New York (196 6) . Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). [3] P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). [4] S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Men and Morals. hon-humans, [5] Animals, An enquiry into the maltreatment of London (1971). H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). ����The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, S. I. Benn, Acting Head of Department of Philosophy to Dr. R. Rosenkrantz, Department of Philosophy, University of South Caroline, 6 Sep 1973 re fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences, supervised by Richard Routley. (3 pages) �A < wx ^S> eJ *-X (J J *~7f^ ^2 /^t)A / ' / �T L64'«-' *■■ J *e7^ 7' ** 44/ I { MorV 7^ c c *■/' /-X /_ ZMZL4ixO Z-/>< a>% , ... --------------- M-i-J ^1.___ /L (? k c 7 )------ 3o^> X^> £ i �Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? §1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environment, in Leopold’s words ’an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ([1], p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. such as Thus assertions Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, It is to this, to the values and evaluations moral oojects. * of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral crit­ icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases,to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. 'A * A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house * spirits. �2. fanner who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if other­ wise decent) a respected member of society.' ([1], p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad­ itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the fanner subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain * obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in * To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter­ minate . �3. Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature? a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant^ and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, ■ and tne co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ­ mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases, it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can­ not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved * rom substantial human interference, whether of �4. the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough­ going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be culti­ vated or otherwise used * for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright, h// The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was * If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature. �simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ­ mental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of(j[3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. §2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster. * An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu­ ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rightsr what * A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions. �6. is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2 contain different principles then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair­ ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent formulation * runs as follows ([3], p.58): K^> AACC C-aU tv/' i^/' of O'f speA SPcP yvxo &"( The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because jlfjA-aw itUU* under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a $4vM« *h bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a d(L<- tic. tic. Cl-IK Cl-ik i/Au*/ �7. others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in £my interests, because I detest you?, that you stop breathing « I- you are free to breathe , for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ’other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism • t. whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too ^1- -fL 3^ - WAa-Zm lullu rfy - Ah. I W-tc restrictive - <or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others, The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon­ sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are �8. assessed over the class of ideal situations. The last man example. (1) The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays . . --------.................................... I about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly i you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, ) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to eso values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving I badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking ‘r- l C-a values have shifted in an environ-nt.l direction h- ■ eric '°f -^responding shifts in the formulation fundamental evaluative principles). The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One const ers the last people in order to rule out the posslbt 1 y that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruit.u or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild 4 �v)O^ <? > J'" J fi. t(r JJj, /A h 9- ‘s, L . it ilr ll' ^onJk ^cU-i /6 U' , zcrta srS o/J oa­ animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various V, familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and KfalltL largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon bean ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform witlCthe^basic chauvinist principle, and as well with jltZ - /W's the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is foz‘ QC Ko^r‘ because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv­ 1 ft/qh'a»4. inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, b’J to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy^ 4^fV Vl to- A, (. ^,kJ ; 7 brovj^ rsuei jUj^^-° £o loot e^> K'oV«f^arjJ< (lii) ? But as_____________ the last people do not natural resources. --------------------------------------------- -------- —..... — xO°V ' ! J destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the the variant is still environmentallW^,^ best of reasons", inadequate. The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3) . The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant, S.sau<i */>'»' \ v#' rei complex of automated factories and farms which he - <r> I01" ’• I Z/ "11 *-)- LJ ° V / f O XI �10. proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. A Of coarse he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare CHvc since he much prefers increased output and product­ ka L■/ l^,(- if- A> p^i^ /? * ’ gUV* k' I */t^> pQ (J ivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western J ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonlyj'bovtW', thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this C^S/XU-i example to the industrial society example: looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. (, J X «< T 7/ vr u*fl ^4/ ’“fa *• TafeTT lQ w the society Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The J— ' blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of X his qualities as a private good, as a source of valu- able oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, 7 though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect rf the "C V '•S M 'n �11. blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruc— tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ­ ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plainsdwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible — at least according to basic chauvinism. L-iUl il~ Wk & But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ mental economics would; instead the market model will HL ui 7?I grind inexorably * along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable - if a n a 2^ o>^.‘ I, fisKis that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that Ola rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim­ ing that these people, those of the examples and respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a * For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [ 3 ] . �0 n ‘s ■UjK , i 111 „lth ... „„ r .=... .J- extending (2) to rnclu .,question were they placed in would be so affected by the action in It may be preferand (3) to exclude speciej&de. the environment in vieW of the way the freedom “J ab le, imply to scrap it altogether, and mate proof, s of rights and permissible conduct, as in a b classes theory sometimes forces changes §3 a radical change in a rejects the Reference in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which a modification of the Theory in a Reference Theory and usual -ta-tdef-eh^also^aeee Jat simllt pheno^nCseens to occur in the case of a neta- A somewhat s nxl P ethlc. Quite apart from ethl°de’“ several environmentally important notions, such as introducing several meta— n 4.4™ arowth and preservation, for mec» conservation, pollut^COTp^e-examinatlon I ethical analysis, an ,< of such characteristic(actions) as natural and modified analyses 3 of obligation and round of right, and of the relations right■ may well require re-assessment of permissibility to rights; it notions as value and right, espectraditional analyses of such on chauvinist assumptions; and it ially where these are based of the more prominent meta-ethical forces the rejection of many illustrated by a very brief exam­ positions. These points are then by a sketch of the ination of accounts of nature^ right an speciess bias of some major positions. * positions. to defeating conditions Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject doctrine of natural rights here irrelevant, the classical which are 'anv adult human ■.• to which, among other things, according are developed by those protesting about points are oevei p especially the essay s Some of these ltreatment of animals; see especial y human ma collected in [4] . �9 /z O /< A, °uf 13. a i, g>OT' ° >f 1 capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig­ ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect .. to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees^have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by partheists. since artefacts are not alive). But p^/theism is false For moral prohibitions forbidding certairTactions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., has a right also has responsibilities and thereat least , whatever____________ 'J fore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests, Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. r \fhO< * But persons can relate AT ***. A- */Z /» A '^s" fa . ... 8(^ �14. morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typ­ ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi­ ness, as a summum bgnum; characteristically each individual of soine base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule­ utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to The species bias is transparent from the the collective ranking. selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, ive then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori­ zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing * �b'v d(k^ V10'" hU •x'5 5 15. oP , X» private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to kr^ow that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then "rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of .the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some vogue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill- disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is R. Routley (rough) justice. Australian National University �REFERENCES [1] A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almenac with other essays on Conservation, New York (1966) . [2] J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). [3] P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Environmental Decay. New York (1972). [4] The Solution becomes the Problem, S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Men and Morals. hon-humans, [5] Economic Growth and H.L.A. Hart, An enquiry into the maltreatment of London (1971) . 'Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Oxford (1967). Animals, Political Philosophy, �The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, Of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that-the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then “rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi­ sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not aione in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some vigue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is (rough) justice. / REFERENCES 1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966). 2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). 3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). 4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans, London (1971). 5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). �§ 3. A radical change in a teory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen­ tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation,for meta-ethical analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as XT value and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec­ tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some * 6 major positions.7 A Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human . . . capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes * the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a farzfrom straight forward matter now that human rights with' respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in­ terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. H Some of these points are developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays collected in [4] �/§ 2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S 3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature 4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in­ cludes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2contain different principles, then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin­ ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) — in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent for­ mulation5 runs as follows ( [31, p. 58): ’The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.’ Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restric­ tion is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being t anywav, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ‘other’ may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism whethe^ ‘other’ expands to ‘other human’ - which is too restrictive - or to ‘other’person’ or to ‘other’seritient being’; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and in­ versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely un­ workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations * (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. (i) The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit­ ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra­ dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where peonle arrive at a new planet and 5 A related principle is that (modified) free enterprise can operate v. ithin similar limits �destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en­ vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck­ ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co­ operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex­ ample to the Industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic­ ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up­ set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun­ ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalep to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en­ vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in­ dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac­ tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain­ ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory 6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3] freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be preferable, in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights. �CJ\^<. & ’ �§ 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people’s relations to the natural environ­ ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe’s actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex­ ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a 1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits - To the consternation modoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeterminate 205 �single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin­ ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserv­ ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com­ fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that wiil deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for human ends, “humanized”. As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump­ tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi­ tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa­ tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Notes, Correspondences and Marginalia Description An account of the resource In one obituary, Sylvan's handwriting was said to have "looked like the oscilloscope for a patient in intensive care", and thus "not for the timid". Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. 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Populations of Australia at 2040 under various assumptions as to population at 2000 and various growth rates. Population in Hypothesis as Population in millions at 2000 to growth rate millions at 2040 more \ likely) •' range /' 17-3 1.1% from 1970 26.8 17.8 1.2% from 1970 28.7 18.9 1.1% from 2000 29.2 18.9 1.2% from 2000 30.4 20.0 1.1% from 2000 30.9 20.0 1.2% from 2000 32.2 21.0 1.1% from 2000 32.5 21.0 1.2% from 2000 33.8 21.0 1.4% from 2000 36.6 22.0 1.7% from 2000 38.2 22.0 1.5% from 2000 39.6 22.4 1.87% from 2000 46.99 probable range C C~ ^) ^co — fVX (f J) V /P' ~~ S^^C /1/^oa^ A X ex A . eu /^. C- t fdL <^2^^Z222 d^£ZZZ. *~^ <^tJO- Z^//9^ 7 s' ^y, J //t,i-rr-f (&df ) ■“?il/< ^' \<_2 TK / cz-v^ 4 - • ( Guy <k_-< Z'-X' —* t A'-r^ cr \ JQ v~<M ) W ' , 7 h t/Jo— i-v—^ f / 77 ! C ) 7 * —-z *- //7’Z. /£■ • Vr/(i7 .^r 6(Jo~-, Z<— /)L^i rMs. /?7/. X <sil<y/ t !A) ■ (aJ - * /?7 /f C tf btot . aJ 2-<~ LAtJ - -t)£^ < * ft /? 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H>^ .^-^t Z>Z_-/_</j/'Z— . Zd~ *« /u^~^<-, ' Tl^ C^—zZ *-^ ?7vz) O£ . Z ‘5^ *-' 2) —- Z if-4/^. C<^V ZZtM—>«_LZZ«_J XZt-^Z-'Zt——»->—ZL /y/J<r 7/er ■Q 77 Crz> / * > z5 ?£> // r Al. 14 ■ ^C<Z>-x^ C Z-tLc /L-Z-Z-^ Z^->—^U<ZZ<^, //7 2- . % £■ <-4 -■-t>-<-^<-c-<^<—. J A /■Ic ly'.zr .Parf ^'7/. ., /-/ 2) 3 /??/. o^i>^ JLj/■■y 7. *3&-4 t-^/b (4J//y. £ * Oz ^Cff^4.7-t4-^ ? y ■ —>'— uJ^-j ^c/cXtJ yd^^x-. c^—cj'P <-4-4 7 / (./) - /3J~ CS^-C /??,). / &-O\^f &7 73 ><-C^ *Uy Z*/ . Z ^7 / . 6^7 -L- uJ^-7 — f"l— {)—&*<-. /■ '5, < £-4- ■ (J,3,^, /f73. The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, Dick Coutinho, Royal Vangorcum to Dr Richard Routley, Australian National University, 1974? re Routhley's manuscript on environmental ethics. (1 leaf) u*^ •f-— Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? §1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environment, in Leopold's words 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ([1], p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as 'Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, It is to this, to the values and evaluations moral objects. * of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral crit­ icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases,to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. 'A * A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits. 2 farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if other­ wise decent) a respected member of society.' ([1], p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad­ itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing of the argument. it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain * obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in * To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter­ minate . 3. Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ­ mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can * not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from substantial human interference, whether of 4. the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough­ going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be culti­ vated or otherwise used * for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was * If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature. simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi­ tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ­ mental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall A new ethic is wanted. e As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between try to show. §2. a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster. * An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu­ ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights^what * A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions. 6. is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S| and S2 contain different principles then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair- ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of 4- A'/Z the modified dominance position:. A recent formulation * runs as follows ([3], p.58): 'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishesproviding (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism -because under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm * A related principle is that (modified) can operate within similar limits. t X /< > /Cy , .... r -r- free enterprise 'i- others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient -hv being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others, 7/v It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon­ sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. (i) The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every The last man example. living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esot­ eric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild 9. animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv­ inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he 10. proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and product­ ivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this example to the industrial society example: looks rather like Civ) the society ours. The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the 11. blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruc­ tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ­ ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains- dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible - at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ­ mental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably * along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable - if ’r < that point has not already been passed. 7/7 / (U• ‘ In sum' class of permissible actions that /rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim­ ing that these people, those of the examples and respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? these people do is No, what to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a * For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3] . 13. /•~i'<'-^\,< /a. Z\z i>'"<’- • > Gf * —‘<-r ^~i ♦ <"- capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig­ ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic 14. morally, through obligations practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typ­ ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi­ ness, as a summum banum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule­ utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes' behaviour, ive then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori­ zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing J 15. private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then "rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position.which has some vogue-obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill- disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them; that is (rough) justice. R. Routley Australian National University REFERENCES [1] A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almenac with other essays on Conservation, [2] J. Passmore, New York (196 6) . Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). [3] P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). [4] S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Men and Morals. hon-humans, [5] Animals, An enquiry into the maltreatment of London (1971). H.L.A. Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). The following has been redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Letter, S. I. Benn, Acting Head of Department of Philosophy to Dr. R. Rosenkrantz, Department of Philosophy, University of South Caroline, 6 Sep 1973 re fellowship at the Research School of Social Sciences, supervised by Richard Routley. (3 pages) A < wx ^S> eJ *-X (J J *~7f^ ^2 /^t)A / ' / T L64'«-' *■■ J *e7^ 7' ** 44/ I { MorV 7^ c c *■/' /-X /_ ZMZL4ixO Z-/>< a>% , ... --------------- M-i-J ^1.___ /L (? k c 7 )------ 3o^> X^> £ i Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic? §1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environment, in Leopold’s words ’an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' ([1], p.238). It is not of course that old and prevailing ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. such as Thus assertions Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees' are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, It is to this, to the values and evaluations moral oojects. * of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take exception. Leopold regards as subject to moral crit­ icism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases,to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. 'A * A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house * spirits. 2. fanner who clears the woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if other­ wise decent) a respected member of society.' ([1], p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such trad­ itionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the fanner subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriously, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain * obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension or modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn't a single ethical system uniquely assumed in * To the consternation no doubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeter­ minate . 3. Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature? a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant^ and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, ■ and tne co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environ­ mental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases, it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic can­ not be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved * rom substantial human interference, whether of 4. the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is to develop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thorough­ going environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use, implying that every natural area should be culti­ vated or otherwise used * for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright, h// The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was * If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature. simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified posi tion can undoubtedly go much further towards an environ­ mental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of(j[3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nonetheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. §2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster. * An ethical system S is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evalu­ ative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rightsr what * A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions. 6. is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2 contain different principles then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fair­ ness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent formulation * runs as follows ([3], p.58): K^> AACC C-aU tv/' i^/' of O'f speA SPcP yvxo &"( The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because jlfjA-aw itUU* under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a $4vM« *h bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a d(L<- tic. tic. Cl-IK Cl-ik i/Au*/ 7. others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in £my interests, because I detest you?, that you stop breathing « I- you are free to breathe , for the time being anyway, because it does not harm me There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ’other' may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism • t. whether 'other' expands to 'other human' - which is too ^1- -fL 3^ - WAa-Zm lullu rfy - Ah. I W-tc restrictive - <or to 'other person' or to 'other sentient being'; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others, The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations (which may be incomplete or even incon­ sistent) , so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are 8. assessed over the class of ideal situations. The last man example. (1) The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays . . --------.................................... I about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly i you like, as at the best abattoirs) . What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, ) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to eso values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving I badly (the reason being perhaps that radical thinking ‘r- l C-a values have shifted in an environ-nt.l direction h- ■ eric '°f -^responding shifts in the formulation fundamental evaluative principles). The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One const ers the last people in order to rule out the posslbt 1 y that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and destroy its ecosystems whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruit.u or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild 4 v)O^ <? > J'" J fi. t(r JJj, /A h 9- ‘s, L . it ilr ll' ^onJk ^cU-i /6 U' , zcrta srS o/J oa­ animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various V, familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and KfalltL largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon bean ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform witlCthe^basic chauvinist principle, and as well with jltZ - /W's the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is foz‘ QC Ko^r‘ because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauv­ 1 ft/qh'a»4. inism may conflict with stewardship or co-operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, b’J to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy^ 4^fV Vl to- A, (. ^,kJ ; 7 brovj^ rsuei jUj^^-° £o loot e^> K'oV«f^arjJ< (lii) ? But as_____________ the last people do not natural resources. --------------------------------------------- -------- —..... — xO°V ' ! J destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the the variant is still environmentallW^,^ best of reasons", inadequate. The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3) . The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant, S.sau<i */>'»' \ v#' rei complex of automated factories and farms which he - <r> I01" ’• I Z/ "11 *-)- LJ ° V / f O XI 10. proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. A Of coarse he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare CHvc since he much prefers increased output and product­ ka L■/ l^,(- if- A> p^i^ /? * ’ gUV* k' I */t^> pQ (J ivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western J ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonlyj'bovtW', thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off". Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this C^S/XU-i example to the industrial society example: looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. (, J X «< T 7/ vr u*fl ^4/ ’“fa *• TafeTT lQ w the society Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The J— ' blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of X his qualities as a private good, as a source of valu- able oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, 7 though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect rf the "C V '•S M 'n 11. blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruc— tion of its habitat by man's activity or the activ­ ities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plainsdwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible — at least according to basic chauvinism. L-iUl il~ Wk & But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalers to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environ mental economics would; instead the market model will HL ui 7?I grind inexorably * along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable - if a n a 2^ o>^.‘ I, fisKis that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that Ola rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claim­ ing that these people, those of the examples and respected industrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a * For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [ 3 ] . 0 n ‘s ■UjK , i 111 „lth ... „„ r .=... .J- extending (2) to rnclu .,question were they placed in would be so affected by the action in It may be preferand (3) to exclude speciej&de. the environment in vieW of the way the freedom “J ab le, imply to scrap it altogether, and mate proof, s of rights and permissible conduct, as in a b classes theory sometimes forces changes §3 a radical change in a rejects the Reference in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which a modification of the Theory in a Reference Theory and usual -ta-tdef-eh^also^aeee Jat simllt pheno^nCseens to occur in the case of a neta- A somewhat s nxl P ethlc. Quite apart from ethl°de’“ several environmentally important notions, such as introducing several meta— n 4.4™ arowth and preservation, for mec» conservation, pollut^COTp^e-examinatlon I ethical analysis, an ,< of such characteristic(actions) as natural and modified analyses 3 of obligation and round of right, and of the relations right■ may well require re-assessment of permissibility to rights; it notions as value and right, espectraditional analyses of such on chauvinist assumptions; and it ially where these are based of the more prominent meta-ethical forces the rejection of many illustrated by a very brief exam­ positions. These points are then by a sketch of the ination of accounts of nature^ right an speciess bias of some major positions. * positions. to defeating conditions Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject doctrine of natural rights here irrelevant, the classical which are 'anv adult human ■.• to which, among other things, according are developed by those protesting about points are oevei p especially the essay s Some of these ltreatment of animals; see especial y human ma collected in [4] . 9 /z O /< A, °uf 13. a i, g>OT' ° >f 1 capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no oblig­ ation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect .. to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees^have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by partheists. since artefacts are not alive). But p^/theism is false For moral prohibitions forbidding certairTactions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., has a right also has responsibilities and thereat least , whatever____________ 'J fore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests, Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. r \fhO< * But persons can relate AT ***. A- */Z /» A '^s" fa . ... 8(^ 14. morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typ­ ically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happi­ ness, as a summum bgnum; characteristically each individual of soine base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual p rankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule­ utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to The species bias is transparent from the the collective ranking. selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism; namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, ive then by the Pareto ranking test the collect/ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (hori­ zontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing * b'v d(k^ V10'" hU •x'5 5 15. oP , X» private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to kr^ow that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then "rational" economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on television. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of .the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some vogue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill- disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is R. Routley (rough) justice. Australian National University REFERENCES [1] A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almenac with other essays on Conservation, New York (1966) . [2] J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). [3] P.W. Barkley and D.W. Seckier, Environmental Decay. New York (1972). [4] The Solution becomes the Problem, S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Men and Morals. hon-humans, [5] Economic Growth and H.L.A. Hart, An enquiry into the maltreatment of London (1971) . 'Are there any natural rights?', reprinted in A. Quinton (editor), Oxford (1967). Animals, Political Philosophy, The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, Of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that-the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then “rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi­ sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not aione in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some vigue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is (rough) justice. / REFERENCES 1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966). 2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). 3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). 4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans, London (1971). 5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). § 3. A radical change in a teory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen­ tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation,for meta-ethical analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as XT value and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec­ tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some * 6 major positions.7 A Hart (in [5]) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human . . . capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes * the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a farzfrom straight forward matter now that human rights with' respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in­ terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. H Some of these points are developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays collected in [4] /§ 2. As we noticed (an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S 3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature 4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions is, near enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in­ cludes (like individuals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong, of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems Sj and S2contain different principles, then they are different systems. It follows that any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin­ ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) — in which case if an environmental ethic is needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is commonly assumed that there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, is the commonly formulated liberal principle of the modified dominance position. A recent for­ mulation5 runs as follows ( [31, p. 58): ’The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.’ Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people, come first and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives permission to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restric­ tion is narrower than a restriction to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being t anywav, because it does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the principle is so far obscure because ‘other’ may be filled out in significantly different ways: it makes a difference to the extent, and privilege, of the chauvinism whethe^ ‘other’ expands to ‘other human’ - which is too restrictive - or to ‘other’person’ or to ‘other’seritient being’; and it makes a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and in­ versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, and whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely un­ workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. It is taken for granted in designing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations * (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. (i) The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to basic chauvinism, but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit­ ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra­ dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where peonle arrive at a new planet and 5 A related principle is that (modified) free enterprise can operate v. ithin similar limits destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en­ vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck­ ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co­ operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex­ ample to the Industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic­ ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up­ set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun­ ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whalep to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en­ vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in­ dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac­ tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain­ ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory 6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [3] freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be preferable, in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights. CJ\^<. & ’ § 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people’s relations to the natural environ­ ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe’s actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex­ ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a 1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits - To the consternation modoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeterminate 205 single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin­ ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserv­ ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com­ fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that wiil deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for human ends, “humanized”. As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump­ tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi­ tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa­ tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 15, Item 1720: Papers and notes on environmental theory, ethics, preference and economics Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 15, Item 1720 Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:857e1c6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:857e1c6</a> Description An account of the resource Letters redacted from access file (PDF) due to copyright restrictions. Title in collection finding aid: Manilla Folder - Environmental Theory /1) Ethics 2) preference 3) economics - papers. and notes RS & VP + others Subject The topic of the resource Typescripts and handwritten notes. Includes 2 draft copies of 'Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?' by Sylvan, with handwritten emendations and annotations; and 2 letters. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [75] leaves. 57.42 MB. Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University Office - Second Bookcase - Third Shelf - Second Pile Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Third Shelf > Second Pile Box 15: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/1a6f9df968598ef8d62edae0aa4919b3.pdf 14219e5a05ca328939e6d5788eb441bf PDF Text Text IS THERE A NEED FOR A NEW, AN ENVIRONMENTAL, ETHIC? Richard Routley (Australia) § 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environ­ ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' (| 1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex­ ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself-explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the woods ofTa 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ (UJ), p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a 1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits 2 To the consternation nodoubt of Quineans But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeterminate 205 �single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilisation: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin­ ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [21) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfcctor. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be preserv­ ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com­ fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man’s proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature — all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for human ends, “humanized”. As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump­ tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi­ tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa­ tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. 2. -A^ we noticed-(an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S 3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature 4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions 206 �'^"es - a( SeS’a,Pr0pos^r th«>ry whlch in. is, near enough, a proposit1or ., ~"f'm (1.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in--.:ludes ( like individuals of a th• . a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set ° of general or to‘other he^er conduct. to verselytypically to its of thers obligatory, or isonf ? applypermissible n’ untableand wrong, what concern,n~ evaluativeOnjudgements of what are rights, what is valued, and !>O forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S, and S2 contain _different principles, then they are different systems. It follows that any en\llnnmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethic5 lifTer from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then ,hese systems differ from the Western super ethic (assurring, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed t!ien a new ethic is wanted It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental count,·r examples to 1t. It 1s commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems. principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Ruk I w ,des one example. Directly relevant here. as a good stab at a core principle. is the com111unli, formulated liberal principle 0f the moqified flominan"-,~siti on..A recent for-""•..._ ,/c,.,.M,....,,, ~ lo/,'/ mulation~ runs a, follows ( 131, p. 58}: 'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing ( I) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not hkel 1 to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this prmciple basic (/Funan) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people, come fir~t and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives perm1ss10n to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is wortti remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a rc,tnction tu the I usual) interests of others; it is not enough that 1t is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being anywa~ because 1t does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to e~actly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the pnnciple is so far obscure because 'other' ma~ be filled out in significantly diffen:nt 11, ays. it makes a difference to the e,itent, and pri, ilege, of the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to ·other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other'peradequacy toCthe a ^t being'; and fnd uture k to 'other'sentient s^ed other as well thaut^ atter s it wmakes °u'd o nn re °difference "°w and^t °mpletel y “n-of the principle, and inson'it or versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to Wor kable, Th^ atake future "ymakethe as count t0 others, Co m°St whether to P to remote future others or only to non-discountable present aspato asis well future e. whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unand others, future It ysK" ^nled in des<gning anaJ ). "ple ™' last m,„ « u,,, ,k 1 -1/.'l;· nr semantical workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. ,( ., ■ „di examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a It is taken for granted in designing counter ·~ .....-<;,_ semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations , ... ~#... ideal some in (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds situation, what is obligatory in every id.:al situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the mam point to grasp for the counter example\ that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. -(i) The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as a• the best abattoirs). What he doc~ 1s quite permissible according to ba 1c chauvinism, but on environmental ground~ what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values to regard Mr Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that raof corresponding in' advance dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental usurne direction ’’ ^""oplos shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles}. (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rul!! out «rcorre p„ that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. the spossibility Otherwise one could as well 1..ons1der science fiction cases where peoole arrive at a new planet and »™ ^“xxi™r <"■■— ^.^ ^ sssh ss ±“ ™.™««. oS «’Srr "”'be “ ” “c,v A ™88eZ™1£„XXe°' rw S,SCUre ss?wX".“ . ,.. ___ X;»,XyrXt“ber ® S “ xxr •' xe xz^x z “:zz:::?“~ssss fgs 5 A related principle is that (m d11ieJ •,.., •.,r.i ..,, »c can operate "ith,n similar limits 207 207 WIMI iWlliMMW-l-i �destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en­ vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck­ ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co­ operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex­ ample to the industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic­ ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up­ set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist: nor need whale hun­ ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whale^ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable—if that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en­ vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way ? No. what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain­ ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory 6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in 131 �2^°;™ pn"c,p e ls 3 morc d,flku11 matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude speciepide. It may be preferable, m view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights. rei2tsArhadRaJ change-ri" a ^eory some,,mcs forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which jects the Reference Theory tn 4 thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen­ tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation, for meta-ethical analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and per­ missibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as \alue and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec­ tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a verv brie! examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some major positions,7 Hart (in |5|) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human ... capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in­ terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. r J The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typica ly employ a single criterion p. such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of afTairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing P°’ntS arC deVdOped by thOSC protcstin« about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays �testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then ‘‘rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi­ sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the ~^^base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some * v^gue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is (rough) justice. REFERENCES 1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966). 2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). 3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). 4. S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans, London (1971). 5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). �for < MC. fyjfot'''? ■tu / �v x .. 5^ ' A - ■. �3 7 • ... , ■ '-■ “"■'T �“"7— , O' .. / ... . t ■ �- _____ 5 11 I * �b. ■-^ ' ■ 1 ■■ ■:.,' ?• f ■ ■ '■ ■ \ • < ■- ■> ■ '■ ...:■■ ■■■ ■- k ..... £ • tOx ' A . ' ’ . ' -. . ........... ........ '■' •■■ ' - ■ ,. ; 1 L ___ SL&L___ ___------------------------------------- r.._ Ao ..... . ' ■ r - \ v * . . , ' ' ' . ... . ' . .■ . , '. - ■ A * O ' ' . ' , ' . . , , f . iK 4**«^ £' . ' •) ■ ; ‘ ' ' ' ' &-A. */- “S A r* - f’ ,Z ■ .. ��t u< lzJ*C C<& 'Co h* zLzx^ X CXA-a. 'tel Aj .. ‘ X .’ ■tzO .. i ’ ' \ u<J-A^LA ,. z^i*" V^o*4^ -^- -Oi--\z> f ■ ' ■ ti i .— 4 a. - ' ■v tO-- \. u> (.<■ •'■ * Z fi fl £/\-'-X n ’ ‘ ' UaJ-A^La I cJ <-X j <A 03 v. 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C-*^-y^'A-'» Co £^4-2- Z-CC V1" ZX) v^<.^J>rC r-O\ i^j-Ca. U-v_ ^V*-4^'r-^A~^-> A>U jXK ^-^-^jl _pL v^x-'JxClLa^ A—>—v<_ -*~-<_>JLv. .'CvAz^ £O^ AXzv^A. ♦ < — c+^ “/JU. “T^Gl 'Ao*- 0 -" —A^* <A*^Cg ^L xX*^ULt—□ iGs^G^ /i<>‘-*-c. '-C»— Ca^ a^Ll I VAaA >>An^ '-O-Qa*~t__ 4 > "^“*~^> V-'JK—A.'^C. Xg.^u^j c Ou%**j "’0^^ 55T *-<a ^~L ^to £)La-a?< H- G>' rG A? ^AQst^.... yO<*-w»»A . QkJLLl . Go^^-a^AA. ..... l^x>— !jC l*Jc — . .... ^n*w^^v&A. Va.^ cG*-? L& -^ >-***- u> C-tfktA^. _. -XSL( o-G_lX %^?yr r <j2^ z>tnC/X**-vjtX '***"■ z/V\z^^Ax ^*-*-^ £ -c<X *V~>~ ^wK>-‘\SwjLX Cczl XJbu-t A'>>~“ _ 'Yvv\U~’J—V (V^Ffr s r * /^v—4-V3 ^>r<. 1^'-*-* , "to _ 0a>-< 3> ^>i~x “ \> ■ k>*- -a^Xaa -•■• (k.c>^\ f //-V . ' / . <r" U<_ , !0'-^C_. <\b*-GA^x^ fiLMs-ut. p- -G— "**{1^-5 Cysut, >—oKxi^t k Tg ^^cJUc I x-v| , �■ IS THERE A NEED FOR A NEW, AN ENVIRONMENTAL, ETHIC? Richard Routley (Australia) § 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environ­ ment, in Leopold's words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex­ ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a 1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits 2 To the consternation .nodoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeterminate 205 �is, near enough: ~ propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes ( like md1v1duals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative Ju~gements co~cermng conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong of_ what ~re rights, what _is valued, and so forth. A ~eneral or lawlike proposition of a system is ~ prmc1ple, and certainly 1f syst~ms S, and S2 contam different principles, then they are different systems. It foll?ws t~at any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreo~er 1f environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded m Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming wh~t _seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environm~ntai eth1_c 1s needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is com_monly assu_med that_ there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical ~ystems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed ~n the Golden Rule provides o~e example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, ts the . commonly formulated hberal pnnc1ple of the modified dominance position .. A recent for: · " • "'• ,;, /'' /,'. / ~·- - ·· ..._ mulation 5 runs as follows ( [ 3 I, p. 58): . 'The liberal philosophy of the Wes tern world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, prov1dmg ( 1) that he d0es not harm orhers and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people. co_me_ first and everyt_hmg else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom pnnc1ple becaus~ 1t gives perm1ss1on to perform a wide range of actions (including actio.ns which mess_ up the ~nv1ronment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to c_unn_mgly shift the onus of pro?fto others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restrict10n 1s narrower than a restnct1on to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my mterests, because. I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because 1t does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or mter_ference. Mor~over the width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may be fill~d. out m s1gmficantly different ways: it makes a difference to the e~tent, and privilege, of the cha~vm1s~ whe~her '.other' _ex~ands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other'person or to _other sent1~nt be1~g ; and 1t mak~s a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic apphcab1hty, to which class of others it is intended to apply whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, a?d. whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and 1t 1s generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. ' //4-_ ItIt_ is taken for granted. in_ d_e_signing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a ....,. /..~..., . ( sem_antical analysis of perm1ss1b1hty and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations r.,.·-=-"'t.. :.;1 -c.: , · ~/:_ (".~-htch may be mcon:iplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal ideal every in s1tuat10n, what 1s obl_1gato_ry in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded ~1tuat10n. But the_mam pomt to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles · t· 1f correct are umversal and are assessed over the class of I·deal s1tua ions. (') Th z collapse of the world system the 1 _survi~ing perso~) (or man e as_t ma~ e~a~ple. The last lays ~bout him, ehmmatmg, ~s far as he can, e~ery !tvmg th_mg, animal or plant (but painlessly if iou hke, a~ at the best abattoirs). What he does 1s qmte permissible according to basic chauvinism ut on envir?nmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit~ ~~d \o e~ot~nc values to regard M'.. Las_t Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra~cfa th mkmg a nd val~es have shifted m an environmental direction in advance of corresponding s .. 1 ts m the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (u) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects h_a~~ blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out ~e pos~1b1hty that what these pe~ple d~ harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. therwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from substantial human interference, whether of the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-Europea n small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a 3 principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforwa rd; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is riot always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for m~ny thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. a ~pecific ethic, /§ 2. -As. we noticed----(a~ ethic is ambi~uous, as bet_ween a specifi~ ethical system, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S ./ 3 If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use p1 inciple is tied to the resource view of nature 4-A meta-elhic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions 5 A related principle is that (modified) free c.1tcrprise can operate I il 11 ,·thi'n s· -1 1- • 1m1 ar 1m11s 207 �destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild ar,imal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all ~emaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined ·by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or cooperation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving outpJt to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since h~ much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off'. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this example to the industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man's activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The l?ehaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accqrdingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whal~[~ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental econo_mics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment _is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respe~ted industrialists fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of ;he sort described, in a morally impermissible way~ No, what these people do _is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For exampl_e, mso~ar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an mdustnal development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is _the slau~hter of the last_ remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvm1sm as a satisfactory 6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [31 freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be preferable , in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof. simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct. as in a bill of rights. § 3. A radical change in a {eory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmentally important notions, such as conservation, pollu1io11, growth and presen•atio11,for meta-ethical analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such characteristic actions as na1ural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights: it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as i-alue and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejection o [ many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some major positions. 7 Hart (in I 5]) accepts. subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which. among other things, 'any adult human . .. capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an em iron mental ethic rt::jects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the deflni1io11 of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right. a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with rcspc:ct to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that lon g ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees have rights (though such a view is occa~ionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right n_ot to _be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests . Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights. and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth. to practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summ.um_ bonu_m; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps mcludmg future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, 6f the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either_ ~ire~tl~, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, asin rule-ut1lttanantsm, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embr~ce persons. or even some animals (at the cost. like that of including remotely future humans, of losing 1 Some of thes< points arc developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays collec!ed in I 4 I 9 ~ iii 208 WJ 6 14 209 �testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then “rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi­ sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the _base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some v v^gue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is (rough) justice. REFERENCES 1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966). 2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). 3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). 4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), A nimals, Men and Morals. 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UgsTma ku-w-tins C^vZ i4! o Act rGJ < Cg/- z/^/zj Aa c't'wJ #4^ (Xi h i i"u^i'u Lt-1 /zo Zte^ > 0- i . ■X c- a-rt-fW^ have. o^e- �7 �er o ’e £ PC- �1 in nmUCh at ,eaSt aS CrUSOe'S w-th —2£S^2SS SS=S=E-lg=:==ES maltreat the land, extract frontU>2 *"* 3 W,'dcrness',f taken to tnterfere with and does not rouse the moral indtgnL^n ofThey ’ C°ndUCt ” not Z^eyyero/ woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows intn rh»> •he „«k. „ SIi„ (ir otherwise dccenl) farmer who clears the <f^^- s a- z. // / A * /7~. z^r&sz A, / ' Z - — ^z4— C ��» Ci s t2"* 7^ ji /<t^/ <- f /'t ^ ~C ' f' /~ e^ttcfuc^ / /^b. f 0 /•> | it is none loo clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or al all well worked out. so that the application of identity criteria foi ethics may remain obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical sy stems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christen ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two,.other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethicszor that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the /?<rf fff /> (Het-//'s-j Ilk > Ct at— single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on ckd«°T^a *ssues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin S’ T. ? nCW e^h‘C and Prevai,ln8 ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity that prevathng ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. - r. . jM40/ Indeed Passmore (in |2|) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.-31 ' j i 7) el'f'r/rel-x rC-~ r* �A. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic^— Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removeej, eg. vv/zo is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with a ^environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be presen ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man’s proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect galiye - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being ^usefulness for.human purposes: while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources./ '7Zu^ /fate- c.C^( 4c~S~ £^7 7c/<*-/'- /rw*. e-1 Cr*..s~y 7 7 , J - cvalua,,^. of an environmental ethic.oXs" coter^^ A t !(^ ; ^,l(he1SStmECXPa!’U"’g P?pula,ions eon,'^d ‘0 finite Indeeo these lesser traditions lead to what a thomnpho’ ‘dr‘”"lg anJ utl,izing ofall natural areas principle of total use,imping that every r-turJl X m ^v,ronmental othic would reject, a human ends, “humanized” ' area shou,d be ^‘^ted or otherw.se used 3 f v 3 rr • H use is extended, somewhat illicitly, to inciud. as regards its actual eftects. Note that the toU’ e •eSiCrVat‘<>n; thiS tOtal USe Princ‘P|c is rendered mocuous al least <»e pr , pie is tied to the resource view of nature , �such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or’romantic, would be new aljigjiu The matter is r straightforward: for the dominant.ethic has been substantial!v uuaiitle^y the n&er that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically int^Tes \0tn peers'. 7 > proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the Goiyuuterference assump­ tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position: and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further '* towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which, destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [31) that blends with the modified position; /hcrt/t f'cd c-Z^x . may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I ^vall A new ethic is wanted, aoh/ 1, /T-- < zfre^e^ 7y 7> j7**u\ �5 /g^7rc> e*- /5> g Zte-Z*-^ a-rfCsC , 'sCett /J /tr ! t>7 f rCL , ioG-j . c s f~CT /fc. /•J2 crt-cc^ a m 7 7/ s e fJ Ifc,'-* 7 ■ is, near‘enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in dudes (like individuals of a theory > a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligators permissible and wrong.'x* ! of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a \ principle; and certamlv if systems S, and S2contain different principles, then they are different systems. It follows that anv en onmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principlaJL embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming. I what seems to be so. that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic /s needed then a new- ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environ mental counter examples to it z , /3^'f> Ji^f^ yt �i« * Q-. V '5'" 7/ / Z/t-y -y ZLo c^-T V / C o-~f^ e o—•. /K^~ . are' w^at amount to, core principles of Western ethicaSR ? 1 7 accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed ' m the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core^&iple ' is the commonly formulated liberal principle ' / * ...2>^-.Yjr7 , /fol; >ws ( j 3J. p. 58): (D). The liberal philosophy of (he Western world holds that one should be able to d< □ what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm .himself jrreparablv.' ■ "Wf® /Ac7 7^— /zxc principle because it e.ves permission m st. some,im« the principle is haded as a freedom SESSSSSsasyr??”- •A?x chauvinism whether ‘other’ expands io ‘other h "* ' ■’ ' Ten' '° lhe c*Ient- antl Pn' 'lege, of the son* or toother sentient be.nXnd t makes aX" wh,chu’s t0° r^<ttive or Mother per verselj to its economic applicability to whieh I LrenrCe l.° the ar,e4uacy of the principle, and in future as well as present other" whether to r '55 ,° r°therS “? t0 ‘ w,lcther to future others, and whether to possible others Th -Th utur<J othefs or onl-v t0 non-discountable V and it is generally c /wf- e \ ��c) fff)Ct^ &J C'C. X ) 1. CAu^f ' b- / ^U4r<fc C 7 *4 & S f/'t J &&&!&&— ?£*~ ^KBMCfc. a/ fiU €t y^ < r- cC 7 ^C/>< Z__i___ �* sC I y/L j (ft) f . } /a fC*2— z’vz/XLt,/ /XL x« /'c-^ anaivjfe of permissibility; £ 7 Zcz2—z obhgatio/falementsjstretc^. out over ideal mInations• (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some idefl^fe situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal ' ■ situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. ZSl ezn^Tfez- />?> b /> C&7 rr cX? eef ff (i) ’ The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system Zo eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to f/)) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover pne d^gsjtot have to Ke commit ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly, (the reason l^eing^crhapsthatra dica! thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles)./^ f /U, Corf MG /<€ C ifZ (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be . to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and ft}) �destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, " and all remaining forests disappear in favour ofpatfuM or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en­ vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; £ qfXL/ }r ex/ s* e< 9 they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck­ ed place. But this conduct may conform with the ’ CCW (£>) Ccf'tC I ^cZ /y //I- /IZPCC-X c'LjruZ^ ~Z / / s/y i ■ jr.ru effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons’", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better ofT’. 7 /<L. , /tMVbcr^r, Z^> /7^ cx-yr .1 , C< /ctj'/ //’fr ) 7(3 /&- cL C ^^T- �77 toe-^ g rXl-rr^ ^/y) <L c7t Qr<g,*y/i/& , M zrzreX e*i SKfX&d ft C^ g<c /&- ^<XaY£- 77 ^1 4rc7jW4— ) f re/nctd lb— /f ... --*^g*._ K on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue w'hale example are provided by cases where a speues is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whale$ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics I would; instead the market r ynuX InGswkblj C/bf £?3 ) tr^Cjec(j-ep-HtL- Cornnc nJ 7 Ct/on(j e(.&^ Ma Jt>«f Cu-Ort- wd ?a6 J w*v7YY w/cX<2- * //> /t * ■J <Y // / Ara /jo f cjff c c , 7 i- ft-T X_S>'C''lf X-S" c x c^r^r Ca— „v z Xc< ✓ » . J ♦ �4 �Zl. e/?o f M dyeeft (T& fd- Ci/c / Awl 7 ■J'yt jf vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in­ dustrialists, fishermen and farmers arc behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a 5 greater or lesser extent eviitand hence in serious vases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primiioe peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and-^r* permissible, so also is the slaughter ol the last remain ing blue whale^for private profit,. , or fa & 1 j“'/z^4> i ■T.JS �(X. (t^o-r<- a~ ^~h%AJ2-A Au—4^-, -vGtt^y ^-■-? —j—G\A<?-‘-*-k Cj^ /^tc /&rf SV-ev*^. 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(though such a view But pantheism is false For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do^riot award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with,jmainstrean» theses according to which rights X coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concerns; i.e., at least, whatever, has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever^has a right has^interests st- <■ �J ? �j2_x>~«^-^—4“V- C>----- <~*'f~'^ < —r_>4 AN-^V5i „ /s i—^Jj-o- -gk, zLo jfe-f-4-^- c^-^a- c'k <j£—*A C. -in ^..Sj-oSL-U-^-^zf- ^LM. c_f-<_ C-O x_ C*"^——'p^^— ^ri»|^e>\A»tL' (o~— 1_ <"7 Qr*—S—Ic^-k^pj —.*—*L_ d /'—>-^—^- J &i $"'z'~1<— . — -^_T-Ca_Xa—<__ Aj<, J^«-------- .__><sxbV_ vyH-m <Ji J<$A_ Aal -n^tx/$J'_>~'lx<"c~j-^_<vj4-toA V 2 k^hssXkx^ Z 4----- ------------------- A-S <—<-^-^X_ rA-c____ cL<i—A, "t^-ajZavJ^v i^a--— (kx_A_—-C—, .O-JL '*-^>>J2—AziUAAA O^ . _ _ aAUL :A>=> v __ <=y- fcAlA- v-*o-aA c-» ^Sjhj /"Xr-j-«_ -t~s p-vvj-^MSV-s »_—c<-^»ji—, 'V—Ci.’V' c_r—4~ iUvagk-A-tar^ t (__r-i!e~-^~--> 3 ci r \ 'Wt or e_. fkftyt i‘n ■'—^££ -T©t? Zv€>v^_^ <_<_ x^-aZ-xA' 0 5 <3^ tX,L 4Z <^/ 4b»-ULk /h <-<&— e2 \> c-^^uuxxi ��78 t ��A__ -V �� Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document IS THERE A NEED FOR A NEW, AN ENVIRONMENTAL, ETHIC? Richard Routley (Australia) § 1. It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environ­ ment, in Leopold’s words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' (| 1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal with man’s relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex­ ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself-explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the woods ofTa 75% slope, turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall, rocks, and soil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ (UJ), p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a 1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits 2 To the consternation nodoubt of Quineans But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeterminate 205 single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilisation: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin­ ciples. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [21) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfcctor. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be preserv­ ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth’s land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com­ fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man’s proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature — all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man’s role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used3 for human ends, “humanized”. As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforward; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assump­ tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer’s polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The posi­ tion may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa­ tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. 2. -A^ we noticed-(an) ethic is ambiguous, as between a specific ethical system, a specific ethic, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S 3 If ‘use’ is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use principle is tied to the resource view of nature 4 A meta-ethic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions 206 '^"es - a( SeS’a,Pr0pos^r th«>ry whlch in. is, near enough, a proposit1or ., ~"f'm (1.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in--.:ludes ( like individuals of a th• . a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set ° of general or to‘other he^er conduct. to verselytypically to its of thers obligatory, or isonf ? applypermissible n’ untableand wrong, what concern,n~ evaluativeOnjudgements of what are rights, what is valued, and !>O forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a principle; and certainly if systems S, and S2 contain _different principles, then they are different systems. It follows that any en\llnnmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreover if environmental ethic5 lifTer from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded in Western systems, then ,hese systems differ from the Western super ethic (assurring, what seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic is needed t!ien a new ethic is wanted It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental count,·r examples to 1t. It 1s commonly assumed that there are, what amount to, core principles of Western ethical systems. principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed in the Golden Ruk I w ,des one example. Directly relevant here. as a good stab at a core principle. is the com111unli, formulated liberal principle 0f the moqified flominan"-,~siti on..A recent for-""•..._ ,/c,.,.M,....,,, ~ lo/,'/ mulation~ runs a, follows ( 131, p. 58}: 'The liberal philosophy of the Western world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, providing ( I) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not hkel 1 to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this prmciple basic (/Funan) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people, come fir~t and everything else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom principle because it gives perm1ss10n to perform a wide range of actions (including actions which mess up the environment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to cunningly shift the onus of proof to others. It is wortti remarking that harming others in the restriction is narrower than a rc,tnction tu the I usual) interests of others; it is not enough that 1t is in my interests, because I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being anywa~ because 1t does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to e~actly what counts as harm or interference. Moreover the width of the pnnciple is so far obscure because 'other' ma~ be filled out in significantly diffen:nt 11, ays. it makes a difference to the e,itent, and pri, ilege, of the chauvinism whether 'other' expands to ·other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other'peradequacy toCthe a ^t being'; and fnd uture k to 'other'sentient s^ed other as well thaut^ atter s it wmakes °u'd o nn re °difference "°w and^t °mpletel y “n-of the principle, and inson'it or versely to its economic applicability, to which class of others it is intended to apply, whether to Wor kable, Th^ atake future "ymakethe as count t0 others, Co m°St whether to P to remote future others or only to non-discountable present aspato asis well future e. whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unand others, future It ysK" ^nled in des<gning anaJ ). "ple ™' last m,„ « u,,, ,k 1 -1/.'l;· nr semantical workable, and it is generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. ,( ., ■ „di examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a It is taken for granted in designing counter ·~ .....-<;,_ semantical analysis of permissibility and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations , ... ~#... ideal some in (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds situation, what is obligatory in every id.:al situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal situation. But the mam point to grasp for the counter example\ that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. -(i) The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system lays about him, eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as a• the best abattoirs). What he doc~ 1s quite permissible according to ba 1c chauvinism, but on environmental ground~ what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be committed to esoteric values to regard Mr Last Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that raof corresponding in' advance dical thinking and values have shifted in an environmental usurne direction ’’ ^""oplos shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles}. (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rul!! out «rcorre p„ that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. the spossibility Otherwise one could as well 1..ons1der science fiction cases where peoole arrive at a new planet and »™ ^“xxi™r <"■■— ^.^ ^ sssh ss ±“ ™.™««. oS «’Srr "”'be “ ” “c,v A ™88eZ™1£„XXe°' rw S,SCUre ss?wX".“ . ,.. ___ X;»,XyrXt“ber ® S “ xxr •' xe xz^x z “:zz:::?“~ssss fgs 5 A related principle is that (m d11ieJ •,.., •.,r.i ..,, »c can operate "ith,n similar limits 207 207 WIMI iWlliMMW-l-i destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all remaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en­ vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck­ ed place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or co­ operation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons”, the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur’s behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better off’. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this ex­ ample to the industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic pic­ ture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up­ set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist: nor need whale hun­ ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whale^ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable—if that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren’t en­ vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in dustrialists, fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way ? No. what these people do is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is the slaughter of the last remain­ ing blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvinism as a satisfactory 6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in 131 2^°;™ pn"c,p e ls 3 morc d,flku11 matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude speciepide. It may be preferable, m view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof, simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct, as in a bill of rights. rei2tsArhadRaJ change-ri" a ^eory some,,mcs forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which jects the Reference Theory tn 4 thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmen­ tally important notions, such as conservation, pollution, growth and preservation, for meta-ethical analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such characteristic actions as natural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and per­ missibility to rights; it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as \alue and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejec­ tion of many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a verv brie! examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some major positions,7 Hart (in |5|) accepts, subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which, among other things, ‘any adult human ... capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons’. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an environmental ethic rejects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the definition of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right, a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with respect to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that long ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees have rights (though such a view is occasionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has in­ terests. Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights, and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth, to practically anything at all. r J The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typica ly employ a single criterion p. such as preference or happiness, as a summum bonum; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps including future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of afTairs, of the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either directly, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, as in rule-utilitarianism, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embrace persons, or even some animals (at the cost, like that of including remotely future humans, of losing P°’ntS arC deVdOped by thOSC protcstin« about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then ‘‘rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi­ sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the ~^^base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some * v^gue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is (rough) justice. REFERENCES 1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966). 2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). 3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). 4. S. and R. Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), Animals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans, London (1971). 5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). for < MC. fyjfot'''? ■tu / v x .. 5^ ' A - ■. 3 7 • ... , ■ '-■ “"■'T “"7— , O' .. / ... . t ■ - _____ 5 11 I * b. ■-^ ' ■ 1 ■■ ■:.,' ?• f ■ ■ '■ ■ \ • < ■- ■> ■ '■ ...:■■ ■■■ ■- k ..... £ • tOx ' A . ' ’ . ' -. . ........... ........ '■' •■■ ' - ■ ,. ; 1 L ___ SL&L___ ___------------------------------------- r.._ Ao ..... . ' ■ r - \ v * . . , ' ' ' . ... . ' . .■ . , '. - ■ A * O ' ' . ' , ' . . , , f . iK 4**«^ £' . ' •) ■ ; ‘ ' ' ' ' &-A. */- “S A r* - f’ ,Z ■ .. t u< lzJ*C C<& 'Co h* zLzx^ X CXA-a. 'tel Aj .. ‘ X .’ ■tzO .. i ’ ' \ u<J-A^LA ,. z^i*" V^o*4^ -^- -Oi--\z> f ■ ' ■ ti i .— 4 a. - ' ■v tO-- \. u> (.<■ •'■ * Z fi fl £/\-'-X n ’ ‘ ' UaJ-A^La I cJ <-X j <A 03 v. 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It is increasingly said that civilization, Western civilization at least, stands in need of a new ethic (and derivatively of a new economics) setting out people's relations to the natural environ­ ment, in Leopold's words ‘an ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it’ ([1], p. 238). It is not of course that old and prevaling ethics do not deal with man's relation to nature: they do, and on the prevailing view man is free to deal with nature as he pleases, i.e. his relations with nature, insofar at least as they do not affect others, are not subject to moral censure. Thus assertions such as ‘Crusoe ought not to be mutilating those trees’ are significant and morally determinate but, inasmuch at least as Crusoe's actions do not interfere with others, they are false or do not hold - and trees are not, in a good sense, moral objects.1 It is to this, to the values and evaluations of the prevailing ethics, that Leopold and others in fact take ex­ ception. Leopold regards as subject to moral criticism, as wrong, behaviour that on prevailing views is morally permissible. But it is not, as Leopold seems to think, that such behaviour is beyond the scope of the prevailing ethics and that an extension of traditional morality is required to cover such cases, to fill a moral void. If Leopold is right in his criticism of prevailing conduct what is required is a change in the ethics, in attitudes, values and evaluations. For as matters stand, as he himself explains, men do not feel morally ashamed if they interfere with a wilderness, if they maltreat the land, extract from it whatever it will yield, and then move on; and such conduct is not taken to interfere with and does not rouse the moral indignation of others. ‘A farmer who clears the woods off a 75% slope,turns his cows into the clearing, and dumps its rainfall,rocks, andsoil into the community creek, is still (if otherwise decent) a respected member of society.’ ([1]), p.245) Under what we shall call an environmental ethic such traditionally permissible conduct would be accounted morally wrong, and the farmer subject to proper moral criticism. Let us grant such evaluations for the purpose of the argument. What is not so clear is that a new ethic is required even for such radical judgements. For one thing it is none too clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or at all well worked out, so that the application of identity criteria for ethics may remain obscure.2 Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical systems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christain ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethics or that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the framework of prevailing Western ethics, is open because there isn’t a 1 A view occasionally tempered by the idea that trees house spirits 2 To the consternation .nodoubt of Quineans. But the fact is that we can talk perfectly well about inchoate and fragmentary systems the identity of which may be indeterminate 205 is, near enough: ~ propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which includes ( like md1v1duals of a theory) a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative Ju~gements co~cermng conduct, typically of what is obligatory, permissible and wrong of_ what ~re rights, what _is valued, and so forth. A ~eneral or lawlike proposition of a system is ~ prmc1ple, and certainly 1f syst~ms S, and S2 contam different principles, then they are different systems. It foll?ws t~at any environmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlined. Moreo~er 1f environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principle embedded m Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming wh~t _seems to be so, that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environm~ntai eth1_c 1s needed then a new ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environmental counter examples to it. It is com_monly assu_med that_ there are. what amount to, core principles of Western ethical ~ystems, principles that will accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed ~n the Golden Rule provides o~e example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core principle, ts the . commonly formulated hberal pnnc1ple of the modified dominance position .. A recent for: · " • "'• ,;, /'' /,'. / ~·- - ·· ..._ mulation 5 runs as follows ( [ 3 I, p. 58): . 'The liberal philosophy of the Wes tern world holds that one should be able to do what he wishes, prov1dmg ( 1) that he d0es not harm orhers and (2) that he is not likely to harm himself irreparably.' Let us call this principle basic (human) chauvinism - because under it humans, or people. co_me_ first and everyt_hmg else a bad last - though sometimes the principle is hailed as a freedom pnnc1ple becaus~ 1t gives perm1ss1on to perform a wide range of actions (including actio.ns which mess_ up the ~nv1ronment and natural things) providing they do not harm others. In fact it tends to c_unn_mgly shift the onus of pro?fto others. It is worth remarking that harming others in the restrict10n 1s narrower than a restnct1on to the (usual) interests of others; it is not enough that it is in my mterests, because. I detest you, that you stop breathing; you are free to breathe, for the time being anyway, because 1t does not harm me. There remains a problem however as to exactly what counts as harm or mter_ference. Mor~over the width of the principle is so far obscure because 'other' may be fill~d. out m s1gmficantly different ways: it makes a difference to the e~tent, and privilege, of the cha~vm1s~ whe~her '.other' _ex~ands to 'other human' - which is too restrictive - or to 'other'person or to _other sent1~nt be1~g ; and 1t mak~s a difference to the adequacy of the principle, and inversely to its economic apphcab1hty, to which class of others it is intended to apply whether to future as well as to present others, whether to remote future others or only to non-discountable future others, a?d. whether to possible others. The latter would make the principle completely unworkable, and 1t 1s generally assumed that it applies at most to present and future others. ' //4-_ ItIt_ is taken for granted. in_ d_e_signing counter examples to basic chauvinist principles, that a ....,. /..~..., . ( sem_antical analysis of perm1ss1b1hty and obligation statements stretches out over ideal situations r.,.·-=-"'t.. :.;1 -c.: , · ~/:_ (".~-htch may be mcon:iplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some ideal ideal every in s1tuat10n, what 1s obl_1gato_ry in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded ~1tuat10n. But the_mam pomt to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles · t· 1f correct are umversal and are assessed over the class of I·deal s1tua ions. (') Th z collapse of the world system the 1 _survi~ing perso~) (or man e as_t ma~ e~a~ple. The last lays ~bout him, ehmmatmg, ~s far as he can, e~ery !tvmg th_mg, animal or plant (but painlessly if iou hke, a~ at the best abattoirs). What he does 1s qmte permissible according to basic chauvinism ut on envir?nmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover one does not have to be commit~ ~~d \o e~ot~nc values to regard M'.. Las_t Man as behaving badly (the reason being perhaps that ra~cfa th mkmg a nd val~es have shifted m an environmental direction in advance of corresponding s .. 1 ts m the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles). (u) The last people example. The last man example can be broadened to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects h_a~~ blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out ~e pos~1b1hty that what these pe~ple d~ harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. therwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on controversial issues such as infanticide, women's rights and drugs, there are competing sets of principles. Talk of a new ethic and prevailing ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity, that prevailing ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. Indeed Passmore (in [2]) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man's relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic - Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removed, e.g. who is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with an environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth's surface should be preserved from substantial human interference, whether of the "improving" sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and comfortable north-Europea n small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man's proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect nature - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being primarily usefulness for human purposes; while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources. Although these positions both depart from the dominant position in a way which enables the incorporation of some evaluations of an environmental ethic, e.g. some of those concerning the irresponsible farmer, they do not go far enough: for in the present situation of expanding populations confined to finite natural areas, they will lead to, and enjoin, the perfecting, farming and utilizing of all natural areas. Indeed these lesser traditions lead to, what a thoroughgoing environmental ethic would reject, a 3 principle of total use,implying that every natural area should be cultivated or otherwise used for human ends, "humanized". As the important Western traditions exclude an environmental ethic, it would appear that such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or romantic, would be new alright. The matter is not so straightforwa rd; for the dominant ethic has been substantially qualified by the rider that one is riot always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically interferes with others. Maybe some such proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the non-interference assumption). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for m~ny thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position; and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [3]) that blends with the modified position; and so on. The position may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situation excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I shall try to show. A new ethic is wanted. a ~pecific ethic, /§ 2. -As. we noticed----(a~ ethic is ambi~uous, as bet_ween a specifi~ ethical system, and a more generic notion, a super ethic, under which specific ethics cluster.4 An ethical system S ./ 3 If 'use' is extended, somewhat illicitly, to include use for preservation, this total use principle is rendered inocuous at least as regards its actual effects. Note that the total use p1 inciple is tied to the resource view of nature 4-A meta-elhic is, as usual, a theory about ethics, super ethics, their features and fundamental notions 5 A related principle is that (modified) free c.1tcrprise can operate I il 11 ,·thi'n s· -1 1- • 1m1 ar 1m11s 207 destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the hell of it. Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild ar,imal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, and all ~emaining forests disappear in favour of quarries or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an environmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wrecked place. But this conduct may conform with the basic chauvinist principle, and as well with the principles enjoined ·by the lesser traditions. Indeed the main point of elaborating this example is because, as the last man example reveals, basic chauvinism may conflict with stewardship or cooperation principles. The conflict may be removed it seems by conjoining a further proviso to the basic principle, to the effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps "for the best of reasons", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving outpJt to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since h~ much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being "better off'. Just as we can extend the last man example to a class of last people, so we can extend this example to the industrial society example: the society looks rather like ours. (iv) The vanishing species example. Consider the blue whale, a mixed good on the economic picture. The blue whale is on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may upset them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hunting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue whale example are provided by cases where a species is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man's activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The l?ehaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accqrdingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not. However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whal~[~ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental econo_mics would; instead the market model will grind inexorably 6 along the private demand curve until the blue whale population is no longer viable-if that point has not already been passed. In sum, the class of permissible actions that rebound on the environment _is more narrowly circumscribed on an environmental ethic than it is in the Western super ethic. But aren't environmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respe~ted industrialists fishermen and farmers are behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading activities of ;he sort described, in a morally impermissible way~ No, what these people do _is to a greater or lesser extent evil, and hence in serious cases morally impermissible. For exampl_e, mso~ar as the killing or forced displacement of primitive peoples who stand in the way of an mdustnal development is morally indefensible and impermissible, so also is _the slau~hter of the last_ remaining blue whales for private profit. But how to reformulate basic chauvm1sm as a satisfactory 6 For the tragedy-of-the-commons type reasons well explained in [31 freedom principle is a more difficult matter. A tentative, but none too adequate beginning might be made by extending (2) to include harm to or interference with others who would be so affected by the action in question were they placed in the environment and (3) to exclude specieside. It may be preferable , in view of the way the freedom principle sets the onus of proof. simply to scrap it altogether, and instead to specify classes of rights and permissible conduct. as in a bill of rights. § 3. A radical change in a {eory sometimes forces changes in the meta-theory; e.g. a logic which rejects the Reference Theory in a thoroughgoing way requires a modification of the usual metatheory which also accepts the Reference Theory and indeed which is tailored to cater only for logics which do conform. A somewhat similar phenomena seems to occur in the case of a meta-ethic adequate for an environmental ethic. Quite apart from introducing several environmentally important notions, such as conservation, pollu1io11, growth and presen•atio11,for meta-ethical analysis, an environmental ethic compels re-examination and modified analyses of such characteristic actions as na1ural right, ground of right, and of the relations of obligation and permissibility to rights: it may well require re-assessment of traditional analyses of such notions as i-alue and right, especially where these are based on chauvinist assumptions; and it forces the rejection o [ many of the more prominent meta-ethical positions. These points are illustrated by a very brief examination of accounts of natural right and then by a sketch of the species bias of some major positions. 7 Hart (in I 5]) accepts. subject to defeating conditions which are here irrelevant, the classical doctrine of natural rights according to which. among other things, 'any adult human . .. capable of choice is at liberty to do (i.e. is under no obligation to abstain from) any action which is not one coercing or restraining or designed to injure other persons'. But this sufficient condition for a human natural right depends on accepting the very human chauvinist principle an em iron mental ethic rt::jects, since if a person has a natural right he has a right; so too the deflni1io11 of a natural right adopted by classical theorists and accepted with minor qualifications by Hart presupposes the same defective principle. Accordingly an environmental ethic would have to amend the classical notion of a natural right. a far from straight forward matter now that human rights with rcspc:ct to animals and the natural environment are, like those with respect to slaves not all that lon g ago, undergoing major re-evaluation. An environmental ethic does not commit one to the view that natural objects such as trees have rights (though such a view is occa~ionally held, e.g. by pantheists. But pantheism is false since artefacts are not alive). For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do not award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right n_ot to _be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with mainstream theses according to which rights are coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concern; i.e., at least, whatever has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever has a right has interests . Thus although any person may have a right by no means every living thing can (significantly) have rights. and arguably most sentient objects other than persons cannot have rights. But persons can relate morally, through obligations, prohibitions and so forth. to practically anything at all. The species bias of certain ethical and economic positions which aim to make principles of conduct or reasonable economic behaviour calculable is easily brought out. These positions typically employ a single criterion p, such as preference or happiness, as a summ.um_ bonu_m; characteristically each individual of some base class, almost always humans, but perhaps mcludmg future humans, is supposed to have an ordinal p ranking of the states in question (e.g. of affairs, 6f the economy); then some principle is supplied to determine a collective p ranking of these states in terms of individual prankings, and what is best or ought to be done is determined either_ ~ire~tl~, as in act-utilitarianism under the Greatest Happiness principle, or indirectly, asin rule-ut1lttanantsm, in terms of some optimization principle applied to the collective ranking. The species bias is transparent from the selection of the base class. And even if the base class is extended to embr~ce persons. or even some animals (at the cost. like that of including remotely future humans, of losing 1 Some of thes< points arc developed by those protesting about human maltreatment of animals; see especially the essays collec!ed in I 4 I 9 ~ iii 208 WJ 6 14 209 testability), the positions are open to familiar criticism, namely that the whole of the base class may be prejudiced in a way which leads to unjust principles. For example if every member of the base class detests dingoes, on the basis of mistaken data as to dingoes’ behaviour, then by the Pareto ranking test the collective ranking will rank states where dingoes are exterminated very highly, from which it will generally be concluded that dingoes ought to be exterminated (the evaluation of most Australian farmers anyway). Likewise it would just be a happy accident, it seems, if collective demand (horizontally summed from individual demand) for a state of the economy with blue whales as a mixed good, were to succeed in outweighing private whaling demands; for if no one in the base class happened to know that blue whales exist or cared a jot that they do then “rational” economic decision-making would do nothing to prevent their extinction. Whether the blue whale survives should not have to depend on what humans know or what they see on televi­ sion. Human interests and preferences are far too parochial to provide a satisfactory basis for deciding on what is environmentally desirable. These ethical and economic theories are not alone in their species chauvinism; much the same applies to most going meta-ethical theories which, unlike intuitionistic theories, try to offer some rationale for their basic principles. For instance, on social contract positions obligations are a matter of mutual agreements between individuals of the base class; on a social justice picture rights and obligations spring from the application of symmetrical fairness principles to members of the _base class, usually a rather special class of persons, while on a Kantian position which has some v v^gue obligations somehow arise from respect for members of the base class, persons. In each case if members of the base class happen to be ill-disposed to items outside the base class then that is too bad for them: that is (rough) justice. REFERENCES 1. A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conservation. New York (1966). 2. J. Passmore, Ecological Problems and Western Traditions (unpublished). 3. P.W.Barkley and D.W.Seckier, Economic Growth and Environmental Decay. The Solution becomes the Problem, New York (1972). 4. S. and R.Godlovitch and J. Harris (editors), A nimals, Men and Morals. An enquiry into the maltreatment of non-humans, London (1971). 5. H.L.A.Hart, ‘Are there any natural rights?’, reprinted in A.Quinton (editor), Political Philosophy, Oxford (1967). C'/■ClUi/! n /t'v'Tl tf-t / ^■nt's 'z 0/7 /#£■* O/^Z ^rfscr . J*. B? c ey-rzZ^ft. Z ZZzztZszL. , tZ/at-e-Zf/^ ; /f ?Z Sl’lff/Z' A0S fe 3 /c^^Z Z,z ZzZ L^f-4- ) /-^ // -------- ----------- ;.. ^z t e-'T— /) <LSfC t-x. e *<~Z^<--~ -f &'? } e- Xa^C^Tl f fs>\ . Zc'T- /ZZr^. t c*/'d />t^r*-( x X-C- ct'Ze^ &a L '—4. HA- ZZ> / Z^S. Zt Z&-'■?■&■'£ -, 4^ t J&-*. ro X, fle^ Si. ^ef/'Yrv Caf^ ---- )CS~ /pf" /J'ttx J 7 G-y 7 Jg; V JK-Ajtj <S\_Cc-O'/n--^> <2/- if y 1 ix j o vt/ hj ’ J) k t-C u, 1 <1 Sa-d- A ansi. OrttQ- &<v&tsx. J A Irt V- — 7 l>o!ri\f<i i&- ©a. * —, >1 /<^®./?v. /, z for * o^fh dUrl c^f'v^r *x 7&/I g fzZf c^e crftor. 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UgsTma ku-w-tins C^vZ i4! o Act rGJ < Cg/- z/^/zj Aa c't'wJ #4^ (Xi h i i"u^i'u Lt-1 /zo Zte^ > 0- i . ■X c- a-rt-fW^ have. o^e- 7 er o ’e £ PC- 1 in nmUCh at ,eaSt aS CrUSOe'S w-th —2£S^2SS SS=S=E-lg=:==ES maltreat the land, extract frontU>2 *"* 3 W,'dcrness',f taken to tnterfere with and does not rouse the moral indtgnL^n ofThey ’ C°ndUCt ” not Z^eyyero/ woods off a 75% slope, turns his cows intn rh»> •he „«k. „ SIi„ (ir otherwise dccenl) farmer who clears the <f^^- s a- z. // / A * /7~. z^r&sz A, / ' Z - — ^z4— C » Ci s t2"* 7^ ji /<t^/ <- f /'t ^ ~C ' f' /~ e^ttcfuc^ / /^b. f 0 /•> | it is none loo clear what is going to count as a new ethic, much as it is often unclear whether a new development in physics counts as a new physics or just as a modification or extension of the old. For, notoriosly, ethics are not clearly articulated or al all well worked out. so that the application of identity criteria foi ethics may remain obscure. Furthermore we tend to cluster a family of ethical sy stems which do not differ on core or fundamental principles together as the one ethic; e.g. the Christen ethic, which is an umbrella notion covering a cluster of differing and even competing systems. In fact then there are two,.other possibilities, apart from a new environmental ethic, which might cater for the evaluations, namely that of an extension of modification of the prevailing ethicszor that of the development of principles that are already encompassed or latent within the prevailing ethic. The second possibility, that environmental evaluations can be incorporated within (and ecological problems solved within) the /?<rf fff /> (Het-//'s-j Ilk > Ct at— single ethical system uniquely assumed in Western civilization: on many issues, and especially on ckd«°T^a *ssues such as infanticide, women’s rights and drugs, there are competing sets of prin S’ T. ? nCW e^h‘C and Prevai,ln8 ethics tends to suggest a sort of monolithic structure, a uniformity that prevathng ethics, and even a single ethic, need not have. - r. . jM40/ Indeed Passmore (in |2|) has mapped out three important traditions in Western ethical views concerning man’s relation to nature; a dominant tradition, the despotic position, with man as despot (or tyrant), and two lesser traditions, the stewardship position, with man as custodian, and the co-operative position with man as perfector. Nor are these the only traditions; primitivism is another, and both romanticism and mysticism have influenced Western views.-31 ' j i 7) el'f'r/rel-x rC-~ r* A. The dominant Western view is simply inconsistent with an environmental ethic; for according to it nature is the dominion of man and he is free to deal with it as he pleases (since - at least on the mainstream Stoic^— Augustine view - it exists only for his sake), whereas on an environmental ethic man is not so free to do as he pleases. But it is not quite so obvious that an environmental ethic cannot be coupled with one of the lesser traditions. Part of the problem is that the lesser traditions are by no means adequately characterised anywhere, especially when the religious backdrop is removeej, eg. vv/zo is man steward for and responsible to? However both traditions are inconsistent with a ^environmental ethic because they imply policies of complete interference, whereas on an environmental ethic some worthwhile parts of the earth’s surface should be presen ed from substantial human interference, whether of the “improving” sort or not. Both traditions would in fact prefer to see the earth's land surfaces reshaped along the lines of the tame and com fortable north-European small farm and village landscape. According to the co-operative position man’s proper role is todevelop, cultivate and perfect galiye - all nature eventually - by bringing out its potentialities, the test of perfection being ^usefulness for.human purposes: while on the stewardship view man's role, like that of a farm manager, is to make nature productive by his efforts though not by means that will deliberately degrade its resources./ '7Zu^ /fate- c.C^( 4c~S~ £^7 7c/<*-/'- /rw*. e-1 Cr*..s~y 7 7 , J - cvalua,,^. of an environmental ethic.oXs" coter^^ A t !(^ ; ^,l(he1SStmECXPa!’U"’g P?pula,ions eon,'^d ‘0 finite Indeeo these lesser traditions lead to what a thomnpho’ ‘dr‘”"lg anJ utl,izing ofall natural areas principle of total use,imping that every r-turJl X m ^v,ronmental othic would reject, a human ends, “humanized” ' area shou,d be ^‘^ted or otherw.se used 3 f v 3 rr • H use is extended, somewhat illicitly, to inciud. as regards its actual eftects. Note that the toU’ e •eSiCrVat‘<>n; thiS tOtal USe Princ‘P|c is rendered mocuous al least <»e pr , pie is tied to the resource view of nature , such an ethic, not primitive, mystical or’romantic, would be new aljigjiu The matter is r straightforward: for the dominant.ethic has been substantial!v uuaiitle^y the n&er that one is not always entitled to do as one pleases where this physically int^Tes \0tn peers'. 7 > proviso was implicit all along (despite evidence to the contrary), and it was simply assumed that doing what one pleased with natural items would not affect others (the Goiyuuterference assump­ tion). Be this as it may, the modified dominant position appears, at least for many thinkers, to have supplanted the dominant position: and the modified position can undoubtedly go much further '* towards an environmental ethic. For example, the farmer's polluting of a community stream may be ruled immoral on the grounds that it physically interferes with others who use or would use the stream. Likewise business enterprises which, destroy the natural environment for no satisfactory returns or which cause pollution deleterious to the health of future humans, can be criticised on the sort of welfare basis (e.g. that of [31) that blends with the modified position; /hcrt/t f'cd c-Z^x . may even serve to restrict the sort of family size one is entitled to have since in a finite situa tion excessive population levels will interfere with future people. Nontheless neither the modified dominant position nor its Western variants, obtained by combining it with the lesser traditions, is adequate as an environmental ethic, as I ^vall A new ethic is wanted, aoh/ 1, /T-- < zfre^e^ 7y 7> j7**u\ 5 /g^7rc> e*- /5> g Zte-Z*-^ a-rfCsC , 'sCett /J /tr ! t>7 f rCL , ioG-j . c s f~CT /fc. /•J2 crt-cc^ a m 7 7/ s e fJ Ifc,'-* 7 ■ is, near‘enough, a propositional system (i.e. a structured set of propositions) or theory which in dudes (like individuals of a theory > a set of values and (like postulates of a theory) a set of general evaluative judgements concerning conduct, typically of what is obligators permissible and wrong.'x* ! of what are rights, what is valued, and so forth. A general or lawlike proposition of a system is a \ principle; and certamlv if systems S, and S2contain different principles, then they are different systems. It follows that anv en onmental ethic differs from the important traditional ethics outlin ed. Moreover if environmental ethics differ from Western ethical systems on some core principlaJL embedded in Western systems, then these systems differ from the Western super ethic (assuming. I what seems to be so. that it can be uniquely characterised) - in which case if an environmental ethic /s needed then a new- ethic is wanted. It suffices then to locate a core principle and to provide environ mental counter examples to it z , /3^'f> Ji^f^ yt i« * Q-. V '5'" 7/ / Z/t-y -y ZLo c^-T V / C o-~f^ e o—•. /K^~ . are' w^at amount to, core principles of Western ethicaSR ? 1 7 accordingly belong to the super ethic. The fairness principle inscribed ' m the Golden Rule provides one example. Directly relevant here, as a good stab at a core^&iple ' is the commonly formulated liberal principle ' / * ...2>^-.Yjr7 , /fol; >ws ( j 3J. p. 58): (D). The liberal philosophy of (he Western world holds that one should be able to d< □ what he wishes, providing (1) that he does not harm others and (2) that he is not likely to harm .himself jrreparablv.' ■ "Wf® /Ac7 7^— /zxc principle because it e.ves permission m st. some,im« the principle is haded as a freedom SESSSSSsasyr??”- •A?x chauvinism whether ‘other’ expands io ‘other h "* ' ■’ ' Ten' '° lhe c*Ient- antl Pn' 'lege, of the son* or toother sentient be.nXnd t makes aX" wh,chu’s t0° r^<ttive or Mother per verselj to its economic applicability to whieh I LrenrCe l.° the ar,e4uacy of the principle, and in future as well as present other" whether to r '55 ,° r°therS “? t0 ‘ w,lcther to future others, and whether to possible others Th -Th utur<J othefs or onl-v t0 non-discountable V and it is generally c /wf- e \ c) fff)Ct^ &J C'C. X ) 1. CAu^f ' b- / ^U4r<fc C 7 *4 & S f/'t J &&&!&&— ?£*~ ^KBMCfc. a/ fiU €t y^ < r- cC 7 ^C/>< Z__i___ * sC I y/L j (ft) f . } /a fC*2— z’vz/XLt,/ /XL x« /'c-^ anaivjfe of permissibility; £ 7 Zcz2—z obhgatio/falementsjstretc^. out over ideal mInations• (which may be incomplete or even inconsistent), so that what is permissible holds in some idefl^fe situation, what is obligatory in every ideal situation, and what is wrong is excluded in every ideal ' ■ situation. But the main point to grasp for the counter examples that follow, is that ethical principles if correct are universal and are assessed over the class of ideal situations. ZSl ezn^Tfez- />?> b /> C&7 rr cX? eef ff (i) ’ The last man example. The last man (or person) surviving the collapse of the world system Zo eliminating, as far as he can, every living thing, animal or plant (but painlessly if you like, as at the best abattoirs). What he does is quite permissible according to f/)) but on environmental grounds what he does is wrong. Moreover pne d^gsjtot have to Ke commit ted to esoteric values to regard Mr. Last Man as behaving badly, (the reason l^eing^crhapsthatra dica! thinking and values have shifted in an environmental direction in advance of corresponding shifts in the formulation of fundamental evaluative principles)./^ f /U, Corf MG /<€ C ifZ (ii) The last people example. The last man example can be . to the last people example. We can assume that they know they are the last people, e.g. because they are aware that radiation effects have blocked any chance of reproduction. One considers the last people in order to rule out the possibility that what these people do harms or somehow physically interferes with later people. Otherwise one could as well consider science fiction cases where people arrive at a new planet and ft}) destroy its ecosystems, whether with good intentions such as perfecting the planet for their ends and making it more fruitful or, forgetting the lesser traditions, just for the Let us assume that the last people are very numerous. They humanely exterminate every wild animal and they eliminate the fish of the seas, they put all arable land under intensive cultivation, " and all remaining forests disappear in favour ofpatfuM or plantations, and so on. They may give various familiar reasons for this, e.g. they believe it is the way to salvation or to perfection, or they are simply satisfying reasonable needs, or even that it is needed to keep the last people employed or occupied so that they do not worry too much about their impending extinctions. On an en­ vironmental ethic the last people have behaved badly; £ qfXL/ }r ex/ s* e< 9 they have simplified and largely destroyed all the natural ecosystems, and with their demise the world will soon be an ugly and largely wreck­ ed place. But this conduct may conform with the ’ CCW (£>) Ccf'tC I ^cZ /y //I- /IZPCC-X c'LjruZ^ ~Z / / s/y i ■ jr.ru effect (3) that he does not wilfully destroy natural resources. But as the last people do not destroy resources wilfully, but perhaps “for the best of reasons’", the variant is still environmentally inadequate. (iii) The great entrepreneur example. The last man example can be adjusted so as to not fall foul of clause (3). The last man is an industrialist; he runs a giant complex of automated factories and farms which he proceeds to extend. He produces automobiles among other things, from renewable and recyclable resources of course, only he dumps and recycles these shortly after manufacture and sale to a dummy buyer instead of putting them on the road for a short time as we do. Of course he has the best of reasons for his activity, e.g. he is increasing gross world product, or he is improving output to fulfil some plan, and he will be increasing his own and general welfare since he much prefers increased output and productivity. The entrepreneur's behaviour is on the Western ethic quite permissible; indeed his conduct is commonly thought to be quite fine and may even meet Pareto optimality requirements given prevailing notions of being “better ofT’. 7 /<L. , /tMVbcr^r, Z^> /7^ cx-yr .1 , C< /ctj'/ //’fr ) 7(3 /&- cL C ^^T- 77 toe-^ g rXl-rr^ ^/y) <L c7t Qr<g,*y/i/& , M zrzreX e*i SKfX&d ft C^ g<c /&- ^<XaY£- 77 ^1 4rc7jW4— ) f re/nctd lb— /f ... --*^g*._ K on the verge of extinction because of his qualities as a private good, as a source of valuable oil and meat. The catching and marketing of blue whales does not harm the whalers; it does not harm or physically interfere with others in any good sense, though it may up set them and they may be prepared to compensate the whalers if they desist; nor need whale hun ting be wilful destruction. (Slightly different examples which eliminate the hunting aspect of the blue w'hale example are provided by cases where a speues is eliminated or threatened through destruction of its habitat by man’s activity or the activities of animals he has introduced, e.g. many plains-dwelling Australian marsupials and the Arabian oryx.) The behaviour of the whalers in eliminating this magnificent species of whale is accordingly quite permissible-at least according to basic chauvinism. But on an environmental ethic it is not However the free-market mechanism will not cease allocating whale$ to commercial uses, as a satisfactory environmental economics I would; instead the market r ynuX InGswkblj C/bf £?3 ) tr^Cjec(j-ep-HtL- Cornnc nJ 7 Ct/on(j e(.&^ Ma Jt>«f Cu-Ort- wd ?a6 J w*v7YY w/cX<2- * //> /t * ■J <Y // / Ara /jo f cjff c c , 7 i- ft-T X_S>'C''lf X-S" c x c^r^r Ca— „v z Xc< ✓ » . J ♦ 4 Zl. e/?o f M dyeeft (T& fd- Ci/c / Awl 7 ■J'yt jf vironmentalists going too far in claiming that these people, those of the examples and respected in­ dustrialists, fishermen and farmers arc behaving, when engaging in environmentally degrading ac tivities of the sort described, in a morally impermissible way? No, what these people do is to a 5 greater or lesser extent eviitand hence in serious vases morally impermissible. For example, insofar as the killing or forced displacement of primiioe peoples who stand in the way of an industrial development is morally indefensible and-^r* permissible, so also is the slaughter ol the last remain ing blue whale^for private profit,. , or fa & 1 j“'/z^4> i ■T.JS (X. (t^o-r<- a~ ^~h%AJ2-A Au—4^-, -vGtt^y ^-■-? —j—G\A<?-‘-*-k Cj^ /^tc /&rf SV-ev*^. 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(though such a view But pantheism is false For moral prohibitions forbidding certain actions with respect to an object do^riot award that object a correlative right. That it would be wrong to mutilate a given tree or piece of property does not entail that the tree or piece of property has a correlative right not to be mutilated (without seriously stretching the notion of a right). Environmental views can stick with,jmainstrean» theses according to which rights X coupled with corresponding responsibilities and so with bearing obligations, and with corresponding interests and concerns; i.e., at least, whatever, has a right also has responsibilities and therefore obligations, and whatever^has a right has^interests st- <■ J ? j2_x>~«^-^—4“V- C>----- <~*'f~'^ < —r_>4 AN-^V5i „ /s i—^Jj-o- -gk, zLo jfe-f-4-^- c^-^a- c'k <j£—*A C. -in ^..Sj-oSL-U-^-^zf- ^LM. c_f-<_ C-O x_ C*"^——'p^^— ^ri»|^e>\A»tL' (o~— 1_ <"7 Qr*—S—Ic^-k^pj —.*—*L_ d /'—>-^—^- J &i $"'z'~1<— . — -^_T-Ca_Xa—<__ Aj<, J^«-------- .__><sxbV_ vyH-m <Ji J<$A_ Aal -n^tx/$J'_>~'lx<"c~j-^_<vj4-toA V 2 k^hssXkx^ Z 4----- ------------------- A-S <—<-^-^X_ rA-c____ cL<i—A, "t^-ajZavJ^v i^a--— (kx_A_—-C—, .O-JL '*-^>>J2—AziUAAA O^ . _ _ aAUL :A>=> v __ <=y- fcAlA- v-*o-aA c-» ^Sjhj /"Xr-j-«_ -t~s p-vvj-^MSV-s »_—c<-^»ji—, 'V—Ci.’V' c_r—4~ iUvagk-A-tar^ t (__r-i!e~-^~--> 3 ci r \ 'Wt or e_. fkftyt i‘n ■'—^££ -T©t? Zv€>v^_^ <_<_ x^-aZ-xA' 0 5 <3^ tX,L 4Z <^/ 4b»-ULk /h <-<&— e2 \> c-^^uuxxi 78 t A__ -V  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 15, item 1721: Notes and cuttings on environmental ethics Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Routley&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Routley</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Subject The topic of the resource Handwritten notes and annotated photocopy (2 copies) of Routley R (1973) 'Is there a need for a new, an environmental, ethic?', Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, 1:205-210. Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: Blue Folder containing more of the same . Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 15, item 1721 Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [68] leaves. 62.47 MB. Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:62d159c" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:62d159c</a> Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Second Bookcase > Third Shelf > Second Pile Box 15: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/2a58a736a0fbf8719d74d4ee50c7d4ca.pdf 07f4f100b518084f6934e2d356da87a8 PDF Text Text PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not far enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these fashionable answers to the focal questions is satisfactory. A different more complex answer through broader classes of paradigms is accordingly investigated. Among significant corollaries, this one stands out: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 0. Focal questions and deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate. In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation; formerly they would have seen such transformation for not mattering, many still do, transformation as increasing wealth (as in mainstream economics). More recently they have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, induction into cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, bureaus, courts, and so on). Whence an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, Why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise? The answer to be arrived at to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, are committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, paradigms displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). �Parts of the answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, often correct as far as they go, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood-production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission, as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however 2 3 4 For main details of this illustrative example, see FF. For more on this style of explanation, see further Routley. I am not, however, going to maintain that religion, or a certain religion such as Christianity, is the main villain of the environmental piece. Religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from philosophies (see below). What I shall be suggesting is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. As logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to coincide. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial �3 through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed, but through a bundle of apparently aligned paradigms. One working image for what is going on here is appropriately ecological: that of a fig cluster (similarly a mangrove or bamboo thicket): Diagram 1: Structural diagram connecting problems with their multiple roots many emergent problems interlinked proximate causes plural supporting sources multiple interlinked roots Observe systematic plurality. Notice however a countervailing human propensity to seek single answers and uniqueness (as depicted in the rhomboidal box), where causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural.5 What is sought are ultimate sources, or roots, not immediate causes. The cause of the pollution may be a factory that the agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. (But there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? In terms of directional explanatory and other rational transmission connections.6) explanation, of them. History too is not singular, but plural, as has occasionally been recognized; at the very least there are plausible alternative histories. While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses die question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors ot roots and sources (the metaphors are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, streams rise from sources, not roots, normally above them, and so on). A striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text. Although this text, The �4 These deeper sources are important. Without locating them, perhaps all of them (if they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at ±ese, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on the necessary preliminaries, because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. Although these will be duly connected, paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. A definition of ‘environmental problem’, and a classification of such problems, has already been proposed.7 Observe that the final sets of problems that emerge are not value-framework independent. What constitutes a major problem on deeper perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, that it is here presumed are serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.8 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise is sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these, desiderata may not be guaranteed. There will be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they are to be resolved. Impact equations, emerging immediately from a classification of Roots of Modem Environmentalism, presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor, and for that matter no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such a usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal injunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Dictionaries do better, with a short listing for the figurature use of root running: the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). That will serve, for a start. 7 See Sylvan and Bennett, GE. 8 As to the extent of the problem in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. �5 problems, reveal how they are to be resolved.9 Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.10 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not a satisfactory stopping point. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer. As we will soon see, most of these answers too simple, and taken as intended as comprehensive, they are wrong. The questions however are important, because if we fail to get to bottom of these, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a very difficult situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships or how many dollars uncaring humans can stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm was explicated, in previous work, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.11 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, etc. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and imperatival theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of capsule formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal12 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), For details see again Greening of Ethics. See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See Routley, where many environmentally relevant examples are documented. For an analogous account of culture see Sylvan 86. It resembles a structured universal, e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. �6 Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, ... . An ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Paradigms are now regularly presented, in extremely truncated form, through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 2: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation ,13 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, ±rough Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) 13 This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. �7 I As observed, paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem ideosystems, eschews deontics.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the wide range of answers proposed supply a single source, and are defective. Roughly, virtually everything you have read on this (or may read elsewhere) is wrong. TABLE 3. Main tabulation of answers and remedies Source Defective practice answers Remedy Objections DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion D3a Defective paradigm answers Pl. i �8 Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism P2b Mechanism Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Organicism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment P6a Materialism Anti-materialism Spiritualism P8. P8a Patriarchy, Masculinism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) P6. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Source Typical remedy suggested Platonism New metaphysics Leibnitzianism New metaphysics Kantianism C onsequentialism Mainstrand Anglo-American philosophy: reductive empiricism-cum-utilitarianism Continental philosophy Utilitarianism Economism New social science, or ethics Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then most elements in that list will have been nominated, likely �9 separately but perhaps only in combination, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including sometimes entries like Taylorism), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other answers however, some varying from interesting to crazy, that we should also take into account, for instance Shepard's answers. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich with talk of ‘mental maladaptation’). Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick — in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, that are to be resisted. The slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something to theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which influences so much now in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.1415No doubt, too, that maturity — but a environmental maturity — is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending towards notes. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was advanced in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. One useful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology 14 15 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in Appendix 3. White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. �10 developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’, namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today’s attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.16 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.17 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.18 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.19 16 17 18 19 Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an interesting recent contribution see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms. Ask, first, not what they say, but what they do, and would do. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted: see Appendix 1. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts ot Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans. For a modest beginning, �11 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.20 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The root of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of anthropocentricism, -imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial trances. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.21 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining 20 21 see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see Routley, table 5. For certain critical elements of Descartes contribution, see Appendix 2. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘reject[ing] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). �12 rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.22 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modem mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed) can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.23 But, as observed, the main theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.24 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. ♦ Modem industrial society. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth-superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.25 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society .26 Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’27 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without 22 23 24 25 26 27 For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature , a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly in McLauglin. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. �13 any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.28 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.29 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.30 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans: It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend setters, including Marcuse, Ulich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.31 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships —domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see GEF. See Seed, quoted in GEF; also Salleh (see e.g. EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from die humans domination ot other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a big section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. �14 harmonious man-nature relationship.32 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.33 • Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.34 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. Commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting the major division in the main tabulation. D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While outputs or “consequences” such matters as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a bad joke. Accordingly new green economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.35 Where they usually arrive, travelling 32 33 34 35 Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could setde into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition, outlined in V. and R. Routley, obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms in at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by set of diem in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see Sylvan and Bennett. Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. �a 15 within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before green, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be no better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.36 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization ) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. P. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, 36 It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have dieir property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). �16 business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on it own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on37)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history or ecohistory, and related virtual histories, enter decisively. Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms. An important example (much less speculative than some of the examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did, or would have (given the technology and numbers), wrecked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established before rise of modem Western paradigms, or in regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far presented, is entirely Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non-Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness 37 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. �17 again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).38 Or Islam, with its reach across the Middle East. The main tabulation (of table 3) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam (Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in or encouraged by religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. A Cartesianism which regards animals as mere auto­ 38 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna. �18 mata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life-forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, or Northern, though (through colonialism and cultural imperialism) paradigm of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Industrialization and technological advance are, without doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging islands and river catchments, to grander and global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems/9 They did not however run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.39 40 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transferred to run in less favourable settings. TABLE 4: Connected continuing sources of global environmental problems Transfer of technology, industry and problems to other regions Inflation intensification and spread of problems to larger regions Technologicalindustrial development within ideological cultural framework development within another , \ or different / • framework / Multiple sources of various regional problems 39 40 The picture of development of environmental problems preferred accordingly bears passing resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by a huge inflationary phenomenon. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). Lacking such favourable ideological surroundings, earlier technological “break throughs were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, gunpowder, etc. �19 Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other cultures. For instance, the West could collapse through protracted war, through choking on its own toxic wastes, or whatever (there are many routes to catastrophic decline, outlined for instance in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue, however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are produced or accelerated by — what connects them — contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. But many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by-products, or similar; thus, in the example, the peasants displaced by agribusiness, absentee wealth-holders or similar, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Westem. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises include those now tabulated: TABLE 5: Examples, several flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) Jainism recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians, etc. Western philosophies: old Stoicism Spinozism new Deep green theories, such as deep ecology. under certain favourable interpretations Given the remoteness of most of these examples from contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out. Much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. What we have arrived at, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two large �20 families: environmentally friendly and unfriendly. No doubt there is a fuzzy residue class (neither, and perhaps both). DIAGRAM 6: Broad environmental division of paradigms. To questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms, the answers are likewise plural, and diverse (and some match answers in Table 3). Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. It is not difficult to indicate, more or less, which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Some family characteristics, then, of unfriendly paradigms: * Combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all-round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).41 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the developments and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. the characteristic universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, as well as numerous technological projects.42). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. ‘Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’, Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. �21 abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.43 Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness was due to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.44 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal stimulus .... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.45 No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily. An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging social theories and life-styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories, practices and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.46 43 44 45 46 Cottingham p.24, p.26. Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. Glacken p.506. Leibnitz’s standing in die history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only �22 * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism, or indeed any system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and perhaps much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’47 The outside world, the nature environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts”’.48 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans had no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could not matter what happened to it. It could be regarded, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.49 Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’.50 * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism);51 as a corollary, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * short-term framework; * maximization assumptions, coupled with grand projects. Family characteristic of friendly paradigms will tend to invert (in effect negate) these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as: * an end to degrading primary production, wherever it prevails. 47 48 49 50 51 Instead ecological forestry tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. Reese p. 102. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument to this divide (cited by Cottingham) is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides. See further Appendix 2. Borrowing some nice phraseology from F. Mathews. See Discourse VI. Shallow will work out only with right mix ol humans. But in any case, it is implausible. An appealing ecological dieorem insinuates itself hereabouts: Given certain conditions (such as short-term vision, techno-fix, ...), shallowness is necessary and sulficient for environmental crisis. �23 and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. • a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of technology can go a very long way. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because most agents are bound to (locked into, committed to, or captively go along with) environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Resulting unfavourable report on dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news.52 It has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, main unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be tipped; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to look to for suggestions, and inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* via Bungendore, OZ. APPENDIX 1. Dominant philosophy has aided and abetted ruination of terrestrial environments. That dominant intellectual paradigms are dismal news for deep (nonchauvinistic) environmental theory has been previously argued, in contraposed form.53 More recently Hargrove has investigated, in detail, negative implications of the main philosophical tradition 53 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under­ estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. On the substantial point, not dierefore removed through the alleged practical impotence ot philosophy, see Appendix 1. An earlier version of this article was presented at die Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 93. It would not have been written otherwise. Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. �24 for environmental theory and practice, especially/or environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation and development of a proper ecological perspective.54 However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously’. Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy.55 Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.56 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship); and in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as can be ascertained). After all, as regards the latter matter, there are isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil See e.g. Hargrove, p.21. Consider the sorts of exceptions: • minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Ilieophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. • figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. • medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and were usually committed not the nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern A more detailed criticism of these claims will be made elsewhere. �25 ♦ quality in Greece during his own lifetime.57 Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.58 The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural-world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value, denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter, that is a matter of indifference. 59 APPENDIX 2. On the prominent roles of dominant philosophy in the inferiorization and mistreatment of (mere) animals. Although the attitudes concerned reach back to antiquity, and were rationalized in classical Greek philosophy (through a theory of separate parts, “highest” of which was a soul or rational component), the whole appalling affair was given an enormous stimulus by Cartesian philosophy. Descartes cherished a scheme for a purely mechanistic science of physiology. Descartes compares the human body to an ‘automaton’ and argues that had we sufficient knowledge of the structure of its working parts we could explain even highly complex behavioural responses in purely mechanical terms. The exception is thought, and its external manifestation, language: this leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and ‘the beasts’: There are no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen— that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance in order to make their thoughts understood, whereas no animal, however perfect, can do the like. This is not because they lack the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak as we do (i.e. show that they are thinking what they are saying). By contrast, even men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech organs as much as the beasts, or more so, normally invent their own signs to make 59 Hargrove, p.29. This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove’s historical excess needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. �26 themselves understood ... This shows that the beasts do not merely have less reason than man, but have no reason at all ...^® These sorts of considerations have been immensely influential in establishing a received fundamental ontological divide, not merely between humans and (other) animals, but between humans and nature. But, as we should now appreciate, they are all subtly, or less subtly, astray, and do not sustain the conclusion drawn. Firstly, investigation reveals internal incoherence. No men are incapable of stringing words together and forming utterances, yet many men are so incapable, not least those who are dumb. As his differential objective demands, Descartes exaggerates what those bom deaf and dumb may do—they do not ‘normally invent their own signs’, but may painstakingly learn a sign language—by contrast with ‘the beasts’. But, as we are now learning, many animals, whose organs are not well adapted to speech, can also painstakingly learn sign language. Indeed they may communicate by signs and sounds (though not usually speech) “in the wild”. There is no sharp cut-off, such as a fundamental divide presumes, between creatures that can, or do, communicate by signs and sounds, and those who cannot, or do not. Secondly, even less is there a significant boundary between those that can understand inputs and reason, and those that cannot, or do not. None of reasoning, thought and understanding are inextricably or inexorably tied to speech, nor, more broadly, to language.60 61 For example, dogs, whose speech is rather limited (though they certainly communicate, including to humans, by a range of different sounds, as well as signs), can understand and respond to several hundred commands and the like (that is, to a number of the same order as the vocabulary of basic languages). As for reasoning, the problem-solving capabilities of many sorts of animals, especially laboratory rats, are now well (even excessively, for primal comfort) documented. Regrettably, Descartes has not been on his own, or out on an exceptional limb. Virtually all past great philosophers insisted, if not on an unbridgeable gap, certainly on a difference in kind of supreme philosophical importance, between humans and other animals. Only Hume afforded a conspicuous exception to unedifying philosophical orthodoxy. Worse with other supposedly fundamental divides, such as that partitioning off nonsentients, there appear to have been no exceptions. The world was and is sharply divided, so it was and is imagined, into fixed inflexible categories. Furthermore, despite Hume, Cartesian inputs have persisted, for instance in the widespread philosophical idea—running contrary to an enormous body of evidence—that animals have no interests, preferences or intentions, that they receive no satisfaction from what they do or choose to do, and so on. Cartesianism certainly assisted, not merely in changing philosophical method importantly, 60 61 Cottingham, Three Rationalists, p.15, also quoting Descartes. For this reason, the “language of thought” conception, pervading much cognitive science, is decidedly regressive. Nor is it necessary: combinatorial operations, which can perform a fine representational job, provide an improved replacement for such a “language”: see DP chapter 11. �27 but in altering metaphysics irrevocably, above all as regards human place in nature. As an outcome of rectified method, Philosophy, including physical science, becomes in Descartes a selfcontained discipline, guided by the light of reason; it has no need to be supplemented by revelation, scripture, or ecclesiastic teaching.62 As to the new physics and its outcome in metaphysics, despite a certain amount of judicious fudging over whether the earth ‘really’ moves, Descartes was firmly committed to the new Copernican cosmology, whereby the Earth is dethroned from its central position. The Earth is simply a planet, it has the same status as Mars and Saturn—‘bodies we do not make so much of’... . What is more, the sun itself is only one star among innumerable others, each of which is the centre of its own celestial ‘vortex’. Descartes [rightly] saw all this as having important implications for human life. The universe, as conceived of in medieval and scholastic cosmology, was one which revealed, in all its details, the purposes of a benevolent creator. In the words of Paracelsus, writing some hundred years before Descartes ‘all things belonging to nature exist for the benefit of man’. For Descartes the vastly expanded size of the post-Copernican universe, the possibility of innumerable other worlds, and the insignificance of our planet in comparison with the hugeness of the whole, made it impossible to continue to regard man as the ‘dearest of God’s creatures’.... The belief that all things exist for our benefit alone, says Descartes ..., involves a presumptuous view of our status and a failure to recognize the unlimited vastness of God’s creation....63 So, in important respects, Cartesianism offered improvements and a way forward. environmentally. But the message was mixed and muffled, as with that concerning final causes, hostility to which Descartes justified as a corollary. No doubt final causes were used to smuggle in divine purposes, specifically God’s special concern for the welfare of humans (no doubt the Church and Church fathers who engaged in this smuggling were not to be trusted). However undesirable practices could be weeded out, without eradicating respectable ones. Over-zealous in just this fashion was the common 17th Century slogan, ‘Abandon final causes and look for underlying structures’, which affords another example of explanatory skimping.64 Sound methodology can admit both internal structures and final causes. Nonetheless, dethroning, relegating or abandoning final causes was a major movement within modern deanthropocentrization, so far as it has yet proceeded. Lovejoy has highlighted the matter. For, according to him, ...physico-theological ideas came to rest on the assumption that all other elements of nature were created for man’s sake, and therefore put man and nature into an unequal relationship: Tout est cree pour Thomme is at once the tacit premise and the triumphant conclusion of that long series of teleological arguments which ... is one of the 62 63 64 Cottingham pp. 176-177. Unfortunately for Descartes’ grand systematic-doubt project, reason was far from sufficient, and did need supplementation, though not through reinstatement of established prejudice. Though judiciously shedding some ancient conventional wisdom (e.g. concerning humans’ privileged control place in nature), Descartes was either forced or else felt obliged to reinstate much received wisdom, through poorly concealed subterfuges, in order to get his rationalistic roadshow moving. Cottingham, ibid. On the slogan, and the Church, see Cottingham p. 178. On skimping, see DP chapter 11. �most curious moments of human imbecility.65 APPENDIX 3. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,66.... He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feels no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, 65 66 Pepper p.44, quoting Lovejoy. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement ir simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. �29 representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots67) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocation at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.68 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destractive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.69 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial human are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters’ (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. �30 growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.70 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings.... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2 CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ Re Vision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization, Rev ed. Norman; University of Oklahama Press, 1974. A Dobson, Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bun gendore, 1993. C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. E.C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. J. Hruschka, ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177 M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p.l5)! �31 A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature'. Industrialism and Deep Ecology SUNY Press, Albany N.Y., 1993. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Bames and Noble, Maryland, 1991. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974 D. Pearce and others, Blueprintfor a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Master of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. V. and R. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, RSSS, Australian National University, 1973; referred to as FF. R. and V. Routley, ‘Social themes, self-management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others) RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. R. and V. Routley ‘Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others), RSSS Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EE. R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982. P. Shephard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. R. Sylvan, Culture and the Roots of Political Divergence, mimeographed, Canberra, 1986. R. Sylvan, Deep Pluralism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994; referred to as DP. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1993; referred to as EP3. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document PARADIGMATIC ROOTS OF ENVIRONMENTAL PROBLEMS Abstract. Virtually all diagnoses of the roots, and sources, of environmental problems are defective. While defective diagnoses persist, problems will not be adequately addressed. Focal questions ask why human communities so frequently degrade, impoverish or even destroy their own environments, and more generally why the whole earth is now in jeopardy through human enterprise. More immediate answers, sometimes correct so far as they go (which is not far enough), look to components of environmental impact equations. More thorough-going answers fall into two classes: first those that do not question entrenched paradigms, but seek (unsuccessfully) to explain widespread problems simply through defective practice, and secondly those that, rightly recognising that defective practice is no adequate answer, look to deeper paradigmatic sources of problems. A fatal flaw in most of the latter answers lies in their monistic concentration on a single paradigm, or single narrow band of paradigms. These flaws are exposed, whence a wider, more satisfactory answer can be broached. Background busywork includes firstly, explaining problems and relevant paradigms and how paradigms operate regarding environmental problems, and secondly, detailed disentangling of proposed and alleged sources of the problems. With this done, it is argued that none of these fashionable answers to the focal questions is satisfactory. A different more complex answer through broader classes of paradigms is accordingly investigated. Among significant corollaries, this one stands out: philosophy as portrayed through its standard history is dismal environmental news. 0. Focal questions and deeper answers. Human activity is now degrading terrestrial eco-systems at an extraordinarily rapid rate. In modem times humans have devised sophisticated and sophistical idea-systems which justify such system degradation; formerly they would have seen such transformation for not mattering, many still do, transformation as increasing wealth (as in mainstream economics). More recently they have developed social systems which induct most humans into degradation procedures (through need, induction into cash economies, and so on) and which weave entrapping justificatory webs (through agencies, bureaus, courts, and so on). Whence an increasingly broached question1: Why is this happening? More explicitly, Why do human communities so frequently degrade and impoverish their environments, their own habitats? Indeed why do they sometimes, persistently, perhaps over a long period, destroy their own habitats? More sweepingly, why is the whole earth now perhaps in jeopardy through human enterprise? The answer to be arrived at to these focal questions is in essence this: because too many humans, especially those in control of environmentally impacting enterprises, are committed to or caught within environmentally unfriendly paradigms, paradigms displaying quite insufficient regard for the health and well-being of relevant habitats and of the earth. 1 In sources as diverse as Shepard (first page) and Jacobs (p.23). Parts of the answers to such focal questions come immediately through environmental impact equations, conservation laws, and such like. For example, degradation is occurring through the impact of overpopulation, excessive pollution, damaging or faulty technologies, and so on. While such answers are important, often correct as far as they go, and while they may correctly indicate what has to be changed somehow, they are nonetheless somewhat superficial, and they leave much to be explained. For example, they do not explain why a community persisted upon a course that deliberately led to such problems, or why it is so resistant to changes that might reduce impacts and pull it out of its problem-holes. Less superficial answers look to ideologically entrenched attitudes and commitments, to pervasive paradigms that underwrite anti-environmental practices, as for instance the wood-production ideology does forestry practice, even so-called “new forestry”.2 An illustrative example which reveals the power of paradigms in blocking or facilitating action will shortcut a more elaborate argument, through action theory, to the efficacy of idea­ systems. Consider an unwanted pregnancy, resulting despite due precautions or whatever. Observe that, more and more there are comparatively safe technologies available to effect termination and seemingly solve the immediate problem. Ask: why so many people are opposed to choice of abortion? A very common answer is: because they are operating under an elaborate paradigm, typically organised religion (bureaucratic Christianity in the West), themes of which, the creeds of which, prohibit such choices.3 Of course pro-choice considerations are also paradigmatically embedded, for instance in forms of liberalism. Picturesquely, a social paradigm imposes controls on action, a system of red and green lights on a captured agent's routing procedures. Or with a different picture, paradigms project a steeply impeding topography on action space. Paradigms not only guide, control and limit; they also correlatively give permission, as, for instance, space to play god, freedom to release a new species or variety which may or has proved a pest or noxious or has been biologically engineered, liberty to neglect or degrade or vandalize. The settings in terms of which agents such as humans act and operate, even down-toearth everyday agents, invariably include, not far in the background, paradigms, cultures, creeds, ideologies, myths or the like, all idea-systems, all involving models (in a technical sense) of one sort or another. Even the most practical (and vociferously practical) of humans are governed by background ideosystems. It is in terms of these background ideosystems that a great deal concerning human practices with respect to natural environments can be explained, what would otherwise lack satisfactory explanation.4 That explanation comes not however 2 3 4 For main details of this illustrative example, see FF. For more on this style of explanation, see further Routley. I am not, however, going to maintain that religion, or a certain religion such as Christianity, is the main villain of the environmental piece. Religions in general borrowed much in their damaging articles from philosophies (see below). What I shall be suggesting is that dominant philosophies do have much to answer for in this regard. As logical positivists observed, explanation and justification patterns tend to coincide. How people justify their practices offers an explanation, though perhaps a misleading or superficial 3 through a single paradigm, as has too often been supposed, but through a bundle of apparently aligned paradigms. One working image for what is going on here is appropriately ecological: that of a fig cluster (similarly a mangrove or bamboo thicket): Diagram 1: Structural diagram connecting problems with their multiple roots many emergent problems interlinked proximate causes plural supporting sources multiple interlinked roots Observe systematic plurality. Notice however a countervailing human propensity to seek single answers and uniqueness (as depicted in the rhomboidal box), where causes and sources are plural. So it is with paradigmatic sources and roots of environmental problems. They are plural.5 What is sought are ultimate sources, or roots, not immediate causes. The cause of the pollution may be a factory that the agent installed, to produce more flim-flam. That too may be the physical source of the immediate problem. But deeper questioning seeks the reasons for such production and such factories. While there may be problems with ideas and idea­ structures as causes, as causally efficacious, these problems do not transfer to reasons and sources. (But there are buried metaphors, and linkages, to be unscrambled: how are “A is source of B” and “A is a root of B” to be explicated? In terms of directional explanatory and other rational transmission connections.6) explanation, of them. History too is not singular, but plural, as has occasionally been recognized; at the very least there are plausible alternative histories. While there is much written on roots and sources of environmental problems or developments virtually none of it addresses die question of what is meant by the partially buried metaphors ot roots and sources (the metaphors are evidently different; more literally, plants have roots, normally below them, streams rise from sources, not roots, normally above them, and so on). A striking example is supplied by Pepper's useful introductory text. Although this text, The 4 These deeper sources are important. Without locating them, perhaps all of them (if they resemble blackberry), problems may not get properly addressed. Should we wrongly locate roots, then proposed resolutions directed at ±ese, cutting them off or replacing them, will also go astray, wrongly directed or whatever. There are several parts to the approach sketched, if it is to be properly elaborated— including a working classification of environmental problems and their proximate solutions, and an account of paradigms and their roles—before getting to paradigmatic answers to focal questions. But we can be brief on the necessary preliminaries, because they have been addressed elsewhere. 1. Problems and paradigms. Although these will be duly connected, paradigms implicated in problems, they are different components, and admit and deserve separate explanation. la. Environmental problems and proximate solutions. A definition of ‘environmental problem’, and a classification of such problems, has already been proposed.7 Observe that the final sets of problems that emerge are not value-framework independent. What constitutes a major problem on deeper perceptions may be but a minor problem, or written off as not a problem at all, on shallower perspectives. Among such indicator problems, that it is here presumed are serious problems, are those of • sustaining biodiversity and • maintaining significant wilderness.8 Even if the broad impact of human enterprise is sufficiently reduced to guarantee comfortable survival of future humans, these, desiderata may not be guaranteed. There will be outstanding problems. In any event, it is not too difficult to say more or less what environmental problems are (at worst by furnishing familiar lists), and in many cases to indicate at least in principle how they are to be resolved. Impact equations, emerging immediately from a classification of Roots of Modem Environmentalism, presents itself specifically as concerning roots, there is in fact no explication offered of the crucial roots metaphor, and for that matter no direct account of what the roots of environmentalism—still less, though quite different, of environmental problems to which environmentalism answers—are supposed to be (granted there is much oblique material). It is apparent that Pepper has become rather carried away with the roots metaphor, throwing it into several chapter headings and applying it pretty indiscriminately to mean simply elements (from some earlier occurrence); thus for instance, ‘the roots of the theme of reconciliation of freedom and authority’ (p.193). Such a usage is unsound. Because rudiments of some idea make an earlier appearance in some authority or work, later workers may not have arrived at such an idea by expanding on these rudiments; they may have arrived where they did quite independently or by a different route. The mistake is that of reading a source or (genetic) causal linkage into a mere temporal injunction: post hoc, propter hoc. Dictionaries do better, with a short listing for the figurature use of root running: the basis, bottom, the fundamental part, or that which supplies origin, sustenance, means of development, etc.’ (Concise English Dictionary). That will serve, for a start. 7 See Sylvan and Bennett, GE. 8 As to the extent of the problem in North America, and a proposed remedy, see The Wildlands Project. 5 problems, reveal how they are to be resolved.9 Namely, by altering relevant impact parameters. Given this why are they proving so intractable? Why is so little done? Why is so very little spent, despite all the talk.10 Proximate solutions, about as far as positive science conveys us, are not a satisfactory stopping point. How is it, given so much scientific information and expertise, that humans are continuing to sharply degrade, and risk substantially destroying, their habitats. To these, the focal questions of this exercise, there is an array of competing answers on offer. As we will soon see, most of these answers too simple, and taken as intended as comprehensive, they are wrong. The questions however are important, because if we fail to get to bottom of these, there is even less prospect of satisfactory action to turn around a very difficult situation. That these issues do not matter, that casual human relationships or how many dollars uncaring humans can stuff in their pockets, matter more than whole islands of habitats—these sorts of value judgements (after all matter is a value term par excellence) derive from and are supported by particular ideologies. lb. Model-like objects: paradigms, ideologies, cultures ,and so on. A paradigm was explicated, in previous work, as a model in precisely a generous logical sense.11 That is, a paradigm amounts to a structure supplied by an elaborate interpretation function on a general system, i.e. on an integrated relational structure. Naturally it is required to faithful to what it models, the social forms and norms, scientific research programs, etc. A social paradigm, in contrast to a scientific paradigm, is a paradigm where the propositional and imperatival theory, the socio-political themes and value judgements, is that of a social group. A pure culture is but a comprehensive social paradigm, where by “comprehensive” is meant that it covers a sufficiently comprehensive part of the life-styles and life-forms of the community concerned. There are now many examples of capsule formulations of the themes delivered under rival social paradigms and under different cultures; from these formulations we can work back towards the underlying models. The basic vehicle, a situations or worlds model, is a semantical object, an item like a complex universal12 similarly open to a range of construals and reduction attempts, e.g. metaphysical, conceptual, epistemic, linguistic and so on. Once this is realised, it can be seen that successive cohorts of philosophers and sociologists have repeated one another in vaguely discerning essentially the same sorts of underlying structures under different categorisations: thus, for instance, forms of understanding (Kant), of consciousness (Marx), of life (Wittgenstein), conceptual schemes (Conant), presuppositions (Collingwood), For details see again Greening of Ethics. See e.g. The cost ofpast environmental policy in OECD countries, Box 1.7, in Pearce et al, p.24. See Routley, where many environmentally relevant examples are documented. For an analogous account of culture see Sylvan 86. It resembles a structured universal, e.g. Plato’s system of forms, Locke’s of complex ideas. 6 Weltanschauungs, total views (Naess), perspectives, outlooks, ideologies, programs, ... . An ideology, for instance, in the nonderogatory (non-Marxist) sense is an ideas-system, initially a propositional system or theory with a relevant domain of ideas operative, from which a paradigm can be discerned and elaborated. Paradigms are now regularly presented, in extremely truncated form, through a tabulation of capsule themes. Here is a combination example: TABLE 2: Elements of Taoism as contrasted with Deep Ecology and with the dominant paradigm: an initial capsule formulation ,13 Taoism Deep Ecology Dominant (Western) Paradigm Harmony with nature, ±rough Tao Harmony with nature Domination over nature Nature valuable in itself; “humanism” rejected Natural environment valued for itself Nature a resource; intrinsic value confined to humans Levelling of differences; wide impartiality Biocentric egalitarianism Human supremacy Supplies ample Earth supplies limited Ample resources with substitutes Following Tao-te Spiritual goals, especially self-realisation Material economic growth a predominant goal Enlightenment Self-realisation Personal (material) enrichment Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Doing with enough; recycling Consumerism Non-competitive lifestyle; voluntary simplicity Cooperative lifestyle Competitive lifestyle Decentralised/neighbourhood and village focus Decentralised/bioregional /neighbourhood focus Centralised/urban centred/ national focus Hierarchy without power structure; anarchoid Non-hierarchical/ grassroots democracy Power structure hierarchical Limited technology Appropriate technology High technology Considerable caution Precautionary practice Risking taking (verging upon adventurism) 13 This tripartite example is adapted from UTD, where capsule elements of Taoism are duly expanded. 7 I As observed, paradigms control action space by some equivalent of directives; red and green lights duly interpreted. They may not supply direct commands, general obligations and prohibitions, but may operate more indirectly. For instance an enlightened person, a role model, a person following Tao, would act this way, not that. (Taoism, like certain modem ideosystems, eschews deontics.) Paradigms are absorbed and they guide practice. They commonly form part of actors' worlds; they are certainly part of actors' programs for practice and considered action in a world. In a sense then, they are things, programs actors carry round in their heads; so heads have to be changed, not rolled. 2. Proposed answers to focal questions; a preliminary classification of inadequate answers and suggested remedies. Most of the wide range of answers proposed supply a single source, and are defective. Roughly, virtually everything you have read on this (or may read elsewhere) is wrong. TABLE 3. Main tabulation of answers and remedies Source Defective practice answers Remedy Objections DI. Ignorance Relevant information Information now available D2. Unintended consequences Relevant information Information now available D2a Faulty technique, or technology Repairs Repairs already made D3 Deviation (from theory, etc.) Education (for failure to limit deviance) Adherence a. Deviation uneliminable, or b. Adherence no remedy D4. Systemic lock-in (through poverty, ensnarement in market forces, etc.) Trap removal a. Explains only certain cases, and b. Due to paradigmatic features D5. Insensitivity or insensibility Problem apprised Remedy tried; background ideological blockage Source single paradigm Remedies proposed (among others) Christianity (mainstream Catholicism) Scientific enlightenment, or alternative (Eastern) religion D3a Defective paradigm answers Pl. i 8 Pla. Protestantism and its ethic P2. P2a Cartesianism Dualism P2b Mechanism Monism Anti-dualism Modified holism Substance metaphysics P3. P3a Possessive individualism P3aa Personalism Organicism Process metaphysics Non-reductionism Transpersonalism P4. Capitalism Socialism P5. Industrialism Pre-industrialism (romanticism) Post-industrialism P5a Technocratic bureaucracy P5aa. Transnational business Enlightenment Anti-enlightenment P6a Materialism Anti-materialism Spiritualism P8. P8a Patriarchy, Masculinism Human domination of humans Feminism Anti-domination (anti-hierarchy) P6. Further sample listings of this paradigmatic sort (but with the paradigms often subject specific or partial) include: Source Typical remedy suggested Platonism New metaphysics Leibnitzianism New metaphysics Kantianism C onsequentialism Mainstrand Anglo-American philosophy: reductive empiricism-cum-utilitarianism Continental philosophy Utilitarianism Economism New social science, or ethics Contractarianism Consequentialism Domination transfer Domination removal Adolescencism Infantilism (from Freudian physchology) Maturation Maturation And so on. A very rough recipe runs as follows: draw up a potted list of major movements and factors in dominant Western thought. Then most elements in that list will have been nominated, likely 9 separately but perhaps only in combination, by someone as the source of the problems. That list accordingly continues (even including sometimes entries like Taylorism), but what is included is representative of the important and more interesting answers to be encountered. There are other answers however, some varying from interesting to crazy, that we should also take into account, for instance Shepard's answers. Although Shepard dismisses ideologies, what he offers is a further ideosystem, of similar dubious or false cast. Strange answers include pushing it back to human psychology (thus not only Shepard, but also Fox, and Ehrlich with talk of ‘mental maladaptation’). Basically, there is something wrong with a society that does that to its habitat. It is sick — in a popular sense, yes, it is sick. It is the slides that follow, however, that are to be resisted. The slide begins invitingly: As it is not literally sick, well not physically usually, it must be mentally sick; that is, sliding further and fast, insane or mad. But the sources of mental sickness lie in childhood (as Freudianism erroneously insists). The slide continues to: what we have are immature societies, frozen at an early stage of development. No doubt there is something to theme that dominant societies, USA especially (which influences so much now in other cultures), are locked into youth culture, a sort of late consumptive adolescence.1415No doubt, too, that maturity — but a environmental maturity — is desirable, even mandatory. Meanwhile, immaturity is fostered right through human life. Considerable effort is put into trying to induct older people, who are often marginalised, into active consumptive society, to spend their money through tourism, on new housing, in those most wasteful of modern institutions such as airliners and hotels, hospitals and old-age homes, and so forth. 3. Documentation as to some of the acclaimed purer sources. Like the lists of proposals and intricated paradigms, the documentation too is somewhat perfunctory, tending towards notes. While whole theses could be spun out on several of these topics, already beginning to elicit such treatment, a prime objective here is different from usual: neither to convict, nor to clear or excuse, but to partially implicate most items cited in the main tabulation above. Consider, in brief, some of the usually accredited sources: • Western religion, above all Christianity. The theme that the source of ecological problems, ‘the historical roots of our ecological crisis’, are to be found in Western religion, and specifically in ‘the Judaeo-Christian belief that mankind was created to have dominion over nature’, was advanced in a particularly pointed and subsequently influential way by White. One useful summary of White's line of argument runs as follows: Allied with technological and scientific developments, orthodox Christianity has produced arrogant exploitation of nature, and a contemporary ecological crisis. White's thesis is that the West's successful science and technology 14 15 It interestingly matches the locking of primary production systems into pioneering stages such as preclimax formations. Shepard’s dialectic is investigated in more detail in Appendix 3. White's article has generated an enormous defensive literature, primarily from Christian apologists, but also from softer environmentalists and from testy historians of ideas. The whole area looks in danger of disappearing from intellectual view under a heavy blanketing snowfall, snowed. 10 developed between the 8th and 12th centuries — it is much older than the scientific revolution though it was not until about 1850 — following the democratic revolutions — that the science and technology were combined to produce truly immense powers to change nature. The early development, however, was paralleled by the development of exploitative attitudes to nature which seemed to be ‘in harmony with larger intellectual patterns’, namely the victory of Christianity over paganism. This destroyed the animistic beliefs whereby men thought twice before they plundered and destroyed natural objects. It substituted instead a faith in perpetual progress, a belief that God designed nature for man's benefit and rule, and that action, not contemplation, was the correct Christian behaviour. Science formed an extension of theology (for to know God you had to find out how his creation worked), and technology provided the active means to carry out God's will. Because today’s attitudes are essentially inherited from Christianity, then it ‘bears the burden of guilt’ for contemporary ecological disruption.16 What has happened with the divisive charge, advanced by White, that Christianity was the prime source of environmental problems, is particularly instructive. In an attempt to diffuse the charge Christian apologists pointed to, what there undoubtedly were, recessive strands or isolated seeds in Christianity which were much more environmentally benign (though some such as stewardship, which has evolved toward total managerialism and sustainable development, have proved increasingly problematic). That does little or nothing to meet a more sensitive criticism that mainstream (or dominant) Christianity has much to answer for as regards destruction and degradation of natural environments.17 Similar responses are apposite for attempts to exonerate their wider sources, such as Western philosophy. Against the sheeting of responsibility to religion, dominant forms of which should undoubtedly cop some heavy criticism, it has been contended that philosophy ... is the primary source of most Western ideas [and] is ... responsible for the ideas and attitudes that inhibit environmental protection today.... Religion... though often criticized ... as the chief culprit, has played a much less fundamental role. Most of the environmentally offensive ideas in Western religion originated not in religion but in Western philosophy.18 • Classical Greek philosophy, above all the peak philosophies of Plato and Aristotle. Greek philosophers approached natural phenomena in a way that (1) prevented the development of an ecological perspective, (2) discouraged the aesthetic appreciation of the natural world, and (3) promoted a conception of reality that made the idea of nature preservation conceptually difficult, if not impossible.19 16 17 18 19 Pepper pp.44-5. Pepper then embarks upon the murky story of alternative interpretations of Biblical data and the Christian tradition, dredged up by a series of White's critiques. The issue continues to be debated; for an interesting recent contribution see Callicott. Each religion is multistranded. But we should look hardest at dominant operative forms. Ask, first, not what they say, but what they do, and would do. Hargrove p.15. Certainly the sort of message that Pentecostal missionaries even now try to preach to resistant Australian Aboriginals, that the earth is just filth, mere rubbish, can be traced back in direct line to Plato’s attitude to the land, an attitude Hargrove and Plumwood help expose. Hargrove p.21. Hargrove’s claims may appear to have been confuted by Attfield, but really, while they have been subject to minor qualification, they have been highlighted: see Appendix 1. There is a much fuller story still to be told about classical Greek philosophy reassessed environmentally, of the very different roles and impacts ot Plato (with his unearthly philosophy), of Aristotle (with his earthier chauvinism), of Stoics and of Epicureans. For a modest beginning, 11 More sweepingly, they set Western philosophy on a ruinous environmental course, a course accentuated with the appearance of modem rationalist and empiricist philosophies. • Cartesian philosophy. The dominant modern environmental approach is sometimes denominated Cartesianism, or the Cartesian Technocratic paradigm, in honour of Descartes, upon whom (as a conveniently select individual from a swag of like-minded people) several of the leading themes and ideas can be pinned.20 While Descartes was undoubtedly extraordinarily influential, so were others; Newton for one, Locke for another. The paradigm is accordingly better denominated the Atomist-Empiricist-Technocratic paradigm, or some such. Evidently it substantially overlaps other modem ideologies, such as that of the Enlightenment, widely implicated as major sources of environmental problems. • Western metaphysics. While some conglomeration of the preceding sources and others (some potted history of Western metaphysics, so to say) may be offered, more often what is presented is some selection of Western metaphysical elements. Here is one example, plainly exhibiting a heavy Heideggerean influence: The root of our environmental problems lie in Western metaphysics. For metaphysics, Being is presencing; no allowance is made for any other mode (sheltering, declining, concealing). Once metaphysics has established the absolute dominion of the present over the not-present or no-longer-present, the way is paved for the scientific method, with its emphasis on replicability of results, predicability, quantification, and control. Nature becomes a “natural resource” —and people become “human resources”. The sources of anthropocentricism, -imperialism, colonialism, sexism and consumerism can all be traced back to metaphysics. Western metaphysics has more or less conquered the world, and there is no going back. Western metaphysics is more than simply a false consciousness overlaid on top of “authentic” experience. Being changes historically, and metaphysics is the index of that change... Metaphysics has a conquering, exclusive imperative, ... and different [former] modes now exist only as vestigial trances. They cannot be resurrected through ancient wisdom, native healing, goddess worship, or any other supposedly intact, dormant system. We cannot create a “new order”. That would simply be another form of the Will to Power... We can—and must—turn away from the dominant rhythms of western metaphysics if we are to avoid the nihilism of a perpetually ensconced technocratic rationalism.21 An alternative to turning entirely away from Western metaphysics, consists in combining 20 21 see Plumwood on Plato, Toulmin on Stoics as contrasted with Epicureans, and Glacken on lesser or lost Greek strands. For encapsulation of the Cartesianism paradigm (a dominant dualistic form), summarising Drengson’s exposition, see Routley, table 5. For certain critical elements of Descartes contribution, see Appendix 2. Drengson, for one, has helped portray Descartes as the environmentally evil genius (or demiurge). That some orthodox philosophers, not merely maverick philosophers, are now rushing to the defence of Descartes should be seen as entirely in keeping with the character and roles of Western philosophy. Undisclosed source. Amusingly, I have seen myself accused of ‘reject[ing] in its entirety mainstream western philosophy and science, ... seen as the cause of the [environmental] problem’ and instead basing my ‘ecocentric values on Eastern philosophies (thus Bellett). This charge was levelled on the strength of a peripheral exercise on classical Taoism and Deep Ecology (now included in UTD). 12 rejection of standard Western metaphysics (or, less sweepingly, of dominant metaphysics, characteristically individualistic and atomistic) in favour of development of recessive traditions or mere Western seeds. Such a more sophisticated approach, also critical of Western metaphysics, with atomism a main villain, is pursued by those who promote instead process or plenum metaphysics.22 • Enlightenment. The source of problems lies in ‘the intellectual heritage of the Enlightenment’ (e.g. Dobson). Of course the main doctrines of the Enlightenment substantially overlap those of modem mainstream philosophy and of Descartes’ philosophy (but they shed dualistic and theistic scholastic hang-overs). • Capitalism. The assumption that capitalism is responsible for environmental as well as social evils, widespread until recently in state-socialist countries (when their own records were revealed) can be traced back to Marx. According to Marx, with capitalism for the first time, nature becomes purely an object for humankind, purely a matter of utility; ceases to be recognised as a power for itself; and the theoretical discovery of its autonomous laws appears merely as a ruse so as to subject it under human needs, whether as an object of consumption or as a means of production.23 But, as observed, the main theme had appeared in earlier philosophy; for instance, the idea of nature as purely an object for humankind, was advanced in Aristotle: ‘Now if nature makes nothing incomplete and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made all animals for the sake of man’.24 Aristotle adopted a similar stance on nature as on other species. The theme was to be oft repeated in subsequent Aristotelianism, and reiterated apparently in shallower Stoicism. But the subjection of everything to utility appears to be a distinctively modem contribution. ♦ Modem industrial society. Modem industrialism (‘the smooth-superhighway of industrial progress’) is the source, such is an extraordinarily popular theme: ‘... the root causes of the present crisis lie deep with the very foundations of the industrial paradigm’.25 Similarly ‘roots [of] the environment crisis ... go deeper to the foundations of modem industrial society .26 Again, ‘the structural roots of the environmental crises [are found in] industrialism, in commoditization, in commercialism, and in competition and greed’27 The popular theme, that industrialism is the source, tends to confuse mere means— industrial technology can without 22 23 24 25 26 27 For the first process option, see Gare; for the second, where the plenum is that of a holistic relativity theory (more exactly holistic relativistic geometrodynamics), see Mathews. Grundrisse p.409f. Aristotle, Politics, Book 1, ch.8. What an inference, you might well exclaim. See further Hargrove p.25. M. Gabriel, ‘How “attitudes and implements” have brought us to “the end of nature , a paper presented at UNE Environmental Paradigms Conference, April 1993. Gabriel proposes a managerial resolution: ‘for us to learn to manage both our relationship to our environment, and more broadly the environment itself (quotes from abstract of paper). This amounts to the flip side of an old problematic record. For the “solution” derives from the same defective box as the evident problem. Gabriel ibid. Similarly in McLauglin. Editorial in The Ecologist, Jan-Feb 1992, p.2. 13 any doubt at all vastly facilitate environmental degradation (as well as, less satisfactorily, subsequent clean-up and environmental repair)— with sources and causes, what directs and powers those uses of industrial technique and practice. • Patriarchy. The source is patriarchy, and androgyny; problems derive from mistreatment of women. ‘Our troubles begin with the invention of male deities located off the planet’.28 ‘patriarchy is the source of the environmental crisis’.29 One sample linkage statement runs as follows: ... there is a huge denial ... of the violence perpetrated on women both historically and ... presently] and ... this the same energy that, turned against the Earth, is destroying the very life-support systems and rapidly destroying the conditions that makes complex life possible. The fires that consume the Amazon are the very same fires that burned 9 million witches and I believe that there can be no solution of our ecological problems unless we simultaneously address our gender issues.30 Patriarchy, as source, is evidently a special case of long invoked domination transfer themes: • Human domination and exploitation of humans: It is an extraordinarily widespread assumption that the impact of humans (or, until recently, of Man!) on the environment, or creatures or things in it, is a product of that of humans with each other, typically of groups or classes. In misleadingly brief form, the source is social: Man’s inhumanity to Man; and the solution correspondingly is social. Unremarkably, this unlikely assumption comes in a variety of different forms: early, concerning the mistreatment of animals as an (inevitable) spill-over from mistreatment of humans, recently concerning maltreatment of nature spilling over from, or being one with, that of women. The fashionable assumption runs, in one form or another, from Aquinas through Kant to a range of recent trend setters, including Marcuse, Ulich, Passmore, Bookchin ... and some leading feminists. In particular, it is part of the very meaning of social ecology, an ideology shaped and championed by Bookchin: ‘ecological problems arise from deep-seated social problems’.31 On this theme among others, Bookchin simply follows a prominent trend in social anarchism set by Kropotkin and his contemporary Reclus: all see that the domination and exploitation of nature by man is but an extension of the domination of man by man. Thus, ‘Both Kropotkin and Reclus ... laid the foundations of a radical theory of human ecology. Ecological despoliation was seen to reflect imbalances in human relationships —domination of nature thus following from human domination’.... It follows that if domineering and exploitative human relationships can be avoided in small-scale decentralised societies then such societies are also best for a Quoted in Eckersley p.64, who develops and begins to assess patriarchical source themes. For a more critical assessment see GEF. See Seed, quoted in GEF; also Salleh (see e.g. EP3). John Seed’s Workshop Schedule 1992, Rainforest Information Centre, Lismore, 12. 12.91. Seed’s extravagant identity claims are but a dramatic extension of that popular tendency to transform comparison and similarity statements into identity claims. Indeed reductionism often reaches further, with attempted conversion of all relational statements into identity ones, along with unrelational property claims. Bookchin sometimes qualifies this central claim, with ‘nearly all present’, e.g. EP3 p.354. But he is not strictly entitled to any such qualification, given his invariant theme that the domination of nature always results from die humans domination ot other humans (see e.g. Clark EP3, p.346). The text EP3 contains a big section providing a useful introduction to social ecology. 14 harmonious man-nature relationship.32 Domination and exploitation of one division by another can in turn be seen as a case of dualism at work, between the one, the dominator or dominating class, and the other, the dominated. • A snare of dualisms. Environmental problems derive from operation of a set of connected ideologically-entrenched and defective dualisms.33 • Modern educational systems: Roots of environmental problems lie in educational systems. Or if roots don't, solutions do. However, roots of environmental or social problems do not lie in educational systems. Parts of their solutions may however. For education is critical, for instance, in correcting insufficient adherence to established satisfactory arrangements, such as, so it is claimed, Enlightenment ideals or traditional ethical systems.34 Therewith we are transported full circle back to defective practice answers. 4. Commentary on, and objections to, proposed answers A main part of this exercise consists in a detailed critical commentary on the entries in the main tabulation, and on proposals like them. Small beginnings are made on the exercise, in two stages reflecting the major division in the main tabulation. D. Defective practice answers tend to come from those who presume we are already in possession of adequate theories, or what approximates them or supplies main elements of them. (Such answers are also more liable to emanate from conservatives, opposed to new or radical theories, advanced on the basis of inadequacy of prevailing theories in practice.) Defective practice answers are especially popular in economic reaches. There was a time, perhaps not past yet, when all market failures in the shape of negative externalities were passed off as unintended consequences of economic activity. While outputs or “consequences” such matters as pollution certainly are, unintended they mostly are not now, without emptying ‘unintended’ of its normal sense. For example, industrialists, apprised of conservation laws and unsurprised by polluted wastes, who dump their waste where and when regulators and waste­ watchers are not looking, can hardly pretend that that output is an unintended consequence of their industry. That should now be a bad joke. Accordingly new green economics insists that we dig deeper—without however exceeding economic settings—to discover why markets may foreseeably fail and why environmentally rectifying technology is not delivered.35 Where they usually arrive, travelling 32 33 34 35 Pepper p.192, with internal quotation from Breitbart. Unfortunately it is all too evident, given humans could so socially organise, that they could setde into harmonious small-scale communities which retained but little of pristine natural environments. Such a proposition, outlined in V. and R. Routley, obtains a much fuller elaboration within Plumwood. In an interesting way, such a proposal can hardly be wrong, given the conclusion reached below that a set of defective paradigms in at work. For evidently paradigms can be covered by dualisms, represented by set of diem in each case, somewhat as numbers can be represented in binary terms, generated from a basic two-oneness duality. Thus Passmore, Attfield, and others. For a critical assessment of education, see Sylvan and Bennett. Thus e.g. Jacobs, p.24. a 15 within such unduly confined settings, is, like welfare economics before green, at better regulated markets, with business set as before within frameworks of plans and incentives, controls and penalties. Environmentally, however, such approaches do not reach very deep, or tap into underlying paradigmatic problem-sources. But these sorts of defective practice answers do not always derive from standard economic sources. A deviation-style answer is much favoured by Marxists to explain failure, environmental and other, of the former Soviet Union and other Eastern block countries; namely that true Marxism was not practiced. Unfortunately, even if it had been, environmental consequences would be no better, given the heavy industrial commitments and environmental shallowness, at best, of true Marxism.36 Differently, enlightenment liberals like Passmore try to ascribe failures in Western environmental practice, not to any deficiencies in mainstream theory, but to deviation from well established principles. Unfortunately adherence to these “well established principles” is just one way in which the Earth will lose what remains of its wilderness and remarkable diversity. Now there are no doubt cases, past especially but also present, some resulting (collectively) in extensive environmental degradation, where defective practice answers may be correct. For example, there is harrowing case after harrowing case (brought together in texts like Topsoil and Civilization ) of degradation of prime agricultural lands by imposed farming practices, where at least early on (before damage became visible) ignorance and unintended consequences could be legitimately claimed. In most historical cases we do not have enough information to be able to say with much assurance that agriculture proceeded until effective collapse because of continuing ignorance, or because practices were locked-in in one way or another, or because of sheer obduracy. But we do know more about present agricultural practices, for example in more arid parts of Australia, concerning both irrigated and dry-land agriculture. Many of these practices are undoubtedly sharply degrading lands, and the consequences of the practices, which cannot plead or pretend ignorance, are sufficiently appreciated. But the practices persist, and are encouraged by a sweep of subsidies or concessions. No doubt some of the practitioners can reasonably claim that they are locked into bad practices through circumstance, circumstances now beyond their control such as financial pressures, unfavourable terms-of-trade, and so on, coupled with the need to make a living. But some, such as companies controlling large tracts of land, can make no such claims or excuses, nor can claim such things as family precedence, attachment to place, and similar. Their obdurate practice has to be attributed to something else, most obviously not deviation from theory, but commitment to an environmentally defective paradigm. P. Dealing with defective paradigm answers is an even more complex, and vexed, 36 It is surprising how much of the practice of later Socialist states is prefigured in texts like The Communist Manifesto. Thus “industrial armies” are to be set up; credit, communications and transport are to become state monopolies; “migrants and rebels” are to have dieir property confiscated; and so on. All this runs contrary to much Marxist apologetics (as A. Urquhart, who made those points, also observed). 16 business. Let us try to condense main matters to a few themes: 1. Many of the (incomplete) paradigms listed are not even sufficient for environmental impasses. They may be seriously mistaken, they may have undesirable intellectual and perhaps social effects, but a society could persist sustainably with those drawbacks. Thus, for example, substance metaphysics (under modified Spinozism), dualisms, even patriarchy. The same might even hold for materialism and mechanism, (assuming these practices can be coherently made out, that depending on how differentiated ideologies and values are accommodated, and so forth). To illustrate: a metaphysics, of any sort, cannot be the whole story, because it does not, on it own, account for action, anti-environmental or other. Without special bridges from metaphysics to value-intricating action theory, a sort of naturalistic fallacy operates. Thus subverted, in essentially Hume’s way, are all the vulgar sources of environmental problems which take them as derived from metaphysics. 2. While several—not just one—of the paradigms listed are sufficient—in the right circumstances (given long historical development, accumulation, and so on37)—none are necessary. Similar impasses could arise, and locally have arisen, given significantly different paradigms; for example given, instead of main Western trouble-making paradigms, Confucianism or advanced Polynesianism. At this stage in dialectic, green history or ecohistory, and related virtual histories, enter decisively. Ponting's Green History of the World begins with a graphic account of the rise and ecological fall of Easter Island under the impact of Polynesian projects. The work also conveniently documents many other examples, well-known to biohistorians, of ecological degradation or collapse, far from the influence of Western paradigms. An important example (much less speculative than some of the examples because of a comparative wealth of primary documentation) outlines the destruction of accessible Chinese ecosystems under Confucian dynasties. What several of these examples also reveal is that no very high level of technology is needed to inflict serious environmental damage; persistence in pursuit of an ideological project (with nothing directly to do with basic needs) will suffice. Other cultures did, or would have (given the technology and numbers), wrecked similar damage. For instance, deforestation, salination, megafaunal elimination, and so on, were well established before rise of modem Western paradigms, or in regions outside their influence. 3. The list of paradigms, as so far presented, is entirely Western in orientation. Moreover environmental woes are regularly ascribed to Western sources — wrongly. For non-Western paradigms have led, or would lead given the opportunities (including access to the technologies), to outcomes as undesirable as under dominant Western paradigm. Witness 37 While it is easy to imagine ineffectual or incompetent tribes which live benignly environmentally, by just muddling along, under even the worst of paradigms, that is not really to the point. A pertinent tribe needs to have developed the structure which leads to problems, to have the means, and so on. 17 again Confucianism, for instance, and its role and influence in Asian regions. Confucianism incorporates human chauvinism par excellence (as well as, some might say, Chinese chauvinism).38 Or Islam, with its reach across the Middle East. The main tabulation (of table 3) should accordingly be extended to take due account of non-Westem paradigms, including for example: Other Abrahamic religions Islam (Judaism Confucianism Shintoism Polynesianism, at least in advanced forms as on Easter Island. What is “Western” is tending to blur also. Is Judaism Western, how western, or Islam? There is also a tendency to suppose that more Western religions, Abrahamic religions, with their intense monotheism, are significantly ideologically worse than non-Westem. But the contrasts are different and much more complex than that. A better divide is into monistic and pluralistic. Even so, many undesirable social and environmental features are incorporated in or encouraged by religious pluralisms from the Indian subcontinent. 4. All the single paradigm answers are inadequate, all are too simple. Even so some are less inadequate than others. It is the same, more or less, for the combined answers, often to be encountered. For generally they represent but one thin cross-section of Western paradigms. While all the single one-source one-shot paradigmatic answers, occur on their own, often they are combined. For instance, although Descartes is often cited as a villain, more often criticism of Cartesianism is combined with criticism of other concurrent ideological elements, such as Baconian empiricism (less incompatibly, Drengson, for one, regularly combines criticism of the technocratic paradigm with criticism of Cartesianism—though Descartes, for all his rich and appalling thought, contributed little to the rise of technocratic organisation.) Similarly Hargrove combines Greek philosophy, as original source, with modern rationalism and much else. 5. Towards a more satisfactory explanation. Not only are the paradigmatic roots seriously intertangled (because of connections of one paradigm with another, because for instance of heavy philosophical inputs into religious paradigms), but further there is not a single defective paradigm. Rather there is a family or sheaf of paradigms, commitment to any of which, or any suitable combination of which, in requisite circumstances, appears to have yielded environmentally untoward outcomes (requisite circumstances including availability of technology, extent of social support, and so on). Within that plurality there are of course gradations—and not only gradations but major differences—in calibre, in environmental friendliness. A Cartesianism which regards animals as mere auto­ 38 Its net of effects extends widely. Consider, e.g., the role of Chinese medicine in decline of large fauna. 18 mata incapable of feeling genuine pain, is significantly worse as regards other life-forms and their decent treatment than a utilitarianism which positively values animal sentience. The family is not exclusively Western, or Northern, though (through colonialism and cultural imperialism) paradigm of these sorts now predominate. Paradigms and cultures of less “advanced” and third world communities have also operated to enhance environmental vandalism and degradation locally and regionally. Industrialization and technological advance are, without doubt, what have inflated environmental problems from rather localised ones, damaging islands and river catchments, to grander and global ones. They are the engines, powerhouses, of major problems/9 They did not however run on their own, nor do they continue on their own. Such engines were not designed and built, fuelled and tended, independently.39 40 They evolved primarily in the specially favoured culture of capitalism, though parallel developments could have occurred, and later did, in other prepared and heavily controlled surroundings, such as state socialism. Now however these engines have been rendered more reliable and less dependent on careful cultural support, and have been transferred to run in less favourable settings. TABLE 4: Connected continuing sources of global environmental problems Transfer of technology, industry and problems to other regions Inflation intensification and spread of problems to larger regions Technologicalindustrial development within ideological cultural framework development within another , \ or different / • framework / Multiple sources of various regional problems 39 40 The picture of development of environmental problems preferred accordingly bears passing resemblance to that now tendered for development of the early Universe, where a source event, the Big Bang, was followed by a huge inflationary phenomenon. Naturally the resemblance has limitations; for instance, universe inflation is not terrestrially replicable in the way industrialization now is (hired or delivered off the shelf, pollution problems and all, with a big price tag). Lacking such favourable ideological surroundings, earlier technological “break throughs were not duly developed: thus early wheels, steam engines, gunpowder, etc. 19 Even if the whole “West” went into a terminal decline, and its paradigms disappeared into history, serious environmental exploitation and degradation would continue, driven by other cultures. For instance, the West could collapse through protracted war, through choking on its own toxic wastes, or whatever (there are many routes to catastrophic decline, outlined for instance in “Limits to Growth” scenarios, that could differentially impact on the West). Degradation would now continue, however; there would be only temporary respite from environmental crises. While most of the problems, awfully aggregated in contemporary environmental crises, are produced or accelerated by — what connects them — contemporary industrial society, not all environmental problems are or have been of this sort. But many of the other problems, such as destruction of rainforests by itinerant peasants, can be seen as by-products, or similar; thus, in the example, the peasants displaced by agribusiness, absentee wealth-holders or similar, arrived there on industrially-made roads opening the forests, and often wrecked this damage using industrial machinery. An environmental friendly culture has to be much more critical concerning certain types of industrialization, and much more selective regarding technology than present dominant cultures, Western or non-Westem. While there are such paradigms, on the ideas market, they mostly lack sophisticated contemporary elaboration. Examples of more friendly paradigms, that do not lead of themselves to massive environmental problems and crises include those now tabulated: TABLE 5: Examples, several flawed, of environmentally friendly paradigms. Oriental ideologies: Taoism (classical) Jainism recessive traditions, now with tiny followings and little political influence. Indigenous cultures: Australian Aboriginals (e.g. Aranda) Amazonian Indians, etc. Western philosophies: old Stoicism Spinozism new Deep green theories, such as deep ecology. under certain favourable interpretations Given the remoteness of most of these examples from contemporary life, and difficulties with their wide adaptability, it is a short step to a familiar conclusion that new paradigms need to be worked out. Much more intellectual effort should be devoted to such enterprise. What we have arrived at, then, is a rough classification of paradigms into two large 20 families: environmentally friendly and unfriendly. No doubt there is a fuzzy residue class (neither, and perhaps both). DIAGRAM 6: Broad environmental division of paradigms. To questions as to why agents adhere, or continue to adhere, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms, the answers are likewise plural, and diverse (and some match answers in Table 3). Reasons are psychological, social and cultural (with circularity here encountered), and include considerations of the following sorts and others: because that is how things are done, or have always been done; because needs can be met, perhaps only met, in that way, so it is believed; because there are no alternatives, or none seen, perhaps because none have been sought; because negative outcomes can be overcome, or do not really matter; and so on. It is not difficult to indicate, more or less, which paradigms will, if duly, diligently or religiously practiced, lead to environmental problems and impasse. Some family characteristics, then, of unfriendly paradigms: * Combination effects, illustrated through Leibnitzianism. Any which guarantees satisfaction of all or enough elements of the consumption impact equation, and so would generate excessive impacts. To illustrate, consider what might be called Leibnitzianism, in honour of Leibnitz (though Leibnitz's fragmentary work did not initiate any genuine historic school). Leibnitz was heavily committed to all of human population growth, unfettered technological advance, and human lifestyles of consumption, in short, to precisely those factors that combine in the impact recipe to produce excessive human impacts upon environments. There is fair evidence for these contentions. First, Leibnitz was an early exponent of utilitarianism, indeed he was all-round an enthusiastic maximizer. From his formulation of utilitarianism, he drew an immediate obvious corollary: the directive to increase human population (maximizing on aggregate human pleasure is most obviously achieved by production of more happy humans, other aspects of which technology and affluence can assure).41 Secondly, Leibnitz was a technology enthusiast; he was heavily committed to the developments and use of scientific technology, for which he had all sorts of schemes (e.g. the characteristic universalis intended to encapsulate all of knowledge in an accessible useable form, a complete calculus duly mechanised, as well as numerous technological projects.42). Thirdly, he was committed to an affluent lifestyle for himself and (through symmetry and basic assumptions of utilitarianism) for others. For his own part, he For Leibnitz’s anticipation of utilitarianism, see Hruschka. For Leibnitz’s immediate application of the principle, to support human population increase, see p.172. ‘Leibnitz's interest in machinery is illustrated by his complicated plan to drain the Harz mines, which involved the construction of a new type of windmill, and a virtually friction-free pump’, Cottingham p.193. For a detailed account of Leibnitz’s extensive entrepreneurial and technological activities, see Aiton. 21 abandoned an academic career at an obscure German university ‘in favour of the more active and lucrative pursuits of the courtier and diplomat’ and, so it turned out, the bright lights of major European cities and grand tours of Europe.43 Leibnitz has sometimes been accounted environmentally friendly. Some of that apparent friendliness was due to scholastic conservativism. Thus he was opposed to mechanism; he was sympathetic to the organic and teleological, which did not contract to isolated human and superhuman loci. His metaphysical theory of monads, which are centres of living energy, effectively distributed life everywhere, though not equally. Harmony and order too prevailed throughout the universe, though under God's maximizing management, the presence of which they duly established! But even this life-expanding harmonious order, variants of which are now familiar from Whiteheadian and deep ecological quarters, was not as benign as it has superficially appeared. Leibnitz supposed that, by virtue of pre-established harmony and final causes governing inevitable progress, humans would not go wrong in the longer term in their environmental activities, that they could not 'cumulatively make undesirable changes in nature’.44 Leibnitz joyfully foresaw more and more of the Earth coming under cultivation, and its long-term advancement to a complete intensive garden, even if there were occasional relapses where parts deteriorated back temporarily towards wild state. Leibnitz even criticised Cartesianism, now widely regarded as prime villain of the environmental piece, as failing ‘to provide the modal stimulus .... to the control of nature’ ... ‘to scientific advance’. The idea of control, advancing to total control, total management, is prophesized in Leibnitz (in a sort of chauvinistic Gaia hypothesis). He saw ‘order as progressively increasing, with the help of man [as] a finisher of nature. He boldly applauded the idea of progress to the earth as a unit, assuming both an orderliness on earth and an orderliness in the changes it had undergone by man’.45 No doubt Leibnitz’s lifestyle commitments need not (and may not) be reflected in his philosophy, which may have independent environmental merit, for example as stimulation or input for later developments. There is unfortunately little evidence that that is so. Nonetheless, substantial fragments of Leibnitz’s philosophy do admit environmental bending and adaptation, in a way that Descartes’ philosophy does not at all easily. An important corollary does emerge: that a promising new metaphysics is no panacea for improved environmental performance or paradigms. Not merely neutral metaphysics, but even positive metaphysics, such as certain organic and process theories, are compatible with, and can be coupled with, damaging social theories and life-styles. It is almost enough to consider the theories, practices and lifestyles of Aristotle, Leibnitz and Whitehead.46 43 44 45 46 Cottingham p.24, p.26. Glacken p.478. As he remarks, these bold assumptions made by Leibnitz have proved wrong. Glacken p.506. Leibnitz’s standing in die history of philosophy is somewhat curious. His main achievement, setting aside his reputation as an intellectual wizard with lots of ideas, appears to be spasmodic work upon a beautiful ruin, an incomplete (and incompletable) metaphysics, of which only 22 * Direct untoward effects, illustrated through Cartesianism and Confucianism, or indeed any system which attributes little or no value to natural items, and perhaps much value to nature transforming or interfering human (or elite) projects. So it is with Confucianism, which is entirely human focussed. ‘Centering his attention on man in his present life, Confucius had as his goal the achievement of a good society characterized by harmonious social relations.’47 The outside world, the nature environment, was of no moral significance. It mattered only instrumentally, to humans. Descartes went further. Human bodies too were automata, complex machinery. ‘The exception is [mind, or specifically] thought, and its external manifestation language: this alone cannot be explained mechanistically—a thesis which leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and “the beasts”’.48 The remaining world, the natural environment—lacking humanity, thought, mind—was again of no moral significance. It possessed derivatively only what value and meaning humans, or minds, chose to confer or project upon it. Since, either way, any way, a natural environment devoid of humans had no thoughts, purposes or interests, no value or meaning of its own, it could not matter what happened to it. It could be regarded, justifiably, as nothing but a reservoir of resources for humans.49 Cartesians drew just such conclusions; similar conclusions derive from Platonism and Pentecostalism, and are implicit at least in Confucianism. Descartes again went further. His practices and methods, like those of Bacon, were ‘aimed at making men the masters and possessors of nature’.50 * devaluation of natural items as against human elements or artefacts (typically exhibiting human chauvinism);51 as a corollary, * entitlement to domination, dominion over nature; * short-term framework; * maximization assumptions, coupled with grand projects. Family characteristic of friendly paradigms will tend to invert (in effect negate) these features. An environmentally friendly paradigm can be expected to yield environmentally significant corollaries, such as: * an end to degrading primary production, wherever it prevails. 47 48 49 50 51 Instead ecological forestry tantalizing fragmentary structures were ever available. It is not even as if there is a surviving supply of challenging bad arguments that can be put before baffled students, as with Descartes and Berkeley for instance. Reese p. 102. Cottingham p.15. The utter invalidity of Descartes' argument to this divide (cited by Cottingham) is now comparatively easy to expose, given almost 400 years of hindsight. There are no such status divides. See further Appendix 2. Borrowing some nice phraseology from F. Mathews. See Discourse VI. Shallow will work out only with right mix ol humans. But in any case, it is implausible. An appealing ecological dieorem insinuates itself hereabouts: Given certain conditions (such as short-term vision, techno-fix, ...), shallowness is necessary and sulficient for environmental crisis. 23 and ecological agriculture will come to prevail. • a calling off of grand ideologically-grounded projects, interfering with or damaging natural environments, such as major dams, river diversions, demolished islands (e.g. for airports), new mountains, terraforming, extensive rainmaking, climatic interference, and generally the sweep of “playing God” projects. A little of this sort of technology can go a very long way. A short answer can now be ventured to the focal questions: Because most agents are bound to (locked into, committed to, or captively go along with) environmentally unfriendly paradigms. As a result the (long-term) health of the rest of environments does not matter, or matter enough. 6. Resulting unfavourable report on dominant philosophy. It will hardly have escaped notice that virtually all dominant philosophical roads lead to Rome, to environmentally unfriendly paradigms. Stripped of metaphor, there are environmental conditions of adequacy, which most philosophical systems fail to meet In an environmentally friendly new world, most philosophy that is remembered, indeed most of the humanities, is destined for scrapping. Prevailing philosophy is a serious impediment to satisfactory environmental outcomes. Philosophy, not just Western philosophy, has by and large been bad environmental news.52 It has supplied, or mightily assisted in supplying, main unfriendly paradigms under which environments labour. Of course not everything has to be tipped; much can be salvaged, arguments, subtheories and so on (and with intellectual tipping there need be little material waste). Nor therefore is it as if an entirely fresh start has to be made. As well as salvaged bits and pieces (which need to be carefully tested for soundness), there are recessive paradigms and neglected traditions to look to for suggestions, and inspiration, and perhaps to rehabilitate. Richard Sylvan* via Bungendore, OZ. APPENDIX 1. Dominant philosophy has aided and abetted ruination of terrestrial environments. That dominant intellectual paradigms are dismal news for deep (nonchauvinistic) environmental theory has been previously argued, in contraposed form.53 More recently Hargrove has investigated, in detail, negative implications of the main philosophical tradition 53 It may be insisted that philosophy can make no difference, for instance to environmental practice. It is not an expression of basic needs, or of any such practical matters. Exceptions to such practical bravado have however to be recognised almost immediately; philosophy soon enters for organizational, justificatory and explanatory ends. That concession still grossly under­ estimates the extent to which ideas, and more generally paradigms, influence and even govern action and practice, especially reflective and rational action. On the substantial point, not dierefore removed through the alleged practical impotence ot philosophy, see Appendix 1. An earlier version of this article was presented at die Environmental Paradigms Conference, University of New England, Armidale, April 93. It would not have been written otherwise. Notably at the end of EE, pp. 188-9. 24 for environmental theory and practice, especially/or environmental attitudes concerned with nature and creature preservation, with nature appreciation and development of a proper ecological perspective.54 However Hargrove has ventured some of his particularly challenging themes in insufficiently careful form, thereby leaving himself unnecessarily vulnerable to criticism and counter-claims. These include the criticisms assembled by Attfield, who, though not unsympathetic to Hargrove’s case, has excessively weakened the themes. For example, what Attfield presents as ‘substantially correct’ is Hargrove’s ‘verdict that the history of philosophy has discouraged preservationist attitudes’, vastly less than Hargrove’s actual negative verdict which comprehended considerably more than just “preservationist attitudes”, and recorded a situation conspicuously worse than mere “discouragement” of nature and creature preservation, as well as much else. Indeed it is worse than Hargrove has charged; Hargrove’s indictment of mainstream philosophy is itself weaker than that here ventured, which takes mainstream philosophy as thoroughly implicated in the present escalating environmental mess, through its roles as a major source and supplier of operative ideas and paradigms. There is a single qualification, invoked incidentally by Attfield himself, that would remove much of Attfield’s criticism: a restriction to mainstream philosophy (or differently, to dominant philosophy). Consider Attfield’s exceptions to ‘the adverse impacts of Western philosophy’, those alleged ‘philosophical traditions that have encouraged taking nature seriously’. Firstly, insofar as the Church Fathers, medieval Christians and others Attfield alludes to are philosophers at all, they are entirely minor figures, unlikely to be known to many philosophers, and but rarely or never referred to in regular philosophy courses; they do not form part of mainstream philosophy.55 Secondly, these minor figures do not afford the clear support for his claims that Attfield has regularly assumed.56 Many of the statements supposed to offer support are ambivalent, or environmentally dubious, supporting some form of managerialism (e.g. perfectionism or stewardship); and in any case they have to be set against the remainder of what a figure says and does (so far as can be ascertained). After all, as regards the latter matter, there are isolated claims in major philosophers (Plato is regularly cited in this regard) which may make them appear environmentally aware and even sympathetic. Although Plato’s philosophy generally suggests that he neither knew or cared about environmental problems, one passage in the Critias shows that he was very much aware of at least one problem: the effect of deforestation on soil See e.g. Hargrove, p.21. Consider the sorts of exceptions: • minor philosophers, many of whom we know very little about, outside gossip and speculation, such as Ilieophrastus, early Stoics, and lesser Epicureans. • figures who are only secondarily or marginally philosophers, such as Hooke, Boyle, Ray and Evelyn. • medieval and early modem Christians, who typically are not significant philosophers, and were usually committed not the nature preservation and the like, but to nature management or perfection. In work referred to on p. 127. The main historical claims, many of them based on secondary sources, are stated in his The Ethics of Environmental Concern A more detailed criticism of these claims will be made elsewhere. 25 ♦ quality in Greece during his own lifetime.57 Unfortunately Hargrove does but a comparatively poor job in accounting for what he alleges, Plato’s indifference and lack of ecological concern.58 The reasons for Plato’s indifference to serious ecological degradation of forests and soils in Greece can be ascribed to a combination of several elements of Plato’s philosophy (a natural-world-dismissive ideology) including: elevation of transcendental forms as what was truly real and really of value, denigration and dismissal of the everyday natural world as utterly inferior, of entirely lower existence or even illusory and certainly not of rational concern. This dualistic ontology and axiology—a wonderfully valuable world of forms standing in complete contrast with the illusory material world of perception—was supplemented and reinforced by a corresponding epistemology. Under a tripartite theory of mind, the higher rational part, which gave epistemic access to the forms, a part exhibited only by humans and more elevated beings, was sharply separated from the two lower animal parts. Thus under Plato’s conception of the human, humans and especially the important rational component of the human, stood in opposition to nature; the distinctively human task is completely separate from nature and concerned with control of it and its unruly elements. It is because what really has value—rational selves cavorting among the forms—is separate from nature, transcending it, with nature at best comprising very inferior copies, of lower existence, that it does not matter what happens to the earth and earthly things, to mere matter, that is a matter of indifference. 59 APPENDIX 2. On the prominent roles of dominant philosophy in the inferiorization and mistreatment of (mere) animals. Although the attitudes concerned reach back to antiquity, and were rationalized in classical Greek philosophy (through a theory of separate parts, “highest” of which was a soul or rational component), the whole appalling affair was given an enormous stimulus by Cartesian philosophy. Descartes cherished a scheme for a purely mechanistic science of physiology. Descartes compares the human body to an ‘automaton’ and argues that had we sufficient knowledge of the structure of its working parts we could explain even highly complex behavioural responses in purely mechanical terms. The exception is thought, and its external manifestation, language: this leads Descartes to assert a fundamental divide between human beings and ‘the beasts’: There are no men so dull-witted or stupid—and this includes even madmen— that they are incapable of arranging various words together and forming an utterance in order to make their thoughts understood, whereas no animal, however perfect, can do the like. This is not because they lack the necessary organs, for we see that magpies and parrots can utter words as we do, and yet cannot speak as we do (i.e. show that they are thinking what they are saying). By contrast, even men born deaf and dumb, and thus deprived of speech organs as much as the beasts, or more so, normally invent their own signs to make 59 Hargrove, p.29. This sort of problem arises not merely in regard to Plato, as Attfield observes, with decided relish. There is little doubt but that Hargrove’s historical excess needs to be sharpened and much elaborated, and, in some critical areas, rectified. On this classical polarisation of nature and higher humanity, see Plumwood. 26 themselves understood ... This shows that the beasts do not merely have less reason than man, but have no reason at all ...^® These sorts of considerations have been immensely influential in establishing a received fundamental ontological divide, not merely between humans and (other) animals, but between humans and nature. But, as we should now appreciate, they are all subtly, or less subtly, astray, and do not sustain the conclusion drawn. Firstly, investigation reveals internal incoherence. No men are incapable of stringing words together and forming utterances, yet many men are so incapable, not least those who are dumb. As his differential objective demands, Descartes exaggerates what those bom deaf and dumb may do—they do not ‘normally invent their own signs’, but may painstakingly learn a sign language—by contrast with ‘the beasts’. But, as we are now learning, many animals, whose organs are not well adapted to speech, can also painstakingly learn sign language. Indeed they may communicate by signs and sounds (though not usually speech) “in the wild”. There is no sharp cut-off, such as a fundamental divide presumes, between creatures that can, or do, communicate by signs and sounds, and those who cannot, or do not. Secondly, even less is there a significant boundary between those that can understand inputs and reason, and those that cannot, or do not. None of reasoning, thought and understanding are inextricably or inexorably tied to speech, nor, more broadly, to language.60 61 For example, dogs, whose speech is rather limited (though they certainly communicate, including to humans, by a range of different sounds, as well as signs), can understand and respond to several hundred commands and the like (that is, to a number of the same order as the vocabulary of basic languages). As for reasoning, the problem-solving capabilities of many sorts of animals, especially laboratory rats, are now well (even excessively, for primal comfort) documented. Regrettably, Descartes has not been on his own, or out on an exceptional limb. Virtually all past great philosophers insisted, if not on an unbridgeable gap, certainly on a difference in kind of supreme philosophical importance, between humans and other animals. Only Hume afforded a conspicuous exception to unedifying philosophical orthodoxy. Worse with other supposedly fundamental divides, such as that partitioning off nonsentients, there appear to have been no exceptions. The world was and is sharply divided, so it was and is imagined, into fixed inflexible categories. Furthermore, despite Hume, Cartesian inputs have persisted, for instance in the widespread philosophical idea—running contrary to an enormous body of evidence—that animals have no interests, preferences or intentions, that they receive no satisfaction from what they do or choose to do, and so on. Cartesianism certainly assisted, not merely in changing philosophical method importantly, 60 61 Cottingham, Three Rationalists, p.15, also quoting Descartes. For this reason, the “language of thought” conception, pervading much cognitive science, is decidedly regressive. Nor is it necessary: combinatorial operations, which can perform a fine representational job, provide an improved replacement for such a “language”: see DP chapter 11. 27 but in altering metaphysics irrevocably, above all as regards human place in nature. As an outcome of rectified method, Philosophy, including physical science, becomes in Descartes a selfcontained discipline, guided by the light of reason; it has no need to be supplemented by revelation, scripture, or ecclesiastic teaching.62 As to the new physics and its outcome in metaphysics, despite a certain amount of judicious fudging over whether the earth ‘really’ moves, Descartes was firmly committed to the new Copernican cosmology, whereby the Earth is dethroned from its central position. The Earth is simply a planet, it has the same status as Mars and Saturn—‘bodies we do not make so much of’... . What is more, the sun itself is only one star among innumerable others, each of which is the centre of its own celestial ‘vortex’. Descartes [rightly] saw all this as having important implications for human life. The universe, as conceived of in medieval and scholastic cosmology, was one which revealed, in all its details, the purposes of a benevolent creator. In the words of Paracelsus, writing some hundred years before Descartes ‘all things belonging to nature exist for the benefit of man’. For Descartes the vastly expanded size of the post-Copernican universe, the possibility of innumerable other worlds, and the insignificance of our planet in comparison with the hugeness of the whole, made it impossible to continue to regard man as the ‘dearest of God’s creatures’.... The belief that all things exist for our benefit alone, says Descartes ..., involves a presumptuous view of our status and a failure to recognize the unlimited vastness of God’s creation....63 So, in important respects, Cartesianism offered improvements and a way forward. environmentally. But the message was mixed and muffled, as with that concerning final causes, hostility to which Descartes justified as a corollary. No doubt final causes were used to smuggle in divine purposes, specifically God’s special concern for the welfare of humans (no doubt the Church and Church fathers who engaged in this smuggling were not to be trusted). However undesirable practices could be weeded out, without eradicating respectable ones. Over-zealous in just this fashion was the common 17th Century slogan, ‘Abandon final causes and look for underlying structures’, which affords another example of explanatory skimping.64 Sound methodology can admit both internal structures and final causes. Nonetheless, dethroning, relegating or abandoning final causes was a major movement within modern deanthropocentrization, so far as it has yet proceeded. Lovejoy has highlighted the matter. For, according to him, ...physico-theological ideas came to rest on the assumption that all other elements of nature were created for man’s sake, and therefore put man and nature into an unequal relationship: Tout est cree pour Thomme is at once the tacit premise and the triumphant conclusion of that long series of teleological arguments which ... is one of the 62 63 64 Cottingham pp. 176-177. Unfortunately for Descartes’ grand systematic-doubt project, reason was far from sufficient, and did need supplementation, though not through reinstatement of established prejudice. Though judiciously shedding some ancient conventional wisdom (e.g. concerning humans’ privileged control place in nature), Descartes was either forced or else felt obliged to reinstate much received wisdom, through poorly concealed subterfuges, in order to get his rationalistic roadshow moving. Cottingham, ibid. On the slogan, and the Church, see Cottingham p. 178. On skimping, see DP chapter 11. most curious moments of human imbecility.65 APPENDIX 3. On Shepard’s approach to focal questions. A remarkably sustained investigation of the focal questions is found in Shepard’s books. In his Nature and Madness, he considers and quickly dismisses many of the stock responses to focal questions suggested by contemporary luminaries (or by himself in earlier work), such as lack of information, faulty technique, insensibility, greed, political inertia, change to agriculture and settlement,66.... He would (and should, for his eliminative argument) have also dismissed industrialization, state and corporate control, and so on. More disconcertingly, for present purposes, Shepard claims that ‘a history of ideas’— similarly no doubt a story of paradigms—will not serve; for it ‘is not enough to explain human behaviour’ (p.3), it ‘seems too easy and academic’ (p.3), itself an easy and superficial criticism. But if, for instance, the ‘dictum that nature should serve man’ and ‘insistence that animals feels no pain’ should become widely entrenched, then they may well impact heavily on practice, as accordingly appears to be the case. His slight further argument appears to miss the intended target: ‘The meticulous analysis of these philosophies and the discovery that they articulate an ethos beg the question’ (p.3). How, it can reasonably be inquired? What is offered is but the facile, false, ‘ideas are impotent’ consideration, fostered by thinking and operating in terms of causes (e.g. lower p.3), rather than reasons and (rational) explanation, and encouraged through an attempted move to (what is explanatorily inadequate) pure behaviour. For a simple example of the familiar explanatory roles of ideas and paradigms, consider an alternative explanation through them. The admittedly bizarre (“crazy”) ‘turning everything into something man-made and [or] man-used’ (p.5) is readily explained through dominant paradigms: that is the way it acquires value, otherwise it is worthless. There is no need at all for psychopathology here. Correspondingly Shepard briefly reviews and rejects several of the very partial, and often hopeless, solutions suggested under stock responses to focal questions such as making information, or better information, more widely available, bringing people from all walks of like together, encouraging conviviality, hitting problems with smart technology, practicing conservation, and so on. Shepard’s own resolution is more readily reached from a further (meta-focal) question that he proceeds to ask: why do humans persist in degrading their habitats once sources and solutions are made transparent? He effectively argues by elimination: other sources (read as causes) do not succeed in providing an answer; but ‘the idea of a sick society’ (which he leaps to, without argument, p.4) does. Wrong on both counts: On the first because a non-causal explanation in terms of ideological wiring can provide answers (listen to politicians, 65 66 Pepper p.44, quoting Lovejoy. No doubt a popular picture of human social changes with agriculture and settlement ir simplistic: that before societies lived in harmony, afterwards they did not. But it is also too simple to go on to claim, as Shepard does, that ‘the economic and material demands of growing villages and towns are ... not causes but results of this change’ (p.3). Some demands appear to derive from factors, such as population pressures, which were among causes of the changes. 29 representative of the people, again, just a little time). On the second because some industrial societies are not sick in a normal sense (though some may be), rather sickness has to be so redefined (such low redefinitions are among underlying subplots67) that having certain ideological commitments that are carried into practice counts as “sickness”. So it is that Shepard arrives at his theme of ‘general, culturally-ratified distortions of childhood, of massive disablement of ontogeny as the basis of irrational and self-destructive attitudes towards the natural environment’ (p.ix). Succinctly, ‘there are profound psychic dislocation at the root of modem society’ (p.xii). Psychic disorders have evolved: ‘over the centuries major institutions and metaphysics might finally celebrate attitudes and ideas originating in the normal context of immaturity [or]... adolescence ...’ (p. 15). Having glided easily and invalidly to the idea of sick societies, in a mere three pages, Shepard proceeds to diagnose in more detail the nature of the alleged sickness.68 It supposedly arises, like other psychopathy with which it is immediately associated, in infancy, and is manifest in life-long immaturity, with whole societies stuck in a kind of destractive adolescence. No doubt there is something to some of what Shepard describes in child and person development (not the ‘private demons’ and so on) or might well have described. There is evidently, conspicuously in “new world” societies, wide commitment to a shallow juvenile culture, adulation or imitation of immature media and sport models and flawed authority figures, marginalization of the elderly, and so on, coupled with hyper-activity, violence and vandalism. But, like political commitment to extensive economic activity, this is hardly satisfactorily accounted for through psychopathological reduction, concentrating the whole social problematic in the ontogeny of individuals.69 A superior explanation to widespread individual psychic disorder proceeds through ideological commitment, that industrial human are raised and educated in, inducted into and committed to, defective ideologies without coming to know or properly experience alternatives. The ‘portraits of maturity’ alluded to likewise appear individualistic and culture-bound, resembling those of deep ecology, directed at embroidery of person and self, through personal For trickery through redefinition of sickness and madness, Wisdom has already prepared us. Observe that Shepard’s redefinition of sickness to include sick (i.e. debasing and devaluing) practices with regard to natural habitats (and conjoined therewith, to, older people) does not leave no contrast classes. For there remain benign ‘relic tribal’ societies, such as the Manus, Crow and Comanche, Aranda and !Kung San (p.xii), ‘people who feel themselves to be guests rather than masters’ (p.6 empasis added)—an elegant analogy. ‘The idea of a sick society’, which as Shepard confesses (on p.4) is hardly new, is reached on the third page of the main text. A psychopathic reduction is in part made plausible by reexpression in medical or psychological terms of what would better be otherwise expressed. Consider, for instance the language of the following clever paragraph, which infiltrates much with no argument: ‘The person himself is, of course, caught between his inner calendar and the surgeries of society. His momentum for further growth may be twisted or amputated according to the hostilities, fears, or fantasies required of him, as his retardation is silently engineered to domesticate his integrity or to allow him to share in the collective dream of mastery (p.16). But the trapping of agents between inner directives and social conditions and demands, or between rival ideologies, can be retold in different, less medical and metaphorical terms. 30 growth and identity, wider identification and relatedness, self-realization.70 They are not exactly those of older and ecologically wiser societies. They do not reveal ecologically mature mixed communities. Furthermore, comparisons with relic tribal societies, which are important, can be decoupled from psychopathological analysis and reduction. Different lifeways, commitments and ideologies, are what they are and do not all reduce to matters of mental health. Undoubtedly we can learn of and from these different societies. We can still witness ‘smallgroup, leisured, foraging life-ways with[in] natural surroundings.... there is the rub—... for us, now, that world no longer exists’ (p. 14 rearranged). Nor is it really true that such a world is no longer accessible to most of us; more leisured small-group ways can be retrieved, some natural surrounding can even now be restored. In a curious fashion, Shepard has managed to invert likely causal relations. While a certain interaction can no doubt be conceded, it is not so much human ill-health that is leading to environmental degradation, but rather environmental degradation, generally brought about for other reasons, that is increasingly leading to human ill-health, and in the longer term causing erosion of life-support systems. REFERENCES E.J. Aiton, Leibnitz A Biography, Adam Hilger, Bristol, 1985. R. Attfield, ‘Has the history of philosophy ruined the environment?’ Environmental Ethics 13(1991) 127-137. A. Bellett, ‘The evaluation of values compatible with ecological sustainability’, Fundamental Questions Papers, No.2 CRES, Australian National University, 1990. J. Callicott, ‘Genesis and John Muir’ Re Vision 12(3) (1990) 31-41. J. Cottingham, The Rationalists, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1988. C. Dale, V.G. Carter, Topsoil and Civilization, Rev ed. Norman; University of Oklahama Press, 1974. A Dobson, Green Reader, Routledge, London, 1991? A. Drengson, ‘Ecosophy’, Positive Vibrations, (1990?) 8-10. R. Eckersley, Environmentalism and Political Theory, UCL Press, London, 1992. A. Gare, Beyond European Civilization, Eco-logical Press, Bun gendore, 1993. C.J. Glacken, Traces on the Rhodian Shore, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1967. E.C. Hargrove, Foundations of Environmental Ethics, Prentice Hall, N.J., 1989. J. Hruschka, ‘The greatest happiness principle and other early German anticipations of utilitarian theory’, Utilitas 3(2)(1991) 165-177 M. Jacobs, The Green Economy, Pluto, London, 1991. Cf pp.12-14. Likewise there is a conservative underlay, more oppressive than that of deep ecology: insistence on ‘one particular mother’ (p.7) even suggestion of unsatisfactoriness in ‘taking mothers off to work’ (p.l5)! 31 A. McLaughlin, Regarding Nature'. Industrialism and Deep Ecology SUNY Press, Albany N.Y., 1993. F. Mathews, The Ecological Self, Bames and Noble, Maryland, 1991. J. Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature, Duckworth, London, 1974 D. Pearce and others, Blueprintfor a Green Economy, Earthscan Publications, London, 1989. D. Pepper, The Roots of Modern Environmentalism, Ed: Tom Colveson London; Dover N.H. Croom Helm 1984. V. Plumwood, Feminism and the Master of Nature, Routledge, London, 1993. C. Ponting, A Green History of the World, Sinclair-Stevenson, London, 1991. V. and R. Routley, The Fight for the Forests, RSSS, Australian National University, 1973; referred to as FF. R. and V. Routley, ‘Social themes, self-management and environmental problems’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others) RSSS, Australian National University, 1980. R. and V. Routley ‘Human chauvinism and environmental ethics’, in Environmental Philosophy (eds. D. Mannison and others), RSSS Australian National University, 1980; referred to as EE. R. Routley, ‘Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action’, Discussion papers in environmental philosophy #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1982. P. Shephard, Nature and Madness, Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1982. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, The Greening of Ethics, White Horse Press, Cambridge, 1994. R. Sylvan with D. Bennett, Of Utopias, Tao and Deep Ecology, Green Series #19, RSSS Australian National University, 1990; referred to as UTD. R. Sylvan, Culture and the Roots of Political Divergence, mimeographed, Canberra, 1986. R. Sylvan, Deep Pluralism, University of Edinburgh Press, 1994; referred to as DP. The Wildlands Project, World Earth, special issue, Canton NY, 1993. S. Toulmin, The Return to Cosmology, University of California, Berkeley, 1982. J. Wisdom, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Blackwell, Oxford, 1953. M. Zimmerman and others (eds.) Environmental Philosophy, Prentice Hall, N.J. 1993; referred to as EP3.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 15, item 951: Paradigmatic roots on environmental problems Subject The topic of the resource Uncorrected paper (typescript, photocopy). Description An account of the resource Title in collection finding aid: RS: Paradigmatic Roots of Environmental Problems uncorrected ts. Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span><span>,</span> Box 15, item 951 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [31] leaves. 27.82 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:04c2bd6" target="_blank" rel="noopener">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:04c2bd6</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, <a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a>. https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/a5431730967f5a55642e84ae70be7f65.pdf 8572c81a727a336ad42efcebe6b136f5 PDF Text Text DEEP-GREEN ETHICS Contents PARTS CHAPTERS 0 I II III IV Prologue DEEP, GREEN, ETHICS, and PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 1 Deep [and] green fundamentals 2 Ethics without humans; philosophy without humans 3 Philosophical setting: deep-green plurallisms 4 Inhibiting presumptions and myths AXIOLOGY: value core 5 Value and its varieities: basic theory and its development 6 Alternative primitives and theoretical beginnings DEONTOLOGY: necessary moral structure 7 Obligation and its deontic circle, and moral dilemmas 8 Rights, and justice VIRTUE and INACTION 9 Environmental virtues: what they are and something of their theory 10 V Environmental ethical practice NATURE of ETHICS 11 Ethics, its new character and revised foundations 12 Principal questions of reoriented ethics, and proposed answers 13 Epilogue �17 .5.96 DEEP-GREEN ETHICS PROLOGUE Philosophy and its branches, ethics especially, are among the last places where prejudice would be found, found alive and thriving, so it might be imagined. Wrong. In the first place, prevailing ethics all exhibit heavy prejudice in favour of humans, human chauvinism. So they are one and all defective, wrong in a deep way. An adequate ethic will remove the prejudices involved. That means, in turn, a radical transformation of prevailing ethics, from the bottom up. Such a transformation constitutes a main objective of this book. Deep-green ethics aims not simply to reform present arrangements and systematizations, but to replace them. Abolition of prejudice has early priority. Prejudice in philosophy, privelege in prevailing ethics. There are only about two and half millenia of recorded philosophy on Earth. To a disconcerting extent, those millenia represent two and half thousand years of prejudice-partial exceptions occurring and prejudice subsiding somewhat only when ideological empires were fractured (e.g. fruitful periods of "warring states" in ancient China and Greece). Ethics is far from alone within philosophy in exhibiting serious deficiencies, in incorporating prejudices that should not figure so prominently in what is ideally an impartial subject. Much the same holds for other branches: politics obviously (partly through its interdependence with ethics), metaphysics and logic perhaps less obviously. Yet prevailing metaphysics display a deep prejudice in favour of the actual, against what does not exist. In logic the prejudical situation has in fact been accentuated through the rise of modern symbolic logic. Regrettably mainstream symbolic logic is wrong. All its forms validate incorrect principles (such as implicational paradoxes), these results flowing primarily from an underlying prejudice in favour of the consistent, against the impossible. 1 Several of the systematic prejudices embedded elsewhere in philosophy impact upon ethics. The prejudice in favour of the actual has served to distort, very seriously, the issue of obligations to future creatures for example, in this fashion:- Remoter future creatures do not exist, and therefore, according to prevailing prejudice, cannot have any relevant features, any preferences or desires, self-traits or satisfactions, to be taken into ethical account. Therefore All the themes are presented and defended in detail elsewhere. As regards metaphysics, see JB; as regards logic, see e.g. BGB and generally in philosophy , see TM. There are several coupled prejudices and prejudical drives, as will appear; for instance the drives to power and to maximization, strongly manifested in logic, see e.g. RLR. Prejudice in ethics was explicitly recognised by Bentham, almost two centuries ago; unfortunately however he imported his own very influential prejudical framework. �2 "they" can be discounted entirely. The same prejudice also enters in a very different way. All the standard positions concerning universals, all of which reflect the metaphysical presupposition that discourse concerns existent objects, show up in ethics. They appear in vexing issues as to the ontological status of values, such as the good, and of deontic notions, such as obligations and the right. These are not only difficult items to discover in the world, but they do not seem adequately housed in conceptual or linguistic apparatus: where are they located? Whence derives immediate pressure for many mostly bizarre reduction exercises; for instance of values to human constructs, contructs from social preferences or from sociobiological drives, and of obligations from veiled contracts. The initial question of location makes, however, the defective metaphysical presupposition, and lapses therewith. Values, though significant items, do not exist; so they are not located, anywhere. Prejudice rooted in established logic has impacted differently, upon a variety of issues in ethics. The absolute requirement of consistency upsets a straightforward treatment of obligations, general sets of which are typically inconsistent, thereby leading for instance to awkward theories of hierarchies of obligation or of merely prima facie obligations. Running parallel with this, the requirement utterly distorted an initially straightforward theory of ethical dilemmas, treatment of which is a significant part of any comprehensive ethical theory. Established logic has also impacted heavily on such different issues as fact-value inferences (e.g. the prescriptive fallacy) and regarding the extent of pluralism in ethics. The assumption behind the rationalistic critique of relativism is that there is a single correct logic, governed by requirements of consistency, namely standard logical theory, which (when combined with the facts) will eliminate various ethical stances as incorrect, indeed which may, given sufficient critical thought, lead to a single correct ethics. 2 But the assumption fails; for it too depends on ancient prejudice. Pluralism is one most important component in removing prejudice generally, certainly in reducing it generally, by admitting alternatives, and allowing some to flourish. 3 Elaboration of deep-green theory is another important direction in removing prejudice, in favour of humans, persons, or like agents from ethics especially but not only. The main development that follows will take both these directions, though focussed upon ethics: it will track and investigate pluralistic deep-green ethics. Human chauvinism is not the only major prejudice damaging ethics. An extraordinarily privileged position given to egoistical considerations is another. Western ethics in particular has 2 3 The approach involved, that of traditional rationalistic ethics, is regularly deployed by Singer (e.g. his Encyclopedia conclusion to Companion to Ethics); the strengthened version features in Regan. Of course how it is supposed to proceed, the details of how reason works this miracle, is never revealed. See esp. TM, epilogue. �3 recently been deformed through a substantially unquestioned axiom of self concern, that agents are interested in and motivated by their own (self) concerns and only by them. (Of course an agent's self, or extended self, may be grander than the agent's soul or person or body or whatever; it may include the agent's family or even the agent's tribe, or differently it may comprehend the agent's land or environment. But under such extensions the axiom is already beginning to disintegrate.) Such an ubiquitous, but largely unquestioned, presumption has lain behind reductionistic exercises that have distorted much of modem ethical (and political) theory. The leading idea is simple enough: given that action is justified through human self-interest, and only thus, if ethical theory (and likewise political superstructure) can be justified through some construction or modelling on that basis (bringing in only indifference and like neutral assumptions) , then justification will be transmitted, it too will be justified. Thus those contractual and utilitarian exercises which have loomed so large in recent theory. 4 The same dubious presumption also features large elsewhere, for instance in the acclaimed derivation of Deep Ecology from the ultimate norm of Self-realization! It is not just prejudice and allied presumption that have damaged and distorted ethics. Narrow ethics, parading as universal or absolute in defiance of pluralism, ethics often underwritten by religious or papal presumption, have severely disadvantage d ethics. Furthermore, connected therewith, ethics has been destabilized, and cast in an unfavourable light, by • a quest for absolute foundations, and in tum connected therewith • an invidious comparison with science, which is supposed to have such foundations. The quest is quixote: there are no such foundations. Nor does science have such foundations, so the comparison is misplaced. Not only is absoluteness for science increasingly disputed, but it is becoming apparent that science is in the same sort of pluralistic situation-pre dicament some, still questing for the old false certainties, would say-as ethics. 5 Through the assumption, or pretence, that it can deliver (whether from religious, rational or other resources) certainties of a type that it cannot deliver, ethics has become discredited. But that is only part among reasons why on the contemporary scene ethics is not the force that it has mostly been in bygone times. At least as important as such intellectual reasons are matters like removal of social and political pressures to conform, redirection of indoctrination practices (into consumerism, etc.), and so on, some welcome and some definitely not. 4 5 Roughly, ethics, knocked down to what's in it for everyone (some aggregated base class), is justified through what's in it for each me. Prima facie the grand construction is based on a simpler fallacy of aggregation: an invalid each to all inference. The theme is argued in detail in TM chapter 10. The quixote quest is strikingly engaged in by Williams, for a entertaining criticism of which see 'Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World' in Putnam 92. �4 Aspects of the discreditation have in turn been exaggerated. Ethics, it is said, makes no difference, even can never make a difference; it never effects change. Such claims are seriously astray, as examination of elementary examples like human slavery and treatment of animals quickly reveals. Environmental ethics too can make a difference (perhaps, when coupled with other practices, a major difference), and they are beginning to do so. But naturally they cannot compel change; nor should they be capable of doing so, as that would exceed proper roles of ethics (and other proper practices). 6 Rectification of ethics requires, then, not merely removal of now conspicuous prejudice and presumptions, but deflation of pretensions. What results-hardly unique naturally, but one selected for good reasons among many, hardly entirely exclusive but overlapping and admitting others-is an ethics which differs from standard ethics in the following respects at least: Such an ethics is: • deep-green, removing prejudice in favour of humans, and in favour of certain (egoistic) agents, in an affirmative fashion; and • Pluralistic in a thorough-going way, accordingly not pretending to absolute or objective status. The run of prevailing ethics, including so-called "applied ethics" and "environmental ethics" are chauvinistic; a satisfactory (environmental) ethic is not. The run of prevailing ethics are absolutist, or otherwise relativist; a satisfactory ethic is neither. However the conditions so far presented are but necessary conditions; they are not jointly sufficient for adequacy. Even among theories that are nonchauvinistic and duly pluralistic, reductionism may persist. Such reductionisms come in striking variety; thus, on just one dimension, individualisms, sentientisms, vitalisms, (i.e. all that has value is alive, somehow), and so on. To avoid such reductionisms, another blanket condition of adequacy is: • non-reductionistic. The main task consists in elaborating in detail an ethic, with other preferred features, that meets these conditions of adequacy. Regrettably, removal of prejudice cannot be accomplished in ethics alone, as a separate pollution-free zone. Prejudice in ethics flows through from other regions, religion especially, but also from psychology (which in the past made little gods of humans with sacred souls of their own, justifying very differential treatment for them in the world), and from elsewhere. Removal of these latter sorts of prejudices requires a severe erosion of belief, in regions strictly outside ethics, but heavily exporting into it; of beliefs fostering intellectual prejudice. Nonetheless ethics has a role in removal of prejudices elsewhere, because, very simply, these prejudices ought to be removed. The basic principle, which can also be presented as one 6 These points are developed at some decent length in GE part IL �5 of rationality, runs as follows: belief ought not to exceed warranting evidence, but should be appropriate to it. None of this is as clean and clear-cut as it may initially appear, because source waters have become very muddied. Sources for instance take a range of forms (this is part of the ancient issue of the criterion reput in more contemporary terms). Sources include not merely empirical evidence, perception especially, the favoured, or even exclusive, source of empiricism. They also include such sources as: emotional presentation, or emotion; postulation or presumption; reason; authority; a range of psychic and extra sensory perception (ESP) forms; and, differently, a range of intuitions. Some of these sources overlap; consider for instance divine relevation. Plainly those sources are very different kinds, quality and calibre. Some such as reason, which includes itself a disputed variety of forms, are more processing of information kinds than sources (thought reason becomes a source, of sorts, in pure rationalism, and a degenerate source of necessary truths in classical logical theory where theorems are proved, by paradoxical means, from nothing so to say). While some of these kind of sources are not important or at issue in ethics, for instance controversial kinds of ESP giving information on remote (spatially distant or past or future) items, several are. It is not going too far to say that ethics is severely vexed as regards sources, and many distortions such as naturalism can be seen as coming about as ways of trying to secure reliable sources (if some naturalistic reduction were correct then ethics would be brought within the orbit of science and even empirical perceptual bases could be adopted, as in science). But ethics does not resemble science; its sources are not (except incidentally) primarily perceptual, thus breaking any very close analogy between epistemology and ethics. A major source in ethics is emotion, by contrast with epistemology where the major source is perception. From there already derives a major difference between the fields, as perception tends to be less variable, more intersubjective, less culturally dependent across the range of subjects usually taken into account. Accordingly, in any quest for a more objective ethics, more has to be drawn out, out of the processing substructure, whence the emphasis on coherence, good reasons, ethical on coherence, good reasons, ethical argumentation. Ethical inputs, sources, and processing are assessed in detail in the text. Although this work is focussed upon ethics, it does not, and evidently cannot, merely concern ethics. Since the ethical theory is itself approached primarily (though not exclusively) by way of value, it bears upon other areas, such as normative-infected social sciences, where value theory features. For another example, it also impacts upon aesthetics, heavily. For, according to the theory advanced, there is no sharp boundary, indeed really no division at all, between what has been dubbed "aesthetic value" and "ethical value". Value is value, without these artificial divides. Evidently too, as will appear, the work intrudes in normative reaches �6 merging into ethics, in particular, wherever normative or deontic dilemmas are encountered, such as reaches of social choice theory and legal theory. Differently, the work includes much, though indirectly, upon philosophy of nature. For it is especially concerned to supersede an old defective philosophy of nature, which included a heavy devaluation of nature, and aided and abetted a manifestly chauvinistic ethics. The ethical theory to be elaborated fits with, and in significant respects presupposes, a·different theory of nature. 7 Although investigations in this text are primarily theoretical, they have significant practical implications. Putting the theory to work in various environmental fields is something that happens elsewhere (see further in the Epilogue). Some of this has already occurred, in essays in the Green Series, and some is reserved for other texts on field ethics. 8 Notes on terminology In this text several familiar terms, such as 'green' and 'deep', are converted into quasi-technical terms. That is to say, special uses of the terms already in currency, such as the use of 'green' to mean environmentally committed, are further refined. The result could be signalled by deloyment of appropriate new terminology. Something like that is assumed done, except that the familiar terms will be retained-onl y now they are to be read in the quasi-technical way. To put the point differently. Let 'grene' (Olde English) or 'gre-een, (Newe English), for example, be the quasi-technical explication of 'green' in the relevant sense. Then in the subsequent text, 'green' will normally signify gre-een, or equivalently 'green' operates as (effectively abbreviates) 'gre-een. Why such a strategem? One reason is that people are now rather conservative regarding terminology. Indeed they are often turned off by new terminology (despite regular ruination of established terminology). As a result, established terminology gets revised for all sorts of new purposes (witness the bizarre high-school reuses in advanced physics), with a resultant overloading of senses. By contrast, recycling of old terminology (words or spellings), that has fallen into disuse would be rather more commendable. Here, rather than pressing our luck with explicit recyclings like diep and chalowe, we resort to the fiction that the terms 'deep' and 'shallow' deployed throughout the text stand in for the technical recyclings. As a result 'deep', as figuring in deep approaches, deep green, deep theory and so on, has no connection with profundity, or 'shallow' with superficiality. As several have said, in several respects deep/shallow terminology is unsatisfactory, execrable it is sometimes said. Founder N aess did a disservice introducing it, and subsequently 7 8 Such an appropriate underlying theory of nature is advanced in the companion work on metaphysics, namely TM. Green Series is a popular label for discussion papers in environmental philosophy, published from Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. One of the other texts is tentatively entitled Green Ethical Fields .. �7 in explaining it, so slackly. While it is too late to easily change the terminology, some undesirable associations may be shaken off by resorting to older or variant spellings, and simultaneous ly refining senses intended. That we do. But then we concede to the general intellectual will, by the substitution or "abbreviations" strategem. Even so, we have risked a few neologisms, and we shall chance, just here, one or two more. One we risk, is euthics, for universalizab le ethics, that is an ethics meeting universalizability requirements (in some appropriate fashion). This bit of terminology helps in resolving a significant ambiguity in philosophical usage of 'ethics', and making an improved start on the vexed issue of why an agent should adhere to an ethics, or differently to an euthics? One we chance is viridology (from Latin virides, green, and Greek logos, study of, in modern palance) for: theory, principles and practices of deep-green; that is, a single classical word for diep-grene theory. A purer alternative we contemplated, from among many, was prasinology (or should it be prasinomics) from Greek (and Latin) prasinus, dark green, leek green. Acknowledg ements and antecendents: personal development and conceit. The production of this work owes much to other humans, with of whom I have little or no acquaintance. The debts are both intellectual and practical. On the heavily practical side, I am most grateful to Frances Redrup for the processing of reems of rough scribble. On the broad practical front I am pleased to acknowledge the continuing support of my research endeavours by the Australian National University. That academic support, while generous by often niggardly world standards, has recently declined, through contraction of research support and expansion of alleged accountability practices. In this little respect, there has regettably been interference in my research, dur the earlier stages of work on this book, by no doubt wellintentioned academics occupying supervisary roles who have deemed by performance less than satisfactory. It is with regret too that I record that, in part owing to biassed appointment practices within the University, there has been negligible imput to the present work from any of my academic colleagues there. But outside imput there has been of course, of two main sorts: from recent activity in environmental philosophy and from past exercises in value theory. While environmental issues have operated as a main stimulus in my recent work in ethics, my own interest in and investigations in ethics reach back to my graduate work in Wellington, New Zealand, where I produced a characteristic ally initative work on ethics, entitled Moral Scepticism (I do not suggest that anyone read that work, which it is far too late to suppress). In New Zealand, I was educated in the 20th century British type and style of ethical theory, primarily Oxbridge material, with not antipodean influence of any significance what cover, except in the obscure background Prior' s quocit little book Logic and the Basis of Ethics (although my professor at Wellington, George Styles, had ethics as a manfield, I learnt only a �8 certain technigue from him; I do not recall one position, little theorem argument or there I must attribute to him, for the very simple reason, (suspect, that he never advanced very much). Among Oxbridge characters, Moore revoided the dominant influence though much of Hume and his near contemporaries-N eurall-Smith Tomlesia and others-was scround up to a tiny circle of ethical enthusiants and fellow academic travellers. Moore is still an influence in this book; in my occasional more conceited moments, I like to envisage the book as an appropriately greenish update of Principia Ethica. At least it may be as near as I ever come to producing such a work: Principa Ethica Virida. What on excessively ambitious idea, sheer hubris! Yet, for all the fuss, Principia Ethica is not really such a good book; rather it enjoys other advantageous features. A few companions with Principa Ethica will be ventured. But, by and large, other ethical theories will not be investigated in much detail. For one reason, that has been done, to a sufficient extent elsewhere (in others' work more than my own). For another, in the wake of accumulating evidence, notably from environmental awakenings, revealing their narrowness and prejudice, they scarcely justify further post mortems. More than Moore and Priest, the present work is indebted to Meinong, and through him to the tradition of Austrian value theory. The theory elaborated in fact fits, more or less, into what has been called critical cognitivism .. The evil of ingratitude, for example, ... Here and there, the present text draws, heavily sometimes, on my own past work, especially concerning environmental ethics. As much of the work, for example in the local Green Series in Canberra, is rather inaccessible, such borrowing may not matter much. There remains a small overlap-ideally vanishingly small as revision proceeds-betwee n this text and better circulated complementary works, notably essays in Environmental Philosophy and parts of The Greening of Ethics. �INTRODU CING DEEP-GR EEN THEORY Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness. The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of (acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory, and relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory more generally can avoid them (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast in a more classical Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form. Nor will these background advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or know proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices. 1. As to deep theory. Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deepgreen theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly with the intertwining of truth and value that .... , it is worth giving an example. Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) exist in "suitable" determinate �2 form in the second. Deep object-theo ry slices straight through these issues, removing the problem generating ontological assumptions. Deep-theor y is a grander theory lying in the background , which significantl y influences the philosophic al approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The backgroun d theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply deep theory. For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc. With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehen sive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehen siveness as regards present philosophic al problems would come a certain completene ss; but I've come to think that a total philosophy is an illusion, like pots of gold at the ends of rainbows, and rainboweri a themselves. Deep theory is no doubt a presumptu ous title (there are worse about, e.g. 'total philosophy ', 'ecosophy' ), not it is altogether satisfactory given the problems and obscurities, to be encountere d, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did no exactly choose the title myself, but had it thrust upon me: problemati c, presumptuo us, it looks to good to refuse. It emerged from a terminolog ical confluence of several areas in which I'd been struggling to assemble ac. capirred theory - deep-green theory (itself a union of green thought, or environmen tal philosophy with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory). To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelatio ns, and some of their revolutiona ry potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been assumed or presuppos ed in Western philosophy , and particularl y in Enlightenm ented contempora ry philosophy. For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:• the Ontologica l Assumptio n, that truth, and also, meaning, are functions of reference, and thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectly well talk and think truly about items that do not exist, and also about items that are not individual but are complex but perhaps indetermin ate wholes, and finally what items are impossible . Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionall y favoured full-back from onticalism, namely possibilism , which assumes �3 • the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals; there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away. Bound up with possibilism are • the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute requirement of consistency. Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs. Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that • entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts to a modal function of material implication 1. The rejection of such themes and their courses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic. While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to independent development and analysis. Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B. �ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GR EEN THEORY This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions. Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate �'relation-to-values', in which inconvenielt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or mere shapes. Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby �3 more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approxima ted by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation thereof. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism, which leave no space for immaterial values. As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility; or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value; • consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes; • straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgement s into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all. Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist �4 fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuou sly failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by coherence methods. The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independe nt, coherence processing , which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an �information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however, that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed. Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they �do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality, universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new information and experience. The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation. The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant �7 destructive ideologies, which (each of them) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely, • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such �from the centre of the ethical stage (or ~xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories, and the institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans). Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values. Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 Bungendore NSW 2621 * Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not features they had at any time requested), for their magazine. �I \. '1 11.10.95 CHAPTER 1 DEEP AND GREEN AND PRESUPPOSED FUNDAMENTALS It soon emerges from preliminary exploration that, under natural characterisations, relevant notion of both ethics and green presuppose the notion of agency. So with something on agency, enough to get started, we shall begin. In terms of agency and proclivities to environments, green can be characterized, and in turn green approaches. Then, within green approaches, three relevantly different types can be distinguished: shallow, intermediate, and deep. It is the last, and really only the last, that matters for the ethical theory that follows. 1. Action, agency and agents: a summary . 1 Action theory is grounded in process theory. For actions are types of processes, agentascribed processes. processes are directed functions, ordinarily time-directed functions, 2 ? framing of certain functional sorts. All the ordinary sorts of processes-ec lipses, transits, removals, reflections, and so on and on-are processes (and ordinary processes can be separated out logically, such as by applicability and inapplicability of certain predicates, e.g. they take place, they are not facts, etc.) Processes themselves in no way require agents. Actions, however, as distinguished within goings-ons and taking-places, do require agency, and so agents. There is no reason at all why these agents should be humans. Many agents are not humans, some humans are not agents. But it is often quite erroneously assumed agents are humans, or persons. Excess requirements on agency are partly to blame, the mistaken idea that agents have to be purposeful, responsible, rational-feat ures that can be added to distinguish subtypes of agents. Rather, actions can be roughly delineated through answers to questions like What is so and so (the relevant agent) doing? How is so and so acting? The result reached following through this route is this: process a is an action iff for some agent x, a is properly ascribed to x, it is x' s doing. To break residual circularity, it remains to define agency. Agency is defined, such is the proposal, in terms of exercising a causal role (which may be misdirected or similar), through the following circuit. First, x is and agent as agents a iff, for some p directly partinent to a, x causes Pbut x is not caused to cause p. In terms of agency-regarding, other notions can be defined as follows: x is a sometime-agent, someties an agent, iff for some a, x is an agent as 2 As full an account of processes as so far worked up from notes appears in 'Process and actions', which does provide detailed background for this section. �'2 regards a. Agency is a characterizing attribute of sometime-agents. An agent is a sometimesagent that establishes a history of agency (a small reputation therefore). 2. Explaining Green. In characterizing green we start with agency. Such relevant features, of greens (or environmentalists), as being positively concerned about nature of natural things, supporting environmental causes and similar, are closely tied to practice and action; they are features of agents. In an original central sense of 'green' so redeployed, an agent was green if that agent firstly believed that some parts of the natural environment should be protected, and secondly took some relevant action. 3 In short, a belief-action analysis emerges, which can be recast as a standard belief-desire-resultant action account. For instance, the agent believes that some natural environment is worth protection, desires that it should be, and acts (in some way, perhaps feebly) accordingly. All the parts of this sort of account call, however, for some elaboration. To remove a certain circularity, resulting from characterising "green" through terms like "environmen t", 'natural environment' can be replaced by 'parts (surface configurations) of the Earth substantially uninterfered with by humans'. To specify protection satisfactorily, protection/ra m what should be indicated. And so on. But there is a little point in elaborating this already weak characterisation, which can be satisfied by an agent interested in saving a few square metres of the Earth's surface from exploitation. For the notion has been further weakened, almost from its inception. To characterise this laxer, but ubiquitous notion, let us insert the intermediary notion of an environmental cause. Such causes include not merely protecting natural environments, but limiting impacts on environments, which may not be pristine, for instance by pouring less sewage or detergents, CFCS or Greenhouse gases, into them, or conserving items, which could be exploited or consumed now for future use or for future human generations (to use or conserve, etc.). The first of these further causes beyond protection, original green, is a largely consumerist notion of green, the second, an economistic notion (it takes in such beloved constraints as intergerational equity). There are other related causes of importance also, such as restoration of something that has been over-exploited or damaged, such as agricultural lands, waterways, urban air, soils (soil conservation), or even human artefacts such as monuments or buildings. The shallow green cause of fighting pollution, for human health reasons, can fit in here. Needless to add the restoration may not be to pristine conditions, but to quite low 3 Although we are explicating terms that are now in widespread usage, in a way substantially faithful to that usage (but not some of its dilute or corrupt expansions), we shall regard the terms as quasi-technical. We see these terms, as the discerning reader also may, as spelt not with a double 'e' but a triple 'e', as 'greeen' and 'greeening' (insert hyphens as need be for appropriate pronunciation, e.g. 'gre-een' _. The effect is to peel off dilution and corruption of 'green' (e.g. so to include every politician, at least when any confronts concerned constituents) and to discard all those unwanted and often undesirable senses the colour term green has accumulated. �standards. In sum, causes include as well as protection, such matters as nondestruction, conservation, maintenance, restoration, and so on. Now substitute supporting an environmental cause for protecting a natural environment. Then an agent is green in this expanded laxer sense if the agent believes in supporting an environmental cause and takes some relevant action in that direction. Such an action component is essential: green does imply some practical, if utterly token, involvement. The lax account connects in the right ways with testable sociological criteria. For instance, believing in supporting a cause can be cashed out in terms of joining an organisation working for that cause, or even, reducing the slight action component still further, considering joining such an organisation. 4 The appellation green applies not only to individual agents, but also to groups, coalitions, institutions, even corporations and governments. As a green government can, meet similar lax conditions, it is evident that there really are very few requirements, even weak sponsorship may serve. Many there are now trying to take advantage of green movements-adve rtisers, vendors, politicians, professors, merchants, even generals (with "defence forces" retooling as environmental defence forces). Cashing i in on the movement by producing a goods or services presented as environmentally friendly does not thereby make parties doing so green, especially if what is supplied adds to overall environmental impacts (as do "environmental markets" delivering environmental junk, sometimes portrayed as "green goods"). The requirement of serving environmental causes has been lost. The excessive generosity of the account arrived at, which allows agents with only passing or slight active beliefs in some cause to count as green, does not matter. For firstly, it corresponds moderately well to current lax usage, which allows almost any sort of concern for environments, coupled with an action component as slight as paying a token subscription, to serve. Secondly, it still exercises quite enough exclusive power. Many agents are not green. For instance all those exclusively tuned into possessive individualism, mainstream economics, or similar creeds are not green (i.e. not even lax green). Thirdly, needed discriminations can be made within the class of (lax) green. An important subclass of green comprises ecological green, where the causes include maintenance and protection of natural ecosystems (including wilderness) and these causes enjoy some primacy. "Ecological green" is by no means a tautology. 4 In a study entitled 'GREEN PACKAGES IN AUSTRALIA', greens were picked out from the whole sample of respondents to the Australian Election Study of 1990 in terms of answer to question: How likely are you to join groups campaigning to protect the environment, or are you alrady a member? Permitted answers: (1) I am a member, (2) I am not a member but I have considered joining (3) I am not a member and I haven't considered joining, and (4) I certainly would not consider joining. Those giving answer (2), perhaps token greens, were accounted green. �4 To be green in more than a token fashion is to have some commitment to containing or reducing the environmental impact of humans on the Earth or regions of it. By virtue of the environmental impact equation (for a given region) that means commitment in the immediate future term to either • human population reduction, or • less impacting lifestyles for many humans, or • improvements in technology to reduce overall impact. Most humans in a region can do little to implement the third requirement, except to hope. Accordingly they cannot satisfactorily demonstrate their commitment in this way. A genuine green will meet both the other conditions. But since as big coalition as feasible is sought for a green coalition, marginal greens who meet only one of the requirements, perhaps in weak form, will not usually be excluded (from almost any green church). Issues of population afford a simple test (a necessary condition) for a genuine green in Australia; for that agent fails who suppoes that while efforts (including the agent's contribution) to effect human population reduction should be invested elsewhere, as in parts of Asia or Africa, Australia can keep on growmg. From filling out the conditions delimiting green commitments, a green platform can be derived. Specifically it will include, along with the action clause, derivative directives as regards curtailing population, refining and limiting consumption, adjusting technologies, and consequent thereupon altering administrative, political and economic arrangements and institutions accordingly. What so results is a proper subplatform of the Deep Ecology platform. A fair approximation to the full Deep Ecology platform can be derived by adjoining requirements for depth to those for genine greenness of the action platform; so result themes concerning intrinsic value in nature, and commitments deriving therefrom. In short, the wellknown Deep Ecology platform accounts (as a fair approximation) to a deep green platformwhich can accordingly supplant it. As genuine green and green platform can be characterized given the initial notion of green, that is lax green, so similarly can other green compounds and modified forms be explained (in a preliminary way). For example, a green ideosystem is an ideosystem (an ideology, in the unbiassed sense) that coheres with green commitments, and typically organizes and guides them. As genuinely green, it is a system that includes a green platform, and it could be defined in that way, as an ideo-system coherently extending a green platform. Similarly for green ethics, and for green philosophy (and also for other green notions that could be defined but are not presently needed, e.g. green goods, green consumers, green parties, green ideas and so forth). A green ethical system is a green ideosystem which is an ethic. Green ethics comprises �5 such green ethical systems and their theory. 5 Green ethics thus comprise a decidedly restricted subset of environmental ethics. For an environmental ethic in the broad usage, an ethics that addresses environmental issues, among others, may well contain themes that could not be adopted by a green agent, that may even operate against environmental causes. In consequence, a green ethics is an ethic that could be coherently adopted by a green agent, that does not run counter to environmental causes. 3. Different approaches to the environment: shallower and deeper. People can do more or less what they like with the environment, with the land and the sea, and with what grows and lives there-such was and, in only slightly modified form, remains a dominant theme of Wes tern cultural heritage. It was not the view of other cultures, such as some of the American Indians or Australian Aborigines; nor was it the only view included in the Western cultural package. But it has dominated, especially in colonial and imperial expansion. It is only recently, for example, that some social or governmental restrictions with teeth have been imposed upon what Australians can do with the land they occupy or claim, and these lag far behind advanced green thinking as to what is required. For the most part there has been little weakening in the Wes tern assumption that people own the land, that it is their possession, to mould to their purposes and whims. 6 This unrestrained approach proved damaging enough while the land was wide and humans comparatively few; now that human populations are expanding more rapidly, perhaps to critical limits, now that much land is damaged and less fragile land is in increasingly short supply, it is time to re-examine older attitudes and the accompanying practices. Any deeper reassessment has to look at the presupposed land ethic, and more generally at the underlying ethical and ideological assumptions. A land ethic, according to Leopold, who introduced the term, is 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' .7 Thus a land ethic amounts to a nature (or environmental) ethic, with land a symbol for the whole of nature (or the more comprehensive environment), and man a symbol for all relevant agents. The unrestrained position, which imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment, affords a land ethic of only a degenerate sort. The unrestrained position would, for example, have little 5 6 7 Although we are anticipating here-as ethics and ethical systems are explained essentially reportively however, in the next chapter, there is no circularity. For ethics is separately and independently characterised. Indeed, with the renewed libertarian movement emanating from industrial north-eastern America, this assumption has gained in strength. Foreign "resources" are not to be hoarded but should be saleable to the highest bidders for "free" economic use. And sometimes it is broadly hinted: or else! A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conversation, New York, 1966, p.238. �6 compunction about using up materials, forests, pristine environments and so on, immediately or even destroying them. In the end the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly ethical positions. 8 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which iplies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local interets, rather than appropriately based on long-range values. Opposed to the unrestrained position are various conservation ethics; what Leopold saw as the land ethic is just one of these. Conservation ethics can be classified, conveniently for subsequent development, into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. 9 Unlike the unrestrained position, all these politions would conserve and maintain certain things-materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow conservation position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description as resource conservation. Though this conservation position is only a small step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass one test for morality proper in that future people are not treated unfairly. Most of the big rush into fashionable environmentalism does not get beyond shallowness. The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share-and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these or similar human on closed notions. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and exploitation oriented, positions. 8 9 This is a substantial, and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitments to future humans, see e.g. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future' in Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental ethics, (ed. E. Partridge), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981, and other essays in this book. This classification refines Naess's non-exhaustive distinction of shallow and deep ecology, and extends it to render it exhaustive. For the original distinction, see A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement' Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100. An elaboration on Aess's position, to which this discussion has some debts, may be found in his 'Philosophical aspects of the deep ecological momvement', Environmental Ethics, to appear. �According to deeper positions humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to the intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values. FIGURE 1. THE POSITIONS SEPARATED, AND SEPARATING PRINCIPLES SHALLOWER UNRESTRAINED DEEPER SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE I I I I J, J, J, DEEP MORALITY SOLE VALUE GREATER VALUE REQUIREMENT ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION (of human apartheid) (of human supremacy) The watershed principle which divides the shallower from deeper positions is the sole value assumption. According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is built into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are represented at best through the preferences or votes of interested humans. Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as utilitarianism. 10 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man 10 But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. These theories, along with utilitarianism, are explained in most modern American introductions to ethical theories or moral problems. �is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests. However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been appended (thus, for example, extemality theory in economics, some allowance for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the land remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought, when it is considered at all. There is, however, another approach, also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it. While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater value assumption:: other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than that of other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What is generally presupposed is that other objects-animals, plants and their communities-are never of much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in versions of utilitarianism where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Western ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which animals are taken to have value in their own right, though in any playoff with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable; in cases of conflict of animal or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose. I I There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 11 So too for some men and some sparrow. So we should reject the intermediate ...... : A man is worth more than a sparrow! (Drungson/ Ralston etc.) �9 can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism.1 2 Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. But some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depredation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintena nce of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an establish ed population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the integrity of rich natural environments.13 Let us look ahead to glimpse paradimatic expansions of the positions indicated (in figure 1). For the positions soon expand, when applied to real life issues, to more comprehensive positions; indeed they have expanded all the way to what are now called social paradigms, that is to full social perspectives. For example, the deep position has expanded from the two core theses-a s initially reformulated, values in nature, which is a positive counterpart of the sole value assumption, and biospecies impartiality, which is a positive elaboration of greater value assumption 14-to fuller deep ecological positions which involve as well many other themes. 12 13 The point is argued in detail in R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life?' Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy #3, Research School of social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982. There are significant cross-classifications of environmental positions. Some further dimensions are included in the following diagram. Environment not taken I Environments is taken into account I into account p 14 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --- shallow intermediate I dogs I ////// I I E I individual I I H I holistic I I Another dimension is the static/dynamic. But no one want to be just stauc, really. According to the values in nature theme natural items other than humans and human artefacts have intrinsic value; while according to biospecies impartiality members of one species, humans in particular, are not favoured or valued over members of another simply on the basis of species. The danger of favouring one species is encouraged by the species fallacy, commonly invoked in favouring humans. This is the mistake of concluding that because a few members of the species have accomplish ed something of (immense) value, all members of the species therefore are (highly) valuable; all members of the species manage to free-load for the ride, obtained by a few members, so to say. The assumption, once challenged, usually falls back on an argument that goes by way of capacities: the remaining members of the species have the capacity to achieve these sorts of things also. But, firstly, that isn't true: intelligence, skills, and the like, vary somewhat within species, and from our narrow perspective, very considerably among humans, some of whom have no capacity for advanced mathematics or music. Secondly, it requires more than capacity: it requires circumstances, a favourable environment to exercise them, (hence, in part, the folly of �lU The expansion is not uniquely determined; there can be various different deeper paradigms. However it characteristically includes a fuller statement of themes recognised as in the spirit of "deep ecology", in particular ecological themes, but also interconnected economic and political themes. In a similar way shallower positions are subsumed in shallower perspectives, and principally in what is called the dominant social paradigm, some relevant themes of which are indicated in figure 2.1s FIGURE 2. RELEVANT COMPONENTS OF THE ENCOMPASSING PARADIGMS. DOMINANT SOCIAL PARADIGM DEEP ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE Dominance over nature Natural environment a resource Harmony with nature Values in nature/biospecies impartiality Less material goals/less growth orientation Earth supplies limited AJ?propriate technology/limits to science Doing with enough/recycling Regional/decentralised/small-scale Material/economic growth Ample reserves/perfect substitutes High technological progress/ scientific solutions Consumerism National/centralised/large-scale SHALLOW f----------------------------- ➔ DEEP 4. Criticisms of these beginnings and other beginnings A main challenge we shall have to meet is that there can be no deep ethics, ethics and axiology are inevitably shallow, because they must answer back to human valuers. This challenge we presently set aside (until the next chapter). But it should already be apparent how we can start to upset the challenge (already taken up by deeper utilitarianism), namely by displacing humans by relevant agents. Other challenges grant that something might answer to deeper ethics, but contend that nothing should-objectio ns of substance-or that making anything much out of it is unwarranted, for example because preliminaries in making out the distinctions have not been 15 more humans in decidedly suboptimal cities), together with a will and drive actually to follow through appropriately on capacities. Much fuller accounts of the dominant social paradigm and environmental alternatives are given in S. Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Wiley, New York, 1982, and in R. Routley 'Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, 1983. The linkage of the dominant paradigm with maximizing, and the deep alternative with sufficing, is elaborated in R. Routley, 'Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. �11 properly accomplished-objections of form and from technicalities (cf. challenges to the analytic/synthetic distinction). We consider examples of both sorts of challenge. The misanthropy charge. Deep environmentalism has been criticised for what it does, so it is alleged, to ethical treatment of other humans; it leads, it has been alleged, to neglectful, negligent, or downright callous treatment of other humans, to inhumanity. The actual impact of deep environmentalism affords but little ground for such allegations. Nor does the theory. Deep environmentalism could leave intrahuman ethics, standard morality virtually entirely intact. If it did so, deep environmental ethics would provide a conservative extension (in the familiar technical sense) of standard intrahuman ethics. In this event the allegations would fall; for the ethical treatment of humans would be in principle just the same as before. But it is unlikely that any deeper environmentalism will leave standard morality entirely intact in its own prime sphere of operations, that restricted to humans. For instance the evolution of humans, and attributions of virtues or vices to them, is bound to be influenced by how they act or respond towards nonhumans and the environment. A virtuous puritanical oldstyle industrialist who makes his affluent living through environmentally damaging practices will no longer obtain the virtuous ranking that would have been accorded to him on the older prevailing morality. (Of course that morality too is changing, but it hardly changes rapidly enough to keep pace with a deeper ethic). The change in the evaluation of and moral standing accorded to hard-working but environmentally exploitative business people, technologists and engineers reflects a more far-reaching adjustment; that of removal of special privilege for humans (or persons). Even in the more austere of standard ethical positions, such as duty ethics in the Kantian mould, it is very easy to gain the impression of persons (usually males on traditional ethics) as kings. There will be a club of kings, that was where more egalitarian industrialism was proceeding also, to make us all kings - with the rest of nature as subjects. While the unwarranted privilege accorded to humans under conventional ethical wisdom will topple then, the treatment of humans by humans need not. To the contrary, if people develop a more respectful and careful attitude to the environment, then they may well develop a better, different and more careful, approach to other people as well. Here the awful Kantianstyle theme that decent treatment of animals will trickle down from a decent treatment of other humans is partially reversed; a better treatment of other humans (a decent treatment is already ethically required) will percolate up from a more gently and respectful treatment of natural environments. Nor finally then need a deeper environmentalism abandon the quest for social justice. 16 Deep-green theory certainly does not; the ethical-change agenda is much wider than social 16 There are two American groups where the quest for terrestial social justice appears to have been abandoned or comprised: eco-fascists and nature greens, as they are sometimes called from outside. �12 change alone, but social and human concerns do not thereby fall off the agenda. They remain, but no longer in such isolations. What they do lose their unchallenged preeminence, and they may also lose priority. Problems with the Greater Value assumption (after Attfield). A prime alternative to a shallow/deep distinction is (what is sometimes considered no alternative, but a variant on it) the anthropocentric/ecologic distinction. Notes: 1. Not the same distinction. While shallow positions are normally anthropocentr ic, converse does not obtain. 2. Distinction never made out properly (really degree issues), and leads to typical 4-fold outcome. 5. Domination and chauvininism. The greater or sole value accorded to humans, as compared with (other) valuations, justify the domination of nature by humans. The main argument is simply that what has lesser or no value should give away to what has greater value, the conventional assumption being that what has greater value is better (analytic) than what has less, and should prevail over it (substantive assumptions of conventional ethical themes such as utilitarianism). Domination and associated class chauvinism are justified not only directly through consideration s of greater or supreme value, but also less directly by pointing to highly valued features possessed by the favoured class. Similar appeals to prized features are of course likewise used to justify class chauvinism. Appendices : 1. Deep ethics are not automatically acceptable as satisfactory. Consider e.g.whole chauvinism, where Wholes are intrinsically valuable, each and every one, and their value much exceeds that of everything else, humans included. So wholes come first. (This is a doctrical some superwholes may hold). Two rough comparisions: cows in India, humans on earth. Other unsatisfactory deep ethics, apart from those that aberate one species, are those that focus exclusively on certain elements. Those e.g. individualisms, strong holisms, etc. 2. Arguments to shallowness. 1. Simplistic (from one James O'Connor of Canada). ' ... the word "value" is a human word, with human meanings, in this case transposed to non-human nature. Hence to say that nature is inherently valuable means that it is inherently valuable to humans'. Ecofascists, who follow a route pioneered by Hardin, call for a triage of nations on lifeboat earth and abandonment of those nations, such as Bangladesh, seen without prospect of recovery. But the position is not deep, it is certainly not a properly moral position; for due criticism see Griffin and Bennett. �u 2. Problem with shallow/deep terminology, e.g. acquired too many associations for comfort. Intellectual offensiveness shallow, etc. 3. Shallowness involves a reductionist exercise. Making (trying to make) environmental issues in all that matter environmentally-answer back to shallow concerns. Series of arguments advanced to try to establish ..... . Counter argument. These do not succeed and can be counter-evolelled. 3. Cross-classifications reformism/revolation is, like anthropocentrism, a poor classification. It can be shallow without reformism and unethical economism with reformism. DE itself is largely reformist in character (and excessively personal).: Anthropo-/ecocentric. No doubt 'anthropocentricsm' meaning what its etymology implies 'centring in man' (OED), is a useful term. Theories such as Coperican and Copenhagen quantum theory can be criticised (or praised) as anthropocentric. What is in doubt is the new contrast of antropocentric with ecocentric. While the vague anthropocentric-ecocentric distinction is alright, so far as it goes, as a starting stage, it is no place to stop. For there is a need for a value specific distinction, antrhopocentr can be any sort of human centredness. 'Anthropocentric' is a poor choice of contrasting terminology, for several reasons. One, which may be convenient to some, lies in its vagueness. There is no sharp cut-off in what is human centred. Similarly for its supposed contrast term 'ecocentric', which presumably expandents to 'ecologically centred'. Second, it becomes apparent that no proper contrast is made in many cases. University textbooks on natural ecology, for instance are both ecocentric because about ecology and anthropocentric because set and supplied for humans. Human ecology, a subject increasingly encountered in universities, is directly both (not both under different aspects). Were the classification satisfactory, it would provide a nice contradiction. But the classification is far from satisfactory. It is not exclusive: nor is it exhaustive, but the remainder obscure. But worse, any practical ethics, no matter how deep, is bound to be anthropocentric, not ecocentric, even though duly concerned with ecology. The reason comes to this: any adequate ethics is bound to be heavily concerned with agents, their obligations and responsibilities, and for all practical purposes (on earth) these agents are generally certain humans. This is, an adequate practical ethics is, as a contingent matter, anthropocentric. Of course such an ethic, by contrast with main traditional ethics, may also be presented as an ecocentric ethic, inasmuch as it may be focussed upon ethical agents' relations to ecological items, human treatment of nature. �14 Problems with the anthropocentric/ecocentric contrast do not mean that something like the contrast cannot be made good. But it would involve redefinition of the critical terms, and could accordingly be better accomplished with adjusted terminology. Anthropocentrism is implausible, once a modern pict "of universe" becomes available. (Scuh a sufficiently modern picture was already available to Descartes.) The sun is a medium sized star of very common sort even within its galaxy. The probability of planets like the Earth within this university is extraordinarly high. The probability of other agents is also very high. Even the probability of other ..... ./competent agents is high. But even if it were not, or even if there were other agents, the discourse to be embarked upon would be significant. It is also pointful, for instance in disposeing of much philosophy. If anthropocentrism is so implausible as regards "main place in nature", why is it not implausible as regards intuitionality, value, etc. Ironically, the swing away from anthropocentrism in the sciences in modern times (with the advert of Copenhagen quantum theory and anthropic principles) was overpinged by increasing anthropocentrism in what are misleadingly distinguished as the humanities. Above all intentionality and value were emptied out of the wider universe and concentrated in the exclusive focus of humanities, humans. To adopt Freud: Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science two great humiliations to its chauvinism .17 The first was when it was realised that our earth was not the centre of the universe, but only a speck in the world system of a magnitude hardly conceivible ... . The second was when his logical science robbed man of his particular privilege of having been specially created and relegated him to a descent from the animal world' (puoted in Unozco Ev ..... May 1982 p.3) There are further shocks in store for humans-poor old humans! 3. Explaining depth [contrasts pale/pallid]. For a good sort of depth, what is needed a deep structure, extraction or format that lies (partially) hidden from the surface. E.G. plate ponites in geology, strata in archasology, logical form in grammar. Deep = penetrating to fundamentals in several ways and nonchauvinistic, not shallow. [Mention also pluralism-so only a framework aimed for, on which grew various detailled positions.] Part of depth of Deep Green theory lies in its penetration below the surface of classrestricted or interested humanism to a genuine nonchauvinistic ethical structure: the (ill-named) annular structure, which ties moral principles to nonhumanistic categorestion. Annular structure 17 Freud says: to great outrages upon it naive serif love. �15 is a deep structure. A deep structure. Maybe can produce one for deep green theory (see Critiq p.93, bottom halt) Start as above other measures of depth (pp.44-5) misconceived. 1'. Extent of searching of perception of value; depth of (value) perception. 1. Extent to which humanism (h.ch) abandoned for econvisonmental perspective. 2. Extent to which conventional moral and value judgements put op for reassessment. (Naess's depth of questioning conventional wisdom) 2 is tied to 1; for abandoning heh involves much reassessment. Note differs from usual reflective equilibrium, which takes many generally accepted judgements for granted. More on what depth means (pragmetinally): Many environmental outcomes sought in deep grounds can be supported in shallow ways (of course). But there are differences, as examples show: • pesticides (in forestry) should not be used, despite insect damage. For pesticides violate natural succession and healing processes. Toxicity questions, though important, are secondary. On shallow view: the main problem becomes not the use of pesticides, but whether they are safe. • natural world appears as a resource. Life forms which interfere with uses are pests. 2. Reformist/Transformist Variations upon Shallow/Deep Ecology Unhappy with the derogatory implications of "shallow", Devall and Sessions tried to convert shallow ecology in ecological reformism. While there was certainly a basis for this conversion in Naess's original brief account of shallow ecology (which almost invited such reconstrual), the result has been that something different has emerged, notably in green politics. For what such conversions, along with associated imagery accompanying reformism, achieve is not elucidation, but introduction of new contrasts, and therewith political crossclassification of the shallow-deep ecology contrasts. There are various contrasts with (mere) reformist adjustment on political theory, for instance revolutionary change and radical change. A revolutionary direction appears inappropriate as regards deep ecology (as revealed both by the literature and political stances of leading members of the movement), but a politically radical direction on environmental issues does emerge from later developments in N aess' s work. Accordingly a rough contrast, which admits sharpening, can be made out between green reformism and green radicalism. A machine image, which often operates not far from view in such contrasts, is initially helpful in indicating the differences. Reformism does not interfere with the main operation of the machine, its motor, though it may alter the adjustments, retune or fine tune it, add filters or mufflers or converters, alter its appearance cosmetically, and so on. By contrast radicalism would alter the machine, would interfere with its motor to some extent, depending on the level of radicalism. �16 In political terms reformism is exemplified in such measures as limiting pollution by emission devices, further treatment of sewerage, small reserves and roadside veneers of trees amid clear-cutting operations, tidying up of litter, and so on. The main motor of liberal democratic market capitalism, the economic engine designed to deliver maximum economic growth, and its main institutions, remain untouched and uncriticised; no change is proposed for them. For radicals such measures and like reforms do not proceed far enough, towards the sources of the problems. To tackle the range of environmental problems more radical change in economic, social and perhaps political machinery is required. But evidently the extent of change envisaged can vary, very considerably. For example, a frugal conservation program, directed at limiting economic growth through removing conspicuous and excessive consumption, need carry no accompanying program for radical social and political change. Again, deep ecology, which offers no well worked out, or even well signposted, radical program or radical restructuring, does not appear to be politically radical. Alternatives to liberal democratic arrangements are not really advanced or investigated. By contrast some anarchist and marxist influenced ecological positions are politically radical, for instance, social ecology. In short, there is room for a classification of green radicalism, as shown by a preliminary grouping according to whether the radicalism affects which of separate (though overlapping) economic, social, or political matters. The reformist-radical distinction is a vague one, without a sharp boundary. Reforms can so accumulate that what was a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind, what was extensive reformism turns out to be radicalism. In such an incremental fashion, positions which were reformist can find themselves radical, without having undergone any conspicuus radicalisation. The contrast between reformism and radicalism can be sharpened somewhat within a (an improved) theory of social paradigms. Then reformism is intra-paradigmatic, whereas radicalism is not (but is extra-paradigmatic). That is a reformist works, like a normal scientist, within the operational paradigm (the given political motor) and does not seek to change it, whereas the radical does; success of radicalism resembles abnormal (even revolutionary) periods in science. As there are many ways of deviating from a paradigm, which typically involves a complex set of presumptions, so there are many sorts of radicalism. The extent to which the political conversion of the shallow-deep contrast into green reformism-radical contrast affords not a restatement, but a different classification, may now be evident though perhaps not to its full extent. The most notable further feature is that green radicalism may be utterly shallow, entirely anthropocentric. 18 Green Marxism affords a useful 18 In these terms Naess conflated two contrasts in his original 1973 article; shallow-deep and reformist-radical. Different followers have latched onto different contrasts. �l'/ example; it is socially and politically radical while shallow (of course it can be argued that it is environmentally incoherent, though not in the mentioned features, but in its plan to supercharge the economic motor and make it run even faster, with evident environmental fall-out). Social ecology offers another example; for while more radical than deep ecology, it is certainy not deep. Something of the rich variety we have come upon can be glimpsed from the following table. All the positions enumerated, except 9, are occupied, we suspect (though positions are often so poorly or incompletely presented that is difficult to be sure ). 19 Positions 9 is practically excluded for committed deep parties who duly care about the demise of what is of intrinsic value under mere reformism. Position 5 is however occupied, by those who want (or believe they have achieved) improved arrangements for and treatment of animals (e.g., no circuses, no ordinary zoos, no cruel contests, etc.) but are not committed to a radical animal liberation agenda. Green party territory is usually shallow, but some of the proposals presented may extend to position 4, for instance in demands for participatory democratic restructuring. Of course, many supporters of green parties may adhere to deeper positions. 19 It is worth noting that such positions will in principle supply their own forms of sustainability, sustainable societies, and so on. �24.10.95 Chapter 2 ETHICS WITHOUT HUMANS, PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT HUMANS, and COROLLARIES It is a commonplace that ethics has proceeded not merely as if humans were on centre stage, but as if humans really were all there is, all that mattered in ethics, as if nothing else enters into morals and ethics, or does through only through them. That commonplace is moreover commonly strengthened to a claim of necessity, that this must be so, that nothing else can enter, except indirectly by way of humans. Ethics has to be thus anthropocentric. Since environmental ethics began to shift humans, if ever so little, off centre stage, there has been a heavy philosophical reaction, a sometimes bitter blacklash against greener ethics that would background humans, or dare sometimes to remove humans, from the scene altogether. Among many other things, it has been contended that by the very meaning of ethics and morals, these subjects must be human-centred. A crucial argument for necessary anthropocentricism of ethics makes human centrality a matter of definition. This crucial argument will be broken, in the first of several stages, through a detailed characterisation of morals and ethics in a way that is independent of humans. The characterizations adopted depart in only minor and justified (though highly consequential) ways from received dictionary definitions; that is the characterisations are substantially reportive, as they have to be if they are to serve their iconoclastic purposes. The matter of characterising ethics is in any case part of our business. Where would deep-green ethics be left, as a subject of investigation, without an appropriate account of ethics? 1. On inadeqacies of what prevails: a sheaf of defective accounts. It takes but little effort to discover severe shortcomings in most preceding investigations, and that most accounts, many of them far too casual, are inappropriate for what they are intended to cover, still less for environmental ends. There is no end to bad and defective definitions to dissect and discard. Even textbooks and guidebooks on ethics often make no attempt at a definition, and often have little or nothing of due generality to offer on what ethics is about. 1 Unremarkably then, many of those presenting or teaching ethics, perhaps well enough, have no adequate idea of what ethics is about. This is revealed by the sorts of definitions they slop down and by what they say ethics is about. The slop presented indicates they did not even bother to consult their dictionaries with any care. It is an elementary exercise to show deficiencies in most proposals. A striking recent example is Singer (ed.) Companion to Ethics, supposedly an encyclopaedic work on ethics. �2 A few sample definitions recently encountered will help confirm our claims. Utterly defective is the account of ethics as 'the relation between you and other people' .2 Such connections as the spatial relations between people, for instance where they sit at a seminar, do not belong to ethics. Narrowing relations to those of treatment, as in 'how you treat other people' improves the account a bit, but not enough. Decent treatment of relevant kinds no doubt comprises part of ethics, but a small part. Nor is such treatment confined, especially as regards receivers, to people; animals, nature and more, all matter. A more interesting account, presumably designed to encompass applied ethics, takes this remarkable form: "'ethics" [is] defined as disciplined reflection by persons in all walks of life on moral ideas and ideals'. 3 As a definition, this too fails entirely, appearing circular, and converting ethics away from, what is essential, practice into head stuff, into something like meditation, a kind of widely practiced theorizing, though practised on certain parts of ethics! There are too some unfortunate side-effects of the insertion, aimed at making ethics applicable to all walks of (human) life: namely, as there are walks of life which have no room for disciplined reflection, so there is in fact no ethics. Back again to the drawing board. Similarly for Russell's fuller attempt: The study of Ethics is perhaps most commonly conceived as being concerned with the questions "What sort of actions ought men to perform?" and "What sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is conceived, that is to say[!], as dealing with human conduct, and as dividing what is virtuous and what is vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice, people are called upon to choose. 4 Owing to feminist criticism of male chauvinism, many now wince at Russell's; piquant use of term like 'men' (in fact throughout his numerous works). Environmental criticism of human chauvinism has not been so (terminologically) successful, sad to report. Back to the board. It takes little effort to assemble a sheaf of inadequate definitions and accounts of ethics. Many include too little, for example the popular account of ethics as "how we should live", which as well as being too narrow is parochial. 5 Similarly, though fractionally better; a coherent set of values to live by is enough for an ethic. For that appears to omit a deontic component, obligations and permissions, and certainly leaves out ethical virtues. A major shortcoming, even in fuller characterisations, concerns the concentration on humans and their parochial affairs. For, as will soon appear, ethics does not essentially concern humans. An adequate ethics says nothing about humans, members of species Homo sapiens, their obligations and rights, values or virtues. It applies but contingently to humans; it applies similarly to hominids, humanoids, and to persons generally, and functions in the absence of persons altogether. As a result, the following familiar sorts of pronouncements on what ethics amount 2 3 4 5 John Langford, on ABC radio, 22 February 1993. Engels, 6. Russell p.1, F & S, from Elements of Ethics 1910. For such an account see e.g. Single [Encyl. Brit.] �3 to are seriously defective: 'An ethic may be thought of as an ideal of human behaviour, an environmental ethics as ideal human behaviour with respect to the environment, natural and built" _6 Not everyone got it quite so wrong. For instance, Brandt gets away to a nice neutral start, even if he does not cover the spread of ethics. Consider his opening: Moral philosophy has traditionally been a systematic attempt to answer some questions of apparently universal interest [!] about: what is worth wanting or working for (what is worthwhile, of worth); what is the best thing for an agent to do from his own point of view; what is morally right, and what is morally just). [Also what is rational in these regards.]7 The nice start does not last. Agents turn out to be humans; utilitarianism soon begins to effect an ugly intrusion, and so on. 2. On how to define ethics and morals more satisfactorily. It is not difficult to do noticeably better than ethics teachers and writers have managed, simply by consulting better dictionaries. But it is also not so difficult to re-organize and improve upon what dictionaries offer. It is significant that dictionary definitions of moral and ethic contain no essential allusion to humans, nothing essential concerning humans, man, or we, us and co. (andwhere 'human' does enter, as in 'principles of human duty', it can simply be elided, it is inessential). But the dictionary accounts do harbour some problems. For one thing, like some of the preceding definitions, the dictionaries seem mired in a common and damaging circularity: ethics is defined in terms of morality (and its adjuncts, decent treatment, and similar); but then morality is itself defined through ethics. Fortunately the loop back to ethics can be broken. A particularly satisfactory way to workable definitions of notions in the ethics orbitethic, ethical, ethics, to take direct cases-is through those in the presupposed moral orbitdirectly, moral, morality, morals. For all these ethical notions are regularly defined, in better dictionaries, through moral notions. This approach reverses the difficult and so far unsuccessful strategy, sometimes tried in ethical theory, of attempting to define morality (e.g. through universalizability conditions) inside a somehow independently characterized ethics. 8 The bases, upon which moral notions are carried, lie in turn in the action orbit, in features of actions and their agents. 9 As agents are entailed by actions-beca use actions just 6 7 8 9 See 'A universal environmental ethics' Connect, UNESCO-UNE P Environmental Education Newsletter XVI(2)(June 1991). pl. Brandt p.l. Long ago I used to think this was now it had to be done, through some singling out of morals within ethics by way of a combination features of humans and requirements of morality (such as, variously, consideration of others, universalizability). Not recognising the virtues of agency, I too erroneously supposed that morality had to pertain to humanity. No doubt the main definitional enterprise can be carried out, more or less, the other way around, beginning with ethics, then cutting down to morals within, through agency. Moreover, such an alternative route (starting out easily enough from the notion of ethics as the theory and systematization of the good and the right, valuable and permissible, the virtuous and responsible, and so on) should arrive at the same place, at a similar end result. These action basics can in turn be explained, as before, within process theory, see Sylvan 1993. A classification of agents can be drawn from there. It is not claimed that this is how we have to start or that action nexus affords unique starting point. But its features have to be included sooner or �4 are agent-ascribed processe s-actions , more generally processes, form bedrock here. Neither processes nor actions have any essential connection with humans. Relevant elements of action nexus, upon which moral actions are carried, are now indicated: Single action snapshot, capturing agent-acts -in-environment nexus: AGENT has motives emotions volitions objectives and goals of prior causes ACTION has subsequent consequences impacts upon (relevant items within) environment The breakdown of actions, into types, will straightaway yield much that has long been taken as central in moral theory, such as agonising (as Socrates did) over choices. Choice-making is a morally critical type of action. Plural actions expose further relevant features, including conduct, dispositions and character of agents, and suggest typologies (or moral relevance) of actions and of impacts. Virtue ethics, but part of moral theory, fit here. Whereas morality -the new ecologically sensitive morality that is-begin s from certain features of an agent in its environment, ecology begins from investigation of an organism in its environment. 'From the outset ecology was clearly understood to be the appreciation of the organism (any organism, note) in and as part of its environment' . 10 'Something along the lines of "the study of organisms in relation to their environment" is the basis of most ... attempts ... [at] working definition of ecology ... over [which] there has been little dispute' . 11 Despite initial appearances, the upshot is not (the perhaps appealing one) that morality is a branch of ecology. For the features investigated are very different (and a satisfactory definition of 'ecology ' has to be sharpened to indicate what features of organism-inenvironments are studied). Whereas in morality there is much interest in the virtues and vices of agents for instance, a parallel interest is outside the scope of ecology (and indeed not a significant question for most organism or for many agents). Interestingly, the ethical theory being advanced begins in precisely the way Deep Ecology, in its pristine formulation, implies that no theory should operate, with an agent-inenvironment image. Under the total-field approach of Deep Ecology all such images dividing up fields should be rejected, in particula r any man-in-e nvironme nt image, a special chauvinistic case of what our theory operates with. Similarly no doubt for organism-inenvironment images of ecology. Unremarkably no arguments are offered for these rejections; 10 11 later, and it has virtues as a start, including familarity and naturalness. R. Kitching [New Education], p.39 Ibid p.40 rearranged. �5 cogent arguments would be hard to find, or articulate. In any case, Deep Ecology strictures do not prevent preliminary or limited uses of field analysis. As it will soon turn out, for more general purposes, what is needed is removal of agents, not dissolving the image. These action-theoretic preliminaries admit of much elaboration and variation, both expansion and contraction most of which however we can pick up as we proceed. For example, an illuminating expansion would expose the setting, of constraints and incentives, within which an agents acts; no doubt some of these features, incentives for instance, can be absorbed into what is already depicted, such as motives, and the remainder could be included in under a prior-influences category. Striking contractions are those afforded by prevailing ethical theories, consequentialism and Kantianism, which would erase, respectively, all but consequences or all but motives. The parable of the Blindman and the Elephant is not only a clever analogy for a implausible perspectivism; it can serve as a telling indictment of much analytic philosophical practice. Moral philosophical practice, especially that of analytic philosophy, consists in only sensing part of a whole (constellation) and failing to see the rest. 12 Moral and action theory afford good examples of such skimping; for instance, consequentialism fails to see anything but consequences. The term moral, generously construed, covers the assessment of agent-intricated elements of the action nexus depicted, in all the following sorts of respects (as applicable): excellent, good, indifferent, bad, evil; approved, disapproved; valuable, of value, or not axiological right or wrong (or alright), fair or unfair, proper or improper obligatory, forbidden, permissible deontic responsible, irresponsible; it also covers principles concerning such assessments. Morality concerns both appreciation and assessment of agents-acting-in-environments as regards those sorts of features and resulting systematization. Parallels with ecology should be evident. X's conduct or the like is moral, broadly so, iff it is a matter for moral appraisal. In short, what is moral is marked out by classes of functors in an action nexus. Plainly some of the features, which perform the distinguishin g work, are not significantly applicable to all elements in the nexus; for instance, impacts of frogs are not significantly responsible. Responsibility applies primarily to certain agents, their conduct and character. The sorts of respects cited are, furthermore, more general forms. But many more specific evaluations are thereby encompassed; for instance, honourable, dishonourable; decent, indecent, again as applicable. In terms of the sorts of respects, certain important subtypes can be distinguished. The first group (given by the first two lines) covers axiological. The second group (given by the next two lines) covers deontic. The third group (not usually distinguished in "the logic of 12 For a detailed treatment of skimping in philosophy, see DP, chapter 11. �6 ethics") comprises accountability notions. Such, formerly important, terms as virtuous and vicious-regu larly, but wrongly included in dictionary listings of respects defining moral (e.g., "of or pertaining to character or disposition considered as ... virtuous or vicious")-ar e axiological. They can be characterized in terms of what is already available, thereby avoiding further circularity vexing dictionary definitions (which define 'moral' using 'virtuous', and 'virtuous' deploying 'moral'). 13 For example, to adjust the dictionaries, virtuous [action] is [that] exhibiting moral excellence or quality, vicious that distinguished as morally evil. Much the same supervenient story gets told for duty in the deontic class. For while a duty just amounts to a certain sort, a rigorous sort, of moral obligation, duty is not among the respects listed in defining the term moral. There are several, loosely consequential , attachments often made to what counts as moral(s), notably: issues of punishments and rewards, with a view to altering proper conduct; of freedom and determinism, as the latter may appear to place moral enterprise in jeopardy; of justification of moral principles, which do not stand on its own without moral justification; and so on, for other theoretical topics that consequently arise. While these further issues do not form part of dictionary definitions of moral, they are stock textbook fare in moral philosophy. But that, moral philosophy and moral theory, is where they can comfortably stay. While the issues that result could be called moral, or distinguished as textbook moral, they might as well simply be accommodate d more accurately, within philosophy of morality (metamorals). Morality is, at base, the attribute of being moral. 14 Thus, basically, an item exhibits morality if and only if that item is moral. In wider compass, morality comprehends a larger package concerning what is moral; it consists in the theory and appreciation, practice and principles of what is moral. It follows, from the account of moral given, that morality is all about certain features of agency, features of theory and practice of agency, namely evaluative and assessment features and principles concerning these, such as conduct and choice. Several other significant corollaries also emerge. Firstly morality has nothing essentially to do with humans. A similar but still more striking result will follow for ethics, which is characterised, also in a human independent way, by way of morality. Ethics too has nothing essentially to do with humans (or even with humanoids). Morality turns on features of agency. Humans, some of them, simply happen to supply, presently, prime terrestrial examples of full moral agents, those actors who do not merely conduct themselves well or badly (a kangaroo can be a good or poor mother, a dog can behave badly and know it) but who make promises, recognise obligations, accept responsibilities, and so forth. Humans were almost certainly not the only full terrestrial agents; other humanoid 13 14 Thus too much of "virtue ethics" can be absorbed, see further, later chapters. In logical terms it is defined through attribute abstraction. �7 species that have become extinct (perhaps with human assistance) very likely were also. Certain humans are probably not the only full moral agents even now in this universe. It is unlikely that humans will exemplify the only moral agents, perhaps even terrestrially. 15 The prominen t role of competen t humans in morality, and so as regards ethics, is utterly contingent. It follows, now quite generally, that those familiar definitions of morality and ethics in terms of humans and their features are one and all defective. For all the (green) ethical theory to be developed, humans can drop out altogether. But competent humans are useful for illustrative purposes; it helps to have some demonstrably actual examples. Moreove r, in such practical terms as terrestrial ethical impact, they are now almost unavoidable. Before explaining how to escape damaging agent centredness, or actocentricity, in ethics that would result from equating ethics with morals (i.e. morality in this sense), there are loose ends to be tied up and certain advantages, worth recording, accruing from having actocentrism as a staging post. One advantage is that unwanted senses of evaluative notions are peeled off automatically, because they do not apply regards agency. For example, so removed are not only merely "aesthetic" uses but all those quasi-descriptive uses of commendatory terms such as good (e.g. 'good car' 'good sort', 'good sox', 'good ox'). Aesthetic uses of evaluative terms, as in 'fine painting' or 'good book', do not concern, except in oblique ways, action or conduct of agents. It may well be objected that even so not enough non-moral uses are peeled off, as various uses like those of mere expediency or practicality are left standing. A countercase will be developed that these should be left standing. For a smarter strategy than attempting exclusion, includes moralities of expedience, of practicality, egoism and the like within the moral orbit-so enabling a straightforward answer to such otherwise vexing questions as Why be moral?- whilst subsequently differentiating within morals a distinuished subclass (to be called meurals) which does function exclusively through meeting more exacting requirements of morality. There is a subsense that should be picked up immediately. Though a vicious or evil agent is certainly a matter for morality, and within its compass, such an agent would not normally be accounted moral (as a naive reading of the dictionaries would suggest), but immoral. What is moral, morality, concerns the span of moral, immoral and indifferent procedures. Plainly moral in the narrower sense comprehends the definitely positive part of the span, as good does of the wide value span. Generally, an item (such as an agent, practice, conduct, or whatever) is strictly moral, moral in this stricter sense, if it is moral, a matter of 15 There are arguments to other moral agents, other full agents even, from evolusionary theory. According to an expanded theory, every niche is eventually occupied. (In a way, this interesting theme carries over from the earlier doctrine of a great chain of being, which similarly onto every position in the chain as potentially occupied.) By a statistical argument (copying those for intelligent life elswhere in this vast universe), there are, or will be, niches for agents, with requisite capabilities, wlsewhere in the universe. Therefore, by the theory, these niches will eventually be occupied. �8 moral concern, and its appraisal is decidedly positive. Naturally for a full account, positive within the moral span, has also to be defined. However here the strict sense is picked up only to be set aside. Focussing upon morality would be unduly limiting from the perspective of environment al ethics. For although anthropocent ricism has been avoided, easily circumvented through agency, though humans play no essential role, still morality is undoubtedly agent-centred. Morality foregrounds agents and assessments of them and their actions, and backgrounds environments of agents, and environments more generally (those without agents in them do not even enter into consideration). The environment remains, so to say, mere backdrop to actions of agents. Escape is through an intermediary, which is substituted in place of morality in the account proposed of ethics. That intermediary is an expanded morality, in convenient shorthand ectomorality. 16 ('Ectomoralit y' is close enough for the present to 'ecomorality' , which is of course part of the main focus.) Expanded morality takes into account also evaluative settings, perhaps devoid of agents; whatever of value that agents, or agent-like subjects, agentoids, might in principle impact upon, interfere with, disturb, effect, change, dislodge, or similar. That is, to say, it encompasses all items of relevant value, of worth, significant items, including many wholes, such as habitats, ecosystems, the Earth itself; and so also whatever applies morally with respect to these, for instance permission to disturb or to improve, principles of letting be, and so on. Such ecosignificant items are also called, in the literature, morally considerable items (a nicely ambiguous term, both sides of which have unfortunate features, one because a considerable item may not have large significance, the other because what it is supposed to respond to is some restricting class of considerers). In yet other and more satisfactory terms, they have ethical standing. Naturally items of significance other than agentoids may have other ethically relevant features (which they perhaps accrue through their significance). For instance they may hold entitlements of various sorts, such as to be left alone, to be represented, and so on. In order to characterize core notions in the ethics orbit, the basic strategy consists in plugging in "expanded morality" where the dictionaries give "morality"; similarly substitute "ectomoral" for "moral". For the adjectival forms 'ethical' , and (equivalently) 'ethic', that is all that is required. For the form concerned means: pertaining to ectomorality, or (equivalently) treating of or relating to ectomorals. For the noun forms it is not so simple, because there are problems with the dictionary accounts (for instance in 'the science of morality' owing to misplaced definiteness, and dated uses of the term 'science'). Always ethics(s) is an abstract, signifying features of being ethical; more exactly, always concerning ectomoral theories or systems. More specifically, ethic( s) signifies firstly, in both singular or plural though usually plural, the whole field of ectomoral theory 16 Greek ektos, outside. We include the inside with the expansion which incorporates the outside. �9 (the "science" of ectomorals), or derivatively, the department of (philosophical) study concerned therewith; secondly, in the singular but pluralising, a system or schematization of ectomorality, that is, at least rudiments of a system, or of a theory, comprising values, ectomoral principles, and rules of proper conduct.17 Like stock textbook ethics, most environmental ethics so far are in fact truncated; they are very rudimentar y schemes, leaving out much that would be expected in a fatter systematization. Hence in part the vagueness of characterization. So far the vagueness (which does not exceed that of dictionaries or of ordinary usage), is immaterial, as the characterisation is workable. But further exactness could be obtained through a technical upgrade of system and a more detailed specification of what such a proposition system contains. 18 What are sometimes cited as further restricted senses of 'ethic' are not further senses. Rather they are restrictions, or designations, of what is already presented. Thus for instance, the 'moral principles of a particular leader or school of thought' as in Buddhist ethics or Kantian ethics. Similarly for field indications or application restrictions, as in medical ethics or bioethics. So much for "senses" of 'ethics'. In order to reach an adequate definition of ethics, not merely for intended environmental purposes, but for historical purposes as well (so as to include Stoic ethics, Taoist ethics, romantic nature ethics and the like as ethics) we have been obliged to adjust (if in an inconspicuous way) dictionary definitions of ethics. That adjustment was made through "expanded morality", but could have been accomplished in other equivalent ways (Leopold's expansion of 'community' is another, though less satisfactory, way of achieving the same sort of thing). Granted that we have adjusted dictionary definitions, have we changed the very notion of ethics, or did the dictionaries, not for the first item, get it wrong, getting caught with chauvinistic definitions? We claim that we have not changed the notion. Rather we captured what some meant, more or less, by ethics all along-fro m Stoics, Epicureans and others on. It has never been a very precise notion. In this case (by contrast with terms like right) not too much hangs on the term, and we could simply divide ethics up, for instance, into wide and narrow. However, we intend to keep the nice term ethics but to give the dictionaries and modem opposition the expressions, standard ethics, or conventional ethics. Our inconspicuous but all important adjustment is both good and bad news. It is bad news, insofar as it appears to assist the charge that [deeper] environmental philosophy is doing something different from ethics, that it is guilty of changing the subject (i.e., effectively committing ignoratio elenchi). However we can freely grant, without incurring damage, that 17 18 Thus ethics include what it has to include, as expanded environment ally: philosophy of ecomorality, and therewith of morality. A system is a relational structure of a certain sort. An ethic is a propositional system, since it has to include principles and the like; thus it involves a theory of strict logical sort. For an illustration of the use of systems formulations in ethics, see e.g. Routley 1973. �10 standard ethics was, as a matter of definition, at least actocentric, and that, insofar as agents were identified with humans, it was, therefore, anthropocentric. Even so ethics, as redefined, includes standard ethics, so it is more satisfactorily seen not a different but a larger subject, expanded through an expanded morality. It is good news, not merely because it facilitates environmental ethics and accords with more satisfactory (greener) accounts of the subject, but because it helps in getting around a snarl of objections to the effect that ethics has to be homocentric, or at least actocentric. Removing these objections will recur throughout what follows. Among corollaries of note, a first one is that plurality of ethics falls out of the characterisation. An ethic is not unique. Nor (through such a result does not follow as environmental ethics form a subclass of ethics) are environmental ethics. Nor are military or professional ethics. Failure of uniqueness is not a deficiency, but a virtue. For, one thing, it gives places to go in cases of breakdown of an ethic, namely to other nearby ethics. Plurality is tied up with nonuniqueness and other features of merit: noncomprehensiveness, openness, flexibility, and so on.19 Secondly, there is more news on what an ethics is; and what an environmental one is. It is widely claimed that an ethics requires a communit y, in an environme ntal ethic the community (of concern etc.) is a wide environmental one. Ethics enlarges the community, a scope of values. Ethics (partaking of ethos ~ the evaluative frame(or spirit) of a community. While these ideas are popular they are astray. Environmental ethics shifts the frame of reference for ethical consideration from purely human concerns to ecological communities. 1-B Human beings as moral agents are not ethically privileged. An environmental ethic must be compatible with ecological principles and with life, i.e. be livable. 3. Within ethics and morals, as so far generously constured: decent and dud distinctions. Something like the division between the first and second specifics above has been quasi-technicalized within ethics, and distorted through merger with a theory-metatheory distinction borrowed from outside ethics. Engagement with the second (as in systematisation, constructing and working within systems, etc.) has been dubbed normative ethics, or sometimes to increase the confusion just ethics, or condescendingly, casuistry. Metaethics has been taken however to be not what the logical analogy, and borrowing, would suggest metanormative ethics, the (positivistically correct) study of such systems, but instead a brand of analytic philosophy, analysing the meanings and uses of key ethical terms. Taken as exhaustive, there is much of importance, that the normative-metaethical distinction leaves out. Nor is the distinction exhaustive. As well, the labels are misleading. In short, the distinction is ill-made out and rather unsatisfactory, a handicap, not an asset; it can be abandoned without 19 See EEHC p.57. �11 loss and to advantage. Let us do so (so forget this paragraph, if you prefer). Many other distinctions from standard ethics are also defective, in one way or another. It will be advisable to resurvey and rechart ethical terrain. Among other standard, but often dud, distinctions from ethical theory that have to reexamined after environmental impact, to be duly salvaged or scrapped, are all the following: • objective/subjective. That the objective/subjective distinction provides a false dichotomy is easily seen from usual explanations of the terms: 'either objective, standing for a real factor in things, or subjective, simply standing for a human proposal' 20 • Cognitive/non-cognitive. 2 1 To be retained are some distinctions which certain forces have worked hard to eliminate, such as that of • Fact/value (and earlier demise). • Expedient/moral. There is an elasticity in the notion of ethics, and a neglected distinction, that it is important to take into account.. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to build a universalizability requirement or some sort of equivalent into the very notion of ethics. The evident result is that selfish systems of evaluation and conduct, systematic egoisms for instance, are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be ethical? become vexed. 22 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is problematic in its formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethics do have much to recommend them, let us coin a convenient portmanteau term condensing the clumsy "universalizable ethics", namely euthics. (Conveniently then un-euthical suggests unethical, which is what from a properly ethical stance it is!) There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or isolated individual 23 ( even so, a Crusoe ethics is intelligible and feasible, as regrettably is egoistic morality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an upper-class ethics are not defective on significance or semantic grounds, even if they are wide open to objections on substantive grounds. Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out, as ethics, by such requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant differences. 24 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a 20 21 22 23 24 Reese p.157. See also Reese. On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer Impractical ethics (Singer equates moral with ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to the question Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented as decisive. Pettit reworking a rough route hacked out by Wittgenstein, tries to expand this across into a philosophical forest denominated "holism", no-dwelling place for an isolated individual. These requirements are presented by Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No �12 Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of responses, which were long accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Egoism, for instance, exhibits rationality failure, as it does not treat likes alike. There are no relevant differences justifying different treatment. Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view,for universality, rests upon an extensive appeal to authority (p.11). What else is offered is but an appeal to usage. the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct on ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I must address myself to a larger audience'(p.10). That depends on the conduct concerned. More important, the audience does not need to be so large, certainly not universal: my family or clan will suffice often enough. Nonetheless there is this of use 'ethics', especially in such criticisms as 'unethical'. • due consideration of others, all others; Parallel to the distinction of euthics within ethics is a distinction of neurals within morals, neurality within morality. Again the subclass, reflecting widespread philosophical usage of the term morality, is separated through some requirement of morality, such as • universalizability, which is a strong way of ensuring the first (do unto others etc.). Insofar as these principles all allude to others, they often admit easy extension (to other others). 25 4. Environmental and greener ethics. As prevailing accounts of ethics are for the most part defective, so are what builds upon them, recent accounts of environmental ethics. But there are also other grounds for dissatisfaction with these. Issues in the characterizat ion of ethics, especially removal of actocentrism and homocentrism, naturally get transmitted to critical types, such as environmental ethics. But it might be imagined, rashly, that disagreement ends there. After all, all decent environmental ethics make the non-human world a proper object of concern, either directly or indirectly. Differences between explications offered can be ascribed to ordinary philosophica l incompleteness. "An environmental ethic, broadly, is a set of values to live by which takes due account of the value of the non-human world". 26 Stated differently, the aim of environmental ethics 'is to understand and act appropriately in relation of our ecological-i n 25 26 doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated. The distinctions can be filled out (and made to work-verify!) by a strategy like the earlier. Again the list of moral predicates is deliberately wide. But once again we can later separate off certain uses e.g. instrumenal, aesthetic uses of good. Gunn 1987, 3. �13 the broad sense-circum stances". 27 Differently again, " ... sets of principles, which would guide our treatment of wild nature, constitute an environmental ethic in the most general sense". 28 The first of these slack explanations leaves out what is essential for an ethics, principles; the second is unduly actocentric, leaving out what is not, as well as main paraphernalia of ethics; the third not only neglects values, but excessively narrows scope so that such an ethics is inapplicable in places devoid of wild nature or to other issues. A better explication, which avoids these obvious pitfalls runs: An environmental ethics is an ethics, as defined, which, among other concerns, takes specific account, through its values and principles, of (significant) environmental items, of parts of nonhuman nature. But obviously it too leaves much to be explained. How the non-human world is made the object of concern, how it is moral concern, to what degree it is made the object of moral concern, what forms of moral concern are applicable to what elements of the environment, and how to achieve the aim of acting appropriately - all are matters that make environmental ethics one of the most controversial areas of philosophy and also one of the most exciting, although many professional philosophers still regard it as a peripheral area. Yet there now is broad agreement among most of those active in the area that some change is needed and that environmental matters need much more attention and action. An environmental ethics is an ethics concerned, usually among other ethical things, with parts of the environment. Coal-face or factory-floor environmenta l ethics bears on environmental issues, problems and causes, and can be expected to say something about environment s or some of their nonhuman components. Academic or board-room environmental ethics is frequently, however, a remove from direct ethical work, comprising discussion of environmental ethics, its features, its methods, its variability, its presumed merely derived and applied character, and so on. Much of this academic environmental ethics is directed against coal-face environmental ethics, especially that of a genuinely committed sort aimed at advancing environmental sources. It is almost immediate that there is an important elasticity -ambiguity, in a slack sense -in the notion of environmental ethics, between an ethics which considers environmental matters, whether positively or negatively, and an ethics which is positive about some environmental elements, which evinces concern about environmental items (as 18th century sympathy ethics did about other humans). A superficial environmental ethics need not say anything particularly positive or sympathetic about environments; indeed productions on the topic may try to dismiss or defeat environmenta l causes and to defuse or dissolve environmental problems, for instance as not worth bothering about. 29 It may be argued that 27 28 29 Drengson 1989, 15. Elliot, in Singer, 284. That is, fashionable contemporary practice with respect to philosophy is transferred to parts of enviromental philosophy (e.g. by Eco Wittgenstein and AppliedQuine). Environmental philosophy may in no way interfere with industry and business. To an astonishing extent American academic environmental ethics tends to conform to such ridiculous strictures (often encouraged by a fawning �14 natural environme nts should serve highest economic causes, which means in practice becoming reserves for city folks, city corporations and consumers. Under such environmental ethics ("environmental ethics" it is tempting to say, contravening usage) many an environme nt should be razed, levelled, and paved over, to become a grand parking lot, shopping mall or urban escarpmen t of a concrete jungle. What rural environment remains will, also serve those "high" purposes, be tamed and managed, like much of Western Europe. Witness the enthusiasm in productions on environmental ethics for landscapes like that of Tuscany, where virtually everything is under tight human control and no bird moves (else it is shot). Environm ental ethics and environme ntal philosophy may well prove to be disappointm ents for enthusiastic environmentalists. For there may be little that is materially green about them, no commitme nt to changes in old attitudes and practices, no offers of improved standing and ethical treatment for environme ntal items. As an environme ntal economics may be no green economics , but (very likely) some part or application of mainstream economics , some sweep of resource or land economics , so an environme ntal ethics or environme ntal ethic may not be particularly or at all green, but, for instance, simply part of establishm ent ethics or an "application" of it to environmental items. Fortunately not all environmental ethics is like this; beyond environmental is genuinely green ethics. The elasticity in environmental ethics between superficial and material forms, parallels that of the term concern (and rather similarly of matter), and can be substantially constricted to that: an environme ntal ethics is one concerned with environmental items or matter. Thus, on the one construal, such an ethics may be simply about such topics, it may be a standard ethics "applied" to such topics, in which case environmental ethics does become just so-called applied ethics. Alternatively, however, such an ethic may be one evincing concern, worry, about the treatment of some environmental items on other, and directed at obtaining improved treatment. Such an ethic is not negative or indifferent towards environme ntal matters, but is advancing environme ntal causes. They matter. With such ethics, environme ntal ethics cannot possibly be an applied ethics, for the framework of standard ethics and their application s, is exceeded. (At best such ethics can be approxima ted by standard ethics by assuming enlightened agents holding appropriate sorts of values. 30) 5. Human chauvinism and its detailed removal. Deep-green theory is, unambiguously, a green ethical theory, of deep kind: that is, there is intrinsic value in nature, natural items have intrinsic value, which may predomina te over human-bas ed value. In short, the theory rejects both the 'Sole Value Assumptio n' and the 'Greater Value Assumptio n'. The theory finds all standard ethics mired in heavy prejudice, in 30 pragmatism). Compare also Naess (in Engel 1990) on utilitarian approximation to Deep Ecology, made by assuming availability of enough agents holding deep ecological values or, more or less equivalently, having deep ecological consciousness. �15 favour of things human and against things non-human. The distinctive, still pervasive, prejudice concerned is that encapsulated as human chauvinism, which is itself a special case of class chauvinism (for the class, human 31 ). Removal of human chauvinism dovetails with displacement of humans. Class chauvinism consists in substantia lly differentia l treatment, typically discriminatory and inferior treatment, of items outside the class, by sufficiently many members of the class concerned, for which there is no sufficient justification. Human chauvinism is a feature, a cardinal weakness, of virtually all ethical systems hitherto, so deepgreen theory contends. The main argument takes the following form: there is no characteristic, such as those tendered in ethical theories as justifying differential treatment in favour of humans (characteristics such as rationality, language possession, tool making abilities, needs, preferences, sentience, etc.) which first is held by all and only humans, as distinct from not all humans and some non-humans, and which second does justify differential treatment.3 2 Signs and manifestations of chauvinism are many and various, some conspicuous, some subtle, and so on. For instance, a dead giveaway is any allusion to all outside certain human concerns that may have a value as resources. For that assigns to the items so referred to mere instrumental value. A little less obvious is the discriminative mode when individual humans are counted, but only species of other living things (or a step down, individual sentients but only species of others). The thorough-going rejection of human chauvinism itself sets a program: that of reworking ethics, and indeed much of philosophy, in a way free of chauvinism and humanism, without any specially privileged place for humans. A first part of such a program has already been outlined, that of suitably characterising ethics in a way that does not make essential appeal to humans or their features, or to other favoured groups such as sentients. A further important part of the program, formulation of ethical theory in a way which avoids entirely group chauvinism. Such a desirable outcome can be achieved simply through formulation of ethical theory in terms of ethically relevant categories, assembled in what is called an annular theory. 33 31 32 33 Insofar as an account of human is required, it can be some improvement on the biological species definitions, a reworking to remove past biasses (superioristic, rationalistic, masceulinist, etc.) and to dislodge appeals to aspects of human nature. But, despite the preponderance of human agents hereabouts, on planet Earth, such an account is not required for ethics, or for philosophy. Theorizing in these and many other areas can proceed perfectly well without allusion to humans. The detailed argument for this proposition is presented in Routley and Routley 1980a 97-108, where chauvinism is spelled out a bit further. A truncated version of this argument appears in Fox 1990, 16-17. Though the theory is so labelled in several publications, the label, which presumably should stay, is misleading, because some ethical relevant categories may overlap one another. The concentric theory (developed in Wenz 1988 and others, perhaps in steps of Leopold), which incorporates a similar mistake, can be seen as a subversion of the annular model. �16 The annular picture helps show how to redo ethics and philosophy with ideal types, or with some equivalent thereof. No simple species or subspecies , such as humans or superhumans, no single feature, such as sentience or life, serves as a reference benchmark, a base class, for determinin g moral relevance and other ethical dimensions . 34 No ethical irrelevant distinctions and classes, such as those of humans or base class, are required. What is required instead is a major shift in perspective , a new focus upon morally relevant categorical distinctions: it is not possible to provide criteria which would justify distinguishing, in the sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have preferences or preferred states. For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some rather arbitrarily -determine d and loaded tests for membershi p of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for the preference s of other creatures. According ly the sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics by philosophe rs and other alike, between all humans and all other animal species, lacks a satisfactory coherent basis (Routley and Routley 80a, 103). The categorical distinctions thereby proposed do not reject traditional ethical notions such as rationality, self-awaren ess, having interests; but they do reject the automatic use of the characteristics of one species, or some base class as the model upon which the characteristics of all other species or classes are judged. They also reject as unjustified distinctions that are not "categorical distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions". 35 For instance, they hold that the human/nonhuman distinction is not ethically significant. Humans enter only in a contingent way into general ethical theory, as holders of these or those features, which 34 35 Another common mistake which annular theory helps dispel and avoid is that of trying to stretch community (or moral commuity) to include webs, mountains, Earth, land etc.-a trend Leopold started with his land ethic. An agent can have an obligation to care for earth, and soil without there being part of community. (The Land ethic is misguided). What ethics covers diverges from any moral community. (Contra Dobson's suggestion p.47). Routley and Routley 1980a, 108. �17 depending upon their respective capabilities and competence. It is also desirable to have available some more positive principles corresponding to the negative rejection of class chauvinism, principles so to say, of anti-chauvinism. Principles like the biospherical egalitarianism of Deep Ecology represent an unsatisfactory attempt in this direction. The deep-green improvement on this principle is the powerful principle of ecoimpartiality, according to which there should be no substantially differential treatment of items outside any favoured class or species of discriminatory sort that lacks sufficient justification. The appropriate impartial treatment is substantially independent of the comparative value of the item treated. Most important, impartial treatment does not entail equal treatment, or equal consideration, and does not require equal intrinsic or other value. Other distinctive principles of deep-green theory will emerge as the ethical theory accumulates. One major conclusion is that human is not a significant ethical category. The outcome is not anti-human; humans enter to the extent that they respectively deserve to enter. It is not being claimed that humans lack value, that none of them have much or any value. Quite the contrary, some humans have great value, some have established themselves as having great propensity for evil, many lead quite indifferent lives. What is being rejected is the elevated, often exaggerated, frequently exclusive, value assigned to humans, too often uniform value. What are being contested are received distributions of values, and the heavy concentration of value in humans and things and features human, the relative importance of which has been grossly exaggerated. 36 Be in no doubt: many humans have positive value, some remarkable value. That is one reason why it matters that humans should not vanish off the planet (for all that many of they have sinned against it), to leave an impoverished earth, for instance a microbe planet. For that would involve a huge reduction in value. Nor is it enough, adequate compensation, that something like humans would evolve again at some remote future time. For, even if it happened (in fact the probability of such replacement looks rather small), there would still be a huge and extended dip in value. Similar points tell against a range of similar arguments to the effect that it does not matter what happens to, or is done to, the Earth, because evolution will eventually restore richness. 37 Even if richness were to return (much evidence indicates 36 37 Moral consideration and intrinsic value are not limited to humans; similarly these are not confined to any other favoured or "improved" class closely overlapping humans, such as (it is supposed) persons or rational creatures. Moral principles can be applied to all species and to the natural environment in general. (A corollary concerns the characterisation of morality. ) Evolutionary space is thereby afforded for other species, other systems other things. An associated feature is stereotyping. Stereotyping is characteristic of speciesism/chauvinism as it is in exploitation. To stereotype an item is to see it purely as a member of a class and as having conventional feature of the class as a whole. Recently there have been some attempts to have things ethical both ways: a special role for humans without privilege or prejudice. There is a latent incoherence in Rachel's text, between his initial and final proposals regarding ethics and morals-which are essentially human intricatedand regarding morals without hubris (MWH)-where human hubris is supposed to be removed. Such an argument has been advanced by, among others, William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and �18 that extinction and destruction is for ever, permanent), there would still be serious loss of value. So it does matter. 6. Philosophy without humans. It is hard to move and operate philosophically without encountering humans and human chauvinism. Chauvinism is written deep into all prevailing Western (and Eastern) ideological forms, common to what, at a more superficial level, are rival positions. But while human chauvinism transcends parochial differences, it is more conspicuous and brazen in some philosophical locales than others, notably idealism and empiricism, existentialism and phenomenology. In short, it is particularly prominent where matters answer back to subjects, those who have the ideas, do the observing, assemble the phenomena, do the living, and so on-back to subjects that are invariably assumed to be human. Thus it is human existence, human Being, human ideas and impressions, that count, those and none others. Such chauvinism, nauseatingly strong, pervades not only Continental philosophy (esp. French and German varieties)-but also Anglo-American empiricism and pragmatism (esp. anti-realist varieties). 38 Once the main strategies of ethics-without-humans have been grasped, it is easy to see how analogous moves can be made the deanthropize other reaches of philosophy, notably some of the more chauvinistic enterprises. In general there are two stages: Firstly, as with morality, replacing humans and human subjects by agents and ideal subjects. And secondly, as with ethics, delineating significant reaches-philosop hical wildernesses-wh ere agents are removed, not just off-stage but altogether. While a few examples of each stage only will be given, it will become evident that the procedures are general. Consider as an example of the first stage, existentialism, a philosophy celebrating humans, and their exclusive freedom, and shot through with human chauvinism. Existentialism is (to quote a convenient caricature) a philosophy which emphasises man's freedom to act independently of any laws, natural or otherwise, and according to his own choice. It is a free will philosophy which can be seen as 'a protest against views of the world and policies ... in which humans are regarded as the helpless playthings of historical forces, or as wholly determined by the regular operation of natural 38 Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993. There is a residual serious problem here, as to why existence is so important. Why do actual humans and existent tigers matter, not merely virtual ones or possible ones. What is it about existence? There are many items which it would be better did not exist, such as devils, helicopters (for the most part), pollution, erosion and so on. Existence, of favoured sorts, makes for richness, which is a high (if defeasible) virtue. Sartre's philosophy is rendolent with human chauvinism: e.g. Critique of Dialectical Reason p.8. as regards destruction and destroy, is an amazing piece of human chauvinism. While humans may have a greater potentiality for production of value than most other animals, many humans also have a far greater potentiality for evil than most other animals. Historically, the evil producing capacity has dominated. Another example of Sartre's anthropocentism is his "philosophy of the present". Marx's philosophy is similarly rendolent. Productivity is human productivity... . For almost random examples from anti-realism, see DP. �19 processes' (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1978). This anti-determinist perspective is, again, connected with the question of objectivity. Existentialists hold that the only objective external fact independent of the control of human beings is the fact of their being brought into existence, and that death will one day come to terminate that existence. In all other respects it is they who are in control. There are no outside independent laws, of economics, history, nature or whatever, which they cannot deny or shape for themselves. Thus we are all free to choose how we will behave and develop and how we will shape society and nature. It follows that the consequences of our actions are down to us, and therefore if they are unpleasant that is our fault-not the fault of outside forces or external laws. There are no excuses for our not thinking and acting for ourselves and we are 'condemned' to be free because everything is theoretically permitted to us and we therefore carry a heavy burden of responsibility for what we do. As Sartre put it, 'Man is responsible for what he is. The first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for existence squarely on his shoulders' .... We have a duty to face up to this, and not to base our actions thoughtlessly on what is said to be prescribed/or us ('laws' of society, of economics, of nature). That is abdicating responsibility.39 Note the heavy concentration throughout on humans, variously appearing as human beings, we, us, they, and (in singular musculine form) man and he. But, as before 40 , on the one boundary, many humans are incapable of what is presumed, the heavy burden of responsibility and so forth; and, on the other, other agents are, in principle at least, capable of achieving those relevant sorts of freedom that humans can obtain. It is already apparent that once the synthetic setting of highly competent humans is exceeded, notions invoked by existentialism begin to fall apart. For instance, some "wild" animals may enjoy considerable levels of unreflective unagonised freedom while lacking capacity to bear much responsibility. Conversely, there are fairly responsible agents, such as some trapped in determined or deterministic situations, who have no opportunity to exercise freedom. Accordingly too, though human should be replaced by agent of appropriate sort in dechauvinized existentialism, it would hardly suffice to substitute for 'human' any of 'responsible agent', 'freedom exercising agent' or similar-though these substitutions effect some of what was intended, such as exclusion of children, many animals, dementeds and so on. What sort of agent is appropriate? That existentialism can be seen as trying to explain. And for the present we can leave it at that, replacing human throughout by the dummy term, existential agent. This is existentialism partly rectified. At the same primary stage of dechauvinizing existentialism, connected improvements could well be sought in existentialism, such as reducing the driven and elitist ethos. In part this ethos is encouraged by the response of existentialism to what motivates and shapes it, deterministic arguments; for it sees only such "strong" agents as evading deterministic forces. The whole business is rather ironic, as the first driven feature is incompatible with full 39 40 Pepper (Roots) pp.118-9; itals in original. Pepper refers to Sartre 1943 and 1946. As at the beginning of EE, where standard privileged treatment for humans is reviewed and found wanting. �20 freedom, while the second elitist feature is incompatible with the stress on things human, as (like elitist religions) only exceptional agents escape. A promising alternative tries direct confrontation with deterministic arguments, undercutting their scope and grip, and thereby making room for free action in a range of situations (not everywhere between birth and death!) for a wide variety of agents, including lesser, less elite, less stressed and sensitive agents. For the arguments prove vulnerable to selective undermining by careful logical and analytic procedures, 41 methods existentialism itself is loath to deploy (for all that its approach rests upon past entrenched argumentation). Insofar as a main motivation for existentialism in its prevailing ironic form is undiscriminating antideterminism, that motivation too is thereby collapsed, and room is made for a less demanding more relaxed dechauvinized existentialism. As for existentialism, so for a range of other subjects inclined to intrude humans as central to world functioning or intelligibility, a range as apparently diverse as phenomenology and quantum theory, empiricism and theology, pragmatism and cosmology. Quantum theory fits into this range because of its received Copenhagen interpretation, cosmology because of its return to anthropocentrism through adoption of anthropic principles. Both are however readily freed of human shackles, first by replacing humans by "observers" (which for the most part can simply be recording devices), and better, secondly to deagentize completely, by amending interpretation s to dislodge both Copenhagen phenomenolo gy and anthropic principles. 42 For a larger illustration, consider a popular mixture of versions of phenomenology (a fuller elaboration again would disentangle versions, all of which however require similar detoxification). Phenomenol ogy to which existentialism is related .. .is summed up by Nietzsche, who said, 'Objectivity is the main enemy of understanding. It means the myth that there are hard observable facts ... but all the concepts we employ in describing the world and predicting its behaviour are imposed on it by ourselves. We have a choice about what view of the world we adopt.' ... Phenomenology is not just a philosophy which implies that we are not subject to external laws, imposed by and through forces independent of ourselves. It holds that there actually is no world external to and separate from ourselves. There is no 'reality' in the sense of there being an external 'real world' divorced from our own consciousness and capable of existing if we did not exist. Nature cannot exist without ourselves also existing-if we ceased to be, so would it cease, and vice-versa. Therefore what 'the environment' is, and is like, is a function of our own subjective construction of it. The very use of such terms as 'ourselves' and 'human consciousness' in opposition to terms like 'nature' and 'the environment' is inappropriate and shows the extent to which we are immersed in positivist science as our way of seeing the world. For the phenomenologists these terms are meaningless because there is no separation between ourselves and a 'nature' or a 'reality'. We and the world are one-a single united entity. Phenomenology is thus anti-positivist science, opposing ... Cartesian dualism. It does not deal in laws, or in cause-effect relationships consequent on the dualism and neither can it be concerned with analysis-brea king the world into parts ... If we want to know and understand nature we must, as Hume 41 42 For technical details, see Sylvan FWD. On satisfactory ways of accomplishing this second stage see Sylvan (Cosm. Syn). �21 { said in his Treatise on Human Nature in 1737, come to full comprehension of man. For if there is no nature except as structured through human consciousness, knowledge and truth cannot exist independently of man. 43 As with existentialism, there is a similar enormous exorbitant emphases on humans and things humans; humans carry everything. But insofar as humans can perform those feats, so better can a class a appropriate agents, phenomenolo gical agents, who include no incompetents (who might let this world flicker out of existence, or worse). Phenomenolo gy is a full immersion human chauvinism. Fashionable contemporary empiricisms, normally taken as rivals to phenomenolo gy, are incomplete immersion analogues. While a few properties, primary properties of basic physics, are separated out as human independent, the rest, the phenomenolo gical mass, are categorised as responsedependent, and treated phenomenologically. 44 Take, for example, aesthetic features, which include certain ecological features. Nowadays humans can grow up with the assumption that aesthetic qualities, indeed all "response dependent" qualities, are features of humans, not in any way objective. So it can be seriously, if ridiculously, hypothesized that what is (considered) beautiful, for instance of depends on how the human gene-pool is composed. As before, humans are readily displaced in favour of appropriate agents. But, for the most part, these agents too are otiose. While the first stage 1s the main stage with agentocentric philosophies like extistentialism, there is a second stage, which comprises significantly more than pointing out how much, how much of importance, such philosophies leave out by their narrow concentration. What is left out includes, to begin, all those times and places where there are no agents, rich worlds, devoid of relevant agents, and the like. But that is only the beginning of the business. For agents have been infiltrated or inserted in all sorts of settings where they have no business to be or to transact. Against the ancient and formerly honorable practice of agent invocation, pushed primarily for explanatory purposes, 45 agent detachment and agent elimination campaigns have periodically been mounted (e.g. conspicuously , but not only, in classic Greece, when it became clearly appreciated that there could be causes without agents, during the Enlightenmen t, and in Frege' s propositional ization program). Deagentizatio n, typically coupled with deanthropization, can be, and should be, pushed much further. Agents, often evidence of immature, even primitive, philosophy, still lurk everywhere in philosophy. Agent-detach ment themes, still struggling against an unenlightened opposition, include: objects, including worlds, without perceivers or sensors, nonexistent items without conceivers, propositions without proposers, assumptions without assumers, values without 43 44 45 Pepper p.199 (where references are supplied). We shall not stop off for expository adjustment or for any critique of this material. For main elements of such a critique, see however DP chapter 11 and JB. Thus thesis that all properties are response dependent merges empiricism with European phenomenology. Deluded explanatory purposes, for agents themselves have in turn to be explained. �I 22 t valuers, causation without causers (or intentional agents), organisation without organisers, wilderness without wilderness managers, land (or property) without owners or stewards, regulation without regulators, selection without selectors, and purposes without purposers. 46 But without humans who does philosophy? Well, in the old days, God of course, most gods, the Devil, demiurges, gifted spirits and so on. At any time duly accomplished agents. While it is easy to see how ethics and philosophy could in principle flourish given only suitably accomplished agents, and no humans, namely the agents do something like what a few humans hereabouts do, still it may be less easy for many to see how these subjects can function without agents. But it is straightforward, is it not? A philosophy stands as a system of propositions. And propositions do not need agents, proposers, or whatever. Nor do systems. It is here that blockage may occur, for two reasons: First, because of the idealistic idea that there are no statements without staters. Second, because of the mistaken assumption that a system of propositions standing on its own involves an obnoxious platonism. No such assumption is made. Third, part of the struggle has been conducted before, in the tussle between psychologism and its opposite in logic and associated regions (e.g. mathematics, philosophy of mathematics etc.), in the tussle between Husserl and Frege (to name two prominent parties). Although the issues have been rejoined more recently, it is still widely supposed that anti-psychologism triumphed. Its success is, to some extent, mere appearance. For all that, anti-psychologism is here extended much further, right across philosophy. Appendix. 1. Examples showing divergence of utilitarianism from consequentialism. Consider two different actions with some set of consequence s, one (A) done deliberately, one (B) unintended. Then suppose, for one sort of case, the outcome is disastrous. Not only is A normally regarded as much worse than B, e.g. arson than a naturally occurring fire such as lightening strike, but further fuller utility assessments should give analogous results, e.g. the satisfaction of the arsonist could be given a high negative rating. Utilitarianism itself is but a well-tempered egoism: egoism extended to substituting others. That cannot so plausibly be charged of consequentialism. Utilitarianism has been associated with the "greed is good" ideology of the 1980s. The association has point (so Singer tries, desperately, to disassociate utilitarianism). Suppose it is said that the 80s, were a decade of greed (as so depicted in many movies) but the 90s is a decade of ethics (despite counterevidence). But nothing has changed in underlying ideologies, in ethics or economics! Appendix 2. Inadequacy of standard ethics. The inadequacy of standard ethics for green purposes has been recognised, if obliquely and perversely, by many critics of the idea of (deep) green ethics (e.g. McCloskey). They 46 The very controversial tlast theme is argued in Sylvan 90 [purpose], where most of these various detachment themes are assembled. Obviously there are many more such themes. �23 l have proceeded to argue that there couldn't be such an ethics because none of the standard ethics would serve. But the argument fails because standard ethics does not exhaust ethics. There are some prospects of a general proof of inadequacy from what has been developed so far. Standard forms are restricted to proper subsets of agents, whereas ethics in full flower applies to all agents. Standard ethics leaves out much of the subject, all the deep part. References William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993. �ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deepgreen theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions. At the core of deep-green theory, as of authentic deep ecology, lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes these positions deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what counts for them. Value then does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are, as it is often put (without however any commitment thereby to dubious essentialist or absolute objectivist positions), intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor (pace deep ecology) does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, and accordingly may be found in nature, it is not encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so subject to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecological features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing total value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may �precede and succeed all such valuers; tfiat is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, and concepts with conceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, relating valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions deliberately chosen suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake, which cannot however be got away with, to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenient values are locked away), not to remove valuers, considered unproblematic, from view. The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal reduction of mainstream modern philosophy, of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for them self. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomonalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achievers satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thoughtexperiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values are not apart from the actual world, then, merely projected onto it by valuers, or else locked up in certain valuers (in the fashion of Carterian intensions ). Values are part of the world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or shapes. �Value like the shape and taste, is an3attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like colour and taste and their determinate forms (red, acidic, etc), a universa l , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. Like shape and colour, value is a high-level universal. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the standard, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as redness or yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour traingles); shapes like value pertain to wholes as well as particulars, and links with gestalts rather better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour, which is, under physicalism, prized off objects and allegedly relocated in creatures or in their interrelation with colourless physical things. Shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the anology can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does, and not something else, like some specialised mathematical or economic thing. It does not contract to some mark of value or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modem economics into (expected) utility or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-inexchange (price). Value means what it means, and has meant: worth; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other cut-down thereof. Price, for example, may fail entirely to reflect worth, it may have little to do with goodness of product. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are than a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural and subcultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured feature, and cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideologic al commitments, such as the varieties of materiali sm (physicalism esp.) or scientism. As has become apparent, attempted reductions of value come too in a variety of forms subjective, which made use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like or subjective aggregations, such as community preferences or utility; or objectiviely naturalistic, which enrol value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary �development as value - consequential, w~ch consider only outcomes, or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes - straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features), or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within theses schemes, or accommodated at all. The idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other knowledge, where philosophy has conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current science, physics especially, does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While those engaged purely in purer science may have the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. Though deep-green value theory is thoroughly nonreductive, it does not sacrifice warranted claims to scientific and logical adequacy thereby. The reductionistic dichotomies are avoided and repudiated. Value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are certainly not subjective; but nor are they objection in an absolutist sense; they are nonjective, that is, neither. Somewhat similarly, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. In any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing , which supplies the �interpretational and rationalisational comp~nents. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and disvalue. The basis of perceptio n is sensation , the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of asking whether the next or a relevant judgemen t fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical practice of devising cases and comparing them with the cases in hand can be worked in under this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in North America under the rubric "reflectiv e equilibrium". Observe, however, that any equilibriu m gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problems arise and further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreduc tionistic value theory can function. Whether that theory is an appropria te environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed. �Enhancement methods reveal too tRat value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks, such as those intended to reflect truth. There can be, there evidently are, rival value systems, measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics, rival physical and biological theories, and rival coherent religions. Chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which take no requisite account of many environmental items, likewise cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social practices; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutation (for the reason that requirements of morality, of universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Of course a range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying equality, can be put to work to move valuers who adhere to other structures, often enough successfully. Emotional presentation of environmental items, by way of new experience and information, is important among these. In short, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep green theory nor authentic deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior , and marked down accordingly, while economism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge, and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green positions, against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism. The value system pluralism of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preference- �information or even desire-belief modellin1); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a noreduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given non-interference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely �• • 8 not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; not to jeopardis e the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystem s, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. As permissib ility, obligatio n and respect principles can be explained through the valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles. Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles. Deep-gre en ethical theory is much more than just another non-redu ctionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinis m, a type of class chauvini sm which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinis m is avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categorie s of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discrimin ately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions. Deep-gre en value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values. But explainin g their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory. �9 * Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 B ungendore NSW 2621 For more on deep-green theory and deep ecology, see for instance essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. �Annex 1. Most people inherit their value framework along with their culture. Many never do any substantial overhaul. Many indeed are not active or responsible valuers. But in these respects, values are not so different from other things. Some people are poor judges of shape; many never learn to distinguish plants, or to discriminate among wines. Likewise for other choices, options, major changes, metaphysical and even political. Mostly that a choice has been made or inherited and is incorporated in the subculture is not noticed, along with its not been observed how arbitrary many of the choices and resulting structures are (in Foucault has emphasized). Of course it is often not in the interests of the power elite, who control media outlets, etc., that this sort of arbitrariness should be widely known, and alternative structures considered and perhaps experimented with. Choices occur where distinctive circumstance prevail. For instance, there is serious scarcity; food supplies in particular are threatened (e.g. with being out of reach is price, with pollution, etc.). Differently, circumstances lead to conversions, as when a new ideology sweeps through, enthusiam generated by some charismatic figures. �/ bits from chapter 2 There is another important elasticity. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to build on universalizability requirement or the equivalent into the very motion of ethics. The evident result is that selfish systems of induction and conduct, systematic egoisms for instance are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be ethical? become vexed. 1 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is problematic in this formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethical do have much to recommend them, let us coin a convenient portmonteau term condensing the chancy "universalerable ethics", namely euthics. (Conveniently then an euthical supports unethical, which is what from a properly ethical stance it is!) There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or isolated individual (even so, a Causal ethics is understood, as is egoisticmorality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an upperclass ethics are not defective on significance grounds, even if they are objectional on substantive grounds. Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out by such requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant differences. 2 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of responses, which were longer accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view, universality, commits in a extensive appel to authority (p.11). What is offered: an appeal to usage. 'the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct in ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I wont address myself to a larger audience' (p.10). That On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer lmpractual ethics (Singer aquates moral with ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented or decisive. 2 These requirements are presented byu Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated. �depends on the conduct concerned. More important the audience does not need to be much larger, certainly not universal: my family or law will suffice often enough. �J. From Chap 4 Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while �meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical practice of devising cases and compari ng them with the cases in hand can be worked in under this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibr ium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in North Americ a under the rubric "reflect ive equilibr ium". Observe , howeve r, that any equilibr ium gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problem s arise and further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodo logy of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary parts. It does howeve r surmou nt a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principl e a nonredu ctionist ic value theory can function . Whethe r that theory is an appropr iate environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed. end The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain desirabl e (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep green theory nor authenti c deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their viewpoint, rival narrowe r and shallow er systems are definitely inferior , and marked down accordingly, while econom ism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at state bo':lndaries). However a critical pluralism does acknow ledge, and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green position s, against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism. The value system pluralis m of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underly ing metaphysical pluralis m of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar as it is conscio usly made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrai ned choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds accordin g to a standard value-in formati on analysis (regular ly oversim plified howeve r to a preferen ceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value essentially. �Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying· obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be given for interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environme ntal interferenc e or modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environme ntal items is founded on such interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dis preferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason; �• not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. As permissibility, obligation and respect principles can be explained through the valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles. Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles. Deep-green ethical theory is much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discriminately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions. Deep-green value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values. But explaining their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory. Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those �atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deep-green theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions. �ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS: their relevance to one another There is rich range of incompatible claims about the mutual interelations of the two ancient subjects. Most of these claims appear mistaken. Sorting out something of what looks right is a daunting task, a small beginning on which is attempted here. Initial severe difficulties derive from the vagueness, in determinacy and problematicality of the relata, both of which are ill-understood by philosophers metaphysics especially. Many there are who think that metaphyscis coincides with ontology, the study (description, explanation and understanding) of what exists. 1 The general study of what there is, sistology, which includes ontology as a very proper part, is only one facet of metaphysics (unless it is presumed that items somehow supply also all propositions concerning them). For sistology is the totality of things side of metaphysics, there is also the totality of true propositions side (propositionology, for a nice term). Metaphysics also comprises the study of the very general attributes of this and other universe and of what accounts for these attributes (or propositional functions). In technical terms, then, a metaphysics amount to a very general and comprehensi ve constrained model; and metaphysics to the plural assembly of these metaphysics. 2 Each metaphysics will be constrained (as will become clear through examples given below) through modelling conditions or postulates (which delimit how "altimate reality" is according to that system). Metaphysics is sometimes construed more comprehencisvely to include some or all of epistemology (knowledge of "ultimate reality" for instance), some of or all of other branches of philosophy, perhaps all of philosophy. Plainly, if metaphysics, so expansively construed, includes ethics, then their relation is straightforward, metaphysics includes ethics. But we shall not adopt such construals. Whereas metaphysics concerns features of universes, ethics is a study of moral values and principles, and of rules and practices of conduct. A case can be made out that an ethic is outlined through its distributions of values, in terms of which both deontic features (rights, obligations, etc) and axiological features (goodness, etc) can be discerned. (Utilitarian can afford a crude exemplar). So, without loss of generality, I can concentrate on the relation of value theory to metaphysics. Now a value theory does not derive from a purely naturalistic metaphysic, by virtue of a rectified naturalistic fallacy. But, firstly even is a value theory may be influenced or even construed by such a metaphysics. For example if the theory rules out all but primary qualities 2 What there is according to most Western philosophers, still labouring under the probleminducing Ontological Assumption. For such a confusion of ontology with metaphysics see Forrest p.3. For the bsis of this large (and estrageous) technical leap, see DP. �2 as some sort of constructs, the value qualities will have to be explained as constructs, projections or similar. Secondly, a metaphysics is unlikely to be purely naturalistic. Metaphysics is not a value-free enterprise; a metaphysics typically presumes a range of presumptions, including archivative ones (deeper examples include assumptions of primary, e.g. of certain sorts of objects, of importance, e.g. of what exists, of implicit world selection, e.g. the world is Newtonian, Copenhagen quantum, or obitives). An ethics does not determine a meta-ethics or therefore a metaphysics. Nor does the converse hold. A metaphysics does not in general determine an ethics, but is compatible with many. Against the stock determination and priority claims, I want to oppose interaction and no priority themes. Determination claims are commonplace in philosophers who wish to wield the big stock of dominant science to settle ethics (or mataethics). For instance Collicott asserts that "intrinsic value in nature ... remains ... painfully inconsistent with the ... modern scientific world-view' (Celbration of Robton p.14, similarly p.22, whence CD 1. Modern scientific metaphysics entails there are no intrinsic values in nature. This is not a lapse (though soon Collicott will weaken his determination claims) because almost immediately Collicott goes on to assert CD2. 'A value neutral nature is ... an immediate inference from the institutionalised metaphysical foundations of modern science' (p.15). Given some large assumptions, most conspiciously that the metaphysics involved is that of British empiricism, the claim CD2 become incontestable. For under that empiricism, as elaborated by Locke and Hurve, non primary qualities like value and colour are not part of or in nature, but substantially subjective in character. However insitutionalized those foundations an important issue - it has since become apparent that there are at least several parts of operative sciences, such a classical and quantum; namely a core calculus or formalism; operational rules for connecting the formalism with testable data and making in ..... applications; and layers of interpretation. It is in these separable, and variable, larger of interpretation that metaphysical and elaborative princi;es begin to enter conspicuously. The "institutionalized" interpretation is but one among the interpretations that can be fitted to classical formalism. It is an interpretation incorperating some major and controverisial philosophical theories, such as the reference theory and verificationism. Rival interpretations are feasible and were developed, for instance by the Scottish comon-sense school. Such rival foundations do not yield a value-free value neutral nature. Collicott calls upon Rolston 'to provide a persuasive alternative to the integral set of Carterian-Gohblein-Humean assumptions that render the subjective provenance of value so fundamental to the modern scientific outlook' (p.16). But Rolston hardly needs to do any such thing 3 : it has already been done, in various 3 Rolston makes giving an appropriate interpretation for more difficult than he need by conceeding "seconddoary" qualities to the reductionistic opposition. Thus, regressively: 'the greenness of the tree is in my hand, but it looks as though the tree is �3 ways, and, in any case, as Collicott soon observes, 'the modern scientific worldview is obsolete' (p.19). The property for a full value-in-nature theory are little better under postmodern quantum theory, Collicott however insinuates, then they were before. Under a Copenhagen interpretations, which he adopts, prospects look worse. Abruptly too Collicott switches from a determination thesis, such as CD, to a slacker and more plausible if vaguer linkage. The linkage appears in different nonequivalent forms: CL 1. A science, such as 'the new physics might play an architectonic role in our eventual thinking about nature (and human society)' (p.23 itals added). Subsequently, 'architectonic role' is replaced through the as vague 'inspired by' and more specific 'mapped out'. CL2. 'A value thoery [may be] inspired by, and mapped on, ... quantum physics (p.25, where reduction and derviation are now explicitly repudiated!). Such a value theory is, it is claimed, 'particularly congenial to an ecologically informed environmental ethics' (p.25). Whether it is, or not, depends on other-things, such as the sort of interpretation of quantum theory, the congeniality of that with ecology. No doubt values in nature without values is excluded under the Copenhagen interpretation, so is much else that makes good sense. Fortunately there are congenial alternatives. REFERENCES P.R.H. Forrest, Speculation and Experience the New Metaphysics, Inaugural Public Lecture, University of New England, N.S.W., 1987. J.B. Callicott, 'Ralston's Environmental Ethics: A critical celbration', critical response at APA, Oakland, March 1989. R. Sylvan, Deep Plurallism, Australian National University, Research School of Social Science, 1993. green. OUt there are only ....... waves... . The greenness is projected, more factural in my head and apparently hung on the tree'. What a ridiculous idea. �' ,,. ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions. Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape.:.perceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate �'relation-to-values', in which inconvenierZt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionally clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or mere shapes. Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby �more immune to reductionist strategies thJn secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation thereof. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism, which leave no space for immaterial values. As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility; or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value; • consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes; • straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all. Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist �4 fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by coherence methods. The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an �information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however, that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed. Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they �do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality, universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new information and experience. The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation. The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant �destructive ideologies, which (each of th]m) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely, • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such �from the centre of the ethical stage (or :xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories, and the institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans). Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values. Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 Bungendore NSW 2621 * Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not features they had at any time requested), for their magazine. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document DEEP-GREEN ETHICS Contents PARTS CHAPTERS 0 I II III IV Prologue DEEP, GREEN, ETHICS, and PHILOSOPHICAL BACKGROUND 1 Deep [and] green fundamentals 2 Ethics without humans; philosophy without humans 3 Philosophical setting: deep-green plurallisms 4 Inhibiting presumptions and myths AXIOLOGY: value core 5 Value and its varieities: basic theory and its development 6 Alternative primitives and theoretical beginnings DEONTOLOGY: necessary moral structure 7 Obligation and its deontic circle, and moral dilemmas 8 Rights, and justice VIRTUE and INACTION 9 Environmental virtues: what they are and something of their theory 10 V Environmental ethical practice NATURE of ETHICS 11 Ethics, its new character and revised foundations 12 Principal questions of reoriented ethics, and proposed answers 13 Epilogue 17 .5.96 DEEP-GREEN ETHICS PROLOGUE Philosophy and its branches, ethics especially, are among the last places where prejudice would be found, found alive and thriving, so it might be imagined. Wrong. In the first place, prevailing ethics all exhibit heavy prejudice in favour of humans, human chauvinism. So they are one and all defective, wrong in a deep way. An adequate ethic will remove the prejudices involved. That means, in turn, a radical transformation of prevailing ethics, from the bottom up. Such a transformation constitutes a main objective of this book. Deep-green ethics aims not simply to reform present arrangements and systematizations, but to replace them. Abolition of prejudice has early priority. Prejudice in philosophy, privelege in prevailing ethics. There are only about two and half millenia of recorded philosophy on Earth. To a disconcerting extent, those millenia represent two and half thousand years of prejudice-partial exceptions occurring and prejudice subsiding somewhat only when ideological empires were fractured (e.g. fruitful periods of "warring states" in ancient China and Greece). Ethics is far from alone within philosophy in exhibiting serious deficiencies, in incorporating prejudices that should not figure so prominently in what is ideally an impartial subject. Much the same holds for other branches: politics obviously (partly through its interdependence with ethics), metaphysics and logic perhaps less obviously. Yet prevailing metaphysics display a deep prejudice in favour of the actual, against what does not exist. In logic the prejudical situation has in fact been accentuated through the rise of modern symbolic logic. Regrettably mainstream symbolic logic is wrong. All its forms validate incorrect principles (such as implicational paradoxes), these results flowing primarily from an underlying prejudice in favour of the consistent, against the impossible. 1 Several of the systematic prejudices embedded elsewhere in philosophy impact upon ethics. The prejudice in favour of the actual has served to distort, very seriously, the issue of obligations to future creatures for example, in this fashion:- Remoter future creatures do not exist, and therefore, according to prevailing prejudice, cannot have any relevant features, any preferences or desires, self-traits or satisfactions, to be taken into ethical account. Therefore All the themes are presented and defended in detail elsewhere. As regards metaphysics, see JB; as regards logic, see e.g. BGB and generally in philosophy , see TM. There are several coupled prejudices and prejudical drives, as will appear; for instance the drives to power and to maximization, strongly manifested in logic, see e.g. RLR. Prejudice in ethics was explicitly recognised by Bentham, almost two centuries ago; unfortunately however he imported his own very influential prejudical framework. 2 "they" can be discounted entirely. The same prejudice also enters in a very different way. All the standard positions concerning universals, all of which reflect the metaphysical presupposition that discourse concerns existent objects, show up in ethics. They appear in vexing issues as to the ontological status of values, such as the good, and of deontic notions, such as obligations and the right. These are not only difficult items to discover in the world, but they do not seem adequately housed in conceptual or linguistic apparatus: where are they located? Whence derives immediate pressure for many mostly bizarre reduction exercises; for instance of values to human constructs, contructs from social preferences or from sociobiological drives, and of obligations from veiled contracts. The initial question of location makes, however, the defective metaphysical presupposition, and lapses therewith. Values, though significant items, do not exist; so they are not located, anywhere. Prejudice rooted in established logic has impacted differently, upon a variety of issues in ethics. The absolute requirement of consistency upsets a straightforward treatment of obligations, general sets of which are typically inconsistent, thereby leading for instance to awkward theories of hierarchies of obligation or of merely prima facie obligations. Running parallel with this, the requirement utterly distorted an initially straightforward theory of ethical dilemmas, treatment of which is a significant part of any comprehensive ethical theory. Established logic has also impacted heavily on such different issues as fact-value inferences (e.g. the prescriptive fallacy) and regarding the extent of pluralism in ethics. The assumption behind the rationalistic critique of relativism is that there is a single correct logic, governed by requirements of consistency, namely standard logical theory, which (when combined with the facts) will eliminate various ethical stances as incorrect, indeed which may, given sufficient critical thought, lead to a single correct ethics. 2 But the assumption fails; for it too depends on ancient prejudice. Pluralism is one most important component in removing prejudice generally, certainly in reducing it generally, by admitting alternatives, and allowing some to flourish. 3 Elaboration of deep-green theory is another important direction in removing prejudice, in favour of humans, persons, or like agents from ethics especially but not only. The main development that follows will take both these directions, though focussed upon ethics: it will track and investigate pluralistic deep-green ethics. Human chauvinism is not the only major prejudice damaging ethics. An extraordinarily privileged position given to egoistical considerations is another. Western ethics in particular has 2 3 The approach involved, that of traditional rationalistic ethics, is regularly deployed by Singer (e.g. his Encyclopedia conclusion to Companion to Ethics); the strengthened version features in Regan. Of course how it is supposed to proceed, the details of how reason works this miracle, is never revealed. See esp. TM, epilogue. 3 recently been deformed through a substantially unquestioned axiom of self concern, that agents are interested in and motivated by their own (self) concerns and only by them. (Of course an agent's self, or extended self, may be grander than the agent's soul or person or body or whatever; it may include the agent's family or even the agent's tribe, or differently it may comprehend the agent's land or environment. But under such extensions the axiom is already beginning to disintegrate.) Such an ubiquitous, but largely unquestioned, presumption has lain behind reductionistic exercises that have distorted much of modem ethical (and political) theory. The leading idea is simple enough: given that action is justified through human self-interest, and only thus, if ethical theory (and likewise political superstructure) can be justified through some construction or modelling on that basis (bringing in only indifference and like neutral assumptions) , then justification will be transmitted, it too will be justified. Thus those contractual and utilitarian exercises which have loomed so large in recent theory. 4 The same dubious presumption also features large elsewhere, for instance in the acclaimed derivation of Deep Ecology from the ultimate norm of Self-realization! It is not just prejudice and allied presumption that have damaged and distorted ethics. Narrow ethics, parading as universal or absolute in defiance of pluralism, ethics often underwritten by religious or papal presumption, have severely disadvantage d ethics. Furthermore, connected therewith, ethics has been destabilized, and cast in an unfavourable light, by • a quest for absolute foundations, and in tum connected therewith • an invidious comparison with science, which is supposed to have such foundations. The quest is quixote: there are no such foundations. Nor does science have such foundations, so the comparison is misplaced. Not only is absoluteness for science increasingly disputed, but it is becoming apparent that science is in the same sort of pluralistic situation-pre dicament some, still questing for the old false certainties, would say-as ethics. 5 Through the assumption, or pretence, that it can deliver (whether from religious, rational or other resources) certainties of a type that it cannot deliver, ethics has become discredited. But that is only part among reasons why on the contemporary scene ethics is not the force that it has mostly been in bygone times. At least as important as such intellectual reasons are matters like removal of social and political pressures to conform, redirection of indoctrination practices (into consumerism, etc.), and so on, some welcome and some definitely not. 4 5 Roughly, ethics, knocked down to what's in it for everyone (some aggregated base class), is justified through what's in it for each me. Prima facie the grand construction is based on a simpler fallacy of aggregation: an invalid each to all inference. The theme is argued in detail in TM chapter 10. The quixote quest is strikingly engaged in by Williams, for a entertaining criticism of which see 'Bernard Williams and the Absolute Conception of the World' in Putnam 92. 4 Aspects of the discreditation have in turn been exaggerated. Ethics, it is said, makes no difference, even can never make a difference; it never effects change. Such claims are seriously astray, as examination of elementary examples like human slavery and treatment of animals quickly reveals. Environmental ethics too can make a difference (perhaps, when coupled with other practices, a major difference), and they are beginning to do so. But naturally they cannot compel change; nor should they be capable of doing so, as that would exceed proper roles of ethics (and other proper practices). 6 Rectification of ethics requires, then, not merely removal of now conspicuous prejudice and presumptions, but deflation of pretensions. What results-hardly unique naturally, but one selected for good reasons among many, hardly entirely exclusive but overlapping and admitting others-is an ethics which differs from standard ethics in the following respects at least: Such an ethics is: • deep-green, removing prejudice in favour of humans, and in favour of certain (egoistic) agents, in an affirmative fashion; and • Pluralistic in a thorough-going way, accordingly not pretending to absolute or objective status. The run of prevailing ethics, including so-called "applied ethics" and "environmental ethics" are chauvinistic; a satisfactory (environmental) ethic is not. The run of prevailing ethics are absolutist, or otherwise relativist; a satisfactory ethic is neither. However the conditions so far presented are but necessary conditions; they are not jointly sufficient for adequacy. Even among theories that are nonchauvinistic and duly pluralistic, reductionism may persist. Such reductionisms come in striking variety; thus, on just one dimension, individualisms, sentientisms, vitalisms, (i.e. all that has value is alive, somehow), and so on. To avoid such reductionisms, another blanket condition of adequacy is: • non-reductionistic. The main task consists in elaborating in detail an ethic, with other preferred features, that meets these conditions of adequacy. Regrettably, removal of prejudice cannot be accomplished in ethics alone, as a separate pollution-free zone. Prejudice in ethics flows through from other regions, religion especially, but also from psychology (which in the past made little gods of humans with sacred souls of their own, justifying very differential treatment for them in the world), and from elsewhere. Removal of these latter sorts of prejudices requires a severe erosion of belief, in regions strictly outside ethics, but heavily exporting into it; of beliefs fostering intellectual prejudice. Nonetheless ethics has a role in removal of prejudices elsewhere, because, very simply, these prejudices ought to be removed. The basic principle, which can also be presented as one 6 These points are developed at some decent length in GE part IL 5 of rationality, runs as follows: belief ought not to exceed warranting evidence, but should be appropriate to it. None of this is as clean and clear-cut as it may initially appear, because source waters have become very muddied. Sources for instance take a range of forms (this is part of the ancient issue of the criterion reput in more contemporary terms). Sources include not merely empirical evidence, perception especially, the favoured, or even exclusive, source of empiricism. They also include such sources as: emotional presentation, or emotion; postulation or presumption; reason; authority; a range of psychic and extra sensory perception (ESP) forms; and, differently, a range of intuitions. Some of these sources overlap; consider for instance divine relevation. Plainly those sources are very different kinds, quality and calibre. Some such as reason, which includes itself a disputed variety of forms, are more processing of information kinds than sources (thought reason becomes a source, of sorts, in pure rationalism, and a degenerate source of necessary truths in classical logical theory where theorems are proved, by paradoxical means, from nothing so to say). While some of these kind of sources are not important or at issue in ethics, for instance controversial kinds of ESP giving information on remote (spatially distant or past or future) items, several are. It is not going too far to say that ethics is severely vexed as regards sources, and many distortions such as naturalism can be seen as coming about as ways of trying to secure reliable sources (if some naturalistic reduction were correct then ethics would be brought within the orbit of science and even empirical perceptual bases could be adopted, as in science). But ethics does not resemble science; its sources are not (except incidentally) primarily perceptual, thus breaking any very close analogy between epistemology and ethics. A major source in ethics is emotion, by contrast with epistemology where the major source is perception. From there already derives a major difference between the fields, as perception tends to be less variable, more intersubjective, less culturally dependent across the range of subjects usually taken into account. Accordingly, in any quest for a more objective ethics, more has to be drawn out, out of the processing substructure, whence the emphasis on coherence, good reasons, ethical on coherence, good reasons, ethical argumentation. Ethical inputs, sources, and processing are assessed in detail in the text. Although this work is focussed upon ethics, it does not, and evidently cannot, merely concern ethics. Since the ethical theory is itself approached primarily (though not exclusively) by way of value, it bears upon other areas, such as normative-infected social sciences, where value theory features. For another example, it also impacts upon aesthetics, heavily. For, according to the theory advanced, there is no sharp boundary, indeed really no division at all, between what has been dubbed "aesthetic value" and "ethical value". Value is value, without these artificial divides. Evidently too, as will appear, the work intrudes in normative reaches 6 merging into ethics, in particular, wherever normative or deontic dilemmas are encountered, such as reaches of social choice theory and legal theory. Differently, the work includes much, though indirectly, upon philosophy of nature. For it is especially concerned to supersede an old defective philosophy of nature, which included a heavy devaluation of nature, and aided and abetted a manifestly chauvinistic ethics. The ethical theory to be elaborated fits with, and in significant respects presupposes, a·different theory of nature. 7 Although investigations in this text are primarily theoretical, they have significant practical implications. Putting the theory to work in various environmental fields is something that happens elsewhere (see further in the Epilogue). Some of this has already occurred, in essays in the Green Series, and some is reserved for other texts on field ethics. 8 Notes on terminology In this text several familiar terms, such as 'green' and 'deep', are converted into quasi-technical terms. That is to say, special uses of the terms already in currency, such as the use of 'green' to mean environmentally committed, are further refined. The result could be signalled by deloyment of appropriate new terminology. Something like that is assumed done, except that the familiar terms will be retained-onl y now they are to be read in the quasi-technical way. To put the point differently. Let 'grene' (Olde English) or 'gre-een, (Newe English), for example, be the quasi-technical explication of 'green' in the relevant sense. Then in the subsequent text, 'green' will normally signify gre-een, or equivalently 'green' operates as (effectively abbreviates) 'gre-een. Why such a strategem? One reason is that people are now rather conservative regarding terminology. Indeed they are often turned off by new terminology (despite regular ruination of established terminology). As a result, established terminology gets revised for all sorts of new purposes (witness the bizarre high-school reuses in advanced physics), with a resultant overloading of senses. By contrast, recycling of old terminology (words or spellings), that has fallen into disuse would be rather more commendable. Here, rather than pressing our luck with explicit recyclings like diep and chalowe, we resort to the fiction that the terms 'deep' and 'shallow' deployed throughout the text stand in for the technical recyclings. As a result 'deep', as figuring in deep approaches, deep green, deep theory and so on, has no connection with profundity, or 'shallow' with superficiality. As several have said, in several respects deep/shallow terminology is unsatisfactory, execrable it is sometimes said. Founder N aess did a disservice introducing it, and subsequently 7 8 Such an appropriate underlying theory of nature is advanced in the companion work on metaphysics, namely TM. Green Series is a popular label for discussion papers in environmental philosophy, published from Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University. One of the other texts is tentatively entitled Green Ethical Fields .. 7 in explaining it, so slackly. While it is too late to easily change the terminology, some undesirable associations may be shaken off by resorting to older or variant spellings, and simultaneous ly refining senses intended. That we do. But then we concede to the general intellectual will, by the substitution or "abbreviations" strategem. Even so, we have risked a few neologisms, and we shall chance, just here, one or two more. One we risk, is euthics, for universalizab le ethics, that is an ethics meeting universalizability requirements (in some appropriate fashion). This bit of terminology helps in resolving a significant ambiguity in philosophical usage of 'ethics', and making an improved start on the vexed issue of why an agent should adhere to an ethics, or differently to an euthics? One we chance is viridology (from Latin virides, green, and Greek logos, study of, in modern palance) for: theory, principles and practices of deep-green; that is, a single classical word for diep-grene theory. A purer alternative we contemplated, from among many, was prasinology (or should it be prasinomics) from Greek (and Latin) prasinus, dark green, leek green. Acknowledg ements and antecendents: personal development and conceit. The production of this work owes much to other humans, with of whom I have little or no acquaintance. The debts are both intellectual and practical. On the heavily practical side, I am most grateful to Frances Redrup for the processing of reems of rough scribble. On the broad practical front I am pleased to acknowledge the continuing support of my research endeavours by the Australian National University. That academic support, while generous by often niggardly world standards, has recently declined, through contraction of research support and expansion of alleged accountability practices. In this little respect, there has regettably been interference in my research, dur the earlier stages of work on this book, by no doubt wellintentioned academics occupying supervisary roles who have deemed by performance less than satisfactory. It is with regret too that I record that, in part owing to biassed appointment practices within the University, there has been negligible imput to the present work from any of my academic colleagues there. But outside imput there has been of course, of two main sorts: from recent activity in environmental philosophy and from past exercises in value theory. While environmental issues have operated as a main stimulus in my recent work in ethics, my own interest in and investigations in ethics reach back to my graduate work in Wellington, New Zealand, where I produced a characteristic ally initative work on ethics, entitled Moral Scepticism (I do not suggest that anyone read that work, which it is far too late to suppress). In New Zealand, I was educated in the 20th century British type and style of ethical theory, primarily Oxbridge material, with not antipodean influence of any significance what cover, except in the obscure background Prior' s quocit little book Logic and the Basis of Ethics (although my professor at Wellington, George Styles, had ethics as a manfield, I learnt only a 8 certain technigue from him; I do not recall one position, little theorem argument or there I must attribute to him, for the very simple reason, (suspect, that he never advanced very much). Among Oxbridge characters, Moore revoided the dominant influence though much of Hume and his near contemporaries-N eurall-Smith Tomlesia and others-was scround up to a tiny circle of ethical enthusiants and fellow academic travellers. Moore is still an influence in this book; in my occasional more conceited moments, I like to envisage the book as an appropriately greenish update of Principia Ethica. At least it may be as near as I ever come to producing such a work: Principa Ethica Virida. What on excessively ambitious idea, sheer hubris! Yet, for all the fuss, Principia Ethica is not really such a good book; rather it enjoys other advantageous features. A few companions with Principa Ethica will be ventured. But, by and large, other ethical theories will not be investigated in much detail. For one reason, that has been done, to a sufficient extent elsewhere (in others' work more than my own). For another, in the wake of accumulating evidence, notably from environmental awakenings, revealing their narrowness and prejudice, they scarcely justify further post mortems. More than Moore and Priest, the present work is indebted to Meinong, and through him to the tradition of Austrian value theory. The theory elaborated in fact fits, more or less, into what has been called critical cognitivism .. The evil of ingratitude, for example, ... Here and there, the present text draws, heavily sometimes, on my own past work, especially concerning environmental ethics. As much of the work, for example in the local Green Series in Canberra, is rather inaccessible, such borrowing may not matter much. There remains a small overlap-ideally vanishingly small as revision proceeds-betwee n this text and better circulated complementary works, notably essays in Environmental Philosophy and parts of The Greening of Ethics. INTRODU CING DEEP-GR EEN THEORY Deep-green theory aims eventually to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. While it stands on its own, it is alternative because it stands in radical ideological opposition to dominant ways, nowadays predominantly industrial. It offers a philosophy both in the contemporary narrower sense, and in the older sense of an intellectually informed and critical way of life. That philosophy is centred on an ethical theory (upon which this issue concentrates), which is in form centred upon a value theory. But the ethic issues, in a fashion broadly associated since Aristotle, in a politics and political economy. But the output of the value theory in fact reaches much further, into practical decision making in a range of environmentally impacting areas such as fishing, forestry and agriculture. The value theory is also intertwined with philosophical issues which are often considered more fundamental, those of astophyism and epistemology. Indeed there is no part of philosophy that remains untouched. Therein lies part of the claim to comprehensiveness. The particular form of deep-green theory elaborated is by no means independent of (acclaimed) advances recently made elsewhere in philosophy (those in object-theory, and relevant and paraconsistent logics especially). But though the theory given is influenced and sometimes in fact shaped through these developments, deep-green theory more generally can avoid them (The type of theory given could easily enough be recast in a more classical Platonistic form - undoubtedly a much less plausible form. Nor will these background advances intrude, it is hoped, in the given elaboration of deep-green theory; the background will remain, fairly directly in the background, and not come to dominate proceedings or know proceedings depend upon special new controversial features of it. Where more technical agreements are required, they will be relegated to appendices. 1. As to deep theory. Deep-green theory is the environmental branch of a much larger affair, deep theory. There is a point, in fact a real expository need, to place deep-green theory in the larger setting of deep theory. For deep theory influences several of the choices made in deciding upon the way deepgreen theory goes, the shape it takes. Although the influence will become evident, particularly with the intertwining of truth and value that .... , it is worth giving an example. Too much of the Anglo-American discussion of intrinsic value and of obligations to future generations is taken up with - hung up upon - ontological questions, about universal items in the first case, and as how there can be obligations regarding future items which do not (yet) exist in "suitable" determinate 2 form in the second. Deep object-theo ry slices straight through these issues, removing the problem generating ontological assumptions. Deep-theor y is a grander theory lying in the background , which significantl y influences the philosophic al approach taken in deep-green theory, as well as being influenced by it. There is no reason why that grand backdrop should remain hidden; there is no hidden agenda. The backgroun d theory, of which deep-green theory is a part, is called simply deep theory. For it represents the confluence of several deep positions with deep-green theory: deep pluralism, depth relevant theory, deep item-theory, and so on. As a theoretical endeavor, deep theory aims to pull together, into a unified coherent theory these various deep positions. It thus draws together and integrates as well, several other interrelated efforts (on dialethism, process theory, anakyrie, etc. With deep theory I aim to supply eventually a fairly comprehen sive philosophical package. I used to imagine that with moderate comprehen siveness as regards present philosophic al problems would come a certain completene ss; but I've come to think that a total philosophy is an illusion, like pots of gold at the ends of rainbows, and rainboweri a themselves. Deep theory is no doubt a presumptu ous title (there are worse about, e.g. 'total philosophy ', 'ecosophy' ), not it is altogether satisfactory given the problems and obscurities, to be encountere d, lacking in the notion of depth. My main excuse is that I did no exactly choose the title myself, but had it thrust upon me: problemati c, presumptuo us, it looks to good to refuse. It emerged from a terminolog ical confluence of several areas in which I'd been struggling to assemble ac. capirred theory - deep-green theory (itself a union of green thought, or environmen tal philosophy with a revised deep ecology), deep relevant theory, deep pluralism (which deepened radical pluralism), and deep item-theory (which deepens object-theory). To give a picture of deep theory, it suffices for present purposes to indicate some main features of deep positions, some of their integrating interrelatio ns, and some of their revolutiona ry potential. Deep theory overturns or subverts very much of what has been assumed or presuppos ed in Western philosophy , and particularl y in Enlightenm ented contempora ry philosophy. For example, it overturns the following widespread assumptions:• the Ontologica l Assumptio n, that truth, and also, meaning, are functions of reference, and thereby presuppose existence. On the contrary according to (deep) item theory, we can perfectly well talk and think truly about items that do not exist, and also about items that are not individual but are complex but perhaps indetermin ate wholes, and finally what items are impossible . Therewith repudiated also then is an occasionall y favoured full-back from onticalism, namely possibilism , which assumes 3 • the Possibilist Reduction, of everything that counts in discourse to possible individuals; there are no other genuine subjects, all else can be analysed (or thrown) away. Bound up with possibilism are • the assumptions of modalism, of the correctness of classical logic, and of the absolute requirement of consistency. Under more throughgoing transconsistency (or paraconsistency) these connected assumptions are one and all repudiated. The transconsistent connection assumes an important role in the straightforward treatment of moral and other dilemmas, in showing for example how an agent may coherently operate under inconsistent obligations or with incompatible needs. Important special cases of modalism are such theories as that • entailment is strict implication (or its metalinguistic analogical) and that conditionality amounts to a modal function of material implication 1. The rejection of such themes and their courses is part of what motivates deep relevant logic. While the parts of deep theory are integrated and are intended to be materially reinforcing, nothing prevents their fairly independent elaborations. The holism conceded does not exclude separation or analysis. In particular, deep-green theory is amenable to independent development and analysis. Material implication is the implication defined in terms of truth-functions thus: A materially implies B iff not last A and not B, or equivalently, iff either not A or B. Strict implication is the necessitation of material obligatory i.e. A strictly implies B iff necessarily A materially implies B, or equivalently, iff it is not possible that not A and not B. ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GR EEN THEORY This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions. Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenielt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or mere shapes. Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby 3 more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approxima ted by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation thereof. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism, which leave no space for immaterial values. As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility; or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value; • consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes; • straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgement s into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all. Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist 4 fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuou sly failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by coherence methods. The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independe nt, coherence processing , which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however, that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed. Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality, universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new information and experience. The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation. The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant 7 destructive ideologies, which (each of them) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely, • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or ~xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories, and the institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans). Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values. Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 Bungendore NSW 2621 * Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). Upon receiving it however, the editors decided that it was too dense, and insufficiently journalistic and popular (not features they had at any time requested), for their magazine. I \. '1 11.10.95 CHAPTER 1 DEEP AND GREEN AND PRESUPPOSED FUNDAMENTALS It soon emerges from preliminary exploration that, under natural characterisations, relevant notion of both ethics and green presuppose the notion of agency. So with something on agency, enough to get started, we shall begin. In terms of agency and proclivities to environments, green can be characterized, and in turn green approaches. Then, within green approaches, three relevantly different types can be distinguished: shallow, intermediate, and deep. It is the last, and really only the last, that matters for the ethical theory that follows. 1. Action, agency and agents: a summary . 1 Action theory is grounded in process theory. For actions are types of processes, agentascribed processes. processes are directed functions, ordinarily time-directed functions, 2 ? framing of certain functional sorts. All the ordinary sorts of processes-ec lipses, transits, removals, reflections, and so on and on-are processes (and ordinary processes can be separated out logically, such as by applicability and inapplicability of certain predicates, e.g. they take place, they are not facts, etc.) Processes themselves in no way require agents. Actions, however, as distinguished within goings-ons and taking-places, do require agency, and so agents. There is no reason at all why these agents should be humans. Many agents are not humans, some humans are not agents. But it is often quite erroneously assumed agents are humans, or persons. Excess requirements on agency are partly to blame, the mistaken idea that agents have to be purposeful, responsible, rational-feat ures that can be added to distinguish subtypes of agents. Rather, actions can be roughly delineated through answers to questions like What is so and so (the relevant agent) doing? How is so and so acting? The result reached following through this route is this: process a is an action iff for some agent x, a is properly ascribed to x, it is x' s doing. To break residual circularity, it remains to define agency. Agency is defined, such is the proposal, in terms of exercising a causal role (which may be misdirected or similar), through the following circuit. First, x is and agent as agents a iff, for some p directly partinent to a, x causes Pbut x is not caused to cause p. In terms of agency-regarding, other notions can be defined as follows: x is a sometime-agent, someties an agent, iff for some a, x is an agent as 2 As full an account of processes as so far worked up from notes appears in 'Process and actions', which does provide detailed background for this section. '2 regards a. Agency is a characterizing attribute of sometime-agents. An agent is a sometimesagent that establishes a history of agency (a small reputation therefore). 2. Explaining Green. In characterizing green we start with agency. Such relevant features, of greens (or environmentalists), as being positively concerned about nature of natural things, supporting environmental causes and similar, are closely tied to practice and action; they are features of agents. In an original central sense of 'green' so redeployed, an agent was green if that agent firstly believed that some parts of the natural environment should be protected, and secondly took some relevant action. 3 In short, a belief-action analysis emerges, which can be recast as a standard belief-desire-resultant action account. For instance, the agent believes that some natural environment is worth protection, desires that it should be, and acts (in some way, perhaps feebly) accordingly. All the parts of this sort of account call, however, for some elaboration. To remove a certain circularity, resulting from characterising "green" through terms like "environmen t", 'natural environment' can be replaced by 'parts (surface configurations) of the Earth substantially uninterfered with by humans'. To specify protection satisfactorily, protection/ra m what should be indicated. And so on. But there is a little point in elaborating this already weak characterisation, which can be satisfied by an agent interested in saving a few square metres of the Earth's surface from exploitation. For the notion has been further weakened, almost from its inception. To characterise this laxer, but ubiquitous notion, let us insert the intermediary notion of an environmental cause. Such causes include not merely protecting natural environments, but limiting impacts on environments, which may not be pristine, for instance by pouring less sewage or detergents, CFCS or Greenhouse gases, into them, or conserving items, which could be exploited or consumed now for future use or for future human generations (to use or conserve, etc.). The first of these further causes beyond protection, original green, is a largely consumerist notion of green, the second, an economistic notion (it takes in such beloved constraints as intergerational equity). There are other related causes of importance also, such as restoration of something that has been over-exploited or damaged, such as agricultural lands, waterways, urban air, soils (soil conservation), or even human artefacts such as monuments or buildings. The shallow green cause of fighting pollution, for human health reasons, can fit in here. Needless to add the restoration may not be to pristine conditions, but to quite low 3 Although we are explicating terms that are now in widespread usage, in a way substantially faithful to that usage (but not some of its dilute or corrupt expansions), we shall regard the terms as quasi-technical. We see these terms, as the discerning reader also may, as spelt not with a double 'e' but a triple 'e', as 'greeen' and 'greeening' (insert hyphens as need be for appropriate pronunciation, e.g. 'gre-een' _. The effect is to peel off dilution and corruption of 'green' (e.g. so to include every politician, at least when any confronts concerned constituents) and to discard all those unwanted and often undesirable senses the colour term green has accumulated. standards. In sum, causes include as well as protection, such matters as nondestruction, conservation, maintenance, restoration, and so on. Now substitute supporting an environmental cause for protecting a natural environment. Then an agent is green in this expanded laxer sense if the agent believes in supporting an environmental cause and takes some relevant action in that direction. Such an action component is essential: green does imply some practical, if utterly token, involvement. The lax account connects in the right ways with testable sociological criteria. For instance, believing in supporting a cause can be cashed out in terms of joining an organisation working for that cause, or even, reducing the slight action component still further, considering joining such an organisation. 4 The appellation green applies not only to individual agents, but also to groups, coalitions, institutions, even corporations and governments. As a green government can, meet similar lax conditions, it is evident that there really are very few requirements, even weak sponsorship may serve. Many there are now trying to take advantage of green movements-adve rtisers, vendors, politicians, professors, merchants, even generals (with "defence forces" retooling as environmental defence forces). Cashing i in on the movement by producing a goods or services presented as environmentally friendly does not thereby make parties doing so green, especially if what is supplied adds to overall environmental impacts (as do "environmental markets" delivering environmental junk, sometimes portrayed as "green goods"). The requirement of serving environmental causes has been lost. The excessive generosity of the account arrived at, which allows agents with only passing or slight active beliefs in some cause to count as green, does not matter. For firstly, it corresponds moderately well to current lax usage, which allows almost any sort of concern for environments, coupled with an action component as slight as paying a token subscription, to serve. Secondly, it still exercises quite enough exclusive power. Many agents are not green. For instance all those exclusively tuned into possessive individualism, mainstream economics, or similar creeds are not green (i.e. not even lax green). Thirdly, needed discriminations can be made within the class of (lax) green. An important subclass of green comprises ecological green, where the causes include maintenance and protection of natural ecosystems (including wilderness) and these causes enjoy some primacy. "Ecological green" is by no means a tautology. 4 In a study entitled 'GREEN PACKAGES IN AUSTRALIA', greens were picked out from the whole sample of respondents to the Australian Election Study of 1990 in terms of answer to question: How likely are you to join groups campaigning to protect the environment, or are you alrady a member? Permitted answers: (1) I am a member, (2) I am not a member but I have considered joining (3) I am not a member and I haven't considered joining, and (4) I certainly would not consider joining. Those giving answer (2), perhaps token greens, were accounted green. 4 To be green in more than a token fashion is to have some commitment to containing or reducing the environmental impact of humans on the Earth or regions of it. By virtue of the environmental impact equation (for a given region) that means commitment in the immediate future term to either • human population reduction, or • less impacting lifestyles for many humans, or • improvements in technology to reduce overall impact. Most humans in a region can do little to implement the third requirement, except to hope. Accordingly they cannot satisfactorily demonstrate their commitment in this way. A genuine green will meet both the other conditions. But since as big coalition as feasible is sought for a green coalition, marginal greens who meet only one of the requirements, perhaps in weak form, will not usually be excluded (from almost any green church). Issues of population afford a simple test (a necessary condition) for a genuine green in Australia; for that agent fails who suppoes that while efforts (including the agent's contribution) to effect human population reduction should be invested elsewhere, as in parts of Asia or Africa, Australia can keep on growmg. From filling out the conditions delimiting green commitments, a green platform can be derived. Specifically it will include, along with the action clause, derivative directives as regards curtailing population, refining and limiting consumption, adjusting technologies, and consequent thereupon altering administrative, political and economic arrangements and institutions accordingly. What so results is a proper subplatform of the Deep Ecology platform. A fair approximation to the full Deep Ecology platform can be derived by adjoining requirements for depth to those for genine greenness of the action platform; so result themes concerning intrinsic value in nature, and commitments deriving therefrom. In short, the wellknown Deep Ecology platform accounts (as a fair approximation) to a deep green platformwhich can accordingly supplant it. As genuine green and green platform can be characterized given the initial notion of green, that is lax green, so similarly can other green compounds and modified forms be explained (in a preliminary way). For example, a green ideosystem is an ideosystem (an ideology, in the unbiassed sense) that coheres with green commitments, and typically organizes and guides them. As genuinely green, it is a system that includes a green platform, and it could be defined in that way, as an ideo-system coherently extending a green platform. Similarly for green ethics, and for green philosophy (and also for other green notions that could be defined but are not presently needed, e.g. green goods, green consumers, green parties, green ideas and so forth). A green ethical system is a green ideosystem which is an ethic. Green ethics comprises 5 such green ethical systems and their theory. 5 Green ethics thus comprise a decidedly restricted subset of environmental ethics. For an environmental ethic in the broad usage, an ethics that addresses environmental issues, among others, may well contain themes that could not be adopted by a green agent, that may even operate against environmental causes. In consequence, a green ethics is an ethic that could be coherently adopted by a green agent, that does not run counter to environmental causes. 3. Different approaches to the environment: shallower and deeper. People can do more or less what they like with the environment, with the land and the sea, and with what grows and lives there-such was and, in only slightly modified form, remains a dominant theme of Wes tern cultural heritage. It was not the view of other cultures, such as some of the American Indians or Australian Aborigines; nor was it the only view included in the Western cultural package. But it has dominated, especially in colonial and imperial expansion. It is only recently, for example, that some social or governmental restrictions with teeth have been imposed upon what Australians can do with the land they occupy or claim, and these lag far behind advanced green thinking as to what is required. For the most part there has been little weakening in the Wes tern assumption that people own the land, that it is their possession, to mould to their purposes and whims. 6 This unrestrained approach proved damaging enough while the land was wide and humans comparatively few; now that human populations are expanding more rapidly, perhaps to critical limits, now that much land is damaged and less fragile land is in increasingly short supply, it is time to re-examine older attitudes and the accompanying practices. Any deeper reassessment has to look at the presupposed land ethic, and more generally at the underlying ethical and ideological assumptions. A land ethic, according to Leopold, who introduced the term, is 'an ethic dealing with man's relation to land and to the animals and plants which grow upon it' .7 Thus a land ethic amounts to a nature (or environmental) ethic, with land a symbol for the whole of nature (or the more comprehensive environment), and man a symbol for all relevant agents. The unrestrained position, which imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment, affords a land ethic of only a degenerate sort. The unrestrained position would, for example, have little 5 6 7 Although we are anticipating here-as ethics and ethical systems are explained essentially reportively however, in the next chapter, there is no circularity. For ethics is separately and independently characterised. Indeed, with the renewed libertarian movement emanating from industrial north-eastern America, this assumption has gained in strength. Foreign "resources" are not to be hoarded but should be saleable to the highest bidders for "free" economic use. And sometimes it is broadly hinted: or else! A. Leopold, A Sand Country Almanac with other essays on Conversation, New York, 1966, p.238. 6 compunction about using up materials, forests, pristine environments and so on, immediately or even destroying them. In the end the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly ethical positions. 8 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which iplies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local interets, rather than appropriately based on long-range values. Opposed to the unrestrained position are various conservation ethics; what Leopold saw as the land ethic is just one of these. Conservation ethics can be classified, conveniently for subsequent development, into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. 9 Unlike the unrestrained position, all these politions would conserve and maintain certain things-materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow conservation position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description as resource conservation. Though this conservation position is only a small step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass one test for morality proper in that future people are not treated unfairly. Most of the big rush into fashionable environmentalism does not get beyond shallowness. The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share-and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these or similar human on closed notions. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and exploitation oriented, positions. 8 9 This is a substantial, and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitments to future humans, see e.g. R. and V. Routley, 'Nuclear energy and obligations to the future' in Responsibilities to Future Generations: Environmental ethics, (ed. E. Partridge), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1981, and other essays in this book. This classification refines Naess's non-exhaustive distinction of shallow and deep ecology, and extends it to render it exhaustive. For the original distinction, see A. Naess, 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement' Inquiry 16 (1973) 95-100. An elaboration on Aess's position, to which this discussion has some debts, may be found in his 'Philosophical aspects of the deep ecological momvement', Environmental Ethics, to appear. According to deeper positions humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to the intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values. FIGURE 1. THE POSITIONS SEPARATED, AND SEPARATING PRINCIPLES SHALLOWER UNRESTRAINED DEEPER SHALLOW INTERMEDIATE I I I I J, J, J, DEEP MORALITY SOLE VALUE GREATER VALUE REQUIREMENT ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION (of human apartheid) (of human supremacy) The watershed principle which divides the shallower from deeper positions is the sole value assumption. According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is built into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are represented at best through the preferences or votes of interested humans. Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as utilitarianism. 10 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man 10 But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. These theories, along with utilitarianism, are explained in most modern American introductions to ethical theories or moral problems. is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests. However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been appended (thus, for example, extemality theory in economics, some allowance for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the land remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought, when it is considered at all. There is, however, another approach, also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it. While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater value assumption:: other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than that of other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What is generally presupposed is that other objects-animals, plants and their communities-are never of much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in versions of utilitarianism where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Western ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which animals are taken to have value in their own right, though in any playoff with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable; in cases of conflict of animal or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose. I I There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 11 So too for some men and some sparrow. So we should reject the intermediate ...... : A man is worth more than a sparrow! (Drungson/ Ralston etc.) 9 can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism.1 2 Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. But some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depredation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintena nce of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an establish ed population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the integrity of rich natural environments.13 Let us look ahead to glimpse paradimatic expansions of the positions indicated (in figure 1). For the positions soon expand, when applied to real life issues, to more comprehensive positions; indeed they have expanded all the way to what are now called social paradigms, that is to full social perspectives. For example, the deep position has expanded from the two core theses-a s initially reformulated, values in nature, which is a positive counterpart of the sole value assumption, and biospecies impartiality, which is a positive elaboration of greater value assumption 14-to fuller deep ecological positions which involve as well many other themes. 12 13 The point is argued in detail in R. Routley and N. Griffin, 'Unravelling the meanings of life?' Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy #3, Research School of social Sciences, Australian National University, 1982. There are significant cross-classifications of environmental positions. Some further dimensions are included in the following diagram. Environment not taken I Environments is taken into account I into account p 14 --------- --------- --------- --------- --------- --- shallow intermediate I dogs I ////// I I E I individual I I H I holistic I I Another dimension is the static/dynamic. But no one want to be just stauc, really. According to the values in nature theme natural items other than humans and human artefacts have intrinsic value; while according to biospecies impartiality members of one species, humans in particular, are not favoured or valued over members of another simply on the basis of species. The danger of favouring one species is encouraged by the species fallacy, commonly invoked in favouring humans. This is the mistake of concluding that because a few members of the species have accomplish ed something of (immense) value, all members of the species therefore are (highly) valuable; all members of the species manage to free-load for the ride, obtained by a few members, so to say. The assumption, once challenged, usually falls back on an argument that goes by way of capacities: the remaining members of the species have the capacity to achieve these sorts of things also. But, firstly, that isn't true: intelligence, skills, and the like, vary somewhat within species, and from our narrow perspective, very considerably among humans, some of whom have no capacity for advanced mathematics or music. Secondly, it requires more than capacity: it requires circumstances, a favourable environment to exercise them, (hence, in part, the folly of lU The expansion is not uniquely determined; there can be various different deeper paradigms. However it characteristically includes a fuller statement of themes recognised as in the spirit of "deep ecology", in particular ecological themes, but also interconnected economic and political themes. In a similar way shallower positions are subsumed in shallower perspectives, and principally in what is called the dominant social paradigm, some relevant themes of which are indicated in figure 2.1s FIGURE 2. RELEVANT COMPONENTS OF THE ENCOMPASSING PARADIGMS. DOMINANT SOCIAL PARADIGM DEEP ECOLOGICAL ALTERNATIVE Dominance over nature Natural environment a resource Harmony with nature Values in nature/biospecies impartiality Less material goals/less growth orientation Earth supplies limited AJ?propriate technology/limits to science Doing with enough/recycling Regional/decentralised/small-scale Material/economic growth Ample reserves/perfect substitutes High technological progress/ scientific solutions Consumerism National/centralised/large-scale SHALLOW f----------------------------- ➔ DEEP 4. Criticisms of these beginnings and other beginnings A main challenge we shall have to meet is that there can be no deep ethics, ethics and axiology are inevitably shallow, because they must answer back to human valuers. This challenge we presently set aside (until the next chapter). But it should already be apparent how we can start to upset the challenge (already taken up by deeper utilitarianism), namely by displacing humans by relevant agents. Other challenges grant that something might answer to deeper ethics, but contend that nothing should-objectio ns of substance-or that making anything much out of it is unwarranted, for example because preliminaries in making out the distinctions have not been 15 more humans in decidedly suboptimal cities), together with a will and drive actually to follow through appropriately on capacities. Much fuller accounts of the dominant social paradigm and environmental alternatives are given in S. Cotgrove, Catastrophe or Cornucopia, Wiley, New York, 1982, and in R. Routley 'Roles and limits of paradigms in environmental thought and action' in Environmental Philosophy (ed. R. Elliot and A. Gare), University of Queensland Press, 1983. The linkage of the dominant paradigm with maximizing, and the deep alternative with sufficing, is elaborated in R. Routley, 'Maximizing, satisficing, satisizing: the difference in real and rational behaviour under rival paradigms', Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #10, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, 1984. 11 properly accomplished-objections of form and from technicalities (cf. challenges to the analytic/synthetic distinction). We consider examples of both sorts of challenge. The misanthropy charge. Deep environmentalism has been criticised for what it does, so it is alleged, to ethical treatment of other humans; it leads, it has been alleged, to neglectful, negligent, or downright callous treatment of other humans, to inhumanity. The actual impact of deep environmentalism affords but little ground for such allegations. Nor does the theory. Deep environmentalism could leave intrahuman ethics, standard morality virtually entirely intact. If it did so, deep environmental ethics would provide a conservative extension (in the familiar technical sense) of standard intrahuman ethics. In this event the allegations would fall; for the ethical treatment of humans would be in principle just the same as before. But it is unlikely that any deeper environmentalism will leave standard morality entirely intact in its own prime sphere of operations, that restricted to humans. For instance the evolution of humans, and attributions of virtues or vices to them, is bound to be influenced by how they act or respond towards nonhumans and the environment. A virtuous puritanical oldstyle industrialist who makes his affluent living through environmentally damaging practices will no longer obtain the virtuous ranking that would have been accorded to him on the older prevailing morality. (Of course that morality too is changing, but it hardly changes rapidly enough to keep pace with a deeper ethic). The change in the evaluation of and moral standing accorded to hard-working but environmentally exploitative business people, technologists and engineers reflects a more far-reaching adjustment; that of removal of special privilege for humans (or persons). Even in the more austere of standard ethical positions, such as duty ethics in the Kantian mould, it is very easy to gain the impression of persons (usually males on traditional ethics) as kings. There will be a club of kings, that was where more egalitarian industrialism was proceeding also, to make us all kings - with the rest of nature as subjects. While the unwarranted privilege accorded to humans under conventional ethical wisdom will topple then, the treatment of humans by humans need not. To the contrary, if people develop a more respectful and careful attitude to the environment, then they may well develop a better, different and more careful, approach to other people as well. Here the awful Kantianstyle theme that decent treatment of animals will trickle down from a decent treatment of other humans is partially reversed; a better treatment of other humans (a decent treatment is already ethically required) will percolate up from a more gently and respectful treatment of natural environments. Nor finally then need a deeper environmentalism abandon the quest for social justice. 16 Deep-green theory certainly does not; the ethical-change agenda is much wider than social 16 There are two American groups where the quest for terrestial social justice appears to have been abandoned or comprised: eco-fascists and nature greens, as they are sometimes called from outside. 12 change alone, but social and human concerns do not thereby fall off the agenda. They remain, but no longer in such isolations. What they do lose their unchallenged preeminence, and they may also lose priority. Problems with the Greater Value assumption (after Attfield). A prime alternative to a shallow/deep distinction is (what is sometimes considered no alternative, but a variant on it) the anthropocentric/ecologic distinction. Notes: 1. Not the same distinction. While shallow positions are normally anthropocentr ic, converse does not obtain. 2. Distinction never made out properly (really degree issues), and leads to typical 4-fold outcome. 5. Domination and chauvininism. The greater or sole value accorded to humans, as compared with (other) valuations, justify the domination of nature by humans. The main argument is simply that what has lesser or no value should give away to what has greater value, the conventional assumption being that what has greater value is better (analytic) than what has less, and should prevail over it (substantive assumptions of conventional ethical themes such as utilitarianism). Domination and associated class chauvinism are justified not only directly through consideration s of greater or supreme value, but also less directly by pointing to highly valued features possessed by the favoured class. Similar appeals to prized features are of course likewise used to justify class chauvinism. Appendices : 1. Deep ethics are not automatically acceptable as satisfactory. Consider e.g.whole chauvinism, where Wholes are intrinsically valuable, each and every one, and their value much exceeds that of everything else, humans included. So wholes come first. (This is a doctrical some superwholes may hold). Two rough comparisions: cows in India, humans on earth. Other unsatisfactory deep ethics, apart from those that aberate one species, are those that focus exclusively on certain elements. Those e.g. individualisms, strong holisms, etc. 2. Arguments to shallowness. 1. Simplistic (from one James O'Connor of Canada). ' ... the word "value" is a human word, with human meanings, in this case transposed to non-human nature. Hence to say that nature is inherently valuable means that it is inherently valuable to humans'. Ecofascists, who follow a route pioneered by Hardin, call for a triage of nations on lifeboat earth and abandonment of those nations, such as Bangladesh, seen without prospect of recovery. But the position is not deep, it is certainly not a properly moral position; for due criticism see Griffin and Bennett. u 2. Problem with shallow/deep terminology, e.g. acquired too many associations for comfort. Intellectual offensiveness shallow, etc. 3. Shallowness involves a reductionist exercise. Making (trying to make) environmental issues in all that matter environmentally-answer back to shallow concerns. Series of arguments advanced to try to establish ..... . Counter argument. These do not succeed and can be counter-evolelled. 3. Cross-classifications reformism/revolation is, like anthropocentrism, a poor classification. It can be shallow without reformism and unethical economism with reformism. DE itself is largely reformist in character (and excessively personal).: Anthropo-/ecocentric. No doubt 'anthropocentricsm' meaning what its etymology implies 'centring in man' (OED), is a useful term. Theories such as Coperican and Copenhagen quantum theory can be criticised (or praised) as anthropocentric. What is in doubt is the new contrast of antropocentric with ecocentric. While the vague anthropocentric-ecocentric distinction is alright, so far as it goes, as a starting stage, it is no place to stop. For there is a need for a value specific distinction, antrhopocentr can be any sort of human centredness. 'Anthropocentric' is a poor choice of contrasting terminology, for several reasons. One, which may be convenient to some, lies in its vagueness. There is no sharp cut-off in what is human centred. Similarly for its supposed contrast term 'ecocentric', which presumably expandents to 'ecologically centred'. Second, it becomes apparent that no proper contrast is made in many cases. University textbooks on natural ecology, for instance are both ecocentric because about ecology and anthropocentric because set and supplied for humans. Human ecology, a subject increasingly encountered in universities, is directly both (not both under different aspects). Were the classification satisfactory, it would provide a nice contradiction. But the classification is far from satisfactory. It is not exclusive: nor is it exhaustive, but the remainder obscure. But worse, any practical ethics, no matter how deep, is bound to be anthropocentric, not ecocentric, even though duly concerned with ecology. The reason comes to this: any adequate ethics is bound to be heavily concerned with agents, their obligations and responsibilities, and for all practical purposes (on earth) these agents are generally certain humans. This is, an adequate practical ethics is, as a contingent matter, anthropocentric. Of course such an ethic, by contrast with main traditional ethics, may also be presented as an ecocentric ethic, inasmuch as it may be focussed upon ethical agents' relations to ecological items, human treatment of nature. 14 Problems with the anthropocentric/ecocentric contrast do not mean that something like the contrast cannot be made good. But it would involve redefinition of the critical terms, and could accordingly be better accomplished with adjusted terminology. Anthropocentrism is implausible, once a modern pict "of universe" becomes available. (Scuh a sufficiently modern picture was already available to Descartes.) The sun is a medium sized star of very common sort even within its galaxy. The probability of planets like the Earth within this university is extraordinarly high. The probability of other agents is also very high. Even the probability of other ..... ./competent agents is high. But even if it were not, or even if there were other agents, the discourse to be embarked upon would be significant. It is also pointful, for instance in disposeing of much philosophy. If anthropocentrism is so implausible as regards "main place in nature", why is it not implausible as regards intuitionality, value, etc. Ironically, the swing away from anthropocentrism in the sciences in modern times (with the advert of Copenhagen quantum theory and anthropic principles) was overpinged by increasing anthropocentrism in what are misleadingly distinguished as the humanities. Above all intentionality and value were emptied out of the wider universe and concentrated in the exclusive focus of humanities, humans. To adopt Freud: Humanity has in the course of time had to endure from the hands of science two great humiliations to its chauvinism .17 The first was when it was realised that our earth was not the centre of the universe, but only a speck in the world system of a magnitude hardly conceivible ... . The second was when his logical science robbed man of his particular privilege of having been specially created and relegated him to a descent from the animal world' (puoted in Unozco Ev ..... May 1982 p.3) There are further shocks in store for humans-poor old humans! 3. Explaining depth [contrasts pale/pallid]. For a good sort of depth, what is needed a deep structure, extraction or format that lies (partially) hidden from the surface. E.G. plate ponites in geology, strata in archasology, logical form in grammar. Deep = penetrating to fundamentals in several ways and nonchauvinistic, not shallow. [Mention also pluralism-so only a framework aimed for, on which grew various detailled positions.] Part of depth of Deep Green theory lies in its penetration below the surface of classrestricted or interested humanism to a genuine nonchauvinistic ethical structure: the (ill-named) annular structure, which ties moral principles to nonhumanistic categorestion. Annular structure 17 Freud says: to great outrages upon it naive serif love. 15 is a deep structure. A deep structure. Maybe can produce one for deep green theory (see Critiq p.93, bottom halt) Start as above other measures of depth (pp.44-5) misconceived. 1'. Extent of searching of perception of value; depth of (value) perception. 1. Extent to which humanism (h.ch) abandoned for econvisonmental perspective. 2. Extent to which conventional moral and value judgements put op for reassessment. (Naess's depth of questioning conventional wisdom) 2 is tied to 1; for abandoning heh involves much reassessment. Note differs from usual reflective equilibrium, which takes many generally accepted judgements for granted. More on what depth means (pragmetinally): Many environmental outcomes sought in deep grounds can be supported in shallow ways (of course). But there are differences, as examples show: • pesticides (in forestry) should not be used, despite insect damage. For pesticides violate natural succession and healing processes. Toxicity questions, though important, are secondary. On shallow view: the main problem becomes not the use of pesticides, but whether they are safe. • natural world appears as a resource. Life forms which interfere with uses are pests. 2. Reformist/Transformist Variations upon Shallow/Deep Ecology Unhappy with the derogatory implications of "shallow", Devall and Sessions tried to convert shallow ecology in ecological reformism. While there was certainly a basis for this conversion in Naess's original brief account of shallow ecology (which almost invited such reconstrual), the result has been that something different has emerged, notably in green politics. For what such conversions, along with associated imagery accompanying reformism, achieve is not elucidation, but introduction of new contrasts, and therewith political crossclassification of the shallow-deep ecology contrasts. There are various contrasts with (mere) reformist adjustment on political theory, for instance revolutionary change and radical change. A revolutionary direction appears inappropriate as regards deep ecology (as revealed both by the literature and political stances of leading members of the movement), but a politically radical direction on environmental issues does emerge from later developments in N aess' s work. Accordingly a rough contrast, which admits sharpening, can be made out between green reformism and green radicalism. A machine image, which often operates not far from view in such contrasts, is initially helpful in indicating the differences. Reformism does not interfere with the main operation of the machine, its motor, though it may alter the adjustments, retune or fine tune it, add filters or mufflers or converters, alter its appearance cosmetically, and so on. By contrast radicalism would alter the machine, would interfere with its motor to some extent, depending on the level of radicalism. 16 In political terms reformism is exemplified in such measures as limiting pollution by emission devices, further treatment of sewerage, small reserves and roadside veneers of trees amid clear-cutting operations, tidying up of litter, and so on. The main motor of liberal democratic market capitalism, the economic engine designed to deliver maximum economic growth, and its main institutions, remain untouched and uncriticised; no change is proposed for them. For radicals such measures and like reforms do not proceed far enough, towards the sources of the problems. To tackle the range of environmental problems more radical change in economic, social and perhaps political machinery is required. But evidently the extent of change envisaged can vary, very considerably. For example, a frugal conservation program, directed at limiting economic growth through removing conspicuous and excessive consumption, need carry no accompanying program for radical social and political change. Again, deep ecology, which offers no well worked out, or even well signposted, radical program or radical restructuring, does not appear to be politically radical. Alternatives to liberal democratic arrangements are not really advanced or investigated. By contrast some anarchist and marxist influenced ecological positions are politically radical, for instance, social ecology. In short, there is room for a classification of green radicalism, as shown by a preliminary grouping according to whether the radicalism affects which of separate (though overlapping) economic, social, or political matters. The reformist-radical distinction is a vague one, without a sharp boundary. Reforms can so accumulate that what was a difference in degree becomes a difference in kind, what was extensive reformism turns out to be radicalism. In such an incremental fashion, positions which were reformist can find themselves radical, without having undergone any conspicuus radicalisation. The contrast between reformism and radicalism can be sharpened somewhat within a (an improved) theory of social paradigms. Then reformism is intra-paradigmatic, whereas radicalism is not (but is extra-paradigmatic). That is a reformist works, like a normal scientist, within the operational paradigm (the given political motor) and does not seek to change it, whereas the radical does; success of radicalism resembles abnormal (even revolutionary) periods in science. As there are many ways of deviating from a paradigm, which typically involves a complex set of presumptions, so there are many sorts of radicalism. The extent to which the political conversion of the shallow-deep contrast into green reformism-radical contrast affords not a restatement, but a different classification, may now be evident though perhaps not to its full extent. The most notable further feature is that green radicalism may be utterly shallow, entirely anthropocentric. 18 Green Marxism affords a useful 18 In these terms Naess conflated two contrasts in his original 1973 article; shallow-deep and reformist-radical. Different followers have latched onto different contrasts. l'/ example; it is socially and politically radical while shallow (of course it can be argued that it is environmentally incoherent, though not in the mentioned features, but in its plan to supercharge the economic motor and make it run even faster, with evident environmental fall-out). Social ecology offers another example; for while more radical than deep ecology, it is certainy not deep. Something of the rich variety we have come upon can be glimpsed from the following table. All the positions enumerated, except 9, are occupied, we suspect (though positions are often so poorly or incompletely presented that is difficult to be sure ). 19 Positions 9 is practically excluded for committed deep parties who duly care about the demise of what is of intrinsic value under mere reformism. Position 5 is however occupied, by those who want (or believe they have achieved) improved arrangements for and treatment of animals (e.g., no circuses, no ordinary zoos, no cruel contests, etc.) but are not committed to a radical animal liberation agenda. Green party territory is usually shallow, but some of the proposals presented may extend to position 4, for instance in demands for participatory democratic restructuring. Of course, many supporters of green parties may adhere to deeper positions. 19 It is worth noting that such positions will in principle supply their own forms of sustainability, sustainable societies, and so on. 24.10.95 Chapter 2 ETHICS WITHOUT HUMANS, PHILOSOPHY WITHOUT HUMANS, and COROLLARIES It is a commonplace that ethics has proceeded not merely as if humans were on centre stage, but as if humans really were all there is, all that mattered in ethics, as if nothing else enters into morals and ethics, or does through only through them. That commonplace is moreover commonly strengthened to a claim of necessity, that this must be so, that nothing else can enter, except indirectly by way of humans. Ethics has to be thus anthropocentric. Since environmental ethics began to shift humans, if ever so little, off centre stage, there has been a heavy philosophical reaction, a sometimes bitter blacklash against greener ethics that would background humans, or dare sometimes to remove humans, from the scene altogether. Among many other things, it has been contended that by the very meaning of ethics and morals, these subjects must be human-centred. A crucial argument for necessary anthropocentricism of ethics makes human centrality a matter of definition. This crucial argument will be broken, in the first of several stages, through a detailed characterisation of morals and ethics in a way that is independent of humans. The characterizations adopted depart in only minor and justified (though highly consequential) ways from received dictionary definitions; that is the characterisations are substantially reportive, as they have to be if they are to serve their iconoclastic purposes. The matter of characterising ethics is in any case part of our business. Where would deep-green ethics be left, as a subject of investigation, without an appropriate account of ethics? 1. On inadeqacies of what prevails: a sheaf of defective accounts. It takes but little effort to discover severe shortcomings in most preceding investigations, and that most accounts, many of them far too casual, are inappropriate for what they are intended to cover, still less for environmental ends. There is no end to bad and defective definitions to dissect and discard. Even textbooks and guidebooks on ethics often make no attempt at a definition, and often have little or nothing of due generality to offer on what ethics is about. 1 Unremarkably then, many of those presenting or teaching ethics, perhaps well enough, have no adequate idea of what ethics is about. This is revealed by the sorts of definitions they slop down and by what they say ethics is about. The slop presented indicates they did not even bother to consult their dictionaries with any care. It is an elementary exercise to show deficiencies in most proposals. A striking recent example is Singer (ed.) Companion to Ethics, supposedly an encyclopaedic work on ethics. 2 A few sample definitions recently encountered will help confirm our claims. Utterly defective is the account of ethics as 'the relation between you and other people' .2 Such connections as the spatial relations between people, for instance where they sit at a seminar, do not belong to ethics. Narrowing relations to those of treatment, as in 'how you treat other people' improves the account a bit, but not enough. Decent treatment of relevant kinds no doubt comprises part of ethics, but a small part. Nor is such treatment confined, especially as regards receivers, to people; animals, nature and more, all matter. A more interesting account, presumably designed to encompass applied ethics, takes this remarkable form: "'ethics" [is] defined as disciplined reflection by persons in all walks of life on moral ideas and ideals'. 3 As a definition, this too fails entirely, appearing circular, and converting ethics away from, what is essential, practice into head stuff, into something like meditation, a kind of widely practiced theorizing, though practised on certain parts of ethics! There are too some unfortunate side-effects of the insertion, aimed at making ethics applicable to all walks of (human) life: namely, as there are walks of life which have no room for disciplined reflection, so there is in fact no ethics. Back again to the drawing board. Similarly for Russell's fuller attempt: The study of Ethics is perhaps most commonly conceived as being concerned with the questions "What sort of actions ought men to perform?" and "What sort of actions ought men to avoid?" It is conceived, that is to say[!], as dealing with human conduct, and as dividing what is virtuous and what is vicious among the kinds of conduct between which, in practice, people are called upon to choose. 4 Owing to feminist criticism of male chauvinism, many now wince at Russell's; piquant use of term like 'men' (in fact throughout his numerous works). Environmental criticism of human chauvinism has not been so (terminologically) successful, sad to report. Back to the board. It takes little effort to assemble a sheaf of inadequate definitions and accounts of ethics. Many include too little, for example the popular account of ethics as "how we should live", which as well as being too narrow is parochial. 5 Similarly, though fractionally better; a coherent set of values to live by is enough for an ethic. For that appears to omit a deontic component, obligations and permissions, and certainly leaves out ethical virtues. A major shortcoming, even in fuller characterisations, concerns the concentration on humans and their parochial affairs. For, as will soon appear, ethics does not essentially concern humans. An adequate ethics says nothing about humans, members of species Homo sapiens, their obligations and rights, values or virtues. It applies but contingently to humans; it applies similarly to hominids, humanoids, and to persons generally, and functions in the absence of persons altogether. As a result, the following familiar sorts of pronouncements on what ethics amount 2 3 4 5 John Langford, on ABC radio, 22 February 1993. Engels, 6. Russell p.1, F & S, from Elements of Ethics 1910. For such an account see e.g. Single [Encyl. Brit.] 3 to are seriously defective: 'An ethic may be thought of as an ideal of human behaviour, an environmental ethics as ideal human behaviour with respect to the environment, natural and built" _6 Not everyone got it quite so wrong. For instance, Brandt gets away to a nice neutral start, even if he does not cover the spread of ethics. Consider his opening: Moral philosophy has traditionally been a systematic attempt to answer some questions of apparently universal interest [!] about: what is worth wanting or working for (what is worthwhile, of worth); what is the best thing for an agent to do from his own point of view; what is morally right, and what is morally just). [Also what is rational in these regards.]7 The nice start does not last. Agents turn out to be humans; utilitarianism soon begins to effect an ugly intrusion, and so on. 2. On how to define ethics and morals more satisfactorily. It is not difficult to do noticeably better than ethics teachers and writers have managed, simply by consulting better dictionaries. But it is also not so difficult to re-organize and improve upon what dictionaries offer. It is significant that dictionary definitions of moral and ethic contain no essential allusion to humans, nothing essential concerning humans, man, or we, us and co. (andwhere 'human' does enter, as in 'principles of human duty', it can simply be elided, it is inessential). But the dictionary accounts do harbour some problems. For one thing, like some of the preceding definitions, the dictionaries seem mired in a common and damaging circularity: ethics is defined in terms of morality (and its adjuncts, decent treatment, and similar); but then morality is itself defined through ethics. Fortunately the loop back to ethics can be broken. A particularly satisfactory way to workable definitions of notions in the ethics orbitethic, ethical, ethics, to take direct cases-is through those in the presupposed moral orbitdirectly, moral, morality, morals. For all these ethical notions are regularly defined, in better dictionaries, through moral notions. This approach reverses the difficult and so far unsuccessful strategy, sometimes tried in ethical theory, of attempting to define morality (e.g. through universalizability conditions) inside a somehow independently characterized ethics. 8 The bases, upon which moral notions are carried, lie in turn in the action orbit, in features of actions and their agents. 9 As agents are entailed by actions-beca use actions just 6 7 8 9 See 'A universal environmental ethics' Connect, UNESCO-UNE P Environmental Education Newsletter XVI(2)(June 1991). pl. Brandt p.l. Long ago I used to think this was now it had to be done, through some singling out of morals within ethics by way of a combination features of humans and requirements of morality (such as, variously, consideration of others, universalizability). Not recognising the virtues of agency, I too erroneously supposed that morality had to pertain to humanity. No doubt the main definitional enterprise can be carried out, more or less, the other way around, beginning with ethics, then cutting down to morals within, through agency. Moreover, such an alternative route (starting out easily enough from the notion of ethics as the theory and systematization of the good and the right, valuable and permissible, the virtuous and responsible, and so on) should arrive at the same place, at a similar end result. These action basics can in turn be explained, as before, within process theory, see Sylvan 1993. A classification of agents can be drawn from there. It is not claimed that this is how we have to start or that action nexus affords unique starting point. But its features have to be included sooner or 4 are agent-ascribed processe s-actions , more generally processes, form bedrock here. Neither processes nor actions have any essential connection with humans. Relevant elements of action nexus, upon which moral actions are carried, are now indicated: Single action snapshot, capturing agent-acts -in-environment nexus: AGENT has motives emotions volitions objectives and goals of prior causes ACTION has subsequent consequences impacts upon (relevant items within) environment The breakdown of actions, into types, will straightaway yield much that has long been taken as central in moral theory, such as agonising (as Socrates did) over choices. Choice-making is a morally critical type of action. Plural actions expose further relevant features, including conduct, dispositions and character of agents, and suggest typologies (or moral relevance) of actions and of impacts. Virtue ethics, but part of moral theory, fit here. Whereas morality -the new ecologically sensitive morality that is-begin s from certain features of an agent in its environment, ecology begins from investigation of an organism in its environment. 'From the outset ecology was clearly understood to be the appreciation of the organism (any organism, note) in and as part of its environment' . 10 'Something along the lines of "the study of organisms in relation to their environment" is the basis of most ... attempts ... [at] working definition of ecology ... over [which] there has been little dispute' . 11 Despite initial appearances, the upshot is not (the perhaps appealing one) that morality is a branch of ecology. For the features investigated are very different (and a satisfactory definition of 'ecology ' has to be sharpened to indicate what features of organism-inenvironments are studied). Whereas in morality there is much interest in the virtues and vices of agents for instance, a parallel interest is outside the scope of ecology (and indeed not a significant question for most organism or for many agents). Interestingly, the ethical theory being advanced begins in precisely the way Deep Ecology, in its pristine formulation, implies that no theory should operate, with an agent-inenvironment image. Under the total-field approach of Deep Ecology all such images dividing up fields should be rejected, in particula r any man-in-e nvironme nt image, a special chauvinistic case of what our theory operates with. Similarly no doubt for organism-inenvironment images of ecology. Unremarkably no arguments are offered for these rejections; 10 11 later, and it has virtues as a start, including familarity and naturalness. R. Kitching [New Education], p.39 Ibid p.40 rearranged. 5 cogent arguments would be hard to find, or articulate. In any case, Deep Ecology strictures do not prevent preliminary or limited uses of field analysis. As it will soon turn out, for more general purposes, what is needed is removal of agents, not dissolving the image. These action-theoretic preliminaries admit of much elaboration and variation, both expansion and contraction most of which however we can pick up as we proceed. For example, an illuminating expansion would expose the setting, of constraints and incentives, within which an agents acts; no doubt some of these features, incentives for instance, can be absorbed into what is already depicted, such as motives, and the remainder could be included in under a prior-influences category. Striking contractions are those afforded by prevailing ethical theories, consequentialism and Kantianism, which would erase, respectively, all but consequences or all but motives. The parable of the Blindman and the Elephant is not only a clever analogy for a implausible perspectivism; it can serve as a telling indictment of much analytic philosophical practice. Moral philosophical practice, especially that of analytic philosophy, consists in only sensing part of a whole (constellation) and failing to see the rest. 12 Moral and action theory afford good examples of such skimping; for instance, consequentialism fails to see anything but consequences. The term moral, generously construed, covers the assessment of agent-intricated elements of the action nexus depicted, in all the following sorts of respects (as applicable): excellent, good, indifferent, bad, evil; approved, disapproved; valuable, of value, or not axiological right or wrong (or alright), fair or unfair, proper or improper obligatory, forbidden, permissible deontic responsible, irresponsible; it also covers principles concerning such assessments. Morality concerns both appreciation and assessment of agents-acting-in-environments as regards those sorts of features and resulting systematization. Parallels with ecology should be evident. X's conduct or the like is moral, broadly so, iff it is a matter for moral appraisal. In short, what is moral is marked out by classes of functors in an action nexus. Plainly some of the features, which perform the distinguishin g work, are not significantly applicable to all elements in the nexus; for instance, impacts of frogs are not significantly responsible. Responsibility applies primarily to certain agents, their conduct and character. The sorts of respects cited are, furthermore, more general forms. But many more specific evaluations are thereby encompassed; for instance, honourable, dishonourable; decent, indecent, again as applicable. In terms of the sorts of respects, certain important subtypes can be distinguished. The first group (given by the first two lines) covers axiological. The second group (given by the next two lines) covers deontic. The third group (not usually distinguished in "the logic of 12 For a detailed treatment of skimping in philosophy, see DP, chapter 11. 6 ethics") comprises accountability notions. Such, formerly important, terms as virtuous and vicious-regu larly, but wrongly included in dictionary listings of respects defining moral (e.g., "of or pertaining to character or disposition considered as ... virtuous or vicious")-ar e axiological. They can be characterized in terms of what is already available, thereby avoiding further circularity vexing dictionary definitions (which define 'moral' using 'virtuous', and 'virtuous' deploying 'moral'). 13 For example, to adjust the dictionaries, virtuous [action] is [that] exhibiting moral excellence or quality, vicious that distinguished as morally evil. Much the same supervenient story gets told for duty in the deontic class. For while a duty just amounts to a certain sort, a rigorous sort, of moral obligation, duty is not among the respects listed in defining the term moral. There are several, loosely consequential , attachments often made to what counts as moral(s), notably: issues of punishments and rewards, with a view to altering proper conduct; of freedom and determinism, as the latter may appear to place moral enterprise in jeopardy; of justification of moral principles, which do not stand on its own without moral justification; and so on, for other theoretical topics that consequently arise. While these further issues do not form part of dictionary definitions of moral, they are stock textbook fare in moral philosophy. But that, moral philosophy and moral theory, is where they can comfortably stay. While the issues that result could be called moral, or distinguished as textbook moral, they might as well simply be accommodate d more accurately, within philosophy of morality (metamorals). Morality is, at base, the attribute of being moral. 14 Thus, basically, an item exhibits morality if and only if that item is moral. In wider compass, morality comprehends a larger package concerning what is moral; it consists in the theory and appreciation, practice and principles of what is moral. It follows, from the account of moral given, that morality is all about certain features of agency, features of theory and practice of agency, namely evaluative and assessment features and principles concerning these, such as conduct and choice. Several other significant corollaries also emerge. Firstly morality has nothing essentially to do with humans. A similar but still more striking result will follow for ethics, which is characterised, also in a human independent way, by way of morality. Ethics too has nothing essentially to do with humans (or even with humanoids). Morality turns on features of agency. Humans, some of them, simply happen to supply, presently, prime terrestrial examples of full moral agents, those actors who do not merely conduct themselves well or badly (a kangaroo can be a good or poor mother, a dog can behave badly and know it) but who make promises, recognise obligations, accept responsibilities, and so forth. Humans were almost certainly not the only full terrestrial agents; other humanoid 13 14 Thus too much of "virtue ethics" can be absorbed, see further, later chapters. In logical terms it is defined through attribute abstraction. 7 species that have become extinct (perhaps with human assistance) very likely were also. Certain humans are probably not the only full moral agents even now in this universe. It is unlikely that humans will exemplify the only moral agents, perhaps even terrestrially. 15 The prominen t role of competen t humans in morality, and so as regards ethics, is utterly contingent. It follows, now quite generally, that those familiar definitions of morality and ethics in terms of humans and their features are one and all defective. For all the (green) ethical theory to be developed, humans can drop out altogether. But competent humans are useful for illustrative purposes; it helps to have some demonstrably actual examples. Moreove r, in such practical terms as terrestrial ethical impact, they are now almost unavoidable. Before explaining how to escape damaging agent centredness, or actocentricity, in ethics that would result from equating ethics with morals (i.e. morality in this sense), there are loose ends to be tied up and certain advantages, worth recording, accruing from having actocentrism as a staging post. One advantage is that unwanted senses of evaluative notions are peeled off automatically, because they do not apply regards agency. For example, so removed are not only merely "aesthetic" uses but all those quasi-descriptive uses of commendatory terms such as good (e.g. 'good car' 'good sort', 'good sox', 'good ox'). Aesthetic uses of evaluative terms, as in 'fine painting' or 'good book', do not concern, except in oblique ways, action or conduct of agents. It may well be objected that even so not enough non-moral uses are peeled off, as various uses like those of mere expediency or practicality are left standing. A countercase will be developed that these should be left standing. For a smarter strategy than attempting exclusion, includes moralities of expedience, of practicality, egoism and the like within the moral orbit-so enabling a straightforward answer to such otherwise vexing questions as Why be moral?- whilst subsequently differentiating within morals a distinuished subclass (to be called meurals) which does function exclusively through meeting more exacting requirements of morality. There is a subsense that should be picked up immediately. Though a vicious or evil agent is certainly a matter for morality, and within its compass, such an agent would not normally be accounted moral (as a naive reading of the dictionaries would suggest), but immoral. What is moral, morality, concerns the span of moral, immoral and indifferent procedures. Plainly moral in the narrower sense comprehends the definitely positive part of the span, as good does of the wide value span. Generally, an item (such as an agent, practice, conduct, or whatever) is strictly moral, moral in this stricter sense, if it is moral, a matter of 15 There are arguments to other moral agents, other full agents even, from evolusionary theory. According to an expanded theory, every niche is eventually occupied. (In a way, this interesting theme carries over from the earlier doctrine of a great chain of being, which similarly onto every position in the chain as potentially occupied.) By a statistical argument (copying those for intelligent life elswhere in this vast universe), there are, or will be, niches for agents, with requisite capabilities, wlsewhere in the universe. Therefore, by the theory, these niches will eventually be occupied. 8 moral concern, and its appraisal is decidedly positive. Naturally for a full account, positive within the moral span, has also to be defined. However here the strict sense is picked up only to be set aside. Focussing upon morality would be unduly limiting from the perspective of environment al ethics. For although anthropocent ricism has been avoided, easily circumvented through agency, though humans play no essential role, still morality is undoubtedly agent-centred. Morality foregrounds agents and assessments of them and their actions, and backgrounds environments of agents, and environments more generally (those without agents in them do not even enter into consideration). The environment remains, so to say, mere backdrop to actions of agents. Escape is through an intermediary, which is substituted in place of morality in the account proposed of ethics. That intermediary is an expanded morality, in convenient shorthand ectomorality. 16 ('Ectomoralit y' is close enough for the present to 'ecomorality' , which is of course part of the main focus.) Expanded morality takes into account also evaluative settings, perhaps devoid of agents; whatever of value that agents, or agent-like subjects, agentoids, might in principle impact upon, interfere with, disturb, effect, change, dislodge, or similar. That is, to say, it encompasses all items of relevant value, of worth, significant items, including many wholes, such as habitats, ecosystems, the Earth itself; and so also whatever applies morally with respect to these, for instance permission to disturb or to improve, principles of letting be, and so on. Such ecosignificant items are also called, in the literature, morally considerable items (a nicely ambiguous term, both sides of which have unfortunate features, one because a considerable item may not have large significance, the other because what it is supposed to respond to is some restricting class of considerers). In yet other and more satisfactory terms, they have ethical standing. Naturally items of significance other than agentoids may have other ethically relevant features (which they perhaps accrue through their significance). For instance they may hold entitlements of various sorts, such as to be left alone, to be represented, and so on. In order to characterize core notions in the ethics orbit, the basic strategy consists in plugging in "expanded morality" where the dictionaries give "morality"; similarly substitute "ectomoral" for "moral". For the adjectival forms 'ethical' , and (equivalently) 'ethic', that is all that is required. For the form concerned means: pertaining to ectomorality, or (equivalently) treating of or relating to ectomorals. For the noun forms it is not so simple, because there are problems with the dictionary accounts (for instance in 'the science of morality' owing to misplaced definiteness, and dated uses of the term 'science'). Always ethics(s) is an abstract, signifying features of being ethical; more exactly, always concerning ectomoral theories or systems. More specifically, ethic( s) signifies firstly, in both singular or plural though usually plural, the whole field of ectomoral theory 16 Greek ektos, outside. We include the inside with the expansion which incorporates the outside. 9 (the "science" of ectomorals), or derivatively, the department of (philosophical) study concerned therewith; secondly, in the singular but pluralising, a system or schematization of ectomorality, that is, at least rudiments of a system, or of a theory, comprising values, ectomoral principles, and rules of proper conduct.17 Like stock textbook ethics, most environmental ethics so far are in fact truncated; they are very rudimentar y schemes, leaving out much that would be expected in a fatter systematization. Hence in part the vagueness of characterization. So far the vagueness (which does not exceed that of dictionaries or of ordinary usage), is immaterial, as the characterisation is workable. But further exactness could be obtained through a technical upgrade of system and a more detailed specification of what such a proposition system contains. 18 What are sometimes cited as further restricted senses of 'ethic' are not further senses. Rather they are restrictions, or designations, of what is already presented. Thus for instance, the 'moral principles of a particular leader or school of thought' as in Buddhist ethics or Kantian ethics. Similarly for field indications or application restrictions, as in medical ethics or bioethics. So much for "senses" of 'ethics'. In order to reach an adequate definition of ethics, not merely for intended environmental purposes, but for historical purposes as well (so as to include Stoic ethics, Taoist ethics, romantic nature ethics and the like as ethics) we have been obliged to adjust (if in an inconspicuous way) dictionary definitions of ethics. That adjustment was made through "expanded morality", but could have been accomplished in other equivalent ways (Leopold's expansion of 'community' is another, though less satisfactory, way of achieving the same sort of thing). Granted that we have adjusted dictionary definitions, have we changed the very notion of ethics, or did the dictionaries, not for the first item, get it wrong, getting caught with chauvinistic definitions? We claim that we have not changed the notion. Rather we captured what some meant, more or less, by ethics all along-fro m Stoics, Epicureans and others on. It has never been a very precise notion. In this case (by contrast with terms like right) not too much hangs on the term, and we could simply divide ethics up, for instance, into wide and narrow. However, we intend to keep the nice term ethics but to give the dictionaries and modem opposition the expressions, standard ethics, or conventional ethics. Our inconspicuous but all important adjustment is both good and bad news. It is bad news, insofar as it appears to assist the charge that [deeper] environmental philosophy is doing something different from ethics, that it is guilty of changing the subject (i.e., effectively committing ignoratio elenchi). However we can freely grant, without incurring damage, that 17 18 Thus ethics include what it has to include, as expanded environment ally: philosophy of ecomorality, and therewith of morality. A system is a relational structure of a certain sort. An ethic is a propositional system, since it has to include principles and the like; thus it involves a theory of strict logical sort. For an illustration of the use of systems formulations in ethics, see e.g. Routley 1973. 10 standard ethics was, as a matter of definition, at least actocentric, and that, insofar as agents were identified with humans, it was, therefore, anthropocentric. Even so ethics, as redefined, includes standard ethics, so it is more satisfactorily seen not a different but a larger subject, expanded through an expanded morality. It is good news, not merely because it facilitates environmental ethics and accords with more satisfactory (greener) accounts of the subject, but because it helps in getting around a snarl of objections to the effect that ethics has to be homocentric, or at least actocentric. Removing these objections will recur throughout what follows. Among corollaries of note, a first one is that plurality of ethics falls out of the characterisation. An ethic is not unique. Nor (through such a result does not follow as environmental ethics form a subclass of ethics) are environmental ethics. Nor are military or professional ethics. Failure of uniqueness is not a deficiency, but a virtue. For, one thing, it gives places to go in cases of breakdown of an ethic, namely to other nearby ethics. Plurality is tied up with nonuniqueness and other features of merit: noncomprehensiveness, openness, flexibility, and so on.19 Secondly, there is more news on what an ethics is; and what an environmental one is. It is widely claimed that an ethics requires a communit y, in an environme ntal ethic the community (of concern etc.) is a wide environmental one. Ethics enlarges the community, a scope of values. Ethics (partaking of ethos ~ the evaluative frame(or spirit) of a community. While these ideas are popular they are astray. Environmental ethics shifts the frame of reference for ethical consideration from purely human concerns to ecological communities. 1-B Human beings as moral agents are not ethically privileged. An environmental ethic must be compatible with ecological principles and with life, i.e. be livable. 3. Within ethics and morals, as so far generously constured: decent and dud distinctions. Something like the division between the first and second specifics above has been quasi-technicalized within ethics, and distorted through merger with a theory-metatheory distinction borrowed from outside ethics. Engagement with the second (as in systematisation, constructing and working within systems, etc.) has been dubbed normative ethics, or sometimes to increase the confusion just ethics, or condescendingly, casuistry. Metaethics has been taken however to be not what the logical analogy, and borrowing, would suggest metanormative ethics, the (positivistically correct) study of such systems, but instead a brand of analytic philosophy, analysing the meanings and uses of key ethical terms. Taken as exhaustive, there is much of importance, that the normative-metaethical distinction leaves out. Nor is the distinction exhaustive. As well, the labels are misleading. In short, the distinction is ill-made out and rather unsatisfactory, a handicap, not an asset; it can be abandoned without 19 See EEHC p.57. 11 loss and to advantage. Let us do so (so forget this paragraph, if you prefer). Many other distinctions from standard ethics are also defective, in one way or another. It will be advisable to resurvey and rechart ethical terrain. Among other standard, but often dud, distinctions from ethical theory that have to reexamined after environmental impact, to be duly salvaged or scrapped, are all the following: • objective/subjective. That the objective/subjective distinction provides a false dichotomy is easily seen from usual explanations of the terms: 'either objective, standing for a real factor in things, or subjective, simply standing for a human proposal' 20 • Cognitive/non-cognitive. 2 1 To be retained are some distinctions which certain forces have worked hard to eliminate, such as that of • Fact/value (and earlier demise). • Expedient/moral. There is an elasticity in the notion of ethics, and a neglected distinction, that it is important to take into account.. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to build a universalizability requirement or some sort of equivalent into the very notion of ethics. The evident result is that selfish systems of evaluation and conduct, systematic egoisms for instance, are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be ethical? become vexed. 22 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is problematic in its formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethics do have much to recommend them, let us coin a convenient portmanteau term condensing the clumsy "universalizable ethics", namely euthics. (Conveniently then un-euthical suggests unethical, which is what from a properly ethical stance it is!) There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or isolated individual 23 ( even so, a Crusoe ethics is intelligible and feasible, as regrettably is egoistic morality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an upper-class ethics are not defective on significance or semantic grounds, even if they are wide open to objections on substantive grounds. Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out, as ethics, by such requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant differences. 24 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a 20 21 22 23 24 Reese p.157. See also Reese. On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer Impractical ethics (Singer equates moral with ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to the question Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented as decisive. Pettit reworking a rough route hacked out by Wittgenstein, tries to expand this across into a philosophical forest denominated "holism", no-dwelling place for an isolated individual. These requirements are presented by Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No 12 Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of responses, which were long accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Egoism, for instance, exhibits rationality failure, as it does not treat likes alike. There are no relevant differences justifying different treatment. Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view,for universality, rests upon an extensive appeal to authority (p.11). What else is offered is but an appeal to usage. the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct on ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I must address myself to a larger audience'(p.10). That depends on the conduct concerned. More important, the audience does not need to be so large, certainly not universal: my family or clan will suffice often enough. Nonetheless there is this of use 'ethics', especially in such criticisms as 'unethical'. • due consideration of others, all others; Parallel to the distinction of euthics within ethics is a distinction of neurals within morals, neurality within morality. Again the subclass, reflecting widespread philosophical usage of the term morality, is separated through some requirement of morality, such as • universalizability, which is a strong way of ensuring the first (do unto others etc.). Insofar as these principles all allude to others, they often admit easy extension (to other others). 25 4. Environmental and greener ethics. As prevailing accounts of ethics are for the most part defective, so are what builds upon them, recent accounts of environmental ethics. But there are also other grounds for dissatisfaction with these. Issues in the characterizat ion of ethics, especially removal of actocentrism and homocentrism, naturally get transmitted to critical types, such as environmental ethics. But it might be imagined, rashly, that disagreement ends there. After all, all decent environmental ethics make the non-human world a proper object of concern, either directly or indirectly. Differences between explications offered can be ascribed to ordinary philosophica l incompleteness. "An environmental ethic, broadly, is a set of values to live by which takes due account of the value of the non-human world". 26 Stated differently, the aim of environmental ethics 'is to understand and act appropriately in relation of our ecological-i n 25 26 doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated. The distinctions can be filled out (and made to work-verify!) by a strategy like the earlier. Again the list of moral predicates is deliberately wide. But once again we can later separate off certain uses e.g. instrumenal, aesthetic uses of good. Gunn 1987, 3. 13 the broad sense-circum stances". 27 Differently again, " ... sets of principles, which would guide our treatment of wild nature, constitute an environmental ethic in the most general sense". 28 The first of these slack explanations leaves out what is essential for an ethics, principles; the second is unduly actocentric, leaving out what is not, as well as main paraphernalia of ethics; the third not only neglects values, but excessively narrows scope so that such an ethics is inapplicable in places devoid of wild nature or to other issues. A better explication, which avoids these obvious pitfalls runs: An environmental ethics is an ethics, as defined, which, among other concerns, takes specific account, through its values and principles, of (significant) environmental items, of parts of nonhuman nature. But obviously it too leaves much to be explained. How the non-human world is made the object of concern, how it is moral concern, to what degree it is made the object of moral concern, what forms of moral concern are applicable to what elements of the environment, and how to achieve the aim of acting appropriately - all are matters that make environmental ethics one of the most controversial areas of philosophy and also one of the most exciting, although many professional philosophers still regard it as a peripheral area. Yet there now is broad agreement among most of those active in the area that some change is needed and that environmental matters need much more attention and action. An environmental ethics is an ethics concerned, usually among other ethical things, with parts of the environment. Coal-face or factory-floor environmenta l ethics bears on environmental issues, problems and causes, and can be expected to say something about environment s or some of their nonhuman components. Academic or board-room environmental ethics is frequently, however, a remove from direct ethical work, comprising discussion of environmental ethics, its features, its methods, its variability, its presumed merely derived and applied character, and so on. Much of this academic environmental ethics is directed against coal-face environmental ethics, especially that of a genuinely committed sort aimed at advancing environmental sources. It is almost immediate that there is an important elasticity -ambiguity, in a slack sense -in the notion of environmental ethics, between an ethics which considers environmental matters, whether positively or negatively, and an ethics which is positive about some environmental elements, which evinces concern about environmental items (as 18th century sympathy ethics did about other humans). A superficial environmental ethics need not say anything particularly positive or sympathetic about environments; indeed productions on the topic may try to dismiss or defeat environmenta l causes and to defuse or dissolve environmental problems, for instance as not worth bothering about. 29 It may be argued that 27 28 29 Drengson 1989, 15. Elliot, in Singer, 284. That is, fashionable contemporary practice with respect to philosophy is transferred to parts of enviromental philosophy (e.g. by Eco Wittgenstein and AppliedQuine). Environmental philosophy may in no way interfere with industry and business. To an astonishing extent American academic environmental ethics tends to conform to such ridiculous strictures (often encouraged by a fawning 14 natural environme nts should serve highest economic causes, which means in practice becoming reserves for city folks, city corporations and consumers. Under such environmental ethics ("environmental ethics" it is tempting to say, contravening usage) many an environme nt should be razed, levelled, and paved over, to become a grand parking lot, shopping mall or urban escarpmen t of a concrete jungle. What rural environment remains will, also serve those "high" purposes, be tamed and managed, like much of Western Europe. Witness the enthusiasm in productions on environmental ethics for landscapes like that of Tuscany, where virtually everything is under tight human control and no bird moves (else it is shot). Environm ental ethics and environme ntal philosophy may well prove to be disappointm ents for enthusiastic environmentalists. For there may be little that is materially green about them, no commitme nt to changes in old attitudes and practices, no offers of improved standing and ethical treatment for environme ntal items. As an environme ntal economics may be no green economics , but (very likely) some part or application of mainstream economics , some sweep of resource or land economics , so an environme ntal ethics or environme ntal ethic may not be particularly or at all green, but, for instance, simply part of establishm ent ethics or an "application" of it to environmental items. Fortunately not all environmental ethics is like this; beyond environmental is genuinely green ethics. The elasticity in environmental ethics between superficial and material forms, parallels that of the term concern (and rather similarly of matter), and can be substantially constricted to that: an environme ntal ethics is one concerned with environmental items or matter. Thus, on the one construal, such an ethics may be simply about such topics, it may be a standard ethics "applied" to such topics, in which case environmental ethics does become just so-called applied ethics. Alternatively, however, such an ethic may be one evincing concern, worry, about the treatment of some environmental items on other, and directed at obtaining improved treatment. Such an ethic is not negative or indifferent towards environme ntal matters, but is advancing environme ntal causes. They matter. With such ethics, environme ntal ethics cannot possibly be an applied ethics, for the framework of standard ethics and their application s, is exceeded. (At best such ethics can be approxima ted by standard ethics by assuming enlightened agents holding appropriate sorts of values. 30) 5. Human chauvinism and its detailed removal. Deep-green theory is, unambiguously, a green ethical theory, of deep kind: that is, there is intrinsic value in nature, natural items have intrinsic value, which may predomina te over human-bas ed value. In short, the theory rejects both the 'Sole Value Assumptio n' and the 'Greater Value Assumptio n'. The theory finds all standard ethics mired in heavy prejudice, in 30 pragmatism). Compare also Naess (in Engel 1990) on utilitarian approximation to Deep Ecology, made by assuming availability of enough agents holding deep ecological values or, more or less equivalently, having deep ecological consciousness. 15 favour of things human and against things non-human. The distinctive, still pervasive, prejudice concerned is that encapsulated as human chauvinism, which is itself a special case of class chauvinism (for the class, human 31 ). Removal of human chauvinism dovetails with displacement of humans. Class chauvinism consists in substantia lly differentia l treatment, typically discriminatory and inferior treatment, of items outside the class, by sufficiently many members of the class concerned, for which there is no sufficient justification. Human chauvinism is a feature, a cardinal weakness, of virtually all ethical systems hitherto, so deepgreen theory contends. The main argument takes the following form: there is no characteristic, such as those tendered in ethical theories as justifying differential treatment in favour of humans (characteristics such as rationality, language possession, tool making abilities, needs, preferences, sentience, etc.) which first is held by all and only humans, as distinct from not all humans and some non-humans, and which second does justify differential treatment.3 2 Signs and manifestations of chauvinism are many and various, some conspicuous, some subtle, and so on. For instance, a dead giveaway is any allusion to all outside certain human concerns that may have a value as resources. For that assigns to the items so referred to mere instrumental value. A little less obvious is the discriminative mode when individual humans are counted, but only species of other living things (or a step down, individual sentients but only species of others). The thorough-going rejection of human chauvinism itself sets a program: that of reworking ethics, and indeed much of philosophy, in a way free of chauvinism and humanism, without any specially privileged place for humans. A first part of such a program has already been outlined, that of suitably characterising ethics in a way that does not make essential appeal to humans or their features, or to other favoured groups such as sentients. A further important part of the program, formulation of ethical theory in a way which avoids entirely group chauvinism. Such a desirable outcome can be achieved simply through formulation of ethical theory in terms of ethically relevant categories, assembled in what is called an annular theory. 33 31 32 33 Insofar as an account of human is required, it can be some improvement on the biological species definitions, a reworking to remove past biasses (superioristic, rationalistic, masceulinist, etc.) and to dislodge appeals to aspects of human nature. But, despite the preponderance of human agents hereabouts, on planet Earth, such an account is not required for ethics, or for philosophy. Theorizing in these and many other areas can proceed perfectly well without allusion to humans. The detailed argument for this proposition is presented in Routley and Routley 1980a 97-108, where chauvinism is spelled out a bit further. A truncated version of this argument appears in Fox 1990, 16-17. Though the theory is so labelled in several publications, the label, which presumably should stay, is misleading, because some ethical relevant categories may overlap one another. The concentric theory (developed in Wenz 1988 and others, perhaps in steps of Leopold), which incorporates a similar mistake, can be seen as a subversion of the annular model. 16 The annular picture helps show how to redo ethics and philosophy with ideal types, or with some equivalent thereof. No simple species or subspecies , such as humans or superhumans, no single feature, such as sentience or life, serves as a reference benchmark, a base class, for determinin g moral relevance and other ethical dimensions . 34 No ethical irrelevant distinctions and classes, such as those of humans or base class, are required. What is required instead is a major shift in perspective , a new focus upon morally relevant categorical distinctions: it is not possible to provide criteria which would justify distinguishing, in the sharp way standard Western ethics do, between humans and certain nonhuman creatures, and particularly those creatures which have preferences or preferred states. For such criteria appear to depend upon the mistaken assumption that moral respect for other creatures is due only when they can be shown to measure up to some rather arbitrarily -determine d and loaded tests for membershi p of a privileged class (essentially an elitist view), instead of upon, say, respect for the preference s of other creatures. According ly the sharp moral distinction, commonly accepted in ethics by philosophe rs and other alike, between all humans and all other animal species, lacks a satisfactory coherent basis (Routley and Routley 80a, 103). The categorical distinctions thereby proposed do not reject traditional ethical notions such as rationality, self-awaren ess, having interests; but they do reject the automatic use of the characteristics of one species, or some base class as the model upon which the characteristics of all other species or classes are judged. They also reject as unjustified distinctions that are not "categorical distinctions which tie analytically with ethical notions". 35 For instance, they hold that the human/nonhuman distinction is not ethically significant. Humans enter only in a contingent way into general ethical theory, as holders of these or those features, which 34 35 Another common mistake which annular theory helps dispel and avoid is that of trying to stretch community (or moral commuity) to include webs, mountains, Earth, land etc.-a trend Leopold started with his land ethic. An agent can have an obligation to care for earth, and soil without there being part of community. (The Land ethic is misguided). What ethics covers diverges from any moral community. (Contra Dobson's suggestion p.47). Routley and Routley 1980a, 108. 17 depending upon their respective capabilities and competence. It is also desirable to have available some more positive principles corresponding to the negative rejection of class chauvinism, principles so to say, of anti-chauvinism. Principles like the biospherical egalitarianism of Deep Ecology represent an unsatisfactory attempt in this direction. The deep-green improvement on this principle is the powerful principle of ecoimpartiality, according to which there should be no substantially differential treatment of items outside any favoured class or species of discriminatory sort that lacks sufficient justification. The appropriate impartial treatment is substantially independent of the comparative value of the item treated. Most important, impartial treatment does not entail equal treatment, or equal consideration, and does not require equal intrinsic or other value. Other distinctive principles of deep-green theory will emerge as the ethical theory accumulates. One major conclusion is that human is not a significant ethical category. The outcome is not anti-human; humans enter to the extent that they respectively deserve to enter. It is not being claimed that humans lack value, that none of them have much or any value. Quite the contrary, some humans have great value, some have established themselves as having great propensity for evil, many lead quite indifferent lives. What is being rejected is the elevated, often exaggerated, frequently exclusive, value assigned to humans, too often uniform value. What are being contested are received distributions of values, and the heavy concentration of value in humans and things and features human, the relative importance of which has been grossly exaggerated. 36 Be in no doubt: many humans have positive value, some remarkable value. That is one reason why it matters that humans should not vanish off the planet (for all that many of they have sinned against it), to leave an impoverished earth, for instance a microbe planet. For that would involve a huge reduction in value. Nor is it enough, adequate compensation, that something like humans would evolve again at some remote future time. For, even if it happened (in fact the probability of such replacement looks rather small), there would still be a huge and extended dip in value. Similar points tell against a range of similar arguments to the effect that it does not matter what happens to, or is done to, the Earth, because evolution will eventually restore richness. 37 Even if richness were to return (much evidence indicates 36 37 Moral consideration and intrinsic value are not limited to humans; similarly these are not confined to any other favoured or "improved" class closely overlapping humans, such as (it is supposed) persons or rational creatures. Moral principles can be applied to all species and to the natural environment in general. (A corollary concerns the characterisation of morality. ) Evolutionary space is thereby afforded for other species, other systems other things. An associated feature is stereotyping. Stereotyping is characteristic of speciesism/chauvinism as it is in exploitation. To stereotype an item is to see it purely as a member of a class and as having conventional feature of the class as a whole. Recently there have been some attempts to have things ethical both ways: a special role for humans without privilege or prejudice. There is a latent incoherence in Rachel's text, between his initial and final proposals regarding ethics and morals-which are essentially human intricatedand regarding morals without hubris (MWH)-where human hubris is supposed to be removed. Such an argument has been advanced by, among others, William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and 18 that extinction and destruction is for ever, permanent), there would still be serious loss of value. So it does matter. 6. Philosophy without humans. It is hard to move and operate philosophically without encountering humans and human chauvinism. Chauvinism is written deep into all prevailing Western (and Eastern) ideological forms, common to what, at a more superficial level, are rival positions. But while human chauvinism transcends parochial differences, it is more conspicuous and brazen in some philosophical locales than others, notably idealism and empiricism, existentialism and phenomenology. In short, it is particularly prominent where matters answer back to subjects, those who have the ideas, do the observing, assemble the phenomena, do the living, and so on-back to subjects that are invariably assumed to be human. Thus it is human existence, human Being, human ideas and impressions, that count, those and none others. Such chauvinism, nauseatingly strong, pervades not only Continental philosophy (esp. French and German varieties)-but also Anglo-American empiricism and pragmatism (esp. anti-realist varieties). 38 Once the main strategies of ethics-without-humans have been grasped, it is easy to see how analogous moves can be made the deanthropize other reaches of philosophy, notably some of the more chauvinistic enterprises. In general there are two stages: Firstly, as with morality, replacing humans and human subjects by agents and ideal subjects. And secondly, as with ethics, delineating significant reaches-philosop hical wildernesses-wh ere agents are removed, not just off-stage but altogether. While a few examples of each stage only will be given, it will become evident that the procedures are general. Consider as an example of the first stage, existentialism, a philosophy celebrating humans, and their exclusive freedom, and shot through with human chauvinism. Existentialism is (to quote a convenient caricature) a philosophy which emphasises man's freedom to act independently of any laws, natural or otherwise, and according to his own choice. It is a free will philosophy which can be seen as 'a protest against views of the world and policies ... in which humans are regarded as the helpless playthings of historical forces, or as wholly determined by the regular operation of natural 38 Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993. There is a residual serious problem here, as to why existence is so important. Why do actual humans and existent tigers matter, not merely virtual ones or possible ones. What is it about existence? There are many items which it would be better did not exist, such as devils, helicopters (for the most part), pollution, erosion and so on. Existence, of favoured sorts, makes for richness, which is a high (if defeasible) virtue. Sartre's philosophy is rendolent with human chauvinism: e.g. Critique of Dialectical Reason p.8. as regards destruction and destroy, is an amazing piece of human chauvinism. While humans may have a greater potentiality for production of value than most other animals, many humans also have a far greater potentiality for evil than most other animals. Historically, the evil producing capacity has dominated. Another example of Sartre's anthropocentism is his "philosophy of the present". Marx's philosophy is similarly rendolent. Productivity is human productivity... . For almost random examples from anti-realism, see DP. 19 processes' (Encyclopaedia Britannica 1978). This anti-determinist perspective is, again, connected with the question of objectivity. Existentialists hold that the only objective external fact independent of the control of human beings is the fact of their being brought into existence, and that death will one day come to terminate that existence. In all other respects it is they who are in control. There are no outside independent laws, of economics, history, nature or whatever, which they cannot deny or shape for themselves. Thus we are all free to choose how we will behave and develop and how we will shape society and nature. It follows that the consequences of our actions are down to us, and therefore if they are unpleasant that is our fault-not the fault of outside forces or external laws. There are no excuses for our not thinking and acting for ourselves and we are 'condemned' to be free because everything is theoretically permitted to us and we therefore carry a heavy burden of responsibility for what we do. As Sartre put it, 'Man is responsible for what he is. The first effect of existentialism is that it puts every man in possession of himself as he is, and places the entire responsibility for existence squarely on his shoulders' .... We have a duty to face up to this, and not to base our actions thoughtlessly on what is said to be prescribed/or us ('laws' of society, of economics, of nature). That is abdicating responsibility.39 Note the heavy concentration throughout on humans, variously appearing as human beings, we, us, they, and (in singular musculine form) man and he. But, as before 40 , on the one boundary, many humans are incapable of what is presumed, the heavy burden of responsibility and so forth; and, on the other, other agents are, in principle at least, capable of achieving those relevant sorts of freedom that humans can obtain. It is already apparent that once the synthetic setting of highly competent humans is exceeded, notions invoked by existentialism begin to fall apart. For instance, some "wild" animals may enjoy considerable levels of unreflective unagonised freedom while lacking capacity to bear much responsibility. Conversely, there are fairly responsible agents, such as some trapped in determined or deterministic situations, who have no opportunity to exercise freedom. Accordingly too, though human should be replaced by agent of appropriate sort in dechauvinized existentialism, it would hardly suffice to substitute for 'human' any of 'responsible agent', 'freedom exercising agent' or similar-though these substitutions effect some of what was intended, such as exclusion of children, many animals, dementeds and so on. What sort of agent is appropriate? That existentialism can be seen as trying to explain. And for the present we can leave it at that, replacing human throughout by the dummy term, existential agent. This is existentialism partly rectified. At the same primary stage of dechauvinizing existentialism, connected improvements could well be sought in existentialism, such as reducing the driven and elitist ethos. In part this ethos is encouraged by the response of existentialism to what motivates and shapes it, deterministic arguments; for it sees only such "strong" agents as evading deterministic forces. The whole business is rather ironic, as the first driven feature is incompatible with full 39 40 Pepper (Roots) pp.118-9; itals in original. Pepper refers to Sartre 1943 and 1946. As at the beginning of EE, where standard privileged treatment for humans is reviewed and found wanting. 20 freedom, while the second elitist feature is incompatible with the stress on things human, as (like elitist religions) only exceptional agents escape. A promising alternative tries direct confrontation with deterministic arguments, undercutting their scope and grip, and thereby making room for free action in a range of situations (not everywhere between birth and death!) for a wide variety of agents, including lesser, less elite, less stressed and sensitive agents. For the arguments prove vulnerable to selective undermining by careful logical and analytic procedures, 41 methods existentialism itself is loath to deploy (for all that its approach rests upon past entrenched argumentation). Insofar as a main motivation for existentialism in its prevailing ironic form is undiscriminating antideterminism, that motivation too is thereby collapsed, and room is made for a less demanding more relaxed dechauvinized existentialism. As for existentialism, so for a range of other subjects inclined to intrude humans as central to world functioning or intelligibility, a range as apparently diverse as phenomenology and quantum theory, empiricism and theology, pragmatism and cosmology. Quantum theory fits into this range because of its received Copenhagen interpretation, cosmology because of its return to anthropocentrism through adoption of anthropic principles. Both are however readily freed of human shackles, first by replacing humans by "observers" (which for the most part can simply be recording devices), and better, secondly to deagentize completely, by amending interpretation s to dislodge both Copenhagen phenomenolo gy and anthropic principles. 42 For a larger illustration, consider a popular mixture of versions of phenomenology (a fuller elaboration again would disentangle versions, all of which however require similar detoxification). Phenomenol ogy to which existentialism is related .. .is summed up by Nietzsche, who said, 'Objectivity is the main enemy of understanding. It means the myth that there are hard observable facts ... but all the concepts we employ in describing the world and predicting its behaviour are imposed on it by ourselves. We have a choice about what view of the world we adopt.' ... Phenomenology is not just a philosophy which implies that we are not subject to external laws, imposed by and through forces independent of ourselves. It holds that there actually is no world external to and separate from ourselves. There is no 'reality' in the sense of there being an external 'real world' divorced from our own consciousness and capable of existing if we did not exist. Nature cannot exist without ourselves also existing-if we ceased to be, so would it cease, and vice-versa. Therefore what 'the environment' is, and is like, is a function of our own subjective construction of it. The very use of such terms as 'ourselves' and 'human consciousness' in opposition to terms like 'nature' and 'the environment' is inappropriate and shows the extent to which we are immersed in positivist science as our way of seeing the world. For the phenomenologists these terms are meaningless because there is no separation between ourselves and a 'nature' or a 'reality'. We and the world are one-a single united entity. Phenomenology is thus anti-positivist science, opposing ... Cartesian dualism. It does not deal in laws, or in cause-effect relationships consequent on the dualism and neither can it be concerned with analysis-brea king the world into parts ... If we want to know and understand nature we must, as Hume 41 42 For technical details, see Sylvan FWD. On satisfactory ways of accomplishing this second stage see Sylvan (Cosm. Syn). 21 { said in his Treatise on Human Nature in 1737, come to full comprehension of man. For if there is no nature except as structured through human consciousness, knowledge and truth cannot exist independently of man. 43 As with existentialism, there is a similar enormous exorbitant emphases on humans and things humans; humans carry everything. But insofar as humans can perform those feats, so better can a class a appropriate agents, phenomenolo gical agents, who include no incompetents (who might let this world flicker out of existence, or worse). Phenomenolo gy is a full immersion human chauvinism. Fashionable contemporary empiricisms, normally taken as rivals to phenomenolo gy, are incomplete immersion analogues. While a few properties, primary properties of basic physics, are separated out as human independent, the rest, the phenomenolo gical mass, are categorised as responsedependent, and treated phenomenologically. 44 Take, for example, aesthetic features, which include certain ecological features. Nowadays humans can grow up with the assumption that aesthetic qualities, indeed all "response dependent" qualities, are features of humans, not in any way objective. So it can be seriously, if ridiculously, hypothesized that what is (considered) beautiful, for instance of depends on how the human gene-pool is composed. As before, humans are readily displaced in favour of appropriate agents. But, for the most part, these agents too are otiose. While the first stage 1s the main stage with agentocentric philosophies like extistentialism, there is a second stage, which comprises significantly more than pointing out how much, how much of importance, such philosophies leave out by their narrow concentration. What is left out includes, to begin, all those times and places where there are no agents, rich worlds, devoid of relevant agents, and the like. But that is only the beginning of the business. For agents have been infiltrated or inserted in all sorts of settings where they have no business to be or to transact. Against the ancient and formerly honorable practice of agent invocation, pushed primarily for explanatory purposes, 45 agent detachment and agent elimination campaigns have periodically been mounted (e.g. conspicuously , but not only, in classic Greece, when it became clearly appreciated that there could be causes without agents, during the Enlightenmen t, and in Frege' s propositional ization program). Deagentizatio n, typically coupled with deanthropization, can be, and should be, pushed much further. Agents, often evidence of immature, even primitive, philosophy, still lurk everywhere in philosophy. Agent-detach ment themes, still struggling against an unenlightened opposition, include: objects, including worlds, without perceivers or sensors, nonexistent items without conceivers, propositions without proposers, assumptions without assumers, values without 43 44 45 Pepper p.199 (where references are supplied). We shall not stop off for expository adjustment or for any critique of this material. For main elements of such a critique, see however DP chapter 11 and JB. Thus thesis that all properties are response dependent merges empiricism with European phenomenology. Deluded explanatory purposes, for agents themselves have in turn to be explained. I 22 t valuers, causation without causers (or intentional agents), organisation without organisers, wilderness without wilderness managers, land (or property) without owners or stewards, regulation without regulators, selection without selectors, and purposes without purposers. 46 But without humans who does philosophy? Well, in the old days, God of course, most gods, the Devil, demiurges, gifted spirits and so on. At any time duly accomplished agents. While it is easy to see how ethics and philosophy could in principle flourish given only suitably accomplished agents, and no humans, namely the agents do something like what a few humans hereabouts do, still it may be less easy for many to see how these subjects can function without agents. But it is straightforward, is it not? A philosophy stands as a system of propositions. And propositions do not need agents, proposers, or whatever. Nor do systems. It is here that blockage may occur, for two reasons: First, because of the idealistic idea that there are no statements without staters. Second, because of the mistaken assumption that a system of propositions standing on its own involves an obnoxious platonism. No such assumption is made. Third, part of the struggle has been conducted before, in the tussle between psychologism and its opposite in logic and associated regions (e.g. mathematics, philosophy of mathematics etc.), in the tussle between Husserl and Frege (to name two prominent parties). Although the issues have been rejoined more recently, it is still widely supposed that anti-psychologism triumphed. Its success is, to some extent, mere appearance. For all that, anti-psychologism is here extended much further, right across philosophy. Appendix. 1. Examples showing divergence of utilitarianism from consequentialism. Consider two different actions with some set of consequence s, one (A) done deliberately, one (B) unintended. Then suppose, for one sort of case, the outcome is disastrous. Not only is A normally regarded as much worse than B, e.g. arson than a naturally occurring fire such as lightening strike, but further fuller utility assessments should give analogous results, e.g. the satisfaction of the arsonist could be given a high negative rating. Utilitarianism itself is but a well-tempered egoism: egoism extended to substituting others. That cannot so plausibly be charged of consequentialism. Utilitarianism has been associated with the "greed is good" ideology of the 1980s. The association has point (so Singer tries, desperately, to disassociate utilitarianism). Suppose it is said that the 80s, were a decade of greed (as so depicted in many movies) but the 90s is a decade of ethics (despite counterevidence). But nothing has changed in underlying ideologies, in ethics or economics! Appendix 2. Inadequacy of standard ethics. The inadequacy of standard ethics for green purposes has been recognised, if obliquely and perversely, by many critics of the idea of (deep) green ethics (e.g. McCloskey). They 46 The very controversial tlast theme is argued in Sylvan 90 [purpose], where most of these various detachment themes are assembled. Obviously there are many more such themes. 23 l have proceeded to argue that there couldn't be such an ethics because none of the standard ethics would serve. But the argument fails because standard ethics does not exhaust ethics. There are some prospects of a general proof of inadequacy from what has been developed so far. Standard forms are restricted to proper subsets of agents, whereas ethics in full flower applies to all agents. Standard ethics leaves out much of the subject, all the deep part. References William Grey in 'Anthropocentrism and Deep Ecology', Australasian Journal of Philosophy vol.71, No 4: December 1993. ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deepgreen theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions. At the core of deep-green theory, as of authentic deep ecology, lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes these positions deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what counts for them. Value then does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are, as it is often put (without however any commitment thereby to dubious essentialist or absolute objectivist positions), intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor (pace deep ecology) does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, and accordingly may be found in nature, it is not encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so subject to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecological features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing total value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; tfiat is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape-perceivers, and concepts with conceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, relating valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions deliberately chosen suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake, which cannot however be got away with, to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenient values are locked away), not to remove valuers, considered unproblematic, from view. The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal reduction of mainstream modern philosophy, of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionall y clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for them self. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomonalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achievers satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thoughtexperiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values are not apart from the actual world, then, merely projected onto it by valuers, or else locked up in certain valuers (in the fashion of Carterian intensions ). Values are part of the world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or shapes. Value like the shape and taste, is an3attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like colour and taste and their determinate forms (red, acidic, etc), a universa l , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. Like shape and colour, value is a high-level universal. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the standard, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as redness or yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour traingles); shapes like value pertain to wholes as well as particulars, and links with gestalts rather better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby more immune to reductionist strategies than secondary properties such as colour, which is, under physicalism, prized off objects and allegedly relocated in creatures or in their interrelation with colourless physical things. Shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the anology can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does, and not something else, like some specialised mathematical or economic thing. It does not contract to some mark of value or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modem economics into (expected) utility or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-inexchange (price). Value means what it means, and has meant: worth; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other cut-down thereof. Price, for example, may fail entirely to reflect worth, it may have little to do with goodness of product. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are than a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural and subcultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured feature, and cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideologic al commitments, such as the varieties of materiali sm (physicalism esp.) or scientism. As has become apparent, attempted reductions of value come too in a variety of forms subjective, which made use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like or subjective aggregations, such as community preferences or utility; or objectiviely naturalistic, which enrol value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value - consequential, w~ch consider only outcomes, or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes - straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features), or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within theses schemes, or accommodated at all. The idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other knowledge, where philosophy has conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current science, physics especially, does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While those engaged purely in purer science may have the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. Though deep-green value theory is thoroughly nonreductive, it does not sacrifice warranted claims to scientific and logical adequacy thereby. The reductionistic dichotomies are avoided and repudiated. Value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are certainly not subjective; but nor are they objection in an absolutist sense; they are nonjective, that is, neither. Somewhat similarly, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. In any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing , which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational comp~nents. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and disvalue. The basis of perceptio n is sensation , the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of asking whether the next or a relevant judgemen t fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical practice of devising cases and comparing them with the cases in hand can be worked in under this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in North America under the rubric "reflectiv e equilibrium". Observe, however, that any equilibriu m gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problems arise and further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreduc tionistic value theory can function. Whether that theory is an appropria te environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed. Enhancement methods reveal too tRat value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks, such as those intended to reflect truth. There can be, there evidently are, rival value systems, measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics, rival physical and biological theories, and rival coherent religions. Chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which take no requisite account of many environmental items, likewise cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social practices; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutation (for the reason that requirements of morality, of universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Of course a range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying equality, can be put to work to move valuers who adhere to other structures, often enough successfully. Emotional presentation of environmental items, by way of new experience and information, is important among these. In short, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep green theory nor authentic deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior , and marked down accordingly, while economism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge, and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green positions, against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism. The value system pluralism of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preference- information or even desire-belief modellin1); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a noreduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given non-interference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely • • 8 not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; not to jeopardis e the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystem s, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. As permissib ility, obligatio n and respect principles can be explained through the valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles. Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles. Deep-gre en ethical theory is much more than just another non-redu ctionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinis m, a type of class chauvini sm which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinis m is avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categorie s of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discrimin ately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions. Deep-gre en value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values. But explainin g their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory. 9 * Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 B ungendore NSW 2621 For more on deep-green theory and deep ecology, see for instance essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environme ntal Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. Annex 1. Most people inherit their value framework along with their culture. Many never do any substantial overhaul. Many indeed are not active or responsible valuers. But in these respects, values are not so different from other things. Some people are poor judges of shape; many never learn to distinguish plants, or to discriminate among wines. Likewise for other choices, options, major changes, metaphysical and even political. Mostly that a choice has been made or inherited and is incorporated in the subculture is not noticed, along with its not been observed how arbitrary many of the choices and resulting structures are (in Foucault has emphasized). Of course it is often not in the interests of the power elite, who control media outlets, etc., that this sort of arbitrariness should be widely known, and alternative structures considered and perhaps experimented with. Choices occur where distinctive circumstance prevail. For instance, there is serious scarcity; food supplies in particular are threatened (e.g. with being out of reach is price, with pollution, etc.). Differently, circumstances lead to conversions, as when a new ideology sweeps through, enthusiam generated by some charismatic figures. / bits from chapter 2 There is another important elasticity. In contemporary ethical theory there is a concerted attempt to build on universalizability requirement or the equivalent into the very motion of ethics. The evident result is that selfish systems of induction and conduct, systematic egoisms for instance are refused the title of ethics, and as an important corollary questions like Why be ethical? become vexed. 1 Given, in particular, that any such "universality" requirement is problematic in this formulation, and typically limited, chauvinistically to persons, a superior course proceeds to distinguish: between ethics as already characterised (reportively) and its subclass, universalizable ethics. As impartial ethical do have much to recommend them, let us coin a convenient portmonteau term condensing the chancy "universalerable ethics", namely euthics. (Conveniently then an euthical supports unethical, which is what from a properly ethical stance it is!) There is undoubtedly some pressure to have ethics and morality extend beyond a single or isolated individual (even so, a Causal ethics is understood, as is egoisticmorality). But that pressure does not extend very far; and such notions as those of a tribal morality and an upperclass ethics are not defective on significance grounds, even if they are objectional on substantive grounds. Such restricted ethics are not however immediately ruled out by such requirements as that like cases be assessed alike, and that differences of assessment be based on relevant differences. 2 For a tribalist or racist can respond that a foreigner is not like a Greek, or that there are relevant differences between whites and blacks (intelligence has been proposed as such a difference, when skin pigmentation appeared a merely superficial difference). These sorts of responses, which were longer accepted, are no longer acceptable, because the differences put up are not considered ethically relevant differences (correctly enough, though ethical relevance itself lacks an adequate explanation). Singer's main argument for a much wider point of view, universality, commits in a extensive appel to authority (p.11). What is offered: an appeal to usage. 'the notion of ethics carries with it the idea of something bigger than the individual'. [It often does, but it may not.] 'If I am to defend my conduct in ethical grounds, I cannot point only to the benefits it brings me. I wont address myself to a larger audience' (p.10). That On both, narrowing and vexing, see Singer lmpractual ethics (Singer aquates moral with ethical). Singer does not really have an answer to Why be moral? though he thinks it not a bad idea; mainly he tries to put down shuffles that have been presented or decisive. 2 These requirements are presented byu Attfield as basic formal requirements of reason (p.6). No doubt they are, though they appear to figure in no logic of ethics yet formulated. depends on the conduct concerned. More important the audience does not need to be much larger, certainly not universal: my family or law will suffice often enough. J. From Chap 4 Evaluations may be arrived at, and value systems expanded, by enhancement methods, which consists in emotional presentation (as under Meinong's phenomenological account) organised by coherence methods. The methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for acquisition of scientific information. As with accumulated empirial information, which can be extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes and taster tastes and goodness, so a valuer feels value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeated with heavy emphasis as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by huntsmen spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying in particular inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). The coherence procedure consists, in essence, of asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. (The familiar ethical practice of devising cases and compari ng them with the cases in hand can be worked in under this procedure.) Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibr ium - admitting what is included, while excluding what is unsupported, fails to gain support, is emotionally spoken against - such coherence procedures have gained currency in North Americ a under the rubric "reflect ive equilibr ium". Observe , howeve r, that any equilibr ium gained at some stage may be quickly lost, as new types of problem s arise and further information enters. To be sure, the whole methodology (like the parallel methodo logy of a coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably usable in rudimentary parts. It does howeve r surmou nt a major obstacle for value theory; it reveals how in principl e a nonredu ctionist ic value theory can function . Whethe r that theory is an appropr iate environmental one or not will depend however above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not dismissed. end The availability of rival value systems and prospect of yet others, while it implies a certain desirabl e (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. Neither deep green theory nor authenti c deep ecology espouse any superficially easy relativism. From their viewpoint, rival narrowe r and shallow er systems are definitely inferior , and marked down accordingly, while econom ism is an onathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at state bo':lndaries). However a critical pluralism does acknow ledge, and offer a place, in the wider scheme of things for other positions, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. Politically then, deep positions can allow for, what makes good sense in these times of numbers, alliances. Hence the point of a green alliance, combining green position s, against still prevailing anti-environmentalism and economism. The value system pluralis m of deep-green theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underly ing metaphysical pluralis m of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview, but choice of associated actual world, is a value dependent choice. That choice, insofar as it is conscio usly made, of world conceptualisation and structure, is a constrai ned choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But in as much as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds accordin g to a standard value-in formati on analysis (regular ly oversim plified howeve r to a preferen ceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to get to the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined. Their relation, not one of identity (for contrary to idealism, there are many relations not identical with identity), can now be stated more accurately than the poets have managed. Neither is one; both are plural, and differently so. In certain significant respects the metaphysics resembles the value theory. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic so also is the metaphysics; what needs to be discerned, in place of absolutism, is a plurality of worlds and of associated truth characterisations. A main aim of a thoroughgoing environmental theory is to displace very destructive dominant ideasystems, regularly presented as absolute, which incorporate both value and truth themes concerning the environment and its organisation. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory, beginning (to take a more accessible route than the metaphysical way) with a more comprehensive ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological theory, elaborating environmental values and virtues, a deontic theory, supplying· obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quitely in its waters, and so on. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricthics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be given for interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environme ntal interferenc e or modification falls upon those who would interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use, only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environme ntal items is founded on such interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dis preferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis form part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. As permissibility, obligation and respect principles can be explained through the valuations reached on the theory, so too can rights and other significant components of morality be explained and justified through, but again not reduced to, values. For example, a creature has a right to something if it has a valid title thereto established from correct moral principles. Candidates for the parameter "something" provide a familiar list: freedom from unnecessary suffering, respectful treatment, satisfaction of basic needs, and so on. Such rights accordingly derive from and reinforce corresponding deontic principles. Deep-green ethical theory is much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or exclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human is not, contrary to prevailing humanism, a highly significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is avoided through a natural annular model, which connects ethical characteristics directly with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Wes tern ethical theories have not merely so limited ethical matters predominately to inter-human affairs, but have been blantantly chauvinistic, exhibiting a substantial, discriminately and unjustifiably bias in favour of humans (of certain privileged humans). These sorts of systems should be superseded; it is not a matter of simple adjustments or extensions. Deep-green value theory, as developed, implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions, both those of a mixed capitalistic kind and those of a more state socialistic cast. They are the (devious) product of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental considerations and values. But explaining their deficiencies, and indicating more satisfactory green alternatives and replacements, is another chapter in the elaboration of deep-green theory. Deep-green theory is a deep environmental theory, with much in common with deep ecology. Like deep ecology, it stands in significant ideological opposition to the dominant technocratic-industrial way. But, even more than deep ecology, deep-green theory aims to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy (in the full senses of those atrophied terms, esp philosophy ). It seeks to accomplish this, furthermore, without accumulating the amount of philosophical rubbish deep ecology regularly attracts. For, to insert a key difference between these ecocentric theories in a deliberately prejudical way: deep-green theory resembles a deep ecology with the pseudo-scientific garbage removed, reorganised into a tight, coherent and more comprehensive theory. Deep-green theory, which has roots that stretch back about as far as its much publicized neighbour, accordingly merits elaboration separate from deep ecology, which in any case lacks a well-thought-through valuational and ethical basis. This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby one central area of deep-green theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing prevailing policies and institutions. ETHICS AND METAPHYSICS: their relevance to one another There is rich range of incompatible claims about the mutual interelations of the two ancient subjects. Most of these claims appear mistaken. Sorting out something of what looks right is a daunting task, a small beginning on which is attempted here. Initial severe difficulties derive from the vagueness, in determinacy and problematicality of the relata, both of which are ill-understood by philosophers metaphysics especially. Many there are who think that metaphyscis coincides with ontology, the study (description, explanation and understanding) of what exists. 1 The general study of what there is, sistology, which includes ontology as a very proper part, is only one facet of metaphysics (unless it is presumed that items somehow supply also all propositions concerning them). For sistology is the totality of things side of metaphysics, there is also the totality of true propositions side (propositionology, for a nice term). Metaphysics also comprises the study of the very general attributes of this and other universe and of what accounts for these attributes (or propositional functions). In technical terms, then, a metaphysics amount to a very general and comprehensi ve constrained model; and metaphysics to the plural assembly of these metaphysics. 2 Each metaphysics will be constrained (as will become clear through examples given below) through modelling conditions or postulates (which delimit how "altimate reality" is according to that system). Metaphysics is sometimes construed more comprehencisvely to include some or all of epistemology (knowledge of "ultimate reality" for instance), some of or all of other branches of philosophy, perhaps all of philosophy. Plainly, if metaphysics, so expansively construed, includes ethics, then their relation is straightforward, metaphysics includes ethics. But we shall not adopt such construals. Whereas metaphysics concerns features of universes, ethics is a study of moral values and principles, and of rules and practices of conduct. A case can be made out that an ethic is outlined through its distributions of values, in terms of which both deontic features (rights, obligations, etc) and axiological features (goodness, etc) can be discerned. (Utilitarian can afford a crude exemplar). So, without loss of generality, I can concentrate on the relation of value theory to metaphysics. Now a value theory does not derive from a purely naturalistic metaphysic, by virtue of a rectified naturalistic fallacy. But, firstly even is a value theory may be influenced or even construed by such a metaphysics. For example if the theory rules out all but primary qualities 2 What there is according to most Western philosophers, still labouring under the probleminducing Ontological Assumption. For such a confusion of ontology with metaphysics see Forrest p.3. For the bsis of this large (and estrageous) technical leap, see DP. 2 as some sort of constructs, the value qualities will have to be explained as constructs, projections or similar. Secondly, a metaphysics is unlikely to be purely naturalistic. Metaphysics is not a value-free enterprise; a metaphysics typically presumes a range of presumptions, including archivative ones (deeper examples include assumptions of primary, e.g. of certain sorts of objects, of importance, e.g. of what exists, of implicit world selection, e.g. the world is Newtonian, Copenhagen quantum, or obitives). An ethics does not determine a meta-ethics or therefore a metaphysics. Nor does the converse hold. A metaphysics does not in general determine an ethics, but is compatible with many. Against the stock determination and priority claims, I want to oppose interaction and no priority themes. Determination claims are commonplace in philosophers who wish to wield the big stock of dominant science to settle ethics (or mataethics). For instance Collicott asserts that "intrinsic value in nature ... remains ... painfully inconsistent with the ... modern scientific world-view' (Celbration of Robton p.14, similarly p.22, whence CD 1. Modern scientific metaphysics entails there are no intrinsic values in nature. This is not a lapse (though soon Collicott will weaken his determination claims) because almost immediately Collicott goes on to assert CD2. 'A value neutral nature is ... an immediate inference from the institutionalised metaphysical foundations of modern science' (p.15). Given some large assumptions, most conspiciously that the metaphysics involved is that of British empiricism, the claim CD2 become incontestable. For under that empiricism, as elaborated by Locke and Hurve, non primary qualities like value and colour are not part of or in nature, but substantially subjective in character. However insitutionalized those foundations an important issue - it has since become apparent that there are at least several parts of operative sciences, such a classical and quantum; namely a core calculus or formalism; operational rules for connecting the formalism with testable data and making in ..... applications; and layers of interpretation. It is in these separable, and variable, larger of interpretation that metaphysical and elaborative princi;es begin to enter conspicuously. The "institutionalized" interpretation is but one among the interpretations that can be fitted to classical formalism. It is an interpretation incorperating some major and controverisial philosophical theories, such as the reference theory and verificationism. Rival interpretations are feasible and were developed, for instance by the Scottish comon-sense school. Such rival foundations do not yield a value-free value neutral nature. Collicott calls upon Rolston 'to provide a persuasive alternative to the integral set of Carterian-Gohblein-Humean assumptions that render the subjective provenance of value so fundamental to the modern scientific outlook' (p.16). But Rolston hardly needs to do any such thing 3 : it has already been done, in various 3 Rolston makes giving an appropriate interpretation for more difficult than he need by conceeding "seconddoary" qualities to the reductionistic opposition. Thus, regressively: 'the greenness of the tree is in my hand, but it looks as though the tree is 3 ways, and, in any case, as Collicott soon observes, 'the modern scientific worldview is obsolete' (p.19). The property for a full value-in-nature theory are little better under postmodern quantum theory, Collicott however insinuates, then they were before. Under a Copenhagen interpretations, which he adopts, prospects look worse. Abruptly too Collicott switches from a determination thesis, such as CD, to a slacker and more plausible if vaguer linkage. The linkage appears in different nonequivalent forms: CL 1. A science, such as 'the new physics might play an architectonic role in our eventual thinking about nature (and human society)' (p.23 itals added). Subsequently, 'architectonic role' is replaced through the as vague 'inspired by' and more specific 'mapped out'. CL2. 'A value thoery [may be] inspired by, and mapped on, ... quantum physics (p.25, where reduction and derviation are now explicitly repudiated!). Such a value theory is, it is claimed, 'particularly congenial to an ecologically informed environmental ethics' (p.25). Whether it is, or not, depends on other-things, such as the sort of interpretation of quantum theory, the congeniality of that with ecology. No doubt values in nature without values is excluded under the Copenhagen interpretation, so is much else that makes good sense. Fortunately there are congenial alternatives. REFERENCES P.R.H. Forrest, Speculation and Experience the New Metaphysics, Inaugural Public Lecture, University of New England, N.S.W., 1987. J.B. Callicott, 'Ralston's Environmental Ethics: A critical celbration', critical response at APA, Oakland, March 1989. R. Sylvan, Deep Plurallism, Australian National University, Research School of Social Science, 1993. green. OUt there are only ....... waves... . The greenness is projected, more factural in my head and apparently hung on the tree'. What a ridiculous idea. ' ,,. ON THE VALUE CORE OF DEEP-GREEN THEORY This essay aims to uncover the value theory of deep-green theory, exposing thereby a central area of that theory. Though the value theory is (inevitably) abstract, it issues in what is more concrete, such as an applicable system and practical ecological directives, potentially destabilizing for prevailing policies and institutions. Deep-green theory which stands in significant ideological opposition to dominant industrial ways, is intended to supply a comprehensive alternative environmental philosophy. At the core of deep-green theory lies a value theory. A fundamental theme thereof, part of what makes the structure deep, is that a range of environmental items are valuable in themselves, directly and irreducibly so, so that their value does not somehow reduce to or emerge from something else, such as features of certain valuers or what matters for them. Thus value does not answer back in some way to humans, or sentient creatures (or other value-responsive classes), their interests, uses, preferences, or such like. Many natural items, such as forests and rivers, mountains and seashores, are intrinsically valuable. They are valuable in their own right - irrespective of whether they are interesting or useful (to any intentional operators, themselves interesting or useful or not), indeed whether or not there exist any valuers. Value spreads through and reaches across the natural domain; it is not bounded by mind, or linkages with subjective states; nor does it stop with sentience, or associated pyschological features like satisfaction; nor does it end at life; it observes no such compromising bounds. Although value is distributed richly if irregularly throughout nature, it is not then encapsulated in some isolable natural feature, such as life or sentience, or even in defeasible ecological values such as richness, diversity and variety (and so open to a different, naturalistic, reduction). But of course such ecologically important features afford criteria for value, and should be represented in recipes (such as "objective functions") for assessing overall value. From the presence of natural things of value, and accordingly of natural values, it is a short, though controversial, step to the important conclusion that there can be values without valuers. For valuers are sentient creatures with appropriate capacities, but things of value may precede and succeed all such valuers; that is, these things can persist, their values intact, without any valuers. As there can be shapes without any shape.:.perceivers, so there can be values without valuers. (The theme, like others advanced, can be backed up by more detailed argument and by formal proof, neither attempted here.) In valuational relations then, which relate valuers as subjects with values as objects, both ends of relations have independent standing; though interrelated, as the descriptions are deliberately chosen to suggest, either can stand without the other. It is a fashionable mistake to try to collapse this relation - usually to endeavour to soak up values into a modification of valuing subjects (e.g. as a predicate 'relation-to-values', in which inconvenierZt values are locked away). The mistaken procedure is in fact just one important example of an archetypal modern reduction of relations to functions; other examples, locking undesired objects away within functions, are those rendering wholes (such as ecosystems and organised structures) functions of their parts, and, under functionalism, minds and types of intentionality, including value-direction, as functions of bodies or their parts such as brains. Values are not, and do not disappear into, functions of valuers. A connected corollary is that values are not apart from the actual world, something "projected" or imposed on it by a favoured class of valuers, something colouring (and even emotionally clouding) the otherwise valueless physical world, in rather the way that reductionistic materialism tries (erroneously) to construe colour itself as projected onto a colourless physical world. Of course this projection effort, never adequately explicated, does not succeed, on its own, in removing values. For they remain, left as some function of the valuers. To try to bulldoze through this difficulty, a second reduction is invoked, of evaluative features of valuers to "natural" features, commonly preferences, consumer desires or such like. The second reduction runs into obstacles that halt even the naturalistic bulldozers (e.g. naturalistic and related fallacies), but the first reduction is the critical one in removing key environmental values, such as those of wilderness and wild things, which become valuable only in the focus of certain sentient beholders, and not in and for themselves. This reduction too is blocked by insuperable difficulties. On the one side, like the parallel proposed phenomenalist reduction of material objects to sensations, the reduction never achieves satisfactory support or even a satisfactory statement. On the other, it is counterexampled by various modellings or thought-experiments revealing intuitively-assessed value in situations devoid of valuers (as e.g. in the well-known Last Person argument). Values remain then part of the still rich actual world; they are objects in the domain of actual and other worlds. But they are not of course material objects; creatures will not fall over them any more than they will trip over shadows or mere shapes. Value, like shape, is an attribute, which things have or may lack, and which furthermore creatures can recognise or may fail to discern. Thus value is, like shape and colour and their determinate forms (round, red, etc), a universal , distributed across things, individuals and wholes. The comparison of value with shape is decidedly more helpful than the regular, but exhausted, comparison of value with colour, or of goodness with colour determinates such as yellow. For example, shape is not bound by a set of determinates as colour is in the specific colours, but comes in a spectacular variety of forms, not totally or linearly ordered (as in a rainbow), or contracted to some primary set (as in colour triangles); shape which pertains to wholes as well as particulars, links with gestalts better than colour; shape discrimination is more culture dependent and sensitive; yet shape is, or was, a primary property, and thereby more immune to reductionist strategies thJn secondary properties such as colour. Again shapes like values, can be vague, indeterminate; that does not prevent things, perhaps unique things, exemplifying them. But naturally the analogy can only be extended so far. Shapes can be approximated by polygons, values cannot; shapes are regularly perceived through sense perception, by vision or touch especially, values are not, but are differently apprised. Value is its own thing, not something else; it is what it is and does what is does; it is not something else, like some quantitative mathematical or economic function. Nor does it contract into some mark of value, or to what it comes down to in highly restricted settings; most important, it does not disappear in the style of modern economics into (expected) utility, or into just two economic forms, value-in-use monetarily and value-in-exchange (price), neither of which may reflect worth. Value means what it means, and has meant: worth ; and it ties with general assessments of merit and demerit, goodness or badness, not an economic or other truncation thereof. The powerful drive to reduce or deny values has several sources. Part of the motivation for reduction of value springs from epistemological worries, concerning how values can be ascertained and known, so far as they are (subjective translation proposals are then a direct evaluative counterpart of phenomenalism). Part derives from supposedly problematic cultural relativity (whence the attempt to impose values by identification of value with some favoured assessible feature, and with it cultural or economic imperialism). Part of the motivation comes from more sweeping ideological commitments, such as varieties of materialism or scientism, which leave no space for immaterial values. As already apparent, attempted reductions of value come in a dazzling variety of forms • subjective, which make use of psychological features, such as desires, interests, emotions, and the like; or more objective aggregations of these, such as community preferences or utility; or objectively naturalistic, which enrol single track value-making characteristics such as richness or evolutionary development as value; • consequential, which consider only outcomes; or purely motivational, which consider only attitudes and ignore leads and outcomes; • straightforward, as in translation proposals for translating value judgements into reducing statements; or oblique, as in supervenience propositions (no variations in value without underwriting variations in reducing features); or obscure, as in unarticulated projection claims. Values are not well accommodated within these reductionistic schemes, or accommodated at all. Deep-green value theory, which is thoroughly nonreductive, repudiates all these reductionistic options. They are not so difficult to avoid, as the options are neither exhaustive nor exclusive. In particular, value reduces neither in subjective nor objective fashion; it does not reduce. Evaluative judgements are nonjective, that is, neither subjective nor objective (in any absolutist 4 fashion). Obversely, evaluation of an act does not reduce to assessing consequences; nor does it come down to an assessment of motives; both may matter. The virulent idea is abroad however that science can offer a reduction, can sweep up value along with all other information, where philosophy has conspicuously failed. Unfortunately for such optimistic ideas, fortunately perhaps for deeper thought, current basic science does not have much to say at all, or of merit, about values, and if it did reductions through it would be circular. But, to the contrary, there is a long-standing pretence that science gets along "well" without values, in appropriate value-free fashion. Nowadays it is increasingly realised that the positivistic assumption of such value-freedom is a myth, that much of what passes as science is heavily value-penetrated. While the residual ideal of pure engagement in pure science may offer the illusion of an escape from value, there is no escape. For, in any case, reductions do not succeed, as a copious literature, littered with failed attempts, meanderingly establishes. Nor are they generally desirable, since mostly shallow, aiming at a reduction to features of some privileged class presented as ideal (i.e. core value is covertly assumed, so there is no real reduction). Nor are they needed; explanation and assessment do not require reduction. Evaluations may be arrived at, and value frameworks expanded, by enhancement methods, which organise and expand emotional presentation by coherence methods. The enhancement methodology in fact resembles that sometimes proposed for further acquisition of scientific information. As accumulated empirical information can be further extended through presentational input and assessment for overall coherence, so further evaluations may be arrived at and assessed through a combination of presentational and coherence procedures. At the (marginal) stage where the next round of evaluations is undertaken, the following active ingredients figure, in an idealised breakdown:- Firstly, a background stock of judgements and value experience will have been accumulated or inherited; in principle all of this is revisable, and some may be up for reassessment. Apart from the background, which enters in assessing overall coherence of system, what is involved is, secondly, emotional presentation, which corresponds to further perceptional and sense data input, and, thirdly and not independent, coherence processing, which supplies the interpretational and rationalisational components. At bottom, parallelling perception in the case of empirical information, is emotional presentation, gut or visceral reaction in starker forms of acceptance or rejection, but more generally comprehending a variety of sentiments, including overall well-being, and also relational impressions, such as empathy, identification, and so on. As a perceiver perceives shapes, so a valuer feels raw value and disvalue. The basis of perception is sensation, the basis of valuation is emotion. Apprehension of value is seated in emotional, and especially visceral, presentation; but what is apprehended is not to be confused with its apprehension any more than what is perceived. All the warnings about sensation as an information source have to be repeat~d, with heavy emphasis, as regards emotional presentation; for example, reliability cannot be guaranteed, interference with presentation through drugs, alcohol, temporary excitement or other inputs may render it dubious or unacceptable, conditioning may have occurred, including substantial cultural conditioning (so that a person is terrified by harmless spiders but not sickened by bloody massacres of dolphins or seals). As with perception, there are checks on emotional presentation, such as constancy over time and after reflection. Emotional presentation, supplying primarily inclusions and exclusions or prohibitions, is but the basis of reflective evaluation and value apprehension. The further critical part, coherence processing, builds on the basis taking account of other inputs or controls including background (which supplies relevant components of already adopted judgements, assimilated subculture and so forth) and constraints (such as moral substitutional requirements like impartiality, e.g. whether considered judgements hold for substitute valuers, and uniformity, e.g. whether similar acts are judged in similar ways). Essentially, the coherence procedure consists in asking whether the next or a relevant judgement fits together with what has been accepted, while meeting constraints, without leading to what has been rejected or excluded. If it does fit it is added to the included side, otherwise it is sent to the excluded side. Because an aim of this rationalisation procedure is achievement of some sort of equilibrium such coherence procedures have gained currency under the rubric "reflective equilibrium". Observe, however, that equilibrium reached at some stage may be lost as new types of problems arise and further information enters. No doubt the whole methodology (like the parallel methodology of an empirically-based coherence theory of truth) is highly idealised, and only practicably applicable in rudimentary parts. It does however surmount a major theoretical obstacle for environmental value theory; it reveals how in principle a nonreductionistic value theory can function, and deliver a tenable value system. Whether what results is however an appropriate deep environmental system will depend above all on the presentational input, the extent to which environmental sensitivity enters and is not suppressed. Enhancement methods reveal too that value systems are not uniquely determined, any more than other comprehensive theoretical frameworks. There evidently are rival value systems measuring up to rigorous rationality requirements, much as there are rival logics and rival physical and biological systems. In particular chauvinistic systems, narrow or shallow value systems, which are unresponsive to and take no account of environmental items and values, cannot be excluded on rational or straight logical grounds. Unfortunately such systems remain in ascendancy, and tend to dominate social and political practice; in recent times economism, a narrow type of utilitarianism, has all too obviously dominated much terrestial practice. While such value frameworks are open to severe criticism, for instance as chauvinistic, as violating universality requirements of morality in the case of economism, they do not succumb to definitive refutatiog (for the reason that requirements of morality, universalizability of principle, impartiality and so on, can simply be repudiated; immoral or amoral frameworks are still value systems). Even so, much can be done to shift or alter values, though as usual effectiveness cannot be guaranteed. A range of argumentative, educational and persuasive techniques, of varying quality, can be put to work to move valuers indoctrinated in old damaging structures, often enough successfully. Important among these are positive presentations of environments, their habitats and creatures, by way of new information and experience. The availability of rival value systems, while it implies a certain desirable (and also troublesome) pluralism, does not mean relativism. From a deep-green viewpoint, rival narrower and shallower systems are definitely inferior, and criticised accordingly, while economism is an anathema which does not even make the moral grade (e.g. too many principles stop at class or state boundaries). However a critical pluralism does acknowledge and offer a place in the wider scheme of things for other systems, even if as less favoured or satisfactory. One political upshot is evident; deep-green theory promotes, what matters in these irrational times of numbers, alliances - in particular, a green alliance, organising green positions, against prevailing forces of environmental degradation. The systematic pluralism of deep-green value theory interpenetrates not only social and political domains above, but also metaphysics traditionally placed below. In the underlying metaphysical pluralism of deep-green theory, value runs very deep - so deep that even truth depends in part upon it. For not merely selection of a correct comprehensive theory or worldview is a value dependent choice, but choice of associated actual world is also. That choice, insofar as it is consciously made, of world structure and conceptualisation, is a constrained choice, constrained by informational inputs, such as those of refined perception. But inasmuch as it is rationally accomplished, that choice, like other choices of structure, proceeds according to a standard value-information analysis (regularly oversimplified however to a preferenceinformation or even desire-belief modelling); that is, to extract the salient point, it involves value essentially. Truth and value are then intertwined; truth, though naturally different from value, is value dependent. Both are plural, and differently so. So, unremarkably deep-green metaphysics resembles the value theory in significant respects. For example, as the value theory is nonreductionistic, so also is the metaphysics; in particular, there is a no-reduction theme that neither parts nor wholes reduce eliminably to one another, as opposed to atomistic and holistic views of environmental interrelations. As the value theory is pluralistic, so also is the metaphysics; in place of established absolutism, a plurality of worlds, with associated truth definitions is discerned. Indeed a main aim of deep-green theory is to dislodge dominant destructive ideologies, which (each of th]m) assume an absolute truth, from their positions thereby providing intellectual living-space for natural environments. Much of deep-green theory devolves then from the abstract value theory. As with the metaphysical way sketched, so it is with the fuller ethical theory, which includes as well as a specific axiological system, elaborating deep environmental values and virtues, a deontic framework, supplying obligations, rights, taboos, and similar. For example, given that a certain wild river is intrinsically valuable, as we can verify by on-site experience and enhancement methods, and given that we duly respect that value, as deontic principles will tell us we should, then we are not free to do as we like with that river, to dam it with concrete, to channel it within concrete, stripping it of its riverine ecosystems. But that does not preclude respectful use of the river, swimming or sailing quietly in its waters, and the like. Value thus guides action, practice, and use; it is the ground also upon which principles are formulated, principles that are assessed and validated by way of enhancement methods. Important among these are non-interference principles, which exclude unwarranted interference with other preference-havers and unwarranted damage, ill-treatment, or devaluation of items of value. Such deontic principles circumscribe environmentally-limited freedom of action. Given noninterference principles, a major shift in onus of proof from homocentricethics takes place. What is required now is that reasons be givenfor interfering with the environment, rather than reasons for not doing so. Also direct responsibility for environmental interference or modification falls upon those who would seriously interfere or significantly modify, who would tread heavily on the land. Non-interference does not preclude use - only too much use and use of too much. What it does lead to is the theme that, where use occurs, it should be careful and respectful use. An important respect thesis regarding environmental items is founded on such non-interference principles and the no-reduction theme: namely, • not to put others (other preference havers) into a dispreferred state for no good reason; • not to jeopardise the well-being of natural objects or systems without good reason; • not to damage or destroy items which, while they cannot literally be put into a dispreferred state, can be damaged or destroyed or have their value eroded or impaired. These apply to ecosystems, their surrounds, their parts, and so on. The mere making of further excess profits, or similar economic excuses, are not good reasons. Such a respect thesis forms part of the ecological outlook of deep-green theory. Deep-green ethical theory amounts to much more than just another non-reductionist ethical theory, which highlights ecological values and virtues, and so forth. It changes the character and shape of ethical enterprise. Perhaps most strikingly, it removes humans as such from the centre of the ethical stage (or :xclusive occupation of the stage). The biological concept of being human ceases to be a significant ethical category. To elevate it to such is to fall into human chauvinism, a type of class chauvinism which unwarrantedly discriminates in favour of the human species. The prevailing chauvinism is not inevitable; it is very logically avoided by directly connecting ethical characteristics with the categories of items that can have them. Relevant categories include those marked out by features like: having well-being, preference-having, rights-holding, contractual-capability, and so on, categories not necessarily connected with any particular species. Hitherto virtually all Western ethical theories, and the institutional arrangements they help support, have not merely limited ethical matters to interhuman affairs, but have been blatantly chauvinistic, exhibiting substantial and unjustifiable discrimination in favour of humans (or certain privileged humans). Deep-green theory thus implies the inadequacy of prevailing social, political and economic arrangements and institutions. These structures are the defective products of inferior value frameworks which take quite insufficient account of environmental desiderata and values. Richard Sylvan* RMB 683 Bungendore NSW 2621 * Thanks to David Bennett for comments on an earlier draft. For more on deep-green theory, see essays in and work referred to in the Green Series, i.e. Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, RSSS, Australian National University, Canberra. This compressed essay was solicited by and written for Island Magazine (Tasmania). 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Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14a9695">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:14a9695</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University Office - Typing Table at End of Desk Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 16: Green Projects in Progress https://www.antipodean-antinuclearism.org/files/original/a603a32bcffb437ca1dd4fad4f934d13.pdf 7072bb701d0ea4422e4c861df9571694 PDF Text Text page PREFACE Part 1 ill ECOLOGICA L ETHICS & ECOLOGICA L POLITICS: TURNING JOHN MCCLOSKE Y'S CHALLENGE i Conservative, reformative and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics 1 ii A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism 3 iii On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics especially that deep-green upstart 8 iv Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics 12 V Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems 19 vi Population impact: the fact of human consumption 21 vii On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations 24 viii On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof ix Part 2 Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology 26 31 A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WEST DEEP ECOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO w ARWICK Fox's RESPONSE TO AN EARLIER CRITIQUE. i Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism 39 ii Value in deep ecology 42 iii The extent of values-in-nature 46 iv A biocentric ethic? 49 V Biospheric egalitarianism revisted 51 vi The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned environmental axiological route 53 vii The 'case' against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach viii Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification ix Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil 57 62 65 �11 X Deconstruction and reselection of self 68 xi More troubles with Self as foundation 73 xii Liquidating Fox's 'deep ecological territory 75 xiii Justifying 'extreme interpretations' of and 'extreme reactions' to wild West deep ecology 77 xiv Transpersonal logic and methodology 82 xv More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science 86 Part 3 ANOTHER 'REFUTATION' OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: JANNA THOMPSON'S CRITICISMS i The newer destructive phase: overtaxing requirements for (environmental) ethics 94 ii Satisfying duly modified requirements, environmentally 98 iii The former constructive phase: a new anthropocentric environmental ethic? 105 �PART 1. CRITICAL EXPOSITION Chapter 1. AT THE PYRAMIDS' JUNCTION. THE BASICS AND CREED OF DEEP ECOLOGY Deep ecology in both a movement and an ideological position. Thus in significant respects it resembles a new religion, which has a creed as well as an organisational structure, practices and so on; a political party, which has a platform as well as organisation, objective and so forth; and an intellectual school, which aim to propagate a philosophy, gain converts and adherents, etc. Like a religion in a literate society, there is a set of texts, DE texts as we shall call them, which present elements of the faith: doctrine, themes, parables, heroic figures, warnings, and so on. The DE texts have not so far been arranged into any authoritative form. Although the movement may have come first, and the theory been but gradually extracted (the historical and pseudo-sociological impression given by the DE texts), it makes for neater characterisation and easier exposition to consider the theoretical structure J first. The very looselyknit movement, subsequently considered, essentially the genuine environment movement (excluding those just in it for human ends), is in any case clustered around this structure - as older cities are around their centre. The theoretical structure is itself conveniently organised in the following (double) pyramidal diagram (now called by Naess, who devised it, "the Apron"):- �Diagram 1. Basic Double Pyramid LEVELS UPPER (INVERTED) PYRAMID C B p 1. Sources, or ultimate bases 2.Core Principles DE PLATFORM R E E D REGULAR PRACTICE PARTICULAR PRACTICES POLICIES LIFESTYLES 3. General themes & norms 4. Particular norms and concrete decisions LOWER (COMPLEX) PYRAMID The theoretical centre of DE is to be found at level 2, where the upper and lower pyramid join. The various sources of the central part, such doctrines as those of Buddhism (B) and Christianity (C) and of philosophic cast (P) at level 1, are not usually a part of DE at all. But there is a preferred philosophical source, ecosophy - another theory elaborated by N aess, who again coined the term which does enjoy a closer connection with DE, and is sometimes considered almost part of it. Levels 3 and 4, which are supposed to derive from the central creed, and in turn inductively inform it, are parts of DE, but less central parts, parts of the varying practice. It is level 2 then that is crucial for �understanding DE. While the upper pyramid givgs the theoretical or intellectual content and sources of DE, the lower pyramid supplies working DE, and core principles and the practice. 1. The Central level, level 2, and the standard DE platforms Deep Ecology is structured around level 2, the central operational level. The main distinctive principles of DE are set on level 2, the platform level. These principles may be grouped as shown in the following diagram:CREED LEVEL2 BASIC CREED wider platform 8 point platform further and more peripheral principles The reason for distinguishing the 8-point platform from the wider platform is simple this:- The 8point platform, as variously presented in DE texts, omits some of the standard articles of the core DE position, and fails to develop others. 1 There is accordingly a real point in distinguishing "the" platform from the more comprehensive and better rounded core or creed. DE is a decidedly vague object, with vague parts. Perhaps the most definite things about it are its 8-point platform and its diametric opposition to features of the mainstream Western ideology, and dominant social paradigm as it otherwise known. The core position is something discerned from the DE texts, in much the way the platform is. But whereas the 8 point platform is explicitly presented, though in different and incompatible terms, the core has to be winnowed and from an array of more peripheral material (as is shown in part II). �Box 1 The 8-point platform, in capsule form. 2 I. Both non-human and human life have intrinsic value: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intrinsic value, inherent value, etc. These value are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues: Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation themselves these values and are also values in of 3. Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues: Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4. Human interference with natural world excessive: Present human interference with the and the situation is rapidly worsening. non-human world is excessive 5. Policies and basic structures must be changed: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures. 6. Human (values compatible with) population decrease: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. decrease of the human 7. Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living: The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness. 8. Obligation to attempt implementation: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes. 2 The 8-point platform is perhaps the most repeated exhibit in the DE texts. The present formulation adopts the presentation of Naess in Resorg ; the brief formulation on the left does not occur in Naess. A slightly different formulation of the platform under heading 'Basic Principles' is given in DS p.70. �The principles have been rendered, and grJuped, to make their structure and interconnections a little clearer. Principles / and 2 concern intrinsic values; principles 3-7 concern human practices and policies. Principle 5 elaborates in principle 3; principle 6 draws the policy consequence of this. The most important of the general policy changes is listed in principle 4; but another crucial policy change is indicated in principle 7: decreased production and consumption. The prime terrestrial policy objectives (that should have obtained separate listing) can in fact be derived from the impact formula: roughly, human environmental impact = human population x personal consumption x available technology. Reducing excessive interference thus requires at least some of, and no doubt all of, human population reduction, consumption reduction, and appropriate technology improvements. Finally, principle 8 supplies a commitment principle. Observe that some of the principles of this 8-point platform, 8-point principles as we may conveniently call them, provide linkages with other levels of the DE pyramid. For example most of the principles, principles 3-7 especially, have implication for policy at level 3, and thence for day-to-day practice at level 4. 8-point principle 8 has direct application to level 4, individual lifestyles. Before the incomplete 8-point platform was devised (as part of a political conciliation and unification attempt), DE was rather differently characterised: primarily through listing of principles countering assumptions of the conventional socioeconomic wisdom, resistance principles. Indeed, in many respects DE is marked out through reaction and resistance: by its opposition the prevailing ideology of industrial society, especially by those elements of it that have lead to the assault on the natural environment, but also by elements that have led to breakdown of connected features of the social fabric. It gives a clearer picture of what DE is about if we tabulate are principles in opposition to those of the dominant Western ideology (or social paradigm), and as compared with those of shallow or reform environmentalism: �TABLE 2 DE PRINCIPLES AS CONTRASTED, ON THE ONE SIDE, WITH THOSE OF THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND SHALLOW ECOLOGY, ON OTHER, WITH ONE OF ITS SOURCES, TAOISM. DOMINANT SHALLOW (WESTERN) ECOLOGY DEEP ECOLOGY TAOISM (DE) PARADIGM (DE) Domination over nature Stewardship of Nature Nature an exploitable resource: intrinsic value confined to As for, but with nature a manager resource Natural environment valued for itself Human supremacy Human ascendency Biocentric egalitarianism Harmony with Nature Elaboration of DE Much as for DE; ''humanism'' rejected Differs from DE; wide impartiality Ample resources substitutes Some resource limitations Earth supplies limited Supplies Material economic growth a predominant goal Sustainable development Non-material goods especially self-realization Following Tao-te Consumerism Optimised consumerism Doing with enough/ recycling Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Competitive lifestyle As for DP Cooperative lifeway Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity Centralised/urbancentred/national focus As for DP Decentralized/ bioregional/ neighborhood focus As for DE Largely as for DP Non-hierarchical/ Grassroots democracy Hierarchy without structure More careful high technology Appropriate technology Limited technology Power structure hierarchical High technology ample Power �7 Shallow ecology, or reform environmentalism as it can to be called3 , differs from the dominant paradigm primarily in its emphasis on stewardship, on long-term management, on sustainable development. DE, while it reacts against the dominant paradigm primarily on environmental grounds, stands opposed to shallow ecology, which it correctly sees as not going nearly far enough, in particular to satisfy genuine environmental values. Of course the dominant paradigm resisted is not itself a uniform or static position; some of the in determining of DE flows from this very feature. For example, until very recently DP used to support dominance as a throughgoing feature: not just over Nature, but of the male, white, Western, Protestant, rich, powerful, free, adult, etc., over their opposites. Domination of the latter sorts, within the human species, is, for the most part, no longer a part of the progressive ideology, having been gradually shed over the last century; but such domination still remains part of much practice (as well as of cultural ideologies). Some of the most distinctive, and most controversial, principles of DE, are omitted from the 8-point platform, as is evident from the opposition/resistance principles. These include the principles regularly, and pontifically, claimed to distinguish deep ecology. Moreover without these further principles, DE amount to nothing more than a slightly less shallow environmental position (indeed apart from principle 1 and perhaps 2, all the principles of the 8-point platform can be adopted by reform environmentalism and in fact often are enough espoused therefor). These additional principles, part of the wider platform (and the creed) include these:9. Biospheric egalitarianism [in principle]: 'all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom'. The principle is presented in this unqualified form (in DS) as one of the two ultimate norms, the other being self-realisation. Fir fact Devall and Sessions proceed to tack on a self-realisation component to this principle, of biocentric equality as they call it: namely 'and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation with the larger Selfrealisation' (DS p.67). But, they immediately add, the 'basic intuition is that all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth' (p.67, continuing, italics added). This italicised value-formulation is straightforward, and has the advantage of moving rights out of the formulation (No doubt, if equal intrinsic value guarantees an equal right to live and blossom, it yields the "equal rights to" formulation.) But it encounters immediate difficulties, because in the process of continuing to live and blossom some organisms interfere with others, for instance through basic demands for food and shelter, most conspicuously in predation. To try to escape these difficulties, Naess at least regularly adds the rider: in principle . 'Naess suggests that biocentric equality as an intuition is true in principle, 3 For example in D & S. The alternative, shallow ecology, was set aside because of the negative conditions of the word 'shallow'. �8 although in the process of living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc.' (DS p.67). 10. Self-realisation . This involves the realisation - growth, development and maturity - of the self, becoming a whole and full person, but not merely in isolation or in a social setting as in older models of self-realisation, but within a biospheric setting, taking due account of other forms of life. It 'can be summarised symbolically as the realisation of "self-in-Self' where "Self' stands for organic wholeness' (DS p.67). Intimately linked with self-realisation in this wider ecological sense is the next principle. 11 Biospheric identification . The procedure, again a personal one, consists in suitably identifying with parts or wholes of the larger surrounding biosphere. The underlying notion here is one of partial identity, sharing certain salient features with, which permits a qualified substitutivity of an imaginative person into the position of another creature, ecoobject or ecosystem. Such "identification" is a significant method of heightening 12. Ecological consciousness . Less grandiosely this covers environmental awareness, appreciation, and concern, and thus responsiveness to environmental depredation. Engendering ecological consciousness is regarded as a crucial part of spreading the deep ecological message. 13. Holism. On DE precepts, this amounts to more than the modem holism according to which there are nonadditive wholes, wholes or objects which amount to more than the sums of their parts. But as to what else holism demands, there is some disagreement within deep ecological circles. 2. Further principles of the DE creed and important optional extras Beyond the standard platform there are further principles, not enunciated at all, or until very recently, or else more peripheral. Some of the further themes help in deciding what clarity DE had; that is one reason why they presumably do not feature in the 8-point platform. Among the principles not enunciated are these:• Non violence. The new themes, several of them periphical to the main concerns of DE include the following:• Deep ecology offers a green synthesis. It 'combines the "Social Greens" with the "Natural Greens" avoiding the extremes of both' (Naess R p.6). This is a surprising theme for a position that has itself been regularly castigated as extreme. What N aess means, above all, is that DE does not neglect humans, and their legalerate social concerns and aspirations, in the way that the �9 Natural-greens have been (generally erroneously) accused of doing; nor does it neglect or devalue nature and its features in the way that many social-greens are inclined to do. Among the important optional extras that may be coupled with DE are principles of a more through-going animal liberation, such as:• a severe reduction oforend to the enclavement, confinement and slaughter of animals. • vegetarianism (of some form). Some deep ecologists are vegetarians (e.g. Bennett), some are not (e.g. Drengson), and some are in between (e.g. Naess). Unless they undergo a conversion, Northerness brought up in the hunting-fishing-shooting tradition eschew these optimal principles. But evidently there is a tension here; there is pressure coming from other principles, especially nonviolence, to limit sharply slaughter of other creatures. 3. The creed, the basic creed, and the movement. Like many a religious creed, the DE creed is an elaborate concoction (as well as a dubious and rather arbitrary one). Adoption of it, knowledge of it even, cannot be expected of all adherents, especially given its features: its vagueness, its inaccessibility, and so on. It is not surprising that, again like many another creed or ideology, many of the faithful do not know too well what it comprises, still less do many of the fellow-travellers (and DE has many). The most that can perhaps be expected of adherents is adoption of some simpler creed, a basic creed more or less in the vicinity of the 8-point platform. But it is apparent from DE texts that not even all of that platform is demanded: enough will do, especially if other DE principles are adopted. The platform represents 'what most supporters have in common at a deep level' 4 No doubt supporters who eschew part of the platform compensate by adherence instead of other DE principles or practice. Hence the depiction of the basic creed in diagram 2. A basic creed comprises enough of the 8-point platform plus enough other principles at least to compensate for omissions. But not even a basic creed is always demanded. At its most generous and laxest, the DE movement includes everyone who professes a concern for some part of the natural environment and does not demolish a manifestation of concern or interest by blatantly anti-environmental activity or involvement therewith. Inclusion in the movement does not even require strict adoption of, or adherence to the DE platform, though it involves some vague recognition of parts of it. Talk of membership of the movement would be somewhat inapposite; there is no paid-up or recorded membership (or even rewarding as would be done in a voting system). 4 Naess R p.3, italics added. �10 It is sometimes said that the DE movement was born in Europe and adopted elsewhere, US and Australia especially. But such a claim confuses the movement with quasi-sociological extraction of the principles involved and the platform assembling them. The movement itself emerged as a late 1960's affair, substantially under way before it was reported upon and labelled (as usual, academics, like politicians, reacted to, rather than led, more popular movements). Such a movement involves some "mass" of people; it must therefore be anticipated by some smaller groups and likely some initiating individuals. So it was with the DE movement. There were prominent individuals in several countries where environmental groups with deep leanings formed or operated, in the 60s and before; and before that there were many isolated individuals. In USA, where the DE movement no doubt grew to substance first, before that in Europe or Australia, there is a significant chain of deep ecologists, or rather deep ecological thinkers, reaching back to the beginning of the century and perhaps into the previous century; for instance, in reverse temporal order, Carson, Leopold, Muir, perhaps Thoreau. 5 Muir is regularly alluded to as an early deep ecologist by Americans. 6 There are deeper-seated motives for vagueness about the basic creed and uncertainty about the basic requirements to be deep ecologist and who makes the hororific status. One is a dislike of criticism, and resulting vacillation among the high bishops of DE as to what extent critics, and those who declare themselves not to be deep ecologists, should be included in the fold, and consequently as to who exactly is a deep ecologist. (From outside the issue can look rather trivial, but gangs are gangs whether ecological or more generally not..) A main reason for the omission of central doctrines of DE from the 8-point platform is of course related: the desire to increase the flock, to turn away no-one who might be decently admitted. 7 Another motive, linked also with trying to enlist support, in order to mobilize democratic forces and like people power, concerns the pluralistic drive that is an important aspect of authentric DE. It concerns the insertion of pluralistic elements within level 2 itself (rather than confining these elements to other levels, where there are conspicuous, as later exposition will show). As Naess explains the idea 5 6 7 In Australia there were, in reverse order, Dunply, Griffin, Stead; there were of course many others with very considerable environmental concerns (e.g. Ratcliffe), who apparently lacked however the requisite feature of depth, and world count only as reform environmentalistser conservationists. But, quite evidently, there are serious problems in discerning whether some environmentalist or other is deep (there is generally only indirect evidence, as the category was not clearly recognised). The issue as to whether some deep environmentalist is a (prota)-deep ecologist is even more vexed because of the muddiness of DE. It is important to observe that little reliance can be placed, in such issues, on standard and applauded histories, such as Nash's Wilderness and the America Mind, because these are written from a shallow perspective and fail to realise the significance of depth; See further Devall's report on Nash's third edition, Ecorotes, pp23-9. See, for instance, Devall Ecorates. Devall also suggests that St. Francis is a deep ecologist, but given what is now known about St. Francis there is room for considerable doubt. Or othersie admitted. But may be excluded by ignored or incompetance, or deterred by qualms about significent propositions (human populations restraint esp.). �11 is avoid the 'devastating' 'tendency to dogmatism': 'there is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite one kind of green society'. Likewise there is no definite or definitive basic creed. For many purposes this does not matter; we can still normally assert such and such, so and so, definitely deep ecological, such and such, so and so, is definitely not. In an attempt to evade criticism, DE is nowadays sometimes represented as a grass-roots movement, one but loosely associated with philosophical views 8 But such movements have intellectually-shaped objectives, offer at least a set of slogans and elementary principles. And DE is this and more; it verges on the dishonest to try to portray DE as such a movement, when in large measure it is the work of intellectuals, initiated by reporting, rather inaccurately it seems, on the supposed attitudes of field ecologists and like workers - hardly typical grass-roots people. 8 In a different respect, in term of moral of ideas and change of themes, DE is no doubt a movement. It has moved (and with Fox shedding critical principles, it continues moving). Such movement is not good for the types of virtues that stable positions may acquire, such a replenity, reliability, assessibility etc; but it does make life difficult for critics. �PART II CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY Chapter 5. THE INITIAL PROBLEM: WHAT ON EARTH IS DEEP ECOLOGY? WHO IS AND ISN'T A DEEP ECOLOGIST? Deep ecology appears , on a preliminary reading, to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves, value sometimes exceeding that of or had by humans. So much appears to follow from the first part of the 8-point platform. But even this much is denied by some of the never philosophers (e.g. Fox). Moreover which elaboration is quite another matter, and decidedly controversial. Indeed DE has not just been rapidly converted (in part through overuse) into a conceptual bog, but is well on the way to becoming all things to all interested parties. This is undoubtedly a drawback; it makes communication, and theoretical and persuasive use of the notion, that much more difficult though it does not condemn an afflicted notion, such as deep ecology undoubtedly is, out of hand. For several important and fruitful notions, which have survived, have encountered very much of this sort of problem - force, mind, energy, differential, infinitesimal, to take some older examples, paradigm and culture to take relevant recent examples.O On the other hand, many notions no more afflicted than deep ecology, such as societism, timocracy and ungrund, have been assigned to the historical scrap-heap. These include the sort of neo-Hegelian panpsychism which deep ecology of the American texts will tum out to resemble. What is evidence of conceptual murkiness and degeneration? The trouble begins with the very introduction of the terminology. Naess, - when first setting down in one preliminary codification what was already in the air,* wrote only of the 'Deep Ecology movement' and set down what he has subsequently described as a 'Deep Ecology platform'. The suggested notion of deep ecology, the underlying notion that informed the loosely-knit and open-ended movement and platform, was not extracted; that subtraction task fell primarily to West Coast American intellectuals, and it was done differently by different proponents of deep ecology. The trouble was accentuated through rapid evolution of the notion. Thus Naess's account of the movement in 0 * In case it is supposed this sort of conceptual muddiness is limited to less exact science, consider such recent notions as anthropic principle, from physics, and nonmonotonic logic, from computer science. See Naess 73, p.98ff. While slogans and preliminary formulations are fine, particularly in campaigns, philosophy cannot rest at the level of slogans or platforms, as too much of DE continues to do. �2 1983 is significantly different from the account he outlined in 1973; seven principles are replaced by six different themes, only two or so of which have much in common with the original principles. t Although DE is introduced in the 8-point platform as a value theory, basically concerned with environmental values 1 , it has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and as primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (pantheistic) religion. Popular Australian sources will begin to indicate some of the spread. The Deep Ecologist , a network newsletter, sees deep ecology as metaphysical at base, as part of a natural philosophy of humans' place in nature (though many of its correspondents see it as a matter of deep experiences , often of a religious cast, too often decidedly anthropocentric, obtained in or through Nature). According to its manifesto, carried in each issue on its title page, Deep ecology is the search for a sustaining metaphysics of the environment; it represents "a deep understanding of our unity with other beings and livings processes" (Drengson); it is biocentric, not anthropocentric. Though we shall come to modify or reject this manifesto phrase by phrase (deep ecology is not a search, but on one level a position or theory, on another a movement; sustaining should concern the environment, not the metaphysics; depth lies elsewhere than understanding; unity too is a metaphor for integration; biocentric is misleadingly restrictive), the present enterprise, illustrating the degenerative spread of deep ecology, is different. Let us hasten on to the strikingly different explanation John Seed prefers in introducing and advertising his anthology Deep Ecology 2 , a person - and consciousness-oriented souffle (drawn from Devall): "What I call deep ecology ... is premised on a gestalt of person-in-nature [an image Naess had rejected at the very outset of the enterprise 3]. The person is not above or outside of nature. The person is part of creation on-going. The person cares for and about nature, shows reverence towards and respect for nonhuman nature, loves, and lives with nonhuman nature, is a person in the "earth household" and "lets beings be", lets nonhuman nature follow separate evolutionary destinies. Deep ecology, unlike reform environmentalism, is not just a pragmatic, short-term social movement with a goal like stopping nuclear power or cleaning up the waterways. Deep ecology first attempts to question and present alternatives to conventional ways of thinking in the modern West. Deep ecology understands that some of the "solutions" of reform environmentalism are counter-productive. Deep ecology seeks transformation of values and social organisation. t 2 3 The claim is documented in the Appendix to this chapter. Thus according to Naess (73, p.99), ' ... the significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are clearly and forcefully normative . They express a value priority system ... '. But even this core claim is now challenged, by Fox, who sees the primary focus of deep ecology as ontological and not evaluative. This is one of three different collections with this title which have been circulated or announced recently: see references. See Naess 73, p.95; but Naess's rejection is rejected below. �• 3 Deep ecology is liberating ecological consciousness ... Consciousness is knowing. From the perspective of deep ecology, ecological resistance will naturally flow from and with a developing ecological consciousness (Devall, 'The Deep Ecology Movement'). Again, while informative, much of this will have to be rejected or rectified (for example, the gesalt theme is problematic, and the deep person need do part only of what is specified; shallow or reform ecology need not be short-term, insofar as it may take account of many future generations of humans; it may well not be pragmatic; shallow ecology is better pluralistically combined with deep ecology, as in Naess's original platform, than denigrated; etc.) It is to Bill Devall, more than anyone, that we are indebted for a confusing myriad of formulations of the driving notion, several of them however extending Naess; for instance, deep ecology is first of all deep questioning, deep ecology is ultimately self-realisation and biocentrism, in deep ecology the most important ideas are 'the wholeness and integrity of person/planet together with biological egalitarianism'; it is also however much else - that again we shall come to modify or reject including a new psychology and new philosophical anthropology. 4 But Devall has been much encouraged by George Sessions, and it is Sessions especially who has tried to convert deep ecology into a new religion, with main texts drawn from pantheism, Spinoza and Buddhism. Thus according to Sessions, If the promise of American pantheism and nature mysticism is to be fulfilled, it will occur in the deep ecology social paradigm which is based upon pantheism and the idea of ecological egalitarianism in principle (Ecophilosophy ill). But although Sessions refers immediately to Naess, there is nothing in Naess about American pantheism and nature mysticism. At most Naess would allow that pantheism, along with other comprehensive positions, like Christianity or ecosophy, can be an underlying base for the deep ecology platform. Small wonder that John Passmore (hardly one to be philosophically baffled given his immense experience in comprehending Continental philosophy) goes astray in yet another account, in which he conveniently pushes the shallow-deep contrast into the unsatisfactory conservation/preservation boxes (of his 74): Deep ecophilosophers ... are mainly interested in the preservation of species and wilderness even when preserving them is not immediately and advantageous to human interest. In order to provide intellectual support for such preservation they are prepared to break with traditional Western ethical principles and metaphysical beliefs (Passmore 83). 4 Devall 79, 83; for a synopsis, see Appendix 1, figure 7B. �4 Again, most of this will have to be rectified, since the presentation is decidedly misleading, not to say biassed. As initial explanations of the deep ecological movement straightaway show, and applications reveal, deep ecology has always concerned, and deep ecophilosophers have always been interested in, much else as well, especially in human population levels and human interference, and in quality of life and technological and organisational structures. While this of course requires breaking with some Western traditions - which are in no way sacrosanct Wes tern tradition is far from uniform, and there are other tradition: deep ecology can remain, and is, rooted in tradition, though much about it is as new and fresh as anything of this sort can be. As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most vague ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is broad vague way is how the label often functions, honorific ally. That is, for instance how it functions in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox, as explained below). Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner. 5 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Attending a consciousness - raising weekend, purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way. While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in 5 I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources. �5 several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been subject to much criticism, deserved criticism as will soon appear. But other features of authentic deep ecology have hitherto been left largely untouched, and new features have emerged. So an ongoing critique is needed. Recently 6 , it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. New themes are introduced, older ones withdrawn or whittled away. Even Naess, the finder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the (nonetheless adjustible) platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make apparently large concessions to opposition charges, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the finder-founder, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophets, to create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if doing so can in any way be avoided. But, on the other, there is an evident desire, among the prophers, to make deep ecology a very select position, a place for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments i.e. after an appropriate testing pilgrimage. Deep ecology, however, lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict. There is a considerable lack of discrimination among the pace-setters of the movement over, and marked differences between them as to, who and what is accounted within deep ecology, and some unwarranted discrimination from this exclusive club (e.g. of Rodman). Many of the people classed as within or associated with deep ecology are shallow. And some who are excluded are not. For example, Naess (in 75) presents a long list of people he associates with the movement, many of whom are rather or even entirely shallow in their environmental orientation. Elsewhere (in 83) Naess proceeds to identify with deep ecology several other positions or movements which only overlap it, and which may be substantially shallow (such as green politics and new natural philosophies). Some of the predominantly American lists Devall and Sessions assemble are not so artless. To some extent, this combined discrimination and lack of discrimination again reflects the conceptual murkiness of deep ecology; to some extent it is symptomatic of other oldconsciousness malignancies, both within the notion and as regards its use. 6 Since the first critique was produced �6 Still more damaging to the movement is that several of the advertised prophets of deep ecology verge on the shallow, and some of these have denied DE.7 A striking example is Bookchin who has recently denounced DE, and written ranging declamations much of Bookchin's main, windy, bringin-it-together book, The Ecology of Freedom, said to be a "book of deep ecology" is very far from that; it is yet another, is a celebration of humans in very much the old (enlightenment) style. Insofar as it gets to grips with deeper environmental issues, Bookchin's material amounts to an extension of shallow ecology. 8 Ecologically Bookchin, like other of the prophets, buys into vitalism by way of extended consciousness. Ecological ethics is said to render nature self-conscious; the mechanistic alternative is presented as deadness, thus making an entirely false contrast. Indeed, part of the problem with the selection of prophets, is that mechanism is seen as the main bogy - when it is only one of the forms metaphysically underpinning shallower positions, Cartesian dualism being another - with the result that work that simply attacks mechanism and its variants and also advocates some sort of environmental way, gets accounted deep. N aess has cast the net of deep ecology too wide, catching therewith not only many remote "supporters", but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly the antagonistic Bockchin (RS p.6). Naess now considers the 8-point platform, formulated by himself and Sessions and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology' - though it leaves out what Devall and Sessions assert are the two essential features of DE, biospheric egalitorionism and self-realisation, and though it does not require depth (immediate positions conforming to the platform). Even so Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement have in common ' (letter 23.6.88). Thus the 8-point platform provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the distinguishing platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to an approved minimum of the principles of the distinguished platform (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to that much of the platform. They may not be members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockchin, or Routley, can be an 7 8 See, e.g., B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'The books of deep ecology', Earth First! 4(8) (1984). Several of these books do not penetrate very deep ecologically or otherwise. See especially p.344, with remarks like 'and wherever possible the wildlife they may support on their fringes'. The paragraph portrays a very human-centered (and conquered-land) picture. See also p.342, middle. �7 adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The DE movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the platform, even "more or less". Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or else try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextricably in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who tum out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Also which isolated exceptions does he have in view? With the rise of environmentism, most of the distinguishing platform is no longer demanding; indeed it is deliberately lax with a view to increasing the following. Moreover, none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Plainly adherence to DE, as well as support for DE, could be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A neat strategy, common to ecomonical practice and sociological research, readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague feeling of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that DE would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock). The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' 9 • The reasoning does not hold up. A range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happens. Naess should certainly be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance, 6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of 9 RS p.7. But elsewhere. Naess did go into some detail (e.g. Book). Furthermore, if Naess - old, famous, unorthodox, courageous enough on difficult mountains - doesn't get down to requisite details of structural change, who will? Well, even some rather shallow theorists do. �8 a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by, point 7. 6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology. 6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions. Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principles of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration. Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the lax distinguishing platform itself, which is pretty wishy-washy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clear-cutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of rangelands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. Even deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE creed, though some of the text enjoin it (e.g. DS); but the issue is (no doubt wisely) avoided by leading prophets of DE familiar with the demands of socialism. Yet deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive polluting types of industry that conspicuously contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from all the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, along with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented, terrestrial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as greenhouse effects, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out. The idea of progress is, like that of more industrialisation, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology"). �9 So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select band, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led in the textbook stakes by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey, but recently joined by some Americans Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly far-reaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes immersed in some spread of these problems (though it is still a rather rare professional philosopher that does), and who does not develop some environmental commitments - even if a liberalish social agenda still continues to dominate an environmental one (even so it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interprenetration of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics 10 , tended to become progressively more accommodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental throught, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and has lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the linking of different positions, not their mergence. Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:Example 1. Moral extensionists, both utilitarians and rationalists 11 . Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sentience or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much nonhuman life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured 10 11 Now benchmark of reaction rareness, but itself beginning to exhibit some restlessness and unpass and signs of change. The useful category of moral extensionism derives from Rodman. It is critically examined also in EE. �10 abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, the broad position is really a coherence theory of morality). Example 2. More far-reaching intermediate positions, which do assign intrinsic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some nonindividuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Positions of this sort are delineated (so far in insufficient theoretical detail) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Ralston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extensionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classification of positions). Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in big formulation given above. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by utilitarians, to sentience as unwarranted, unnecessary, unenforceable and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like environmental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Firsters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religio-political quest for a large support base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and the aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which has not gained much ground or good grades academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players, and return to its �11 more radical mission. Academics, after all, form only a tiny minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, on the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults. We have proceeded to cut through the problem of what DE is or may be by formulating a specific version, authentic deep ecology, and by taking explicit account of main alternatives proposed. Authentic deep ecology follows, for the most part, Naess's account of deep ecology. But insistence on authentic deep ecology leaves several casualties, nebulous deep ecologists who prove not to be authentically deep. An important test is offorded through the greater value assumption, and the associated special place reserved for humans in the scheme of things, assent to which serves to expose the inadequate depth of more nebulous 'followers of deep ecology'. For (after proper preparation) they make the wrong responses on the crucial tests of depth. A conspicuous casualty who fails to negotiate 'these tricky slopes' is Drengson, behind whose genuine ecological sensibility lies a human supremacist position with humans occupying 'a unique position ... in the scheme of things', at the summit of that old-consciousness hierarchy, "the great chain of being" .12 According to Drengson, circumstances Might force us, sometimes, to choose between the life of a fish or a cow and that of a human child. We do not hesitate to choose the child. Our priorities are a result of our position in the scheme of things, with a spectrum of species (p.7). Not even followers of medium-depth ecology need respond in this reflex fashion, for instance where the child is seriously defective. Certainly, faced with a range of duly-elaborated imagined circumstances of difficult or forced choice, deeper thinkers would hesitate - since such situations tend to pose moral dilemmas. And sometimes at least their priorities would be different from Drengson's; for example, the fish is rare and the child ordinary, the cow occupies a unique place in an important ecosystem.13 Even Naess himself, who vacillates considerably in what he has to say and occasionally lapses badly from the authentic way. 14 It is worth examining some of Naess's logics, not for nonphilosophical reasons (or even to reveal N aess as a further flaws doyen, typical of the heroes 12 13 14 See The Trumpeter 1(4) (1984), 6-7. Drengson is not the only casualty; Berry, whose criticism Drengson is trying to meet, is another. Differently, the child is Hitler or the President who chooses to press the nuclear button. Such cases, which in some settings permit of a traditional treatment, were considered from a deeper perspective in Routley 2 79. A most striking example is Naess's Rescequence article, 'The basis of deep ecology', which departs considerably from the spirit and themes of DE. Even Naess, who is not significantly hang-up in doctrinal purity and doctrinal divergence, felt obliged to circulate a note correcting, "reformulating", what he had said and written (the article was originally a Sub ...... lecture). 'Some ... may find some of its sentences not quite in forming with what I usually tend to say. Therefore I offer some reformulations ... I still stick to my views recently expressed in various articles and books' (Nute, italics added). �12 of DE), but because these show committing about DE, they are indicative of its doctrical instability, lack of clarity, and scope for improvement. • Any society worthy of the name Green is a deep ecological one. 15 Given that there are a range of ........... societies that are green but not deep green, such a claim must fail. Even if 'deep green' were substituted for 'green' it could not be contained, because DE policies exclude some deep green alternatives. Accordingly, it is false that explication of DE is 'articulation of the fundamental positions that are presupposed in Green societies' (p.4); DE societies are but part of that rich and variety plurality. What does Naess say by way of rectification? Frankly, not nearly enough. He proceeds to assert that in his opinion, a 'society that does not operate in harmony with [the 8-point platform of DE ... is not] worthy of being called Green! But a genuinely Green society may well reject or violate several of the points emanciated, e.g. the wide intrinsic value assumption (of point 1), the obligation to action (of point 8). • 'We should never engage in any discussion on technicalities without asking, "What do we basically need in life?" Always ask the basic question. This is what I mean by the term Deep Ecology Movement' (p.5). Naess does nothing whatever to complenish for presentation of the basic technical question in this (biospherically) chauvinistic way. Do we need a DE which tells us that the bottom line is "What's in it for us?"! Doesn't part of deep environmentalism consist in seeing through and explaining what is wrong with this pernicious bottom line. As regard the 'This is what I mean by ... ' blunder, Naess tries to exonerate himself by use of the well-worn criterion/definition distinction.1 6 But on its own it hardly helps; such bottom line inquiry is not a criterion for DE either. Nor is following inquiry through to ultimate ends a distinctive feature of DE; the shallowest sorts of hedonism, for example, may adopt similar procedures. In fact N aess lands himself in further trouble in trying to extricate himself. To try to make the criterion offer look tempting (a comprehensive test for depth), he claims that 'when supporters of the shallow ecology movement are seriously asked about ultimate ends they tend to affirm the same ones as supporters of the deep movement'. Not only would this be a most unlikely outcome of a satisfactory questionaire; but worse, if it were the outcome, it would render shallow ecology supporters deep; so the criterion would eliminate a fundamental contrast for, and for making out, DE. In any event, too many humans, especially powerholders, remain outside the orbit of 15 16 This follows from what Naess asserts given on that a society that adapts 'policies characteristic of Deep Ecology' is a deep ecological one. There is at least a touch of arrogance (or is it part Naess's disdain for conceptual nicety?) in Naess's introduction of this shabby exoneration attempt: The damaging sentences, - those quoted - 'might be reformulated (in honor of my conceptually interested friends) in the follow way:'. Maybe Naess was serious in his (otherwise ab sure) opening remarks in the R ......... article about looking forward to hobnobbing with the aristocracy. �13 shallow ecology, often attached to the pernicious bottom line (it is doubtful that 'most people dwell in shallow ecology', p.5 heading). • Articulation of DE principles gives a total view. (An amazing contrast with the ....... . juxtaposed doctrine of ignorance which suggest we can never obtain a total view.) By contrast with 'shallow ecology which (avoids) the basic questions ... the Deep Ecology Movement concerns itself with basic beliefs and assumptions about the universe. If you articulate the principles of the Deep Ecology Movement you get a total view . The term "total view" is essential. The Deep Ecology Movement is a total view. It covers our basic assumptions, our life philosophy and our decisions in everyday life' (Res ,p.6.italics added). In first place, the alleged contrast with shallow ecology do not stand up to much examination. A dedicated shallow Christian or capitalist may practice the same depth of questioning and reflection or a deep ecologist, or rather more; such a person may have a well-integrated lifestyle, with a fairly comprehensive philosophy (as these thing go) covering it. Secondly, N aess takes what seems to be asserted back in commentary. 'If we articulate the principles of the deep ecology movement, -- you do not get a total view' (p.3); but that apparently directly contradicts the above italicized passage. There is an escape from contradiction offered - distinguish the principles, by filling in the dashes by "in the sense of principles of the DE platform" - but it leads a severe problem - what are the principles of DE? What is DE? Naess's commentary implies that the principles of DE required for a total view are those of all levels of the double pyramid. Such an idea lands the articulation of DE in hopeless difficulties. Firstly, we do not, and cannot, know what the principles are, because they now include principles applied and decisions taken at the bottom level which refers to particular situations, including 'particular direct actions at a particular date'; but these will vary, in ......... ways, over-future times. Secondly, since there are various different, and compating, principles at the top level, DE will either be damagingly inconsistently characterised, or else it will be far from uniquely characterised. For DE will include Christianity of this and that sect, Buddinism of this and that form, and so on. In fact Naess accepts such an outcome (but in his misdirect attempt to avoid dogmatism): 'There is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite "ecosophy", no definite set of green policies' (p.3) and, he should have added on this line of thinking no definite deep ecology or set of DE principles. But there is a set of central principles, those at level 2. They do not present a total view. But nor in general do those of all four levels of deep ecology. There is much, a mass of opinion (for instance, concerning scientific speculation) which would form part of a more comprehensive (world) view that is not reflected at any of the four levels. It is indeed entirely unclear what would present a total view? Spiniza's philosophy perhaps? But it is easy to ...... of topics it does not cover, such as city architecture and factory farming, on which a total view could have an angle. It is certainly doubtful that lesser mentals than Spinaza, such as typical supporters of DE, �14 operate in a total view. N aess claims that they do, but adduces no evidence; testing is much more likely to reveal how pragmentory the ecological view of most deep ecologists are. Not only is the noton of a "total view", drawn from Naess's earlier philosophizing muddy; the desirability of the notion is open to (damaging) questioning. "Total view" comprehends too much, fixes too much that perhaps should be left open; it sails too close to "totaliterian view" for real pluralistic comfort. There is, then, quite evidently, a serious problem with deep ecology, and in finding out exactly what it is, that even the clearer accounts offered differ in significant subjects face similar difficulties, philosophy for one. With movements, which is what deep ecology is often presented as, the situation is normally much worse. Consider the difficulties in saying, with much precision, what some political movement (such as green politics) represents, what some party stands for and against. And despite the accelerating diversity of accounts there appears to be substance to the deep ecology notion. Several important interconnected distinctions, which look to be worth disentangling, are marked out, and an important group of ideas is assembled. Rather than being simply junked (something my conservative inclinations rise against with notions, as with the premature discarding of material "goods"), the notions involved should at least be disentangled and, if feasible, renovated or recycled. More generally, it is not merely valuabe, but quite essential in senous intellectul assignments, to indicate what deep ecology is and isn't - for lots of purposes, including explaining it, arguing from it, and applying it. What can be done? One resolution can be obtained along the lines of critical rationalism. The fuller formulations of deep ecology, after reorganisation into more tractable form, are subject to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more satisfactory, thinner and fitter formulation, which at the same time meets other desirable criteria. Among these is a desideratum often lost sight of in the ferment of environmental action, the need for environmental pluralism. A start on this rather analytic approach involves separating out the different components of the deep ecology messages, and isolating core themes of deep and shallow ecology from wider positions and paradigms which they inform. The core is (as Naess indicated) essentially normative. Fortunately the core themes have already been isolated, in a previous application of deep ecology to population theory 17 , and this work can be taken over largely intact. For the extensive remainder, the following pretty complicated sort of picture starts to emerge (upon organising themes and claims of several supporters of deep ecology, in a way explained in the Appendix to this chapter):- 17 In Routley 84. �Figure 5.1. SHALLOWER AND DEEPER POSITIONS, AND THEIR ACCLAIMED ASSUMPTIONS, PARTLY SCHEMATIZED. SHALLOW VALUE CORE ENVIRONMENT AL SUBJECT SOLE (INTRINSIC) K,' ALUE ASSUMPTION VALUES-IN-NATURE GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTION BIOSPECIES IMPARTIALITY FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL BASES GROUNDOF VALUE DEEP (separable theoretical underpinning) FEATURES OF HUMANS DIVERSITY, RICHNESS OF NATURAL(LIFE)FORMS ii. METAPHYSICAL INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION. NATURE AS BACKDROP IRREDUCIBLE SYSTEMS. NATUREAS IN1EGRAL m EPISTEMIC REDUCTIONIST/ANALYTIC SUBJECT-OBJECT ACCOUNT HOLISTIC/GESTALT /FIELD ACCOUNT LARGER ENCOMPASSING AND INFORMING THEORY EMPIRICISM,IDEALISM, ECOSOPHY, PANTHEISM, POSITIVISM AMERICAN NATURALISM +- DIFFERENT FACETS ➔ OF CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, ... VALUE (DEONTIC AND ACTION) COLLARIES EXTENSIVE INTERFERENCE FOR HUMAN INTERESTS AND PURPOSES 1. ACTION (META-) PRINCIPLE APPLICATIONS (AS COROLLARIES) LIMITED INTERFERENCE AND RIGHTS THEREfO ETHICS ASETHETICS METAPHYSICS EPISTEMOLOGY IDEOLOGY/ RELIGION LIFESTYLE +-OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS➔ To population, (individual) consumption, (individual) impact, resources, technology, pollution, economic growth and quality-of-life, culture, organisation, science, education; and to the variety of natural (and some artifical) forms, such as land, oceans, atmosphere, arctic regions, swamps, forests, soils, ... POLICY ECONOMICS POLITICS Given the picture some major and serious sets of problems with deep ecology begin to appear at once. First, the value core arrived at already substantially transforms that suggested by the literature, with, for instance, biospecies impartiality improving on biospheric egalitarianism. Secondly, both the bases and the encompassing theories usually indicated (those diagrammed) are not just highly problematic but are detachable from the core and can be avoided. For example, the various, rather different, epistemic and metaphysical theories that have been proposed as �16 supporting, or even essential to, deeper positions are, to say the least, very dubious. So it is fortunate that the deeper value core is independent of them all - though that is not to say that it is independent of every account, since some (plausible) story of value qualities in the natural world, and our perception and knowledge of them, has to be told, sooner or later. But one weaker parts of the larger deep ecological story as usually told concerns the embedding of deep ecology in a broader philosophical theory, such as Naess's system ecosophy T, or Buddhism, or nature mysticism, or whatever. This much is true: as it is with shallow positions, which can be supported by most of the mainstream, more comprehensive, philosophical theories (for what they are worth), so it is with deeper positions, which can be supported by very different, though unorthodox, philosophical theories, for instance, by (a modification of) Whitehead's process theory or by (an adaption of) Meinong's object theory. But, for reasons we shall come to, such theoretical frameworks as ecosophy, pantheism, Christianity and Buddhism do not include thorough-going deep positions, but sustain only shallower positions, and a properly deep picture is not derivable from them. This suggests that the proposed derivation of deep ecology from ecosophy is substantially astray (and that so, more sweepingly, is the whole derivational pyramid regularly presented by Naess in his four-level picture). So it will prove to be: the success of these derivations would depend upon importing analogues of shallowness into deep ecology. APPENDIX 1. Survey methods as a way of pinning down deep ecology. How does the sort of picture shown in figure 5.1 - which is worth persevering with, elaborating and applying - fit in with the burgeoning deep ecological literature? It is surely not just tangential to that, so that we should look elsewhere to grasp the deeper features of deep ecology? In fact the core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes, were assembled in a quite impressionistic fashion, namely working through much of the literature, and all the more basic work, and setting down the themes which on reflection seemed to be presented or emerge. Something like this is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of ideas, and philosophy. �Figure 7a Schematic picture of elementary procedures Source 1 T H Source 2 Source n i INTERSECTION (COMMON CORE) E M E s UNION t DISCOUNTED But here, with deep ecology, there were prospects of doing better than such impressionistic methods, or so one might have thought. Empirical, or at least quasi-empirical, methods (of the sort favoured by Naess in his earlier days) could be employed. The main idea is that the set of relevant sources is assembled, and then some statistical and set-theoretic work is done on the themes extracted from these sources; so the method is an elaboration of the sort of technique larger dictionaries such as the Oxford adopt in pinning down the standard senses of a term. The hope was that analysis of the serious philosophical literature (pretty rough selection criteria these, to be sure) on deep ecology would lead, not to despair, but in particular in two directions:Firstly, to what is more or less common to the positions presented - the intersection of theories, giving the substantial core or basic theory. And secondly, to what results when all the theories are put together - the union of themes, giving an approximation, after some sifting, to a deep ecological paradigm. As you might have anticipated by now, this thematic method hardly worked to perfection. Still it is worth explaining the method in a little more detail since, despite its limited success, it �18 reveals much. First a set of sources is assembled. Here there is scope for sampling and statistical methods, so beloved of social scientists; but in the case of deep ecology it seemed feasible, back in 1984, to gather for winnowing all more serious texts accessible in Australia. That latter limitation (all too familiar in environmental research) imposes a perhaps unfortunate parochial geographical constraint; but it induces no violation of such adequacy requirements as that sources introducing the notion be included in the bundle, as are all sources referred back to in several other sources. With the rise of networking magazines concerned with deep ecology, there are many references to deep ecological thinking and experience which get discounted, as not appropriately serious. Increasingly often, any sort of deeper experience or thought gets assigned under the "deep" heading, no matter how anthropocentric. This is one of the many problems with the depth notion and deep terminology, rather counteracting the valuable idea of penetrating below the conventional surface of received environmental assumptions, that it is important to think deeper than the assumption of Environment Z-land, for instance, that the environment should be managed for present and future generations of humans - a typical governmental surface assumption, often announced, but much less often put into practice. Once the sources are assembled, a beginning can be made on unscrambling themes, something that calls for a good deal of judgement also, especially in such matters as deciding whether themes from different sources come to the same or not. Here and elsewhere care is required not to penetrate too deeply, to expose only so much of surface themes as is necessary (a well-known principle in logical analysis). When the themes are duly marked out, there is some smoothing of the thematic data; for instance, evidently remote and irrelevant themes in one source may be deleted. (It is like the judging of a diving contest or the massaging of statistics, where isolated wild elements are removed from the sample used for assessment.) Then the elementary set operations of union and intersection are applied, again subject to some qualification. In particular, if a very prominent theme in some formulations is omitted from, or only approximated in, one formulation, then that theme will be put, initially at least, in the intersection. (Logicians and mathematicians, for example, sometimes omit intended or assumed axioms; e.g. Parry in analytic implication, Maclean in category theory.) A striking example concerns the very introduction of the notion of deep ecology into the philosophical literature (Naess 73), which fails to present the fundamental value thesis, that intrinsic value is not confined solely to humans or human features. While it can be argued that rejection of the sole and greater value assumptions is implied by what is said concerning biospheric egalitarianism (the equal right to live and blossom), the argument is not decisive, since value is only involved indirectly and perhaps only instrumentally (as Naess's appeal to effects on the 'life quality of humans' and to our ecological dependence might suggest). �19 The results are tabulated, as follows: Figure 7b. Actual results, in not form, of a survey of some main sources. Naess 73 Naess 83 Naess-Sessions 84 Intrinsic value Intrinsic value of life (1) (1) Biological egalitarianism (2) Diversity/richness(3) Complexity not complication (6) Diversity/ richness (2) Diversity/ richness ( 1) Total field holism (1) No negative interference rights, excepting vital needs (3) No negative interference, etc. (3) Devall 79 ROUGH CLASSIFICATIONS VALUE CORE Diversity (10 GROUNDSAND BASES New person/planet metaphysics (1) Objective approach to nature 2 Earth wisdom, VALUEAND limited interference ACTION COROLLARIES More leisure (13) Action obligation 6 Present interference excessive (4) Policy adjustments to economic and ideological structures (5) Anti-pollution/ resource depletion (5) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (7) Anti-class posture 4 Action obligation 8 Present human interference excessive (5) Policy adjustments, etc. [Also to technological structures (6) Objective life quality rather than higher living standard (7) World population reduction (4) POLICY AND LIFESTYLE APPLICATIONS Interim policy steady state (15),(18) Soft Technology ( 11) Life quality rather than quantity of products (6) Reduction of population to optimum (7) Emphasis on pollution and like topics counterproductive (8) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (11),(14) New psychology (3) DISCOUNTED AREAS: with rejection of NEW SUBJECTS dualisms: man/nature, subject/object, etc New philosophical anthropology (9) New objective �20 Embedding in ecosophy NOTES: science (4) New education (12) ? Embedding in updated Spinoza (2) EMBEDDJNG PHrr,OSOPHY/RELIGION 1. Bracketed numerals indicate theses numbers in the sources. 2. The disappointing absence of core themes can to some extent be compensated for by appeal to statements of them or implying them elsewhere in accompanying texts and commentaries. 3. Naess-Sessions 84, also Naess 84, became the 8-point platform, now widely reintensted. Naturally one does not attempt this sort of analysis entirely in the dark, but in the partial expectation that certain kinds of results will emerge, these three especially: • The substantial core represents a significant deviation from mainstream assumptions, a deviation which has been encountered before. • The total theory, or union, is not simply a jumble of theses, but has some reasonable coherence. • There are ways of getting from the substantial core toward the total theory. In the case of deep ecology it would have been pleasant to report triumphantly that these expectations, and more, are fulfilled; indeed the theory is so well integrated it represents a (sub)cultural paradigm. Unfortunately it did not work out that way, as is evident. What is more, the situation has become markedly worse, as presentations of deep ecology have burgeoned since 1984. Partly the thematic enterprise did not succeed because of the poor calibre of the leading presentations of "the" deep ecology intuition, and because exponents had and have different intuitions, messages and objectives. Partly, however it did not work because the idea of obtaining a substantial core and a coherent union was misconceived. Taking the union, in particular, assumed that there was much wider common ground - something that could be called the deeper ecological paradigm which could be approached in this sort of way - rather than as a plurality of positions. Pluralism is fine and feasible, and worth encouraging much more widely; but taking the union of themes of some pluralistic system of positions is likely to lead only to intractable inconsistent sets, and perhaps to trouble. Consider, to illustrate, the United Religion, about to sweep California, a pluralist grouping made up of representations of the World's great religions. While the refined common core of these positions is likely to be interesting, the union is not: it will contain, for example, all of the following inconsistent triad: Many gods exist (from e.g. Hinduism); Exactly one god exists (e.g. Islam); no gods exist (from e.g. Buddhism). There is analogous trouble in combining deep ecological sources with such results as that stones and mountains both do and do not have inherent value; there both are and are not detachable intrinsic values; and so on. The picture is then as shown:- �21 putative substantial core inconsistent elements of putative union What all this emphicizes once again is that deep ecology has to be treated differently, not as a coherent position but as a loose pluralistic grouping of position. To obtain a clearer authentic starting position, we shall have to discount since of what paradox as deep ecology. It is for this sort of reason of course that we chose to follow Naess before other prophets. Once an authentic position has been made out other prositions can be clustered around it. Such a pluralistic outcome does not show that the notion of a deeper ecological paradigm is illusory. It only reveals some of the pluralistic features, mostly not duly recognised at the deeper ends of ecological movements. And it only indicates that a different route should be taken in getting to a deeper paradigm. For the alternative environmental, and deep ecological, paradigm covers a spread of positions, much as the contrasting dominant social paradigm does. �A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WESTERN DEEP ECOLOGY: a response to Warwick Fox's Response to an earlier Critique. Western deep ecology differs in important respects from the deep ecology originated and pursued by Naess, what I now call authentic deep ecology, at which my Critique of Deep Ecology was mainly, but by no means entirely, directed. Western deep ecology, also known as transpersonal ecology (though the ecology has largely dropped out), is very roughly a doctrine of the west of those new world continents where environmental philosophy functions; it has been advanced primarily by West Coast Americans (Devall, Drengson, Sessions and others) and associated West Australians (Fox, now of Tasmania, also Hallem and others). Unlike authentic deep ecology, Western deep ecology is hostile to environmental ethics, which it tends to dismiss as mere axiology; and it is excessively enthusiastic about trans personal experience, spiritual "paths" and "ways", and unitarian metaphysics - in which there are no ontological divides, no dualisms (of subject/object, subjective/objective), and no separation of things. Consider what Drengson 'take[s] to be at the heart of deep ecology as Devall and Sessions present it', and which he enthusiastically endorses: What deep ecology directs us towards ... is neither an environmental axiology or a theory of environmental ethics nor a minor reform of existing practices. It directs us to develop our own sense of self until it becomes Self, that is, until we realise through deepening ecological sensibilities that each of us forms a union with the natural world, and that protection of the natural world is the protection of ourselves .... reality lies not in the imaginative, subjective dualism of the dominant outlook, with its self-destructive exploitation of nature and overkill nuclear weapons. Reality is to be found in a quite different way: by a path that is nonaggressive, humble, compassionate, and knows itself as ultimately embedded in the Self of nature. The sacred is immanent in the profane, the spirit pervades and is the world, the cosmos. It is the formed and formless as a unity. This ecosophy is at hand for each of us [ecosophical salvation]. Its realisation is always personal, firsthand experiential understanding. It is an I-Thou, not an I-it relationship (Review pp.87-8). Fox's Response to my Critique develops similar themes, in considerably more detail, so they become rather more open to assessment. That is why my further critique will concentrate on his Responses. (On its own, I doubt that his Response would have sufficient intrinsic interest to warrant an extensive reply.) In Western deep ecology, the focus is upon, or even (as in Fox 89) contracts to, that of self and Self (or what it might almost as well be, soul and Soul/Anima sive Natura, or spirit and World Spirit). For example, Drengson pontificates upon �• 38 the crux of the issues raised by deep ecology [as follows]. We are challenged to move to genuinely ecological modes of perception, conception, and practice. If we do this, we will do it to the degree that we realise that our self is part of a larger Self for which we must care. This is part of the ecology of self-Self in the cosmology of deep ecology' (p.89). Fox goes further, making this type of stuff coextensive with "deep ecology": Stated rather formally ... the deep ecological framework ... proceed[s] from two basic hypotheses and one ultimate norm [all concerning self and Self]. The hypotheses are (i) that "the self is as comprehensive as the totality of our identifications. Or, more succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify" ... ; and (ii) that the self can and does grow/develop/mature (i.e. widen its sphere and intensity of identification over time). The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the widest (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self.... this ideal state of being is referred to as "Selfrealisation" by N aess and as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions" and its cultivation - effective a spiritual discipline - is considered to be the "real work" of deep ecology (pp. 86-7). This self-Self cultivation of Western deep ecology, which will be severely criticised, is far removed from the deep ecology platform upon which authentic deep ecology is centred, a mundane, secular platform concerned with real environmental issues, which is not a predominantly human psychological exercise and which does not mention 'self' or 'Self'. On the strength of the variant presentation of "deep ecology", of this elaboration of Western deep ecology, Fox feels entitled to assert that 'Sylvan has seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about. ... Sylvan's criticisms miss their mark ... Sylvan's critique leaves deep ecology ... largely untouched' (p.5). Drengson feels entitled to enlarge this unfounded assertion: 'the critiques of deep ecology that have appeared so far have been based on misconceptions of what deep ecology is all about, and they have therefore been off the mark, or at best superficial' (p.89). The critiques that are substantial, not substantially tirades or shallow, have been substantially directed at authentic deep ecology, not at its different Western analogue. There has been no misconception or misunderstanding by such critics; they have aimed at a different target in the same broad field. On a personal level, I am quite attracted by authentic deep ecology; but I am substantially repelled by Western deep ecology. I subscribe, more or less, to the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and accordingly should be accounted a supporter of deep ecology (for all that critics are not very welcome). Though I do not care for some features of Naess's system Ecosophy T, which does provide a rickety bridge ·to Western deep ecology, N aess has always insisted that this was but one of several optional background ideological frameworks. Western deep ecology is another matter. Too much of it strikes me as like an evangelic cult, much too incidentally coupled to deep environmentalism; too much is a �39 celebration of self, human self, an expanded egoism; too much is essentially a good oldfashioned celebration of things human, a comparatively shallow celebration disguised in new environmental and avant-gard attire. Drengson has the ability to lay on these obnoxious, chauvinistic features disagreeably thick. Consider a bit of his poetic outpouring on that jumbled text, Deep Ecology: Sessions and Devall see humans as beings who are an expression of a nature deeper, more mysterious, and creative than any of our abstract theories appreciate .... it is hoped that [our] experiential encounter with the otherness of Nature transformed as Self will help us to live in such a harmonious way as to continually discover ever new wonders and value inherent in wild nature and in the natural human self. ... The book, thus is dedicated to ... presenting a philosophy of life that resolves some of our most fundamental questions, the central one of this is: how can we live truly in authentic, harmonious relationships with all beings so as to realise a maximum of intrinsic goodness? This is a question, ultimately, of what it means to become a complete, mature, fully Selfrealised human being (pp.94-5 rearranged). The statement could almost have come straight out of modem romanticism; all the same elements are there down to the maximization of human self-realisation. So presented, the new environmental paradigm of Western deep ecology is the old anti-Enlightenment movement in contemporary gear. Though I am substantially turned off by some of Western deep ecology, though I am disappointed by its apparent shallowness, by its reversion to human chauvinism, though I try to take cover when its heavy evangelism blows through, I am far from suggesting that more than critical intellectual action be taken against it. It is, after all, generally for the right sorts of things environmentally, even if it has invested too heavily in dominant notions, such as the exalted human self that a radical environmentalism should be escaping; and it is no worse intellectually than predominant creeds that are far less kind to natural environments, such as Vatican christianity and American pragmatism. Live and let live. 1. Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism. Well is Fox's response to Sylvan's critique of deep ecology entitled 'Approaching Deep Ecology'; for it does no more than approach deep ecology, it does not reach the authentic article. Instead Fox converts deep ecology into a related concoction, largely of his own (now called transpersonal ecology*). Having thus commandeered deep ecology for * Transpersonal ecology is an extreme variant of Western deep ecology, which tries, for instance, to jettison what Drengson and others retain: intrinsic goodness, intrinsic value, and the like. �40 his own purposes, it is easy for Fox to feel confident in his charge that 'Sylvan has seriously understood what deep ecology is about' (p.5). Fox's main accusation is indeed that I have seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about, that my criticism is misdirected, and that deep ecology emerges largely unscathed. We shall see about that. But first, I want to lodge a counter-charge: Fox appears to have misunderstood a good deal of what I was about. My critique was not concerned with his position, except - in so far as it purported to be deep ecology - in passing; it was addressed to the mainstream of deep ecology. Fox's own transpersonal ecology does not belong to the mainstream of deep ecology; indeed it is doubtful that it is deep ecology at all. It tries to throw away central parts of deep ecology, the value theory in particular, and to revert to what appears, to all intents and purposes, to be a rather shallow position. But, most remarkable, it has very little to do with the natural environment; much of it is but expanded self adulation. Both Fox and N aess, in their responses to my critique, try to make some easy initial capital by pointing to the different ending of a working draft of the critique from the pluralist ending of the published version. 1 Naess uses the different endings to ground his allegation that Sylvan is uncertain what he is about, an ad hominem strategy which he presumably hopes will help to defuse substantial criticisms of deep ecology which he does not address (see his 84 and 85). Fox makes much of the different endings (almost 5 pages worth) in order to reveal an uncharitable interpretation: that already indicated, of misunderstanding, and that my 'critique leaves deep ecology .... largely untouched' (p.5). Naess and Fox seem to think that it counts against a critique that it may enjoy more than one ending, that it can leave room for doubt as to whether something should be restored or abandoned. Yet these are very much the sort of outcome a more tolerant and careful assessment may yield. Consider an old building seriously defective in main structural detail, yet with many worthwhile period features. It may be a hard question, over which there is room for uncertainty, whether it should be restored or demolished. So it is often with intellectual systems, such as deep ecology and ecosophy. By and large I am in favour of rehabilitation (see e.g. Routley 74), though from a favoured nonpluralistic 1 Though I feel a bit used, I'm not going to make anything of incomplete working drafts I naively handed out not being a fair target for commentary (it is obvious that one can be even more stupid and so forth in drafts than in more considered final versions). Much of the interesting work in and around deep ecology appears only in working draft form or in what academic snobs describe as semi-published form. �41 stance such systems as ecosophy include material destined for the intellectual scrap heap. But, in any event, I am in favour of recycling of rubbish wherever this is feasible. For anyone who adheres to a select position within an also conceded pluralistic setting, there is always more than one presentation, and more than one ending: a monistic, or singular, ending deriving from the select position, and a pluralistic ending from the setting. There is nothing particularly remarkable about this, for all that it baffles Fox. On the singular ending (of the limited edition "penultimate version" of my critique) many major themes of deep ecology go down, not because they are ' insubstantial or vacuous' (what Fox finds it convenient to infer p.2ff.), but because they are all defective, all substantially astray. So much had already been argued in the main body of the work; for instance, one sustained development aimed to demonstrate the substantial falsity of the principle of biospheric egalitarianism and its inconsistency with other principles of deep ecology. What of the last words, drawn from Eliot's Four Quartets, 'there is no one to bury'? By this, I meant: no correct doctrine, not: nothing substantial. It is true that from the singular position I did look upon several main 'ideas of deep ecology ... not even as if they were once useful ... but rather that upon closer scrutiny there is ... nothing ... [correct in] them in the first place' (p.3); from that stance I still look upon them in that way. On the final pluralistic ending what remains 2 are not the trumpeted major themes, which still go down, but a good many of the less heralded points and themes, such as departure principles in the 8-point platform of deep ecology. What can be added, furthermore, are significant variations upon some of the major themes; for instance ecospheric impartiality in place of biospheric egalitarianism. Now both Naess and Fox assume that a pluralistic ending diminishes, or ought to weaken, the force of the criticism. Not so. Naess ends his response to the critique with a relativistic complaint: 'if you have your own philosophy from which you generate the [core] position of deep ecology, ... why object to ecosophy T?' (Naess pp.3-4 reordered, also quoted in Fox). The short answer is because system T is seriously intellectually flawed. A pluralist may let such material stand, but, unlike a relativist, doesn't have to let it alone; its weaknesses can be exposed, its inferiority exhibited. Fox goes on to claim that under pluralism, which he also confuses with relativism, my 'critique loses much of its original sting and no longer constitutes the challenge to deep ecology that was formerly intended' (p.5). Again, not so; the challenge and sting remain as before. But now deep ecology is regarded more benignly; and more future work will be directed at restoration, etc. As you might now anticipate, Fox finds 'a 2 Fox's surprise about this (p.3) can be attributed to his failure to appreciate the force of 'acclaimed major themes' in the theories to be put to rest. �42 strong tension between such a pluralistic position' and the singular position which he regards as 'essentially argumentative' (p.5). But there is no tension; the singular position slots neatly into the pluralistic array. Further, both are argumentative, though neither essentially so. 3 2. Value in deep ecology Fox's 'most fundamental objection to [my] critique' is that it offers, is based upon, an 'environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology' (p.29, p.53). Given what Fox intends by 'environmental axiological interpretation' (his never properly explained terminology, not mine), which involves axiological reductionism and a certain axiological priority and hegemony throughout environmental philosophy (p.52) 4 , I deny this. My critique neither offers nor is based upon such an interpretation; and, as inspection will confirm, my other work will not bear such an interpretation 5 , I do not 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology'. What I do ascribe to deep ecology is "a value core", features of which I explain in some detail (and to which we shall have to return). But a large transformer (or similar item) does not reduce to its cores, there is much to such an item besides the core; nor do the cores pervade, dominate or guide all the rest. The core, which was introduced primarily as part of an organising structure, does not support what Fox tries to read out of it, namely an axiological reduction (back in 84, Naess thought 'core' was a 'good expression' for a quite proper part of deep ecology). In fact, I am not hooked on the term 'core'; substitution of 'value part' for 'value core' would make very little difference to the substance of my critique of deep ecology, but it would quite adversely effect Fox's response. An early example of the feebleness of Fox's reconstruction is his attempt to make my treatment of deep ecological theory outside the value core look as if it too was part of an axiological interpretation. He proceeds to argue from a title of a later section, 'Beyond the value core: metaphysical and epistemological "intuitions" of deep ecology', thus: 'as this title suggests, it is Sylvan's environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology that underpins his criticisms there (as elsewhere)' (p.29). The title was not intended to suggest, and would not normally suggest, such an interpretation; it indicated a separation of parts and 3 For much more detail on all these pluralistic matters, see my Deep Plurallism. 4 For fuller illustration of such undesirable phenomena at work in philosophy, see Edwards, Ethics without Philosophy. 5 For one example, see the jointly authored The Fight for the Forests. �43 the upcoming contents. As an argument (to be slack with this term), Fox's move is a nonsequitur. 6 Now to get down to the real adjudicational business (of this section), I claim to have been verballed by Fox.7 While I am becoming pretty accustomed to serious misrepresentation, I see Fox as ascending to new heights in this regard. For he proceeds to attribute to me major derivative theses which I nowhere presented, which do not derive from what I did present, and to which I should not, in any case, accede. Let's look straight away at some of what Fox proceeds to foist upon me. 'Sylvan assumes from the outset and proceeds upon the basis that deep ecology is ... primarily a value-in-nature position' (p.30), that is the 'primary claim' (p.31). I do not assume that deep ecology is primarily that, but that it is that among other things; 8 I do not proceed on that basis, and I never did suppose that deep ecology was primarily or only a values-in-nature position. As I say, in a clause Fox left out in the selective quotation of his indictment, deep ecology 'has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and a primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (Pantheist) religion' (and in an accompanying note I mention Fox's alternative ontological focus). I am not committed to such a primacy claim (what Fox refers to as 6 As the text reveals, Fox is rather fond of making passages suggest not what they were intended to suggest or prima facie do suggest, but what he would have them "suggest" conveniently for his own unscrupulous purposes (we might even label this the suggestive fallacy). He is not averse either to considerable distortion. For example (also on p.29) he makes it look, by a clever use of sectional divisions, as if the bulk of my critique was concerned with the value part of deep ecology, when in fact I get beyond that part on p.26 in a critique of 60 pages. Of course it would not show that much even if I had devoted virtually the whole critique to the value part rather than less than a third; it could just mean that that was the part of deep ecology that interested me most, or that I ran out of energy and patience thereabouts, etc. In the present critique I ran out of these commodities and time before I had finalized a section on fallacious methodological practices in deep ecology, perhaps to be called 'fallacies of transpersonal ecology'. Next edition, perhaps. 7 Verbal is an Australian verb, alluding to fabricated evidence made up by police or official prosecutioners. Verballing was a common practice in Queensland, and is certainly used by police gangs in some other states. 8 I do begin the first "problem" section of the critique 'Deep ecology appears to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves .. .' (Cp.1 ). But that says nothing more offensive than what can be inferred from point 1 of the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and nothing about primacy. Moreover I go on to say that the elaboration is extensive (e.g. Cp.4), a claim well illustrated by Figure 1 (Cp.5), where the "value core" comprises but a small part of the deep position. �44 'Sylvan's primary claim', p.31, p.33, p.34, p.47, p.48, p.57, p.70 and many other pages, sometimes obliquely as 'Sylvan's claims' and the like, e.g. 'Sylvan says', p.86). 'Moreover', Fox continues (p.30), 'for Sylvan, it is an objective position since its "core theme" of "values-in-nature suggests ... that natural items have value qualities independently of perceivers"'. Firstly there is a misquotation; I refer to 'core themes', which furthermore extend beyond the value part. 9 Secondly, no objectivist claim is made or follows for Sylvan. 10 On the basis of the primacy claim, in conjunction with the objectivist claim (in the case of D2 at least), Fox proceeds to foist upon me 'two derivative claims': Dl. 'deep ecology does not proceed from a general vision of reality or "underlying perception of the way things are" ' 11 , and D2. 'deep ecology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world' (p.31, Fox's italics). Firstly, I do not present such claims; indeed I present a substantial amount of material incompatible with such claims, for instance in the discussion of the theme of extreme holism as regards D 1, and of cosmic identity as regards D2. Secondly, I did not and do not adhere to such claims; indeed I have put a good deal of effort into exposing the metaphysical and epistemological parts of deep ecology. Thirdly, as should be thus evident, they do not derive from what I did present in the critique. Fourthly, in particular, they do not derive from the primacy and objectivist claims. Indeed readily available counter-models will show as much. Consider a values-in-nature objectivist position such as that of Holmes Rolston, which we can conveniently call 'R(olston)'s deep ecology' (there is not even any cheating here, as Ralston's position has a better claim to be accounted deep ecology than some of the positions admitted to the club). Now simply substitute 'R's deep ecology' for 'deep ecology' throughout the "derivation" of the claims. The premiss or grounds hold, as R's deep ecology satisfies both primacy and objectivist claims; but the claims supposed to be derived do not hold, both RD 1 and RD2 fail. For example, Ralston's deep ecology is very 9 It seems to be on the basis of efforts like this misquotation that Fox feels himself justified in writing of 'Sylvan's "core claim" that deep ecology is primarily a valuesin-nature position ' (p.34). That is remote from what I do. For example, I am in trouble for dismissing a sizeable chunk of core deep ecology as rubbish; but a valuesin-nature position is not rubbish. 10 The point was explained in considerable detail in EE p.154ff, where the ugly term nonjective was deliberately introduced to remove illusions as to objectivity or subjectivity. 11 The context makes it look as if the internal quotation is drawn from me, but it is not as perusal of fn.44 will show. DI gains no support from anything I assert. �45 much concerned with the way we experience the world, as a reading of Rolston quickly discloses. Or if a clearer deep example than Rolston is demanded, there is N aess himself. Finally, unsurprisingly now, Fox has made elementary mistakes in his alleged derivations. Consider D2 first. 'This follows', Fox says, 'since value-in-nature are held to exist "out there" independently of perceivers' (p.31). But again it just does not follow, as a topic can be deeply concerned with something that enjoys some independence. You might almost as well try to say that epistemology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world since primary properties are "out there" independent of perceivers. Consider next D1, where there is considerably more distortion to be exposed. Fox's "derivation" really consists of two separable parts. In the first part, Fox's thoroughly fallacious strategy is to replace 'concerned with' by 'only concerned with' and 'because' by 'simply because', as textual comparisons, of my text with what Fox draws from it, make plain. His strategy certainly makes for terrific derivations. For example, from "the Prime Minister is concerned with his sex life" we obtain the startling result that the Prime Minister is only concerned with his sex life. From the premiss that a man likes his wife because of her body we obtain without any further ado the familiar worry that he likes her simply because of her body. 'Beyond this', in a second part, there is an argument based on independence (apparently involving some misunderstanding of the notion). The argument appears to be of the form: A is independent of B, therefore A does not proceed from B. The defectiveness of such an argument is obvious enough once its form is exposed. And the defectiveness of the case in hand should have been evident to Fox. For Naess has explained many times how a person can be a deep ecologist (e.g. can adhere to the platform) without adopting (or even being aware of) the general metaphysical vision from which it proceeds. The felling of Fox's derivations brings down, like trees felled in a rainforest, a good part of the rest of the structure. For instance, there cease to be the problems Fox supposes he has found (p.32 ff.), such as difficulties of consistency in accounting for the metaphysical 'sources that supporters of deep ecology draws upon' (p.33). With that small exercise in logic, the remainder of Fox's "response" to my critique (pages 31-89 of text and miles of footnotes) is disposed of in main essentials. For pages 53-84 constitute a largely separate essay on wider identification, an essay which only bears obliquely on my critique; and most of the rest turns upon lumbering me with the claims just off loaded, the claims which 'constitute [my] very poor understanding of deep ecology' (p.31). Thus, for example, Fox expends a good deal of space upon citing authorities from deep ecology (who too often supply extremely dubious statements) directed at contradicting D 1 and D2. Obviously that is beside the point. But while my main work on Fox's dismal response is done, and I could stop here, I don't intend to, as there is a lot more heavily �46 polluting rubbish to be despatched, or recycled. One's rubbish may be another's input (therein for Moore lay the whole challenge of philosophy). 3 The extent of values-in-nature. Even a casual reader of Fox's Response will have observed the following: that Fox is very quick off the mark with (largely unsubstantiated) accusations like 'so and so has failed to grasp', 'has misunderstood', 'has ignored', 'has missed the point'; that the evidence for these ad hominem claims is often quite insubstantial; and that that 'so and so' often happens to be Sylvan. One of the many things Sylvan allegedly 'fails to grasp' is 'that (a position) deep ecology can be normative (i.e. offer prescriptive proposals) without that necessarily meaning that it is prescriptive [of this or that,] of a values-in-nature position'. Well, I thought I had a reasonable grasp upon, and had made use in print of, the distinction between prescription and evaluation (likewise deontology and axiology), and had in the critique sufficiently emphasized that shallow positions were normative but decidedly not prescriptive of values-in-nature. So what evidence does Fox present for his charge? Well, none really. True he begins his next sentence with a 'Thus', but he then rambles on with quotations of material (he has previously tried to flog to death) concerning deep ecology and value theory. But, as nearly everyone appreciates, a position may include a value theory without that theory being a values-in-nature position; shallow positions are such. Now 'Sylvan takes Naess's statement that deep ecology is normative as direct support ... the only support that Sylvan provides ... for his own ... "claim" that deep ecology is ... a value-in-nature position' (p.36 rearranged, prejudicial terms deleted). Well, he didn't take that as direct support; what he did take as support is Naess's oft-repeated assertion (quoted by Fox on the very page) that 'the significant tenets of ... Deep Ecology ... express a value priority system' (many places, e.g. 73 p.99, my italics). So it includes a value framework. Furthermore further evidence is adduced or alluded to both for the claim that deep ecology involves a value framework and that it includes a values-in-nature tenet (e.g. 'deep ecology seeks a transformation of values' Cp.29, quoting Devall; an 'egalitarian principle of equal value of all life, is "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom"' Cp.13 quoting N aess; the restriction of this axiom to cases 'when genuine conflicts of value are absent 'Cp.14 quoting Fox; etc). Fox issues the challenge: 'where is the (objectivist) values-in-nature "core claim"?' (p.36). Of course it is right there in the platform, in the very first point which duly �47 distributes intrinsic value much more widely than humans and human features; it is also implied by the biocentric egalitarian principle; and so on. 12 What is more, although I have at long last (late 1989) read Fox's tactless Response, I am sticking to my claim that deep ecology has a value core. As it happens, I think as much is evident from Naess's recent publications (esp. 89 chapters 2 and 3). But the claim can be argued, for example as follows:- Firstly, Deep ecology has a value part. Secondly, that part is a core part. As to the first, I should begin by appealing to the value themes of the deep ecology platform, particularly points 1 and 2 which amounts values-in-nature points. Curiously, when several of the points in the platform are value themes, Fox proceeds to assert that 'biocentric ... egalitarianism ... is the deep ecological notion that most lends itself to interpretation as a value-in-nature position' (pp.31-33). Perhaps this is a diversionary tactic. It seems that it would be most convenient for Fox's anti-axiology and unauthentic view of deep ecology if critics forgot about the platform of deep ecology. The value part of deep ecology is reasonably taken as a core, i.e. as a central or inner part (to use dictionary accounts of 'core'). A number of arguments can be advanced for adopting it as a core, of which I'll indicate one 13 . The 8-point platform is a central part of deep ecology, what more or less distinguishes deep ecologists; value themes comprise a central part of this platform (the first three points as well as others such as point 7); what is a central part of a central part is indeed central. It is no doubt 'somewhat unfortunate that the 8-principles start with ethical terms ... ' (quoting Sessions p.49). Fox tries to wriggle out of that unfortunate predicament, that the 8-point platform of deep ecology - one of the few hitherto stable parts of the whole jerrybuilt structure - begins with value themes and a values-in-nature claim, by an expansion of the same shabby tactic he has already tried to use to defuse biological egalitarianism and displace apparently ethical principles of deep ecology (such as the important obligation to implement environmental commitments): Namely, the formal-axiological waste-disposal is replaced by an even grander formal-philosophical disposal - down which goes my criticism. 'Sylvan ... takes the "neutral"' (i.e. variously: literal, nontechnical, 12 It is only anomalous that the intrinsic value theme is missing Naess's early paper because it features so prominently in the platform and in parts of Naess's later work, both characterising deep ecology. Fox tries to twist the anomaly into a contradiction in my evidence (pp.36-7), but it is a shabby effort, entirely neglecting the evidence I assemble in Appendix 1 (which he quotes from however) for Figure 1 of the Critique which indicates the value core. 13 Thereby doing in, by example, another of Fox's unpleasant shotgun accusations, p.6. �48 understandable to most persons) 'formulation of basic principles as a formal philosophical position .... Thus, even such limited support for his "core claim" as Sylvan is able to find turns out to be due to mistaking an everyday language 8-point list for an ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms' (p.51) That I find, I confess, a ridiculous accusation and defence. I wasn't taking the basic principles at other than face value, as other than principles in a "neutral" formulation; I was, and am, 'using the word "value" in a metaphorical or everyday sense' (p.49), namely in the literal everyday non-metaphorical sense where it signifies worth. I frankly don't really know what it would be like to take deep ecology in the way Fox alleges I do, as a 'formal philosophical position' (p.49, p.51). It is not just that we are far removed from 'the ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms'; deep ecology is not, in the hands of Fox and friends, the sort of position that looks at all likely to obtain such formulation ever. Until it is properly made out, then, Fox's "defence" lapses. He owes us an account of what a 'formal philosophical expression' would be, by contrast with what we have, and to provide requisite evidence that Sylvan (whatever his actual intentions) was "taking" the platform in that "mistaken" way. I'm not surprised that Fox has not attempted the requisite philosophical work; I am surprised he got Session to go along with him in the intellectually disreputable ploy. I freely confess, then, my astonishment that Sessions states that he and N aess would not agree philosophically to the principles of the deep ecology platform (p.50,p.51 ). What on earth does he mean? In his own book (with Devall), these principles are presented as 'basic principles of deep ecology' (in boldface capitals, p.69), they are supplemented by a detailed commentary of a type appropriate for serious philosophical principles, and they are introduced as having 'summarized fifteen years of thinking on the principles of deep ecology' (p.69). If that doesn't make them philosophical, what in the deep ecological scheme of things would? In any case, Sessions has elsewhere been prepared, in highly philosophical contexts to ascribe intrinsic values to parts of nonhuman Nature (e.g. p.236). For Naess too there is no easy escape. Firstly, the platform is said to derive from his Ecosophy T; secondly Ecosophy T itself assigns 'intrinsic value to every life form' (89 p.164ff). But I should make an admission; deep ecology is bound to be a values-in-nature position, at least as I characterised those things. It follows from the way I explained depth and what is meant by 'values-in-nature'. That is one reason why I claim Fox's �49 transpersonal ecology is not deep ecology, because it is explicitly not a values-in-nature position. 14 Fox himself has tried various ways of avoiding values-in-nature; but, needless to say, value expressions of "in-nature" cast creep into much of his discourse. For example, the shallow/deep distinction is now "explained" (in 89 p.33), not directly in terms of value, but, to begin with, through an anthropocentric/ecocentric distinction. The trouble is that, in explaining the intended senses of contrasting terms, value slips back again (as in 'use value for humans (e.g. its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value)'). But Fox's main chance is the "value constellation" idea, which tries to lock values away in a complex involving a valuer and a valuing relation. But nothing stops analyses of this complex, examination of components of the constellation; and for many logical purposes (such as quantification of the value end of the complex) some separation is required. 4 A biocentric ethic? It has been widely thought that deep ecology supplies 'a biocentric ethic as opposed to an anthropocentric one' 15 , that it includes at least rudiments of a value theory and leading features of an environmental ethics. But now whether deep ecology is, among other things, an environmental ethic is in increasing doubt. There are now many, not merely on the margins of deep ecology, who would question the role or significance of ethics or even dispense with it altogether. On these issues, as on others, deep ecology speaks not just with many tongues, but forked tongues as well. Fox does something to assemble the diverse voices from the deep ecology multitude (p.42ff.). Let us classify - in a preliminary way: A. Getting rid of ethics altogether. This appears to be a position taken by Livingston and by Shepard, at least in the quotes Fox supplies. There is nothing new and exciting, still less of new paradigmatic cast, about this. It is as old as ethical nihilism and scepticism, which is to say, very old, reaching back to classical Greek thought. 16 Nor are the entirely dubious supporting considerations adduced in any way new: 'ethics and morals were ... invented by one species to meet the needs of that species' p.42, or, more cynically, for the advantage of certain classes or pressure groups within that species; ethics are at best mischievous, more 14 See e.g. p.85. The matter is further discussed below. 15 Thus Bradford 89,p.10. The authentic deep ecology (of. Naess, on reliable days) certainly does. 16 For preliminary notes on the history of moral nihilism, see Hinckfuss p.17. �50 likely damaging; ethics are unsuccessful and even counterproductive in their effects (p.43); 'ethics and morals are unknown in nature' (p.42); and similar. A*. Retaining ethics, hardly intellectually revolutionary either, but B. Downgrading the whole enterprise. Such appears to be one of Naess's newer tactics, where ethics, now of minor importance, becomes an experiential epiphenomenon. 'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the world .... Ethic follows from how we experience the world' (p.46, also Naess 89 p.20 and elsewhere). Naess is doing more in this much quoted passage (which involves clear commission of the prescriptive fallacy 17 ) than expressing personal idiosyncracies; he is saying, he is taken as saying, by those who quote him, how things now stand for deep ecology (of which he is still, though losing ground, the chief guru). B*. While ethical enterprise is perhaps not downgraded, C. Ethics as usually conceived is displaced or superseded. According to Fox, "conventional ethics", which combines a code of conduct with a set of values, is displaced by an 'experientially grounded state of being' (p.41). 18 That state of being is none other than ecological consciousness, which 'precedes and preempts the search for an "environmental ethic"' (Devall quoted p.45, similarly Sessions, who also goes further, suggesting we should abandon the search for an environmental ethics' p.44). But surely it is foolish to discard useful tools (if admittedly due for repair) because something that may look brighter and shinier and does something for some agents, attracts attention; in these critical times everything that works at all is needed. A bit differently, Rodman suggests superfessions of conventional ethics (though perhaps not of a more expansive ethics), because it is an integral part of the former moral/legal stage of consciousness, conventional ethics - if not actually in the process of being superseded (in the dominant culture it is not) by a later and higher stage, of appropriate new experience - ought to be superseded, since the moral/legal stage is 'now more part of the problem than its solution' (p.43). Again all 17 Elsewhere however (e.g. Naess 89 p.24) explains how values go beyond "facts". 18 Later Fox proceeds differently, with 'deep ecology ... described as ... a position within ... "foundational ethics'" (p.86). "Foundational ethics", another exceedingly illexplained notion, is ethics as 'concerned with "understanding ourselves"' (p.86, p.113), and so part of the egocentric self nexus; it is also said to be ethics as 'concerned with development of a state of being' (p.113), the being of selves no doubt. Does "foundational ethics" supply principles and some values? If not, how does it manage to be an ethic? If so, how does it escape Fox's objections to environmental ethics? In any case, "foundational ethics" which we are supposed to search for (along with "understanding ourselves"), is intended to be an environmental ethic! �51 decidedly questionable, both historically and systematically, particularly given the prospect of a plurality of integrated techniques. C*. Instead, a radically new ethic is designed. This is of course part of what deepgreen and other radical, not merely reformist, alternatives to prevailing ethics and nature philosophies are about. It was, once upon a time, an objective of deep ecology also; it apparently no longer invariably is. But just as there is no definite position offered by deep ecology on several critical issues (esp. in ecological politics), so there is now no definite position on the place of ethics (pace p.41), as the tentative classification serves to reveal. No doubt Fox had a particular message that he wanted to be drawn from the quotations and needed for his arguments - explicit rejection of an ethical approach in favour of experience in the shape of ecological consciousness (p.47) - but what he has supplied is an entertaining pot pourri of positions, countering or jamming the message. It is ironic that Western deep ecology should have tried to opt out of ethics, at exactly the time that ethics is making a major come back, when ethics are becoming again a significant force in business and the world. Or in terms of a different image, at the very time when the ship of ethics is returning to harbour after a long period on high rough seas, Fox and friends decide to jump overboard; we hope they are strong swimmers. With ethics returned, a renewed force, what we need is not no ethics but new ethics, not to concede the power of renewed ethics over to conservative power-holders or restrictive do-gooders, but to put ethics to expansive tolerant good environmental and social works. 5. Biospheric egalitarianism revisited. The notion is terminally ill, but I fear we shall keep revisiting it until it is buried under heavy concrete. So far, for all its problems, it lives on (with apologists, Fox included, shifting ground accordingly; similarly N aess, e.g. 85 p.6). It just keeps reappearing in strong unqualified form, for instance in Sessions (recently): 'one of the first clear statements' of ecosophy 'that all individuals, species (including humans), and ecosystems have EQUAL inherent value (the ecocentric position) was made by Arne Naess when he proposed the principle of BIOSPHERICAL (ECOLOGICAL) EGALITARIANISM ... ' (89, p.11). So represented it simply succumbs to all the previous criticism (in my Critique and indirectly in EE p.139 ff.). Interestingly then both Fox and Naess appeal to 'Sessions' interpretation of biocentric egalitarianism as "a statement of non-anthropocent ricism"' (p.39), to which Fox adds, in all seriousness, 'rather than as a formal environmental axiological position'. In a revealing passage, Sessions puts it rather differently, 'Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a rejection of human chauvinistic ethical theory and the criteria �52 used to ascribe rights and value; it is a reductio ad absurdum of conventional ethics. Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a statement of non-anthropocentricism' 19 . This statement does not hang together. For instance, non-anthropocentricism is weaker than rejection of human chauvinism, which on its own is not a reductio ad absurdum of all conventional ethics (because, first off, not an argument, and because, second, of the character of some "conventional" ethics such as intuitionism). Without the logically inadmissible loop through anti-human chauvinism (the deep-green position) the situation is worse still; for, on the contrary, rather conventional British utilitarianisms such as Smart's and Singer's are robustly nonanthropocentric. By so excessively eroding its egalitarian principles, deep ecology loses much depth. In a passage which Fox says 'greatly clarifies the confusion that has surrounded Naess's notion', Naess too, again over-influenced by his minders, takes a similar pathetic course. The principle had previously 'suggest[ed] a positive doctrine, and that is too much'! 'The importance of the intuition' contracts to 'its capacity to counteract' certain chauvinistic hubris. What Fox manages to draw out of these counteracting principles are, however, not principles at all, but an orientation to or general attitude of non-interference, "Letting be", etc. This is not just considerably removed from what N aess offers; it is pretty remote from egalitarianisms. For one can let inferiors, and what is of no inherent value, be, spare and preserve them, perhaps for later exploitation. But what Fox is really concerned to draw from his authorities is the concession (they do not make, nor did he himself formerly) that the principle of biospherical egalitarianism is not a principle, not a position at all (a curious thing to think it was), but something much less definite, less positive, less specific, less open to criticism, a more general attitude, no doubt underlying ethical practice, but definitely not part of an environmental axiology. Poor deluded critics like Sylvan who supposed that a principle is a principle have 'missed' 'the extremely important point' that for supporters of deep ecology a "principle" is but a general attitude. These supporters indeed feel that treating a principle as a principle can do more harm than good, 'and so have deliberately chosen not to take the environmental axiological route' (p.41). There ends Fox's diversion on biospheric egalitarianism. What it comes to is this:- Had the principle been a principle, within environmental axiology, the criticism made of the principle would at 19 Quoted by Fox in a quote that never ends (p.39). In this mismash, Session proceeds to draw upon our material against human chauvinism and conventional ethics, having first dismissed us, referring to EE p.139, as 'mistak[ing] what Naess is up to. Naess's position is not ... "an extension of conventional Western ethics"'. As it happens, we don't mention Naess at all either on p.139 or in our discussion of extensionalism: how do we mistake what Naess is up there to when we don't consider what he is up to? Back in the 70s deep ecology was, after all, not a significant position. �53 the very least constitute a powerful challenge (p.38); but fortunately it is not, "positive doctrines" are too open to criticism! It is only a general attitude concerning reluctance to harm other living beings (p.40). 20 Egalitarianism, of value as well as principle, has dropped out in this rather shallow evasion. 6. The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned "environmental axiological route". Fox wants to distance deep ecology from value theory but is also aware, from time to time, that this is not really possible. As a result his position on the relation of deep ecology to value theory is decidedly ambiguous at best, and at worst inconsistent. The tensions appear within the space of a single page (e.g. p.85). We are told both that 'deep ecology is not [a] position within environmental axiology' and that 'it could be quite mistaken to think' that deep ecology 'stands outside ... value theory'. Whence inconsistency results, given that axiology has its normal technical sense. 21 But there is evidence that Fox intends significantly more by 'axiology' than normal - as well as adopting the normal sense: so that behind the initial inconsistency stands another inconsistency. What precisely Fox does intend remains however obscure, scandalously obscure. For one of Fox's main accusations against critics of deep ecology 22 , is that critics are committed to 'environmental axiological reductionism', they 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology', so they are blind to what 'deep ecology thinkers are really on about', which (negatively) consists in 'rejection of the "environmental axiological route"' (pp.51-53). Among these critics, mired in "ethical reductionism", blind to the new paradigmatic character of deep ecology which 20 Or presumably otherwise negatively interfere with other natural things - otherwise the reformulation, though apparently platitudinous, is too narrow, discriminating against some parts of nature. The harm reformulation is borrowed from Devall and Session, who try to make biospherical egalitarian and Self-realisation interpenetrate: 'Biocentric equality is intimately related to the all inclusive Self-realisation in the sense that if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves' (p.56). Unfortunately in the ordinary sense of 'harm' the latter claim is entirely false; as I previously remarked, it is all too easy to harm parts of Nature without harming ourselves, with but negligible impact on ourselves. 21 The word 'axiology' does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary. But no doubt it means the investigation, study and theory of value or worth, and is thus tantamount to value theory, as contrasted however with deontology. What it means will soon become an issue: see below. 22 Yes, it remains an unduly adversial intellectual game, part of the long Britishscholastic history of philosophy. �54 has taken as a guiding star precisely avoidance of the "axiological route", is the hapless Sylvan; the tenacity with which he sticks to his indefensible account of deep ecology is largely explained through these features (p.52). For explanation of some of the operative abusive terminology we are referred elsewhere, to other writings of Fox. But the source is scarcely more informative, and indeed relevant parts of it have, in any case, been lifted for Fox's Response. 23 The promise of explanation is not fulfilled. 'Ethical reductionism' is, like its successor 'environmental axiological reductionism', explained by Fox on the run, which is to say it is not explained. Nor is the reductionist charge sustained. For what is offered, what 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers' are alleged to do, the pursuit of 'environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental ethics/axiology', may well reflect undue concentration, but it is not reductionism. Fox is decidedly adept in the fallacious business of sliding terms around (otherwise known as Humpty Dumptyism). 'Reductionism' and 'axiology' are not the only terms that suffer at his hands; so, relevant to our purposes, does 'ontology'. At least in the context of his "guiding stars" paper, parts of which are shunted into his Response, Fox uses 'ontology' to mean, not what it does mean, roughly 'the general study of what exists', but very differently, the 'underlying perception of the way things are', which, among other things, epistemologizes what was part of metaphysics. In those terms, 'deep ecology's guiding star ... [which] is (and should be) ... this attempt to shift the primary focus of environmental philosophical concern from ethics to ontology' becomes an epistemological diversion: a regressive attempt to move environmental philosophy to anthropic experiential concerns (Fox 84 p.204 rearranged). It is evident, by the way, who is attempting to do this shifting. If epistemologists focus their efforts on a tiny number of tiny epistemological problems, if logicians discuss only quantificational logic, they cannot be significantly accused of reductionism; they would have 23 While many sorts of recycling are of course commendable, reservations should be held about academic recycling of earlier papers, especially when no improvements are attempted. Fox does at least attempt some "improvements" to get around the obvious objection that deep ecology is itself a normative and hence ethical route; but the adjustments he infiltrates actually make other matters worse. For they consist of the replacement of 'ethical' by 'axiological' or 'environmental axiological' or similar. So now, for instance, the journal Environmental Ethics is charged with reflecting environmental axiological reductionism (p.106); but as examination quickly shows the journal carries much ethical material which is not axiological (e.g. on rights and obligations) - evidently it also carries much that is not reductionistic and even some that concerns philosophy of nature rather than ethics. Fox's charges are without proper foundation. �55 also to claim that is all there is to their enterprise, and to make some attempt to show how the apparent remainder comes down to that. These further necessary conditions are not fulfilled in the case of 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers'; apart from a small minority of philosophers associated with the "ethics without philosophy" idea here is nothing approaching a requisite reduction framework. No doubt there is an axiological reduction program, pursued by consequentalists of various brands, but that is predominantly a program within ethics. As well the long-running naturalistic reduction program grinds on unsuccessfully. But there is no recognisable environmental philosophy reduction program; nor could such a program hope to succeed. There are suitably many counter-instances to Fox's large accusations; among them, conveniently, is that main target, Sylvan, who does not take an "environmental axiological route". In print I have come out against reduction of deontic notions and normative discourse generally to axiological terms; and have, in any case, made it perfectly plain that environmental philosophy comprises much more than ethics, certainly including parts of politics, philosophy of nature, metaphysics and so on. 24 Thus Sylvan, so far from 'criticis[ing] deep ecology on the erroneous basis of it being a position or approach within environmental axiology' (p.101), does not himself take the alleged "environmental axiological route", as the record shows. Rather than rely on my record (a political expedient that should engender but little philosophical enthusiasm), I'm tempted to issue a countercharge: insofar as Sylvan is committed to an "environmental axiological route" so also is (authentic) deep ecology, as elaborated by Naess. Consider, for instance, Naess's elaboration of the deep ecological platform. But in sustaining this counter-charge (the detailed support involves a comparison, made in Bennett and Sylvan, of deep-green theory with authentic deep ecology), we come up once again against the problem of what is meant here by 'axiology'. Unremarkably Fox deploys the fallacious method of redefinition. By 'axiology' and its compounds, Fox both means what is normally meant and also means significantly more. Hardly necessary by now to add, he manages to slide from one to the other. In the normal way, axiology, or value theory, is the philosophical study of virtue and values, 'their meaning, characteristics, origins, types, criteria and epistemological status (p.100, quoting Angeles). 24 So far so good. But now for the first twist and slide. 'In the area of See EP, e.g . p.188, p.222, and several works in the Green series. In the early 70s when there was briefly some glimmer of hope that the Australian National University might interest itself in environmental philosophy, I sketched out a perspective of what it might comprise, which I reproduce as an Appendix (if I can find it!). �56 environmental ethics, the axiological concept of intrinsic value plays a fundamental role. 25 . . . On this understanding, environmental ethics is more accurately described as environmental axiology ... ' (p.100). This is a major non-sequitur. It would almost as well be said that because induction plays a fundamental role in philosophy of science, philosophy of science is more accurately described as induction-theory, and even amounts to induction-theory! Plainly it is quite inaccurately described as induction-theory, since there is much else to philosophy of science; what makes matters still worse is that there are schools which contend that induction drops out as a method and so as a problem. Rather similarly environmental ethics is much more inaccurately redescribed as environmental axiology because, but not only because, there is much more to ethics than axiology, the whole matter of proper conduct for example. For value only impacts on action and proper conduct by way of further principles which are not themselves part of value theory. It is obvious that value theory does not in general exclude what is not (without further ado) a part of it, such as deontic theory, moral epistemology, and so on; but the obvious gets lost sight of, as when Fox assumes that environmental axiology rules out experiential and empathetic procedures. Fox attempts rather more than adjustment and exclusion in his "redescription" of normal environmental ethics as environmental axiology; he has to if his charges against environmental axiology (on the face of it a harmless enough study), and the importance of avoiding it, are to begin to stand up. 25 Fox backs up this claim with themes drawn from Callicott and Regan, with which it is said 'most environmental philosophers would agree', (p.100). Maybe others do; but I doubt that they should, not without significant qualification. Regan states that 'the development of what can properly be called an environmental ethic requires that we postulate inherent value in nature'. Firstly, that is only one way to try to develop an environmental ethic (which may not be deep). There are other feasible starting points and primitives: rights, justice, respects, fairness, empathy, identification, utility, vandalism, evil, and so on, in terms of which value may (or may not) be subsequently be defined (e.g. along lines that tempted former philosophers: what it is fitting/right, for any rational being to prefer/desire). Secondly, the term 'postulate' at best grates, at worst gets the picture seriously wrong: value may not be self-evident, assumed without proof, imposed as a demand, ... . Callicott describes 'the problem of intrinsic value in nature ... as the most critical and most recalitrant theoretical problem of environmental ethics'. That already presupposes that an ethics starts out in Regan's sort of way. Even if a deep ethics does take value as primitive, that is but one problem among several, a problem blown up to critical exaggerated size, primarily by opponents of environmental ethics and infiltrators of the ranks. For other major problems for any ethics, and a more balanced view, see Broad's final chapter. �57 We can glean further information as to what is loaded into the terminology from what Fox tries to do. An environmental axiology is the same as a (formal) environmental axiological position, and that as a formal value theory (pp.40-41; the word 'formal' can be inserted or left out, in Fox it appears to function primarily as a con-term). Such theories, which are "theoretical" and "definite", contain as well as • a value theory, and perhaps also a rights theory (e.g. p.35), both • exact principles, offering specific positional guidance, which are • positively formulated • which apply to all situations, and • a code of conduct, no doubt made up from the principles. 26 Some of Fox's criticisms of environmental axiology turn on these further, and excessively exacting, features he has tried illegitimately to incorporate into axiology. At this stage, there are two main confusions:- first, as to the extent of ethics and moral theory that axiology comprehends, and secondly as to the character of the principles axiology (and, for that matter, deontology and praxis) is supposed to include. A value theory on it own yields neither a rights' theory nor a code of conduct. Even a highly and objectionably reductive theory such as consequentialism requires principles drawn from outside value theory, such as that one ought to act so as to maximize value or utility, in order to arrive at principles of conduct and actionable rights. A value theory may include principles but these are principles concerning value. Like other principles, like those of deontology, they may well not measure up to the excessive standards Fox tries to impose. In particular, the principles may be defeasible, may include or presuppose unspecified and unlistable exceptions; they may include ceteris paribus clauses; and so they may well not apply in all situations. They may fall far short of supplying necessary and/or sufficient conditions; they may not be positively formulated (prohibitions in such forms as 'Don't ... ' are commonplace in ethics); and so on. 26 As well, it seems to be assumed that an axiology, and indeed an Anglo-American ethics, must be atomistic and individualistic; they are but 'means of structuring the interactions of atomistic individuals' (p.112). Not so. It is worth remarking that deep-green theory assumes neither atomism nor individualism (see EP). Nor does it pursue or assume any of the following reductive practices: deontic to axiological, or vice versa; environmental philosophy to environmental ethics, or vice versa; axiological notions to a unique set of primitives, or the single primitive value. As there are several ways to disable a bulldozer, so there are many ways to enable an environmental philosophy: value is but one starting point. �58 7. The "case" against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach' (p.82). Among the 'serious problems' encountered are said to be those, now hoary, issues concerning intrinsic value, which Fox tosses up in a substantially shallow way. For most environmental ethicists, it is difficult to see how something can have value in itself (i.e. intrinsic value) if it isn't valuable to itself, and to be valuable to itself it must be able to matter to itself or, in other words, be sentient, by which is meant that it must possess the capacity to suffer (p.73)27_ This contention is at least dubious clause by clause, and overall profoundly mistaken. The critical transformation, for deep environmentalism, is centred on that of value in to valuable to (or of value to). It is difficult to see why any environmental thinker would accede to such a transformation, in itself and to itself being so very different in meaning (e.g. consider them coupled respectively with such terms as conspicuous, unusual, etc.) But, in any event, there are several sorts of evident counter-examples to such transformations. Firstly, there are examples from outside environmental territory such as works of art, intellectual theories, and transcendental metaphysical gems. A beautiful theory or a resplendent form can be intrinsically valuable without being of value to itself, without being able to matter to itself, etc. Secondly, there are examples like rare seed, embryonic valuables, and the like. Thirdly, there are sentient or conscious items of intrinsic value that are not valuable to themselves, and do not matter to themselves, such as great but utterly modest people. There is much else wrong in the connections Fox delivers up 28 , but we can bypass most of them (e.g. sentience does not mean a capacity to suffer, as shown by perceptually aware creatures who do not suffer because they have no pain receptors and the like; nor is sentience required, as consciousness will serve for mattering; and so on). 27 It is hard to credit that someone fronting up as a deep environmental thinker could present such stuff, but of course various reasons can be found. While the argument is very bad, there is no doubt, what is no excuse, that worse can be found. For instance, what is intrinsically valuable is valuable in itself, so it must have a self, so it must be sentient, etc. 28 Fox subsequently announces the 'link between something not mattering to itself ... and the conclusion that we can do as we will with it ... sacred in the Environmental Axiological Orthodox Church of Intrinsic Value' (p.80). It is a Church of his own fabrication, at which no respectable deep environmentalist would worship or even be found. �59 Fox runs straight on to an old paradigm assertion by Frankena, from whom he borrowed the argument, which he again proceeds to ascribe (without any evidence offered or, I suspect, any research basis)to most environmental ethicists 29 : 'I do not see, however, how anything can have intrinsic value except the activities, experiences, and lives of conscious sentient beings (persons, etc.)' (Frankena, quoted p.73). Frankena's assertion, as it stands utterly unsupported, 'is a powerful one', according to Fox, again displaying his shallow proclivities: 'What difference does it make how I treat something if it cannot matter to itself?' (p.78) Big differences, not merely to those in a region for whom it may matter, but in the region, if Fox dams the last wild river in the region, cuts down the last lowland rainforest. Fox tops his astounding move by dignifying this shallow rubbish by the title 'powerful argument'. Its power 'is evidenced by the fact that those who want to say rocks or trees have intrinsic value often do so by pure assertion rather than providing an argument for their view (140)' (p.78). That's no evidence, it's irrelevant; and I wouldn't pursue it, were not such a familiar utterly shallow complaint built into the alleged evidence, and were Sylvan not roped in again in a footnote as 'another case in point' (p.112 note 140). It may come as news to Fox (who seems to have read little of what I have written before he rushed out his Response), but I do provide arguments, including those built on examples like the Last Person and the Last Sentient Creatures, examples which have obtained a fair bit of exposure (for some of these, see e.g. EP pp.121-132; and in fact a general argument can be developed from the semantical analysis of value). The certainties of Frankena's dogmatic assertion can be whittled away, first by separating conscious from sentient (after all many people can now see that animals that are not conscious persons can have intrinsic value), second by assembling marginal cases and analogies in a now familiar way, then by counter-arguments, and so on. But, in any case, insofar as environmental ethicists (as distinct from conventional ethicists) continue to side with Frankena that reveals them as a rather reactionary lot, significantly lagging popular thinking. 30 As Naess and others report, many non-philosophers have no difficulty in recognising value-in-itself outside persons, in living creatures and natural objects. 29 There is evidence that these ascriptions are mere desk-chair speculation, in fact of little value; e.g. at the bottom of p.78 where Fox says, of Frankena's position, 'I think it represents the dominant position within ... environmental axiology'. I suspect that, once again, Fox is not duly separating environmental axiology from conventional axiology. 30 The chauvinism of traditional ethical systems is enough to explain the comparative lack of intellectual interest in such moribund systems, and the resulting much wider search for roots, ideas, etc. There is accordingly no serious puzzle as to the sources of deep environmentalism (pace Fox p.74). �60 In the course of trying to get his attack on the environmental axiological framework airborne Fox resorts to some extraordinary distortion and falsification. The looseleaf insert (page 79), where some disenchanted thinkers make an abrupt unexplained entry, affords a good illustration. First we are told that what those in the business (except no doubt some enlightened deep ecologists) 'typically fail to realise is that the environmental axiological framework of discourse so dominates the discussion of our relationship with the natural world that it is mistakenly taken to be the only possible approach' (p.79). This claim is, it seems to me, roundly refuted by the history of the discussion and some of the literature it encompasses. Among other approaches there are, for instance, extended rights (e.g. Stone), environmental justice (e.g. Wenz), extended interests (e.g. Johnson), and negatively ethical nihilism (e.g. Hinckfuss). Fox continues unabashed: 'In other words [!], the hegemony of the environmental axiological framework is such that it has led almost everybody involved in the ecophilosophical debate to think that we have an obligation to care for something if and only if it "has" intrinsic value' (p.79). There's some prime rubbish for you. The charge is manifestly false, seriously flawed, plucked from thin air, and unnecessary except for Fox's misguided mission. Even if an axiological approach were the only approach, no such obligation-to-care principles would follow, and certainly not principles as dubious or refutable as those given. The if -half of the unabashed claim is at, the very, least dubious and would be rejected on some popular positions: suppose, for instance that the intrinsic value of the thing is small, or that it is overridden by the intrinsic value of some competitor for our attention. The only-if-half (which wins Fox's italics, he is going to make much of it) would be rejected by almost everyone who thought about the matter, because of course obligations apply to what has merely instrumental value. If I have borrowed a friend's tools then I have an obligation to care for them though these tools have no intrinsic value. Differently, I am under obligations to behave generally in certain sorts of ways whether the things encountered have intrinsic value or not; accordingly I'm not entitled to treat them any old way (e.g. to vandalise them) or even as I will or, more ambiguously, as I 'see fit'. Combining the pernicious principles Fox has unearthed yields the following ridiculous result: if a thing has no value to itself, for instance has ceased to be of value to itself, then we have no obligation to care for it, we can do what we like with it. The applications of this result are remarkable. There is no doubt that Fox has thereby provided a simple - if appalling - solutions to such major social problems as those of drug and alcohol abuse; victims who are so far down the track that they have ceased to be of value to themselves, can simply be vanished, or dealt with in whatever other way we find convenient. Then too human slavery and sacrifice, never entirely vanquished, could be widely reinstated: Oh brave new world that Fox has lead us into! �61 Fox tries to make a lot out of these odious obligation-to-care principles he has attempted to foist upon environmental axiology. He suggests they indicate the need to abandon rather than broaden the notion of intrinsic value; he suggests they may 'reflect the inherent limitations of the environmental axiological approach' (p.79); he suggests that we need to find instead 'another framework of discourse that can articulate' our feelings about what we ought to care about. This alternative framework - from the many and various that might have been selected - is none other than the wider self identification framework. The obvious course, which should be pursued anyway, of seeking an obligation-to-care principle that does measure up better to our emotional presentations, does not seem to have occurred to Fox, so preoccupied is he with attacking what he sees as "the environmental axiological route" and getting to self immersion. Finally, Fox runs out some examples which are supposed to show the repugnant conclusions to which the axiological approach leads. Unfortunately for Fox's case, the arguments involved do not succeed without further assumptions beyond those Fox enumerates, assumptions smarter adherents of an axiological approach do not make. The examples involve comparisons of groups of individuals, which, it is alleged, exponents of intrinsic value cannot discriminate, though the group situations are very different. One example runs as follows: ' ... the loss, by human interference at least, of the last members of a species ... is somehow "worse" than the loss by human interference of an equivalent number from an abundant species ... . Yet, in terms of intrinsic value, those losses are equivalent since the same "amount" is lost in both cases' (p.80). Fox then argues against more holistic assignments of value on the basis of another dogmatic pronouncement from 'Frankena that communities (such as species ... ) do not "have intrinsic value over and above that contained in ... [their] members"' .31 But he goes on to assert that, irrespective of Frankena's position, 'the point ... applies generally to any atomistic environmental axiological position i.e. to any position that sees intrinsic value as exclusively adhering in or attaching to individual entities' (p.81). Fox is dead wrong. The case assumes, without warrant or mention, equality of the value adhering or assigned to individuals. Plainly the loss of the last members of the species is worse (where it is, e.g. the species is not a diabolical laboratory concoction) because the members of the species are individually more valuable than those of the abundant species. Consider, for comparison, the razing by fire of 31 Fox's second example actually contains the elements of an interesting argument (perhaps, to be uncharitable, the only example in his whole Response). This example, of monoculture vs diversity (p.81), does introduce, if not much of holism, at least relational features of the individuals assembled. There is no reason, of course, why axiology should not take account of those features. Contrary to Fox, there is no need to 'separately posit' that the principle of diversity is 'valuable in and of itself' (p.82). �62 two art galleries containing the same numbers of individual art works, one containing rare art works, the other containing selections from the abundant works of relatively indifferent crafters. The amount, assessed in monetary value even, lost in the first fire is much greater, and so the loss much worse, than in the second fire. Fox not only proceeds to state what his examples would show without due qualification. But he goes on, quite inadmissibly, to general claims which leave off even the qualifications he had earlier introduced (thus later on, p.82, he drops the essential restriction to atomistic positions). Environmental axiology accordingly emerges substantially unscathed; it does not need to be replaced by something else, such as wider identification, only rendered smarter, and supplemented or merged into a fuller environmental philosophy. 8. Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification. But Wes tern deep ecology is now bent upon replacement. Devall, for example, now maintains that 'the unique contribution that deep ecology makes to ecophilosophy is its emphasis on ecological self and affirmation. Subscribing to similar ideas Fox has suggested changing the label "deep ecology" to "transpersonal ecology".' Devall (in 89 again) has deep ecology as, above all, discovering 'an aspect of our self' which has been culturally neglected. Such a reorientation is significantly at variance with Naess's introduction and initial elaboration of deep ecology; for his original summary (in 73) of deep ecology, which is ecologically focussed, contains no allusion to self, ecological or other. It is also at variance with Devall and Sessions of but three years earlier, where nature, ecology and biological systems still appeared fundamental to deep ecology, these entering through the other ultimate norm (besides Self-realisation) of deep ecology, that of biocentric equality (see their p.66). As it happens, Devall, by contrast with Fox, vacillates between a more authentic deep ecology in the style ofNaess (chapter 1 of Devall 89) and the Western variant of transparent ecology (e.g. pp.39-57), which would displace the original theory. There is much speaking with many tongues, much inconsistency, in deep ecology. We have already witnessed such deep ecology doubletalk in the matter of value and the status of ethics. We see it again with transpersonal or expanded-self identification. We only enter 'the real territory of deep ecology' according to Fox (p.53ff.) with such expanded identification. Yet one can be a deep ecologist, much literature explains, without any identification efforts at all (for example by adopting the platform which does not mention identification). So one can be a deep ecologist without ever 'entering deep ecological territory'. Deep ecology without deep ecology - another wonder, or just more double talk? Like Fox's parting flourish: there are sketch maps for deep ecological territory (p.89), yet it is 'ultimately mapless' (see Devall 89 p.39). �63 Fox tries to explain "the search" of deep ecology 'for such things as "ecological consciousness" (Devall and Sessions) and "Self-realisation" (Naess)' through expanded identification. Most conveniently he can take ready-made from Devall and Sessions reductive explications:- 'Ecological consciousness is the result of a psychological expansion of the narrowly encapsulated sense of self as isolated ego, through identification with all humans (species chauvinism), to finally an awareness of the identification and interpenetration of self with ecosystem and biosphere' (Sessions, quoted pp.53-4). 'The essence of ecological consciousness ... [is] to overcome this illusory dichotomy [between Humans and N ature 32 ]' for which 'the important task is ... the psychological development from narrow egotistical "self' to identification with the whole' (Devall as quoted p.53). But, once again, it is one thing to have on authority such explication; it is quite another thing whether such reductions work. I submit that they do not, for the simple reason that ecological consciousness may be had or attained without any such self expansion developments. Consider, first, Professor Flatpan who is a devoted but unimaginative ecological field worker. All his practice, behaviour and so on, shows him as utterly committed to ecological causes, preservation of wilderness and so on, and fully conscious of its importance. But he makes no identification of himself with what he works with or for. It may be that he is some sort of empirical separatist; or it may not. Perhaps he even rejects identification suggestions when they are put to him, e.g. on grounds of hubris, nonsense, ... , or he simply doesn't identify, etc. In Professor Flatpan and his variants we seem to have a tribe of people with strong ecological consciousness and affiliations but without identification. Consider next, the interesting Wombat tribe, superb in their tribal treatment of their environment, who have not developed the notion of self or, for that matter, that of identification. The tribe exhibits a high ecological consciousness (in our ordinary understanding of that non-technical notion, in terms of a strong perception or awareness of environmental matters) but lacks even the conceptual apparatus for self expansion developments. Expanded identity or self developments may serve as useful or powerful tactics for raising ecological consciousness in people raised and hooked on a narrow self-interested self, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or understanding ecological consc10usness. Analogous points apply against the attempt to drag Self-realisation into the picture. 32 Naess, in a regressive move, now asserts that humans are unique (e.g. in 89), whence the dichotomy ceases to be illusory. More inconsistency. �64 There are in fact at least three separable notions which deep ecology has tended to fuse: ecological consciousness, widened identification and wider Self-realisation. Confusion is made so much the easier because those notions are, for the most part, not decently introduced. The whole deep ecological theory of expanded identification and Self remains exceedingly poorly explained (thus e.g. identification in Fox, esp. p.60; dimensions of Self, p.83). As ecological consciousness has already been distinguished, it remains to begin on unscrambling identification and self-realisation, and therewith the many senses of self In the first place, identification is independent of self, its manifestation or "realisation", at least to this extent: that discourse concerning identification can be explained and can proceed satisfactorily without any introduction of or notion of selves. A theory may well include identification, and even expanded identification with remote items, without selves or expanded selves. Early Taoism appears to illustrate the point well. Differently, an ontologically modest account of acting can afford a good example of how identification can operate without persona or selves. In fact, a case can be argued that such theories proceed better in this fashion, because they avoid problematic commitments to selves. It may look as if Fox, following Naess and Wilber, can escape these problems, and separation, simply by defining 'self' through identification (and perhaps conversely): 'succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.54). There are serious obstacles to such a stratagem. d Elsewhere Fox makes quite a fuss about ontological commitments; on the matter of cluttering up the universe with Selves he is strangely silent. Yet there are rather a lot of these strange selves. Assuming selves do not reproduce themselves, in a universe where there are n objects, and so 2n -1 complexes, and m individuals with selves (with m << n), there are, at first estimate, m x (2n -1) larger selves. Of course some of these larger selves may be the same, nonetheless the number of selves is huge where n is large. Moreover, if a person can identify with nonexistent, with Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus or Satan if not with the form of the Good and the set of all sets, then the numbers shoot right up, into the big infinities. Yet nothing is more common in this arena than for people to identify with fictional objects, of books, TV and so on. Indeed the art of acting depends heavily upon it. A character actor works to identify with the character being portrayed; a good actor enjoys more success in this identification enterprise. d It does not in any case evade ontic issues, because the definition requires that which abstraction which a modest theory would not have generally available. d There are questions as to the adequacy of such an explicative definition of self: whether, for example, it answers duly to prevailing senses of 'self'. The proposal does not. Consider, to bring out just one deficiency, two different but closely integrated creatures, �65 Arthur and Martha say, who identify with the same class of items including themselves and each other. Then on the Naess-Fox definition, it follows, counter-intuitively, that Arthur's Self = Martha's Self, though Arthur @ Martha. Part of what has gone wrong is evident from recent philosophical investigations, namely that the first person point of view, crucial to such items as a self or a spirit or a soul or an ego, has got omitted; a widened self involves some sort of (concentric) expansion from, or focused upon, a first-person self. 33 Normally in religious settings, it is furthermore expansion outwards from an inner personal locus by restrictive identification or selective identification (as Wilber has it), not arbitrary identification. 9. Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil. Restrictive practices can remove a serious problem for identification theory, the problem of evil identifications, but they raise an equally serious problem, how the re intrusion of value is to be avoided. Fox is vaguely aware that 'the concept of intrinsic worth' may intrude in discussions of Self-realisation. But he assumes, much too facilely, that it can be simply removed (p.56). Devall's later writings should have alerted him to the problems of those who identify with anti-environmental objects or causes, such as beach buggies, symbols of power like bulldozers or tanks , or sand mining opportunities. Identification is not always with the good, with good guys or good causes, as selective deep ecology examples invariably suggest (e.g. p.60, with sea turtles, tigers and gibbons). Spinoza, one of the progenitors of the theory, avoided the problem of evil attachments and causes by envisaging primarily identification with Nature or God, assumed ipso facto to be good. But Naess and Sessions allow for a much wider range of identifications, with the whole human race, which may overall be evil (for all that conventional ethics assert), or with undoubtedly evil human groups or organisations (e.g. the German S.S. or the Mafia). Such expanded identification is hardly to be recommended or encouraged. 33 The person touch is too narrow, unless animals are persons. For there appear to be no serious difficulties in ascribing selves to animals. Of course, if consciousness (or circularly self-consciousness) is written into the notion of self, as with some of the dictionary senses, then selves will be restricted to those animals that enjoy consciousness, a quite extensive class overlapping humans. In a different sense, tied to an original meaning of 'self as same, or one and the same used esp. prepositionally in referring back, there is no difficulty in ascribing selves much more widely. Thus we naturally say of a forest, 'It looks after itself', of an automata or even boomerang, 'It came back itself'. The broad philosophical sense (first part of sense 3 in OED) in terms of individual essences, what a thing really and intrinsically is, haecceity, certainly admits selves for forests! �66 There are criticisms, yet to be answered (though initiated in my Critique), that the "widened identification route" introduces virtually as many problems as it would resolve, and that it cannot proceed independently of what it is supposed to offer an alternative to (p.53), the pernicious "environmental axiological route". In a passage quoted from Seed part of the problem is glimpsed, though Fox who emphasizes the relevant passage fails to observe it: 'It is only by identification with the whole process that correct values will emerge' (p.63). Why? Because, as in Spinoza, "the whole process" is assumed Good, while anything less may not be; a distribution of value is presupposed. How furthermore does a disciple ensure that a proper totalising identification is made? By confirming that correct values do emerge. In brief, then, identification theory is no substitute for valuation theory, but an addition to it. Moreover, it is not an entirely essential addition, however psychologically useful. With the reintrusion of value or the like, the acclaimed superiority of the wider identification approach over the environmental axiological approach lapses. The claim, for which Fox offers initial but unpersuasive defence (p.77 on), is based on another mistake: the mistake, already observed, of thinking that value theory excludes identification. But it need not: selective identification can complement intrinsic value. Very selective identification reveals as well how a theory of heightened Self can be substantially independent of widened (unrestrictive) identification. In showing independence Hinduism, as sometimes presented (e.g. by Smith), affords an admirable example. Hinduism supposes a diminution or deepening of the self to the underlying Self, a route of self-abnegation; but that is taken to be equivalent, by inversion, to a unique expansion of self to approximate a God's eye viewpoint (of things sub specie aeternitas ). 34 34 Whereas Western approaches aim to enlarge the self - as with stock aggrandizement, or Western deep ecology expansion - Indian approaches are concerned primarily with contracting upon the self, to reduce individual expectations, aspirations, wants (to nothing on some accounts). For a resolution of life with disappointments, the (negative) suggestion is: 'if the ego were to have no expectations, there would then be nothing to disappoint' (Smith p.26). But interestingly, there is supposed to be a positive inversion of self abnegation which turns it into self expansion. Expand 'the interests of the self ... to the point of approximating a God's-eye view .. . . Seeing, thus, all things "under the aspect of eternity", would not one become completely objective towards oneself, accepting failure as being as natural an occurrence as success ... . How can defeat disappoint if one feels the joy of the victor as if it were one's own?' (p.26). 'Detachment from the finite self or attachment to reality as a whole ... positive or negative ... ' (p.27). One path to God, to oneness with the Godhead (Brahman), that through knowledge, jnana yoga, strikingly resembles Western deep ecology in some of its features and terminology. The 'Yoga of knowledge is said to be the shortest path to divine realisation (to God). It is also the steepest' (p.35). For intellectuals, introverts and the like 'Hinduism proposes a series of meditations and logical demonstrations �67 While Hinduism does also make room for expansions of selves through time, so as to 'rise above the present and even above present lifespans' (p.28) these expansions are tied to lifelines of single creatures (perhaps as reincarnated). There is no technical provision for unlimited wider identification, for instance identification with inanimate items, with a motorcycle or nuclear reactor. Thus Hinduism can serve to show the independence of unrestrictive expanded identification from self-Self theories. Evidently, too, variations on self-Self (e.g. with more ascetic theories of big Self) can strengthen this result. designed to convince the thinker that there is more to him than his finite self; ... [to] shift his central concern to the deeper reaches of his being ... the larger self that lies behind ... ' (p.33). One 'must pierce and dissolve the innumerable layers of manifest personality until all strata of the mask [all roles of the persona] are at length cut through, [to] arrive finally at the anonymous and strangely unconcerned actor [Atman] who stands beneath. The distinction between self and Self can come through another image' (p.34) however than that of the removal of roles and personae; thus there is the image of the game of life upon a chess-board and the image of the charioteer. Through exercise with such images and such practices it is claimed that a practitioner can 'build up a lively sense of an abiding Self that underlies his phenomenal personality' (p.34). The further 'step consists in shifting his self-identification from the passing to the eternal part of his being. The most direct way of doing this ... is simply to [contemplate] one's identity with the Eternal Spirit ... ' (p.35). Of course analogous self-improvement, self-abnegation and self-expansive elements feature in other religions than Indian, where they were especially early and conspicuous. In Zen, for instance, 'the dualisms of self and object, of self and other, are transcended' (p.134). In Christianity too, the circle of self can be broken, and release experienced from the cramping confines of ego (Smith again, p.280). Analogous elements made their way into Western philosophies, such as that of Spinoza, early romanticism (e.g. Schegel), German idealism and T.H. Green, and directly or indirectly into Western deep ecology (Fox, p.57). As Marxism is sometimes seen, crudely, as obtained by upending Hegelianism and replacing God by Man, so transpersonal ecology can be regarded as similarly varying elements of Hinduism, replacing God by Nature (rather than identifying them as in Spinoza). Ideological tradition does not however point uniformly in one direction, with self elevation as invariant. According to Buddhism, here too more enlightened than alternatives, that is a wrong direction. 'Strong emotions, however lofty [including those of ecological consciousness], tend to emphasize and strengthen the fatal illusion of the ego, which it is the whole aim and purpose of religion to transcend'. For the 'idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation becomes impossible)' (both quoted in Perrett, p.72). Instead Buddhism offers the tantalizing doctrine of "no self', which at least denies the existence of a substantial self. Further there is allusion to "'the two kinds of non-self': that means there is no ego in humans and no Self in Nature'. �68 Features of Hinduism also show up deficiencies in the Western Enlightenmentsponsored objective of Self-realisation. These include the already remarked problem of evil, which afflicts unrestricted Self-realisation in much the way it plagues closely related hedonism (often a main goal of Self-realisation, and out of an adjacent intellectual stable). To avoid promotion of evil and the like, ethical or similar controls need to be inserted. It should be realisation of an ethical Self, just as elsewhere it should be ethical happiness and ethical profit, not happiness and profit at the expense of other creatures or the Earth. There is worse to come. For there is a scurrilous bigger-is-better element to big Self expansion and realisation, and to often announced, but thoroughly dubious, goals of maximization. Without ethical constraints, the supreme goal of ecosophy, of maximizing Self-realisation, can be decidedly anti-environmental, as too many maximizers proceed to aggrandize themselves, maximize their consumption, or their identification with false chauvinistic Gods, or their dominance, and so on. Such maximal Self-realisation is evidently antithetical to deep environmentalism, which like high-path Hinduism and Taoism, is opposed to selfelevation and self-aggrandizement, especially in material consumption, and favours some self-restraint, self-effacement, self-domination, even selflessness and self-abnegation. But such unconstrained maximization is also in conflict with other features of ecosophy, such as simplicity of, and restraint in, material means, implying a certain Self-contraction. In brief, unrefined ecosophy is liable to be inconsistent. 10. Deconstruction and reselection of self. The problems run deeper however. The theory of expanded self and Self-realisation has ecologically defective starting points: it takes as given what should be investigated and rejected. For instance, Naess simply assumes that the process of heightened Self-realisation starts with the 'development of the narrow ego of the small [Western] child into the comprehensive structure of a Self which comprises all human beings' (quoted p.55; egoism is also assumed p.64 ). Of course deep ecology aims to induce a further development, beyond the anthropic limitations of standard trans personal psychology, 'a deep identification of individuals with all of life' (p.55 again). 35 While it is plain enough that ego is a theoretical notion, elaborated especially by Freud, it is less plain that self too is a folk-theoretic term of certain folk cultures, and it is quite insufficiently appreciated that narrow egos and individual selves are not culturally independent items (artifacts some would now say), but are acquired concepts, 35 Both developments parallel ascents in Hinduism, of upward path of "renunciation", to third (service to human communities) and fourth life-objectives. �69 chauvinistically learnt early in civilised life. Perhaps because individual selves are so deeply entrenched, especially in Westerners' impressions of themselves, a clever practical and ideological course is no doubt the encouragement of expanded egoism, self stretching exercises and empathy. But a deeper philosophical approach would investigate the notions of ego and selftheir history, development, entrenchment, arbitrariness, and dispensibility - rather than take them substantially for granted. In dissolving egoism, it is wise not to concede it at the outset. It, and the intertwined notions of self-interest, and self-ish-ness, should be taken apart to begin with, both analytically and historically. There are of course two parts to the unmasking and dethroning of self-interest: dealing with interest and dealing with self A historical investigation of the rise of the modern theory of self, done in the style of Foucault, might serve to show how arbitrary in crucial respects the notion now rigorously adhered to in social theory happens to be, and how developments could have been different. But even if such an investigation should run aground (e.g. because the notion, although not present in all tribal peoples, reaches back to prehistory), a systematic investigation need not get stuck. The notion of self-interest, and also expanded self interest in the form of group or class interest, has already been taken apart, from the angle of interest, and found wanting as an ethical starting point (see esp. our 79). A complementary investigation of self, standard theories of which should certainly not be conceded, is now required. 36 Some realisation of the problematic character of the notion of self is in fact disclosed in Naess's much earlier investigations, but he does not apply it to the familiar Enlightenment ideal of self-realisation which he takes over as foundation of his own ecosophy, and so of deep ecology as he conceives it. Instead of requisite critical and de( con)structive investigation of the notion of self, resulting in its demotion, what we are witnessing in too much deeper environmental philosophy, is an elevation of the notion and an attempt to focus and found much theory upon it (as esp. in Fox). It is reminiscent of, and related to, the earlier failed attempt to found much theory, including ethics (or a replacement for it), on the notion of person.3 7 36 My impression is that several such investigations are now under way. For discussion and elaboration of earlier investigations, which glimpse some of the requisite points, see Perrett. Our own previous investigations, particularly of the interests and needs of oneself and their interrelations and overlap with those of others (and accordingly the falseness of the egoism-altruism contrast) in 79 and EP, go some small way along the requisite path. 37 Thus, for instance, Strawson in metaphysics, and Benn in moral sciences, both elaborating on Kantian illusions. �70 Indeed those routes are significantly interlinked and offer similar beginnings; for instance, a personality comprises certain roles into which a self, oneself, is cast. In important respects, self amounts to person somewhat deanthropocized. It also suffers similar defects. Neither is sufficiently explained (e.g. what are the existence conditions, the identity conditions, the distinctive properties); neither is up to carrying the heavy theoretical load aficionados have attempted to impose upon them. In particular, neither enables an independent characterisation of central axiologic or deontic notions or other notions bound up with the regulation of conduct which they would somehow displace and to some extent provide new foundations for. Furthermore it appears that the notion of self is not, and cannot be, sufficiently deanthropicized, short of distributing selves around in woods, springs and mountains in the way pagan religions did with spirits (and then letting them be good and evil, and so forth). Undue concentration upon selves has the unfortunate and retrograde effect of swinging environmental philosophy away from deepened ecology and back to agents and actors, the live active subcomponents within ecologies. unacknowledged return to shallower waters. It signals an Because self, however dispensible in environmental philosophy, is integral to Wes tern deep ecology, it behoves us to say something about it, something more than deep ecology has said. Self is a folk-theoretic object of philosophical cast, though no doubt an item with experiential linkage, for instance as a permanent substratum of a certain range of successive (internal) states and experiences, or, without a substance, as a bundle or stringing together of a succession of 'personal' experiences. 38 It is an item, almost an objectification, whose features (which may vary with underlying theory) are primarily supplied through a culturally-dependent theory or the like (e.g. a religious or cult theory). In this regard it is like other typically psychological items of philosophical importance, such as soul (with which it is sometimes identified), spirit, mental substance, mind, psyche, person, personal essence, ego, life force, conatus, etc. In due course a now standard range of philosophical theories gets invoked to account for, or discount, such items: realisms, constructivisms, nominalisms, etc., with dominant scientific ideology committed to a dismissive nominalism. A fashionable humanist opposition has, by contrast, become enamoured of a flamboyant constructivism: selves are made, fabricated, and the like. By contrast again Western deep ecology appears committed to realism, and therewith an 38 While the experiences, such as surges of desire or apprehension, are subjectively empirical enough, the substratum or self-substance may not be. To put it in Humean terms, when I look within I don't find a self just like that (how a sceptical Hume managed to still eludes me). Self itself, like cause, though empirically grounded, is not an "empirical" concept. �71 incredible ontology of selves (already castigated). None of these standard mass-produced positions impresses as at all satisfactory (for reasons elaborated in JB ). For example, scientific nominalism inexcusably leaves out lots of experience, life-forms, and much richness (whereas for its own "legitimate" theoretical purposes it is prepared to introduce all sorts of strange objects). For constructivism there are so far unsurmounted difficulties in getting beyond the analogy: exhibiting the materials and explaining just how they are assembled. While not averse to phrases like 'the fabrication of self', it needs to be remembered that the fabrications are more like those of fiction. Insensitive realism is different; there is sound reason to remain entirely sceptical about an intuitive ontology of selves, especially when a good empathesizer may have numerous different existent selves. I can see little excuse for (being taken in by) such ontological blow outs. Item-theory offers an appealing alternative to these standard positions generally, and therewith very different prospects for self. An item-theoretic account of self will resemble that already offered for mind (in MX); analogous item-theoretic accounts can no doubt be given for spirit, psyche and ego (and also spook, shade, spectre, ghost, etc.). Minds are fairly satisfactory folk-theoretic items which do not exist; ghosts, whether in machines or not, are decidedly less satisfactory inexistential items. Selves are different inexistential items again, with different features; many subjects which do not have minds may have selves. The difficult part of the business consists in explaining whic~ items selves are, a business that is complicated because there are several somewhat different but interconnected notions of self in circulation. Fortunately these can all be accounted for as restrictions in one way or another- temporal, cultural, subject-discipline - of a total self. The total self of a subject abstracts from the total set of features which contribute to the self or personality of that subject, from everything that makes it selfwise what it is (whether supplied by local cultures or not, both supplied internally and not), over the life-span of the subject. For some subjects with richer psychic lives, these features will include states of consciousness (and then the total self will properly include ego, the conscious self). Thus a total self is, if you like, what distinguishes a subject, makes it what it is and so gives its abiding essence (and id-entity), and so resolves issues of personal identity over times. 39 What the relevant features are will become clearer as we come to the usual restrictions. A first set of restrictions are temporal restrictions, a second set aspect restrictions. These are combined in the OED sense 39 This account sharpens and much elaborates the senses which the dictionaries list as philosophical, e.g. OED sense 3. The inexistential account offered shares common ground with the Buddhist "no self' theory when presented as denying the real existence of a self. �72 '4.a. What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation; one's nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or appearance, considered as different at different times. Chiefly with qualifying adj.' So, for example, Dobbin's total self restricted to time period t1 differs from his total self restricted to t2 at which period he is old and mentally decrepit. A main aspect restriction, very commonly imposed, is to psychically-relevant features, excluding merely bodily features. Differently, a total self, especially a total psychic self, of a subject may be partitioned into such selves, whence sense 4 b of OED. '4. b. An assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be conceived as constituting one of various conflicting personalities within a human being. Better self: the better part of one's nature.' Among the topic, or subject-discipline, restricted selves those of economics and social sciences are nowadays particularly prominent. A broad economic self, for instance, is a psychic self confined to an individual and restricted to its locus of wants, preferences, desires, interests, needs, aspirations, goals, etc. (Of course some of the volitional features can be explained in terms of others; in older faculty discourse, it coincides with the individual will.) With a narrow economic self, that of mainstream economics, the broad economic self is narrowed considerably to remove all volitional features stretching beyond those of a present human. Thus interests, for instance, are restricted to selfish interests, those of the human concerned, to exclude both altruistic interests (those of relevance to other items and typically against a creature's own selfish interests) and, more important, other-directed and higher-order interests (such as a's interest is that Ws interest be fulfilled, a's concern for~' etc.) 40 This narrow self tightens up a further dictionary sense, namely OED '5. One's personal welfare and interests as an object of concern; chiefly in a bad sense, selfish or self-interested motives ... '. The tightened-up restrictive notion lies at the base of most modern social science. It is characteristically coupled with the Hobbesian theme, according to which all motivation reduces to that of narrow economic selves, effectively self-interest. Such psychological egoism, that nothing can move a creature to action or decision except interests and like experiences of its own self, was assumed by Spinoza, who proposed absorbing this 40 These points are much further explained in 79 and EP. Other selves, such as altruistic selves and self-effacing selves, deploy quite different obverse restrictions, eliminating local selfish interests. �73 excessively narrow self in a generous Nature (p.57). Deep ecology has attempted to expand this sorry route (p.54), which starts out from a dominant paradigm mistake. 41 11. More troubles with Self as foundation. The big trouble is that an expanded Hobbesian picture, with expanded-self interest as the only fundamental motive, presupposes the essential correctness of Hobbes' crude theme - all that Hobbes really got wrong was the 'size' of one's self - but that is a fundamental mistake. It is a mistake as fundamental as the conflicting crude motivational theme that the only basic motive of business enterpreneurs is [self-]profit. It is a mistake of the same cast as the pervasive idea that conventional ethics can be rendered environmentally adequate just by expansion of those it applies to (expansion of the "community", or of a suitable base class of parties with interests, sentience, etc.) - what is often now called 'moral extensionism' 42 . As empirical evidence tells, prima facie decisively, against intertwined Hobbesian and entrepreneurial economic motivational theory - an extraordinarily convenient, and not "rationally" abandoned, theory for contemporary power elites - two substantially successful theory-saving strategies swing into action: • a sustained propaganda campaign to align people's motives with the theory, conducted through advertising, education and other mass channels of persuasion; • a sustained reduction campaign by subservient intellectuals to show that all apparently exceptional motives actually conform to the motivational theory. At the same time, minorities (such as pre-industrial peoples) whose motives do not conform to the established/ment theory are of course discounted. This seriously flawed anti-environmental theory should be resisted and replaced, not just extended. For the only basic and legitimate motives and interests are not merely those of self (whether expanded in a futile attempt to encapture other or not). One distinct motive is, to put it in old-fashioned Kantian terms though the example is not Kantian, that of duty, duty for instance to this Earth, duty which is neither self-regarding or necessarily Self-regarding or, in any ordinary sense, otherregarding. 41 The chauvinistic expansion of self and person is sometimes carried to remarkable lengths, as revealed by Shepard: 'we must affirm that the world is being a part of our own body'. 42 For further explanation and criticism of this expansion, see EP. At least Fox does Sylvan the "favour" of distancing him from the most famous exponent of such extensionism, Leopold, whom he tries to push into the wider identification and wider Self fold (p.64). �74 A third complementary strategy renders the theory normative: while agents may act, or appear to act, on non-self-interested motives, it is only rational to act according to one's ongoing self-interest. (While we shall focus upon a strong version of the normative egoistic theme, that it is only rational to act in one's own self-interest, including one's future self, much of what is said counts against weaker forms of the theme according to which it is in some way preeminently reasonable to act in one's own on-going self-interest.) This normative assumption depends crucially however upon a specially-tailored theory of self- a substantial underlying self that suitably integrates all one's interests and concerns, past, present and future. Without such an account the peculiar self-evidence normative egoism is presented as enjoying, and upon which it depends as an unargued rest position, begins to fall away. Suppose instead a self or person is represented as a sequence of causally connected experiential moments (e.g. momentary selves, of a person). Unfortunately then, for normative egoism, it ceases to be evident to many presently placed selves that there are special specially-valid reasons for only being concerned with future elements of one particular sequence rather than another, to which one's present self may not belong; for promoting the interests of this future momentary self rather than some other more congenial one, perhaps in another sequence. 43 Indeed it is evident that reasons for action are not confined to those intermalised to the interests of one future self rather than another, one my or thou or it (say) rather than another; that reasons can and do operate beyond interests, as when directed at the futures of forests or fens, and beyond selves and their extensions and variants such as I's and Thou's and You's, as when arguing for deep environmental action. Nor is there cogent reason for trying to curtail reasons to what answers to a bad, if deeply incalcated, theory, a pernicious and damaging, if widely promoted, theory and sense of self joined to chauvinistic bodily consumption and advancement. A more generous itemtheoretic theory of total self can expose this theoretical fraud, allowing for a full flowering of reasons for action; it thus diffuses the narrow greedy self of Hobbesian theory. Expanded Hobbesian is assumed in deep ecological Ego-tripping (pp. 65-66) and in 'the theme of ecological resistance as Self-defence', that resisting ecological depredation is defending oneSelf, because the whales or forests are me; it is me that is being injured (p.61). Such expanded Hobbesian is even less plausible than Hobbesianism itself - among other things because you can go on, to become other You's even after You as the forest has been destroyed. Be sure I do not deplore, but welcome worthwhile ecological resistance 43 On all these points see further Perrett, esp. p.72. Perrett explains how the regularly assumed opposition between egoism and altruism depends on particular assumptions about the nature of self, and breaks down when, as in buddhist ethics with its doctrine of no-self, these assumptions get removed. �75 whether conducted as Self-defence, or not; good works, even if undertaken for self-ish or distorted or ridiculous motives, are not to be disparaged. Nor similarly should the help of campaigners whose motives have been distorted by propaganda systems be disparaged because those campaigners are engaged on dubious or bizarre bases, such as that they are defending themselves rather than something else that deserves their care, concern and respect. What should be resisted are the twin ideas that these are the wholesome motives or the only [rational] motives, and that quality of motivation does not affect goodness of act. The main trouble then with the wild Western approach so advanced under Self-interest is that, like Hobbesianism but on an expanded scale, it would reduce or suppress all other motivation. In many ways, it has not really got beyond bad "old paradigm" thinking, but merely bizarrely extended it. 12. Liquidating Fox's "deep ecological territory". The success Fox imagines expanded-Self is going to have in the environmental struggle arena, a success far surpassing that environmental ethics is likely to have (p.84), is premissed on this faulty expanded Hobbesianism theory. It is not based on monitored field experience. In the action field, where some Western deep ecologists are seldom seen, identification techniques, far from admirably shifting the onus of proof (a dubious claim also advanced on p.84 ), are likely to be greeted with amazement and disbelief: what is this crap? It is not very long ago that people who thought they were tigers or trees were locked away, or else regarded, like the man who identified his wife as a hat, as figures of fun not to be taken seriously. Such motivation is likely to be taken, and presented, by a hostile and backwards opposition as crazy. Furthermore, such defences can back-fire. Identification with a rainforest, for instance, because symmetrical, does not guarantee defence of its needs as one's own, as against one's own needs as its. A powerful bunch of developers and bureaucrats who identify with the forest may take their needs, for timber profits and tourist revenues, as its, and interfere with it accordingly. Identification, on its own, admits disastrous reversal. Expanded Selves can be dubious allies in environmental struggles. It is fortunate then that for almost all environmental purposes, including those of deep environmental philosophy, the notion of self can drop out; selves are inessential. While �76 decent theories of self and self-Self can presumably be worked out44 , and Self tried out as sole primitive, the theory so far, and with it (Western) deep ecological theory in present form remains both a shambles and an embarrassment. It is bad news then, given the abysmal shape of the deep ecological theory of self, that deep ecology should contract, at least on Fox's continuing vision, to a theory of self (see also 89). On this presentation much of authentic deep ecology is thrown away. The deep ecological framework comes down to 'two basic hypotheses and on ultimate norm', all of which revolve around Self (pp.86-7): it is Self, Self and Self, nothing but Self. And it has nothing essentially to do with the environment. For Self does not provide the great new (or shabby old) starting point to environmental philosophy that Fox imagines. To elaborate:One "hypothesis", already criticised, is that 'Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.86, the pluralisation is interesting, e.g. a vintage car club has a group Self which includes their cars and perhaps others they covet); the other, not previously encountered, is that 'the self can and does grow/develop/mature ... over time' (p.17). That hypothesis is presumably false; for selves, like plants, may decline, wither or die. Or don't ecological selves wither and die? 'The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the evident (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self'. It seems to be assumed that the ideal state, identified in the "norm", ought to be striven for (though it is hard to see why: it involves much unpleasant, embarrassing or boring identification work, etc.). There are accordingly covert principles of conduct, such as striving towards the norm and undertaking the "real spiritual work" of deep ecology, and covert values, such as that of the (so-called) ideal state, lurking at the bottom of Wes tern deep ecology; it too hides, even in its reduced form, a condemned "axiology" and ethics. But not environmental ones; the norm could have issued from a deviant Hinduism, without environmental commitments, concerned above all with introverted cultivation of self. Although Fox says the 'ideal state of being is referred to ... as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions' (p.87), such reference does not make it so; ecological consciousness involves rather awareness of and commitment to certain things and matters ecological, not widest identification, which involves much that is unecological, such 44 Perhaps following through suggestions sketched earlier, perhaps elaborating, in less anthropocentric style, T.H. Green, whose theory appears to anticipate much of wild Western deep ecology. Green took self-awareness as a guide to the nature of things and self-realisation as each person's goal. He held that the developed self is the end which defines the good, and that all ethical terms may be formed, so far as required, to that end. Of course he also spoke against atomism and individualism, and in favour of holism and organicism. �77 as traffic with occult and transfinite, or antiecological, such as identification with developers ripping down rainforest and heritage works. While Fox does claim that consequences for the natural (not the built) environment do follow from his framework, the claim is mistaken. According to him, 'it follows ... that when we harm or limit the flow of nature then we are harming or limiting that with which we ... identify and so diminishing our ... Self' (p.87). No such consequence follows as regards widest possible identification; all that destruction of an ecosystem does is to put the ecosystem in a possible world, with which identification is sustained, and bring up a different and perhaps humanly improved world (e.g. a wild river is dammed to save villages). The remote Self is unperturbed by such commerce of actuality. Even if Fox should try to save the show by again restricting awkward or uncomfortable identification feats, his intended consequences do not follow. For we may well increase that with which we identify by "limiting the flow of nature", for instance by varying or enriching parts of extensive monotonous natural systems. 45 Fox's deep ecological-framew ork, Self-indulgence of a deep spiritual cast, is no framework for an environmental anything. Luckily it is not needed, but can be despatched with other deep ecological rubbish. 13. Justifying "extreme interpretations" of and "extreme reactions" to wild West deep ecology. Fox exhibits full dominant paradigm outrage at what he refers to as my 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (boldface headings for sections 3 and 4, p.13 and p.19). While I am quite accustomed to being called or accounted an extremist, it is generally done by those far on the shallow side of the environmental divide. I trust such terms as 'extreme' carry no more weight with readers than they do with me. It is a fashionable, but methodologically quite unsound, ploy to try to dismiss those who depart far from some lately received position as extremists. Nowadays even 'Thomas Aquinas, for example, is depicted as an 'extremist' (by Hart) and dismissed because the views he expressed do not accord with what "all lawyers think" (Dworkin)' ;46 one is in good company. The Earth will in the longer term be helped by deep environmental extremists 45 That Fox's theory (already epicycling, into dimensions) admits such cases is evident from "the extinction example" (pp. 82-3). Because they are sufficiently evident, I have not recorded difficulties regarding this example, which attempts to discriminate different sorts of environmental losses by their differential effects on Selves (if there are any ecological ones left that is: Last Self arguments retain their bite and smile). 46 According to H. Miles in a curious letter to the ANU Reporter 1989. �78 who serve to shift various balances in environmental directions - the balances to be achieved, for example, in discussions, in time allowed in decision making, and so on. But what Fox also says he means, under the emotive overlay, is that 'Sylvan's arguments show a tendency to push the claims of those he criticises to extremes' through application of the following reduction-of-relations principles: S 1. 'if two concepts/ideas are linked, then they must be completely similar (equivalent [identical])'; S2. 'if they are contrasted then they must be completely different (i.e. non-intersecting) as well as completely exhaustive (i.e. covering all cases/examples of the set in question)' (p.13 and earlier). All these principles (S2 breaks down into a pair straightaway) are evidently fallacious, and only hold in very special cases. Now I claim to be well aware of this, and to have illustrated this awareness sufficiently in my work (esp. investigation of the history of the attempt to remove or suppress relations, investigation of very special cases, such as "classical relevant logics", where a connections of the form, "where Rab then a = b" does hold; see JB and RLR respectively). Indeed I discuss an example of this 'crude fallacy' in one of the sectors that particularly excites Fox (Cp.27). But in any case, the principles are substantially irrelevant to Fox's discussion of 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (in his sections 3 and 4)! For, as we shall see, what really bothers Fox, and also N aess, has little that is not superficial (merely terminological) to do with extremes; what troubles them rather is that I take their claims seriously, and not as forever 'preliminary', or at 'a superficial level', or 'metaphorical' or the like (see e.g. p.13, p.49). 47 Firstly, I introduced the quasi-technical term 'extreme holism' ('extreme' was italicised to indicate its introduction and quasi-technical character, not to emphasize my extremism) as contrasted with 'moderate holism' .48 That is obviously not an extreme claim, it is not pressing a claim to extremes; it is simply using a piece of terminology, and does nothing for Fox's cause. I take seriously Naess's holistic claim, repeated by incautious deep ecologists, that his conception 'dissolves ... the very notion of the world as composed of discrete, compact, separate "things"', which I describe as 'extreme holism'. 47 One day I should really like some non-preliminary formulations from Naess. Quite separately from that standing request, I do regard it as pretty ridiculous to insist that ordinary discourse about chairs and desks, fems and wombats is 'talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication'. Perhaps we have to expect this sort of twaddle from hard-wired physicalists, not from deep thinkers. 48 It is a contrast previously discussed, in more detail but in different terms, in EP, p.222ff. �79 Fox's response to my reporting of Naess's claim, in the style of Dr. Johnson (no separate things, so no wildernesses!, no forests!), his only response it seems, is '(Does Sylvan) sincerely think that anybody could be that silly?' (p.14). The answer is of course: Yes, damned right he does; for example, too many influenced by Hegelianism. It 1s unremarkable that Fox and Naess are trying to backtrack without appearing to do so. 49 Where, then, is the (non-quotational) extreme interpretation? Fox makes two connected moves, neither of which duly involve principles Sl and S2. Firstly, he introduces a distinction, not previously in the ballpark, between relative and absolute autonomy of "things in the world" (p.14). As commonplace in Fox's practice, the apparent distinction is introduced and put to work without proper explanation. Then Fox announces that 'it is clear from his interpretation that he [Sylvan] takes Naess and myself to be denying even relative autonomy ... whereas it should be clear ... that what is being denied is absolute autonomy'; and he has the audacity to go on, ' ... there is really no excuse for Sylvan's extreme interpretation' (p.14). Well, you can take my word for it that Sylvan did not take N aess and Fox that way; the distinction in question had not been introduced in the literature under discussion. For similar reasons, that there is no basis for it, there is no extreme interpretation, and nothing to underwrite Fox's captious moralising. Secondly, Fox proceeds quite scurrilously to make it look as if I am attributing certain themes I nowhere allude to him and Naess (but in fact attacked in Wilber's book). ' ... Sylvan's extreme interpretation ... would have Naess and myself reduce all diversity and multiplicity to something like "uniform, homogeneous, and unchanging mush" or to "uniform, all-prevading, featureless but divine goo"'. The quotations, which may well look as if they were drawn from my criticism, bear no resemblance to anything I attributed to Naess or Fox; they are in fact drawn from Wilber's fashionable Eye to Eye. Similarly that 'extreme interpretation' is not to be found in Sylvan; it is a fabrication on the part of Fox. Nothing I made critical use of tells against Naess's total-field exhibiting various features, such as some internal differentiation. The Flux of late nineteenth century philosophy was both non-uniform and non-homogeneous, with 'eddies, ripples and whirlpools in a stream ("unity in process")' (p.15), without being composed of separate individuals. The other example Fox includes in his section in extreme interpretations, the matter of internal relations, will also require, to begin with, some grimy textual exegesis, including further inspection of Fox's practice of tactical misquotation (or quotation out of context), 49 Their behaviour is reminiscent of Parmenides and Zeno at the races, as delightfully related by Bouwsma. �80 rather than real philosophical work. 50 But here no attempt is made to exhibit an 'extreme interpretation' (nor again do principles Sl and S2 enter). Fox's first (and final) point is that subscription to a doctrine of internal relations 'does not necessarily render one an idealist' (p.17). Whereupon, by way of counterexample, Fox trots out his own admirable philosophical pedigree, and reveals a doctrine of internal relations inherited from the neutral monism of Spinoza and the process philosophy of Whitehead, both well known for their doctrines of internal relations. N aess does at least make it evident that he is adopting or adapting the received theory of internal relations. As it happens, I did not commit myself to the proposition that a doctrine of internal relations (however characteristic of idealism) entails idealism; naturally there appears to be more to idealism than that (such as a total-field doctrine). Only by a misreading or misquotation does Fox obtain his necessarily linkage to idealism. Firstly he represents me as ascribing to him 'this "idealist theory of internal relations"' (p.15), when what I actually wrote was that a certain 'form of argument ... commandeers elements of the idealist theory of internal relations' (p.27 emphasis added). Later he congratulates himself upon 'discrediting Sylvan's claims that deep ecology subscribes ... to his characterisation of the theory of internal relations, which he describes (p.28) as "a terminal form of idealism newly warmed up"' (p.18). To credit to me 'a characterisation of the theory of internal relations' is certainly a gross overstatement, though it may be convenient in trying to exonerate the doctrine of deep ecology from evident criticism. But the immediate salient point is that what I say 'looks like a terminal form of idealism ... ' (C p.28 emphasis added) is not the theory of internal relations but 'what Fox describes as "the central intuition of deep ecology"'. The second, of Fox's three points as to my comments on the deep ecological doctrine of internal relations, is a bit more philosophically substantive, and concerns the character of the necessity ascribed to connections. But textual exegesis is again unavoidable. Fox contends that 'Naess's definition of internal relations ... flatly contradicts Sylvan's claim that this view point renders "all connections necessary" in the ... sense Sy Ivan intends' (p.16; Fox has the term 'strong' where dots are inserted; we'll look at what Fox is trying to hang on me shortly). 51 On Naess's explanation, an internal 'relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constituents of A and B, so that without the relation, A and Bare no longer the same things' (see p.15). Consider any 50 By and large, deep ecology involves disturbingly little real philosophical work. So much of it is name dropping, rank pulling, unacknowledged borrowing - all the old stuff some of us hoped to be rid of with a "new environmental paradigm". 51 In fact I had been arguing from Fox's theme that "all entities are constituted by their relations" (see C pp.27-8), but Fox diverts the issue to Naess. �81 internal connection R between A and B (indeed on the standard theory where all relations of objects are internal, any connection). Then ARB holds by virtue of definitional or constitutional features of A and B. But what so holds, holds as a matter of necessity (is 'necessarily constitutive' in Fox's lingo, Fox trying again for a resolving distinction); whence the connection holds of necessity. A flat contradiction? Now to the 'strong sense' Fox has located and is spreading abroad that I intend (once again he did not consult me as to what I intended). 'Sylvan is claiming', according to him (though I have never advanced such a claim, and am still not clear what it means, 'exact nature of' being Fox's terminology), 'that the exact nature of all those relationships is also necessary' (p.16). Now in trying to show that Naess's story conflicts with this claim he has hung on me, Fox proceeds to run Naess into deep trouble (though Naess is blithely oblivious; see note (22)). For, so Fox says,5 2 'Naess explicitly acknowledges that A and B can exist "without" the relation"', meaning "'in a different relationship" or "in the absence of that specific relation"' (p.16). Suppose such a different relation is S (at worst S is the absence of R). So apparently ASB and not-ARB; whence A, for instance, has inconsistent properties, namely both ... RB which is constitutive and not- ... RB by acknowledgement . To be sure, the difficulty can be avoided, by insisting (as N aess did and as Fox also has him say) that 'without the relationship, A and B are no longer the same things', so what we have is A'SB' and not- A'RB' for some counterparts A' and B' of A and B. Some such line is taken by the standard theory. But Fox seeks a connection between A and B for Naess which is in some respects contingent. Certainly that is possible, but it goes beyond the bounds of the standard theory by admitting external relations, for which it is not required that A and B are no longer the same without the relation. And, in a straightforward sense, it fails the constituting claim: entities have relations, external ones, which are not constituting (to deal with Fox-past), or alternatively (to refute Fox-present, p.17) it is false that 'all relationships are necessarily constitutive' because some, external ones, are not. My wombat example, to come to Fox's third point, was designed to indicate just that, that a wombat stands in various relationships which are not (necessarily) constitutive and which are merely contingent. Suppose wombat A passed by hollow stringbark B on its foraging route (say once only, and accidentally, because it had wandered out of its territory). Then "A passed by B" is a relation between A and B, a true relation, which furthermore is merely contingent, because it might not have transpired. Moreover, the relation is not constitutive, for instance of A, because it makes no difference to the nature or 52 The claim attributed to Naess does not appear in his original 1973 paper where the relational total field image was presented, and from which the other Naess' quotes were drawn. �82 constitution of wombat A. What I mean by term 'constitute' (and likewise 'constitutive') Fox professes unclarity about this (p.17) - is what is ordinarily meant by the term in such contexts, namely what makes a thing what it is, what determines it (see OED), what gives a definite nature or character to (see Concise English). 53 Wombat A, one and the same A, a creature with exactly the same make-up as A, not some counterpart or surrogate A', might not have passed by B. So "passed by B" is not constitutive of A; and again not all relations are constitutive. Despite the general paucity and poorness of argument in much revealed deep ecology literature, the general downgrading of rational and analytic methods 54 , and the emphasis on experiential and empathetic approaches, the status of argument turns out to be a sensitive issue too. Fox beats up an issue on this topic, on route to the grander issue of intellectual rubbish, by his standard practice of misattribution. He proceeds stealthily to amend my aside, '(argument often not being considered in the proper style of such a nonanalytical enterprise as deep ecology)', which I believe I can sustain, to the assertion 'that argument is not in the "proper style" of deep ecology' (p.20), which I did not make (for all Fox's kind attribution) and would not want to defend. I wish decent argument and careful reasoning were more often considered in the proper sty le of deep ecology, and more often practised. Then I should be more enthusiastic about it, writing much less critical of it, and castigating less as rubbish. Fox, I am afraid, has done little to convince me that 'closely measured intellectual argument is thoroughly in keeping with the style of deep ecology' (p.20) or that it is much of a priority. He offers but two examples: he stands on his own record as attested in his Response (how can I say anything unfavourable about that), and he appeals, forgetting I said 'often ... considered', to an exceedingly loose talk by Devall on the Stone/Sky path, which mentions 'logical analyses of ideas, premises, systems of thought' and 'formal statements of definitions of key terms, explication of relationships', but deliberately avoids any such work, preferring instead, in characteristic deep ecological style, 'a steeper ... path that requires ... the "real work"', consciousness elevation, jnana yoga or psychedelic drugs maybe (pp.21-2). 14. Transpersonal logic and methodology. 53 It is proponents of the dubious doctrine of internal relations - a doctrine quite inessential to and external to deep environmentalism - who are forced into assigning an extraordinary meaning to constitute. 54 The Counter-Enlightenment antipathy to analytic and rational methods resurfaces in Western deep ecology. For an example in Fox's Response, consider his remarks on the 'blunt tools of logical analysis' when applied to the 'real world of communication' (p.11), which could almost have come from the late eighteenth century. �83 The quaint relation-reduc tion principles, S 1 and S2, do show up with the first premisses of what Fox dignifies with the misleading titles of "false equivalence argument" and "false contrast argument". The second title is particularly misleading, because there is a recognised traditional fallacy of "false contrast" or "false dichotomy" (arising as regards classifications), which differs from Fox's defective "false contrast argument". Fox has proceeded to latch onto my legitimate use of traditional logic, as when I say (rightly or wrongly) that Devall and Sessions are operating with a false contrast (p.11), in order to saddle me with a defective argument of his own concoction which I do not apply. But to show that these defective arguments, which Fox accuses me of heavily and repeatedly applying (p.6, p.11 ), are not deployed by me in the way Fox alleges, we shall need to look at the arguments. To avoid further confusion with tradition, let us relabel the arguments, replacing 'false' by 'foxy'. Let A and B be terms (Fox has 'concept/idea'); let a be a person or group whose views are under criticism. Then the foxy equivalence argument, set down pretty much in Fox's way, runs as follows Key Premiss. When a links A with B (i.e. maintains that ARB for some relation R), claim a holds that A=B. Subargument. Show there are cases where A without B or B without A, whence A;;:: B. Conclusion according to Fox: ' the "argument" (i.e. the claim that A = B) is "false" or that it "fails"' (p.6). An immediate observation is that Fox has not succeeded in setting down what he is after with much success. The conclusion, which does not make use of the key premiss, is a mess. As he hasn't located an argument, in 'the claim that A = B', he has perhaps felt obliged to put critical terms in italics, or perhaps he imagines he is quoting me - what is going on is unclear. He might have concluded, though a level up, that the "false equivalence argument" itself fails, a conclusion he doesn't explicitly draw, but then he would be left without a conclusion at all for the foxy equivalence argument. There is a valid traditional argument, filling out the subargument that is buried in the foxy argument as intended. In a standard logical format, with A( c) symbolising that c is or has A or that A applies to c, it runs as follows:!. A= B hypothesized claim (imposed on a) 2. A( c) iff B(c) for every case c 3. A(c) & ~B(c) for some case c standard case expansion of 1 further data 4. ~2 from 3 5. ~(A= B) from 4 6. ~(A= B) reductio, discharging the hypothetical argument �84 Thus the claim, that A= B, is indeed false, as its negation is categorically established, given the data. But again the argument, now valid, makes no use of the key premiss. A proper fuller version of the argument would replace 3 by the disjunction, A(ci) & -B(ci) V. -A(c2) & B(c2) for some cases ci and c2, and consider each disjunct. But the result would be the same, namely 6 categorically. The preceding represents the valid core of the foxy equivalence argument. What of the key premiss however? That part also can be rendered correct, but upon assumption of the quite defective S 1. To convert this part of the argument into available logical form, let us replace holding or maintaining functors by a correspondin g asserting or (more satisfactorily) commitment to asserting functor. (Should you imagine a fast one is being pulled just read 't-a' as 'a holds that'). Then the key dubious premiss becomes, at first approximation. KP. from a is committed to asserting A is related to B, i.e. ARB, infer that a is committed to asserting that A= B (or A= B). Expressed in symbols in implicational form it looks as follows: KP➔ . .,_a ARB ➔ . t-a A= B. This form makes it easy to see how the key premiss derives from relation-reduction S 1, i.e. ARB ➔ A = B, namely by a standard distribution of the committed-to -asserting functor, .,_a, or specifically by the rule x ➔ y / t-a x ➔ t-a y. S1 is the way to arrive at KP. Moreover without S 1, there is little basis for KP. Now the arguments can be put together. We argue to KP➔, e.g. from Sl. We run out the subargument to ~(A= B), from which we conclude a is wrong or mistaken in asserting A = B. Then we proceed back across KP➔ (using what results from it by distribution of the mistake functor W, namely W t-a A= B ➔. W t-a ARB), to conclude that our friends a were wrong in maintaining, as they did, that A is linked to B. Exposure of that part of the argument involving KP➔ is enough to at least suggest that I am unlikely to rely on it heavily, since it is manifestly defective when so exposed, relying upon the already jettisoned S 1. Fox, for all his assertions, does nothing to show that I do rely on it heavily; indeed he does not show that I rely upon it at all. For all his effort in eliciting these arguments (shoddy though his work may be), he fails entirely to follow through and show how they apply. Consider his "example" of the foxy argument at work, and supposedly scrutinized, where the terms involved are life and value (p.7). Fox's conclusion does not appear, no conclusion is reached. Moreover the key premiss is not instantiated, nor is any evidence of its use advanced; it is knocked down to the claim, deriving from certain deeper positions, that life= value. Whence the sort of argument that I am alleged to be employing 'in a totally �85 fallacious manner' comes down to the valid traditional subargument. Fox's complaint is not about an argument at all, it is about the premiss. As Fox concedes 'this argument is fine, it's just that the original claim is false' (p.7)! Let's take time out from the argument to consider the original claim. What Fox reports that 'Sylvan ... claims, [namely] that (U.S.) "West Coast deep ecology" equates life (A) and value (B)', differs significantly from what Sylvan did write, namely 'the impression comes through from much West Coast deep ecology (from certain insufficiently penetrating intermediate positions) that what is important is ... life and nothing but life' (Cp.16). No universal claim, no equation, no falsehood. Naturally there are some commitments, but Fox hasn't taken much care with those, or got them right either. For example, Sylvan does not offer a definition (of his own or of any sort) of 'biospherical' (which does not mean 'earth-centered') or of 'biocentric', but relies on standard meanings (accordingly, too, he cannot 'refute his own ... definition'). The position with the foxy contrast argument is very similar to that already dealt with, a similar shambles. The argument is exactly the same except that equality or (strong) equivalence,= , is replaced throughout by a dual notion, exclusive disjunction, symbolised V. But Fox does not dualise properly; instead of the dual conclusion, "the argument (i.e. the claim that A V B) is "false" or that it fails", he misleadingly introduces the traditional fallacy terms, as if they were new terms without a predetermined sense. He has it that we 'conclude that the contrast in question is a "false contrast" or a "false dichotomy'" (p.8). Once again, a properly developed illustration of the argument is not offered, and in the very sketchy "example" given the argument drops out. It turns into a question - an interesting question - of the use, point, and merit of the shallow/deep distinction. Let's take time out to consider the issues raised, as some are important. But first some trivia. Fox, in effect, charges me with presenting a straw-person, as no one (but me) takes the shallow/deep distinction as exhaustive of environmental positions. Well, he has led a sheltered life; I've met too many activists who do. Fox implies that I 'want to assign the shallow/deep terminology to the "historical scrap-heap"' (p.9). Here, and elsewhere, Fox apparently joins the activists who conflate the shallow/deep distinction with the shallow ecology/deep ecology distinction. It is only deep ecology that I have contemplated for the scrap heap, not the shallow/deep distinction. More important is the status of such illdefined items as deep ecology. Fox now assumes that shallow and deep ecology, however imperfect, are "ideal types", the merit of which is to be assessed pragmatically, through their usefulness, heuristic roles, etc. Some scepticism is warranted. Ideal types such as protestant and middle class might be defensible in sociological investigations where there are plenty of protestants or middle class people to survey, but what is supposed to correspond with deep ecology? The comparison has serious problems. Western deep �86 ecologists have yet to get their theoretical slum in order, to rectify their classifications, clean up the objects of these, and so forth. 15. More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science. Along with a substantial upgrading of the calibre of argumentation in deep ecology should go extensive removal of rubbish, such as the unnecessary doctrine of internal relations. The image of philosophers removing the rubbish, which comes from Locke, is much favoured in Australia, and has been deployed by both Armstrong and Passmore. 55 It tends to accompany the picture of real philosophy 'as tough, practical, rational and secular', which Sessions deplores, in the case of environmental ethics, as 'neither desirable nor necessary, and perhaps not possible'. 56 While such an approach is hardly necessary it is certainly possible: it is a divisive issue whether it is desirable. As is increasingly appreciated these days, there are various sorts of rubbish, which can be separated; so too in philosophy there is more than one sort of rubbish. Not all of it is nonsense or quite unintelligible (pace p.23). Considerable parts of prevailing religions have been dismissed as rubbish (see OED examples); but while some parts, such as the doctrine of Trinity, may be accounted unintelligible, most parts would not. They are regarded rather as substantially false as well as seriously flawed in important respects, and perhaps also as pernicious or largely worthless (and likely as unnecessary). Evidently, then, there are several distinguishable components to rubbish; and, as dictionary senses reveal (e.g. OED: 'worthless, ridiculous, nonsensical ideas, discourse, or writing'), there may be quite a variety of ideological and intellectual rubbish. Rubbish, of all sorts, is hard to escape these days; unfortunately it is easily encountered in both deep ecology and popular science. Many environmental philosophers, Fox is one, do seem to be highly attracted by a very fashionable cutting edge, along with a semi-respectable crank end, of recent diverting popular science. It is almost enough to look at the cast of witnesses Fox pulls in for defence of his unstated theme that there is no 55 According to Locke, 'it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge'. Contrary to the impression Fox tries to convey, here and elsewhere, it wasn't so much a matter of 'following Passmore' (except in a dilute temporal sense, in which I always follow Aquinas when I agree with him), as of following a larger tradition. 56 This part of Session's essay is quoted approvingly in Fox's Response, p.44. Sessions should be rapped over the knuckles for his sexist citations (which Fox too does little to rectify). �87 rubbish in deep or transpersonal ecology (the theme is enthymematically Self-refuting, so to say). The cast includes Capra, Davies, Bohm, Wilber, Gribbin, Pegals, Zukav, Prigogine, d'Espagnat, Sheldrake, Pribram, Comfort and Walsh. There is ample rubbish littering the works of some of these authors, some of which finds its way into Western deep ecology (e.g. Fox's Section 4, and also e.g. pp. 58-9). It is instructive to look at a couple of examples of prime rubbish early in the work of Gribbin cited:- First 'Isaac Newton invented physics, and all of science depends on physics' (p.7). Observe that this conjoint claim, which luckily does not drift into deep ecology, is intelligible, but it is ridiculous 57 ; and observe, furthermore, that there is no straightforward way of recycling such intellectual rubbish. Second, 'what quantum mechanics says is that nothing is real and that we cannot say anything about what things are doing when we are not looking at them' (p.2). As Gribbin presents quantum mechanics as true, we can detach to achieve his shocking headlines and like assertions; so for instance, 'Nothing is real unless it is observed' (p.3), naive phenomenalism. Remarkably, Gribbin is hardly obliged to generate the amount of striking rubbish he does (but then he is a scientific journalist), because of his later proclivity towards a "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, which affords one neat way of halting production of this type of idealist rubbish. Fox, eager to retain an idealistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics for his nefarious metaphysical purposes, fails to take account of Gribbin's later turnabout which effectively repeals the earlier headlines, and actually appeals to Gribbin's "authority" (in note 41) in trying to dispose of the many worlds interpretation! Fortunately we do not have to put up philosophically with the rubbish produced by popular elaborations of the Copenhagen interpretation, which Fox and other avant-garde thinkers would foist upon us. One reason is that micro-features of quantum behaviour very rarely impinge upon macro-phenomena. They thus make little or no real difference to issues of environmental philosophy (only problems tangential to it, such as determinism). Another and major reason is that there are significant alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation, which at least shed most of the rubbish. And the 'range of choice' is far more extensive than Fox would allow 'if Sylvan did follow his appeal through' (p.27) - yet another example of "false choice". It happens that Sylvan had followed through on some of the further options Fox does not consider, namely 57 If physics and science are the sorts of things that can significantly be invented, then there are plenty of candidates for the claims both before and after Newton, e.g. Einstein if we wish to be really extravagant. As for the extravagant reduction claim, well it is refuted along with physicalism and associated Australian primitivism; see e.g. J.W. Smith and JB . �88 • alternative logic approaches. There are many interesting possibilities here, but few of which physicists have had time or inclination to investigate. My own, rather preliminary, investigations have concerned a uniform relevant logic approach (see uu § 13, on ultramodal quantum logic) and, differently, paraconsistent approaches (see OP p.157ff.) • a neutral worlds interpretation (see my 85). What this amounts to is an ontic neutralisation of many-worlds interpretation. Because of the neutralisation, the 'metaphysical baggage' and unparsimoniousness that Fox complains about are removed. Of course too, since the interpretation corresponds, through the mathematical formalism deployed, to other standard interpretations, it as just as falsifiable (pace note 41 ), and accordingly hardly 'desperate', a mere "just-so" story. These observations, duly elaborated (as attempted, in part, in work alluded to), indicate 'how Sylvan would describe the ontological implications of the "new (ie. post-1920s) physics?"' (p.23 reordered). Briefly, there are many hitherto unknown physical objects at the sub-atomic level whose behaviour is classically anomalous, being partly wavelike and partly particlelike, for which a new and interpretationally difficult theory has been devised. But the positivism and related idealism of early interpretations can be removed by a warranted change of interpretation. And then the ontic implications for ecology and most of environmental philosophy are much less remarkable than Wes tern deep ecology has imagined. Given apparently viable options as to interpretation, all the rubbish Walsh and Fox add to the already problematic Copenhagen interpretation can be packed off (if you can find a way to recycle it, good luck to you). For those who like picking through rubbish (I occasionally collect stuff from the local dump myself), Fox's page 26 is particularly rewarding. But two examples only :- 'What can be known is ... never the independent properties of the observed alone'. So it cannot be known that the wounded wombat (somehow) observed is female, pregnant, and so on. Such astonishing epistemological results are not delivered by the Copenhagen interpretation, which only tells us that knowledge as to quantum happenings is limited by exclusion principles. Similarly for 'the known universe is inextricably linked with consciousness rather than being separable into consciousness and objects of consciousness'. The standard formalism of quantum theory discloses nothing about observers; and while observers do feature in the Copenhagen interpretation these can be simply more measuring or witnessing devices: consciousness does not figure. Even if it did, that would only apply to quantum objects, and would scarcely warrant the grand extrapolations Fox and Walsh wish to make. Furthermore, the Copenhagen interpretation as elaborated is obliged to set quantum domains within wider classical settings always (by contrast with multiple-world interpretations there is no wave function for the universe, etc.); so in the larger setting classical assumptions concerning independence, separability, and so on, are not overthrown, but confirmed. �89 In fact my passing reference to rubbish in Fox's presentations was directed not at Walsh, who was not pretending to tell us what deep ecology is about, but at Fox's reproduction of this material 'in advancing the "unity of process" metaphysics of deep ecology' (p.19). Fox's presentation of the issues (in section 4), with himself as some sort of interested third party in a dispute between Sylvan and Walsh, is substantially misleading; I was not attempting (what is overdue) a critique of transpersonal psychology. What is taken to be known, furthermore, affords little comfort or support for the list of 'ontological implications' that Fox and Walsh wish to draw from the "new physics". Consider some representative exhibits, mostly compressed one-worders, from 'the fundamental ontology now being revealed', with which Fox tells us deep ecology is not merely 'in accord with' but 'throws its full weight behind' (see p.18):- Impermanen t? Some of the newly discovered sub-atomic objects are extraordinarily durable and have experimentally assessed lifetimes of millions of years. Fluid? This attribute of macrosystems does not extend significantly even down to the molecular level; it makes no sense to say that wavicles (or even atoms) flow, they are the wrong sorts of things. Whereas the attribution of impermanence makes straightforward sense (but is substantially false), that of fluidity does not. Empty? Some of the newly located astrophysical objects are extraordinarily dense, packed with matter. Infinitely over-determined? How does this sit with quantum indeterminacy and under-determination? Or with another speculative exhibit from the list: Self-consistent? At least questions of the consistency of the "new physics" and its parts are proper and reasonable. But we are far from being in a position to assert that the theory is consistent. On the contrary, inconsistencies keep emerging in the developing theory, to which often ad hoc repairs are proposed (e.g. with the Dirac o function, renormalization etc.; cf OP). Given the inadequate ramshackle character of the present quantum theory, it is a fair bet that it remains inconsistent. It is a widespread opinion among researchers that the present theory is something of a mess and in much need of improvement. Even so practicing scientists are not hoping for foundations, which tend to be frowned upon these days. However, foundations, such as an extension of von Neumann's axiomatisatio n of part of quantum theory, would help in effecting improvements, and something of the sort is a prerequisite for establishing consistency, if it can be done. Foundationless? What is meant is, apparently, not foundations for the theory, such as axiomatic foundations, nor really basic (atomic) components for what the theory is about. In this sense, Newtonian physics had as foundational elements corpuscles, or particles of certain sorts. It is sometimes said that quantum physics afford no such ultimate building blocks, each apparent stopping point fragmenting into new substructures, most recently quarks. But this idea, which so far appears to lack a satisfactory physical modelling, diverges from the still entrenched paradigm of particle physics which, for all the talk about "new paradigms" in physics, still consists in analytical reduction to ultimates. �90 Such objectual foundations leave open, of course, the question as to whether, and to what extent, new phenomena may emerge, at "higher levels", as the building blocks are variously put together and structured. As with elements, so with microphysical particles, while the zoo of known items has expanded apace, the hope remains that there is a simple underlying explanation in terms of very small ultimates, such as contemporary quarks. Those who looked forward to a quite new outlook emerging from particle physics are bound - if they look at what really goes on nowadays (esp. all the hightech dominant social paradigm aspects) as distinct from what some popular science entrepreneurs say - to be very disappointed. Walsh's "explanation" of what 'foundationle ss' means is something else: 'the universe appears to be ... foundationless and self-consistent in that, since all components and mechanisms are interconnected and interdependent, none are ultimately more fundamental than any other- hence the universe is inexplicable in terms of a limited number of fundamental mechanisms' (p.23, quoting Walsh p.180). This is Fox's example of how 'Walsh provides clear and intelligible meanings to each and every one of the items on the list'! The truth is that Walsh offers nothing of substance on some terms in his list (e.g. 'self-consistent'), and much of what he does offer is like that quoted, garbage. Granted we can make something of some of it, something extravagantly false. Even on Newtonian physics everything is connected, through forces such as gravitation 58 , but some objects are fundamental building blocks. So it is too on the 'new physics', protons for instance are more fundamental than molecules, quarks (if recent theory succeeds and proves consistent) than protons. Some objects are certainly more fundamental than others. And in the "new physics" it is widely assumed that the universe is explicable in terms of a very few principles of mechanist character (e.g. the rashly promised single equation T-shirt). But Walsh's hence clause would not follow, as simple models indicate, even if his premiss had requisite physical cogency. It does deep ecology no credit to include conspicuous rubbish. Nor is there any good reason why it should; the rubbish is not essential to deep ecology. It is not part of the platform for instance, and it is relatively easily removed from (authentic) deep ecology. So much should be evident from my original Critique (as published), and the accompanying 58 Such forces as gravitation offer, of course, nonlocal connections, and delineate fields what are said to be at 'the nub of what these emerging ideas ... of cross-disciplinary parallels ... have in common' (p.23, insert from p.23 and p.21). This confirms the impression that Fox lacks a solid grasp on what is new in the "new physics" and other "new sciences" such as they are, and thereby contributes towards answers to further of Fox's questions (p.23), by undermining their presuppositions. �I 91 sketch of deep green theory, intended to function as a relatively rubbish-free relative of deep ecology. It is some measure of the intellectual sloppiness of some of these engaged in presenting and promoting deep ecology that in a recent major text from Naess (Naess 89), the editor and translator, Rothenberg, asserts that my 'critique of deep ecological philosophy ... labels all of deep ecology literature "inconsistent rubbish"' (p.19), somehow achieving a fallacious transition from some to all. But apparently Rothenberg's acquaintance with my Critique was extraordinarily casual, since I didn't use the label 'inconsistent rubbish' (and wouldn't as anyone who had read much of my work, esp. OP, would realise), and since I certainly did not make a universal claim (and wouldn't for reasons already given, which should have been evident). 'The interpretation of the whole thing as rubbish', Rothenberg continues (p.19), 'comes only if you concentrate too much on rereading some of the sketchy formulations of deep ecology philosophies ... '. While endorsing the point about sketchy formulations, no rereading of many deep ecological productions is required to produce rubbish, no projection; several offerings - such as items lifted from trans personal psychology, idealist physics and other esoteric deep ecological sources, and such as Fox's 'sketch map of deep ecological territory' (p.89) - contain notable rubbish of themselves. Unfortunately Rothenberg proceeds, without even a pause, to repeat Fox's regressive conclusion, which would return deep ecology to human psychology, the very fate of earlier establishment-cha llenging ethics, such as (group) egoism and utilitarianism. 'One should steer clear of "environmental axiology" - that is, looking for values in nature', indeed one almost feels, from looking directly at nature at all. Instead, one should seek to change one's whole way of sensing oneself and the world in the direction of identification and Self-realisation .... Fox summarises [this debacle]: The appropriate framework of discourse for describing and presenting deep ecology is not one that is fundamentally to do with the value of the non-human world, but rather one that is fundamentally to do with the nature and possibilities of the Self, or, we might say, the question of who we are, can become, and should become in the larger scheme of things (Rothenberg p.19, quoting Fox p.85). It is a sad fate for a promising philosophy of nature; degeneration into human psychology. While that can no doubt be edifying enough, in the style of uplifting anthropocentric religions, it is hardly the sought new ecological paradigm (p. 71) and only a warped fragment of the sort of philosophy the whole Earth needs. REFERENCES Bennett, D and Sylvan, R., Damn Greenies: Australian perspectives on environmental ethics, a UNESCO project, typescript, Canberra 1989; revised text 1990. �f I 92 Bouwsma, O.K., 'Philosophical essays', University Nebraska, Lincoln, 1965, 24-25. Bradford, G. 1987 'How deep is deep ecology?', Fifth Estate 22(3)(1987) 3-30. Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul & Others, London, 1944. Devall, B. and Sessions G, Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1985. Devall, B., Simple in Means, Rich in Ends. Practicing Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1988. Drengson, A. "Review of Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology", Environmental Ethics vol 10, nl, 1988. Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982. Fox, W., Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20, University of Tasmania, 1986: unless otherwise indicated all references to Fox are to this study. Fox, W., 'The meanings of "deep ecology"', Island Magazine 32(1989) 32-5; reprinted in The Trumpeter 7(1990) 48-50. Hinckfuss, I., The Moral Society: its structure and effects, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #16, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987. Johnson,L.E., A Morally Deep World, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #17, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987. Mannison, D. and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, RSSS Australian National University, 1979; referred to as EP. Naess, A., 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. A summary', Inquiry, 16(1973) 95-100. Naess, A., 'Deep ecology disentangled?', typescript, Canberra, 1984. Naess, A., 'Notes on Professor's Sylvan's Critique of the Deep Ecology Movement', typescript, Canberra, 1985. Naess, A. and Rothenberg, D., Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Nettleship, R.L. (ed.) Work of Thomas Hill Green, three volumes, Longman, Green & Co, London, 1889. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; referred to as OED. Perrett, R.W., 'Egoism, altruism and intentionalism in Buddhist Ethics', Journal of Indian Philosophy 15(1987) 71-85. Priest, G. and Routley, R., On Paraconsistency, Research Series in logic and Metaphysics #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as OP. Rolston, H. R. IV, Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1986. �93 Routley, R., 'The semantical metamorphosis of metaphysics', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1974. Routley, Rand V., The Fight for the Forests, Third edition, RSSS, Australian National University, 1975. Routley, R. and V., 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism', Ethics and Problems of the 21 st Century , (ed. K.E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre), University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, 36-59. Routley, Rand V., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in EP; referred to EE. Routley, R., 'Ultralogic as universal?', represented in JB; referred to as uu. Routley, R, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, RSSS, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. Routley, R. and Others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. Session, G., 'Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection', in The Wilderness Condition (ed. M. Oelschlaeger), 1989; to appear. Shepard, P., 'Introduction - ecology and man - a viewpoint' in The Subversive Science (ed. P. Shepard & D McKinley), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, 1-10. Smith, H., The Religions of Man, Harper, New York, 1958. Smith, J.W., Reductionism and Cultural Being, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984. Stone, C.D., Should Trees Have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, revised edition, Avon Books, New York, 1975. Sylvan, R., 'Windows on Science III, Towards a cosmo-logical synthesis', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, #2, RSSS Australian National University, 1985. Sylvan, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #12, RSSS 1985; referred to as c. Sylvan, R., 'Mind and its misplacement in nature', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to asMX. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, completed typescript 1990. Walsh, R.N., 'Emerging cross-disciplinary parallels: suggestions from the neurosciences', Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 11(1979) 175-184. Wenz, P.W., Environmental Justice, State University of New York Press, Albany N.Y., 1988. Wilber, K., Eye to Eye: The quest for the new paradigm, Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden City N.Y., 1983. �ECOLOGICAL ETHICS and ECOLOGICAL POLITICS: turning John MCCioskey's challenge This essay comes first because it offers an advanced introduction to parts of environmental ethics, and to certain significant issues in environmental politics. It is hung, not altogether incidentally, on MCCloskey's little text on the topics, because that is a convenient vehicle for organising the material (it is also a text, written in haste, that deserves more criticism than it has received). Fortunately no one need attempt the onerous business of reading MCCioskey in order to follow the essay, should it succeed. Rather, for the purposes of this essay, MCCioskey and likewise his little work can both be regarded as characters in this piece of intellectual fiction; neither need ever have existed. 1. Conservative, reformative, and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics. There are three broad kinds of responses to the impact of ecology on ethics according to MCCloskey's account, which adapts a standard political classification: radical or revolutionary, reformist, and conservative. Of course there are responses which lie outside this classification, not by disputing the impacts of escalating environmental problems (or the new awareness of nature and its fragility), but by questioning the relevance of the other end of the relation: ethics. Those responses target ethics, its role in evaluating and regulating conduct, or differently, its place in environmental philosophy (see other essays herein). As we too aspire to MCCloskey's elevated view of the importance, potential power, and effective ineliminability of ethics in rational evaluation and conduct, we set aside these gutter responses (which we have argued against elsewhere). Otherwise, the responses are these: Radical. A fundamentally new ethic is required, a non-human-centred nature-centred (or nonanthropocentric ecocentric) ethic and morality, a deeper environmental ethic, what MCCioskey and others call an ecological ethic. According to MCCioskey - who adopts the usual double standard, requiring conspicuously higher standards for new challenging theories than entrenched ones - no one 'has yet succeeded in stating or defending [an ecological ethic] in a systematic way' (p.29). Nonetheless it will turn out, quite remarkably, that MCCioskey himself, if he is at all successful, does, given but a small twist to what he does. �2 There are two standard components to any such ethic: meta-ethical and normative. According to Mccloskey, both components are 'more commonly alluded to than set out and defended in a developed, worked-out form' (p.29). There are, accordingly, two broad problems for an ecological ethics: devising a new meta-ethic, and furnishing a new normative ethic (p.30). Meta-ethics, as well as comprising the study of ethics or ethical systems, includes the logic and analysis of key ethical terms. For the new ethics a critical meta-ethical task is to 'explain valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like' (p.30). Normative ethics involves the organisation, design and structure of systems themselves, their values, principles, constraints and the like. For the new ethics critical normative tasks include explaining and justifying the assignments of value made, especially to natural items independently of species Homo sapiens, and the principles adopted, especially concerning treatment of more natural environments, wilderness, and endangered species of plants and animals. Since all these requirements have been met, to some considerable extent (e.g. in works such as EE), the issue becomes one of adequacy. How adequately have these things been done, in particular in what is now called deep-green theory, and what of significance has been left undone? These are central questions in the on-going dialogue with MCCioskey; they will direct the questions discussed when shortly we get down to the real business of MCCloskey's more substantive objections. Reformist. Instead of a "new" ethic, standard ethical theories are reformed, modifying them or adjusting them at the periphery, 'so as to acknowledge new, specifically ecological values and duties' (p.30). Characteristically the adjustment is to the margins of normative theory, with standard meta-ethics left substantially intact. Animal rights theories which simply adjust utilitarianism to take account of the suffering of other sentient creatures than humanoids, afford a stock example of significant reformism. By contrast, differently designed and defended theories of animal rights may be radical in character. The classification is thus pretty rough and ready; given the comparative vagueness of "newness" and "standardness" as regards ethical theories, the divisions between responses is likewise blunt. Evidently too, the classification only overlaps other classifications of ethics with some vogue, for instance that into shallow, intermediate, and deep (used elsewhere e.g. TE). Thus while reformist utilitarianisms are typically intermediate, a reformist ethic (or even a revolutionary one, such as Nietzsche's has been taken to be) may be substantially shallow. The converse linkages are tighter: only an ethic which merely purports to be conservative can really be intermediate, as MCCloskey's intuitionism is, or deep, as "supplementation" of such intuitionism could �3 be. Conservative. No input from ecology warrants even so much as reform, let alone revolution, in standard ethical theory; all that is required is 'a more informed, more accurate thinking out of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29). MCCioskey claims to defend the stock conservative view that ecological considerations and 'findings ... do not necessitate a basic revolution in ethics but supply a more informed, more accurate thinking out, of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29, similarly p.31). Rather than looking hard at the conspicuous difficulties and inadequacies of prevailing ethics, unresolved after thousands of years of investigation, MCCioskey proceeds immediately to try to shift the onus of proof: ' ... no moral philosopher has yet succeeded in either stating or defending it ... a new ecological ethic ... in a systemic way' (p.29, insertion from same page). He alleges, to elaborate on a previous charge, that 'the problem of [a radical] ecological ethics is that of devising a a new meta-ethics, one that explains valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like, and a a new normative ethics that explains both • the value of natural phenomena prior to man's existence and after the extinction of the species Homo sapiens and • why it is morally wrong for man to damage wilderness and endanger or render extinct natural species of plants and animals' (p.30, display inserted). As it happens, all these things have been attempted, as was said and as will become evident - though perhaps in too sketchy and too technical a way so far (it is still early days). For example, why it is wrong to damage pristine wilderness is, at bottom, because such wilderness possesses high intrinsic value - something MCCioskey does not really dispute. How then does he sustain his allegations? For the most part, despite the repeated rhetoric about "arguing" this and that, he doesn't. He simply assumes that 'concern for human well-being' must dominate, that it always has, well almost always has, priority (e.g. p.52). 2. A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism. Furthermore, MCCioskey, although he claims to be defending this conservative 'third view', does not state matters as clearly as he should: he only rules out the 'need for a specifically ecological ethic', not reformism. This constitutes one part of what amounts �4 to substantial cheating in MCCloskey's "conservatism" . 1 A further part consists in adopting an extremely unfashionable ethical theory, an intuitionism supplementing a now little known theory of the kind developed by Ross, as his "standard" ethical theory. Like the rare "ideal utilitarianism", such intuitionism can be much closer to proposed new ecological ethics, given appropriate ideals and intuitions, than standard "standard" ethics (indeed, given a deep tum, they can be tantamount to ecological ethics). But the most important dodge is incorporated in the "supplementation" MCCioskey makes of his "standard" ethic, which far exceeds what it is said to be: Ross 'supplemented by an account of the moral rights of persons' (p.31). For he also concedes himself such objectives as an open-ended 'promotion of good' and coupled 'prima facie obligations to ... promote good' (p.33 and p.31). Moreover, such promotion of good elsewhere expands to a promotion of good, beauty and knowledge (p.36), and to include promotion and preservation of what is intrinsically valuable (p.36); among 'recognised ethical values' is 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' (p.8). Moreover, among what is intrinsically valuable are some (but not all) natural species, some wilderness (p.36), and other valuable natural items such as 'forests, lakes, rivers, seas' (p.31). Such critical "supplementations" mean that MCCioskey can proceed to argue for the preservation of wilderness or natural species in just the ways that most deep environmentalists do; for example, along the lines that an area of wilderness has not merely instrumental value, but evident intrinsic value, which can be felt or intuited (e.g. p.61 bottom). Such supplementations thus lift MCCioskey right out of the normal conservative camp in which he has misleadingly located himself: for that shallow camp does not recognise irreducible values in nature. What he is covertly assuming, in his considerable supplementation of an unusual noncognitive ethic, is at least a significant reform of standard ethics. MCCloskey's ethic is not 'perfectly familiar' historically; more, his insistence (ascribable not to modesty but to political purposes) that it is not 1 There is analogous, if less outrageous, covert cheating in another leading Australian conservative, with whom McCloskey aligns himself: Passmore. For example, Passmore helps himself to a notion of vandalism (deep vandalism involving depreciation or destruction of what has intrinsic value) to which his theory does not entitle him. It has not been much appreciated that Passmore, too, for all his apparently tough conservatism (early on) on ethics, also (characteristically) hedges his claims. A much-quoted passage, endorsed by McCloskey (p.37 italics added), begins: 'what it [the West] needs,for the most part, is not so much a "new ethic" as a more general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic'. What that familiar ethic is, and how it is to be reformed, Passmore never really tells us. In any case the main conservative theme looks less and less plausible. It is increasingly dubious that better adherence to established ethical and political forms will prove adequate, especially to environmental problems unforeseen by these chauvinistic theories. �5 new is nowhere demonstrated, simply asserted. (In fact the claim is somewhat empty in the absence of sharpened criteria for newness.) How far removed MCCloskey's supplemented intuitionism is from its 'perfectly familiar' source is readily shown by a comparison of MCCioskey with Ross on intrinsic goodness. Ross contends (on the basis of reflection and using an interesting little argument from a then 'widely accepted classification of elements in the life of the soul') that four things, and basically only four things, 'seem to be intrinsically good', all of which are 'ideal states of the mind' (p.140). How far things ethical have moved since the nineteen thirties is also shown by the little argument Ross runs out, as if it was quite decisive, to refute people like MCCioskey who imagine they find intrinsic value beyond states of mind - in wilderness, forests and other material items. 'It might of course be objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods that are not states of mind or relations between states of mind at all, but in this suggestion I find no plausibility. Contemplate any imaginary universe from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and you will fail to find anything in it that you can call good in itself' (p.140). Ross no doubt reflects the conventional ethical wisdom, a narrow wisdom, of his time and place (essentially British ethics of the first half of the twentieth century). But many before Ross, and many more since, have not so failed in finding items of intrinsic worth in the absence of states of mind, in the Earth itself and its natural features for example. Such comparatively successful arguments as those concerning the Last Sentient (in EE), and the world before the rise of mental life, were designed to expose and reinforce such common findings. So much Mccloskey is sufficiently clear about (thereby shortening subsequent argument for a new ethics): 'The negative part of the Routley's argument, that traditional [Western] ethics and contemporary morality are human-centered, is substantially well based. The ecological moral intuitions they seek to explain and justify find no justification in terms of such ethics' (p.58). But in MCCloskey's ethics they do find some confirmation, or rather conformation, in the intrinsic ecological values discerned. Moreover, with but a turn in the intuitions admitted that intuitionistic ethics itself becomes properly deep - just allow the (over-malleable) intuitions to coincide with those of deep ecological consciousness: then deepened MCCioskey is deep ecology. MCCioskey even puts effort into explaining how conventional theories are 'heavily human centered', without appreciating how far it removes him from the 'perfectly familiar' ethic of Ross, and from his own professed conservatism. As a result too, those making too superficial a survey of MCCloskey's complex ethical position, especially if they came at it with preconceptions of what it amounted to, have been seriously misled. Goodin is one reviewer who is undone. By quoting MCCloskey's effort on conventional ethics right out of context, Goodin manages to �6 attribute to Mccloskey the very negation of what he advances, namely 'that all talk of intrinsic value must nevertheless be human-centered' (Goodin p.345). The same applies to what Goodin takes to be 'the punchline' of MCCloskey's position, 'that the environment per se has no independent moral claims upon it. All our duties to protect it must be derived from human-centered concerns' (p.344). Nor does such a punch line emerge from the admittedly convoluted passage quoted in support; for the passage makes the promotion of goodness, which includes promotion of intrinsic value independent of humans, a prima f acie obligation. But Goodin does have excuses. For not merely is MCCloskey's position hard to fathom, but it exhibits confusion and is internally inconsistent. For example, Mccloskey typically presents himself as having, and frequently operates as if he had, an entirely conservative position, when his position is in important respects at least reformist, making allowance for intrinsic values of natural items including wilderness, plants and animals (pp. 52-3); his position is both different, with new elements, and not different, with no new elements. Part of the problem can be traced back to a confusion about intrinsic value (likewise intrinsic goodness), which is both intrinsic, valuable in itself, and not intrinsic, because valuable for something else, typically beauty or human knowledge in the case of natural items. The confusion is manifest in the many intuitive judgements of intrinsic value of natural items advanced simply on the strength of judgements of beauty or ugliness, and appears in such themes as that 'a moral duty to preserve species and wilderness ... is ... based on ... the securing of the intrinsically valuable objects of knowledge and the beautiful' (p.110). It is no longer just 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' as is earlier said (e.g. p.8); those "intrinsic values" somehow now reduce or answer instrumentally to supposedly human evaluations, i.e. are not "intrinsic" after all, whereupon MCCloskey's seriously damaged position reverts to the shallow conservative position it is often been taken to be. The main features brought out make MCCloskey's ethic, confusions apart, at least a reformist one, not a conservative one. Briefly, MCCloskey's "supplementation " of Ross's theory is so great as to make for a difference of kind. The features also render it what is called an intermediate position. For it admits values in nature, it assigns intrinsic value to some natural objects, while not however allowing values of natural things to sometimes override those of humans. The point is fundamental. 'However, as the theory developed here implies, ultimately, when there is a clear clash between human welfare and human rights on the one hand and the preservation of wilderness and of plant and animal species on the other, human welfare and respect for human rights must prevail ... ' (p.36). Why so? Why preserve this ancient ethical prejudice? Despite the assertion the theory sketched out, the supplemented Ross ethic, does not imply human �7 ethical supremacy. But even if the theory did imply this greater value assumption, the appeal to it in defence of the assumption would be indecently circular. It is no proper defence of proposition p that Shifty's theory implies p, unless Shifty's theory is shown to have independent merit, such as correctness, robustness (i.e. continuing to yield p under reasonable variations), etc. None of the requisite demonstration is attempted. The radically reformed Ross ethic is just assumed. In fact MCCioskey has adduced no decent case for this crucial assumption, which colours much of his text. For it is his repeated insistence on the supreme importance of things human, of Man over the rest of nature, that gives his work its undoubted antienvironmental appearance, which is obnoxiously exhibited at many places in the text. One revolting example concerns venomous snakes: 'today they are a nuisance and a danger to human life and health, concern for which dictates that individuals be accorded the freedom to kill such snakes, to rid their properties of these pests even at the risk of rendering them endangered species. (Sufficient specimens could be retained in zoos throughout the world, where they survive well ... )', perhaps along with dangerous subspecies of humans (p.116). MCCioskey is particularly concerned to put down arguments 'for the preservation of species and wilderness at the cost of human interests, human concerns .. ', even though these arguments 'appear to be correct about the intuitive insights of those who live in different countries in affluence. 2 Nonetheless it will be my concern in this work to reject this approach and the moral intuitions on which it rests' (p.36, italics added). Unfortunately the strongly proclaimed rejection is not backed up with requisite argument. MCCioskey, in a familiar intuitionistic predicament, is stranded without argument. Nor, in this case, could the rejection be so easily supported. For one thing MCCioskey feels obliged, almost immediately, to qualify his human supremacy claim: human interest 'must prevail, unless what it is proposed to preserve has great intrinsic value' (p.36 italics added). For another reason, the human interests involved often cannot justify preeminence; they are too often trivial, or unworthy, or just plain ordinary. So the ancient (unethical) prejudice in favour of humans can, and should be relinquished (as argued in much more detail in other places, e.g. EE). But then there is nothing to stop MCCloskey's intuitionism sliding to real depth, the ethic moving from reformist to radical. Call the resulting theory, MCCloskey's stripped 2 But the impression of McCloskey as a fighter for the under-privileged among humans, one who of course along with developers and colonizers makes human interests paramount, is deceptive. �8 of anthropic prejudice so to say, deepened intuitionism, intuitionism informed, again if you like, by deep ecological consciousness. The beauty of deepened intuitionism is that it answers, in MCCloskey's own terms, MCCloskey's challenge to radically new ecological ethics. A now evident "adjustment" to MCCloskey's own theory will serve. The trouble, of course, with this answer is the trouble with intuitionism in ethics generally; that, for instance, it is built on the shifting sands of intuition. That is why a direct response to Mccloskey will be offered, in terms of deep-green theory. 3. On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics, esp. that deep-green upstart. Part of MCCloskey's complaint is that the new environmental ethics demanded back in the early seventies, have not been presented sufficiently 'clearly and fully' as to admit proper examination and assessment (p.60). It is easy to level such charges at new proposals; and such charges did carry some force, and still do, though less as the new theories develop, among other things, to meet criticism. But MCCioskey would like to make a much grander charge, the sort of charge (discussed below) that Thompson recently did level: that such 'a new ethic ... is logically impossible to set out' (p.59 reordered). But Mccloskey, by contrast with Thompson who can slip into still fashionable noncognitivism, is poorly placed to press such a charge. For he considers that noncognitivism, which would logically tie all valuation to aspects of human (or creature) cognition and so would be bad news for deep environmentalism, is bound to fail. MCCioskey tries instead to push through an eliminative argument, relying upon the limited range of cognitivist (meta-)ethics 'developed to date'. He claims to eliminate all but intuitionism: 'Of the known, plausible, meta-ethical theories, the only one available to such ecologist ethicists is the ethical realism of intuitionism' (p.59), which regrettably they decline. But the elimination argument is radically defective, as MCCioskey is very far from exhausting the initially plausible options open to environmentalism. In addition, more satisfactory options will aim to discard not merely intuitionism but also both the ethical realism and objectivism that regularly (and to its intellectual cost) accompany it, but need not. While it would hardly be surprising should the quite limited range of ethical theories that have achieved much development to date prove inadequate to new environmental objectives, the situation is by no means as desperate as MCCioskey implies. Firstly, the options MCCioskey does offer, deviously pruned down (not 'ideal observer ethic' but 'Humean ideal observer ethic', not 'natural law ethic' but 'Thomistic natural law ethic'), are not all restricted in the way portrayed: 'All make human nature or personhood or features thereof basic to ethics' (p.59). Not so; the contention certainly does not hold for all the types of theory listed, e.g. naturalism or relativism, and insofar �9 as it does, it is sometimes easily avoided, as with natural law (e.g. set within pantheism). Secondly, there is a range of recognised ethical types, such as those distinguished by Broad, which affords scope for the elaboration of ecological ethics. Obvious candidates within naturalism include biological and evolutionary naturalism - typical examples of which 'are the following: "To be virtuous means to perform the specific activities of the species to which you belong efficiently" (Spinoza). "Better conduct means conduct that comes later in the course of evolution and is more complex than earlier conduct of the same kind" (Herbert Spencer)' (Broad p.259). No doubt such proposals exhibit deficiencies, but not per se of a human chauvinistic sort; and they admit of improvement, which they are beginning to obtain within the tradition of American naturalism (thus e.g. Rolston's work). More promising, however, are "non-naturalistic" theories, of which objectivistic realistic intuitionism such as Mccloskey is keen to offer and promote is but one kind. For there are other less demanding types of intuitionism (see, e.g. Broad p.270), including various "deep intuitionisms", which may be neither objectivistic nor realistic (in the sense of labouring under heavy ontological commitments). In particular, as Elliot explains (p.502), what entirely escapes MCCloskey is the feasibility of a meta-ethic which is nonjective, that is, not objective, like transcendental intuitionism, but not implausibly subjective either. Then there are moral sense theories and their more plausible variations including mixtures with rationalism. Further, there are analogous mixtures coherently building upon emotional presentation. Such a rational reconstuction, varying the Austrian theory of values as elaborated empirically and logically by Meinong, is in fact the ethical way taken by deep-green theory (for detail see TE and DG). And so on. There is logical scope, then, for quite a variety of ecological meta-ethics, and definitely scope for significant improvements upon those 'developed to date'. As much to the point, there have already been significant developments of some forms of ecological meta-ethics, notably of that theory in effect under criticism, deepgreen theory, which is already better articulated than most conventional ethics. There are several connected parts to this elaboration because it brings into meta-ethics new logical technology, especially world-semantics. The parts, furthermore, have not been duly separated because of a pervasive verificationism living on in Anglo-American ethical theory, which proceeds to equate semantic with epistemic, meaning with method of coming to know, and the like. A first step then in meta-ethical analysis is some proper separation of the parts, such as meaning, epistemic confirmation, and rational justification. Naturally the parts fit together into a larger whole, into the meta-ethical edifice, but simplistic positivistic equations do not satisfactorily explain the integration. �10 As to meaning, deep-green theory can already stand on its record of proferred semantical analyses. 3 Semantics both for axiological terms such as value and bettemess and for deontic terms such as obligation and wrongness have been provided through world semantics (see sv, MD). The deontic theory developed in the process (in MD) offers a considerable improvement over Ross's theory (which supplies no semantics), because it enables the theory-saving artifice of prima facie obligations to be removed and natural language discourse concerning obligations to be recovered. While such semantical advances do not pretend to offer a full account of meaning, as much more remains to be done within pragmatics, they do offer straightforward resolutions both of long-standing ethical puzzles and paradoxes and of several complaints about environmentally deep ethics. A major early problem for a genuinely nonchauvinistic ethics was to give a satisfactory account of ethical terms without reference to favoured biological species, above all to humans. On deep-green theory this was accomplished by a combination of an "annular theory", offering an ethically relevant typology of doers and receivers, with the semantical analyses (see EE and AP for details). By these means, deep-green theory proceeded to remove humans from an essential role in ethics. Humans enter importantly, of course, but only contingently, as certain sorts of valuers and agents, which sorts depending upon their relevant capacities. For example, humans do not inevitably enter, as too many had previously supposed, into every ethical picture, because there were no value judgements without valuers, and all valuers were humans. Both parts of this linkage fail. Most important, values are not tied to valuers or actual valuing. But possible valuers and therewith their valuing can always be dummied in logically. The reason is at bottom that any coherent distribution of values can be regarded as the values of certain possible valuers. Furthermore, contrary to MCCloskey's unsupported charge against such semantical analyses, this does not expose the theory 'to difficulties parallel to those encountered by phenomenalism ... ' (p.60). For phenomenalism attempts a reduction; the semantical theory makes no such attempt. The meta-ethic is non-reductionist; nor is it obliged to rely upon tricks like supervenience. Deep-green theory already had more up on the meta-ethical scoreboard in the early eighties than Ross's theory upon which MCCioskey purportedly proposed to reply. MCCloskey's criticism of ecological ethics as meta-ethically inadequate lapses. As to normative theory, the other prong of his attack, his demands are excessive. Few ethical theories have been stated 'fully and clearly' and 'developed in a systematic, detailed 3 Standing on records is hardly a practice I embrace with much enthusiasm, but sometimes it is inevitable if excess repetition is to be avoided. �11 form' such as Mccloskey appears to expect (e.g. p.60). To take some grand comparisons: Those that are detailed such as Confusianism are not particular systematic, those that are detailed and systematic such as Spinoza's ethic are hardly clear and are likely inconsistent, those that are fairly full and moderately clear such as Sidgwick's utilitarianism are also rather clearly defective; and in the twentieth century, nothing much, ecological or not, matches these grand examples. But to indicate a few details of what is accomplished normatively in deep-green theory:- Non-interference and like principles are defended (cf EE p.174); these afford a basis for integrating standard social justice principles (including obligations to the future), duly amended, with environmental principles. In this way, making use of the annular theory, much of prevailing social ethics, of a radical kind, can be subsumed. In an attempt to be helpful, Mccloskey quite erroneously suggests that 'the normative ethic appears to be base[d] on ... intuitive insights into what is intrinsically valuable and what is intrinsically obligatory, where what is intrinsically obligatory need not be tied to intrinsic value' (p.60, rearranged). What is obligatory, like what is right, does answer back to what is intrinsically valuable, though in more complex fashion than elementary ethical courses care to contemplate (see TE and MD). But what is intrinsically valuable is often not discerned through intuitive insights. The idea that is is part of what lies at the back of the expectation that instant answers can and should be given to any question as to what is intrinsically valuable or the like. Rather what is intrinsically valuable is arrived at through a process of reasoning and coherence-assessment, based at bottom on emotional presentation (for more detail see TE). We offered, furthermore, many examples of items - not only individuals, but species, such as the blue whale, complexes, and ecosystems - that are intrinsically valuable, valuable in and for themselves and not on other counts (such as some of MCCloskey's "intrinsic values" which vanish into economic or aesthetic values). Accordingly, the charge (p.60), 'Nor are the relevant values or principles explained or discussed', loses its force. As to the specific difficulties for an ecological ethic of deep-green kind that MCCioskey alleges, many of these are only encountered upon importing assumptions that the ethics do not include and should not supply. So it is with the assumption that an ecological ethic should assign intrinsic value to all species, even equally to each species, given that it does to some. MCCloskey's own intermediate ethic does not do this, why should an ecological ethic? Some-to-all arguments do not suddenly become valid in deep space. Deep-green theory, in particular, unlike deep ecology, makes no assumptions as to biospecies equality; rather it requires a certain interspecies impartiality. The extent of intrinsic value of a species is assessed in principle, through a multiple factor procedure incorporating value-making features of the species (cf. EE p.168). Mccloskey wheels �12 out the already exhausted examples of disease organisms and parasites, and offers his intuition, a strong human prejudice, that 'there seems to be no intrinsic value in the existence of such species and organisms' (p.61). No doubt such species and organisms do not exhibit intrinsic value in the way or to the extent that conspicuous species near the tops of food chains do. Their biological role and value is different. Their importance, consists, in part, in control, in regulation of the character and the numbers of more valuable species; their biological value is, to stretch a term, primarily facilitative, but often nonetheless, under present ecological arrangements, apparently essential. One reason why MCCioskey fails to observe how easy it is to shift the difficulties he finds so pressing is, of course, that he is trying to make a case against deep positions. Another reason is that he is operating with far too coarse a mesh, both ecologically and socially. Intrinsic value does not come in big indiscriminable unsieved lumps: all species if any, all pleasure if any, all knowledge if any. The need for discrimination becomes evident if added to MCCloskey's list of intrinsic valuables (e.g. p.108) are such standard goals as wealth and power (itself often linked to knowledge). Like wealth and power, human pleasure and knowledge4, for example, are far from invariable goods. Often, like much entrepreneurial information transmitted through expensive systems, they are trivial; sometimes they are positively evil, as pleasure in extensive torture, or practical knowledge of the means of excruciating torture. 5 A finer mesh is needed, and available, a mesh that can be usefully applied in the ecological domain to remove standard "difficulties", as it was applied by Mill, though in a failed attempt to repair utilitarianism. 4. Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics. Ecological politics is a structure grafted onto ecological ethics, in much the way that political theory more generally is supposedly built upon (or alongside) ethics. Politics is essentially concerned with groups, societies and certain social institutions; ethics, so it is said, with individuals. But the distinction is not quite so simple; ethics too concerns groups and interrelations of individuals, normatively. In fact, the exact 4 For these often shoddy goals McCloskey indecently contemplates destruction of the Rottnest quokka, a species McCloskey provocatively presents as 'useless' and 'ugly' (p.61). Judgements of aesthetic and utility are notoriously ideological systemdependent, and here McCloskey flouts his commitment to an old, damaging, and fortunately disappearing, ideology. 5 In any event, Western ethics and ideology much overrate knowledge and information; largely defunct Eastern theories, such as Taoism, have a better appreciation of the importance, and nonimportance, of different kinds of knowledge (cf. Sylvan and Bennett on Taoism). �13 interrelation of politics with ethics, though an issue under investigation since Aristotle sought to settle the matter, remains unclear. Judicious borrowing from logic can help a bit in clarification, in both the general and the ecologically restricted cases. With ethics and politics, or ecological ethics and ecological politics (of given sorts, e.g. utilitarian, deep-green), both considered as theories, the relation is that of extension: the latter extends the former, in fact extends it substantially. For comparison, logical examples of extensions are afforded by the relation of quantification logic to sentential logic, or set theory to quantification logic, or, a little nearer the mark in terms of complexity, classical mathematics to set theory. Ecological politics is not merely - or as regards the pure theory at all - an application of ecological ethics. It requires a considerable amount of further apparatus (typically primitives and defined terms in the extended theory) that does not enter into ethics proper, such as states, leaders, corporations, unions, organisers, and moreover (what correspond to axiomatic constraints) the manifold interconnections of these political items. What kind of extension politics is, or ought to be, of ethics is a more vexed question. In particular (depending on the matching of the politics to the presumed ethics it extends) the extension may not be conservative. For example, theoretical allowance has to be made for the Machiavellian idea that certain political components may be exempt from given ethical constraints, an idea that has proved unacceptable to most philosophers from Aristotle through Mccloskey. The prevailing conservative extension theme is forcefully presented, if in too shallow and individualistic form, by Nozick: Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do [politically] through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state's fundamental coercive power has (Nagel p.199, endorsing Nozick). In short, should conservative extension be abandoned, rational justification becomes a serious, indeed insuperable, problem. As it happens, the way in which ecological politics proceeds to extend ecological politics (when done conservatively) is admirably illustrated by MCCloskey's practice and development of issues. In virtually every case, the approach adopted as regards the politics of the issue builds directly upon the results reached in the ethical investigation of that issue. However, in the political theory advanced, Mccloskey does not take full and proper advantage of his supplemented ethics, but lapses back into an old-fashioned chauvinism. (He thus resembles a logician, actual exemplars shall go unnamed, who �14 with all the underlying logical technology available to avoid the paradoxes and anomalies of classical set theory, lapses back into these when he makes the extension to set theory.) Once again this abysmal outcome is primarily a result of his tenacious adherence to that ancient greater value prejudice, which vastly overrates humans, their attitudes, freedoms and products, and undervalues natural things, even to the extent of undercutting previously granted intrinsic value (cf. p.111). Mccloskey proceeds to play humans off against environments, assuming of course that humans ought to win hands-down. The resulting theory is ecological only in addressing - in a decidedly unsympathetical way ecologically - ecological problems. Ecologically then, the proferred ecological politics proves exceedingly disappointing; politically, things are little better. A political theory is bound to add to an ethical theory further organisational structure, comprising further structural units (corporations, states, etc.), institutional arrangements (property, markets, etc.), and so on. There are a great many, still illclassified and largely untried, types of options here: options as to what gets added, and how it is adjoined. Among the enormous range of choice McCloskey opts, without much argument, for unimaginative arrangements like those prevailing in the West and North, for a statist and developmental status quo (for which he serves very much as an apologist). He opts for what he is pleased to call 'liberal democratic states' - though the veneer of democracy is thin (control typically being vested with a ruling minority) and liberality is sharply hedged (true-blue liberalism conflicting with statism, in ways thorough-going libertarianism has exposed). Practically, as we know from experience, it is a jerry-built structure; theoretically, as is insufficiently realised, it remains a house of cards. The status quo choice of "liberal democracy" gets confirmed, so Mccloskey imagines, by disposing of but two sorts of alternatives: primitivism, which he regards as substantially self-refuting in presently highly civilized highly warlike times; and totalitarianism, which he regards as the main and menacing alternative. It is a simplistic scheme, leaving out significant alternatives; but such a picture is remarkably widespread, even among academics. While, like most urbanised intellectuals, Mccloskey cannot resist sounding off about any proposed 'return to primitivism', to 'rural communities of the political imagination' (p.109), he does in fact confine his consideration of alternative political arrangements to totalitarian alternatives which would sharply increase the restrictiveness of present statist arrangements. Against totalitarian alternatives, even present inadequate arrangements no doubt look good; but against certain other political alternatives (e.g. decentralised organisation using advanced technology as appropriate), these arrangements look more like a recipe for on-going ecological trouble. Such other alternatives, Mccloskey does not really consider. He has sighted the far ecological right, �15 ecofascism as it is sometimes dubbed, and fires almost all his guns at it. However there is an ecological left, with a longer tradition than the right, which passes unnoticed; yet it offers a vision of new ecological communities in which liberal principles, on the face of it MCCloskey's main concern, are maintained or even enhanced. But, for all its shortcomings, MCCloskey's attempt to get to grips with ecological politics deserves a somewhat fuller discussion than indicated by Goodin's cavalier dismissal: 'The politics discussion just amounts to a bash at the authoritarianism of some of the more rabid ecological doomsayers, propositions which are quite sufficient reductios in and of themselves' (p.344). For one thing, that was how much of the field looked when MCCioskey was helping to put ecological politics on the philosophical agenda. Ecological politics still remained an unfashionable, and in some places dangerous, field at the time MCCioskey was writing. Liberal philosophers with respectable academic positions in North America tended to keep out of the field, which accordingly got left to practical environmentalists, over-enthusiastic in their appeals to the state for tough control and regulation, and to authoritarian academics keen to strengthen totalitarian and isolationist tendencies of states. As MCCioskey emphasizes, Much ecological political writing exhibits two disturbing features that undermine its value. The one feature relates to the readiness of many political theorists on the basis of the flimsiest evidence to waive lightly man's claim to recognition of his human rights on the ground that the ecological crisis is so grave and critical that only the most drastic, desperate measures will succeed. The other feature is the very great confidence in the capacity of states to take whatever action is necessary to avoid the ecological crisis. In fact, the states of the world today greatly contribute to various of the ecologically based problems that confront mankind. They are unworthy of the great faith and trust that many ecological reformers appear to have in them or in the state in the abstract.(p.108). Bravo! But rather than considering carefully dismantling states, in favour of alternative organisational arrangements, MCCioskey leaps immediately in the opposite direction, to the orthodox position that 'a major part of the ecological political problem is that of ensuring that states carry out their ecological responsibilities' - whatever those may be (states do not regard themselves as morally bound, and typically their constitutions are incredibly weak and unspecific, and sometimes evasive on such matters). Indeed he goes further: 'The nation-state needs to be not superseded but complimented by a world political authority' (p .107). Again there is little argument, and no due concern that such an Authority would be yet a further developmental agency operating with tanks and bulldozers. �16 For another, MCCioskey tried to open up or advance several issues in ecological politics (and would have, if his book had existentially impacted and had not been largely bypassed or dismissed). These issues include not merely the standard issues of overpopulation, pollution and unethical technology; more notably, they also include the issue, which has recently received much airing, as to whether environmental demands and regulations interfere damagingly with individual freedoms and other aspects of liberal principles. There are other facets to this that deserve further examination (do it decently, someone!): the extent to which liberal states do and can deliver on environmental matters, as well as the extent of interference with liberties (much turns then on how it is all done). MCCioskey has overestimated the abilities of states to deliver liberal ideals and guarantee liberal principles, such as individual freedom (in fact, to note some lesser infringements, they characteristically coerce citizens in many respects, forcing them into a money economy, to pay taxes and obtain licences, even to serve on juries, to vote, to fight, etc.). If the state promises liberties with one hand, it is busy actually taking liberties away with the other. While we may be stuck with states for the present, as an unpleasant political reality, it is not too difficult to see that there are better unrealised alternatives even from a traditional liberal angle, alternatives that pass unconsidered. And MCCioskey has grossly underestimated the severity of ecological problems states should be trying to solve. In some of his findings, MCCioskey is so wildly astray that his judgement on factual issues and his credibility has to fall under real suspicion. For example: ' ... it is evident that over the whole period of his existence man has only been one relatively minor factor bearing on species survival rates' (p.47)! ' ... man is simply adding more hazards to those created by nature itself for some species' (p.47 continuing). For the next example, by contrast with the previous, MCCioskey might seek refuge in the fact that he was writing back in 1982: 'Few suggest that man can or will destroy the ecosystem of the earth' (p.49). Even so, the news on nuclear winter had broken, and the Greenhouse effect was already worrying some scientists. "Man" appears able to do little that is very wrong; MCCioskey can only bring himself to engage in the mildest of censure: ' ... man could have used DDT to better effect' (p.50). No doubt he could have refrained from using it to significantly better effect. A due adaptation of that Old Testament idea that humans are characteristically radically flawed, regularly and perhaps inevitably sinning in their treatment of the Earth, does not break through in MCCloskey's approach. In fact anti-ecological themes strongly pushed by MCCioskey will break through again and again in what follows. �17 Nor did Mccloskey anticipate the rapid march of ecological history at all well. With his operational assumption that ecological reforms 'would not be popular' (e.g. p.156), he appears to have been swiftly refuted by history. There has been much popular movement in favour of ecological causes. The main resistance to far-reaching reforms has not been popular, but establishment resistance, together with that from business, wealth and privilege, and their hired economic men and thugs. Similarly with his assumptions that reform, or change, would not occur unless the ecological problems were believed 'to be real problems' (p.157) - which of course MCCloskey himself believed they were not by and large, something he deluded himself that he had shown. But popular beliefs have changed rapidly, taking MCCloskey's assumptions under along with old beliefs. In any case, MCCloskey's argument to unpopularity lacks cogency. It is that ecological measures 'may necessitate less convenient, changed lifestyles, many controls and restrictions, increased costs, additional taxes, basic interference with what now are seen as being matters of basic rights .... democratic legislators [cannot] hope to bring about the reforms ... and still retain office' (p.157). Whence, again ecological reformers may look to totalitarian political solutions. So far as I am aware, there have been no such proposals by ecological groups in Australasia. In small measure too, Mccloskey begins to meet his own argument. For measures of the type Mccloskey rightly finds distasteful, have already been run through in contemporary representative democracies; consider security and surveillance, foreign control and surveillance, nuclear power and surveillance, urban restructuring and surveillance opportunities, and so on. Secondly, there are important trade-offs; if these often minor inconveniences are not experienced now, much more drastic and dislocating changes will probably have to be undertaken subsequently. Thirdly, of course, if they are not undertaken now much of immense value will be lost. More direct democracies than we have today, where peoplegovernance and control of established elites is tenuous, would stand a better chance of limiting these losses; properly pluralistic systems would presumably manage better still. But Mccloskey does not address such issues as ecologically improved democracies. Instead he assumes, quite wrongly, that solutions to ecological difficulties will require strong and authoritarian central governments (perhaps both of states and of the world), but that such institutions run directly counter to liberal concerns: 'the enjoyments of many rights and liberties and opportunities to rectify grave injustices' (p.25). So he tears off to address the difficulties of ecological totalitarianism (pp.158-9), well-known difficulties (as Goodin observed) confronting Antipodean non-starters among political alternatives. �18 Without examining other alternatives than certain totalitarian ones, Mccloskey manages to conclude (to his own satisfaction) that 'the only realistic, feasible avenue to ecological political reform is through the political institutions of an open society that respects human rights', what he appears to think is offered by contemporary 'liberal democratic states' (p.159). Naturally deep environmentalists seek open societies that respect rights, including decently discerned human rights. The big trouble is that on these matters, as with environmental matters, contemporary liberal democratic states have performed decidedly sublimenally, i.e. well below adequacy threshold. 6 It is not unreasonable to contemplate alternative political arrangements that perform more satisfactorily. But it is perhaps unrealistic to expect such improved organisational structure to be got into place at all easily or at all. For liberal democratic states retain regional monopolies on violence and other critical control, which, for all the palavering about respecting rights, they do not hesitate to deploy when their power and security are threatened. Nor is Mccloskey, by contrast with libertarians, at all averse to regulations and restrictions and limitations on liberty - except when these put environmental things ahead of humans. For humans, if not animals, things material are supposed to be pretty good in MCCloskey's liberal democratic mixed capitalistic setting. Environmental constraints are not to impose upon or reduce human living 'standards or levels of enjoyment' (p.134) - unless that enjoyment should be profligate, for instance involving conspicuous consumption and waste. Certainly such constraints are not to interfere with morally acceptable human freedoms: such is one side of the proferred dilute liberalism. But unnecessary waste is another thing, and should be curbed, through state guidance and regulation; liberalism here parts company with libertarianism. 'The switch from a resource-profligate society to a resource-liberal one would involve an acceptance of much more state action, more state interference by way of incentives, disincentives, regulations, restrictive laws, and over all planning than now prevails. However, it would not require the loss of basic freedom ... ' (p.134)! Such double-talk certainly makes the heavy liberal case MCCloskey tries to mount against decent environmental concerns - as against decent human concerns - look thin and flawed. Because such regulation does make serious inroads upon capitalistic freedoms, much hangs on the term 'basic', which is not however explained in this context. If, being freedom-loving Europeans, we burn down an empty freeway at speeds in excess of wasteful consumption limitations and we are accordingly locked away for months, then the effect 6 Sublimenal is a satisizing analogue of the maximization ideology's suboptimal. �19 on our basic freedom to life at large is serious. The paternalistic states MCCioskey offers, in significant respects more paternal than those we already have in the West, do not sit so easily with liberalism; patently they are incompatible with libertarianism, which does not brook such restrictive regulation. The critical point is however this: what is permissible in rectifying a resource-profligate society is similarly permissible in reorganising an environmentally-profligate society. Again there need be no loss of basic freedom, where basic is now characterised in terms of whats ethically acceptable. Only the ethics is now a deep environmental ethics. 5. Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems. Environmental ethics and politics are regularly said to be engendered by environmental problems, increasingly severe and encroaching problems. Yet in MCCloskey's text, as in that of his main model, Passmore's establishment text, there is no well-organised classification of environmental problems, only a rather ramshackle list. We can however reach towards an improved classification by considering environmental impact in a dynamic setting (cf. the beginning of section 1). An impact of something is something which comes from somewhere, sources, into something, sinks, parts of environments. In a process diagram, it looks like this: impacts processes sources sinks types of environments participants distinguished agents of impacts recipients of impacts Expanding upon the elements of this process diagram will deliver the sought after improved classification. Firstly, given distinguished background experience, especially with environmental impact equations, a further two-way classification is suggested: in terms of • sorts of impacts, and • types of environments. The latter framework is wide enough (in obvious respects too wide for a tight classification) to include both special concentrated sources such as mines, power stations, factories, and the like, and special sinks such as rubbish dumps, sewerage outflows, and the like. But the framework is not quite wide enough; it is important to factor into types of environments, expected inhabitants of those environments, which are the recipients of impacts (impactees). These will include not only present inhabitants of �20 environments: animals, plants, native humans, for land-surface environments, but also expected future inhabitants, whose likelihood or very existence may be impaired. There are two ways of incorporating these sorts of elements in the general scheme: either expanding environmental components, by having zones and habitats with kinds of expected inhabitants; or distinguishing participants in the impacts, givers and receivers. Here the latter course is preferred; we distinguish also then • kinds of recipients, and as well of course • kinds of impactors. While the kinds of impactors is diverse, including such superagents and nonagents as Nature, Chance, God (as in "acts of God"), and so forth, as well as animals, the main impactors of interest are, presently, humans. Accordingly let us run out the standard environmental impact equation for humans in a region, though it applies to any class of impactors through any kind of impact: EI. Environmental impact (of ... through ... ) = Population size (of ... ) X Resource use per member (of ... ) x Impact (through ... ) per unit of resource use e.g. of humans in USA through atmospheric pollution. Such an impact breakdown leads directly to three major categories of environmental problems, namely a Population a Consumption and use a Technology and waste. Those components act in concert, and, despite well-publicized attempts to load problems onto just one component, evidently all are sometimes important. A more sophisticated environmental impact equation would reduce the aggregation of the equation, EI = P x C x T (in brief, and functional, form), by introducing distributional features, which indicated where and when impact really mattered. Suppose, for example, there are n sufficiently independent regions, as in the following regionalized impact equation: n EI = Pi X Ci X Ti i=l Suppose, for instance, we are investigating the environmental impact of present humans l through industrialization, i.e. EI (present humans through industrialization). Then, on an obvious regional breakdown, the impact is overwhelmingly dominated by three regions: North America, Europe, and North Asia (primarily Japan). If it were not that the rest of the world were locked into this system (and its humans encouraged to applaud �21 and emulate it), supplying much of the raw materials, taking too much of the expensive products and waste, and suffering the pollution effects that spill outside the offending regions, main problems of industrialisation could be isolated in the high latitude N orthem hemisphere. The regionalized environmental impact equation will also serve to better organise widespread assumptions as to how those impacts that are taken seriously can be eroded. Not only is there the illusory prospect of reducing impact to "acceptable levels" by variation of just one parameter - Ci is that invariably favoured by socially-oriented shallower environmentalists; Ti, in the shape of wizard technology, by economists and technocrats (but such technology is likely to have its own impact and thereby to add to environmental problems). There is also the possibility of moving further afield to new regions, where impacts are lower. There are familiar frontier practices ( and a corresponding frontier ethics), which can be seen as reapplied to elements such as industrialisation and its components, pollution and waste. Of course such frontier practices are impoverishing, and too often destructive of further environments and many of their inhabitants; but in any case they are now seriously limited by biospheric limitations of the whole Earth. Many significant types of environment obtain little or no consideration in MCCloskey's survey; e.g. deserts (too many the product of past human activity), urban regions, polar regions, atmospheric zones, and so on. To stay within reasonable bounds, however, not even all the areas of concern that Mccloskey does look at will be examined in what follows. For to try to track Mccloskey in all the areas he does delve into would require an extensive treatise, as he raises many fundamental issues in political theory: to mention two remarkable examples, a brief discussion of 'the right to private property' is tucked away under 'Family Rights and Rights to Reproduce', and of the 'right for education' under 'The Right to Respect as a Person' (p.75ff.) Instead a more detailed treatment of a few of the areas he addresses will be offered (in fact some of the other areas have been investigated elsewhere, in Green Series discussions, or will be). 6. Population impact: the fact of human overpopulation. A major and very conspicuous impact of humans upon the Earth comes through their sheer numbers, which, though already huge, are still growing rapidly, and are overwhelming environmental and social bases for reasonable support in many parts of the globe. MCCloskey's first thesis, which sets the agenda for his entire population discussion, is this (pp 146-7,p.97): that there is no world population crisis, indeed further, NP. The world is not threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future. �22 But instead of coming out directly and cleanly with this preposterous thesis, MCCioskey approaches the business in a typical oblique way, designed to shift the onus of proof, claiming that he has 'argued that a tenable, plausible case had not been made out for believing that the world is threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future' (p.146). It is fair to wonder about his experiential basis, whether, for instance, he has travelled through India or visited the vast urban slums of many third-world countries. It is fair to wonder what would make a "tenable plausible case" - proper theoretical business for philosophers, which philosophers have generally steadfastly avoided - or, of immediate relevance, what would constitute a "population crisis", and what counts as "overpopulation". On the last at least we do have a proposal from MCCioskey, 'to use overpopulation to refer to population sizes that exceed a country's or the world's capacity to feed adequately and to make it possible for all to enjoy their basic rights' (p.97). While the proposal is no doubt very convenient for the argumentative route MCCioskey will try to take, a route it already signposts, it is a decidedly chauvinistic and exceedingly shallow suggestion, which is ecologically entirely unacceptable. First, it takes no due account of future humans, or other creatures. But present capacity is achieved, so far as it is, too often through running down present biological and other systems, thereby jeopardising future capacity; decent sustainability is required even by shallow ecological positions. Secondly, the proposal is indecently chauvinistic; it takes account of naught but humans, their basic rights and their feeding. It thus violates the framework MCCioskey elsewhere professes to have adopted. For instance, high populations, which are not MCCioskey overpopulations, may lead, and are leading, to promotion of evil and to gross reductions in intrinsic value, including types of value MCCioskey earlier (somewhat reluctantly) acknowledged. But like all the political applications of the potentially generous ethical basis, that on population takes an ugly anti-ecological tum. It is all humans and humans, humans first, last and only, though humans at brute food subsistence levels or less as it turns out, and is turning out in many regions. Now really the proposal should be relativised, to 'overpopulation of a region', as the awkward disjunction, between country or world, makes evident. Many regions and countries are already seriously overpopulated (even by MCCloskey's slack standards), as he goes on to say. However, so he immediately asserts, 'the world as a whole is not overpopulated' (p.97). Whatever the case for this claim - a defective and disreputable case as will soon appear - plainly some large assumptions go into the proposition that a whole or summation can enjoy certain distribution properties when many of its parts do not: assumptions about the role of international trade, regionalism and self-sustainability on the one side and about summative features on the other. If clothes, for example, are �23 dirty or shabby in many parts, so are they as a whole. Suppose some parts are overpopulated because of constant infringements of basic human rights, infringements presumably traceable back to excess population sizes (though the connection is not made clear enough). Then the whole can hardly but be overpopulated, as it stands, whatever the future prospects for redistribution, reorganisation, and so forth. To evade such problems and to scramble to his conclusion Mccloskey firstly weakens 'basic rights' to 'basic needs' (but rights normally demand more than need satisfaction), and then drops 'basic needs' out altogether. Thus what he finally gets down to is the bare food issue, all else set aside: of whether 'if the food actually produced were distributed and used to the best advantage of all persons in the world' every human could be fed. But, so he claims, 'it is widely accepted' that all can be amply fed (pp 97-8). It is evident that, even if what is so "widely accepted" were true, the outcome would be insufficient to show no Mccloskey overpopulation. Suppose the world has the capacity (and will) to redistribute food to the most advantage. Still, basic food is no assurance of basic rights. Further argument, not supplied, is essential; argument to showing that regional overpopulation, stayed however by bread (but not circuses), does not lead to basic rights infringement, through such media as unemployment, poverty, inequity and so on. Furthermore it is very doubtful that this can be established, for the simple reason that there are connections between these human conditions (however difficult they may be to push into quantifiable or law-like form). Humans do not survive or depend upon food alone. To keep many of them even partly contented, so inflated have their wants and needs become under ideological pressures, will require a very large and very environmentally destructive pie. Humans are now an extraordinarily greedy and destructive species. Though one animal species among thousands, and one biological species among tens of millions, they have taken over most of the Earth and most of its products, so far as they can, for their own uses and purposes. More than 80% of the fruits of photosynthesis, for example, now flow to this one species. Yet perhaps 10% of the world's human population are malnourished, and many millions at least lack other subsistence needs. Even the bare food claim, upon which MCCloskey's whole case depends at bottom, is no longer so widely accepted, since the shock of the North American and other droughts; it was being questioned as MCCloskey wrote. Now however we have available the Brown University study of world food supply in relation to human �24 population. 7 The study is based on the 1986 harvest, which was a world record. The findings were that, with this supply, assuming perfect and equal redistribution, 6 billion humans would be fed a vegetarian diet. Thus by the end of the century, present record supplies will not be able to sustain the world's human population even at vegetarian levels. If the somewhat better South American style diet, with 15% meat, is considered, then only 4 billion humans can be fed; that is, less than the present world population. While if a rather better Australian style diet is contemplated, the number that can be fed declines to 2.5 billion, that is half the present world population. So much for ample feeding. It might reasonably be anticipated that the rest of the argument to NP, no foreseeable population crisis, is hopeless. And it is. All we are offered are, firstly, some reasons, of very variable quality, 'to suspect the most confident, brash predictions' (p.99) - suspicions which seem to include NP within their scope, along with MCCloskey's next speculative thesis. Secondly we are offered the speculative thesis that world food production will grow at least sufficiently to match world population growth. It is a thesis floated largely on technological optimism, a thesis that should be regarded with heavy suspicion given recent serious declines in biological capital: fisheries, soils, forests, and so on, and given apparently increasing climatic instability. To give him his small due, MCCioskey does assert, repeatedly, that there is little ground 'for complacency and inaction in respect of the world's population growth' (e.g. p.99 ); and as well as firing moral shots at 'alarmist predictions ... based on the flimsiest premisses' countering NP (for no problem), he makes heavy moral noises about morally assessing the situation. In any case, he needs to say something like this in order to pull off convincingly his big discussion of the ins and outs of, ethics and politics of, human sexuality and population control. 7. On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations. Hitherto received opinion, in modem Wes tern civilization, has taken the line that culling animal species is perfectly alright, but that culling humans is not, because humans have an unalienable right to life (a right regularly neglected however in times of war, in regressive criminal justice systems, and now questioned as regards poachers of significant animals). Received opinion, which MCCioskey tries to shore up, is now being challenged. Alternative methods of controlling populations of wild animals, to 7 The study is regularly cited by Ehrlich in his talks, lectures and works: see reference. �25 previous technologically primitive ones, are being seriously considered. Another gulf between humans and other sizeable intelligent animals is beginning to close. Unlike some dangerous Christian thinkers, Mccloskey does not cede to humans an unlimited right to procreation. As he says, 'there is no recognised moral, social or legal right for consenting parties to reproduce at will', but 'few philosophers today would seek philosophically to justify prevailing recognised ... restrictions on procreation' (p.150). Mccloskey wishes to impose a restriction as regards adequate provision for offspring; there is no right to reproduction where a requirement of reasonable prospects of adequate provision is not met. This bears heavily, as he realises, and perhaps also inequitably, on impoverished parents in poor communities; the issue is not really resolved (see p.101). But otherwise, in richer countries, the duties of those who would undertake human parenthood are presented as slight. Individuals, acting on their own, have otherwise no duties to restrict the size of their families (for the unMCCloskeyian consequentialist reason that it will have limited practical significance and achieve little). Where overpopulation is an issue, political, not individual, action is what is required. Where overpopulation threatens, individuals 'adequately fulfil their duty if they have only that number of children for which they can adequately care and [very differently, and with major political implications] if they foster and support world action to stabilize the world population and [confirming a right previously hedged] to ensure that all persons enjoy the right, equally with themselves, to have offspring if they so choose' (p.104 ). Otherwise the issue is dumped in the (too hard) political basket, for states and world organisations to try to handle. All this is decidedly unsatisfactory. Most important, there is no right to production of children without limit, even given that they can be "provided for". One reason is that new children produce impacts, and children in quantity seriously interfere with others; so result in significant violations of liberal principles regarding noninterference with others. In rough analogical terms, as the Macs' new building interferes with their neighbours' views, so their new children interfere with the neighbours' freedom and lifestyles and environments, beginning with local noise and crowding and continuing, much further, through taxes for family allowances, for schools and so on, through crowded and polluted parks and beaches and so on. Those assuming (conditional) rights, to reproduce for instance, tend to forget that rights require justifications (they cannot just be pulled out of thin air). But here any straightforward justificatory pattern is upset, because of a very familiar neglect of relations: namely, impacts of new people on environments, and interference of new people with in-place people. A change in attitudes and practices is accordingly warranted. Parties producing larger numbers of children should be regarded as socially and ecologically irresponsible; they should no longer gain special financial support, but �26 perhaps should, on the contrary, be duly penalized. These themes run counter to the main thrust of MCCloskey's discourse on population control, an extensive discussion premised on what he takes to be the improbable hypothesis that a world population crisis eventuates (pp.147-155). It ought to be enough to pull the plug on that discussion, sending intellectual babies with soiled bath water. That voluntary methods of limiting human births 'will not succeed' is MCCloskey's prime thesis (p.147). The support offered for it is characteristic and characteristically inadequate. First the thesis is weakened, and then some restricted and contestable empirical evidence is advanced as suggestive. 'That voluntary methods of checking birth rates are unlikely to be adequate is suggested by the relatively limited success of family planning projects even where [well] backed ... ' (p.147). On the contrary, voluntary methods of checking birth rates, mostly independent of family planning projects, have been substantially successful in many better educated, less impoverished communities. Some of these might even count as spectacularly successful, and more would be if they achieved some real, and sensitive, state support. But there are many powerful interests, especially those emanating from organised religions, operating against delivery of support designed for success. There is a conspicuous difference, again connected with ancient prejudices, between the attitude shown to human populations and the approach MCCloskeyians take to animal populations. Humans have the right, but socially constrained, to continue on their expansive and environmentally degrading course; animals have no such right, because, among other things, they have no rights. 8. On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof. The argument to the conservative result, that animals cannot enjoy (moral) rights, attempts to trade off an argument on which great emphasis is put, that 'there is a vast gap between rights and interests' (p.66). But that attempt depends on a confusion between what rights are - certainly not interests - and what can hold rights significantly - perhaps only items with interests. With that confusion out of the way, MCCioskey still has two main arguments to his shrill conclusion, that 'animals do not, cannot possess moral rights' (p.66 and several other places): a tight redefinition argument, and an environmental chaos otherwise argument. The tight redefinition argument proceeds, by appealing to special features of rights, to tighten up the notion of right so that unwanted (if commonly recognised) classes of right-holders are excluded. Such an argument, widely deployed against animal liberation, takes two main forms: less plausibly, that rights require interests, which �27 animals are alleged to lack, and, more plausibly, that rights have to be suitably exercisable and claimable, feats beyond animals abilities and capacities to perform. Though formerly among the ageing afficiandos of the less plausible Cartesian nointerests approach, MCCioskey now pursues the more plausible form. He appeals first to typical features of rights (though really some combination of these must form an invariant cluster for a decisive argument), such as their being 'foregone, insisted upon, exercised in or contrary to one's interests. For possession of a moral right to be meaningful, the possessor or his/her representative must be able to claim it, exercise it, or the like' (p.66, italics added). Unfortunately for his argument, MCCioskey proceeds, at crucial points, to leave out the representative alternative. Thus while an animal may not be able to claim its rights, a representative can; whereupon talk of claiming a right is not empty (pace p.66). Thus the argument so far is broken-backed. Having recanted on his earlier contention that animals cannot have interests (see p.65), MCCioskey is no longer in a position to preclude the attribution of rights on that ground, that interests are a necessary condition. 8 'We can plausibly claim to have some idea of what is in the interests of an animal. We can have no knowledge concerning how it would exercise its moral rights, if it had any' (p.66). Surely we can. A wombat can exercise its right to proceed along a way in the same way that a human can, namely by proceeding along it, setting aside obstructions, and so on. But MCCioskey proceeds, in a way characteristic of high redefinition strategies, to heighten the requirements. He appeals to features of what he takes to be 'paradigm cases of the possessors of rights, persons, rational, morally autonomous beings' which he couples with the characteristic exercise of rights (p.66). There are, however, other paradigm examples of right holders, such as small children, senile humans, imbeciles, etc. Despite the suggestions, rationality and a high level of autonomy are not required for the possession or exercise of rights. MCCioskey asserts that 'it is capacity for moral autonomy, for moral selfdirection and self-determination, that is basic to the possibility of possessing a right' (p.66). That is a high redefinition, substantially exceeding the requirements normally expected, especially where guardians or representatives are appointed or envisaged. MCCioskey-rights are a quite proper subclass of rights as ordinarily conceived. Even so it may well be that animals can hold them; it all depends upon how much gets pumped into the elusive term 'moral'. Wombats, for example, are not human, do not read and write, are not much given to calculus, do not enter into contracts, and so on; nor do 8 Elliot is quite mistaken in saying that McCloskey's views have not changed since those espoused in 1979 (p.503). Admitting animal interests represents a major change. That animals do, of course, have interests is argued in detail in my 81. �28 many primitive peoples, though humans, engage in any of these activities (though some of them perhaps could with education). But wombats are, by and large, decidedly autonomous, self-determining and self-directed; they exhibit much more independence than most modern humans. Similarly with whales. Despite such familiar findings, MCCioskey takes the following proposition as decisive: 'Consider how we should respond if it were to be determined that a whale or dolphin possessed moral autonomy' (p.66). He does not address the issues raised in this queer pronouncement, but immediately leaps to his sought conclusion against animal rights. Given that moral autonomy is not to the point, except for MCCioskey-rights, the proposition is irrelevant to and not supportive of the conclusion. Without the elusive term 'moral', the proposition is, furthermore, decidedly not a discussion stopper. Most dolphins exhibit a high degree of autonomy, the exceptions being primarily those (improperly) held in captivity, injured in fishing activities, sickened by pollution, and so on. The trouble with the infiltration of morality is that it normally (if wrongly) suggests human activities and human communities - whence what small force MCCloskey's proposition enjoys, as whales as agents fall outside that setting. The argument to environmental chaos, to entirely untoward environmental implications, if rights were ceded to animals, comprises several facets. They are facets that have been seen before, with every legitimate struggle for extensions of rights, such as, most memorably, allocation of rights to enslaved humans. That latter certainly brought some desirable dislocation to social arrangements; so will legitimating animal rights. But it need bring nothing like the complication and aggravations of social and environmental problems that MCCioskey fearfully envisages (p.69, p.122). A first facet concerns conflict of rights. There are of course conflicts of rights between humans and groups of humans, but MCCioskey fears the situation with animals would not merely be more complicated (as it would with much greater numbers) but that 'the difficulty and complexity of this rights calculus' would make it unworkable (p.67). But again he fails to show anything like this. Indeed he immediately weakens his position of apparent strength by looking to an 'easier calculus' where 'man simply protects animals from human violations of animal rights' (p.67). That would be a fine start, though politically virtually all nations and peoples would have to advance a long way to achieve it (Sweden less than most others). While the "easier calculus" does not mean that animals have lesser rights than humans, as MCCioskey implies, what is suggested is important in escaping from difficulties MCCioskey tries to amass. For not all right-holders are on a par, much as not all types of creatures are equal in abilities or capacities. In particular, to get to critical and divisive issues straightaway: it does not follow then from the fact that animals have �29 rights that some of them, domestic ones, cannot be kept, or used - any more than it follows from the fact that humans have rights that some cannot be kept, or employed, for instance as servants. Nor does it follow that dead animals (or humans) cannot be eaten. Nor, most controversially, is it incompatible with animals having rights, that some are killed. For not all rights stand or fall together; a right for continued existence is very different from a right to a decent life or treatment while alive. Furthermore, MCCloskey's invalid arguments to ecological chaos succeed in turning animal liberation into animal libertinism. They do this by familiar slide strategies from some to more to all, from some rights, to many other rights, to the same rights as fully-competent persons. The strategy is coupled with that of assigning to humans more rights than they have, or should hold. Examples include the right to be absolutely where they like or to breed at will. But one human does not have the right to be in any other human's house or bed or space.9 No more do animals, like feral animals or 'disease-carrying pests such as rats and mice'. So, for example, the major conflict MCCioskey alleges with human rights to health dissolves; it depends upon granting excessive rights to rats and mice. With a sensible calculus of rights humans need not be overwhelmed by either animals or other humans; given due constraints on human populations (more than any other animal populations), interference by others could be stabilized at a low level. A further large facet of MCCloskey's argument to chaos doggedly pursues practical and ecological costs of vegetarianism, costs which he considerably exaggerates. But whether he is right about these costs, or not, is a separate issue - irrelevant to the main issue of animal rights. For admitting or stressing animal rights most emphatically does not 'dictate acceptance of vegetarianism as a moral position or practice' (p.68). There is no valid route from rights for animals to vegetarianism, for reasons that have already been very briefly indicated above. 10 MCCioskey has linked the question of animal rights much too closely with positions like that of Singer (an evident target on pp.68-9 of the text). But many more ordinary people and even some philosophers, 11 both before and after Singer, have assigned rights to animals, without commitment thereby to vegetarianism, and without evident (or any) fallacy. As a result or this flawed linkage, 9 While writing this I heard a local airforce contingent claiming its right-to the freedom of Canberra. Plainly it only has a right-to the freedom of only certain cities, and to quite limited things within those cities. 10 A much more detailed case, along with counter-models, can be extracted from my previous work, esp. the Green Series, number 13, i.e.TE (essay 3), and number 2. 11 A neglected early philosopher is Maclver; see esp. his remarks on p.69. �30 MCCioskey makes another interesting mistake: namely 'that the two movements, animal rights on the one hand (the view that some animals possess moral rights) and conservation and preservation on the other', so far from being 'complementary, mutually supportive positions', 'in fact are fundamentally opposed and are such as to be calculated to lead to many major clashes' (p.69, rearranged). While there are major clashes, for example, between moral extensionisms, such as the expanded utilitarianisms of Bentham, Sidgwick and Singer on the one side, and deep environmentalism on the other, there are no clashes of an animal rights position with deep environmentalism . For, very simply, such deep positions accord animals rights. As elsewhere, so with animal rights, errors in the ethical treatment intrude into the supposed political implications. Unremarkably then MCCioskey sees 'the ecological state' as committed to ecological chaos, all of which 'would very seriously curtail human liberty in many ways' and 'create massive theoretical and practical political problems' (p.122). No doubt decent treatment for animals, codified in rights, would restrict human liberty somewhat, as abolition of public spectacles such as hangings, floggings or throwing Christians to hungry lions, curtailed spectator opportunities and freedoms. But the desirable elimination of factory-farmed fast foods and animal-tested cosmetics, or the curtailment of circuses and reformation of zoos, are hardly very serious restrictions on human liberty, or what MCCioskey is thinking of really. He is again thinking of his house full of rats and his garden full of copulating animals, of vegetarianism and protection of rabbits made legally obligatory, and so on (for many such fantasies see p.122). But no such consequences, ensue, without repetition of the errors already exposed in the ethical treatment: inferences from some rights to excessive rights, and so on. Because side-tracked by his own production, by this pantomime of absolutely unconstrained, rampaging, warring and rapidly-multiplyin g animals (i.e. like some humans when ideological controls are lifted, not like most animals), MCCioskey does not address at all the very serious abuses in prevailing present treatment of animals, abuses on farms and in laboratories, at home and in the wild, abuses that should be politically addressed from ethical bases, issues well addressed through rights. An institutionalisation of animal rights would not produce the big problems MCCioskey envisages; after all most people are now represented by professionals in many of their dealings concerning legal rights, a professional paternalism increasingly operates, which �31 subsumes many professionals themselves. On the contrary, such institutionalisation of animal rights, properly done could make for very desirable changes. 12 9. Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology. The orthodox assumption, which McCloskey makes, is that a liberal democratic state will have a mixed (or marginally socially constrained) market capitalist economy. Under the simplistic equations that tend to distort much modem political discussion, even the inadequate qualifications occasionally inserted are forgotten: a liberal democratic state is often equated with institution of market capitalism, indeed too often market arrangements get equated with capitalism. Evidently, however, these equations fall apart under but slight disturbance. Logically they come apart entirely. There are severe logical problems with the very idea of a liberal democracy, which is a dialectical union of individual liberal with social welfare and democratic ideals. For a democratic state, especially should it take popular majoritarian form, can seriously curtail the freedom of minorities (the well-known "tyranny of the majority"). Liberal ends may be better served by a benign dictatorship than by democratic arrangements. Liberality and democracy part company. Similarly individual liberty and statist social welfare. And so on. Certainly liberality, which is the most free ranging of the five big political league players being disentangled, 13 does imply some significant limitations on arrangements, but they may not favour democracy, or capitalism. Fully liberal arrangements should enable a community to opt for democratic organisation, should it wish; but similarly these arrangements should allow the community to choose otherwise, should it want. Also liberal arrangements of a social cast (with decent freedom of the servants) would mean winding back of capitalism. Despite the immense damage illregulated capitalism and market structures can, and do, separately inflict upon ecological and social systems, there is practically no discussion of such matters in MCCloskey, and again little investigation of improved structures or regulation. 14 12 For one thing, it challenges factory farming, as infringing animal rights, in an obvious way. McCloskey avoids the issue when it arises (p.140). 13 In fact four of the five substantially independent players we are reflecting upon market, social welfare, capitalistic, democratic, and liberal arrangements - do not receive an index listing in Mccloskey, while the fifth, liberal, collects many citations and much discussion. 14 A major contemporary myth is that markets and capitalism can flourish without regulation, indeed that they flourish best in a fully deregulated setting. Both �32 As with liberal democracy, so with market capitalism, the components separate. Markets can flourish without capitalism, where for instance agents have sharply limited and bounded budgets and capitalistic accumulation cannot operate. Markets require no liberty in other parts of social life than those involving exchange of certain material goods; they certainly do not require a democratic framework. Capitalism can function without a vibrant free market system; indeed in advanced capitalist states it increasingly does so, with oligopolistic arrangements in place of competitive output markets, vertical integration and contract delivery replacing former input markets, and so on. Capitalism too requires neither democracy nor liberty, indeed too much of either could seriously undermine it. It does however depend upon property, for control and as a store for capital accumulated. In principle, of course, a very limited capitalism could work without private ownership of land and resources, so long as some exchangeable stable form of wealth, such as a sound currency or gold, was available for accumulation and payment of labour. But smart capitalists would rightly feel excessively vulnerable under such arrangements; for they could be wiped out by an outside devaluation of the currency or outside increases in rents on resources and land. In any case, many capitalists (virtually all people of substantial wealth in Australia), and a large array of parasitic middle parties, agents and hangers-on, would be duly despatched along with free-for-all property markets. Having glimpsed MCCloskey's unquestioned commitment to mixed capitalism, it is piquant to behold him begining upon undermining an institution fundamental to historic capitalism, namely private property. Most of MCCloskey's brief discussion of rights to private property (pp. 78-80) focusses upon the labour theory of property, descended from Locke and others, upon which he effects a full demolition job. In fact he severely weakens the case for a substantially unfettered ("free") institution of private property, upon which however the type of liberalism he advances depends. For strong property rights and guarantees are basic to present liberal democratic arrangements, as they are to proposed libertarian alternatives. MCCioskey even tries to close off discussion of the 'political desirability of allowing property rights by way of patent rights to discoveries' in plant and animal breeding, particularly through genetic engineering, on the pretext that these 'cannot reasonably be objected to without the whole private-property system of institutions depend for their operation and for their very survival on regulation, on an appropriate enforceable legal setting. Otherwise, in communities where a certain egalitarianism counted for something for instance, a capitalist would be rash to bank upon holding onto substantial surplus wealth for long. �33 liberal democratic states being questioned' (p.139). Now peripheral cases do not generally threaten the centre, unless, perchance, it is already in some doubt. The extent and character of property is a quite critical, indeed a watershed, issue for environmental politics. For excessive propertarian rights and powers constitute a very serious impediment to sound environmental practice. The reason is simple: the proprietor may be less than well disposed to the environment, and may well permit or enact unsound practices. Yet propertarians often now appeal to a purported need to strengthen and expand the institution of private property - rather that to let it naturally contract - in order to combat environmental problems. Thus such dubious proposals as saleable rights to pollute environments, dump wastes, etc. - licences which look even to the uninitiated like ways of extending, not contracting, pollution and like environmental problems, and which look to the more cynical as ways of circumventing costs and limits environmental constraints impose upon economic activity. 15 The liberal democratic structure to which MCCioskey commits himself to, with its uncritical approach to population and consumption - like market capitalism, with its commitments to expanding populations to ensure growth and profit, expanding markets, enhanced consumption, and cheap labour resources - forces an unduly heavy dependence on technological wizardry. In particular, it requires a technology that will facilitate greatly increased cheap food supplies, without however too rapidly depleting "biological capital". Given recent experience it demands a faith in technology, and the smart science that underwrites it, that is increasingly difficult to justify. Like all too many academics, MCCioskey has that faith. Science should be given entirely free reign, and technology pushed to the hilt. There is a naive optimism in MCCloskey's attitude to science. 'It is not improbable that ultimately, through the investigations of the sciences, we will come ... to have a full understanding of the earth's weather and climatic patterns. Man will be able to use this 15 Such saleable rights also appear to get another foot-in-the-door for bargaining utilitarians, who claim to want no absolute prohibitions, but want to put the whole environment up for negotiation - and ultimately for sale. What are not up for negotiation are the underlying propertarian and utility maximization principles, the insufficiently examined sources of many of the problems. In any case, the evidence now coming in shows that market approaches to pollution, such as saleable rights and pricing controls (like company fines), do not work at all well. Making directors of polluting firms directly responsible, and putting offenders in jail, apparently does. �34 knowledge for his and the earth's best advantage' (p.137). We, the total managers, will know what is "best" for the earth! Despite the 'dangers of misuse', major disasters, global warfare, climatic destablisation, and so on, 'this fact constitutes no reason for holding back the pursuit of knowledge ... ' (p.137). Maximum speed ahead in the glorious pursuit of science, with full anarchistic enthusiasm there. There is, as well, 'no reason ... for entrusting rulers with the control of science' (p.137); science at least is utterly free in MCCloskey's liberal democracy. While Mccloskey wants the state kept out of science (except as a money pump presumably), he wants it actively intervening in technology, not to limit it, but 'acting to ensure that new technologies be developed and used and their benefits widely enjoyed' (p.138). The liberal state is to be actively and heavily involved in technology promotion and delivery - which puts into serious question its presumed neutral regulatory function. Also espoused is a quite insufficiently discriminating attitude to technology. Like most apologists, Mccloskey emphasizes the possible - but generally unrealised - benefits of technology, that technology 'can release persons from much mindless, degrading work. Hence some, even many persons may never need to work' (p.138). For all the talk about the possible benefits of technology, many alleged benefits seldom or never accrue, for instance to shorten substantially people's working hours and give them more worthwhile leisure; and benefits that do accrue are often not well used. Rather technology is primarily funded to maintain or increase market share and profits (which too often end up in conspicuous consumption and waste), thereby inducing cycles of production and waste, more technology to help control the waste, and so on and up. Technology itself is merely of instrumental worth, with many of its instruments and techniques defective, destructive or dangerous, either directly or through eventual side-effects. While some technology is no doubt instrumentally good, much is not. And the balance of good over bad has been systematically exaggerated in Wes tern culture, where more technology is now looked to or required to rectify gross economic and social mismanagement in liberal democratic states. Technology is however no universal panancea. Both on its record, and in terms of its theoretical prospects, the faith being put in it, to "deliver us from evil", is misplaced But, as remarked, MCCloskey has the faith (such episodes as the Green Revolution are seen as unmitigated successes), and enthusiastically expects great things from technology ('genetic engineering ... constitutes a dramatic, exciting breakthrough of major proportions, one that opens up vastly wider possibilities for developing new plant and animal organisms', p.139). Naturally he concentrates on the sunny side of technology, scarcely touching upon the darker aspects. We merely glimpse one darker side of genetic engineering (for which perhaps no further engineering is needed), the edifying spectacle of mass-production of human drones for �35 industrial slavery (p. 139). As to the big problems with this engineering, we are fobbed off with an evasive throw-away, of the kind more typical of politicians, as to 'the need for relevant controls and checks', and no doubt balances, presumably determined by state masters behind closed doors. Instead Mccloskey tries to divert attention by yet another attack on the hypothetical totalitarian ecological state, and the threat of its coercive methods, not those of your normal corrupt intimidatory democratic state, to human liberties. But the smokescreen quickly subsides, our factional text degenerates into notes: 'Relevant point here include ... ' (p.139). Mccloskey would have us locked into state systems that are delivering increasingly negative results for increasing numbers of humans and disastrous outputs for nonhumans and natural environments. By changing political directions significantly, environmental and human affairs could again have an opportunity to flourish. But for much of the environment at least, there is not a lot of time left. REFERENCES D. Bennett and R. Sylvan, Damn Greenies: Australian Perspectives on Environmental Ethics, typescript, Canberra, 1989; referred to as AP. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul and Others, London, 1944. R. Elliott, Critical Notice of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63(1985) 499-504. P.R. and A.H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1990. R. E. Goodin, Review of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Ethics 94(1984) 344-5. A.M. Maciver, 'Ethics and the beetle', Analysis 8(1948) 65-70. H.J. MCCioskey, Ecological Ethics and Politics, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa N.J., 1983; all page references not otherwise indicated are to this work. T. Nagel, 'Libertarianism without foundations', in Reading Nozick (ed. J.Paul), Blackwell, Oxford, 1981. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Clarendon, Oxford, 1930. H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1988. R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals', Inquiry 24(1981) 387-417. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas, and the logic of deontic notions', now in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989; referred to as MD. �36 R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous 17(1973) 441-456; referred to as sv. R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1979; referred to as EE. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Tao and deep ecology', The Ecologist 18(4/5) (1988) 148159. R. Sylvan, Three essayes upon deeper environmental ethics, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, (Green Series) #13, Australian National University 1987; referred to as TE. R. Sylvan, 'On the value core of deep-green theory', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to as DG. �DEEP ECOLOGY AND DEEP-GREEN THEORY. Deep-green theory is a deep pluralistic environmental position, underwritten by a deep metaphysical theory. It is intended as an alternative, less fraught with problems, to deep ecology. Deep-green theory has developed, in significant part, through fruitful interreaction with deep ecology. Many of its leading ideas can thus be more rapidly introduced by contructing and comparing them with ideas of deep ecology which are already widely diffused (if often in a muddy or muddled way). As a spin-off then, this outline will offer a simple exposition of central ideas of deep ecology, and further criticism of many of them. In any practical showdown, however, deep ecology and deep-green theory are not antagenistic positions but close allies, both deep positions within a wider environmental alliance. Though the rudiments of deep-green theory go back about as far as deep ecology (to around 1973), it remained unnamed until the early 80's (and only achieved initial investigation in Bennett 86). Moreover, it has not hitherto attained in any fuller platform and slogan formulation, such as deep ecology has benefitted (and suffered) from almost since its inception. The term 'deep ecology' was coined by the Norwegian intellectual, Ame Naess, to label an emerging environmental movement. But, despite Naess's commitment to pluralism, it was from the outset constrained to a certain style of environmental position. The notion has since been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several Northamericans, particularly Bill Devall and George Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with Naess (their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end). The notion has caught on outside narrow academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Wes tern Europe, significant areas of natural environment remain and are becoming of increasing public concern. Deep ecology is a radical environmenta l position, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned with the management and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominent social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments. (Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman.) �2 Deep ecology takes off from value theory themes which stand in diametrical opposition to mainstream Western ethical and social theory.1 The first of these themes, the wide values theme, is that what is valuable in or for itself is not confined to human beings or their features (such as their interests, concerns, pleasures, consciousness, etc.), but extends much more widely to other beings. The value of these other systems or creatures of their features is not merely instrumental, aluable as a means to human objectives, but is independent of human concerns; it is in brief nonanthropic. Indeed deep ecology goes further, rejecting the greater value assumption, according to which anthropic values always take precedence over such natural values. How then is value distributed, in particular across the things of the world? It is here that deep ecology and deepgreen theory part company. Deep ecology takes value to be restricted to things that are alive (in some attentuated sense, so it turns out); this is the theme of biocentrism, life-centredness. And it assumes that these things with life are all of equal value; this is the controversial theme of biospheric egalitarianism. A unique assignment of value results. Deep-green theory rejects both these themes. For reason to be given, Deep-green theory is much less specific as to how value is distributed. But it is spread on to things - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals which are not alive, and it does not cover all things that are living. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus Deep-green theory is axiocentric, value-centered. Value in nature is regular coupled with some mix of value-making characteristics, including such defeasible ecological universals as richness, rarity stability, resilience, diversity, and so forth. But there are considerable constraints on how values are derived from any such "objective function". One over or thing constraint, that of impartiality, substitutes for that of egalitarianism. According to the requirement of biospecies impartiality, which excludes certain types of class chauvinism, a thing cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another simply in virtue of belonging to some species (e.g. being human); such features are not in themselves value-making characteristics. 1 There are some who account themselves deep ecologists who would repudiate such an approach through value theory, most notably Warrick Fox. �3 Figure 1. A compariso n of Deep Ecology and Deep-gree n theory, in capsule form. 2 Deep ecology biospheric egalitarianism Shared themes or goals I I I I I Deep-gree n. theory wider value theme rejection of greater value assumption, +through ➔ biocentrism ecological universals as defeasible value-making biospecies impartiality , and rejection of class chauvinism axiocentrism characteristics extreme holism natural systems as integral, irreducible cosmic identity moderate holism ultraperson al identificati on maximal satisizing on value self-realisation determinates limited interference only with natural systems; restricted rights thereto commitment to implement principles applications to economics, politics and policy, especially in bioregional ism ➔ environmen tal areas; e.g. regionalism and federalism +- ecoregionalism human population reduction A major difference between the theories lies in the distribution of value (from which much else of ethical consequenc e arises: rights, obligations , and so forth). Deep ecology, like simpler utilitarianism, proposes a unique initial distribution (over a given atomistic base class): each living individual is assigned equal intrinsic value, and nothing else has intrinsic value. Values of other things, complexes, systems and so on, are then in principle open to determinate s by a calculation. It is a type of recipe to which intellectual s bent on numeration and calculation are regularly attracted; pseudo-obj ective variations are to be found not only in utilitarianis m but in economics and in democtrati c political theory, and also in probability theory, where elements of suitable 2 Most of the capsule theses of deep ecology are explained in detail in the critique, CD; many of those of Deep-green theory are explained in FE. �4 initial esembles are assigned equal probability, through a principle of indifference. The practice is also as problematic as indifference principles (cf. CD on deep ecological egalitarianism). Deep-green theory rejects the assumptions upon which the deep ecological distribution depends. It rejects the latent atomism, the idea of ultimates upon which value devolves. More dangerously these days, it rejects the equality assumption. Much as some humans are more valuable than others (on most moral and other counts), so some creatures, some systems, are more valuable than others. DG theory is, quite deliberately, much less specific as to how value is distributed. Often enough, especially in difficult cases, assessment of value is a complex matter which may call for much reflection (for some details see TE, first essay). But certainly value is an unevenly distributed feature of a variety of things, not just at bottom altimates. It is a quality of many items - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals - which are not alive; and it does not extend to all things that are living, e.g. malignant virases engineered in biochemical laboratories. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus the theory is at least weakly axiocentric, value-centered. In fact it is more strongly axiocentric, in two important respects. Firstly, deontic notions such as those of obligation, rights and duties, answer back to axiologic ones (see TE, essay 3). Secondly, more difficult to explain, value penetrates the metaphysics, including what is accounted fact; most strikingly, the choice of actual world itself depends upon value (see DP). �AUTHENTIC DEEP ECOLOGY: expositio n, critique, alternati ves PREFAC E No longer is there so much need to chronicle and document the major and serious environmental problems confonting the Earth and its ecosystems. Much of the relevant information - details of the damage, difficulties, devastation, disasters, and dire threats of more - now appears in later chapters of biology and geography textbooks, often in striking pictorial or diagramatic form; and the information is regularly updated by articles, too often environmental horror stories, in popular perodicals or newspapers. While many of the problems are abundantly and glaringly evident, others are more subtle, sometimes more insidious, hidden from view, but bound to emerge in not so long term. So we can take the problems, and further problems, "for granted", though with little comfort or ease. Many were, and are, foreseeable; many were, or could be, avoided or mitigated. Serious though these problems are they are still not being taken with full or due seriousness by those who exercise some control over how relevant things happen. 1 Most states are busy attempting more of what has landed us in some of the worst of these problems: more growth, of economic products, of people, of consumption2 , of energy; more or "better" militarisation; more productivity, of agriculture, with environmental cost-cutting and short-cutting, more development and more consumption thereby of biological capital. Growth remains at the top of most national agendas; it is seen as a panacea for all other problems, economic and security problems of course. Serious environmental problems are still mostly treated as economic "externalities", peripheral but growing nuisances, that we shall have to learn to live with3, but not the "real" problems. We have lived under this dominant destructive ideology for much too long already. It has already led to the devastation of much of the planet Earth, to the loss of much of value, many species, While there is a power structure, and a power elite, in all states (virtually as a corollary of features of the state, such as its monopolies on coercion, currency, etc), it cannot be pretended that there are any impressive control systems. So some of the problems are unintended. Given the propensity for human-developed control systems to function in undesirable ways, e.g. to tend towards militarism and totilitarianism, the lack of satisfactory system is no doubt to the good. 2 So, for example, the USA is pressuring Japan to consume more, internally, to ease American balance-ofpayments problems, and soak up excessive production; there is no pressure to produce less. 3 So, for example, prestigious scientific organisations are preparing to teach us how to live with and love the Greenhouse effect. Many communities have learned to live with damaging and noxious pollution; no doubt they would miss it if it were gone. �2 much irreplaceable wilderness, and has left us with an immense, and sometimes hopeless, clean-up and restoration task. Moreover things will rapidly get worse environmentally if we are not rid of it and its variants. Plainly we need several strategies: a strategy for fundamental change, a strategy (needed first) for what comes after the change, and so on. Deep ecology offers a strategy and an initial structure for addressing these environmental problems, along with proposals for addressing the menacing array of other problems confronting modern industrial societies. It is a strategy which goes much deeper than the pathetic patch-up the damage after it's largely done (pollute, then cleanup or pay a bit) approaches that prevail. For this reason alone, deep ecology deserves to be much more widely known. But there is still no satisfactory text on the topic. This book, while hardly an easy introduction to the subject4 , aims to fill a part of the gap. Perhaps too, it can help serve as a basis for that introductory text that still needs to be written. This text tries to do what the title promises. It begins with a sympathetic exposition of deep ecology. That is necessary. It remains hard to find out what deep ecology (DE) is, as it means so many different things to different expositors and exponents. The matter of different visions and elaborations of DE is taken up in the second part, which provides a detailed critique of DE in its main versions. In the final part, other criticisms of DE, from its rival social ecology in particular, are (negatively) assessed; an alternative to DE, deep-green theory is outlined; and some of the political connections of deeper environmentalism are investigated, including strategies for appropriate revolutionary change. Deep ecology is the most exciting deep environmentalism on the present intellectual market; for all its sortcomings, it is still the most thoroughly worked out widely accessible position. That is one reason why its worth a fair bit of time, my time, in struggling with it and trying to improve it, and your time, in getting to know it. This text grew from a critique of DE along with an unpublished expansion of that critique (called 'Continuin g the critique of deep ecology') and sundry associated articles on deep environmentalism. As an expanded version of critique5 remains the centre of the text, some of what I wrote in prefacing the critique should be repeated. I think, I hope, it merits repetition, as amended. 4 There is a need also, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, for a text that measures up to recognised academic standards, sufficiently complex and full of (bad) argument, in order to put deep ecology firmly on academic agenda, to try to ensure that it is not merely a crude popular movement that can be intellectually ignored. 5 'A critique of deep ecology' Radical Philosophy. �3 It was with considerable ambivalence and some serious misgiving that I first undertook a critique of DE, as it risked offending many friends in the deep ecology movement. It succeeded. The trouble was that when I got down to trying to explain what deep ecology was all about (for a seminar, at which N aess and Devell were present, some years ago), I found myself confronted by the following predicament :- While I applauded much about the deep ecology movement, and what it stood for, I could not find my way to accept deep ecology as formulated by any of its main proponents. The reason was not merely that deep ecology is less than a fully coherent body of doctrine, with, furthermore, many problematic sub-themes, but worse, that much of it departed from the ideals I felt it should be expressing, and that some of it was rubbish. Yet I had no doubt that deep ecology was a worthwhile enterprise (carried on by dedicated and good people), and that something along the lines of a replacement for deep ecology - revamped deep ecology if it is simply a matter of repairs, deep-green theory for more - was very much on the right track. Or to put it slightly differently, while rejecting every formulation of deep ecology, I agreed with the general drift of much of deeper ecology, and with virtually all the careful applications of deep ecology. My attempted resolution went along the lines of critical rationalism (for which I have been criticised). The method was to subject deep ecology to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more acceptable formulation, which at the same time met other desirable criteria. However to resort to such critical methods was already to type oneself, as old consciousness and old paradigm still, and to risk alienating part of the deep movement. The risks have been taken: but there are some concessions. In the end, when it comes to applications, to lifestyles and policies, the rational ladder has to be enlarged and also supplemented; for it offers only one distinctive way among many. Though the applications of deep ecology to real-world problems are very important, as already indicated, we shall only reach them and not attempt to develop them very far. However a detailed listing of various important applications that have been made will be given.6 Naess and others have complained, with some justification, that I have not gone out my way to find generous interpretation s of deep ecology, which remove apparent rubbish from it (see Naess RS p.3). It is true that, following the prevailing philosophical mode (by no means always to be applauded), I have not been very charatable (here or in other philosophical critiques). I have treated DE as a find it, hopefully in an expositionally straightforwar d and honest way. I do, however, try to 6 The final part of the background paper on population (Routley 84) provides one application in detail, an application expanding on some remarks of Naess (in 83). And several other examples which Naess has outlined (also in 83) can be similarly elaborated. Gare has attempted a major elaboration applying to science. �4 offer alternatives to DE and improvements upon it when I discover them. Deep-greep theory can be seen as a fairly comprehensive alternative. �/ ON SOCIAL ECOLOGY A heavy attack on DE, a tirade really, was launched recently by Bookchin. It caught leading deep ecologists - who had rather foolistly seen Bookchim as one of them, though it was obvious enough that he wasn't - off-guard, entirely stunning some of them 1 . Bookchin furthermore went about his frontal attack in a most ungentlemanly and less than American way, using practices and methods that Americans do not use as regards decent fellow countrymen, but reserve for communism and its representatives and others engaged in un-American activities. 2 Intellectual exchanges are supposed, otherwise, to proceed in a nice, collegial way (the knives come out in the back rooms, not on the front pages). Bookchin broke American cultural conventions (which is a main reason why several people, e.g. Sale, failed to comprehend what was going on). There is heaps of straight mudslinging in Bookchin, name-calling, attributions of guilt by very thin associations, ad hominen moves. We shall bypass this unworthy material, much of what there is in the attack, because anyone with decent basic training in logic can document it for themselves, if they can obtain copies of the work (not at all easy in the peripheral world). We shall try to isolate the much slimmer intellectual content of Bookchin's criticism. Should we dig under all the dirt, we find there are some core criticisms of DE, which are for the most part defective, but as well some interesting suggestions, which are worth fossicking out and displaying. There are two key issues. In both Bookchin's criticism repacts, but focusses upon DE, the old-fashioned erroneous socialist condemnation of environmentalism of all types - as not only getting priorities wrong in not putting human societies absolutely first, but worse failing to appreciate that environmental problems are the product of social problems and removed with them. • Ecological problems are at bottom nothing but social problems. This rival reduction theme, which is what justfies the social ecology terminology and approach, also gets stated in various, often weaker or slacker forms: For instance, ecological problems have their 1 The phrase 'off-guard' is from Naess. As to the extent of Bookchin's depth see the Critique. 2 This nasty face of American intellectual activity is well exposed in Chomsky's political writings. For the most part American philosophical periodicals permit only the nice face to be exhibited. For my part I enjoyed some of this outrageous stuff of Bookchin's, which was livily and refreshing after the flatness and dullness of much in Naess's notes, and also by contrast with Bookchin's earlier papers, which are mostly repetitive and often rather vacuous diatribes. �2 roots in social problems, ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and social problems, etc. But DE, 'despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense of' this; that is a major (disgusting) trouble with it. The correctness and tellingness of social reduction themes vary more or less inversely, depending in particular upon how far the operative term 'social' is stretched. If all problems concerning "groups" (including single member groups) of "individuals" of any sort (including volcanoes, hurricanes, seiges, etc.) are "social" problems, then evidently all ecological problems become social problems, as these are all concerned in some way with individuals and their relations with their surroundings. But such a misleading adjustment to the theme, rendered near-tautologous by a low redefinition of 'social', is not what Bookchin and other socialists have intended. They characteristically intend by 'social' 'human social', and what they intend to convey by 'the social roots of the ecological crisis' is that it is 'the gross inequities in [human] society' - which should be attended to first- 'that underpin the disequilibrium between [human] society and nature'. 3 Now this strong social bias thesis is interestingly false. Consider counterexamples of the following sort:Imagine mixed capitalistic and welfare socio-economic arrangements had worked and succeeded in eliminating the gross inequities in society, at least in some relatively independent regions of the world, and perhaps even globally. There were, it still seems, real prospects that this could have happened in the 60s, had energy and funds been redirected from military-industrial enterprise to social-industrial activity. A welfare safety net is stretched right across the regions concerned so that no longer is any human homeless or without sufficient nourishment or basic eductional opportunities and so on, so that poverty and all other grosser inequities are eliminated. 4 It is sufficiently evident that even if all this is achieved, many ecological problems will not be addressed, but may be aggravated by the increased industrialisation and economic development involved. The lot of factory farmed animals or of threatened wild species would not be removed, but, if touched at all, 3 Bookchin 87 p.10 where the thesis is inaccurately associated with Kropotkin. 4 Naturally, finer inequities, such as unsatisfactory job relativities, race relativities, etc., will not thereby be eliminated and are perhaps part of "the human condition", some of which many societies will be prepared to live with or ignore. The relatively easy opportunities of the 60s for societies free of grosser inequities (for good or even great societies) may have passed, as certain new social problems have much complicated matters. �3 likely worsened. There is no guarantee that the position of wild and natural regions would thereby be improved, that these regions would be freed from constant inroads by human developmental activity, that the Antartcic would not be citified, and so on. In general, no environmental damage and degradation that did not rebound upon the relevant human social situation would be halted or resolved. Furthermore, not only is the strong social bias thesis false, as well human social concerns do not always come first where ecological depth is attained. Bookchin suggests an historical basis for the strong social bias thesis, that the notion of the domination of nature arose in the first place out of social domination of people by people, women by men, and so on. But that is pseudo-history; for the domination of nature and some appreciation of its operation, reaches as far back, so far as we can see, so far as our records go, as other forms of domination. What is more, even if a real history were like Bookchin's it would offer little support for strong social bias thesis. All it would reveal is that some ecological problems were glimpsed by anology with social problems, not that ecological problems are at bottom social problems and so resolved with them. • • "Second nature", constituted by human society, is uniquely different from first nature, and so naturally and justifiably interferes substantially with the processes of first nature. The unexploited play on "second nature" does nothing to support such intervention; or the contrary, second nature follows nature rather effortlessly without specific reflection. However, the two "natures" distinction, inadequately introduced and incapable of bearing much weight, is applied, in social ecology, to support much human interferenc e and substantial separateness. 'Natural evolution has not only provided humans with ability but also the necessity to be purposive interveners into "first nature", to conscously change "first nature" by means of highly institutionalized forms of community we call "society".' 5 Given the highly artificial and rather accidental social forms now in place, that many humans now suffer or swear under, this is very far from obvious. This second nature vs. first nature division would re-erect the old division and separation , Man vs. Nature, in old-fashio ned football-m ilitary terms, that deeper environmentalism has been concerned to remove. It is human chauvinistic; it ignores the continuity between humans and other creatures, the overlap in incapacities and skills (remembering all the capable animals able to live skilfully off the land and all the incapable humans). As regards relevant skills and capabilities, there is no uniqueness, or singularity, of humans as a whole. It would chauvinistically try to convert being human into a 5 Bockchin 87 p.21. �4 significant moral category, when it is not. 6 It would induce an inverse, obnoxious ranking among biological kinds; first class, matching second nature, and second class, matching first or primitive nature. The division would accordingly offer a springboard to a range of further interference of the sorts of which we have already witnessed much too much. The main thrust of Bookchin's attack is thus an old-fashioned socialist criticism, which fails any longer to impress because of its excess anthropocentrism. Social problems, which are of course often but not always intertangled with environmental problems, are no longer top of action, political, or other agendas; nor are their standard modern rivals, similarly entangled with environmental problems, namely economic problems. There is a third set of problems, neither exactly left nor right, neither exactly social nor economic nor reducing in approved fashion to those would-be universal categories, nor yet forming an entirely independent dimension: namely, environmental problems. Bookchin faithfully rolls out other elements of routine socialist criticism, against deep ecology. Some of these are telling enough, but mostly not new. They include:• a seriously flawed pantheon of heroic figures. Bookchin gets stuck into DEs favourable mention of Heidegger, of course, but he also tries to convey quite by association with Woody Guthrie (p.6), Malthus (p.15) Ehrlich (p.17) and others. Problems with the heroic figures and historical pedigree of DE had already been observed by others, e.g. Sholomowski. • a thin and inadequate historical genesis and setting. In this regard Naess's work is, of course, primarily in the perfectly admissible tradition and company of systematic philosophy and of most science. Deep environmental has, no more than science, to supply at the outset a full historical context in which its ideas are placed (pace. p.5 bottom). 6 So it is argued at length in EP. �INTRODUCTION Deep ecology is a major environmental position and movement, one of the most important of contemporary times. In name and in assemblage of themes it is a recently elaborated position, dating back only to about 1973; but most of the themes are older, some of them much older. It is the assemblage, package and the way that has been put to environmental work that is newer and different. The initial assemblage and the name are due to Naess, a principal character (in all senses) in what follows 1. 1. On the deep ecology movement and ideology: their intellectual standing. The expression 'deep long-range ecological movement', of which 'deep ecology' 1s a subsequent abbreviation, was minted by N aess to label an emerging environmental movement . Naess was then (sociological) finder ather than founder of this emerging movement, a movement concerned primarily with the natural environment. In explaining ideological features of the movement Naess set down a number of what he took to be characteristic themes. It is from these themes, with much elaboration and considerable variation, that deep ecology, as a doctrine, has grown. It is with the evolving body of doctrine, the position, that we shall primarily be concerned. Control such as it was, of the doctrine did not long remain with Naess. Like many good promising ideas it was quickly imported into California, where it was modified, and to some extent converted into a further individual consciousness-elevating exercise. Thus the doctrine has been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several North-Americans, particularly Devall and Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with N aess, and more recently by various Australians, most notably Fox and Seed.NI Deep ecology has caught on largely outside No attempt will be made to give an account of Naess's philosophy, except insofar as it bears directly on deep ecology, though such an attempt would be worth making. We commend the work (which could simply be entitled Naess ) to others; a smell beginning is made in Naess and Rothenberg. Naess was already a significant, influential, but maverick, figure on the European intellectual scene well before deep ecology was discerned. Naess had been professor of philosophy at Oslo since 1939, a chair he obtained when 27. In early days he was a Norwegian Ayer, likwise basking in reflected glory of a disinfecting logical positivism; but how much Naess subsequently diverged from empiricism can be gauged from his 1971 debate with Ayer (recorded in Reflexive Water). In fact Naess had already began to move out of an empiricist set as a result of his early interesting attempt to carry it towards its logical conclusion, and to do philosophy itself empirically, recorded in Truth as Conceived by those who are not Professional Philosophers. Subsequently Naess traversed a wide and unusual range of philosophical enterprise: scepticism naturally; many of the then fashionable areas, such as communication, semantics and interpretation; and several others that were much less philosophically fashionable, but politically significant, such as Gandhi and pacifism, ideology and failure of objectivity, and of course pluralism. These investigations form the complex backdrop to deep ecology. Unfortunately, despite Naess's longstanding commitment to pluralism, deep ecology was from the outset constrained to a certain unduly narrow style of environmentalismm as will appear. �5 narrower academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Western Europe, significant areas of natural environment still remain; these are rapidly becoming of increasing public concern. Deep ecology is a radical environmental pos1t10n, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned at best with the management, husbandry and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominant social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments.N 2 Deep ecology (hereafter is an ideology in the respectible older sense, a system of belief and ideas. It is not an ideology in the post Marxion sense, of such a system characterised by an inflexibility and an unwillingness to listen to other points of view. Quite the contrary. Radical DE may still be, though its radicalness is in decline as it ages and as informed opinion on environmental issues advances; respectable, it is not. In particularly DE is not a respectable academic subject. Though it is arguably the most important movement in environmental philosophy in recent times, it is fl:Ot even mentioned in several recent texts on the topic. There are several reasons for this, ranging from the conservation and close-mindedness, snobbery and bigotry almost, of much contemporary philosophy, to evident presentational deficiencies in DE, its mouldeness, its lack of discriptive and argument, its popular appeal. DE is particularly weak weaker than environmental ethics, which do poorly on these academic indicators - on a run of things that are taken to matter in contemporary ethics; analyses of meanings of key ethical terms, reductions of ethical terms to few primitives, smart arguments, utilitarian-style justifications, etc. That is one reason why it is not part of Anglo-American analytic philosophy; another is that it challenges so much of what analytic philosophy represents and (politically) presupposes. DE scarcely represents, then, many of you will be relieved to learn analytic philosophers' philosophy. N aess believes has been through and seen through that sort of philosophy early in life; and seen that it does not contribute very much to the real features of life and living that philosophy should make significant contributions towards, but mostly does not. As a result you will find very little analysis in DE. Also there is remarkedly little argument, though argument is often taken to be what is distinctive in philosophy. (But that is an Anglo American idea of what philosophy is all about; you find comparatively little argument in much Continental European philosophy - what you do find, even in authors like Kant and Hegel who look superficially as if they are arguing, is mostly patently bad argument, poor at best. DE is much more like European philosophy in tone and style, which helps explain why it is neglected and denigrated in American schools; by contrast, in British philosophy curricula the environment is only just beginning to win any satisfactory attention at all.) �6 These are some of the reasons why, despite its importance, DE goes largely unmentioned in most texts on environmental philosophy and ethics. This says a good deal about the texts, which are mostly not offering satisfactory coverage of their fields (see further chapter 2). But it indicates something too about DE, which is not as intellectually accessible as it could or should be. Moreover, presentation of DE often go out of their way to violate (questionable) academic standards, expecially those for clarity of statement, extent of analysis, and level of argumentation. Deep ecology is an amophous doctrine, as anyone who tries to set down from its sources in a clear and crisp way what its themes are, will readily enough discover. Of course compared with much French philosophy, it is clarity itself; but French philosophy does not provide an acceptable benchmark. A good deal of the obscurity concerning DE results from its varying and different presentations by different expositors. To avoid this problem, we shall, for the most part, follow Naess's elaboration of DE, taking that as fairly authoritative. But the problem is not thereby resolved. Naess's views on deep ecology, its place and importance, and its themes, have changed over the years. Nor are the themes always, sufficiently clear though many of them are succinctly stated. Some of them are said, by disciples or by N aess himself, to be metaphorical. Furthermore, as some important matters go largely unelaborated, for instance the issues of satisfactory methods for achieving ecopolitical change. To surmount these kinds of difficulties, we shall (somewhat presumptuously no doubt) offer our own exposition and elaboration of DE, what we call authentic deep ecology. At least under Naess's conception of DE we are entitled to do this. In part II however, which offers a critique of DE as it has been variously presented, we shall look at the genuine article in its various formulations. Rather than becoming easier with the passage of time, DE has become more and more difficult, and less intellectually tractable as it picks up or toys with environmental fashions, often zanier environmental fads. It is complicated by New themes, often muddy themes, and its solidity is removed by modification or erosion of old themes. Among the new themes picked up, several to be examined critically (in part II), are the Gaia hypothesis, according to which the Earth itself some sort of organic living system. DE is thus an irremedially vague object. Its vagueness has increased with its popularity with its becoming on the green fringe a fashionable, not to say vogue, item (a Foucaultian object). Vague and vogue, a common concotenation. 2. Types of environmental positions: deep environmentalism. �7 What distinguishes an environmental position is a certain level of constraint with respect to the environment, the natural environment especially: not anything goes with respect to nature. In this regard environmental positions contrast with a dominant theme of Western cultural heritage; namely, provided it does not interfere with acknowledged people such as property holders, that people can do more or less what they like with the land, and with what grows and lives there. It is even therefor humans to exploit or manage. This unrestrained position imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment itself. Under it there would, for example, be little compunction about using up material resources, forests, fisheries and so on, immediately or even destroying them. But, because it grants such entitlements to exploitation, the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly moral positions. 2 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which implies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local (or national) interests, rather than assessments appropriately based on long-range transnational values. Opposed to the unrestrained position are various environmental positions (what Leopold saw as the land ethic is just one of these). Such positions can be classified - conveniently for subsequent development but in a way that already refines and extends Naess's classification - into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. Unlike the unrestrained position, all these positions would conserve and maintain things - materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow (conservation) position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description in the literture as resource conservation (thus, e.g., soil conservation organisations). Though this conservation position is only a step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass the test of morality in that future people are not treated unfairly; so it is a very significant step. 2 This is a substantial and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical in the narrow or semse, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitment to future humans, see e.g. Routley 81, and other essays collected with it in Partridge 81. This section is drawn from my People vs the Land (84). �8 The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and management and exploitation oriented, positions. According to deeper positions, humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to an intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values. Figure 1. The positions separated, and separating principles SHALLOWER UNRESTRAINED DEEPER SHALLOW IMMEDIAIB DEEP MORALITY SOLE VALUE GREATER VALUE REQUIREMENT ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION (of human apartheid) (of human supremacy) The watershed principle which divides the shallow from the deeper positions is the sole value assumption . According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is build into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are presented at best through the preference or votes of interested humans. 3 3 The points are explained in more detail in EP, where too, account is taken of the shift from humans to persons (which would be important were it taken seriously and adhered to) and also of the inclusion of �9 Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as standard utilitarianism. 4 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction (preference-fulfilment, pleasure, absence of pain, and so on, for other satisfaction determinates) to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests. However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been appended (thus, for example, externality theory in economics, some allowances for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the environment remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought or backdrop, a (re-)source and sink, when it is considered at all. There is, however, another approach also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid, which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.N While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater value assumption; other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What super-humans. With value for natural items goes, of course, concern, respect, and sensitivity, towards them; but the reverie connection may exhibit occasional failures. 4 But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. More broadly based historical utilitarianisms, which allow for some input from other sentient creatures, are considered below. �10 is generally presupposed is that other objects - animals, plants and their communities - are never of very much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in variants upon utilitarianism (from Hutcheson and Bentham on) where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Wes tern ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. So in practice does most utilitarianism. 5 It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position 6 is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which individual animals (but not plants, forests, ecosystems, etc.) are taken to have value in their own right, though in any play-off with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable and not alway assured; in cases of conflict of animals with humans or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose. There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans do not always matter7 and, more pertinently, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans voluntarily lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 8 can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism. Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. However, some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depradation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintenance of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an established population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the 5 There practice contrasts with what the theory allows or requires. Utilitarianism is like much pollution control, where regulations are on the books or are part of the law, but are or never only very occasionally applied. Utilitarian double standards are further discussed and referenced in DEP #7. 6 Other examples are considered below. Two of the four form of ecological consciousness considered by Rodman fit here (as Rodman has remarked). For instance, falling into the intermediate range are the types of environmental positions adopted by Birch and Cobb, and by Attfield and by many other consequentialists. 7 See the argument of EP, beginning the Last Man argument, p .... ff. See also the initial example of Routley 2 79 .. 8 The point is argued in detail in DEP #3. �11 integrity of rich natural environments. This simple result cuts deeply into (standard shallow) consumer theory, to take just one example of the impact of deep environmentalism. Authentic deep ecology is a type of deep environmentalism. A genuinely ecospheric egalitarianism, such as deep ecology offers, is bound to reject the Greater Value assumption. For under egalitarianism, larger collarations of significant eco-objects outweight smaller groupings of undistinguished humans. Notes 1. All their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end. 2. Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman. 3. Here authenticity is important. As will become evident in part II, certain proclaimed deep ecologists are not prepared to scuttle the Greater Value assumption. As will also become evident, the egalitarian arguments upsetting the Greater Value assumption are build on defective foundations. �CONTINUING THE CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is how the label often functions, honorifically, for instance in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox). Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner. 1 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way. While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been criticised in sufficient detail in the original critique. But other features of authentic deep ecology (hereafter mainly DE) were left largely untouched in the original critique, and new features have emerged. The critique thus needs continuing. Since the critique was produced, it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. Even Naess, the founder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources. �2 apparently large concessions to opposition changes, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the founder of DE, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophels, to create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if it can in any way be avoided. But, on the other there is an evident desire to make deep ecology a very select position, for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments. Deep ecology lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict. I.Further problems with the platform and core platform of deep ecology. It is the platform (at level 2 of the organising "double pyramid" of DE depicted below) that constrains, delimits and defines deep ecology, so far as it is well-characterised. For even this level is not very precisely characterised to put it mildly. Some exponents or practitioners of deep ecology (some of them self-nominated or self-proclaimed) appear to repudiate even the core themes at level 2 (e.g. Fox on axiocentrism). In the face of criticism, Naess himself backtracks as far as he plausibly can, and sometime further. Not only does he considerably muddy the clear waters of doctrine of occasional prosentations, but the doctrine itself begins to disappear, to be qualified away (see e.g. Naess's performance in Resurgance , discussed below). The response to intellectual criticism, which DE has been increasingly encountering as it spreads, has not been an appropriate one of clarifying, and where requisite expounding, the core theory; it has rather been one of retreat and digging in, of trying to hold the temple under seige, through diversionary activity (or by broken-record techniques: simply reiterating parts of the messge not under heavy criticism over and over again). When the critical raid has passed, the priests (and very occassional priestess) of deep ecology reemerge, bearing the original doctrine essentially unchanged. The practice resembles christianity (and too much of the practice of dominant science, the rival Western church). Dealing with deep ecologists is very like dealing with devout christians; some of them one feels sure have only recently changed positional hats, from evangelism to deep ecology (correspondingly, my own position has become that of a black sheep). A good deal of the argumentative practice of deep ecology appears to be explained by its evangelical, and even messianic, character. There is genuine effort to tum no-one, except the most incorrigible moneylenders, away from the temple. Everyone else (except perhaps philosophic critics) is welcome, and encouraged to join in worship. Much like the churches, the founder of the �3 De movement seeks as large a flock as possible. In these democratic days, numbers count (at least under the "right" polling conditions); earlier numbers overted for taxing or tithing purposes. Other high priests are not so sure: there are some critics of the movement, who may be beyond the poles; and surely it should be a little more exclusive. But, in any event, DE is a much more liberal doctrine than one of its sources, christianity, has ever been; it admits coupling not just (so it is said) with all the great religions, but with all the more benign positions and practices that achieve fashionability in California. All not ill-disposed to the natural world and duly acknowledging its value can march under the banner of deep ecology, whose main citadel is Nature. N aess casts the net of deep ecology wide, catching therewith not only many remote supporters, but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly Bockshim (p.6). Naess now considers the 8 point platform, formulated by himself and Susians and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology'. Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement have in common' (23.6.88). Thus the 8 point platform (condensed in box 1) provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the core, the core platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to the principles of the core (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to the core, the common (intersection of the) platform. They may not be members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockshim, or myself, can be an adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The De movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the core, even more or less. Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextrically in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who turn out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Which isolated exceptions does he have in view? Box 1. The core 8 point plat/orm, in capsule form. l. Non-human and human life have intrinsic value: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intinsic value, inherent �4 value, etc. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues : Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation of these values and are also values in themselves. 3.Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues: Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4.Human (values compatible with) population decrease: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 5. Human inte,ference with natural world excessive: Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive and the situation is rapidly worsening. 6. Policies and basic structures must be changed: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures. 7.Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living: The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness. 8. Obligation to attempted implementation: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes. Most of the core platform is no longer demanding; none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Mainly adherence to DE, and support of DE, would be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A strategy common to econonical practice and sociological research �5 readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the core platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague failing of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that De would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock). The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' (R p.7). The reasoning does not hold up; a range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happened. Naess should be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance, 6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by point 7. 6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology. 6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions. Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principle of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration. Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the core platform itself, which is pretty wishy-wasy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clearcutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of range-lands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. �6 Deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE program, and the issue is (perhaps wisely) avoided by some leading proponents of DE. But deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive prolluting types of industry that conspiciuosly contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented,terrestial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as the greenhouse affect, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out. The idea of progress is, like industry, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology"). So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select hand, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey. Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly farreaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes inmersed in a spread of these problems, and who does not develop some environmental commitments, even if a liberalish social agenda continues to dominate an environmental one (and it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interpretation of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics (now ......... of reaction crises), tended to become progressively more accomodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental drought, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep �7 ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the joining of different positions. Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:- Example 1. Among extensionists, both utilitarians and ratonalists. Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sometimes a or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much non-human life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions, which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from a utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, it is really a coherence theory of morality). Example 2. More far-reaching informediate positions, which do assign intrinic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some non-individuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Examples of this sort the postions deliminated (so far in insufficient theoretical details) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Rolston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extenionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classificaton of positions). Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in this formulation. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, �8 despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by ulitarians, to sentience, or unwarranted, unnecessary and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like enviromental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Facters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religo-political quest for a large support Base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which does not make much ground academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players and return to its more radical mission (academics form only a small minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, one the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults). 2. Variability, antiquity or dubiquity of main themes of deep ecology omitted from the core platform. Some themes have been retained by letting them undergo extensive change. Nowhere is this more conspicuous than with the difficult principle of "biospherical egalitarianism in principle", central to earle DE, which has taken on some remarkable new guises. In Naess, it becomes a curiously qualified principle of rights: that every being has a right to live - unless the basic needs of other beings overrides its rights. In Devall, who prefers to avoid the term 'rights' (the use of which he asserts is metaphorical in Naess, not at all what Naess, who appeals to childrens" usage, asserts), the principle is emptied of main egalitarian content: 'Properly understood, the principle of biocentric equality means that humans are members of the biotic community, not its masters' (p.58). So understood, the principle can be accepted by many shallow thinkers; it is not incompatible with chauvinism, nor with conciderable inequality, nor with greater value invariably assigned to humans, only with a certain domination. It is a sell-out. Few of the supporters of deep ecology (DE) appear to realise how old-fashionedly defective and sometimes inappropriate some of the elements, and most of the methodology, of deep ecology really is. 2 The organic and organistic image, for instance - heavily deployed by one of the heroes of deep ecology, Whitehead - is as old as Aristotle (for some of the history see Berlin). Despite much valiant effort, no one has so far got the image (now redeployed in the extravagent Gaia 2 Recently, Sholomowski has re-emphasized some of these features. �9 hypothesis) - valuable as it may be, chauvinistic as it characteristically is -to work in a very fruitful way. Likewise the drive for self-realisation, is both old-fashioned - it was fostered by the Enlightenment and had its heyday in the 19thC, was decidedly human chauvinistic in its emphases. But perhaps the heaviest residue of old-fashioned inappropriate material is to be found in the methodology of deep ecology, which is mainly transferred from positivism with little alteration. The hypothetico-deductive methodology, for example, appears essentially intact in the double pyramidal diagram (now called 'the apron' by Naess), which one is supposed to shuffle around and descend by deduction. Having descended so, the way back to the top is by intuition of hypotheses, by the hypothetical part of the method. First principles at the top admit of no proof or derivation - because of the character of the one inferential relation admitted, deduction. In other respects, the double pyramid strait-jacket, which is Naess's way of trying to infuse a certain pluralism (a pluralism of fundamental positions at first principles) into deep ecology, is insufficiently specific. It does not explain, for example, how at a practical lower level, either an environmental directive or environmental action is forthcoming. Indeed given restriction to deduction, it cannot explain how these things come about. DE lacks any requisite theory of environmental action. 3 The double pyramid gets stylized in the way on the left; an alternative representation is that on the right (and Naess now has a representation awkwardly superimposed on a mandala):Needless to say, there are problems lacking within DE's easy pluralism. Noone has ever explained how to get the unretracted DE platform derivationally out of - what looks incompatible Christianity. For that matter no-one has shown how to deduce the platform from any of the other, sometimes more congenial, great religions or philosophies. The nearest we seem to get is Naess's sketch of how we derive parts of the platform from his own specially concocted ecosophy. 3. Further flowing of the DE gospel: its heroes, its arguments, .... Deep ecology is a seriously flawed gospel, not only as regards its doctrines and their coherence, but in other surrounding evangelic respects as well. Virtually all the patron saints of DE, the past philosophical heroes (all male) are deeply flawed. Spinoza's views on the place and treatment of animals, for instance, should be entirely disowned by any deeper environmentalist. Even the later "reformed" Heidegger is conspicuously human chauvinistic, too complacent in a human-dominated and tamed landscape, and, (apart from some new-fangled technology and 3 Various old-fashioned, and again defective, models are available to DE, and could be tacked onto the theory, e.g. the belief (or information) and desire (or value) account of intention and action conventionally attributed to Hume. �10 industrialisation) with the established rural way of things in Germany, including significantly racist and sexist ways. The pervasive background four-fold, fitting the cosmological scheme of things in, includes only divinities and humans; wilderness and its creatures are not part of the fundamentals. Whitehead, despite the apparent bounteousness of his philosophical scheme, was a practising christian, committed to a great chain of being with humans at the top of the chain (and thus to a greater value assumption antithetical to DE); he took no significant interest in nature or nonhuman creatures at all, and was very comfortable in the ways of a socio-political order which directly produced present environmental impasses. 4 No doubt the heroes should be differently viewed. Not as patrons, not even as forerunners; but as deep thinkers, from whom certain elements can be drawn in elaborating an environmental philosophy (e.g. parts of a theory of nature, features of process theory, elements of a critique of technology), while much else is discarded. Most of this theoretical work remains to be done. Regrettably the calibre of the arguments for proceeding to a DE position has not improved. N aess has now resorted to making his case in a very conventionalistic populist fashion. People are inclined to respond in such and such a way (favourable to environmental concerns) to so and so questions. Thus, for instance 'there is reasonably widespread agreement that animals, and even plants, have rights' (EIJ p.3). But surely it is largely as a result of environmentalism, which must (and should) be based on something else that people have began to respond thus and so. Naess also argues from the the concern of many people about nature and natural phenomena for their own sakes (the data is however not all that clearcut) to several other conclusions, for instance that political and stilist approaches to the environmental crisis (etc) should be less anthropocentric (EIJ p.5). The arguments are thus close in character to those widely used in arguments in economics and democratic theory; they are none the better for that. The fact that people used to respond favourably to damming up every nearby river and draining all the swamps is not a solid recommendation for such practices. Moreover, such populist considerations hardly win out, as Naess himself explains (p.4). Pressure groups pedalling narrow and sometimes destructive economic ambitions often succeed against democratic opinion. 4. But much criticism of DE is even more seriously flawed. Despite the growing constituency for core princles. De, which Naess will correctly have alluded to here, DE has been portrayed as extremism - especially from the US political right (which tends towards extreme right). What is extreme depends, of course, on where a carping critic is 4 He appears to have owed his appointment to a philosophy chair at Harvard in significient part to the fact that he was in no way a radical, but suited to the conservative scene established there. �11 situated. Gung-ho growth economists are extremists from a deeper environmental situation. No doubt such GG economists would claim that they have reason, not emotion, on their side; but it is a narrow flawed reason, tailored and biassed to their cause, reflecting a different class of emotions, primarily preferences of business communities of humans. In present deteriorating environmental circumstances, clever "extremism" is sometimes exactly what is required - ideas and action that upset, disturb, interfere with, subvert, and eventually overturn, the dominant military-industrial social ethos. Extremism presumably amounts to being isolated on the outer margins of some politically or socially sensitive (more useless) normal distribution, without respectable companions. On many environmentally important issues, DE is no longer in such a position (often instead the power elite would be if it were not so entrenched). Where it is in such a position, then generally it needs to be, and needs to try to swing the norm in its direction or else to gather respectability for that position. What, if anything, supports the charge of extremism, levelled against DE? Such emotionallycharged criticisms from the right tend to be particularly vague. Sometimes DE itself, portrayed as radical environmentalism, and compared with radical feminism, is dismissed as extremist, without indicating where it is considered extreme. In fact, while better developed, less accommodating DE is radical, at least literally in going, as one aspect of its depth, to root issues and assumptions, it is not very politically radical; it does not seriously challenge present political arrangements in the way that ecoanovehism, or even ecosocialism, does. What has infuriated some critics is undoubtedly the DE removal of humans from absolute centre stage, and above all the cavalier or callous way in which some environmentalists have portrayed the demise of unfortunate humans, from the God-given position to having to share the world-stage. There are many different issues tangled up here, and the charges of extremism depends on retaining the confusion, as well as ascribing to DE claims it does not make. DE asserts that irreducible value is not confined to humans, that life other than humans has intrinsic value. Although such a claim is indeed incompatible with the dominant social paradigm, it represents an old challenge, going back in utilitarianism at least to Bentham. As some of those who held or now hold such a position were not, by any means extremists or even radicals (e.g. Sidgwick) the charge against this part of the DE platform, lapses. Similar points apply against any charge of extremism based on the DE assertion (carefully avoided in the core platform) that a substantial decrease in human population is desirable, especially for conservation of the biosphere. Such a theme is increasingly widely maintained, by many respectable figures, far from any fringes. Nor need any extreme, threatening or dangerous, action result from such DE themes. Human population reduction can occur (and is envisaged by Naess to occur) by such unthreatening means as a �12 reduction in birth rates, a demographic transition brought about for instance through improved education and contraception. Yet some coupling to "extreme" action, and adoption or preparedness to adopt such, has to be established if a proper charge of extremism is to sustained (cf. also the OED definition of 'extremism'). Deep ecologists propose no extreme action to reduce human population, no wars, no genecide, nothing macho. Indeed the idea is ludicrous. Deep ecologists tend to be gentle people, who are opposed to violence; they care about humans, who are part of nature (even if too many of them are trying to set themselves above and apart from it). There are individuals and groups, more evident in America than elsewhere, who do adopt an uncaring, and sometimes brutal attitude to other humans, especially those outside America. Ecofascists, like Hardin, to the right of environmental thought, who think that the time for triage has already arrived, and that starving humans in third world countries should be left to fend for themselfes, offer a striking example. But eco-fascism is far from deep ecology, and has been severely criticised by those close to DE (e.g. Bennett and Griffin). It is no doubt troublesome for deep ecology, and convenient for opportunistic critics, if environmentalists with eco-fascist prodivities present themselves as deep ecologists (as has happened, a prominent example being the present editor of Earth First). It is no doubt troublesome for a charitable organisation if members of a mafia present themselves as agents of it and collect on its behalf; it has long been a problem for democracy that fascists can present themselves as democrats, and even put an end to democracy through seemingly democratic methods. Political movements admits of much infiltration, by both well- and evil-intentioned. ANNEX 1. Interesting proposals continue to emerge from the deep literature. One is for an environmental organisation, which might could be called Environment International, parallelling Amesty International , and adopting a similar role with regard to the environment that Amesty does with respect to human rights and political processes (Naess p.4). 2. There are many false "virtues " in contemporary political life that green politics, such as DE is coupled with, will eventually help remove. These include:- • Unity, united front. All that has merit is a certain limited unity in diversity. • Balance. Balance is achieved by resolution of many forces. To shift �13 the balance, then, environmentalists should be as far out as they can (while still being counted in the resolution, not written off). For end political purposes, citing especially credibility doesn't matter, by contrast with countability. Advice to offer more balanced statements and work should be courteously ignored: it is oppositional, political advice. • Two party ideal REFERENCES A. Naess, 'Environmental ethics and international justice', Ecospirit Quarterly IV (1) (198.) 1-7; referred to as EIJ. � Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Draft Papers Description An account of the resource Sylvan's literary executor encountered an archive in which “all his projects were current", since manuscripts were undated and unattributed. Text A resource consisting primarily of words for reading. Examples include books, letters, dissertations, poems, newspapers, articles, archives of mailing lists. Note that facsimiles or images of texts are still of the genre Text. Text Any textual data included in the document page PREFACE Part 1 ill ECOLOGICA L ETHICS & ECOLOGICA L POLITICS: TURNING JOHN MCCLOSKE Y'S CHALLENGE i Conservative, reformative and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics 1 ii A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism 3 iii On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics especially that deep-green upstart 8 iv Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics 12 V Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems 19 vi Population impact: the fact of human consumption 21 vii On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations 24 viii On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof ix Part 2 Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology 26 31 A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WEST DEEP ECOLOGY: A RESPONSE TO w ARWICK Fox's RESPONSE TO AN EARLIER CRITIQUE. i Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism 39 ii Value in deep ecology 42 iii The extent of values-in-nature 46 iv A biocentric ethic? 49 V Biospheric egalitarianism revisted 51 vi The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned environmental axiological route 53 vii The 'case' against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach viii Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification ix Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil 57 62 65 11 X Deconstruction and reselection of self 68 xi More troubles with Self as foundation 73 xii Liquidating Fox's 'deep ecological territory 75 xiii Justifying 'extreme interpretations' of and 'extreme reactions' to wild West deep ecology 77 xiv Transpersonal logic and methodology 82 xv More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science 86 Part 3 ANOTHER 'REFUTATION' OF ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS: JANNA THOMPSON'S CRITICISMS i The newer destructive phase: overtaxing requirements for (environmental) ethics 94 ii Satisfying duly modified requirements, environmentally 98 iii The former constructive phase: a new anthropocentric environmental ethic? 105 PART 1. CRITICAL EXPOSITION Chapter 1. AT THE PYRAMIDS' JUNCTION. THE BASICS AND CREED OF DEEP ECOLOGY Deep ecology in both a movement and an ideological position. Thus in significant respects it resembles a new religion, which has a creed as well as an organisational structure, practices and so on; a political party, which has a platform as well as organisation, objective and so forth; and an intellectual school, which aim to propagate a philosophy, gain converts and adherents, etc. Like a religion in a literate society, there is a set of texts, DE texts as we shall call them, which present elements of the faith: doctrine, themes, parables, heroic figures, warnings, and so on. The DE texts have not so far been arranged into any authoritative form. Although the movement may have come first, and the theory been but gradually extracted (the historical and pseudo-sociological impression given by the DE texts), it makes for neater characterisation and easier exposition to consider the theoretical structure J first. The very looselyknit movement, subsequently considered, essentially the genuine environment movement (excluding those just in it for human ends), is in any case clustered around this structure - as older cities are around their centre. The theoretical structure is itself conveniently organised in the following (double) pyramidal diagram (now called by Naess, who devised it, "the Apron"):- Diagram 1. Basic Double Pyramid LEVELS UPPER (INVERTED) PYRAMID C B p 1. Sources, or ultimate bases 2.Core Principles DE PLATFORM R E E D REGULAR PRACTICE PARTICULAR PRACTICES POLICIES LIFESTYLES 3. General themes & norms 4. Particular norms and concrete decisions LOWER (COMPLEX) PYRAMID The theoretical centre of DE is to be found at level 2, where the upper and lower pyramid join. The various sources of the central part, such doctrines as those of Buddhism (B) and Christianity (C) and of philosophic cast (P) at level 1, are not usually a part of DE at all. But there is a preferred philosophical source, ecosophy - another theory elaborated by N aess, who again coined the term which does enjoy a closer connection with DE, and is sometimes considered almost part of it. Levels 3 and 4, which are supposed to derive from the central creed, and in turn inductively inform it, are parts of DE, but less central parts, parts of the varying practice. It is level 2 then that is crucial for understanding DE. While the upper pyramid givgs the theoretical or intellectual content and sources of DE, the lower pyramid supplies working DE, and core principles and the practice. 1. The Central level, level 2, and the standard DE platforms Deep Ecology is structured around level 2, the central operational level. The main distinctive principles of DE are set on level 2, the platform level. These principles may be grouped as shown in the following diagram:CREED LEVEL2 BASIC CREED wider platform 8 point platform further and more peripheral principles The reason for distinguishing the 8-point platform from the wider platform is simple this:- The 8point platform, as variously presented in DE texts, omits some of the standard articles of the core DE position, and fails to develop others. 1 There is accordingly a real point in distinguishing "the" platform from the more comprehensive and better rounded core or creed. DE is a decidedly vague object, with vague parts. Perhaps the most definite things about it are its 8-point platform and its diametric opposition to features of the mainstream Western ideology, and dominant social paradigm as it otherwise known. The core position is something discerned from the DE texts, in much the way the platform is. But whereas the 8 point platform is explicitly presented, though in different and incompatible terms, the core has to be winnowed and from an array of more peripheral material (as is shown in part II). Box 1 The 8-point platform, in capsule form. 2 I. Both non-human and human life have intrinsic value: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intrinsic value, inherent value, etc. These value are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues: Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation themselves these values and are also values in of 3. Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues: Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4. Human interference with natural world excessive: Present human interference with the and the situation is rapidly worsening. non-human world is excessive 5. Policies and basic structures must be changed: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures. 6. Human (values compatible with) population decrease: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. decrease of the human 7. Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living: The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness. 8. Obligation to attempt implementation: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes. 2 The 8-point platform is perhaps the most repeated exhibit in the DE texts. The present formulation adopts the presentation of Naess in Resorg ; the brief formulation on the left does not occur in Naess. A slightly different formulation of the platform under heading 'Basic Principles' is given in DS p.70. The principles have been rendered, and grJuped, to make their structure and interconnections a little clearer. Principles / and 2 concern intrinsic values; principles 3-7 concern human practices and policies. Principle 5 elaborates in principle 3; principle 6 draws the policy consequence of this. The most important of the general policy changes is listed in principle 4; but another crucial policy change is indicated in principle 7: decreased production and consumption. The prime terrestrial policy objectives (that should have obtained separate listing) can in fact be derived from the impact formula: roughly, human environmental impact = human population x personal consumption x available technology. Reducing excessive interference thus requires at least some of, and no doubt all of, human population reduction, consumption reduction, and appropriate technology improvements. Finally, principle 8 supplies a commitment principle. Observe that some of the principles of this 8-point platform, 8-point principles as we may conveniently call them, provide linkages with other levels of the DE pyramid. For example most of the principles, principles 3-7 especially, have implication for policy at level 3, and thence for day-to-day practice at level 4. 8-point principle 8 has direct application to level 4, individual lifestyles. Before the incomplete 8-point platform was devised (as part of a political conciliation and unification attempt), DE was rather differently characterised: primarily through listing of principles countering assumptions of the conventional socioeconomic wisdom, resistance principles. Indeed, in many respects DE is marked out through reaction and resistance: by its opposition the prevailing ideology of industrial society, especially by those elements of it that have lead to the assault on the natural environment, but also by elements that have led to breakdown of connected features of the social fabric. It gives a clearer picture of what DE is about if we tabulate are principles in opposition to those of the dominant Western ideology (or social paradigm), and as compared with those of shallow or reform environmentalism: TABLE 2 DE PRINCIPLES AS CONTRASTED, ON THE ONE SIDE, WITH THOSE OF THE DOMINANT PARADIGM AND SHALLOW ECOLOGY, ON OTHER, WITH ONE OF ITS SOURCES, TAOISM. DOMINANT SHALLOW (WESTERN) ECOLOGY DEEP ECOLOGY TAOISM (DE) PARADIGM (DE) Domination over nature Stewardship of Nature Nature an exploitable resource: intrinsic value confined to As for, but with nature a manager resource Natural environment valued for itself Human supremacy Human ascendency Biocentric egalitarianism Harmony with Nature Elaboration of DE Much as for DE; ''humanism'' rejected Differs from DE; wide impartiality Ample resources substitutes Some resource limitations Earth supplies limited Supplies Material economic growth a predominant goal Sustainable development Non-material goods especially self-realization Following Tao-te Consumerism Optimised consumerism Doing with enough/ recycling Doing with enough (recycling inappropriate) Competitive lifestyle As for DP Cooperative lifeway Much as for DE: voluntary simplicity Centralised/urbancentred/national focus As for DP Decentralized/ bioregional/ neighborhood focus As for DE Largely as for DP Non-hierarchical/ Grassroots democracy Hierarchy without structure More careful high technology Appropriate technology Limited technology Power structure hierarchical High technology ample Power 7 Shallow ecology, or reform environmentalism as it can to be called3 , differs from the dominant paradigm primarily in its emphasis on stewardship, on long-term management, on sustainable development. DE, while it reacts against the dominant paradigm primarily on environmental grounds, stands opposed to shallow ecology, which it correctly sees as not going nearly far enough, in particular to satisfy genuine environmental values. Of course the dominant paradigm resisted is not itself a uniform or static position; some of the in determining of DE flows from this very feature. For example, until very recently DP used to support dominance as a throughgoing feature: not just over Nature, but of the male, white, Western, Protestant, rich, powerful, free, adult, etc., over their opposites. Domination of the latter sorts, within the human species, is, for the most part, no longer a part of the progressive ideology, having been gradually shed over the last century; but such domination still remains part of much practice (as well as of cultural ideologies). Some of the most distinctive, and most controversial, principles of DE, are omitted from the 8-point platform, as is evident from the opposition/resistance principles. These include the principles regularly, and pontifically, claimed to distinguish deep ecology. Moreover without these further principles, DE amount to nothing more than a slightly less shallow environmental position (indeed apart from principle 1 and perhaps 2, all the principles of the 8-point platform can be adopted by reform environmentalism and in fact often are enough espoused therefor). These additional principles, part of the wider platform (and the creed) include these:9. Biospheric egalitarianism [in principle]: 'all things in the biosphere have an equal right to live and blossom'. The principle is presented in this unqualified form (in DS) as one of the two ultimate norms, the other being self-realisation. Fir fact Devall and Sessions proceed to tack on a self-realisation component to this principle, of biocentric equality as they call it: namely 'and to reach their own individual forms of unfolding and self-realisation with the larger Selfrealisation' (DS p.67). But, they immediately add, the 'basic intuition is that all organisms and entities in the ecosphere, as parts of the interrelated whole, are equal in intrinsic worth' (p.67, continuing, italics added). This italicised value-formulation is straightforward, and has the advantage of moving rights out of the formulation (No doubt, if equal intrinsic value guarantees an equal right to live and blossom, it yields the "equal rights to" formulation.) But it encounters immediate difficulties, because in the process of continuing to live and blossom some organisms interfere with others, for instance through basic demands for food and shelter, most conspicuously in predation. To try to escape these difficulties, Naess at least regularly adds the rider: in principle . 'Naess suggests that biocentric equality as an intuition is true in principle, 3 For example in D & S. The alternative, shallow ecology, was set aside because of the negative conditions of the word 'shallow'. 8 although in the process of living, all species use each other as food, shelter, etc.' (DS p.67). 10. Self-realisation . This involves the realisation - growth, development and maturity - of the self, becoming a whole and full person, but not merely in isolation or in a social setting as in older models of self-realisation, but within a biospheric setting, taking due account of other forms of life. It 'can be summarised symbolically as the realisation of "self-in-Self' where "Self' stands for organic wholeness' (DS p.67). Intimately linked with self-realisation in this wider ecological sense is the next principle. 11 Biospheric identification . The procedure, again a personal one, consists in suitably identifying with parts or wholes of the larger surrounding biosphere. The underlying notion here is one of partial identity, sharing certain salient features with, which permits a qualified substitutivity of an imaginative person into the position of another creature, ecoobject or ecosystem. Such "identification" is a significant method of heightening 12. Ecological consciousness . Less grandiosely this covers environmental awareness, appreciation, and concern, and thus responsiveness to environmental depredation. Engendering ecological consciousness is regarded as a crucial part of spreading the deep ecological message. 13. Holism. On DE precepts, this amounts to more than the modem holism according to which there are nonadditive wholes, wholes or objects which amount to more than the sums of their parts. But as to what else holism demands, there is some disagreement within deep ecological circles. 2. Further principles of the DE creed and important optional extras Beyond the standard platform there are further principles, not enunciated at all, or until very recently, or else more peripheral. Some of the further themes help in deciding what clarity DE had; that is one reason why they presumably do not feature in the 8-point platform. Among the principles not enunciated are these:• Non violence. The new themes, several of them periphical to the main concerns of DE include the following:• Deep ecology offers a green synthesis. It 'combines the "Social Greens" with the "Natural Greens" avoiding the extremes of both' (Naess R p.6). This is a surprising theme for a position that has itself been regularly castigated as extreme. What N aess means, above all, is that DE does not neglect humans, and their legalerate social concerns and aspirations, in the way that the 9 Natural-greens have been (generally erroneously) accused of doing; nor does it neglect or devalue nature and its features in the way that many social-greens are inclined to do. Among the important optional extras that may be coupled with DE are principles of a more through-going animal liberation, such as:• a severe reduction oforend to the enclavement, confinement and slaughter of animals. • vegetarianism (of some form). Some deep ecologists are vegetarians (e.g. Bennett), some are not (e.g. Drengson), and some are in between (e.g. Naess). Unless they undergo a conversion, Northerness brought up in the hunting-fishing-shooting tradition eschew these optimal principles. But evidently there is a tension here; there is pressure coming from other principles, especially nonviolence, to limit sharply slaughter of other creatures. 3. The creed, the basic creed, and the movement. Like many a religious creed, the DE creed is an elaborate concoction (as well as a dubious and rather arbitrary one). Adoption of it, knowledge of it even, cannot be expected of all adherents, especially given its features: its vagueness, its inaccessibility, and so on. It is not surprising that, again like many another creed or ideology, many of the faithful do not know too well what it comprises, still less do many of the fellow-travellers (and DE has many). The most that can perhaps be expected of adherents is adoption of some simpler creed, a basic creed more or less in the vicinity of the 8-point platform. But it is apparent from DE texts that not even all of that platform is demanded: enough will do, especially if other DE principles are adopted. The platform represents 'what most supporters have in common at a deep level' 4 No doubt supporters who eschew part of the platform compensate by adherence instead of other DE principles or practice. Hence the depiction of the basic creed in diagram 2. A basic creed comprises enough of the 8-point platform plus enough other principles at least to compensate for omissions. But not even a basic creed is always demanded. At its most generous and laxest, the DE movement includes everyone who professes a concern for some part of the natural environment and does not demolish a manifestation of concern or interest by blatantly anti-environmental activity or involvement therewith. Inclusion in the movement does not even require strict adoption of, or adherence to the DE platform, though it involves some vague recognition of parts of it. Talk of membership of the movement would be somewhat inapposite; there is no paid-up or recorded membership (or even rewarding as would be done in a voting system). 4 Naess R p.3, italics added. 10 It is sometimes said that the DE movement was born in Europe and adopted elsewhere, US and Australia especially. But such a claim confuses the movement with quasi-sociological extraction of the principles involved and the platform assembling them. The movement itself emerged as a late 1960's affair, substantially under way before it was reported upon and labelled (as usual, academics, like politicians, reacted to, rather than led, more popular movements). Such a movement involves some "mass" of people; it must therefore be anticipated by some smaller groups and likely some initiating individuals. So it was with the DE movement. There were prominent individuals in several countries where environmental groups with deep leanings formed or operated, in the 60s and before; and before that there were many isolated individuals. In USA, where the DE movement no doubt grew to substance first, before that in Europe or Australia, there is a significant chain of deep ecologists, or rather deep ecological thinkers, reaching back to the beginning of the century and perhaps into the previous century; for instance, in reverse temporal order, Carson, Leopold, Muir, perhaps Thoreau. 5 Muir is regularly alluded to as an early deep ecologist by Americans. 6 There are deeper-seated motives for vagueness about the basic creed and uncertainty about the basic requirements to be deep ecologist and who makes the hororific status. One is a dislike of criticism, and resulting vacillation among the high bishops of DE as to what extent critics, and those who declare themselves not to be deep ecologists, should be included in the fold, and consequently as to who exactly is a deep ecologist. (From outside the issue can look rather trivial, but gangs are gangs whether ecological or more generally not..) A main reason for the omission of central doctrines of DE from the 8-point platform is of course related: the desire to increase the flock, to turn away no-one who might be decently admitted. 7 Another motive, linked also with trying to enlist support, in order to mobilize democratic forces and like people power, concerns the pluralistic drive that is an important aspect of authentric DE. It concerns the insertion of pluralistic elements within level 2 itself (rather than confining these elements to other levels, where there are conspicuous, as later exposition will show). As Naess explains the idea 5 6 7 In Australia there were, in reverse order, Dunply, Griffin, Stead; there were of course many others with very considerable environmental concerns (e.g. Ratcliffe), who apparently lacked however the requisite feature of depth, and world count only as reform environmentalistser conservationists. But, quite evidently, there are serious problems in discerning whether some environmentalist or other is deep (there is generally only indirect evidence, as the category was not clearly recognised). The issue as to whether some deep environmentalist is a (prota)-deep ecologist is even more vexed because of the muddiness of DE. It is important to observe that little reliance can be placed, in such issues, on standard and applauded histories, such as Nash's Wilderness and the America Mind, because these are written from a shallow perspective and fail to realise the significance of depth; See further Devall's report on Nash's third edition, Ecorotes, pp23-9. See, for instance, Devall Ecorates. Devall also suggests that St. Francis is a deep ecologist, but given what is now known about St. Francis there is room for considerable doubt. Or othersie admitted. But may be excluded by ignored or incompetance, or deterred by qualms about significent propositions (human populations restraint esp.). 11 is avoid the 'devastating' 'tendency to dogmatism': 'there is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite one kind of green society'. Likewise there is no definite or definitive basic creed. For many purposes this does not matter; we can still normally assert such and such, so and so, definitely deep ecological, such and such, so and so, is definitely not. In an attempt to evade criticism, DE is nowadays sometimes represented as a grass-roots movement, one but loosely associated with philosophical views 8 But such movements have intellectually-shaped objectives, offer at least a set of slogans and elementary principles. And DE is this and more; it verges on the dishonest to try to portray DE as such a movement, when in large measure it is the work of intellectuals, initiated by reporting, rather inaccurately it seems, on the supposed attitudes of field ecologists and like workers - hardly typical grass-roots people. 8 In a different respect, in term of moral of ideas and change of themes, DE is no doubt a movement. It has moved (and with Fox shedding critical principles, it continues moving). Such movement is not good for the types of virtues that stable positions may acquire, such a replenity, reliability, assessibility etc; but it does make life difficult for critics. PART II CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY Chapter 5. THE INITIAL PROBLEM: WHAT ON EARTH IS DEEP ECOLOGY? WHO IS AND ISN'T A DEEP ECOLOGIST? Deep ecology appears , on a preliminary reading, to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves, value sometimes exceeding that of or had by humans. So much appears to follow from the first part of the 8-point platform. But even this much is denied by some of the never philosophers (e.g. Fox). Moreover which elaboration is quite another matter, and decidedly controversial. Indeed DE has not just been rapidly converted (in part through overuse) into a conceptual bog, but is well on the way to becoming all things to all interested parties. This is undoubtedly a drawback; it makes communication, and theoretical and persuasive use of the notion, that much more difficult though it does not condemn an afflicted notion, such as deep ecology undoubtedly is, out of hand. For several important and fruitful notions, which have survived, have encountered very much of this sort of problem - force, mind, energy, differential, infinitesimal, to take some older examples, paradigm and culture to take relevant recent examples.O On the other hand, many notions no more afflicted than deep ecology, such as societism, timocracy and ungrund, have been assigned to the historical scrap-heap. These include the sort of neo-Hegelian panpsychism which deep ecology of the American texts will tum out to resemble. What is evidence of conceptual murkiness and degeneration? The trouble begins with the very introduction of the terminology. Naess, - when first setting down in one preliminary codification what was already in the air,* wrote only of the 'Deep Ecology movement' and set down what he has subsequently described as a 'Deep Ecology platform'. The suggested notion of deep ecology, the underlying notion that informed the loosely-knit and open-ended movement and platform, was not extracted; that subtraction task fell primarily to West Coast American intellectuals, and it was done differently by different proponents of deep ecology. The trouble was accentuated through rapid evolution of the notion. Thus Naess's account of the movement in 0 * In case it is supposed this sort of conceptual muddiness is limited to less exact science, consider such recent notions as anthropic principle, from physics, and nonmonotonic logic, from computer science. See Naess 73, p.98ff. While slogans and preliminary formulations are fine, particularly in campaigns, philosophy cannot rest at the level of slogans or platforms, as too much of DE continues to do. 2 1983 is significantly different from the account he outlined in 1973; seven principles are replaced by six different themes, only two or so of which have much in common with the original principles. t Although DE is introduced in the 8-point platform as a value theory, basically concerned with environmental values 1 , it has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and as primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (pantheistic) religion. Popular Australian sources will begin to indicate some of the spread. The Deep Ecologist , a network newsletter, sees deep ecology as metaphysical at base, as part of a natural philosophy of humans' place in nature (though many of its correspondents see it as a matter of deep experiences , often of a religious cast, too often decidedly anthropocentric, obtained in or through Nature). According to its manifesto, carried in each issue on its title page, Deep ecology is the search for a sustaining metaphysics of the environment; it represents "a deep understanding of our unity with other beings and livings processes" (Drengson); it is biocentric, not anthropocentric. Though we shall come to modify or reject this manifesto phrase by phrase (deep ecology is not a search, but on one level a position or theory, on another a movement; sustaining should concern the environment, not the metaphysics; depth lies elsewhere than understanding; unity too is a metaphor for integration; biocentric is misleadingly restrictive), the present enterprise, illustrating the degenerative spread of deep ecology, is different. Let us hasten on to the strikingly different explanation John Seed prefers in introducing and advertising his anthology Deep Ecology 2 , a person - and consciousness-oriented souffle (drawn from Devall): "What I call deep ecology ... is premised on a gestalt of person-in-nature [an image Naess had rejected at the very outset of the enterprise 3]. The person is not above or outside of nature. The person is part of creation on-going. The person cares for and about nature, shows reverence towards and respect for nonhuman nature, loves, and lives with nonhuman nature, is a person in the "earth household" and "lets beings be", lets nonhuman nature follow separate evolutionary destinies. Deep ecology, unlike reform environmentalism, is not just a pragmatic, short-term social movement with a goal like stopping nuclear power or cleaning up the waterways. Deep ecology first attempts to question and present alternatives to conventional ways of thinking in the modern West. Deep ecology understands that some of the "solutions" of reform environmentalism are counter-productive. Deep ecology seeks transformation of values and social organisation. t 2 3 The claim is documented in the Appendix to this chapter. Thus according to Naess (73, p.99), ' ... the significant tenets of the Deep Ecology movement are clearly and forcefully normative . They express a value priority system ... '. But even this core claim is now challenged, by Fox, who sees the primary focus of deep ecology as ontological and not evaluative. This is one of three different collections with this title which have been circulated or announced recently: see references. See Naess 73, p.95; but Naess's rejection is rejected below. • 3 Deep ecology is liberating ecological consciousness ... Consciousness is knowing. From the perspective of deep ecology, ecological resistance will naturally flow from and with a developing ecological consciousness (Devall, 'The Deep Ecology Movement'). Again, while informative, much of this will have to be rejected or rectified (for example, the gesalt theme is problematic, and the deep person need do part only of what is specified; shallow or reform ecology need not be short-term, insofar as it may take account of many future generations of humans; it may well not be pragmatic; shallow ecology is better pluralistically combined with deep ecology, as in Naess's original platform, than denigrated; etc.) It is to Bill Devall, more than anyone, that we are indebted for a confusing myriad of formulations of the driving notion, several of them however extending Naess; for instance, deep ecology is first of all deep questioning, deep ecology is ultimately self-realisation and biocentrism, in deep ecology the most important ideas are 'the wholeness and integrity of person/planet together with biological egalitarianism'; it is also however much else - that again we shall come to modify or reject including a new psychology and new philosophical anthropology. 4 But Devall has been much encouraged by George Sessions, and it is Sessions especially who has tried to convert deep ecology into a new religion, with main texts drawn from pantheism, Spinoza and Buddhism. Thus according to Sessions, If the promise of American pantheism and nature mysticism is to be fulfilled, it will occur in the deep ecology social paradigm which is based upon pantheism and the idea of ecological egalitarianism in principle (Ecophilosophy ill). But although Sessions refers immediately to Naess, there is nothing in Naess about American pantheism and nature mysticism. At most Naess would allow that pantheism, along with other comprehensive positions, like Christianity or ecosophy, can be an underlying base for the deep ecology platform. Small wonder that John Passmore (hardly one to be philosophically baffled given his immense experience in comprehending Continental philosophy) goes astray in yet another account, in which he conveniently pushes the shallow-deep contrast into the unsatisfactory conservation/preservation boxes (of his 74): Deep ecophilosophers ... are mainly interested in the preservation of species and wilderness even when preserving them is not immediately and advantageous to human interest. In order to provide intellectual support for such preservation they are prepared to break with traditional Western ethical principles and metaphysical beliefs (Passmore 83). 4 Devall 79, 83; for a synopsis, see Appendix 1, figure 7B. 4 Again, most of this will have to be rectified, since the presentation is decidedly misleading, not to say biassed. As initial explanations of the deep ecological movement straightaway show, and applications reveal, deep ecology has always concerned, and deep ecophilosophers have always been interested in, much else as well, especially in human population levels and human interference, and in quality of life and technological and organisational structures. While this of course requires breaking with some Western traditions - which are in no way sacrosanct Wes tern tradition is far from uniform, and there are other tradition: deep ecology can remain, and is, rooted in tradition, though much about it is as new and fresh as anything of this sort can be. As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most vague ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is broad vague way is how the label often functions, honorific ally. That is, for instance how it functions in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox, as explained below). Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner. 5 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Attending a consciousness - raising weekend, purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way. While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in 5 I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources. 5 several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been subject to much criticism, deserved criticism as will soon appear. But other features of authentic deep ecology have hitherto been left largely untouched, and new features have emerged. So an ongoing critique is needed. Recently 6 , it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. New themes are introduced, older ones withdrawn or whittled away. Even Naess, the finder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the (nonetheless adjustible) platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make apparently large concessions to opposition charges, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the finder-founder, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophets, to create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if doing so can in any way be avoided. But, on the other, there is an evident desire, among the prophers, to make deep ecology a very select position, a place for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments i.e. after an appropriate testing pilgrimage. Deep ecology, however, lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict. There is a considerable lack of discrimination among the pace-setters of the movement over, and marked differences between them as to, who and what is accounted within deep ecology, and some unwarranted discrimination from this exclusive club (e.g. of Rodman). Many of the people classed as within or associated with deep ecology are shallow. And some who are excluded are not. For example, Naess (in 75) presents a long list of people he associates with the movement, many of whom are rather or even entirely shallow in their environmental orientation. Elsewhere (in 83) Naess proceeds to identify with deep ecology several other positions or movements which only overlap it, and which may be substantially shallow (such as green politics and new natural philosophies). Some of the predominantly American lists Devall and Sessions assemble are not so artless. To some extent, this combined discrimination and lack of discrimination again reflects the conceptual murkiness of deep ecology; to some extent it is symptomatic of other oldconsciousness malignancies, both within the notion and as regards its use. 6 Since the first critique was produced 6 Still more damaging to the movement is that several of the advertised prophets of deep ecology verge on the shallow, and some of these have denied DE.7 A striking example is Bookchin who has recently denounced DE, and written ranging declamations much of Bookchin's main, windy, bringin-it-together book, The Ecology of Freedom, said to be a "book of deep ecology" is very far from that; it is yet another, is a celebration of humans in very much the old (enlightenment) style. Insofar as it gets to grips with deeper environmental issues, Bookchin's material amounts to an extension of shallow ecology. 8 Ecologically Bookchin, like other of the prophets, buys into vitalism by way of extended consciousness. Ecological ethics is said to render nature self-conscious; the mechanistic alternative is presented as deadness, thus making an entirely false contrast. Indeed, part of the problem with the selection of prophets, is that mechanism is seen as the main bogy - when it is only one of the forms metaphysically underpinning shallower positions, Cartesian dualism being another - with the result that work that simply attacks mechanism and its variants and also advocates some sort of environmental way, gets accounted deep. N aess has cast the net of deep ecology too wide, catching therewith not only many remote "supporters", but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly the antagonistic Bockchin (RS p.6). Naess now considers the 8-point platform, formulated by himself and Sessions and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology' - though it leaves out what Devall and Sessions assert are the two essential features of DE, biospheric egalitorionism and self-realisation, and though it does not require depth (immediate positions conforming to the platform). Even so Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement have in common ' (letter 23.6.88). Thus the 8-point platform provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the distinguishing platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to an approved minimum of the principles of the distinguished platform (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to that much of the platform. They may not be members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockchin, or Routley, can be an 7 8 See, e.g., B. Devall and G. Sessions, 'The books of deep ecology', Earth First! 4(8) (1984). Several of these books do not penetrate very deep ecologically or otherwise. See especially p.344, with remarks like 'and wherever possible the wildlife they may support on their fringes'. The paragraph portrays a very human-centered (and conquered-land) picture. See also p.342, middle. 7 adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The DE movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the platform, even "more or less". Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or else try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextricably in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who tum out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Also which isolated exceptions does he have in view? With the rise of environmentism, most of the distinguishing platform is no longer demanding; indeed it is deliberately lax with a view to increasing the following. Moreover, none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Plainly adherence to DE, as well as support for DE, could be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A neat strategy, common to ecomonical practice and sociological research, readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague feeling of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that DE would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock). The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' 9 • The reasoning does not hold up. A range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happens. Naess should certainly be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance, 6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of 9 RS p.7. But elsewhere. Naess did go into some detail (e.g. Book). Furthermore, if Naess - old, famous, unorthodox, courageous enough on difficult mountains - doesn't get down to requisite details of structural change, who will? Well, even some rather shallow theorists do. 8 a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by, point 7. 6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology. 6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions. Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principles of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration. Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the lax distinguishing platform itself, which is pretty wishy-washy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clear-cutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of rangelands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. Even deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE creed, though some of the text enjoin it (e.g. DS); but the issue is (no doubt wisely) avoided by leading prophets of DE familiar with the demands of socialism. Yet deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive polluting types of industry that conspicuously contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from all the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, along with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented, terrestrial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as greenhouse effects, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out. The idea of progress is, like that of more industrialisation, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology"). 9 So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select band, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led in the textbook stakes by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey, but recently joined by some Americans Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly far-reaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes immersed in some spread of these problems (though it is still a rather rare professional philosopher that does), and who does not develop some environmental commitments - even if a liberalish social agenda still continues to dominate an environmental one (even so it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interprenetration of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics 10 , tended to become progressively more accommodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental throught, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and has lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the linking of different positions, not their mergence. Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:Example 1. Moral extensionists, both utilitarians and rationalists 11 . Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sentience or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much nonhuman life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured 10 11 Now benchmark of reaction rareness, but itself beginning to exhibit some restlessness and unpass and signs of change. The useful category of moral extensionism derives from Rodman. It is critically examined also in EE. 10 abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, the broad position is really a coherence theory of morality). Example 2. More far-reaching intermediate positions, which do assign intrinsic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some nonindividuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Positions of this sort are delineated (so far in insufficient theoretical detail) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Ralston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extensionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classification of positions). Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in big formulation given above. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by utilitarians, to sentience as unwarranted, unnecessary, unenforceable and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like environmental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Firsters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religio-political quest for a large support base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and the aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which has not gained much ground or good grades academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players, and return to its 11 more radical mission. Academics, after all, form only a tiny minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, on the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults. We have proceeded to cut through the problem of what DE is or may be by formulating a specific version, authentic deep ecology, and by taking explicit account of main alternatives proposed. Authentic deep ecology follows, for the most part, Naess's account of deep ecology. But insistence on authentic deep ecology leaves several casualties, nebulous deep ecologists who prove not to be authentically deep. An important test is offorded through the greater value assumption, and the associated special place reserved for humans in the scheme of things, assent to which serves to expose the inadequate depth of more nebulous 'followers of deep ecology'. For (after proper preparation) they make the wrong responses on the crucial tests of depth. A conspicuous casualty who fails to negotiate 'these tricky slopes' is Drengson, behind whose genuine ecological sensibility lies a human supremacist position with humans occupying 'a unique position ... in the scheme of things', at the summit of that old-consciousness hierarchy, "the great chain of being" .12 According to Drengson, circumstances Might force us, sometimes, to choose between the life of a fish or a cow and that of a human child. We do not hesitate to choose the child. Our priorities are a result of our position in the scheme of things, with a spectrum of species (p.7). Not even followers of medium-depth ecology need respond in this reflex fashion, for instance where the child is seriously defective. Certainly, faced with a range of duly-elaborated imagined circumstances of difficult or forced choice, deeper thinkers would hesitate - since such situations tend to pose moral dilemmas. And sometimes at least their priorities would be different from Drengson's; for example, the fish is rare and the child ordinary, the cow occupies a unique place in an important ecosystem.13 Even Naess himself, who vacillates considerably in what he has to say and occasionally lapses badly from the authentic way. 14 It is worth examining some of Naess's logics, not for nonphilosophical reasons (or even to reveal N aess as a further flaws doyen, typical of the heroes 12 13 14 See The Trumpeter 1(4) (1984), 6-7. Drengson is not the only casualty; Berry, whose criticism Drengson is trying to meet, is another. Differently, the child is Hitler or the President who chooses to press the nuclear button. Such cases, which in some settings permit of a traditional treatment, were considered from a deeper perspective in Routley 2 79. A most striking example is Naess's Rescequence article, 'The basis of deep ecology', which departs considerably from the spirit and themes of DE. Even Naess, who is not significantly hang-up in doctrinal purity and doctrinal divergence, felt obliged to circulate a note correcting, "reformulating", what he had said and written (the article was originally a Sub ...... lecture). 'Some ... may find some of its sentences not quite in forming with what I usually tend to say. Therefore I offer some reformulations ... I still stick to my views recently expressed in various articles and books' (Nute, italics added). 12 of DE), but because these show committing about DE, they are indicative of its doctrical instability, lack of clarity, and scope for improvement. • Any society worthy of the name Green is a deep ecological one. 15 Given that there are a range of ........... societies that are green but not deep green, such a claim must fail. Even if 'deep green' were substituted for 'green' it could not be contained, because DE policies exclude some deep green alternatives. Accordingly, it is false that explication of DE is 'articulation of the fundamental positions that are presupposed in Green societies' (p.4); DE societies are but part of that rich and variety plurality. What does Naess say by way of rectification? Frankly, not nearly enough. He proceeds to assert that in his opinion, a 'society that does not operate in harmony with [the 8-point platform of DE ... is not] worthy of being called Green! But a genuinely Green society may well reject or violate several of the points emanciated, e.g. the wide intrinsic value assumption (of point 1), the obligation to action (of point 8). • 'We should never engage in any discussion on technicalities without asking, "What do we basically need in life?" Always ask the basic question. This is what I mean by the term Deep Ecology Movement' (p.5). Naess does nothing whatever to complenish for presentation of the basic technical question in this (biospherically) chauvinistic way. Do we need a DE which tells us that the bottom line is "What's in it for us?"! Doesn't part of deep environmentalism consist in seeing through and explaining what is wrong with this pernicious bottom line. As regard the 'This is what I mean by ... ' blunder, Naess tries to exonerate himself by use of the well-worn criterion/definition distinction.1 6 But on its own it hardly helps; such bottom line inquiry is not a criterion for DE either. Nor is following inquiry through to ultimate ends a distinctive feature of DE; the shallowest sorts of hedonism, for example, may adopt similar procedures. In fact N aess lands himself in further trouble in trying to extricate himself. To try to make the criterion offer look tempting (a comprehensive test for depth), he claims that 'when supporters of the shallow ecology movement are seriously asked about ultimate ends they tend to affirm the same ones as supporters of the deep movement'. Not only would this be a most unlikely outcome of a satisfactory questionaire; but worse, if it were the outcome, it would render shallow ecology supporters deep; so the criterion would eliminate a fundamental contrast for, and for making out, DE. In any event, too many humans, especially powerholders, remain outside the orbit of 15 16 This follows from what Naess asserts given on that a society that adapts 'policies characteristic of Deep Ecology' is a deep ecological one. There is at least a touch of arrogance (or is it part Naess's disdain for conceptual nicety?) in Naess's introduction of this shabby exoneration attempt: The damaging sentences, - those quoted - 'might be reformulated (in honor of my conceptually interested friends) in the follow way:'. Maybe Naess was serious in his (otherwise ab sure) opening remarks in the R ......... article about looking forward to hobnobbing with the aristocracy. 13 shallow ecology, often attached to the pernicious bottom line (it is doubtful that 'most people dwell in shallow ecology', p.5 heading). • Articulation of DE principles gives a total view. (An amazing contrast with the ....... . juxtaposed doctrine of ignorance which suggest we can never obtain a total view.) By contrast with 'shallow ecology which (avoids) the basic questions ... the Deep Ecology Movement concerns itself with basic beliefs and assumptions about the universe. If you articulate the principles of the Deep Ecology Movement you get a total view . The term "total view" is essential. The Deep Ecology Movement is a total view. It covers our basic assumptions, our life philosophy and our decisions in everyday life' (Res ,p.6.italics added). In first place, the alleged contrast with shallow ecology do not stand up to much examination. A dedicated shallow Christian or capitalist may practice the same depth of questioning and reflection or a deep ecologist, or rather more; such a person may have a well-integrated lifestyle, with a fairly comprehensive philosophy (as these thing go) covering it. Secondly, N aess takes what seems to be asserted back in commentary. 'If we articulate the principles of the deep ecology movement, -- you do not get a total view' (p.3); but that apparently directly contradicts the above italicized passage. There is an escape from contradiction offered - distinguish the principles, by filling in the dashes by "in the sense of principles of the DE platform" - but it leads a severe problem - what are the principles of DE? What is DE? Naess's commentary implies that the principles of DE required for a total view are those of all levels of the double pyramid. Such an idea lands the articulation of DE in hopeless difficulties. Firstly, we do not, and cannot, know what the principles are, because they now include principles applied and decisions taken at the bottom level which refers to particular situations, including 'particular direct actions at a particular date'; but these will vary, in ......... ways, over-future times. Secondly, since there are various different, and compating, principles at the top level, DE will either be damagingly inconsistently characterised, or else it will be far from uniquely characterised. For DE will include Christianity of this and that sect, Buddinism of this and that form, and so on. In fact Naess accepts such an outcome (but in his misdirect attempt to avoid dogmatism): 'There is not one, definite, deep ecology philosophy, not one definite "ecosophy", no definite set of green policies' (p.3) and, he should have added on this line of thinking no definite deep ecology or set of DE principles. But there is a set of central principles, those at level 2. They do not present a total view. But nor in general do those of all four levels of deep ecology. There is much, a mass of opinion (for instance, concerning scientific speculation) which would form part of a more comprehensive (world) view that is not reflected at any of the four levels. It is indeed entirely unclear what would present a total view? Spiniza's philosophy perhaps? But it is easy to ...... of topics it does not cover, such as city architecture and factory farming, on which a total view could have an angle. It is certainly doubtful that lesser mentals than Spinaza, such as typical supporters of DE, 14 operate in a total view. N aess claims that they do, but adduces no evidence; testing is much more likely to reveal how pragmentory the ecological view of most deep ecologists are. Not only is the noton of a "total view", drawn from Naess's earlier philosophizing muddy; the desirability of the notion is open to (damaging) questioning. "Total view" comprehends too much, fixes too much that perhaps should be left open; it sails too close to "totaliterian view" for real pluralistic comfort. There is, then, quite evidently, a serious problem with deep ecology, and in finding out exactly what it is, that even the clearer accounts offered differ in significant subjects face similar difficulties, philosophy for one. With movements, which is what deep ecology is often presented as, the situation is normally much worse. Consider the difficulties in saying, with much precision, what some political movement (such as green politics) represents, what some party stands for and against. And despite the accelerating diversity of accounts there appears to be substance to the deep ecology notion. Several important interconnected distinctions, which look to be worth disentangling, are marked out, and an important group of ideas is assembled. Rather than being simply junked (something my conservative inclinations rise against with notions, as with the premature discarding of material "goods"), the notions involved should at least be disentangled and, if feasible, renovated or recycled. More generally, it is not merely valuabe, but quite essential in senous intellectul assignments, to indicate what deep ecology is and isn't - for lots of purposes, including explaining it, arguing from it, and applying it. What can be done? One resolution can be obtained along the lines of critical rationalism. The fuller formulations of deep ecology, after reorganisation into more tractable form, are subject to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more satisfactory, thinner and fitter formulation, which at the same time meets other desirable criteria. Among these is a desideratum often lost sight of in the ferment of environmental action, the need for environmental pluralism. A start on this rather analytic approach involves separating out the different components of the deep ecology messages, and isolating core themes of deep and shallow ecology from wider positions and paradigms which they inform. The core is (as Naess indicated) essentially normative. Fortunately the core themes have already been isolated, in a previous application of deep ecology to population theory 17 , and this work can be taken over largely intact. For the extensive remainder, the following pretty complicated sort of picture starts to emerge (upon organising themes and claims of several supporters of deep ecology, in a way explained in the Appendix to this chapter):- 17 In Routley 84. Figure 5.1. SHALLOWER AND DEEPER POSITIONS, AND THEIR ACCLAIMED ASSUMPTIONS, PARTLY SCHEMATIZED. SHALLOW VALUE CORE ENVIRONMENT AL SUBJECT SOLE (INTRINSIC) K,' ALUE ASSUMPTION VALUES-IN-NATURE GREATER VALUE ASSUMPTION BIOSPECIES IMPARTIALITY FURTHER PHILOSOPHICAL BASES GROUNDOF VALUE DEEP (separable theoretical underpinning) FEATURES OF HUMANS DIVERSITY, RICHNESS OF NATURAL(LIFE)FORMS ii. METAPHYSICAL INDIVIDUAL REDUCTION. NATURE AS BACKDROP IRREDUCIBLE SYSTEMS. NATUREAS IN1EGRAL m EPISTEMIC REDUCTIONIST/ANALYTIC SUBJECT-OBJECT ACCOUNT HOLISTIC/GESTALT /FIELD ACCOUNT LARGER ENCOMPASSING AND INFORMING THEORY EMPIRICISM,IDEALISM, ECOSOPHY, PANTHEISM, POSITIVISM AMERICAN NATURALISM +- DIFFERENT FACETS ➔ OF CHRISTIANITY, BUDDHISM, ... VALUE (DEONTIC AND ACTION) COLLARIES EXTENSIVE INTERFERENCE FOR HUMAN INTERESTS AND PURPOSES 1. ACTION (META-) PRINCIPLE APPLICATIONS (AS COROLLARIES) LIMITED INTERFERENCE AND RIGHTS THEREfO ETHICS ASETHETICS METAPHYSICS EPISTEMOLOGY IDEOLOGY/ RELIGION LIFESTYLE +-OBLIGATION TO IMPLEMENT COMMITMENTS➔ To population, (individual) consumption, (individual) impact, resources, technology, pollution, economic growth and quality-of-life, culture, organisation, science, education; and to the variety of natural (and some artifical) forms, such as land, oceans, atmosphere, arctic regions, swamps, forests, soils, ... POLICY ECONOMICS POLITICS Given the picture some major and serious sets of problems with deep ecology begin to appear at once. First, the value core arrived at already substantially transforms that suggested by the literature, with, for instance, biospecies impartiality improving on biospheric egalitarianism. Secondly, both the bases and the encompassing theories usually indicated (those diagrammed) are not just highly problematic but are detachable from the core and can be avoided. For example, the various, rather different, epistemic and metaphysical theories that have been proposed as 16 supporting, or even essential to, deeper positions are, to say the least, very dubious. So it is fortunate that the deeper value core is independent of them all - though that is not to say that it is independent of every account, since some (plausible) story of value qualities in the natural world, and our perception and knowledge of them, has to be told, sooner or later. But one weaker parts of the larger deep ecological story as usually told concerns the embedding of deep ecology in a broader philosophical theory, such as Naess's system ecosophy T, or Buddhism, or nature mysticism, or whatever. This much is true: as it is with shallow positions, which can be supported by most of the mainstream, more comprehensive, philosophical theories (for what they are worth), so it is with deeper positions, which can be supported by very different, though unorthodox, philosophical theories, for instance, by (a modification of) Whitehead's process theory or by (an adaption of) Meinong's object theory. But, for reasons we shall come to, such theoretical frameworks as ecosophy, pantheism, Christianity and Buddhism do not include thorough-going deep positions, but sustain only shallower positions, and a properly deep picture is not derivable from them. This suggests that the proposed derivation of deep ecology from ecosophy is substantially astray (and that so, more sweepingly, is the whole derivational pyramid regularly presented by Naess in his four-level picture). So it will prove to be: the success of these derivations would depend upon importing analogues of shallowness into deep ecology. APPENDIX 1. Survey methods as a way of pinning down deep ecology. How does the sort of picture shown in figure 5.1 - which is worth persevering with, elaborating and applying - fit in with the burgeoning deep ecological literature? It is surely not just tangential to that, so that we should look elsewhere to grasp the deeper features of deep ecology? In fact the core themes, and philosophical basis, and extension themes, were assembled in a quite impressionistic fashion, namely working through much of the literature, and all the more basic work, and setting down the themes which on reflection seemed to be presented or emerge. Something like this is still a main method of research in the humanities, e.g. in history, history of ideas, and philosophy. Figure 7a Schematic picture of elementary procedures Source 1 T H Source 2 Source n i INTERSECTION (COMMON CORE) E M E s UNION t DISCOUNTED But here, with deep ecology, there were prospects of doing better than such impressionistic methods, or so one might have thought. Empirical, or at least quasi-empirical, methods (of the sort favoured by Naess in his earlier days) could be employed. The main idea is that the set of relevant sources is assembled, and then some statistical and set-theoretic work is done on the themes extracted from these sources; so the method is an elaboration of the sort of technique larger dictionaries such as the Oxford adopt in pinning down the standard senses of a term. The hope was that analysis of the serious philosophical literature (pretty rough selection criteria these, to be sure) on deep ecology would lead, not to despair, but in particular in two directions:Firstly, to what is more or less common to the positions presented - the intersection of theories, giving the substantial core or basic theory. And secondly, to what results when all the theories are put together - the union of themes, giving an approximation, after some sifting, to a deep ecological paradigm. As you might have anticipated by now, this thematic method hardly worked to perfection. Still it is worth explaining the method in a little more detail since, despite its limited success, it 18 reveals much. First a set of sources is assembled. Here there is scope for sampling and statistical methods, so beloved of social scientists; but in the case of deep ecology it seemed feasible, back in 1984, to gather for winnowing all more serious texts accessible in Australia. That latter limitation (all too familiar in environmental research) imposes a perhaps unfortunate parochial geographical constraint; but it induces no violation of such adequacy requirements as that sources introducing the notion be included in the bundle, as are all sources referred back to in several other sources. With the rise of networking magazines concerned with deep ecology, there are many references to deep ecological thinking and experience which get discounted, as not appropriately serious. Increasingly often, any sort of deeper experience or thought gets assigned under the "deep" heading, no matter how anthropocentric. This is one of the many problems with the depth notion and deep terminology, rather counteracting the valuable idea of penetrating below the conventional surface of received environmental assumptions, that it is important to think deeper than the assumption of Environment Z-land, for instance, that the environment should be managed for present and future generations of humans - a typical governmental surface assumption, often announced, but much less often put into practice. Once the sources are assembled, a beginning can be made on unscrambling themes, something that calls for a good deal of judgement also, especially in such matters as deciding whether themes from different sources come to the same or not. Here and elsewhere care is required not to penetrate too deeply, to expose only so much of surface themes as is necessary (a well-known principle in logical analysis). When the themes are duly marked out, there is some smoothing of the thematic data; for instance, evidently remote and irrelevant themes in one source may be deleted. (It is like the judging of a diving contest or the massaging of statistics, where isolated wild elements are removed from the sample used for assessment.) Then the elementary set operations of union and intersection are applied, again subject to some qualification. In particular, if a very prominent theme in some formulations is omitted from, or only approximated in, one formulation, then that theme will be put, initially at least, in the intersection. (Logicians and mathematicians, for example, sometimes omit intended or assumed axioms; e.g. Parry in analytic implication, Maclean in category theory.) A striking example concerns the very introduction of the notion of deep ecology into the philosophical literature (Naess 73), which fails to present the fundamental value thesis, that intrinsic value is not confined solely to humans or human features. While it can be argued that rejection of the sole and greater value assumptions is implied by what is said concerning biospheric egalitarianism (the equal right to live and blossom), the argument is not decisive, since value is only involved indirectly and perhaps only instrumentally (as Naess's appeal to effects on the 'life quality of humans' and to our ecological dependence might suggest). 19 The results are tabulated, as follows: Figure 7b. Actual results, in not form, of a survey of some main sources. Naess 73 Naess 83 Naess-Sessions 84 Intrinsic value Intrinsic value of life (1) (1) Biological egalitarianism (2) Diversity/richness(3) Complexity not complication (6) Diversity/ richness (2) Diversity/ richness ( 1) Total field holism (1) No negative interference rights, excepting vital needs (3) No negative interference, etc. (3) Devall 79 ROUGH CLASSIFICATIONS VALUE CORE Diversity (10 GROUNDSAND BASES New person/planet metaphysics (1) Objective approach to nature 2 Earth wisdom, VALUEAND limited interference ACTION COROLLARIES More leisure (13) Action obligation 6 Present interference excessive (4) Policy adjustments to economic and ideological structures (5) Anti-pollution/ resource depletion (5) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (7) Anti-class posture 4 Action obligation 8 Present human interference excessive (5) Policy adjustments, etc. [Also to technological structures (6) Objective life quality rather than higher living standard (7) World population reduction (4) POLICY AND LIFESTYLE APPLICATIONS Interim policy steady state (15),(18) Soft Technology ( 11) Life quality rather than quantity of products (6) Reduction of population to optimum (7) Emphasis on pollution and like topics counterproductive (8) Local autonomy/ decentralisation (11),(14) New psychology (3) DISCOUNTED AREAS: with rejection of NEW SUBJECTS dualisms: man/nature, subject/object, etc New philosophical anthropology (9) New objective 20 Embedding in ecosophy NOTES: science (4) New education (12) ? Embedding in updated Spinoza (2) EMBEDDJNG PHrr,OSOPHY/RELIGION 1. Bracketed numerals indicate theses numbers in the sources. 2. The disappointing absence of core themes can to some extent be compensated for by appeal to statements of them or implying them elsewhere in accompanying texts and commentaries. 3. Naess-Sessions 84, also Naess 84, became the 8-point platform, now widely reintensted. Naturally one does not attempt this sort of analysis entirely in the dark, but in the partial expectation that certain kinds of results will emerge, these three especially: • The substantial core represents a significant deviation from mainstream assumptions, a deviation which has been encountered before. • The total theory, or union, is not simply a jumble of theses, but has some reasonable coherence. • There are ways of getting from the substantial core toward the total theory. In the case of deep ecology it would have been pleasant to report triumphantly that these expectations, and more, are fulfilled; indeed the theory is so well integrated it represents a (sub)cultural paradigm. Unfortunately it did not work out that way, as is evident. What is more, the situation has become markedly worse, as presentations of deep ecology have burgeoned since 1984. Partly the thematic enterprise did not succeed because of the poor calibre of the leading presentations of "the" deep ecology intuition, and because exponents had and have different intuitions, messages and objectives. Partly, however it did not work because the idea of obtaining a substantial core and a coherent union was misconceived. Taking the union, in particular, assumed that there was much wider common ground - something that could be called the deeper ecological paradigm which could be approached in this sort of way - rather than as a plurality of positions. Pluralism is fine and feasible, and worth encouraging much more widely; but taking the union of themes of some pluralistic system of positions is likely to lead only to intractable inconsistent sets, and perhaps to trouble. Consider, to illustrate, the United Religion, about to sweep California, a pluralist grouping made up of representations of the World's great religions. While the refined common core of these positions is likely to be interesting, the union is not: it will contain, for example, all of the following inconsistent triad: Many gods exist (from e.g. Hinduism); Exactly one god exists (e.g. Islam); no gods exist (from e.g. Buddhism). There is analogous trouble in combining deep ecological sources with such results as that stones and mountains both do and do not have inherent value; there both are and are not detachable intrinsic values; and so on. The picture is then as shown:- 21 putative substantial core inconsistent elements of putative union What all this emphicizes once again is that deep ecology has to be treated differently, not as a coherent position but as a loose pluralistic grouping of position. To obtain a clearer authentic starting position, we shall have to discount since of what paradox as deep ecology. It is for this sort of reason of course that we chose to follow Naess before other prophets. Once an authentic position has been made out other prositions can be clustered around it. Such a pluralistic outcome does not show that the notion of a deeper ecological paradigm is illusory. It only reveals some of the pluralistic features, mostly not duly recognised at the deeper ends of ecological movements. And it only indicates that a different route should be taken in getting to a deeper paradigm. For the alternative environmental, and deep ecological, paradigm covers a spread of positions, much as the contrasting dominant social paradigm does. A CRITIQUE OF (WILD) WESTERN DEEP ECOLOGY: a response to Warwick Fox's Response to an earlier Critique. Western deep ecology differs in important respects from the deep ecology originated and pursued by Naess, what I now call authentic deep ecology, at which my Critique of Deep Ecology was mainly, but by no means entirely, directed. Western deep ecology, also known as transpersonal ecology (though the ecology has largely dropped out), is very roughly a doctrine of the west of those new world continents where environmental philosophy functions; it has been advanced primarily by West Coast Americans (Devall, Drengson, Sessions and others) and associated West Australians (Fox, now of Tasmania, also Hallem and others). Unlike authentic deep ecology, Western deep ecology is hostile to environmental ethics, which it tends to dismiss as mere axiology; and it is excessively enthusiastic about trans personal experience, spiritual "paths" and "ways", and unitarian metaphysics - in which there are no ontological divides, no dualisms (of subject/object, subjective/objective), and no separation of things. Consider what Drengson 'take[s] to be at the heart of deep ecology as Devall and Sessions present it', and which he enthusiastically endorses: What deep ecology directs us towards ... is neither an environmental axiology or a theory of environmental ethics nor a minor reform of existing practices. It directs us to develop our own sense of self until it becomes Self, that is, until we realise through deepening ecological sensibilities that each of us forms a union with the natural world, and that protection of the natural world is the protection of ourselves .... reality lies not in the imaginative, subjective dualism of the dominant outlook, with its self-destructive exploitation of nature and overkill nuclear weapons. Reality is to be found in a quite different way: by a path that is nonaggressive, humble, compassionate, and knows itself as ultimately embedded in the Self of nature. The sacred is immanent in the profane, the spirit pervades and is the world, the cosmos. It is the formed and formless as a unity. This ecosophy is at hand for each of us [ecosophical salvation]. Its realisation is always personal, firsthand experiential understanding. It is an I-Thou, not an I-it relationship (Review pp.87-8). Fox's Response to my Critique develops similar themes, in considerably more detail, so they become rather more open to assessment. That is why my further critique will concentrate on his Responses. (On its own, I doubt that his Response would have sufficient intrinsic interest to warrant an extensive reply.) In Western deep ecology, the focus is upon, or even (as in Fox 89) contracts to, that of self and Self (or what it might almost as well be, soul and Soul/Anima sive Natura, or spirit and World Spirit). For example, Drengson pontificates upon • 38 the crux of the issues raised by deep ecology [as follows]. We are challenged to move to genuinely ecological modes of perception, conception, and practice. If we do this, we will do it to the degree that we realise that our self is part of a larger Self for which we must care. This is part of the ecology of self-Self in the cosmology of deep ecology' (p.89). Fox goes further, making this type of stuff coextensive with "deep ecology": Stated rather formally ... the deep ecological framework ... proceed[s] from two basic hypotheses and one ultimate norm [all concerning self and Self]. The hypotheses are (i) that "the self is as comprehensive as the totality of our identifications. Or, more succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify" ... ; and (ii) that the self can and does grow/develop/mature (i.e. widen its sphere and intensity of identification over time). The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the widest (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self.... this ideal state of being is referred to as "Selfrealisation" by N aess and as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions" and its cultivation - effective a spiritual discipline - is considered to be the "real work" of deep ecology (pp. 86-7). This self-Self cultivation of Western deep ecology, which will be severely criticised, is far removed from the deep ecology platform upon which authentic deep ecology is centred, a mundane, secular platform concerned with real environmental issues, which is not a predominantly human psychological exercise and which does not mention 'self' or 'Self'. On the strength of the variant presentation of "deep ecology", of this elaboration of Western deep ecology, Fox feels entitled to assert that 'Sylvan has seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about. ... Sylvan's criticisms miss their mark ... Sylvan's critique leaves deep ecology ... largely untouched' (p.5). Drengson feels entitled to enlarge this unfounded assertion: 'the critiques of deep ecology that have appeared so far have been based on misconceptions of what deep ecology is all about, and they have therefore been off the mark, or at best superficial' (p.89). The critiques that are substantial, not substantially tirades or shallow, have been substantially directed at authentic deep ecology, not at its different Western analogue. There has been no misconception or misunderstanding by such critics; they have aimed at a different target in the same broad field. On a personal level, I am quite attracted by authentic deep ecology; but I am substantially repelled by Western deep ecology. I subscribe, more or less, to the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and accordingly should be accounted a supporter of deep ecology (for all that critics are not very welcome). Though I do not care for some features of Naess's system Ecosophy T, which does provide a rickety bridge ·to Western deep ecology, N aess has always insisted that this was but one of several optional background ideological frameworks. Western deep ecology is another matter. Too much of it strikes me as like an evangelic cult, much too incidentally coupled to deep environmentalism; too much is a 39 celebration of self, human self, an expanded egoism; too much is essentially a good oldfashioned celebration of things human, a comparatively shallow celebration disguised in new environmental and avant-gard attire. Drengson has the ability to lay on these obnoxious, chauvinistic features disagreeably thick. Consider a bit of his poetic outpouring on that jumbled text, Deep Ecology: Sessions and Devall see humans as beings who are an expression of a nature deeper, more mysterious, and creative than any of our abstract theories appreciate .... it is hoped that [our] experiential encounter with the otherness of Nature transformed as Self will help us to live in such a harmonious way as to continually discover ever new wonders and value inherent in wild nature and in the natural human self. ... The book, thus is dedicated to ... presenting a philosophy of life that resolves some of our most fundamental questions, the central one of this is: how can we live truly in authentic, harmonious relationships with all beings so as to realise a maximum of intrinsic goodness? This is a question, ultimately, of what it means to become a complete, mature, fully Selfrealised human being (pp.94-5 rearranged). The statement could almost have come straight out of modem romanticism; all the same elements are there down to the maximization of human self-realisation. So presented, the new environmental paradigm of Western deep ecology is the old anti-Enlightenment movement in contemporary gear. Though I am substantially turned off by some of Western deep ecology, though I am disappointed by its apparent shallowness, by its reversion to human chauvinism, though I try to take cover when its heavy evangelism blows through, I am far from suggesting that more than critical intellectual action be taken against it. It is, after all, generally for the right sorts of things environmentally, even if it has invested too heavily in dominant notions, such as the exalted human self that a radical environmentalism should be escaping; and it is no worse intellectually than predominant creeds that are far less kind to natural environments, such as Vatican christianity and American pragmatism. Live and let live. 1. Approaching deep ecology and understanding plurallism. Well is Fox's response to Sylvan's critique of deep ecology entitled 'Approaching Deep Ecology'; for it does no more than approach deep ecology, it does not reach the authentic article. Instead Fox converts deep ecology into a related concoction, largely of his own (now called transpersonal ecology*). Having thus commandeered deep ecology for * Transpersonal ecology is an extreme variant of Western deep ecology, which tries, for instance, to jettison what Drengson and others retain: intrinsic goodness, intrinsic value, and the like. 40 his own purposes, it is easy for Fox to feel confident in his charge that 'Sylvan has seriously understood what deep ecology is about' (p.5). Fox's main accusation is indeed that I have seriously misunderstood what deep ecology is about, that my criticism is misdirected, and that deep ecology emerges largely unscathed. We shall see about that. But first, I want to lodge a counter-charge: Fox appears to have misunderstood a good deal of what I was about. My critique was not concerned with his position, except - in so far as it purported to be deep ecology - in passing; it was addressed to the mainstream of deep ecology. Fox's own transpersonal ecology does not belong to the mainstream of deep ecology; indeed it is doubtful that it is deep ecology at all. It tries to throw away central parts of deep ecology, the value theory in particular, and to revert to what appears, to all intents and purposes, to be a rather shallow position. But, most remarkable, it has very little to do with the natural environment; much of it is but expanded self adulation. Both Fox and N aess, in their responses to my critique, try to make some easy initial capital by pointing to the different ending of a working draft of the critique from the pluralist ending of the published version. 1 Naess uses the different endings to ground his allegation that Sylvan is uncertain what he is about, an ad hominem strategy which he presumably hopes will help to defuse substantial criticisms of deep ecology which he does not address (see his 84 and 85). Fox makes much of the different endings (almost 5 pages worth) in order to reveal an uncharitable interpretation: that already indicated, of misunderstanding, and that my 'critique leaves deep ecology .... largely untouched' (p.5). Naess and Fox seem to think that it counts against a critique that it may enjoy more than one ending, that it can leave room for doubt as to whether something should be restored or abandoned. Yet these are very much the sort of outcome a more tolerant and careful assessment may yield. Consider an old building seriously defective in main structural detail, yet with many worthwhile period features. It may be a hard question, over which there is room for uncertainty, whether it should be restored or demolished. So it is often with intellectual systems, such as deep ecology and ecosophy. By and large I am in favour of rehabilitation (see e.g. Routley 74), though from a favoured nonpluralistic 1 Though I feel a bit used, I'm not going to make anything of incomplete working drafts I naively handed out not being a fair target for commentary (it is obvious that one can be even more stupid and so forth in drafts than in more considered final versions). Much of the interesting work in and around deep ecology appears only in working draft form or in what academic snobs describe as semi-published form. 41 stance such systems as ecosophy include material destined for the intellectual scrap heap. But, in any event, I am in favour of recycling of rubbish wherever this is feasible. For anyone who adheres to a select position within an also conceded pluralistic setting, there is always more than one presentation, and more than one ending: a monistic, or singular, ending deriving from the select position, and a pluralistic ending from the setting. There is nothing particularly remarkable about this, for all that it baffles Fox. On the singular ending (of the limited edition "penultimate version" of my critique) many major themes of deep ecology go down, not because they are ' insubstantial or vacuous' (what Fox finds it convenient to infer p.2ff.), but because they are all defective, all substantially astray. So much had already been argued in the main body of the work; for instance, one sustained development aimed to demonstrate the substantial falsity of the principle of biospheric egalitarianism and its inconsistency with other principles of deep ecology. What of the last words, drawn from Eliot's Four Quartets, 'there is no one to bury'? By this, I meant: no correct doctrine, not: nothing substantial. It is true that from the singular position I did look upon several main 'ideas of deep ecology ... not even as if they were once useful ... but rather that upon closer scrutiny there is ... nothing ... [correct in] them in the first place' (p.3); from that stance I still look upon them in that way. On the final pluralistic ending what remains 2 are not the trumpeted major themes, which still go down, but a good many of the less heralded points and themes, such as departure principles in the 8-point platform of deep ecology. What can be added, furthermore, are significant variations upon some of the major themes; for instance ecospheric impartiality in place of biospheric egalitarianism. Now both Naess and Fox assume that a pluralistic ending diminishes, or ought to weaken, the force of the criticism. Not so. Naess ends his response to the critique with a relativistic complaint: 'if you have your own philosophy from which you generate the [core] position of deep ecology, ... why object to ecosophy T?' (Naess pp.3-4 reordered, also quoted in Fox). The short answer is because system T is seriously intellectually flawed. A pluralist may let such material stand, but, unlike a relativist, doesn't have to let it alone; its weaknesses can be exposed, its inferiority exhibited. Fox goes on to claim that under pluralism, which he also confuses with relativism, my 'critique loses much of its original sting and no longer constitutes the challenge to deep ecology that was formerly intended' (p.5). Again, not so; the challenge and sting remain as before. But now deep ecology is regarded more benignly; and more future work will be directed at restoration, etc. As you might now anticipate, Fox finds 'a 2 Fox's surprise about this (p.3) can be attributed to his failure to appreciate the force of 'acclaimed major themes' in the theories to be put to rest. 42 strong tension between such a pluralistic position' and the singular position which he regards as 'essentially argumentative' (p.5). But there is no tension; the singular position slots neatly into the pluralistic array. Further, both are argumentative, though neither essentially so. 3 2. Value in deep ecology Fox's 'most fundamental objection to [my] critique' is that it offers, is based upon, an 'environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology' (p.29, p.53). Given what Fox intends by 'environmental axiological interpretation' (his never properly explained terminology, not mine), which involves axiological reductionism and a certain axiological priority and hegemony throughout environmental philosophy (p.52) 4 , I deny this. My critique neither offers nor is based upon such an interpretation; and, as inspection will confirm, my other work will not bear such an interpretation 5 , I do not 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology'. What I do ascribe to deep ecology is "a value core", features of which I explain in some detail (and to which we shall have to return). But a large transformer (or similar item) does not reduce to its cores, there is much to such an item besides the core; nor do the cores pervade, dominate or guide all the rest. The core, which was introduced primarily as part of an organising structure, does not support what Fox tries to read out of it, namely an axiological reduction (back in 84, Naess thought 'core' was a 'good expression' for a quite proper part of deep ecology). In fact, I am not hooked on the term 'core'; substitution of 'value part' for 'value core' would make very little difference to the substance of my critique of deep ecology, but it would quite adversely effect Fox's response. An early example of the feebleness of Fox's reconstruction is his attempt to make my treatment of deep ecological theory outside the value core look as if it too was part of an axiological interpretation. He proceeds to argue from a title of a later section, 'Beyond the value core: metaphysical and epistemological "intuitions" of deep ecology', thus: 'as this title suggests, it is Sylvan's environmental axiological interpretation of deep ecology that underpins his criticisms there (as elsewhere)' (p.29). The title was not intended to suggest, and would not normally suggest, such an interpretation; it indicated a separation of parts and 3 For much more detail on all these pluralistic matters, see my Deep Plurallism. 4 For fuller illustration of such undesirable phenomena at work in philosophy, see Edwards, Ethics without Philosophy. 5 For one example, see the jointly authored The Fight for the Forests. 43 the upcoming contents. As an argument (to be slack with this term), Fox's move is a nonsequitur. 6 Now to get down to the real adjudicational business (of this section), I claim to have been verballed by Fox.7 While I am becoming pretty accustomed to serious misrepresentation, I see Fox as ascending to new heights in this regard. For he proceeds to attribute to me major derivative theses which I nowhere presented, which do not derive from what I did present, and to which I should not, in any case, accede. Let's look straight away at some of what Fox proceeds to foist upon me. 'Sylvan assumes from the outset and proceeds upon the basis that deep ecology is ... primarily a value-in-nature position' (p.30), that is the 'primary claim' (p.31). I do not assume that deep ecology is primarily that, but that it is that among other things; 8 I do not proceed on that basis, and I never did suppose that deep ecology was primarily or only a values-in-nature position. As I say, in a clause Fox left out in the selective quotation of his indictment, deep ecology 'has been presented as a metaphysics, as a consciousness movement (and a primarily psychological), and even as a sort of (Pantheist) religion' (and in an accompanying note I mention Fox's alternative ontological focus). I am not committed to such a primacy claim (what Fox refers to as 6 As the text reveals, Fox is rather fond of making passages suggest not what they were intended to suggest or prima facie do suggest, but what he would have them "suggest" conveniently for his own unscrupulous purposes (we might even label this the suggestive fallacy). He is not averse either to considerable distortion. For example (also on p.29) he makes it look, by a clever use of sectional divisions, as if the bulk of my critique was concerned with the value part of deep ecology, when in fact I get beyond that part on p.26 in a critique of 60 pages. Of course it would not show that much even if I had devoted virtually the whole critique to the value part rather than less than a third; it could just mean that that was the part of deep ecology that interested me most, or that I ran out of energy and patience thereabouts, etc. In the present critique I ran out of these commodities and time before I had finalized a section on fallacious methodological practices in deep ecology, perhaps to be called 'fallacies of transpersonal ecology'. Next edition, perhaps. 7 Verbal is an Australian verb, alluding to fabricated evidence made up by police or official prosecutioners. Verballing was a common practice in Queensland, and is certainly used by police gangs in some other states. 8 I do begin the first "problem" section of the critique 'Deep ecology appears to be some elaboration of the position that natural things other than humans have value in themselves .. .' (Cp.1 ). But that says nothing more offensive than what can be inferred from point 1 of the 8-point platform of deep ecology, and nothing about primacy. Moreover I go on to say that the elaboration is extensive (e.g. Cp.4), a claim well illustrated by Figure 1 (Cp.5), where the "value core" comprises but a small part of the deep position. 44 'Sylvan's primary claim', p.31, p.33, p.34, p.47, p.48, p.57, p.70 and many other pages, sometimes obliquely as 'Sylvan's claims' and the like, e.g. 'Sylvan says', p.86). 'Moreover', Fox continues (p.30), 'for Sylvan, it is an objective position since its "core theme" of "values-in-nature suggests ... that natural items have value qualities independently of perceivers"'. Firstly there is a misquotation; I refer to 'core themes', which furthermore extend beyond the value part. 9 Secondly, no objectivist claim is made or follows for Sylvan. 10 On the basis of the primacy claim, in conjunction with the objectivist claim (in the case of D2 at least), Fox proceeds to foist upon me 'two derivative claims': Dl. 'deep ecology does not proceed from a general vision of reality or "underlying perception of the way things are" ' 11 , and D2. 'deep ecology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world' (p.31, Fox's italics). Firstly, I do not present such claims; indeed I present a substantial amount of material incompatible with such claims, for instance in the discussion of the theme of extreme holism as regards D 1, and of cosmic identity as regards D2. Secondly, I did not and do not adhere to such claims; indeed I have put a good deal of effort into exposing the metaphysical and epistemological parts of deep ecology. Thirdly, as should be thus evident, they do not derive from what I did present in the critique. Fourthly, in particular, they do not derive from the primacy and objectivist claims. Indeed readily available counter-models will show as much. Consider a values-in-nature objectivist position such as that of Holmes Rolston, which we can conveniently call 'R(olston)'s deep ecology' (there is not even any cheating here, as Ralston's position has a better claim to be accounted deep ecology than some of the positions admitted to the club). Now simply substitute 'R's deep ecology' for 'deep ecology' throughout the "derivation" of the claims. The premiss or grounds hold, as R's deep ecology satisfies both primacy and objectivist claims; but the claims supposed to be derived do not hold, both RD 1 and RD2 fail. For example, Ralston's deep ecology is very 9 It seems to be on the basis of efforts like this misquotation that Fox feels himself justified in writing of 'Sylvan's "core claim" that deep ecology is primarily a valuesin-nature position ' (p.34). That is remote from what I do. For example, I am in trouble for dismissing a sizeable chunk of core deep ecology as rubbish; but a valuesin-nature position is not rubbish. 10 The point was explained in considerable detail in EE p.154ff, where the ugly term nonjective was deliberately introduced to remove illusions as to objectivity or subjectivity. 11 The context makes it look as if the internal quotation is drawn from me, but it is not as perusal of fn.44 will show. DI gains no support from anything I assert. 45 much concerned with the way we experience the world, as a reading of Rolston quickly discloses. Or if a clearer deep example than Rolston is demanded, there is N aess himself. Finally, unsurprisingly now, Fox has made elementary mistakes in his alleged derivations. Consider D2 first. 'This follows', Fox says, 'since value-in-nature are held to exist "out there" independently of perceivers' (p.31). But again it just does not follow, as a topic can be deeply concerned with something that enjoys some independence. You might almost as well try to say that epistemology is not at all concerned with the way in which we experience the world since primary properties are "out there" independent of perceivers. Consider next D1, where there is considerably more distortion to be exposed. Fox's "derivation" really consists of two separable parts. In the first part, Fox's thoroughly fallacious strategy is to replace 'concerned with' by 'only concerned with' and 'because' by 'simply because', as textual comparisons, of my text with what Fox draws from it, make plain. His strategy certainly makes for terrific derivations. For example, from "the Prime Minister is concerned with his sex life" we obtain the startling result that the Prime Minister is only concerned with his sex life. From the premiss that a man likes his wife because of her body we obtain without any further ado the familiar worry that he likes her simply because of her body. 'Beyond this', in a second part, there is an argument based on independence (apparently involving some misunderstanding of the notion). The argument appears to be of the form: A is independent of B, therefore A does not proceed from B. The defectiveness of such an argument is obvious enough once its form is exposed. And the defectiveness of the case in hand should have been evident to Fox. For Naess has explained many times how a person can be a deep ecologist (e.g. can adhere to the platform) without adopting (or even being aware of) the general metaphysical vision from which it proceeds. The felling of Fox's derivations brings down, like trees felled in a rainforest, a good part of the rest of the structure. For instance, there cease to be the problems Fox supposes he has found (p.32 ff.), such as difficulties of consistency in accounting for the metaphysical 'sources that supporters of deep ecology draws upon' (p.33). With that small exercise in logic, the remainder of Fox's "response" to my critique (pages 31-89 of text and miles of footnotes) is disposed of in main essentials. For pages 53-84 constitute a largely separate essay on wider identification, an essay which only bears obliquely on my critique; and most of the rest turns upon lumbering me with the claims just off loaded, the claims which 'constitute [my] very poor understanding of deep ecology' (p.31). Thus, for example, Fox expends a good deal of space upon citing authorities from deep ecology (who too often supply extremely dubious statements) directed at contradicting D 1 and D2. Obviously that is beside the point. But while my main work on Fox's dismal response is done, and I could stop here, I don't intend to, as there is a lot more heavily 46 polluting rubbish to be despatched, or recycled. One's rubbish may be another's input (therein for Moore lay the whole challenge of philosophy). 3 The extent of values-in-nature. Even a casual reader of Fox's Response will have observed the following: that Fox is very quick off the mark with (largely unsubstantiated) accusations like 'so and so has failed to grasp', 'has misunderstood', 'has ignored', 'has missed the point'; that the evidence for these ad hominem claims is often quite insubstantial; and that that 'so and so' often happens to be Sylvan. One of the many things Sylvan allegedly 'fails to grasp' is 'that (a position) deep ecology can be normative (i.e. offer prescriptive proposals) without that necessarily meaning that it is prescriptive [of this or that,] of a values-in-nature position'. Well, I thought I had a reasonable grasp upon, and had made use in print of, the distinction between prescription and evaluation (likewise deontology and axiology), and had in the critique sufficiently emphasized that shallow positions were normative but decidedly not prescriptive of values-in-nature. So what evidence does Fox present for his charge? Well, none really. True he begins his next sentence with a 'Thus', but he then rambles on with quotations of material (he has previously tried to flog to death) concerning deep ecology and value theory. But, as nearly everyone appreciates, a position may include a value theory without that theory being a values-in-nature position; shallow positions are such. Now 'Sylvan takes Naess's statement that deep ecology is normative as direct support ... the only support that Sylvan provides ... for his own ... "claim" that deep ecology is ... a value-in-nature position' (p.36 rearranged, prejudicial terms deleted). Well, he didn't take that as direct support; what he did take as support is Naess's oft-repeated assertion (quoted by Fox on the very page) that 'the significant tenets of ... Deep Ecology ... express a value priority system' (many places, e.g. 73 p.99, my italics). So it includes a value framework. Furthermore further evidence is adduced or alluded to both for the claim that deep ecology involves a value framework and that it includes a values-in-nature tenet (e.g. 'deep ecology seeks a transformation of values' Cp.29, quoting Devall; an 'egalitarian principle of equal value of all life, is "an intuitively clear and obvious value axiom"' Cp.13 quoting N aess; the restriction of this axiom to cases 'when genuine conflicts of value are absent 'Cp.14 quoting Fox; etc). Fox issues the challenge: 'where is the (objectivist) values-in-nature "core claim"?' (p.36). Of course it is right there in the platform, in the very first point which duly 47 distributes intrinsic value much more widely than humans and human features; it is also implied by the biocentric egalitarian principle; and so on. 12 What is more, although I have at long last (late 1989) read Fox's tactless Response, I am sticking to my claim that deep ecology has a value core. As it happens, I think as much is evident from Naess's recent publications (esp. 89 chapters 2 and 3). But the claim can be argued, for example as follows:- Firstly, Deep ecology has a value part. Secondly, that part is a core part. As to the first, I should begin by appealing to the value themes of the deep ecology platform, particularly points 1 and 2 which amounts values-in-nature points. Curiously, when several of the points in the platform are value themes, Fox proceeds to assert that 'biocentric ... egalitarianism ... is the deep ecological notion that most lends itself to interpretation as a value-in-nature position' (pp.31-33). Perhaps this is a diversionary tactic. It seems that it would be most convenient for Fox's anti-axiology and unauthentic view of deep ecology if critics forgot about the platform of deep ecology. The value part of deep ecology is reasonably taken as a core, i.e. as a central or inner part (to use dictionary accounts of 'core'). A number of arguments can be advanced for adopting it as a core, of which I'll indicate one 13 . The 8-point platform is a central part of deep ecology, what more or less distinguishes deep ecologists; value themes comprise a central part of this platform (the first three points as well as others such as point 7); what is a central part of a central part is indeed central. It is no doubt 'somewhat unfortunate that the 8-principles start with ethical terms ... ' (quoting Sessions p.49). Fox tries to wriggle out of that unfortunate predicament, that the 8-point platform of deep ecology - one of the few hitherto stable parts of the whole jerrybuilt structure - begins with value themes and a values-in-nature claim, by an expansion of the same shabby tactic he has already tried to use to defuse biological egalitarianism and displace apparently ethical principles of deep ecology (such as the important obligation to implement environmental commitments): Namely, the formal-axiological waste-disposal is replaced by an even grander formal-philosophical disposal - down which goes my criticism. 'Sylvan ... takes the "neutral"' (i.e. variously: literal, nontechnical, 12 It is only anomalous that the intrinsic value theme is missing Naess's early paper because it features so prominently in the platform and in parts of Naess's later work, both characterising deep ecology. Fox tries to twist the anomaly into a contradiction in my evidence (pp.36-7), but it is a shabby effort, entirely neglecting the evidence I assemble in Appendix 1 (which he quotes from however) for Figure 1 of the Critique which indicates the value core. 13 Thereby doing in, by example, another of Fox's unpleasant shotgun accusations, p.6. 48 understandable to most persons) 'formulation of basic principles as a formal philosophical position .... Thus, even such limited support for his "core claim" as Sylvan is able to find turns out to be due to mistaking an everyday language 8-point list for an ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms' (p.51) That I find, I confess, a ridiculous accusation and defence. I wasn't taking the basic principles at other than face value, as other than principles in a "neutral" formulation; I was, and am, 'using the word "value" in a metaphorical or everyday sense' (p.49), namely in the literal everyday non-metaphorical sense where it signifies worth. I frankly don't really know what it would be like to take deep ecology in the way Fox alleges I do, as a 'formal philosophical position' (p.49, p.51). It is not just that we are far removed from 'the ultimate expression of deep ecology in formal philosophical terms'; deep ecology is not, in the hands of Fox and friends, the sort of position that looks at all likely to obtain such formulation ever. Until it is properly made out, then, Fox's "defence" lapses. He owes us an account of what a 'formal philosophical expression' would be, by contrast with what we have, and to provide requisite evidence that Sylvan (whatever his actual intentions) was "taking" the platform in that "mistaken" way. I'm not surprised that Fox has not attempted the requisite philosophical work; I am surprised he got Session to go along with him in the intellectually disreputable ploy. I freely confess, then, my astonishment that Sessions states that he and N aess would not agree philosophically to the principles of the deep ecology platform (p.50,p.51 ). What on earth does he mean? In his own book (with Devall), these principles are presented as 'basic principles of deep ecology' (in boldface capitals, p.69), they are supplemented by a detailed commentary of a type appropriate for serious philosophical principles, and they are introduced as having 'summarized fifteen years of thinking on the principles of deep ecology' (p.69). If that doesn't make them philosophical, what in the deep ecological scheme of things would? In any case, Sessions has elsewhere been prepared, in highly philosophical contexts to ascribe intrinsic values to parts of nonhuman Nature (e.g. p.236). For Naess too there is no easy escape. Firstly, the platform is said to derive from his Ecosophy T; secondly Ecosophy T itself assigns 'intrinsic value to every life form' (89 p.164ff). But I should make an admission; deep ecology is bound to be a values-in-nature position, at least as I characterised those things. It follows from the way I explained depth and what is meant by 'values-in-nature'. That is one reason why I claim Fox's 49 transpersonal ecology is not deep ecology, because it is explicitly not a values-in-nature position. 14 Fox himself has tried various ways of avoiding values-in-nature; but, needless to say, value expressions of "in-nature" cast creep into much of his discourse. For example, the shallow/deep distinction is now "explained" (in 89 p.33), not directly in terms of value, but, to begin with, through an anthropocentric/ecocentric distinction. The trouble is that, in explaining the intended senses of contrasting terms, value slips back again (as in 'use value for humans (e.g. its scientific, recreational, or aesthetic value)'). But Fox's main chance is the "value constellation" idea, which tries to lock values away in a complex involving a valuer and a valuing relation. But nothing stops analyses of this complex, examination of components of the constellation; and for many logical purposes (such as quantification of the value end of the complex) some separation is required. 4 A biocentric ethic? It has been widely thought that deep ecology supplies 'a biocentric ethic as opposed to an anthropocentric one' 15 , that it includes at least rudiments of a value theory and leading features of an environmental ethics. But now whether deep ecology is, among other things, an environmental ethic is in increasing doubt. There are now many, not merely on the margins of deep ecology, who would question the role or significance of ethics or even dispense with it altogether. On these issues, as on others, deep ecology speaks not just with many tongues, but forked tongues as well. Fox does something to assemble the diverse voices from the deep ecology multitude (p.42ff.). Let us classify - in a preliminary way: A. Getting rid of ethics altogether. This appears to be a position taken by Livingston and by Shepard, at least in the quotes Fox supplies. There is nothing new and exciting, still less of new paradigmatic cast, about this. It is as old as ethical nihilism and scepticism, which is to say, very old, reaching back to classical Greek thought. 16 Nor are the entirely dubious supporting considerations adduced in any way new: 'ethics and morals were ... invented by one species to meet the needs of that species' p.42, or, more cynically, for the advantage of certain classes or pressure groups within that species; ethics are at best mischievous, more 14 See e.g. p.85. The matter is further discussed below. 15 Thus Bradford 89,p.10. The authentic deep ecology (of. Naess, on reliable days) certainly does. 16 For preliminary notes on the history of moral nihilism, see Hinckfuss p.17. 50 likely damaging; ethics are unsuccessful and even counterproductive in their effects (p.43); 'ethics and morals are unknown in nature' (p.42); and similar. A*. Retaining ethics, hardly intellectually revolutionary either, but B. Downgrading the whole enterprise. Such appears to be one of Naess's newer tactics, where ethics, now of minor importance, becomes an experiential epiphenomenon. 'I'm not much interested in ethics or morals. I'm interested in how we experience the world .... Ethic follows from how we experience the world' (p.46, also Naess 89 p.20 and elsewhere). Naess is doing more in this much quoted passage (which involves clear commission of the prescriptive fallacy 17 ) than expressing personal idiosyncracies; he is saying, he is taken as saying, by those who quote him, how things now stand for deep ecology (of which he is still, though losing ground, the chief guru). B*. While ethical enterprise is perhaps not downgraded, C. Ethics as usually conceived is displaced or superseded. According to Fox, "conventional ethics", which combines a code of conduct with a set of values, is displaced by an 'experientially grounded state of being' (p.41). 18 That state of being is none other than ecological consciousness, which 'precedes and preempts the search for an "environmental ethic"' (Devall quoted p.45, similarly Sessions, who also goes further, suggesting we should abandon the search for an environmental ethics' p.44). But surely it is foolish to discard useful tools (if admittedly due for repair) because something that may look brighter and shinier and does something for some agents, attracts attention; in these critical times everything that works at all is needed. A bit differently, Rodman suggests superfessions of conventional ethics (though perhaps not of a more expansive ethics), because it is an integral part of the former moral/legal stage of consciousness, conventional ethics - if not actually in the process of being superseded (in the dominant culture it is not) by a later and higher stage, of appropriate new experience - ought to be superseded, since the moral/legal stage is 'now more part of the problem than its solution' (p.43). Again all 17 Elsewhere however (e.g. Naess 89 p.24) explains how values go beyond "facts". 18 Later Fox proceeds differently, with 'deep ecology ... described as ... a position within ... "foundational ethics'" (p.86). "Foundational ethics", another exceedingly illexplained notion, is ethics as 'concerned with "understanding ourselves"' (p.86, p.113), and so part of the egocentric self nexus; it is also said to be ethics as 'concerned with development of a state of being' (p.113), the being of selves no doubt. Does "foundational ethics" supply principles and some values? If not, how does it manage to be an ethic? If so, how does it escape Fox's objections to environmental ethics? In any case, "foundational ethics" which we are supposed to search for (along with "understanding ourselves"), is intended to be an environmental ethic! 51 decidedly questionable, both historically and systematically, particularly given the prospect of a plurality of integrated techniques. C*. Instead, a radically new ethic is designed. This is of course part of what deepgreen and other radical, not merely reformist, alternatives to prevailing ethics and nature philosophies are about. It was, once upon a time, an objective of deep ecology also; it apparently no longer invariably is. But just as there is no definite position offered by deep ecology on several critical issues (esp. in ecological politics), so there is now no definite position on the place of ethics (pace p.41), as the tentative classification serves to reveal. No doubt Fox had a particular message that he wanted to be drawn from the quotations and needed for his arguments - explicit rejection of an ethical approach in favour of experience in the shape of ecological consciousness (p.47) - but what he has supplied is an entertaining pot pourri of positions, countering or jamming the message. It is ironic that Western deep ecology should have tried to opt out of ethics, at exactly the time that ethics is making a major come back, when ethics are becoming again a significant force in business and the world. Or in terms of a different image, at the very time when the ship of ethics is returning to harbour after a long period on high rough seas, Fox and friends decide to jump overboard; we hope they are strong swimmers. With ethics returned, a renewed force, what we need is not no ethics but new ethics, not to concede the power of renewed ethics over to conservative power-holders or restrictive do-gooders, but to put ethics to expansive tolerant good environmental and social works. 5. Biospheric egalitarianism revisited. The notion is terminally ill, but I fear we shall keep revisiting it until it is buried under heavy concrete. So far, for all its problems, it lives on (with apologists, Fox included, shifting ground accordingly; similarly N aess, e.g. 85 p.6). It just keeps reappearing in strong unqualified form, for instance in Sessions (recently): 'one of the first clear statements' of ecosophy 'that all individuals, species (including humans), and ecosystems have EQUAL inherent value (the ecocentric position) was made by Arne Naess when he proposed the principle of BIOSPHERICAL (ECOLOGICAL) EGALITARIANISM ... ' (89, p.11). So represented it simply succumbs to all the previous criticism (in my Critique and indirectly in EE p.139 ff.). Interestingly then both Fox and Naess appeal to 'Sessions' interpretation of biocentric egalitarianism as "a statement of non-anthropocent ricism"' (p.39), to which Fox adds, in all seriousness, 'rather than as a formal environmental axiological position'. In a revealing passage, Sessions puts it rather differently, 'Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a rejection of human chauvinistic ethical theory and the criteria 52 used to ascribe rights and value; it is a reductio ad absurdum of conventional ethics. Biocentric egalitarianism is essentially a statement of non-anthropocentricism' 19 . This statement does not hang together. For instance, non-anthropocentricism is weaker than rejection of human chauvinism, which on its own is not a reductio ad absurdum of all conventional ethics (because, first off, not an argument, and because, second, of the character of some "conventional" ethics such as intuitionism). Without the logically inadmissible loop through anti-human chauvinism (the deep-green position) the situation is worse still; for, on the contrary, rather conventional British utilitarianisms such as Smart's and Singer's are robustly nonanthropocentric. By so excessively eroding its egalitarian principles, deep ecology loses much depth. In a passage which Fox says 'greatly clarifies the confusion that has surrounded Naess's notion', Naess too, again over-influenced by his minders, takes a similar pathetic course. The principle had previously 'suggest[ed] a positive doctrine, and that is too much'! 'The importance of the intuition' contracts to 'its capacity to counteract' certain chauvinistic hubris. What Fox manages to draw out of these counteracting principles are, however, not principles at all, but an orientation to or general attitude of non-interference, "Letting be", etc. This is not just considerably removed from what N aess offers; it is pretty remote from egalitarianisms. For one can let inferiors, and what is of no inherent value, be, spare and preserve them, perhaps for later exploitation. But what Fox is really concerned to draw from his authorities is the concession (they do not make, nor did he himself formerly) that the principle of biospherical egalitarianism is not a principle, not a position at all (a curious thing to think it was), but something much less definite, less positive, less specific, less open to criticism, a more general attitude, no doubt underlying ethical practice, but definitely not part of an environmental axiology. Poor deluded critics like Sylvan who supposed that a principle is a principle have 'missed' 'the extremely important point' that for supporters of deep ecology a "principle" is but a general attitude. These supporters indeed feel that treating a principle as a principle can do more harm than good, 'and so have deliberately chosen not to take the environmental axiological route' (p.41). There ends Fox's diversion on biospheric egalitarianism. What it comes to is this:- Had the principle been a principle, within environmental axiology, the criticism made of the principle would at 19 Quoted by Fox in a quote that never ends (p.39). In this mismash, Session proceeds to draw upon our material against human chauvinism and conventional ethics, having first dismissed us, referring to EE p.139, as 'mistak[ing] what Naess is up to. Naess's position is not ... "an extension of conventional Western ethics"'. As it happens, we don't mention Naess at all either on p.139 or in our discussion of extensionalism: how do we mistake what Naess is up there to when we don't consider what he is up to? Back in the 70s deep ecology was, after all, not a significant position. 53 the very least constitute a powerful challenge (p.38); but fortunately it is not, "positive doctrines" are too open to criticism! It is only a general attitude concerning reluctance to harm other living beings (p.40). 20 Egalitarianism, of value as well as principle, has dropped out in this rather shallow evasion. 6. The uneasy position of value theory, or axiology within deep ecology and the condemned "environmental axiological route". Fox wants to distance deep ecology from value theory but is also aware, from time to time, that this is not really possible. As a result his position on the relation of deep ecology to value theory is decidedly ambiguous at best, and at worst inconsistent. The tensions appear within the space of a single page (e.g. p.85). We are told both that 'deep ecology is not [a] position within environmental axiology' and that 'it could be quite mistaken to think' that deep ecology 'stands outside ... value theory'. Whence inconsistency results, given that axiology has its normal technical sense. 21 But there is evidence that Fox intends significantly more by 'axiology' than normal - as well as adopting the normal sense: so that behind the initial inconsistency stands another inconsistency. What precisely Fox does intend remains however obscure, scandalously obscure. For one of Fox's main accusations against critics of deep ecology 22 , is that critics are committed to 'environmental axiological reductionism', they 'pursue environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental axiology', so they are blind to what 'deep ecology thinkers are really on about', which (negatively) consists in 'rejection of the "environmental axiological route"' (pp.51-53). Among these critics, mired in "ethical reductionism", blind to the new paradigmatic character of deep ecology which 20 Or presumably otherwise negatively interfere with other natural things - otherwise the reformulation, though apparently platitudinous, is too narrow, discriminating against some parts of nature. The harm reformulation is borrowed from Devall and Session, who try to make biospherical egalitarian and Self-realisation interpenetrate: 'Biocentric equality is intimately related to the all inclusive Self-realisation in the sense that if we harm the rest of Nature then we are harming ourselves' (p.56). Unfortunately in the ordinary sense of 'harm' the latter claim is entirely false; as I previously remarked, it is all too easy to harm parts of Nature without harming ourselves, with but negligible impact on ourselves. 21 The word 'axiology' does not appear in the Oxford English Dictionary. But no doubt it means the investigation, study and theory of value or worth, and is thus tantamount to value theory, as contrasted however with deontology. What it means will soon become an issue: see below. 22 Yes, it remains an unduly adversial intellectual game, part of the long Britishscholastic history of philosophy. 54 has taken as a guiding star precisely avoidance of the "axiological route", is the hapless Sylvan; the tenacity with which he sticks to his indefensible account of deep ecology is largely explained through these features (p.52). For explanation of some of the operative abusive terminology we are referred elsewhere, to other writings of Fox. But the source is scarcely more informative, and indeed relevant parts of it have, in any case, been lifted for Fox's Response. 23 The promise of explanation is not fulfilled. 'Ethical reductionism' is, like its successor 'environmental axiological reductionism', explained by Fox on the run, which is to say it is not explained. Nor is the reductionist charge sustained. For what is offered, what 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers' are alleged to do, the pursuit of 'environmental philosophical discussion almost entirely at the level of environmental ethics/axiology', may well reflect undue concentration, but it is not reductionism. Fox is decidedly adept in the fallacious business of sliding terms around (otherwise known as Humpty Dumptyism). 'Reductionism' and 'axiology' are not the only terms that suffer at his hands; so, relevant to our purposes, does 'ontology'. At least in the context of his "guiding stars" paper, parts of which are shunted into his Response, Fox uses 'ontology' to mean, not what it does mean, roughly 'the general study of what exists', but very differently, the 'underlying perception of the way things are', which, among other things, epistemologizes what was part of metaphysics. In those terms, 'deep ecology's guiding star ... [which] is (and should be) ... this attempt to shift the primary focus of environmental philosophical concern from ethics to ontology' becomes an epistemological diversion: a regressive attempt to move environmental philosophy to anthropic experiential concerns (Fox 84 p.204 rearranged). It is evident, by the way, who is attempting to do this shifting. If epistemologists focus their efforts on a tiny number of tiny epistemological problems, if logicians discuss only quantificational logic, they cannot be significantly accused of reductionism; they would have 23 While many sorts of recycling are of course commendable, reservations should be held about academic recycling of earlier papers, especially when no improvements are attempted. Fox does at least attempt some "improvements" to get around the obvious objection that deep ecology is itself a normative and hence ethical route; but the adjustments he infiltrates actually make other matters worse. For they consist of the replacement of 'ethical' by 'axiological' or 'environmental axiological' or similar. So now, for instance, the journal Environmental Ethics is charged with reflecting environmental axiological reductionism (p.106); but as examination quickly shows the journal carries much ethical material which is not axiological (e.g. on rights and obligations) - evidently it also carries much that is not reductionistic and even some that concerns philosophy of nature rather than ethics. Fox's charges are without proper foundation. 55 also to claim that is all there is to their enterprise, and to make some attempt to show how the apparent remainder comes down to that. These further necessary conditions are not fulfilled in the case of 'the vast majority of environmental philosophers'; apart from a small minority of philosophers associated with the "ethics without philosophy" idea here is nothing approaching a requisite reduction framework. No doubt there is an axiological reduction program, pursued by consequentalists of various brands, but that is predominantly a program within ethics. As well the long-running naturalistic reduction program grinds on unsuccessfully. But there is no recognisable environmental philosophy reduction program; nor could such a program hope to succeed. There are suitably many counter-instances to Fox's large accusations; among them, conveniently, is that main target, Sylvan, who does not take an "environmental axiological route". In print I have come out against reduction of deontic notions and normative discourse generally to axiological terms; and have, in any case, made it perfectly plain that environmental philosophy comprises much more than ethics, certainly including parts of politics, philosophy of nature, metaphysics and so on. 24 Thus Sylvan, so far from 'criticis[ing] deep ecology on the erroneous basis of it being a position or approach within environmental axiology' (p.101), does not himself take the alleged "environmental axiological route", as the record shows. Rather than rely on my record (a political expedient that should engender but little philosophical enthusiasm), I'm tempted to issue a countercharge: insofar as Sylvan is committed to an "environmental axiological route" so also is (authentic) deep ecology, as elaborated by Naess. Consider, for instance, Naess's elaboration of the deep ecological platform. But in sustaining this counter-charge (the detailed support involves a comparison, made in Bennett and Sylvan, of deep-green theory with authentic deep ecology), we come up once again against the problem of what is meant here by 'axiology'. Unremarkably Fox deploys the fallacious method of redefinition. By 'axiology' and its compounds, Fox both means what is normally meant and also means significantly more. Hardly necessary by now to add, he manages to slide from one to the other. In the normal way, axiology, or value theory, is the philosophical study of virtue and values, 'their meaning, characteristics, origins, types, criteria and epistemological status (p.100, quoting Angeles). 24 So far so good. But now for the first twist and slide. 'In the area of See EP, e.g . p.188, p.222, and several works in the Green series. In the early 70s when there was briefly some glimmer of hope that the Australian National University might interest itself in environmental philosophy, I sketched out a perspective of what it might comprise, which I reproduce as an Appendix (if I can find it!). 56 environmental ethics, the axiological concept of intrinsic value plays a fundamental role. 25 . . . On this understanding, environmental ethics is more accurately described as environmental axiology ... ' (p.100). This is a major non-sequitur. It would almost as well be said that because induction plays a fundamental role in philosophy of science, philosophy of science is more accurately described as induction-theory, and even amounts to induction-theory! Plainly it is quite inaccurately described as induction-theory, since there is much else to philosophy of science; what makes matters still worse is that there are schools which contend that induction drops out as a method and so as a problem. Rather similarly environmental ethics is much more inaccurately redescribed as environmental axiology because, but not only because, there is much more to ethics than axiology, the whole matter of proper conduct for example. For value only impacts on action and proper conduct by way of further principles which are not themselves part of value theory. It is obvious that value theory does not in general exclude what is not (without further ado) a part of it, such as deontic theory, moral epistemology, and so on; but the obvious gets lost sight of, as when Fox assumes that environmental axiology rules out experiential and empathetic procedures. Fox attempts rather more than adjustment and exclusion in his "redescription" of normal environmental ethics as environmental axiology; he has to if his charges against environmental axiology (on the face of it a harmless enough study), and the importance of avoiding it, are to begin to stand up. 25 Fox backs up this claim with themes drawn from Callicott and Regan, with which it is said 'most environmental philosophers would agree', (p.100). Maybe others do; but I doubt that they should, not without significant qualification. Regan states that 'the development of what can properly be called an environmental ethic requires that we postulate inherent value in nature'. Firstly, that is only one way to try to develop an environmental ethic (which may not be deep). There are other feasible starting points and primitives: rights, justice, respects, fairness, empathy, identification, utility, vandalism, evil, and so on, in terms of which value may (or may not) be subsequently be defined (e.g. along lines that tempted former philosophers: what it is fitting/right, for any rational being to prefer/desire). Secondly, the term 'postulate' at best grates, at worst gets the picture seriously wrong: value may not be self-evident, assumed without proof, imposed as a demand, ... . Callicott describes 'the problem of intrinsic value in nature ... as the most critical and most recalitrant theoretical problem of environmental ethics'. That already presupposes that an ethics starts out in Regan's sort of way. Even if a deep ethics does take value as primitive, that is but one problem among several, a problem blown up to critical exaggerated size, primarily by opponents of environmental ethics and infiltrators of the ranks. For other major problems for any ethics, and a more balanced view, see Broad's final chapter. 57 We can glean further information as to what is loaded into the terminology from what Fox tries to do. An environmental axiology is the same as a (formal) environmental axiological position, and that as a formal value theory (pp.40-41; the word 'formal' can be inserted or left out, in Fox it appears to function primarily as a con-term). Such theories, which are "theoretical" and "definite", contain as well as • a value theory, and perhaps also a rights theory (e.g. p.35), both • exact principles, offering specific positional guidance, which are • positively formulated • which apply to all situations, and • a code of conduct, no doubt made up from the principles. 26 Some of Fox's criticisms of environmental axiology turn on these further, and excessively exacting, features he has tried illegitimately to incorporate into axiology. At this stage, there are two main confusions:- first, as to the extent of ethics and moral theory that axiology comprehends, and secondly as to the character of the principles axiology (and, for that matter, deontology and praxis) is supposed to include. A value theory on it own yields neither a rights' theory nor a code of conduct. Even a highly and objectionably reductive theory such as consequentialism requires principles drawn from outside value theory, such as that one ought to act so as to maximize value or utility, in order to arrive at principles of conduct and actionable rights. A value theory may include principles but these are principles concerning value. Like other principles, like those of deontology, they may well not measure up to the excessive standards Fox tries to impose. In particular, the principles may be defeasible, may include or presuppose unspecified and unlistable exceptions; they may include ceteris paribus clauses; and so they may well not apply in all situations. They may fall far short of supplying necessary and/or sufficient conditions; they may not be positively formulated (prohibitions in such forms as 'Don't ... ' are commonplace in ethics); and so on. 26 As well, it seems to be assumed that an axiology, and indeed an Anglo-American ethics, must be atomistic and individualistic; they are but 'means of structuring the interactions of atomistic individuals' (p.112). Not so. It is worth remarking that deep-green theory assumes neither atomism nor individualism (see EP). Nor does it pursue or assume any of the following reductive practices: deontic to axiological, or vice versa; environmental philosophy to environmental ethics, or vice versa; axiological notions to a unique set of primitives, or the single primitive value. As there are several ways to disable a bulldozer, so there are many ways to enable an environmental philosophy: value is but one starting point. 58 7. The "case" against environmental axiology: 'the inadequacies or repugnant conclusions that attend the environmental axiological approach' (p.82). Among the 'serious problems' encountered are said to be those, now hoary, issues concerning intrinsic value, which Fox tosses up in a substantially shallow way. For most environmental ethicists, it is difficult to see how something can have value in itself (i.e. intrinsic value) if it isn't valuable to itself, and to be valuable to itself it must be able to matter to itself or, in other words, be sentient, by which is meant that it must possess the capacity to suffer (p.73)27_ This contention is at least dubious clause by clause, and overall profoundly mistaken. The critical transformation, for deep environmentalism, is centred on that of value in to valuable to (or of value to). It is difficult to see why any environmental thinker would accede to such a transformation, in itself and to itself being so very different in meaning (e.g. consider them coupled respectively with such terms as conspicuous, unusual, etc.) But, in any event, there are several sorts of evident counter-examples to such transformations. Firstly, there are examples from outside environmental territory such as works of art, intellectual theories, and transcendental metaphysical gems. A beautiful theory or a resplendent form can be intrinsically valuable without being of value to itself, without being able to matter to itself, etc. Secondly, there are examples like rare seed, embryonic valuables, and the like. Thirdly, there are sentient or conscious items of intrinsic value that are not valuable to themselves, and do not matter to themselves, such as great but utterly modest people. There is much else wrong in the connections Fox delivers up 28 , but we can bypass most of them (e.g. sentience does not mean a capacity to suffer, as shown by perceptually aware creatures who do not suffer because they have no pain receptors and the like; nor is sentience required, as consciousness will serve for mattering; and so on). 27 It is hard to credit that someone fronting up as a deep environmental thinker could present such stuff, but of course various reasons can be found. While the argument is very bad, there is no doubt, what is no excuse, that worse can be found. For instance, what is intrinsically valuable is valuable in itself, so it must have a self, so it must be sentient, etc. 28 Fox subsequently announces the 'link between something not mattering to itself ... and the conclusion that we can do as we will with it ... sacred in the Environmental Axiological Orthodox Church of Intrinsic Value' (p.80). It is a Church of his own fabrication, at which no respectable deep environmentalist would worship or even be found. 59 Fox runs straight on to an old paradigm assertion by Frankena, from whom he borrowed the argument, which he again proceeds to ascribe (without any evidence offered or, I suspect, any research basis)to most environmental ethicists 29 : 'I do not see, however, how anything can have intrinsic value except the activities, experiences, and lives of conscious sentient beings (persons, etc.)' (Frankena, quoted p.73). Frankena's assertion, as it stands utterly unsupported, 'is a powerful one', according to Fox, again displaying his shallow proclivities: 'What difference does it make how I treat something if it cannot matter to itself?' (p.78) Big differences, not merely to those in a region for whom it may matter, but in the region, if Fox dams the last wild river in the region, cuts down the last lowland rainforest. Fox tops his astounding move by dignifying this shallow rubbish by the title 'powerful argument'. Its power 'is evidenced by the fact that those who want to say rocks or trees have intrinsic value often do so by pure assertion rather than providing an argument for their view (140)' (p.78). That's no evidence, it's irrelevant; and I wouldn't pursue it, were not such a familiar utterly shallow complaint built into the alleged evidence, and were Sylvan not roped in again in a footnote as 'another case in point' (p.112 note 140). It may come as news to Fox (who seems to have read little of what I have written before he rushed out his Response), but I do provide arguments, including those built on examples like the Last Person and the Last Sentient Creatures, examples which have obtained a fair bit of exposure (for some of these, see e.g. EP pp.121-132; and in fact a general argument can be developed from the semantical analysis of value). The certainties of Frankena's dogmatic assertion can be whittled away, first by separating conscious from sentient (after all many people can now see that animals that are not conscious persons can have intrinsic value), second by assembling marginal cases and analogies in a now familiar way, then by counter-arguments, and so on. But, in any case, insofar as environmental ethicists (as distinct from conventional ethicists) continue to side with Frankena that reveals them as a rather reactionary lot, significantly lagging popular thinking. 30 As Naess and others report, many non-philosophers have no difficulty in recognising value-in-itself outside persons, in living creatures and natural objects. 29 There is evidence that these ascriptions are mere desk-chair speculation, in fact of little value; e.g. at the bottom of p.78 where Fox says, of Frankena's position, 'I think it represents the dominant position within ... environmental axiology'. I suspect that, once again, Fox is not duly separating environmental axiology from conventional axiology. 30 The chauvinism of traditional ethical systems is enough to explain the comparative lack of intellectual interest in such moribund systems, and the resulting much wider search for roots, ideas, etc. There is accordingly no serious puzzle as to the sources of deep environmentalism (pace Fox p.74). 60 In the course of trying to get his attack on the environmental axiological framework airborne Fox resorts to some extraordinary distortion and falsification. The looseleaf insert (page 79), where some disenchanted thinkers make an abrupt unexplained entry, affords a good illustration. First we are told that what those in the business (except no doubt some enlightened deep ecologists) 'typically fail to realise is that the environmental axiological framework of discourse so dominates the discussion of our relationship with the natural world that it is mistakenly taken to be the only possible approach' (p.79). This claim is, it seems to me, roundly refuted by the history of the discussion and some of the literature it encompasses. Among other approaches there are, for instance, extended rights (e.g. Stone), environmental justice (e.g. Wenz), extended interests (e.g. Johnson), and negatively ethical nihilism (e.g. Hinckfuss). Fox continues unabashed: 'In other words [!], the hegemony of the environmental axiological framework is such that it has led almost everybody involved in the ecophilosophical debate to think that we have an obligation to care for something if and only if it "has" intrinsic value' (p.79). There's some prime rubbish for you. The charge is manifestly false, seriously flawed, plucked from thin air, and unnecessary except for Fox's misguided mission. Even if an axiological approach were the only approach, no such obligation-to-care principles would follow, and certainly not principles as dubious or refutable as those given. The if -half of the unabashed claim is at, the very, least dubious and would be rejected on some popular positions: suppose, for instance that the intrinsic value of the thing is small, or that it is overridden by the intrinsic value of some competitor for our attention. The only-if-half (which wins Fox's italics, he is going to make much of it) would be rejected by almost everyone who thought about the matter, because of course obligations apply to what has merely instrumental value. If I have borrowed a friend's tools then I have an obligation to care for them though these tools have no intrinsic value. Differently, I am under obligations to behave generally in certain sorts of ways whether the things encountered have intrinsic value or not; accordingly I'm not entitled to treat them any old way (e.g. to vandalise them) or even as I will or, more ambiguously, as I 'see fit'. Combining the pernicious principles Fox has unearthed yields the following ridiculous result: if a thing has no value to itself, for instance has ceased to be of value to itself, then we have no obligation to care for it, we can do what we like with it. The applications of this result are remarkable. There is no doubt that Fox has thereby provided a simple - if appalling - solutions to such major social problems as those of drug and alcohol abuse; victims who are so far down the track that they have ceased to be of value to themselves, can simply be vanished, or dealt with in whatever other way we find convenient. Then too human slavery and sacrifice, never entirely vanquished, could be widely reinstated: Oh brave new world that Fox has lead us into! 61 Fox tries to make a lot out of these odious obligation-to-care principles he has attempted to foist upon environmental axiology. He suggests they indicate the need to abandon rather than broaden the notion of intrinsic value; he suggests they may 'reflect the inherent limitations of the environmental axiological approach' (p.79); he suggests that we need to find instead 'another framework of discourse that can articulate' our feelings about what we ought to care about. This alternative framework - from the many and various that might have been selected - is none other than the wider self identification framework. The obvious course, which should be pursued anyway, of seeking an obligation-to-care principle that does measure up better to our emotional presentations, does not seem to have occurred to Fox, so preoccupied is he with attacking what he sees as "the environmental axiological route" and getting to self immersion. Finally, Fox runs out some examples which are supposed to show the repugnant conclusions to which the axiological approach leads. Unfortunately for Fox's case, the arguments involved do not succeed without further assumptions beyond those Fox enumerates, assumptions smarter adherents of an axiological approach do not make. The examples involve comparisons of groups of individuals, which, it is alleged, exponents of intrinsic value cannot discriminate, though the group situations are very different. One example runs as follows: ' ... the loss, by human interference at least, of the last members of a species ... is somehow "worse" than the loss by human interference of an equivalent number from an abundant species ... . Yet, in terms of intrinsic value, those losses are equivalent since the same "amount" is lost in both cases' (p.80). Fox then argues against more holistic assignments of value on the basis of another dogmatic pronouncement from 'Frankena that communities (such as species ... ) do not "have intrinsic value over and above that contained in ... [their] members"' .31 But he goes on to assert that, irrespective of Frankena's position, 'the point ... applies generally to any atomistic environmental axiological position i.e. to any position that sees intrinsic value as exclusively adhering in or attaching to individual entities' (p.81). Fox is dead wrong. The case assumes, without warrant or mention, equality of the value adhering or assigned to individuals. Plainly the loss of the last members of the species is worse (where it is, e.g. the species is not a diabolical laboratory concoction) because the members of the species are individually more valuable than those of the abundant species. Consider, for comparison, the razing by fire of 31 Fox's second example actually contains the elements of an interesting argument (perhaps, to be uncharitable, the only example in his whole Response). This example, of monoculture vs diversity (p.81), does introduce, if not much of holism, at least relational features of the individuals assembled. There is no reason, of course, why axiology should not take account of those features. Contrary to Fox, there is no need to 'separately posit' that the principle of diversity is 'valuable in and of itself' (p.82). 62 two art galleries containing the same numbers of individual art works, one containing rare art works, the other containing selections from the abundant works of relatively indifferent crafters. The amount, assessed in monetary value even, lost in the first fire is much greater, and so the loss much worse, than in the second fire. Fox not only proceeds to state what his examples would show without due qualification. But he goes on, quite inadmissibly, to general claims which leave off even the qualifications he had earlier introduced (thus later on, p.82, he drops the essential restriction to atomistic positions). Environmental axiology accordingly emerges substantially unscathed; it does not need to be replaced by something else, such as wider identification, only rendered smarter, and supplemented or merged into a fuller environmental philosophy. 8. Fox's 'Deep Ecological Territory': transpersonal identification. But Wes tern deep ecology is now bent upon replacement. Devall, for example, now maintains that 'the unique contribution that deep ecology makes to ecophilosophy is its emphasis on ecological self and affirmation. Subscribing to similar ideas Fox has suggested changing the label "deep ecology" to "transpersonal ecology".' Devall (in 89 again) has deep ecology as, above all, discovering 'an aspect of our self' which has been culturally neglected. Such a reorientation is significantly at variance with Naess's introduction and initial elaboration of deep ecology; for his original summary (in 73) of deep ecology, which is ecologically focussed, contains no allusion to self, ecological or other. It is also at variance with Devall and Sessions of but three years earlier, where nature, ecology and biological systems still appeared fundamental to deep ecology, these entering through the other ultimate norm (besides Self-realisation) of deep ecology, that of biocentric equality (see their p.66). As it happens, Devall, by contrast with Fox, vacillates between a more authentic deep ecology in the style ofNaess (chapter 1 of Devall 89) and the Western variant of transparent ecology (e.g. pp.39-57), which would displace the original theory. There is much speaking with many tongues, much inconsistency, in deep ecology. We have already witnessed such deep ecology doubletalk in the matter of value and the status of ethics. We see it again with transpersonal or expanded-self identification. We only enter 'the real territory of deep ecology' according to Fox (p.53ff.) with such expanded identification. Yet one can be a deep ecologist, much literature explains, without any identification efforts at all (for example by adopting the platform which does not mention identification). So one can be a deep ecologist without ever 'entering deep ecological territory'. Deep ecology without deep ecology - another wonder, or just more double talk? Like Fox's parting flourish: there are sketch maps for deep ecological territory (p.89), yet it is 'ultimately mapless' (see Devall 89 p.39). 63 Fox tries to explain "the search" of deep ecology 'for such things as "ecological consciousness" (Devall and Sessions) and "Self-realisation" (Naess)' through expanded identification. Most conveniently he can take ready-made from Devall and Sessions reductive explications:- 'Ecological consciousness is the result of a psychological expansion of the narrowly encapsulated sense of self as isolated ego, through identification with all humans (species chauvinism), to finally an awareness of the identification and interpenetration of self with ecosystem and biosphere' (Sessions, quoted pp.53-4). 'The essence of ecological consciousness ... [is] to overcome this illusory dichotomy [between Humans and N ature 32 ]' for which 'the important task is ... the psychological development from narrow egotistical "self' to identification with the whole' (Devall as quoted p.53). But, once again, it is one thing to have on authority such explication; it is quite another thing whether such reductions work. I submit that they do not, for the simple reason that ecological consciousness may be had or attained without any such self expansion developments. Consider, first, Professor Flatpan who is a devoted but unimaginative ecological field worker. All his practice, behaviour and so on, shows him as utterly committed to ecological causes, preservation of wilderness and so on, and fully conscious of its importance. But he makes no identification of himself with what he works with or for. It may be that he is some sort of empirical separatist; or it may not. Perhaps he even rejects identification suggestions when they are put to him, e.g. on grounds of hubris, nonsense, ... , or he simply doesn't identify, etc. In Professor Flatpan and his variants we seem to have a tribe of people with strong ecological consciousness and affiliations but without identification. Consider next, the interesting Wombat tribe, superb in their tribal treatment of their environment, who have not developed the notion of self or, for that matter, that of identification. The tribe exhibits a high ecological consciousness (in our ordinary understanding of that non-technical notion, in terms of a strong perception or awareness of environmental matters) but lacks even the conceptual apparatus for self expansion developments. Expanded identity or self developments may serve as useful or powerful tactics for raising ecological consciousness in people raised and hooked on a narrow self-interested self, but they are neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining or understanding ecological consc10usness. Analogous points apply against the attempt to drag Self-realisation into the picture. 32 Naess, in a regressive move, now asserts that humans are unique (e.g. in 89), whence the dichotomy ceases to be illusory. More inconsistency. 64 There are in fact at least three separable notions which deep ecology has tended to fuse: ecological consciousness, widened identification and wider Self-realisation. Confusion is made so much the easier because those notions are, for the most part, not decently introduced. The whole deep ecological theory of expanded identification and Self remains exceedingly poorly explained (thus e.g. identification in Fox, esp. p.60; dimensions of Self, p.83). As ecological consciousness has already been distinguished, it remains to begin on unscrambling identification and self-realisation, and therewith the many senses of self In the first place, identification is independent of self, its manifestation or "realisation", at least to this extent: that discourse concerning identification can be explained and can proceed satisfactorily without any introduction of or notion of selves. A theory may well include identification, and even expanded identification with remote items, without selves or expanded selves. Early Taoism appears to illustrate the point well. Differently, an ontologically modest account of acting can afford a good example of how identification can operate without persona or selves. In fact, a case can be argued that such theories proceed better in this fashion, because they avoid problematic commitments to selves. It may look as if Fox, following Naess and Wilber, can escape these problems, and separation, simply by defining 'self' through identification (and perhaps conversely): 'succinctly: Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.54). There are serious obstacles to such a stratagem. d Elsewhere Fox makes quite a fuss about ontological commitments; on the matter of cluttering up the universe with Selves he is strangely silent. Yet there are rather a lot of these strange selves. Assuming selves do not reproduce themselves, in a universe where there are n objects, and so 2n -1 complexes, and m individuals with selves (with m << n), there are, at first estimate, m x (2n -1) larger selves. Of course some of these larger selves may be the same, nonetheless the number of selves is huge where n is large. Moreover, if a person can identify with nonexistent, with Sherlock Holmes or Pegasus or Satan if not with the form of the Good and the set of all sets, then the numbers shoot right up, into the big infinities. Yet nothing is more common in this arena than for people to identify with fictional objects, of books, TV and so on. Indeed the art of acting depends heavily upon it. A character actor works to identify with the character being portrayed; a good actor enjoys more success in this identification enterprise. d It does not in any case evade ontic issues, because the definition requires that which abstraction which a modest theory would not have generally available. d There are questions as to the adequacy of such an explicative definition of self: whether, for example, it answers duly to prevailing senses of 'self'. The proposal does not. Consider, to bring out just one deficiency, two different but closely integrated creatures, 65 Arthur and Martha say, who identify with the same class of items including themselves and each other. Then on the Naess-Fox definition, it follows, counter-intuitively, that Arthur's Self = Martha's Self, though Arthur @ Martha. Part of what has gone wrong is evident from recent philosophical investigations, namely that the first person point of view, crucial to such items as a self or a spirit or a soul or an ego, has got omitted; a widened self involves some sort of (concentric) expansion from, or focused upon, a first-person self. 33 Normally in religious settings, it is furthermore expansion outwards from an inner personal locus by restrictive identification or selective identification (as Wilber has it), not arbitrary identification. 9. Problems of Self and Self-realisation: the intrusion of value and the issue of evil. Restrictive practices can remove a serious problem for identification theory, the problem of evil identifications, but they raise an equally serious problem, how the re intrusion of value is to be avoided. Fox is vaguely aware that 'the concept of intrinsic worth' may intrude in discussions of Self-realisation. But he assumes, much too facilely, that it can be simply removed (p.56). Devall's later writings should have alerted him to the problems of those who identify with anti-environmental objects or causes, such as beach buggies, symbols of power like bulldozers or tanks , or sand mining opportunities. Identification is not always with the good, with good guys or good causes, as selective deep ecology examples invariably suggest (e.g. p.60, with sea turtles, tigers and gibbons). Spinoza, one of the progenitors of the theory, avoided the problem of evil attachments and causes by envisaging primarily identification with Nature or God, assumed ipso facto to be good. But Naess and Sessions allow for a much wider range of identifications, with the whole human race, which may overall be evil (for all that conventional ethics assert), or with undoubtedly evil human groups or organisations (e.g. the German S.S. or the Mafia). Such expanded identification is hardly to be recommended or encouraged. 33 The person touch is too narrow, unless animals are persons. For there appear to be no serious difficulties in ascribing selves to animals. Of course, if consciousness (or circularly self-consciousness) is written into the notion of self, as with some of the dictionary senses, then selves will be restricted to those animals that enjoy consciousness, a quite extensive class overlapping humans. In a different sense, tied to an original meaning of 'self as same, or one and the same used esp. prepositionally in referring back, there is no difficulty in ascribing selves much more widely. Thus we naturally say of a forest, 'It looks after itself', of an automata or even boomerang, 'It came back itself'. The broad philosophical sense (first part of sense 3 in OED) in terms of individual essences, what a thing really and intrinsically is, haecceity, certainly admits selves for forests! 66 There are criticisms, yet to be answered (though initiated in my Critique), that the "widened identification route" introduces virtually as many problems as it would resolve, and that it cannot proceed independently of what it is supposed to offer an alternative to (p.53), the pernicious "environmental axiological route". In a passage quoted from Seed part of the problem is glimpsed, though Fox who emphasizes the relevant passage fails to observe it: 'It is only by identification with the whole process that correct values will emerge' (p.63). Why? Because, as in Spinoza, "the whole process" is assumed Good, while anything less may not be; a distribution of value is presupposed. How furthermore does a disciple ensure that a proper totalising identification is made? By confirming that correct values do emerge. In brief, then, identification theory is no substitute for valuation theory, but an addition to it. Moreover, it is not an entirely essential addition, however psychologically useful. With the reintrusion of value or the like, the acclaimed superiority of the wider identification approach over the environmental axiological approach lapses. The claim, for which Fox offers initial but unpersuasive defence (p.77 on), is based on another mistake: the mistake, already observed, of thinking that value theory excludes identification. But it need not: selective identification can complement intrinsic value. Very selective identification reveals as well how a theory of heightened Self can be substantially independent of widened (unrestrictive) identification. In showing independence Hinduism, as sometimes presented (e.g. by Smith), affords an admirable example. Hinduism supposes a diminution or deepening of the self to the underlying Self, a route of self-abnegation; but that is taken to be equivalent, by inversion, to a unique expansion of self to approximate a God's eye viewpoint (of things sub specie aeternitas ). 34 34 Whereas Western approaches aim to enlarge the self - as with stock aggrandizement, or Western deep ecology expansion - Indian approaches are concerned primarily with contracting upon the self, to reduce individual expectations, aspirations, wants (to nothing on some accounts). For a resolution of life with disappointments, the (negative) suggestion is: 'if the ego were to have no expectations, there would then be nothing to disappoint' (Smith p.26). But interestingly, there is supposed to be a positive inversion of self abnegation which turns it into self expansion. Expand 'the interests of the self ... to the point of approximating a God's-eye view .. . . Seeing, thus, all things "under the aspect of eternity", would not one become completely objective towards oneself, accepting failure as being as natural an occurrence as success ... . How can defeat disappoint if one feels the joy of the victor as if it were one's own?' (p.26). 'Detachment from the finite self or attachment to reality as a whole ... positive or negative ... ' (p.27). One path to God, to oneness with the Godhead (Brahman), that through knowledge, jnana yoga, strikingly resembles Western deep ecology in some of its features and terminology. The 'Yoga of knowledge is said to be the shortest path to divine realisation (to God). It is also the steepest' (p.35). For intellectuals, introverts and the like 'Hinduism proposes a series of meditations and logical demonstrations 67 While Hinduism does also make room for expansions of selves through time, so as to 'rise above the present and even above present lifespans' (p.28) these expansions are tied to lifelines of single creatures (perhaps as reincarnated). There is no technical provision for unlimited wider identification, for instance identification with inanimate items, with a motorcycle or nuclear reactor. Thus Hinduism can serve to show the independence of unrestrictive expanded identification from self-Self theories. Evidently, too, variations on self-Self (e.g. with more ascetic theories of big Self) can strengthen this result. designed to convince the thinker that there is more to him than his finite self; ... [to] shift his central concern to the deeper reaches of his being ... the larger self that lies behind ... ' (p.33). One 'must pierce and dissolve the innumerable layers of manifest personality until all strata of the mask [all roles of the persona] are at length cut through, [to] arrive finally at the anonymous and strangely unconcerned actor [Atman] who stands beneath. The distinction between self and Self can come through another image' (p.34) however than that of the removal of roles and personae; thus there is the image of the game of life upon a chess-board and the image of the charioteer. Through exercise with such images and such practices it is claimed that a practitioner can 'build up a lively sense of an abiding Self that underlies his phenomenal personality' (p.34). The further 'step consists in shifting his self-identification from the passing to the eternal part of his being. The most direct way of doing this ... is simply to [contemplate] one's identity with the Eternal Spirit ... ' (p.35). Of course analogous self-improvement, self-abnegation and self-expansive elements feature in other religions than Indian, where they were especially early and conspicuous. In Zen, for instance, 'the dualisms of self and object, of self and other, are transcended' (p.134). In Christianity too, the circle of self can be broken, and release experienced from the cramping confines of ego (Smith again, p.280). Analogous elements made their way into Western philosophies, such as that of Spinoza, early romanticism (e.g. Schegel), German idealism and T.H. Green, and directly or indirectly into Western deep ecology (Fox, p.57). As Marxism is sometimes seen, crudely, as obtained by upending Hegelianism and replacing God by Man, so transpersonal ecology can be regarded as similarly varying elements of Hinduism, replacing God by Nature (rather than identifying them as in Spinoza). Ideological tradition does not however point uniformly in one direction, with self elevation as invariant. According to Buddhism, here too more enlightened than alternatives, that is a wrong direction. 'Strong emotions, however lofty [including those of ecological consciousness], tend to emphasize and strengthen the fatal illusion of the ego, which it is the whole aim and purpose of religion to transcend'. For the 'idea of a Self is at the root of every evil passion (and through its action Salvation becomes impossible)' (both quoted in Perrett, p.72). Instead Buddhism offers the tantalizing doctrine of "no self', which at least denies the existence of a substantial self. Further there is allusion to "'the two kinds of non-self': that means there is no ego in humans and no Self in Nature'. 68 Features of Hinduism also show up deficiencies in the Western Enlightenmentsponsored objective of Self-realisation. These include the already remarked problem of evil, which afflicts unrestricted Self-realisation in much the way it plagues closely related hedonism (often a main goal of Self-realisation, and out of an adjacent intellectual stable). To avoid promotion of evil and the like, ethical or similar controls need to be inserted. It should be realisation of an ethical Self, just as elsewhere it should be ethical happiness and ethical profit, not happiness and profit at the expense of other creatures or the Earth. There is worse to come. For there is a scurrilous bigger-is-better element to big Self expansion and realisation, and to often announced, but thoroughly dubious, goals of maximization. Without ethical constraints, the supreme goal of ecosophy, of maximizing Self-realisation, can be decidedly anti-environmental, as too many maximizers proceed to aggrandize themselves, maximize their consumption, or their identification with false chauvinistic Gods, or their dominance, and so on. Such maximal Self-realisation is evidently antithetical to deep environmentalism, which like high-path Hinduism and Taoism, is opposed to selfelevation and self-aggrandizement, especially in material consumption, and favours some self-restraint, self-effacement, self-domination, even selflessness and self-abnegation. But such unconstrained maximization is also in conflict with other features of ecosophy, such as simplicity of, and restraint in, material means, implying a certain Self-contraction. In brief, unrefined ecosophy is liable to be inconsistent. 10. Deconstruction and reselection of self. The problems run deeper however. The theory of expanded self and Self-realisation has ecologically defective starting points: it takes as given what should be investigated and rejected. For instance, Naess simply assumes that the process of heightened Self-realisation starts with the 'development of the narrow ego of the small [Western] child into the comprehensive structure of a Self which comprises all human beings' (quoted p.55; egoism is also assumed p.64 ). Of course deep ecology aims to induce a further development, beyond the anthropic limitations of standard trans personal psychology, 'a deep identification of individuals with all of life' (p.55 again). 35 While it is plain enough that ego is a theoretical notion, elaborated especially by Freud, it is less plain that self too is a folk-theoretic term of certain folk cultures, and it is quite insufficiently appreciated that narrow egos and individual selves are not culturally independent items (artifacts some would now say), but are acquired concepts, 35 Both developments parallel ascents in Hinduism, of upward path of "renunciation", to third (service to human communities) and fourth life-objectives. 69 chauvinistically learnt early in civilised life. Perhaps because individual selves are so deeply entrenched, especially in Westerners' impressions of themselves, a clever practical and ideological course is no doubt the encouragement of expanded egoism, self stretching exercises and empathy. But a deeper philosophical approach would investigate the notions of ego and selftheir history, development, entrenchment, arbitrariness, and dispensibility - rather than take them substantially for granted. In dissolving egoism, it is wise not to concede it at the outset. It, and the intertwined notions of self-interest, and self-ish-ness, should be taken apart to begin with, both analytically and historically. There are of course two parts to the unmasking and dethroning of self-interest: dealing with interest and dealing with self A historical investigation of the rise of the modern theory of self, done in the style of Foucault, might serve to show how arbitrary in crucial respects the notion now rigorously adhered to in social theory happens to be, and how developments could have been different. But even if such an investigation should run aground (e.g. because the notion, although not present in all tribal peoples, reaches back to prehistory), a systematic investigation need not get stuck. The notion of self-interest, and also expanded self interest in the form of group or class interest, has already been taken apart, from the angle of interest, and found wanting as an ethical starting point (see esp. our 79). A complementary investigation of self, standard theories of which should certainly not be conceded, is now required. 36 Some realisation of the problematic character of the notion of self is in fact disclosed in Naess's much earlier investigations, but he does not apply it to the familiar Enlightenment ideal of self-realisation which he takes over as foundation of his own ecosophy, and so of deep ecology as he conceives it. Instead of requisite critical and de( con)structive investigation of the notion of self, resulting in its demotion, what we are witnessing in too much deeper environmental philosophy, is an elevation of the notion and an attempt to focus and found much theory upon it (as esp. in Fox). It is reminiscent of, and related to, the earlier failed attempt to found much theory, including ethics (or a replacement for it), on the notion of person.3 7 36 My impression is that several such investigations are now under way. For discussion and elaboration of earlier investigations, which glimpse some of the requisite points, see Perrett. Our own previous investigations, particularly of the interests and needs of oneself and their interrelations and overlap with those of others (and accordingly the falseness of the egoism-altruism contrast) in 79 and EP, go some small way along the requisite path. 37 Thus, for instance, Strawson in metaphysics, and Benn in moral sciences, both elaborating on Kantian illusions. 70 Indeed those routes are significantly interlinked and offer similar beginnings; for instance, a personality comprises certain roles into which a self, oneself, is cast. In important respects, self amounts to person somewhat deanthropocized. It also suffers similar defects. Neither is sufficiently explained (e.g. what are the existence conditions, the identity conditions, the distinctive properties); neither is up to carrying the heavy theoretical load aficionados have attempted to impose upon them. In particular, neither enables an independent characterisation of central axiologic or deontic notions or other notions bound up with the regulation of conduct which they would somehow displace and to some extent provide new foundations for. Furthermore it appears that the notion of self is not, and cannot be, sufficiently deanthropicized, short of distributing selves around in woods, springs and mountains in the way pagan religions did with spirits (and then letting them be good and evil, and so forth). Undue concentration upon selves has the unfortunate and retrograde effect of swinging environmental philosophy away from deepened ecology and back to agents and actors, the live active subcomponents within ecologies. unacknowledged return to shallower waters. It signals an Because self, however dispensible in environmental philosophy, is integral to Wes tern deep ecology, it behoves us to say something about it, something more than deep ecology has said. Self is a folk-theoretic object of philosophical cast, though no doubt an item with experiential linkage, for instance as a permanent substratum of a certain range of successive (internal) states and experiences, or, without a substance, as a bundle or stringing together of a succession of 'personal' experiences. 38 It is an item, almost an objectification, whose features (which may vary with underlying theory) are primarily supplied through a culturally-dependent theory or the like (e.g. a religious or cult theory). In this regard it is like other typically psychological items of philosophical importance, such as soul (with which it is sometimes identified), spirit, mental substance, mind, psyche, person, personal essence, ego, life force, conatus, etc. In due course a now standard range of philosophical theories gets invoked to account for, or discount, such items: realisms, constructivisms, nominalisms, etc., with dominant scientific ideology committed to a dismissive nominalism. A fashionable humanist opposition has, by contrast, become enamoured of a flamboyant constructivism: selves are made, fabricated, and the like. By contrast again Western deep ecology appears committed to realism, and therewith an 38 While the experiences, such as surges of desire or apprehension, are subjectively empirical enough, the substratum or self-substance may not be. To put it in Humean terms, when I look within I don't find a self just like that (how a sceptical Hume managed to still eludes me). Self itself, like cause, though empirically grounded, is not an "empirical" concept. 71 incredible ontology of selves (already castigated). None of these standard mass-produced positions impresses as at all satisfactory (for reasons elaborated in JB ). For example, scientific nominalism inexcusably leaves out lots of experience, life-forms, and much richness (whereas for its own "legitimate" theoretical purposes it is prepared to introduce all sorts of strange objects). For constructivism there are so far unsurmounted difficulties in getting beyond the analogy: exhibiting the materials and explaining just how they are assembled. While not averse to phrases like 'the fabrication of self', it needs to be remembered that the fabrications are more like those of fiction. Insensitive realism is different; there is sound reason to remain entirely sceptical about an intuitive ontology of selves, especially when a good empathesizer may have numerous different existent selves. I can see little excuse for (being taken in by) such ontological blow outs. Item-theory offers an appealing alternative to these standard positions generally, and therewith very different prospects for self. An item-theoretic account of self will resemble that already offered for mind (in MX); analogous item-theoretic accounts can no doubt be given for spirit, psyche and ego (and also spook, shade, spectre, ghost, etc.). Minds are fairly satisfactory folk-theoretic items which do not exist; ghosts, whether in machines or not, are decidedly less satisfactory inexistential items. Selves are different inexistential items again, with different features; many subjects which do not have minds may have selves. The difficult part of the business consists in explaining whic~ items selves are, a business that is complicated because there are several somewhat different but interconnected notions of self in circulation. Fortunately these can all be accounted for as restrictions in one way or another- temporal, cultural, subject-discipline - of a total self. The total self of a subject abstracts from the total set of features which contribute to the self or personality of that subject, from everything that makes it selfwise what it is (whether supplied by local cultures or not, both supplied internally and not), over the life-span of the subject. For some subjects with richer psychic lives, these features will include states of consciousness (and then the total self will properly include ego, the conscious self). Thus a total self is, if you like, what distinguishes a subject, makes it what it is and so gives its abiding essence (and id-entity), and so resolves issues of personal identity over times. 39 What the relevant features are will become clearer as we come to the usual restrictions. A first set of restrictions are temporal restrictions, a second set aspect restrictions. These are combined in the OED sense 39 This account sharpens and much elaborates the senses which the dictionaries list as philosophical, e.g. OED sense 3. The inexistential account offered shares common ground with the Buddhist "no self' theory when presented as denying the real existence of a self. 72 '4.a. What one is at a particular time or in a particular aspect or relation; one's nature, character, or (sometimes) physical constitution or appearance, considered as different at different times. Chiefly with qualifying adj.' So, for example, Dobbin's total self restricted to time period t1 differs from his total self restricted to t2 at which period he is old and mentally decrepit. A main aspect restriction, very commonly imposed, is to psychically-relevant features, excluding merely bodily features. Differently, a total self, especially a total psychic self, of a subject may be partitioned into such selves, whence sense 4 b of OED. '4. b. An assemblage of characteristics and dispositions which may be conceived as constituting one of various conflicting personalities within a human being. Better self: the better part of one's nature.' Among the topic, or subject-discipline, restricted selves those of economics and social sciences are nowadays particularly prominent. A broad economic self, for instance, is a psychic self confined to an individual and restricted to its locus of wants, preferences, desires, interests, needs, aspirations, goals, etc. (Of course some of the volitional features can be explained in terms of others; in older faculty discourse, it coincides with the individual will.) With a narrow economic self, that of mainstream economics, the broad economic self is narrowed considerably to remove all volitional features stretching beyond those of a present human. Thus interests, for instance, are restricted to selfish interests, those of the human concerned, to exclude both altruistic interests (those of relevance to other items and typically against a creature's own selfish interests) and, more important, other-directed and higher-order interests (such as a's interest is that Ws interest be fulfilled, a's concern for~' etc.) 40 This narrow self tightens up a further dictionary sense, namely OED '5. One's personal welfare and interests as an object of concern; chiefly in a bad sense, selfish or self-interested motives ... '. The tightened-up restrictive notion lies at the base of most modern social science. It is characteristically coupled with the Hobbesian theme, according to which all motivation reduces to that of narrow economic selves, effectively self-interest. Such psychological egoism, that nothing can move a creature to action or decision except interests and like experiences of its own self, was assumed by Spinoza, who proposed absorbing this 40 These points are much further explained in 79 and EP. Other selves, such as altruistic selves and self-effacing selves, deploy quite different obverse restrictions, eliminating local selfish interests. 73 excessively narrow self in a generous Nature (p.57). Deep ecology has attempted to expand this sorry route (p.54), which starts out from a dominant paradigm mistake. 41 11. More troubles with Self as foundation. The big trouble is that an expanded Hobbesian picture, with expanded-self interest as the only fundamental motive, presupposes the essential correctness of Hobbes' crude theme - all that Hobbes really got wrong was the 'size' of one's self - but that is a fundamental mistake. It is a mistake as fundamental as the conflicting crude motivational theme that the only basic motive of business enterpreneurs is [self-]profit. It is a mistake of the same cast as the pervasive idea that conventional ethics can be rendered environmentally adequate just by expansion of those it applies to (expansion of the "community", or of a suitable base class of parties with interests, sentience, etc.) - what is often now called 'moral extensionism' 42 . As empirical evidence tells, prima facie decisively, against intertwined Hobbesian and entrepreneurial economic motivational theory - an extraordinarily convenient, and not "rationally" abandoned, theory for contemporary power elites - two substantially successful theory-saving strategies swing into action: • a sustained propaganda campaign to align people's motives with the theory, conducted through advertising, education and other mass channels of persuasion; • a sustained reduction campaign by subservient intellectuals to show that all apparently exceptional motives actually conform to the motivational theory. At the same time, minorities (such as pre-industrial peoples) whose motives do not conform to the established/ment theory are of course discounted. This seriously flawed anti-environmental theory should be resisted and replaced, not just extended. For the only basic and legitimate motives and interests are not merely those of self (whether expanded in a futile attempt to encapture other or not). One distinct motive is, to put it in old-fashioned Kantian terms though the example is not Kantian, that of duty, duty for instance to this Earth, duty which is neither self-regarding or necessarily Self-regarding or, in any ordinary sense, otherregarding. 41 The chauvinistic expansion of self and person is sometimes carried to remarkable lengths, as revealed by Shepard: 'we must affirm that the world is being a part of our own body'. 42 For further explanation and criticism of this expansion, see EP. At least Fox does Sylvan the "favour" of distancing him from the most famous exponent of such extensionism, Leopold, whom he tries to push into the wider identification and wider Self fold (p.64). 74 A third complementary strategy renders the theory normative: while agents may act, or appear to act, on non-self-interested motives, it is only rational to act according to one's ongoing self-interest. (While we shall focus upon a strong version of the normative egoistic theme, that it is only rational to act in one's own self-interest, including one's future self, much of what is said counts against weaker forms of the theme according to which it is in some way preeminently reasonable to act in one's own on-going self-interest.) This normative assumption depends crucially however upon a specially-tailored theory of self- a substantial underlying self that suitably integrates all one's interests and concerns, past, present and future. Without such an account the peculiar self-evidence normative egoism is presented as enjoying, and upon which it depends as an unargued rest position, begins to fall away. Suppose instead a self or person is represented as a sequence of causally connected experiential moments (e.g. momentary selves, of a person). Unfortunately then, for normative egoism, it ceases to be evident to many presently placed selves that there are special specially-valid reasons for only being concerned with future elements of one particular sequence rather than another, to which one's present self may not belong; for promoting the interests of this future momentary self rather than some other more congenial one, perhaps in another sequence. 43 Indeed it is evident that reasons for action are not confined to those intermalised to the interests of one future self rather than another, one my or thou or it (say) rather than another; that reasons can and do operate beyond interests, as when directed at the futures of forests or fens, and beyond selves and their extensions and variants such as I's and Thou's and You's, as when arguing for deep environmental action. Nor is there cogent reason for trying to curtail reasons to what answers to a bad, if deeply incalcated, theory, a pernicious and damaging, if widely promoted, theory and sense of self joined to chauvinistic bodily consumption and advancement. A more generous itemtheoretic theory of total self can expose this theoretical fraud, allowing for a full flowering of reasons for action; it thus diffuses the narrow greedy self of Hobbesian theory. Expanded Hobbesian is assumed in deep ecological Ego-tripping (pp. 65-66) and in 'the theme of ecological resistance as Self-defence', that resisting ecological depredation is defending oneSelf, because the whales or forests are me; it is me that is being injured (p.61). Such expanded Hobbesian is even less plausible than Hobbesianism itself - among other things because you can go on, to become other You's even after You as the forest has been destroyed. Be sure I do not deplore, but welcome worthwhile ecological resistance 43 On all these points see further Perrett, esp. p.72. Perrett explains how the regularly assumed opposition between egoism and altruism depends on particular assumptions about the nature of self, and breaks down when, as in buddhist ethics with its doctrine of no-self, these assumptions get removed. 75 whether conducted as Self-defence, or not; good works, even if undertaken for self-ish or distorted or ridiculous motives, are not to be disparaged. Nor similarly should the help of campaigners whose motives have been distorted by propaganda systems be disparaged because those campaigners are engaged on dubious or bizarre bases, such as that they are defending themselves rather than something else that deserves their care, concern and respect. What should be resisted are the twin ideas that these are the wholesome motives or the only [rational] motives, and that quality of motivation does not affect goodness of act. The main trouble then with the wild Western approach so advanced under Self-interest is that, like Hobbesianism but on an expanded scale, it would reduce or suppress all other motivation. In many ways, it has not really got beyond bad "old paradigm" thinking, but merely bizarrely extended it. 12. Liquidating Fox's "deep ecological territory". The success Fox imagines expanded-Self is going to have in the environmental struggle arena, a success far surpassing that environmental ethics is likely to have (p.84), is premissed on this faulty expanded Hobbesianism theory. It is not based on monitored field experience. In the action field, where some Western deep ecologists are seldom seen, identification techniques, far from admirably shifting the onus of proof (a dubious claim also advanced on p.84 ), are likely to be greeted with amazement and disbelief: what is this crap? It is not very long ago that people who thought they were tigers or trees were locked away, or else regarded, like the man who identified his wife as a hat, as figures of fun not to be taken seriously. Such motivation is likely to be taken, and presented, by a hostile and backwards opposition as crazy. Furthermore, such defences can back-fire. Identification with a rainforest, for instance, because symmetrical, does not guarantee defence of its needs as one's own, as against one's own needs as its. A powerful bunch of developers and bureaucrats who identify with the forest may take their needs, for timber profits and tourist revenues, as its, and interfere with it accordingly. Identification, on its own, admits disastrous reversal. Expanded Selves can be dubious allies in environmental struggles. It is fortunate then that for almost all environmental purposes, including those of deep environmental philosophy, the notion of self can drop out; selves are inessential. While 76 decent theories of self and self-Self can presumably be worked out44 , and Self tried out as sole primitive, the theory so far, and with it (Western) deep ecological theory in present form remains both a shambles and an embarrassment. It is bad news then, given the abysmal shape of the deep ecological theory of self, that deep ecology should contract, at least on Fox's continuing vision, to a theory of self (see also 89). On this presentation much of authentic deep ecology is thrown away. The deep ecological framework comes down to 'two basic hypotheses and on ultimate norm', all of which revolve around Self (pp.86-7): it is Self, Self and Self, nothing but Self. And it has nothing essentially to do with the environment. For Self does not provide the great new (or shabby old) starting point to environmental philosophy that Fox imagines. To elaborate:One "hypothesis", already criticised, is that 'Our Self is that with which we identify' (p.86, the pluralisation is interesting, e.g. a vintage car club has a group Self which includes their cars and perhaps others they covet); the other, not previously encountered, is that 'the self can and does grow/develop/mature ... over time' (p.17). That hypothesis is presumably false; for selves, like plants, may decline, wither or die. Or don't ecological selves wither and die? 'The norm is that the ideal state of being is one that sustains the evident (and deepest) possible identification and, hence, sense of Self'. It seems to be assumed that the ideal state, identified in the "norm", ought to be striven for (though it is hard to see why: it involves much unpleasant, embarrassing or boring identification work, etc.). There are accordingly covert principles of conduct, such as striving towards the norm and undertaking the "real spiritual work" of deep ecology, and covert values, such as that of the (so-called) ideal state, lurking at the bottom of Wes tern deep ecology; it too hides, even in its reduced form, a condemned "axiology" and ethics. But not environmental ones; the norm could have issued from a deviant Hinduism, without environmental commitments, concerned above all with introverted cultivation of self. Although Fox says the 'ideal state of being is referred to ... as "ecological consciousness" by Devall and Sessions' (p.87), such reference does not make it so; ecological consciousness involves rather awareness of and commitment to certain things and matters ecological, not widest identification, which involves much that is unecological, such 44 Perhaps following through suggestions sketched earlier, perhaps elaborating, in less anthropocentric style, T.H. Green, whose theory appears to anticipate much of wild Western deep ecology. Green took self-awareness as a guide to the nature of things and self-realisation as each person's goal. He held that the developed self is the end which defines the good, and that all ethical terms may be formed, so far as required, to that end. Of course he also spoke against atomism and individualism, and in favour of holism and organicism. 77 as traffic with occult and transfinite, or antiecological, such as identification with developers ripping down rainforest and heritage works. While Fox does claim that consequences for the natural (not the built) environment do follow from his framework, the claim is mistaken. According to him, 'it follows ... that when we harm or limit the flow of nature then we are harming or limiting that with which we ... identify and so diminishing our ... Self' (p.87). No such consequence follows as regards widest possible identification; all that destruction of an ecosystem does is to put the ecosystem in a possible world, with which identification is sustained, and bring up a different and perhaps humanly improved world (e.g. a wild river is dammed to save villages). The remote Self is unperturbed by such commerce of actuality. Even if Fox should try to save the show by again restricting awkward or uncomfortable identification feats, his intended consequences do not follow. For we may well increase that with which we identify by "limiting the flow of nature", for instance by varying or enriching parts of extensive monotonous natural systems. 45 Fox's deep ecological-framew ork, Self-indulgence of a deep spiritual cast, is no framework for an environmental anything. Luckily it is not needed, but can be despatched with other deep ecological rubbish. 13. Justifying "extreme interpretations" of and "extreme reactions" to wild West deep ecology. Fox exhibits full dominant paradigm outrage at what he refers to as my 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (boldface headings for sections 3 and 4, p.13 and p.19). While I am quite accustomed to being called or accounted an extremist, it is generally done by those far on the shallow side of the environmental divide. I trust such terms as 'extreme' carry no more weight with readers than they do with me. It is a fashionable, but methodologically quite unsound, ploy to try to dismiss those who depart far from some lately received position as extremists. Nowadays even 'Thomas Aquinas, for example, is depicted as an 'extremist' (by Hart) and dismissed because the views he expressed do not accord with what "all lawyers think" (Dworkin)' ;46 one is in good company. The Earth will in the longer term be helped by deep environmental extremists 45 That Fox's theory (already epicycling, into dimensions) admits such cases is evident from "the extinction example" (pp. 82-3). Because they are sufficiently evident, I have not recorded difficulties regarding this example, which attempts to discriminate different sorts of environmental losses by their differential effects on Selves (if there are any ecological ones left that is: Last Self arguments retain their bite and smile). 46 According to H. Miles in a curious letter to the ANU Reporter 1989. 78 who serve to shift various balances in environmental directions - the balances to be achieved, for example, in discussions, in time allowed in decision making, and so on. But what Fox also says he means, under the emotive overlay, is that 'Sylvan's arguments show a tendency to push the claims of those he criticises to extremes' through application of the following reduction-of-relations principles: S 1. 'if two concepts/ideas are linked, then they must be completely similar (equivalent [identical])'; S2. 'if they are contrasted then they must be completely different (i.e. non-intersecting) as well as completely exhaustive (i.e. covering all cases/examples of the set in question)' (p.13 and earlier). All these principles (S2 breaks down into a pair straightaway) are evidently fallacious, and only hold in very special cases. Now I claim to be well aware of this, and to have illustrated this awareness sufficiently in my work (esp. investigation of the history of the attempt to remove or suppress relations, investigation of very special cases, such as "classical relevant logics", where a connections of the form, "where Rab then a = b" does hold; see JB and RLR respectively). Indeed I discuss an example of this 'crude fallacy' in one of the sectors that particularly excites Fox (Cp.27). But in any case, the principles are substantially irrelevant to Fox's discussion of 'extreme interpretations' and 'extreme reactions' (in his sections 3 and 4)! For, as we shall see, what really bothers Fox, and also N aess, has little that is not superficial (merely terminological) to do with extremes; what troubles them rather is that I take their claims seriously, and not as forever 'preliminary', or at 'a superficial level', or 'metaphorical' or the like (see e.g. p.13, p.49). 47 Firstly, I introduced the quasi-technical term 'extreme holism' ('extreme' was italicised to indicate its introduction and quasi-technical character, not to emphasize my extremism) as contrasted with 'moderate holism' .48 That is obviously not an extreme claim, it is not pressing a claim to extremes; it is simply using a piece of terminology, and does nothing for Fox's cause. I take seriously Naess's holistic claim, repeated by incautious deep ecologists, that his conception 'dissolves ... the very notion of the world as composed of discrete, compact, separate "things"', which I describe as 'extreme holism'. 47 One day I should really like some non-preliminary formulations from Naess. Quite separately from that standing request, I do regard it as pretty ridiculous to insist that ordinary discourse about chairs and desks, fems and wombats is 'talking at a superficial or preliminary level of communication'. Perhaps we have to expect this sort of twaddle from hard-wired physicalists, not from deep thinkers. 48 It is a contrast previously discussed, in more detail but in different terms, in EP, p.222ff. 79 Fox's response to my reporting of Naess's claim, in the style of Dr. Johnson (no separate things, so no wildernesses!, no forests!), his only response it seems, is '(Does Sylvan) sincerely think that anybody could be that silly?' (p.14). The answer is of course: Yes, damned right he does; for example, too many influenced by Hegelianism. It 1s unremarkable that Fox and Naess are trying to backtrack without appearing to do so. 49 Where, then, is the (non-quotational) extreme interpretation? Fox makes two connected moves, neither of which duly involve principles Sl and S2. Firstly, he introduces a distinction, not previously in the ballpark, between relative and absolute autonomy of "things in the world" (p.14). As commonplace in Fox's practice, the apparent distinction is introduced and put to work without proper explanation. Then Fox announces that 'it is clear from his interpretation that he [Sylvan] takes Naess and myself to be denying even relative autonomy ... whereas it should be clear ... that what is being denied is absolute autonomy'; and he has the audacity to go on, ' ... there is really no excuse for Sylvan's extreme interpretation' (p.14). Well, you can take my word for it that Sylvan did not take N aess and Fox that way; the distinction in question had not been introduced in the literature under discussion. For similar reasons, that there is no basis for it, there is no extreme interpretation, and nothing to underwrite Fox's captious moralising. Secondly, Fox proceeds quite scurrilously to make it look as if I am attributing certain themes I nowhere allude to him and Naess (but in fact attacked in Wilber's book). ' ... Sylvan's extreme interpretation ... would have Naess and myself reduce all diversity and multiplicity to something like "uniform, homogeneous, and unchanging mush" or to "uniform, all-prevading, featureless but divine goo"'. The quotations, which may well look as if they were drawn from my criticism, bear no resemblance to anything I attributed to Naess or Fox; they are in fact drawn from Wilber's fashionable Eye to Eye. Similarly that 'extreme interpretation' is not to be found in Sylvan; it is a fabrication on the part of Fox. Nothing I made critical use of tells against Naess's total-field exhibiting various features, such as some internal differentiation. The Flux of late nineteenth century philosophy was both non-uniform and non-homogeneous, with 'eddies, ripples and whirlpools in a stream ("unity in process")' (p.15), without being composed of separate individuals. The other example Fox includes in his section in extreme interpretations, the matter of internal relations, will also require, to begin with, some grimy textual exegesis, including further inspection of Fox's practice of tactical misquotation (or quotation out of context), 49 Their behaviour is reminiscent of Parmenides and Zeno at the races, as delightfully related by Bouwsma. 80 rather than real philosophical work. 50 But here no attempt is made to exhibit an 'extreme interpretation' (nor again do principles Sl and S2 enter). Fox's first (and final) point is that subscription to a doctrine of internal relations 'does not necessarily render one an idealist' (p.17). Whereupon, by way of counterexample, Fox trots out his own admirable philosophical pedigree, and reveals a doctrine of internal relations inherited from the neutral monism of Spinoza and the process philosophy of Whitehead, both well known for their doctrines of internal relations. N aess does at least make it evident that he is adopting or adapting the received theory of internal relations. As it happens, I did not commit myself to the proposition that a doctrine of internal relations (however characteristic of idealism) entails idealism; naturally there appears to be more to idealism than that (such as a total-field doctrine). Only by a misreading or misquotation does Fox obtain his necessarily linkage to idealism. Firstly he represents me as ascribing to him 'this "idealist theory of internal relations"' (p.15), when what I actually wrote was that a certain 'form of argument ... commandeers elements of the idealist theory of internal relations' (p.27 emphasis added). Later he congratulates himself upon 'discrediting Sylvan's claims that deep ecology subscribes ... to his characterisation of the theory of internal relations, which he describes (p.28) as "a terminal form of idealism newly warmed up"' (p.18). To credit to me 'a characterisation of the theory of internal relations' is certainly a gross overstatement, though it may be convenient in trying to exonerate the doctrine of deep ecology from evident criticism. But the immediate salient point is that what I say 'looks like a terminal form of idealism ... ' (C p.28 emphasis added) is not the theory of internal relations but 'what Fox describes as "the central intuition of deep ecology"'. The second, of Fox's three points as to my comments on the deep ecological doctrine of internal relations, is a bit more philosophically substantive, and concerns the character of the necessity ascribed to connections. But textual exegesis is again unavoidable. Fox contends that 'Naess's definition of internal relations ... flatly contradicts Sylvan's claim that this view point renders "all connections necessary" in the ... sense Sy Ivan intends' (p.16; Fox has the term 'strong' where dots are inserted; we'll look at what Fox is trying to hang on me shortly). 51 On Naess's explanation, an internal 'relation between two things A and B is such that the relation belongs to the definitions or basic constituents of A and B, so that without the relation, A and Bare no longer the same things' (see p.15). Consider any 50 By and large, deep ecology involves disturbingly little real philosophical work. So much of it is name dropping, rank pulling, unacknowledged borrowing - all the old stuff some of us hoped to be rid of with a "new environmental paradigm". 51 In fact I had been arguing from Fox's theme that "all entities are constituted by their relations" (see C pp.27-8), but Fox diverts the issue to Naess. 81 internal connection R between A and B (indeed on the standard theory where all relations of objects are internal, any connection). Then ARB holds by virtue of definitional or constitutional features of A and B. But what so holds, holds as a matter of necessity (is 'necessarily constitutive' in Fox's lingo, Fox trying again for a resolving distinction); whence the connection holds of necessity. A flat contradiction? Now to the 'strong sense' Fox has located and is spreading abroad that I intend (once again he did not consult me as to what I intended). 'Sylvan is claiming', according to him (though I have never advanced such a claim, and am still not clear what it means, 'exact nature of' being Fox's terminology), 'that the exact nature of all those relationships is also necessary' (p.16). Now in trying to show that Naess's story conflicts with this claim he has hung on me, Fox proceeds to run Naess into deep trouble (though Naess is blithely oblivious; see note (22)). For, so Fox says,5 2 'Naess explicitly acknowledges that A and B can exist "without" the relation"', meaning "'in a different relationship" or "in the absence of that specific relation"' (p.16). Suppose such a different relation is S (at worst S is the absence of R). So apparently ASB and not-ARB; whence A, for instance, has inconsistent properties, namely both ... RB which is constitutive and not- ... RB by acknowledgement . To be sure, the difficulty can be avoided, by insisting (as N aess did and as Fox also has him say) that 'without the relationship, A and B are no longer the same things', so what we have is A'SB' and not- A'RB' for some counterparts A' and B' of A and B. Some such line is taken by the standard theory. But Fox seeks a connection between A and B for Naess which is in some respects contingent. Certainly that is possible, but it goes beyond the bounds of the standard theory by admitting external relations, for which it is not required that A and B are no longer the same without the relation. And, in a straightforward sense, it fails the constituting claim: entities have relations, external ones, which are not constituting (to deal with Fox-past), or alternatively (to refute Fox-present, p.17) it is false that 'all relationships are necessarily constitutive' because some, external ones, are not. My wombat example, to come to Fox's third point, was designed to indicate just that, that a wombat stands in various relationships which are not (necessarily) constitutive and which are merely contingent. Suppose wombat A passed by hollow stringbark B on its foraging route (say once only, and accidentally, because it had wandered out of its territory). Then "A passed by B" is a relation between A and B, a true relation, which furthermore is merely contingent, because it might not have transpired. Moreover, the relation is not constitutive, for instance of A, because it makes no difference to the nature or 52 The claim attributed to Naess does not appear in his original 1973 paper where the relational total field image was presented, and from which the other Naess' quotes were drawn. 82 constitution of wombat A. What I mean by term 'constitute' (and likewise 'constitutive') Fox professes unclarity about this (p.17) - is what is ordinarily meant by the term in such contexts, namely what makes a thing what it is, what determines it (see OED), what gives a definite nature or character to (see Concise English). 53 Wombat A, one and the same A, a creature with exactly the same make-up as A, not some counterpart or surrogate A', might not have passed by B. So "passed by B" is not constitutive of A; and again not all relations are constitutive. Despite the general paucity and poorness of argument in much revealed deep ecology literature, the general downgrading of rational and analytic methods 54 , and the emphasis on experiential and empathetic approaches, the status of argument turns out to be a sensitive issue too. Fox beats up an issue on this topic, on route to the grander issue of intellectual rubbish, by his standard practice of misattribution. He proceeds stealthily to amend my aside, '(argument often not being considered in the proper style of such a nonanalytical enterprise as deep ecology)', which I believe I can sustain, to the assertion 'that argument is not in the "proper style" of deep ecology' (p.20), which I did not make (for all Fox's kind attribution) and would not want to defend. I wish decent argument and careful reasoning were more often considered in the proper sty le of deep ecology, and more often practised. Then I should be more enthusiastic about it, writing much less critical of it, and castigating less as rubbish. Fox, I am afraid, has done little to convince me that 'closely measured intellectual argument is thoroughly in keeping with the style of deep ecology' (p.20) or that it is much of a priority. He offers but two examples: he stands on his own record as attested in his Response (how can I say anything unfavourable about that), and he appeals, forgetting I said 'often ... considered', to an exceedingly loose talk by Devall on the Stone/Sky path, which mentions 'logical analyses of ideas, premises, systems of thought' and 'formal statements of definitions of key terms, explication of relationships', but deliberately avoids any such work, preferring instead, in characteristic deep ecological style, 'a steeper ... path that requires ... the "real work"', consciousness elevation, jnana yoga or psychedelic drugs maybe (pp.21-2). 14. Transpersonal logic and methodology. 53 It is proponents of the dubious doctrine of internal relations - a doctrine quite inessential to and external to deep environmentalism - who are forced into assigning an extraordinary meaning to constitute. 54 The Counter-Enlightenment antipathy to analytic and rational methods resurfaces in Western deep ecology. For an example in Fox's Response, consider his remarks on the 'blunt tools of logical analysis' when applied to the 'real world of communication' (p.11), which could almost have come from the late eighteenth century. 83 The quaint relation-reduc tion principles, S 1 and S2, do show up with the first premisses of what Fox dignifies with the misleading titles of "false equivalence argument" and "false contrast argument". The second title is particularly misleading, because there is a recognised traditional fallacy of "false contrast" or "false dichotomy" (arising as regards classifications), which differs from Fox's defective "false contrast argument". Fox has proceeded to latch onto my legitimate use of traditional logic, as when I say (rightly or wrongly) that Devall and Sessions are operating with a false contrast (p.11), in order to saddle me with a defective argument of his own concoction which I do not apply. But to show that these defective arguments, which Fox accuses me of heavily and repeatedly applying (p.6, p.11 ), are not deployed by me in the way Fox alleges, we shall need to look at the arguments. To avoid further confusion with tradition, let us relabel the arguments, replacing 'false' by 'foxy'. Let A and B be terms (Fox has 'concept/idea'); let a be a person or group whose views are under criticism. Then the foxy equivalence argument, set down pretty much in Fox's way, runs as follows Key Premiss. When a links A with B (i.e. maintains that ARB for some relation R), claim a holds that A=B. Subargument. Show there are cases where A without B or B without A, whence A;;:: B. Conclusion according to Fox: ' the "argument" (i.e. the claim that A = B) is "false" or that it "fails"' (p.6). An immediate observation is that Fox has not succeeded in setting down what he is after with much success. The conclusion, which does not make use of the key premiss, is a mess. As he hasn't located an argument, in 'the claim that A = B', he has perhaps felt obliged to put critical terms in italics, or perhaps he imagines he is quoting me - what is going on is unclear. He might have concluded, though a level up, that the "false equivalence argument" itself fails, a conclusion he doesn't explicitly draw, but then he would be left without a conclusion at all for the foxy equivalence argument. There is a valid traditional argument, filling out the subargument that is buried in the foxy argument as intended. In a standard logical format, with A( c) symbolising that c is or has A or that A applies to c, it runs as follows:!. A= B hypothesized claim (imposed on a) 2. A( c) iff B(c) for every case c 3. A(c) & ~B(c) for some case c standard case expansion of 1 further data 4. ~2 from 3 5. ~(A= B) from 4 6. ~(A= B) reductio, discharging the hypothetical argument 84 Thus the claim, that A= B, is indeed false, as its negation is categorically established, given the data. But again the argument, now valid, makes no use of the key premiss. A proper fuller version of the argument would replace 3 by the disjunction, A(ci) & -B(ci) V. -A(c2) & B(c2) for some cases ci and c2, and consider each disjunct. But the result would be the same, namely 6 categorically. The preceding represents the valid core of the foxy equivalence argument. What of the key premiss however? That part also can be rendered correct, but upon assumption of the quite defective S 1. To convert this part of the argument into available logical form, let us replace holding or maintaining functors by a correspondin g asserting or (more satisfactorily) commitment to asserting functor. (Should you imagine a fast one is being pulled just read 't-a' as 'a holds that'). Then the key dubious premiss becomes, at first approximation. KP. from a is committed to asserting A is related to B, i.e. ARB, infer that a is committed to asserting that A= B (or A= B). Expressed in symbols in implicational form it looks as follows: KP➔ . .,_a ARB ➔ . t-a A= B. This form makes it easy to see how the key premiss derives from relation-reduction S 1, i.e. ARB ➔ A = B, namely by a standard distribution of the committed-to -asserting functor, .,_a, or specifically by the rule x ➔ y / t-a x ➔ t-a y. S1 is the way to arrive at KP. Moreover without S 1, there is little basis for KP. Now the arguments can be put together. We argue to KP➔, e.g. from Sl. We run out the subargument to ~(A= B), from which we conclude a is wrong or mistaken in asserting A = B. Then we proceed back across KP➔ (using what results from it by distribution of the mistake functor W, namely W t-a A= B ➔. W t-a ARB), to conclude that our friends a were wrong in maintaining, as they did, that A is linked to B. Exposure of that part of the argument involving KP➔ is enough to at least suggest that I am unlikely to rely on it heavily, since it is manifestly defective when so exposed, relying upon the already jettisoned S 1. Fox, for all his assertions, does nothing to show that I do rely on it heavily; indeed he does not show that I rely upon it at all. For all his effort in eliciting these arguments (shoddy though his work may be), he fails entirely to follow through and show how they apply. Consider his "example" of the foxy argument at work, and supposedly scrutinized, where the terms involved are life and value (p.7). Fox's conclusion does not appear, no conclusion is reached. Moreover the key premiss is not instantiated, nor is any evidence of its use advanced; it is knocked down to the claim, deriving from certain deeper positions, that life= value. Whence the sort of argument that I am alleged to be employing 'in a totally 85 fallacious manner' comes down to the valid traditional subargument. Fox's complaint is not about an argument at all, it is about the premiss. As Fox concedes 'this argument is fine, it's just that the original claim is false' (p.7)! Let's take time out from the argument to consider the original claim. What Fox reports that 'Sylvan ... claims, [namely] that (U.S.) "West Coast deep ecology" equates life (A) and value (B)', differs significantly from what Sylvan did write, namely 'the impression comes through from much West Coast deep ecology (from certain insufficiently penetrating intermediate positions) that what is important is ... life and nothing but life' (Cp.16). No universal claim, no equation, no falsehood. Naturally there are some commitments, but Fox hasn't taken much care with those, or got them right either. For example, Sylvan does not offer a definition (of his own or of any sort) of 'biospherical' (which does not mean 'earth-centered') or of 'biocentric', but relies on standard meanings (accordingly, too, he cannot 'refute his own ... definition'). The position with the foxy contrast argument is very similar to that already dealt with, a similar shambles. The argument is exactly the same except that equality or (strong) equivalence,= , is replaced throughout by a dual notion, exclusive disjunction, symbolised V. But Fox does not dualise properly; instead of the dual conclusion, "the argument (i.e. the claim that A V B) is "false" or that it fails", he misleadingly introduces the traditional fallacy terms, as if they were new terms without a predetermined sense. He has it that we 'conclude that the contrast in question is a "false contrast" or a "false dichotomy'" (p.8). Once again, a properly developed illustration of the argument is not offered, and in the very sketchy "example" given the argument drops out. It turns into a question - an interesting question - of the use, point, and merit of the shallow/deep distinction. Let's take time out to consider the issues raised, as some are important. But first some trivia. Fox, in effect, charges me with presenting a straw-person, as no one (but me) takes the shallow/deep distinction as exhaustive of environmental positions. Well, he has led a sheltered life; I've met too many activists who do. Fox implies that I 'want to assign the shallow/deep terminology to the "historical scrap-heap"' (p.9). Here, and elsewhere, Fox apparently joins the activists who conflate the shallow/deep distinction with the shallow ecology/deep ecology distinction. It is only deep ecology that I have contemplated for the scrap heap, not the shallow/deep distinction. More important is the status of such illdefined items as deep ecology. Fox now assumes that shallow and deep ecology, however imperfect, are "ideal types", the merit of which is to be assessed pragmatically, through their usefulness, heuristic roles, etc. Some scepticism is warranted. Ideal types such as protestant and middle class might be defensible in sociological investigations where there are plenty of protestants or middle class people to survey, but what is supposed to correspond with deep ecology? The comparison has serious problems. Western deep 86 ecologists have yet to get their theoretical slum in order, to rectify their classifications, clean up the objects of these, and so forth. 15. More rubbish removal, especially that borrowed from pop science. Along with a substantial upgrading of the calibre of argumentation in deep ecology should go extensive removal of rubbish, such as the unnecessary doctrine of internal relations. The image of philosophers removing the rubbish, which comes from Locke, is much favoured in Australia, and has been deployed by both Armstrong and Passmore. 55 It tends to accompany the picture of real philosophy 'as tough, practical, rational and secular', which Sessions deplores, in the case of environmental ethics, as 'neither desirable nor necessary, and perhaps not possible'. 56 While such an approach is hardly necessary it is certainly possible: it is a divisive issue whether it is desirable. As is increasingly appreciated these days, there are various sorts of rubbish, which can be separated; so too in philosophy there is more than one sort of rubbish. Not all of it is nonsense or quite unintelligible (pace p.23). Considerable parts of prevailing religions have been dismissed as rubbish (see OED examples); but while some parts, such as the doctrine of Trinity, may be accounted unintelligible, most parts would not. They are regarded rather as substantially false as well as seriously flawed in important respects, and perhaps also as pernicious or largely worthless (and likely as unnecessary). Evidently, then, there are several distinguishable components to rubbish; and, as dictionary senses reveal (e.g. OED: 'worthless, ridiculous, nonsensical ideas, discourse, or writing'), there may be quite a variety of ideological and intellectual rubbish. Rubbish, of all sorts, is hard to escape these days; unfortunately it is easily encountered in both deep ecology and popular science. Many environmental philosophers, Fox is one, do seem to be highly attracted by a very fashionable cutting edge, along with a semi-respectable crank end, of recent diverting popular science. It is almost enough to look at the cast of witnesses Fox pulls in for defence of his unstated theme that there is no 55 According to Locke, 'it is ambition enough to be employed as an under-labourer in clearing the ground a little and removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way of knowledge'. Contrary to the impression Fox tries to convey, here and elsewhere, it wasn't so much a matter of 'following Passmore' (except in a dilute temporal sense, in which I always follow Aquinas when I agree with him), as of following a larger tradition. 56 This part of Session's essay is quoted approvingly in Fox's Response, p.44. Sessions should be rapped over the knuckles for his sexist citations (which Fox too does little to rectify). 87 rubbish in deep or transpersonal ecology (the theme is enthymematically Self-refuting, so to say). The cast includes Capra, Davies, Bohm, Wilber, Gribbin, Pegals, Zukav, Prigogine, d'Espagnat, Sheldrake, Pribram, Comfort and Walsh. There is ample rubbish littering the works of some of these authors, some of which finds its way into Western deep ecology (e.g. Fox's Section 4, and also e.g. pp. 58-9). It is instructive to look at a couple of examples of prime rubbish early in the work of Gribbin cited:- First 'Isaac Newton invented physics, and all of science depends on physics' (p.7). Observe that this conjoint claim, which luckily does not drift into deep ecology, is intelligible, but it is ridiculous 57 ; and observe, furthermore, that there is no straightforward way of recycling such intellectual rubbish. Second, 'what quantum mechanics says is that nothing is real and that we cannot say anything about what things are doing when we are not looking at them' (p.2). As Gribbin presents quantum mechanics as true, we can detach to achieve his shocking headlines and like assertions; so for instance, 'Nothing is real unless it is observed' (p.3), naive phenomenalism. Remarkably, Gribbin is hardly obliged to generate the amount of striking rubbish he does (but then he is a scientific journalist), because of his later proclivity towards a "many worlds" interpretation of quantum mechanics, which affords one neat way of halting production of this type of idealist rubbish. Fox, eager to retain an idealistic Copenhagen interpretation of quantum mechanics for his nefarious metaphysical purposes, fails to take account of Gribbin's later turnabout which effectively repeals the earlier headlines, and actually appeals to Gribbin's "authority" (in note 41) in trying to dispose of the many worlds interpretation! Fortunately we do not have to put up philosophically with the rubbish produced by popular elaborations of the Copenhagen interpretation, which Fox and other avant-garde thinkers would foist upon us. One reason is that micro-features of quantum behaviour very rarely impinge upon macro-phenomena. They thus make little or no real difference to issues of environmental philosophy (only problems tangential to it, such as determinism). Another and major reason is that there are significant alternatives to the Copenhagen interpretation, which at least shed most of the rubbish. And the 'range of choice' is far more extensive than Fox would allow 'if Sylvan did follow his appeal through' (p.27) - yet another example of "false choice". It happens that Sylvan had followed through on some of the further options Fox does not consider, namely 57 If physics and science are the sorts of things that can significantly be invented, then there are plenty of candidates for the claims both before and after Newton, e.g. Einstein if we wish to be really extravagant. As for the extravagant reduction claim, well it is refuted along with physicalism and associated Australian primitivism; see e.g. J.W. Smith and JB . 88 • alternative logic approaches. There are many interesting possibilities here, but few of which physicists have had time or inclination to investigate. My own, rather preliminary, investigations have concerned a uniform relevant logic approach (see uu § 13, on ultramodal quantum logic) and, differently, paraconsistent approaches (see OP p.157ff.) • a neutral worlds interpretation (see my 85). What this amounts to is an ontic neutralisation of many-worlds interpretation. Because of the neutralisation, the 'metaphysical baggage' and unparsimoniousness that Fox complains about are removed. Of course too, since the interpretation corresponds, through the mathematical formalism deployed, to other standard interpretations, it as just as falsifiable (pace note 41 ), and accordingly hardly 'desperate', a mere "just-so" story. These observations, duly elaborated (as attempted, in part, in work alluded to), indicate 'how Sylvan would describe the ontological implications of the "new (ie. post-1920s) physics?"' (p.23 reordered). Briefly, there are many hitherto unknown physical objects at the sub-atomic level whose behaviour is classically anomalous, being partly wavelike and partly particlelike, for which a new and interpretationally difficult theory has been devised. But the positivism and related idealism of early interpretations can be removed by a warranted change of interpretation. And then the ontic implications for ecology and most of environmental philosophy are much less remarkable than Wes tern deep ecology has imagined. Given apparently viable options as to interpretation, all the rubbish Walsh and Fox add to the already problematic Copenhagen interpretation can be packed off (if you can find a way to recycle it, good luck to you). For those who like picking through rubbish (I occasionally collect stuff from the local dump myself), Fox's page 26 is particularly rewarding. But two examples only :- 'What can be known is ... never the independent properties of the observed alone'. So it cannot be known that the wounded wombat (somehow) observed is female, pregnant, and so on. Such astonishing epistemological results are not delivered by the Copenhagen interpretation, which only tells us that knowledge as to quantum happenings is limited by exclusion principles. Similarly for 'the known universe is inextricably linked with consciousness rather than being separable into consciousness and objects of consciousness'. The standard formalism of quantum theory discloses nothing about observers; and while observers do feature in the Copenhagen interpretation these can be simply more measuring or witnessing devices: consciousness does not figure. Even if it did, that would only apply to quantum objects, and would scarcely warrant the grand extrapolations Fox and Walsh wish to make. Furthermore, the Copenhagen interpretation as elaborated is obliged to set quantum domains within wider classical settings always (by contrast with multiple-world interpretations there is no wave function for the universe, etc.); so in the larger setting classical assumptions concerning independence, separability, and so on, are not overthrown, but confirmed. 89 In fact my passing reference to rubbish in Fox's presentations was directed not at Walsh, who was not pretending to tell us what deep ecology is about, but at Fox's reproduction of this material 'in advancing the "unity of process" metaphysics of deep ecology' (p.19). Fox's presentation of the issues (in section 4), with himself as some sort of interested third party in a dispute between Sylvan and Walsh, is substantially misleading; I was not attempting (what is overdue) a critique of transpersonal psychology. What is taken to be known, furthermore, affords little comfort or support for the list of 'ontological implications' that Fox and Walsh wish to draw from the "new physics". Consider some representative exhibits, mostly compressed one-worders, from 'the fundamental ontology now being revealed', with which Fox tells us deep ecology is not merely 'in accord with' but 'throws its full weight behind' (see p.18):- Impermanen t? Some of the newly discovered sub-atomic objects are extraordinarily durable and have experimentally assessed lifetimes of millions of years. Fluid? This attribute of macrosystems does not extend significantly even down to the molecular level; it makes no sense to say that wavicles (or even atoms) flow, they are the wrong sorts of things. Whereas the attribution of impermanence makes straightforward sense (but is substantially false), that of fluidity does not. Empty? Some of the newly located astrophysical objects are extraordinarily dense, packed with matter. Infinitely over-determined? How does this sit with quantum indeterminacy and under-determination? Or with another speculative exhibit from the list: Self-consistent? At least questions of the consistency of the "new physics" and its parts are proper and reasonable. But we are far from being in a position to assert that the theory is consistent. On the contrary, inconsistencies keep emerging in the developing theory, to which often ad hoc repairs are proposed (e.g. with the Dirac o function, renormalization etc.; cf OP). Given the inadequate ramshackle character of the present quantum theory, it is a fair bet that it remains inconsistent. It is a widespread opinion among researchers that the present theory is something of a mess and in much need of improvement. Even so practicing scientists are not hoping for foundations, which tend to be frowned upon these days. However, foundations, such as an extension of von Neumann's axiomatisatio n of part of quantum theory, would help in effecting improvements, and something of the sort is a prerequisite for establishing consistency, if it can be done. Foundationless? What is meant is, apparently, not foundations for the theory, such as axiomatic foundations, nor really basic (atomic) components for what the theory is about. In this sense, Newtonian physics had as foundational elements corpuscles, or particles of certain sorts. It is sometimes said that quantum physics afford no such ultimate building blocks, each apparent stopping point fragmenting into new substructures, most recently quarks. But this idea, which so far appears to lack a satisfactory physical modelling, diverges from the still entrenched paradigm of particle physics which, for all the talk about "new paradigms" in physics, still consists in analytical reduction to ultimates. 90 Such objectual foundations leave open, of course, the question as to whether, and to what extent, new phenomena may emerge, at "higher levels", as the building blocks are variously put together and structured. As with elements, so with microphysical particles, while the zoo of known items has expanded apace, the hope remains that there is a simple underlying explanation in terms of very small ultimates, such as contemporary quarks. Those who looked forward to a quite new outlook emerging from particle physics are bound - if they look at what really goes on nowadays (esp. all the hightech dominant social paradigm aspects) as distinct from what some popular science entrepreneurs say - to be very disappointed. Walsh's "explanation" of what 'foundationle ss' means is something else: 'the universe appears to be ... foundationless and self-consistent in that, since all components and mechanisms are interconnected and interdependent, none are ultimately more fundamental than any other- hence the universe is inexplicable in terms of a limited number of fundamental mechanisms' (p.23, quoting Walsh p.180). This is Fox's example of how 'Walsh provides clear and intelligible meanings to each and every one of the items on the list'! The truth is that Walsh offers nothing of substance on some terms in his list (e.g. 'self-consistent'), and much of what he does offer is like that quoted, garbage. Granted we can make something of some of it, something extravagantly false. Even on Newtonian physics everything is connected, through forces such as gravitation 58 , but some objects are fundamental building blocks. So it is too on the 'new physics', protons for instance are more fundamental than molecules, quarks (if recent theory succeeds and proves consistent) than protons. Some objects are certainly more fundamental than others. And in the "new physics" it is widely assumed that the universe is explicable in terms of a very few principles of mechanist character (e.g. the rashly promised single equation T-shirt). But Walsh's hence clause would not follow, as simple models indicate, even if his premiss had requisite physical cogency. It does deep ecology no credit to include conspicuous rubbish. Nor is there any good reason why it should; the rubbish is not essential to deep ecology. It is not part of the platform for instance, and it is relatively easily removed from (authentic) deep ecology. So much should be evident from my original Critique (as published), and the accompanying 58 Such forces as gravitation offer, of course, nonlocal connections, and delineate fields what are said to be at 'the nub of what these emerging ideas ... of cross-disciplinary parallels ... have in common' (p.23, insert from p.23 and p.21). This confirms the impression that Fox lacks a solid grasp on what is new in the "new physics" and other "new sciences" such as they are, and thereby contributes towards answers to further of Fox's questions (p.23), by undermining their presuppositions. I 91 sketch of deep green theory, intended to function as a relatively rubbish-free relative of deep ecology. It is some measure of the intellectual sloppiness of some of these engaged in presenting and promoting deep ecology that in a recent major text from Naess (Naess 89), the editor and translator, Rothenberg, asserts that my 'critique of deep ecological philosophy ... labels all of deep ecology literature "inconsistent rubbish"' (p.19), somehow achieving a fallacious transition from some to all. But apparently Rothenberg's acquaintance with my Critique was extraordinarily casual, since I didn't use the label 'inconsistent rubbish' (and wouldn't as anyone who had read much of my work, esp. OP, would realise), and since I certainly did not make a universal claim (and wouldn't for reasons already given, which should have been evident). 'The interpretation of the whole thing as rubbish', Rothenberg continues (p.19), 'comes only if you concentrate too much on rereading some of the sketchy formulations of deep ecology philosophies ... '. While endorsing the point about sketchy formulations, no rereading of many deep ecological productions is required to produce rubbish, no projection; several offerings - such as items lifted from trans personal psychology, idealist physics and other esoteric deep ecological sources, and such as Fox's 'sketch map of deep ecological territory' (p.89) - contain notable rubbish of themselves. Unfortunately Rothenberg proceeds, without even a pause, to repeat Fox's regressive conclusion, which would return deep ecology to human psychology, the very fate of earlier establishment-cha llenging ethics, such as (group) egoism and utilitarianism. 'One should steer clear of "environmental axiology" - that is, looking for values in nature', indeed one almost feels, from looking directly at nature at all. Instead, one should seek to change one's whole way of sensing oneself and the world in the direction of identification and Self-realisation .... Fox summarises [this debacle]: The appropriate framework of discourse for describing and presenting deep ecology is not one that is fundamentally to do with the value of the non-human world, but rather one that is fundamentally to do with the nature and possibilities of the Self, or, we might say, the question of who we are, can become, and should become in the larger scheme of things (Rothenberg p.19, quoting Fox p.85). It is a sad fate for a promising philosophy of nature; degeneration into human psychology. While that can no doubt be edifying enough, in the style of uplifting anthropocentric religions, it is hardly the sought new ecological paradigm (p. 71) and only a warped fragment of the sort of philosophy the whole Earth needs. REFERENCES Bennett, D and Sylvan, R., Damn Greenies: Australian perspectives on environmental ethics, a UNESCO project, typescript, Canberra 1989; revised text 1990. f I 92 Bouwsma, O.K., 'Philosophical essays', University Nebraska, Lincoln, 1965, 24-25. Bradford, G. 1987 'How deep is deep ecology?', Fifth Estate 22(3)(1987) 3-30. Broad, C.D., Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul & Others, London, 1944. Devall, B. and Sessions G, Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1985. Devall, B., Simple in Means, Rich in Ends. Practicing Deep Ecology, Peregrine Smith Books, Salt Lake City, 1988. Drengson, A. "Review of Devall and Sessions, Deep Ecology", Environmental Ethics vol 10, nl, 1988. Edwards, J.C., Ethics without Philosophy, University Presses of Florida, Tampa, 1982. Fox, W., Approaching Deep Ecology: A Response to Richard Sylvan's Critique of Deep Ecology, Environmental Studies Occasional Paper 20, University of Tasmania, 1986: unless otherwise indicated all references to Fox are to this study. Fox, W., 'The meanings of "deep ecology"', Island Magazine 32(1989) 32-5; reprinted in The Trumpeter 7(1990) 48-50. Hinckfuss, I., The Moral Society: its structure and effects, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #16, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987. Johnson,L.E., A Morally Deep World, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #17, RSSS, Australian National University, 1987. Mannison, D. and others (eds.), Environmental Philosophy, RSSS Australian National University, 1979; referred to as EP. Naess, A., 'The shallow and the deep, long-range ecology movement. A summary', Inquiry, 16(1973) 95-100. Naess, A., 'Deep ecology disentangled?', typescript, Canberra, 1984. Naess, A., 'Notes on Professor's Sylvan's Critique of the Deep Ecology Movement', typescript, Canberra, 1985. Naess, A. and Rothenberg, D., Ecology, community and lifestyle, Cambridge University Press, 1989. Nettleship, R.L. (ed.) Work of Thomas Hill Green, three volumes, Longman, Green & Co, London, 1889. Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 1971; referred to as OED. Perrett, R.W., 'Egoism, altruism and intentionalism in Buddhist Ethics', Journal of Indian Philosophy 15(1987) 71-85. Priest, G. and Routley, R., On Paraconsistency, Research Series in logic and Metaphysics #1, RSSS, Australian National University, 1984; referred to as OP. Rolston, H. R. IV, Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics, Prometheus Books, Buffalo, 1986. 93 Routley, R., 'The semantical metamorphosis of metaphysics', Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 1974. Routley, Rand V., The Fight for the Forests, Third edition, RSSS, Australian National University, 1975. Routley, R. and V., 'Against the inevitability of human chauvinism', Ethics and Problems of the 21 st Century , (ed. K.E. Goodpaster and K.M. Sayre), University of Notre Dame Press, 1979, 36-59. Routley, Rand V., 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics' in EP; referred to EE. Routley, R., 'Ultralogic as universal?', represented in JB; referred to as uu. Routley, R, Exploring Meinong's Jungle and Beyond, RSSS, Australian National University, 1980; referred to as JB. Routley, R. and Others, Relevant Logics and Their Rivals, Ridgeview, California, 1982. Session, G., 'Ecocentrism, wilderness, and global ecosystem protection', in The Wilderness Condition (ed. M. Oelschlaeger), 1989; to appear. Shepard, P., 'Introduction - ecology and man - a viewpoint' in The Subversive Science (ed. P. Shepard & D McKinley), Houghton Mifflin, Boston, 1969, 1-10. Smith, H., The Religions of Man, Harper, New York, 1958. Smith, J.W., Reductionism and Cultural Being, Nijhoff, The Hague, 1984. Stone, C.D., Should Trees Have Standing? - Towards Legal Rights for Natural Objects, revised edition, Avon Books, New York, 1975. Sylvan, R., 'Windows on Science III, Towards a cosmo-logical synthesis', Research Series in Unfashionable Philosophy, #2, RSSS Australian National University, 1985. Sylvan, R., A Critique of Deep Ecology, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy #12, RSSS 1985; referred to as c. Sylvan, R., 'Mind and its misplacement in nature', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to asMX. Sylvan, R., Deep Plurallism, completed typescript 1990. Walsh, R.N., 'Emerging cross-disciplinary parallels: suggestions from the neurosciences', Journal of Transpersonal Psychology, 11(1979) 175-184. Wenz, P.W., Environmental Justice, State University of New York Press, Albany N.Y., 1988. Wilber, K., Eye to Eye: The quest for the new paradigm, Anchor Press/Doubleday, Garden City N.Y., 1983. ECOLOGICAL ETHICS and ECOLOGICAL POLITICS: turning John MCCioskey's challenge This essay comes first because it offers an advanced introduction to parts of environmental ethics, and to certain significant issues in environmental politics. It is hung, not altogether incidentally, on MCCloskey's little text on the topics, because that is a convenient vehicle for organising the material (it is also a text, written in haste, that deserves more criticism than it has received). Fortunately no one need attempt the onerous business of reading MCCioskey in order to follow the essay, should it succeed. Rather, for the purposes of this essay, MCCioskey and likewise his little work can both be regarded as characters in this piece of intellectual fiction; neither need ever have existed. 1. Conservative, reformative, and radical responses to the impacts of ecology on ethics. There are three broad kinds of responses to the impact of ecology on ethics according to MCCloskey's account, which adapts a standard political classification: radical or revolutionary, reformist, and conservative. Of course there are responses which lie outside this classification, not by disputing the impacts of escalating environmental problems (or the new awareness of nature and its fragility), but by questioning the relevance of the other end of the relation: ethics. Those responses target ethics, its role in evaluating and regulating conduct, or differently, its place in environmental philosophy (see other essays herein). As we too aspire to MCCloskey's elevated view of the importance, potential power, and effective ineliminability of ethics in rational evaluation and conduct, we set aside these gutter responses (which we have argued against elsewhere). Otherwise, the responses are these: Radical. A fundamentally new ethic is required, a non-human-centred nature-centred (or nonanthropocentric ecocentric) ethic and morality, a deeper environmental ethic, what MCCioskey and others call an ecological ethic. According to MCCioskey - who adopts the usual double standard, requiring conspicuously higher standards for new challenging theories than entrenched ones - no one 'has yet succeeded in stating or defending [an ecological ethic] in a systematic way' (p.29). Nonetheless it will turn out, quite remarkably, that MCCioskey himself, if he is at all successful, does, given but a small twist to what he does. 2 There are two standard components to any such ethic: meta-ethical and normative. According to Mccloskey, both components are 'more commonly alluded to than set out and defended in a developed, worked-out form' (p.29). There are, accordingly, two broad problems for an ecological ethics: devising a new meta-ethic, and furnishing a new normative ethic (p.30). Meta-ethics, as well as comprising the study of ethics or ethical systems, includes the logic and analysis of key ethical terms. For the new ethics a critical meta-ethical task is to 'explain valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like' (p.30). Normative ethics involves the organisation, design and structure of systems themselves, their values, principles, constraints and the like. For the new ethics critical normative tasks include explaining and justifying the assignments of value made, especially to natural items independently of species Homo sapiens, and the principles adopted, especially concerning treatment of more natural environments, wilderness, and endangered species of plants and animals. Since all these requirements have been met, to some considerable extent (e.g. in works such as EE), the issue becomes one of adequacy. How adequately have these things been done, in particular in what is now called deep-green theory, and what of significance has been left undone? These are central questions in the on-going dialogue with MCCioskey; they will direct the questions discussed when shortly we get down to the real business of MCCloskey's more substantive objections. Reformist. Instead of a "new" ethic, standard ethical theories are reformed, modifying them or adjusting them at the periphery, 'so as to acknowledge new, specifically ecological values and duties' (p.30). Characteristically the adjustment is to the margins of normative theory, with standard meta-ethics left substantially intact. Animal rights theories which simply adjust utilitarianism to take account of the suffering of other sentient creatures than humanoids, afford a stock example of significant reformism. By contrast, differently designed and defended theories of animal rights may be radical in character. The classification is thus pretty rough and ready; given the comparative vagueness of "newness" and "standardness" as regards ethical theories, the divisions between responses is likewise blunt. Evidently too, the classification only overlaps other classifications of ethics with some vogue, for instance that into shallow, intermediate, and deep (used elsewhere e.g. TE). Thus while reformist utilitarianisms are typically intermediate, a reformist ethic (or even a revolutionary one, such as Nietzsche's has been taken to be) may be substantially shallow. The converse linkages are tighter: only an ethic which merely purports to be conservative can really be intermediate, as MCCloskey's intuitionism is, or deep, as "supplementation" of such intuitionism could 3 be. Conservative. No input from ecology warrants even so much as reform, let alone revolution, in standard ethical theory; all that is required is 'a more informed, more accurate thinking out of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29). MCCioskey claims to defend the stock conservative view that ecological considerations and 'findings ... do not necessitate a basic revolution in ethics but supply a more informed, more accurate thinking out, of our moral obligations and moral rights' (p.29, similarly p.31). Rather than looking hard at the conspicuous difficulties and inadequacies of prevailing ethics, unresolved after thousands of years of investigation, MCCioskey proceeds immediately to try to shift the onus of proof: ' ... no moral philosopher has yet succeeded in either stating or defending it ... a new ecological ethic ... in a systemic way' (p.29, insertion from same page). He alleges, to elaborate on a previous charge, that 'the problem of [a radical] ecological ethics is that of devising a a new meta-ethics, one that explains valuation, and hence values, without reference to human beings, their preferences, pro-attitudes, and the like, and a a new normative ethics that explains both • the value of natural phenomena prior to man's existence and after the extinction of the species Homo sapiens and • why it is morally wrong for man to damage wilderness and endanger or render extinct natural species of plants and animals' (p.30, display inserted). As it happens, all these things have been attempted, as was said and as will become evident - though perhaps in too sketchy and too technical a way so far (it is still early days). For example, why it is wrong to damage pristine wilderness is, at bottom, because such wilderness possesses high intrinsic value - something MCCioskey does not really dispute. How then does he sustain his allegations? For the most part, despite the repeated rhetoric about "arguing" this and that, he doesn't. He simply assumes that 'concern for human well-being' must dominate, that it always has, well almost always has, priority (e.g. p.52). 2. A confused and confusing response: supplemented intuitionism. Furthermore, MCCioskey, although he claims to be defending this conservative 'third view', does not state matters as clearly as he should: he only rules out the 'need for a specifically ecological ethic', not reformism. This constitutes one part of what amounts 4 to substantial cheating in MCCloskey's "conservatism" . 1 A further part consists in adopting an extremely unfashionable ethical theory, an intuitionism supplementing a now little known theory of the kind developed by Ross, as his "standard" ethical theory. Like the rare "ideal utilitarianism", such intuitionism can be much closer to proposed new ecological ethics, given appropriate ideals and intuitions, than standard "standard" ethics (indeed, given a deep tum, they can be tantamount to ecological ethics). But the most important dodge is incorporated in the "supplementation" MCCioskey makes of his "standard" ethic, which far exceeds what it is said to be: Ross 'supplemented by an account of the moral rights of persons' (p.31). For he also concedes himself such objectives as an open-ended 'promotion of good' and coupled 'prima facie obligations to ... promote good' (p.33 and p.31). Moreover, such promotion of good elsewhere expands to a promotion of good, beauty and knowledge (p.36), and to include promotion and preservation of what is intrinsically valuable (p.36); among 'recognised ethical values' is 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' (p.8). Moreover, among what is intrinsically valuable are some (but not all) natural species, some wilderness (p.36), and other valuable natural items such as 'forests, lakes, rivers, seas' (p.31). Such critical "supplementations" mean that MCCioskey can proceed to argue for the preservation of wilderness or natural species in just the ways that most deep environmentalists do; for example, along the lines that an area of wilderness has not merely instrumental value, but evident intrinsic value, which can be felt or intuited (e.g. p.61 bottom). Such supplementations thus lift MCCioskey right out of the normal conservative camp in which he has misleadingly located himself: for that shallow camp does not recognise irreducible values in nature. What he is covertly assuming, in his considerable supplementation of an unusual noncognitive ethic, is at least a significant reform of standard ethics. MCCloskey's ethic is not 'perfectly familiar' historically; more, his insistence (ascribable not to modesty but to political purposes) that it is not 1 There is analogous, if less outrageous, covert cheating in another leading Australian conservative, with whom McCloskey aligns himself: Passmore. For example, Passmore helps himself to a notion of vandalism (deep vandalism involving depreciation or destruction of what has intrinsic value) to which his theory does not entitle him. It has not been much appreciated that Passmore, too, for all his apparently tough conservatism (early on) on ethics, also (characteristically) hedges his claims. A much-quoted passage, endorsed by McCloskey (p.37 italics added), begins: 'what it [the West] needs,for the most part, is not so much a "new ethic" as a more general adherence to a perfectly familiar ethic'. What that familiar ethic is, and how it is to be reformed, Passmore never really tells us. In any case the main conservative theme looks less and less plausible. It is increasingly dubious that better adherence to established ethical and political forms will prove adequate, especially to environmental problems unforeseen by these chauvinistic theories. 5 new is nowhere demonstrated, simply asserted. (In fact the claim is somewhat empty in the absence of sharpened criteria for newness.) How far removed MCCloskey's supplemented intuitionism is from its 'perfectly familiar' source is readily shown by a comparison of MCCioskey with Ross on intrinsic goodness. Ross contends (on the basis of reflection and using an interesting little argument from a then 'widely accepted classification of elements in the life of the soul') that four things, and basically only four things, 'seem to be intrinsically good', all of which are 'ideal states of the mind' (p.140). How far things ethical have moved since the nineteen thirties is also shown by the little argument Ross runs out, as if it was quite decisive, to refute people like MCCioskey who imagine they find intrinsic value beyond states of mind - in wilderness, forests and other material items. 'It might of course be objected that there are or may be intrinsic goods that are not states of mind or relations between states of mind at all, but in this suggestion I find no plausibility. Contemplate any imaginary universe from which you suppose mind entirely absent, and you will fail to find anything in it that you can call good in itself' (p.140). Ross no doubt reflects the conventional ethical wisdom, a narrow wisdom, of his time and place (essentially British ethics of the first half of the twentieth century). But many before Ross, and many more since, have not so failed in finding items of intrinsic worth in the absence of states of mind, in the Earth itself and its natural features for example. Such comparatively successful arguments as those concerning the Last Sentient (in EE), and the world before the rise of mental life, were designed to expose and reinforce such common findings. So much Mccloskey is sufficiently clear about (thereby shortening subsequent argument for a new ethics): 'The negative part of the Routley's argument, that traditional [Western] ethics and contemporary morality are human-centered, is substantially well based. The ecological moral intuitions they seek to explain and justify find no justification in terms of such ethics' (p.58). But in MCCloskey's ethics they do find some confirmation, or rather conformation, in the intrinsic ecological values discerned. Moreover, with but a turn in the intuitions admitted that intuitionistic ethics itself becomes properly deep - just allow the (over-malleable) intuitions to coincide with those of deep ecological consciousness: then deepened MCCioskey is deep ecology. MCCioskey even puts effort into explaining how conventional theories are 'heavily human centered', without appreciating how far it removes him from the 'perfectly familiar' ethic of Ross, and from his own professed conservatism. As a result too, those making too superficial a survey of MCCloskey's complex ethical position, especially if they came at it with preconceptions of what it amounted to, have been seriously misled. Goodin is one reviewer who is undone. By quoting MCCloskey's effort on conventional ethics right out of context, Goodin manages to 6 attribute to Mccloskey the very negation of what he advances, namely 'that all talk of intrinsic value must nevertheless be human-centered' (Goodin p.345). The same applies to what Goodin takes to be 'the punchline' of MCCloskey's position, 'that the environment per se has no independent moral claims upon it. All our duties to protect it must be derived from human-centered concerns' (p.344). Nor does such a punch line emerge from the admittedly convoluted passage quoted in support; for the passage makes the promotion of goodness, which includes promotion of intrinsic value independent of humans, a prima f acie obligation. But Goodin does have excuses. For not merely is MCCloskey's position hard to fathom, but it exhibits confusion and is internally inconsistent. For example, Mccloskey typically presents himself as having, and frequently operates as if he had, an entirely conservative position, when his position is in important respects at least reformist, making allowance for intrinsic values of natural items including wilderness, plants and animals (pp. 52-3); his position is both different, with new elements, and not different, with no new elements. Part of the problem can be traced back to a confusion about intrinsic value (likewise intrinsic goodness), which is both intrinsic, valuable in itself, and not intrinsic, because valuable for something else, typically beauty or human knowledge in the case of natural items. The confusion is manifest in the many intuitive judgements of intrinsic value of natural items advanced simply on the strength of judgements of beauty or ugliness, and appears in such themes as that 'a moral duty to preserve species and wilderness ... is ... based on ... the securing of the intrinsically valuable objects of knowledge and the beautiful' (p.110). It is no longer just 'the securing of the intrinsically valuable' as is earlier said (e.g. p.8); those "intrinsic values" somehow now reduce or answer instrumentally to supposedly human evaluations, i.e. are not "intrinsic" after all, whereupon MCCloskey's seriously damaged position reverts to the shallow conservative position it is often been taken to be. The main features brought out make MCCloskey's ethic, confusions apart, at least a reformist one, not a conservative one. Briefly, MCCloskey's "supplementation " of Ross's theory is so great as to make for a difference of kind. The features also render it what is called an intermediate position. For it admits values in nature, it assigns intrinsic value to some natural objects, while not however allowing values of natural things to sometimes override those of humans. The point is fundamental. 'However, as the theory developed here implies, ultimately, when there is a clear clash between human welfare and human rights on the one hand and the preservation of wilderness and of plant and animal species on the other, human welfare and respect for human rights must prevail ... ' (p.36). Why so? Why preserve this ancient ethical prejudice? Despite the assertion the theory sketched out, the supplemented Ross ethic, does not imply human 7 ethical supremacy. But even if the theory did imply this greater value assumption, the appeal to it in defence of the assumption would be indecently circular. It is no proper defence of proposition p that Shifty's theory implies p, unless Shifty's theory is shown to have independent merit, such as correctness, robustness (i.e. continuing to yield p under reasonable variations), etc. None of the requisite demonstration is attempted. The radically reformed Ross ethic is just assumed. In fact MCCioskey has adduced no decent case for this crucial assumption, which colours much of his text. For it is his repeated insistence on the supreme importance of things human, of Man over the rest of nature, that gives his work its undoubted antienvironmental appearance, which is obnoxiously exhibited at many places in the text. One revolting example concerns venomous snakes: 'today they are a nuisance and a danger to human life and health, concern for which dictates that individuals be accorded the freedom to kill such snakes, to rid their properties of these pests even at the risk of rendering them endangered species. (Sufficient specimens could be retained in zoos throughout the world, where they survive well ... )', perhaps along with dangerous subspecies of humans (p.116). MCCioskey is particularly concerned to put down arguments 'for the preservation of species and wilderness at the cost of human interests, human concerns .. ', even though these arguments 'appear to be correct about the intuitive insights of those who live in different countries in affluence. 2 Nonetheless it will be my concern in this work to reject this approach and the moral intuitions on which it rests' (p.36, italics added). Unfortunately the strongly proclaimed rejection is not backed up with requisite argument. MCCioskey, in a familiar intuitionistic predicament, is stranded without argument. Nor, in this case, could the rejection be so easily supported. For one thing MCCioskey feels obliged, almost immediately, to qualify his human supremacy claim: human interest 'must prevail, unless what it is proposed to preserve has great intrinsic value' (p.36 italics added). For another reason, the human interests involved often cannot justify preeminence; they are too often trivial, or unworthy, or just plain ordinary. So the ancient (unethical) prejudice in favour of humans can, and should be relinquished (as argued in much more detail in other places, e.g. EE). But then there is nothing to stop MCCloskey's intuitionism sliding to real depth, the ethic moving from reformist to radical. Call the resulting theory, MCCloskey's stripped 2 But the impression of McCloskey as a fighter for the under-privileged among humans, one who of course along with developers and colonizers makes human interests paramount, is deceptive. 8 of anthropic prejudice so to say, deepened intuitionism, intuitionism informed, again if you like, by deep ecological consciousness. The beauty of deepened intuitionism is that it answers, in MCCloskey's own terms, MCCloskey's challenge to radically new ecological ethics. A now evident "adjustment" to MCCloskey's own theory will serve. The trouble, of course, with this answer is the trouble with intuitionism in ethics generally; that, for instance, it is built on the shifting sands of intuition. That is why a direct response to Mccloskey will be offered, in terms of deep-green theory. 3. On the supposedly dim prospects for new environmental ethics, esp. that deep-green upstart. Part of MCCloskey's complaint is that the new environmental ethics demanded back in the early seventies, have not been presented sufficiently 'clearly and fully' as to admit proper examination and assessment (p.60). It is easy to level such charges at new proposals; and such charges did carry some force, and still do, though less as the new theories develop, among other things, to meet criticism. But MCCioskey would like to make a much grander charge, the sort of charge (discussed below) that Thompson recently did level: that such 'a new ethic ... is logically impossible to set out' (p.59 reordered). But Mccloskey, by contrast with Thompson who can slip into still fashionable noncognitivism, is poorly placed to press such a charge. For he considers that noncognitivism, which would logically tie all valuation to aspects of human (or creature) cognition and so would be bad news for deep environmentalism, is bound to fail. MCCioskey tries instead to push through an eliminative argument, relying upon the limited range of cognitivist (meta-)ethics 'developed to date'. He claims to eliminate all but intuitionism: 'Of the known, plausible, meta-ethical theories, the only one available to such ecologist ethicists is the ethical realism of intuitionism' (p.59), which regrettably they decline. But the elimination argument is radically defective, as MCCioskey is very far from exhausting the initially plausible options open to environmentalism. In addition, more satisfactory options will aim to discard not merely intuitionism but also both the ethical realism and objectivism that regularly (and to its intellectual cost) accompany it, but need not. While it would hardly be surprising should the quite limited range of ethical theories that have achieved much development to date prove inadequate to new environmental objectives, the situation is by no means as desperate as MCCioskey implies. Firstly, the options MCCioskey does offer, deviously pruned down (not 'ideal observer ethic' but 'Humean ideal observer ethic', not 'natural law ethic' but 'Thomistic natural law ethic'), are not all restricted in the way portrayed: 'All make human nature or personhood or features thereof basic to ethics' (p.59). Not so; the contention certainly does not hold for all the types of theory listed, e.g. naturalism or relativism, and insofar 9 as it does, it is sometimes easily avoided, as with natural law (e.g. set within pantheism). Secondly, there is a range of recognised ethical types, such as those distinguished by Broad, which affords scope for the elaboration of ecological ethics. Obvious candidates within naturalism include biological and evolutionary naturalism - typical examples of which 'are the following: "To be virtuous means to perform the specific activities of the species to which you belong efficiently" (Spinoza). "Better conduct means conduct that comes later in the course of evolution and is more complex than earlier conduct of the same kind" (Herbert Spencer)' (Broad p.259). No doubt such proposals exhibit deficiencies, but not per se of a human chauvinistic sort; and they admit of improvement, which they are beginning to obtain within the tradition of American naturalism (thus e.g. Rolston's work). More promising, however, are "non-naturalistic" theories, of which objectivistic realistic intuitionism such as Mccloskey is keen to offer and promote is but one kind. For there are other less demanding types of intuitionism (see, e.g. Broad p.270), including various "deep intuitionisms", which may be neither objectivistic nor realistic (in the sense of labouring under heavy ontological commitments). In particular, as Elliot explains (p.502), what entirely escapes MCCloskey is the feasibility of a meta-ethic which is nonjective, that is, not objective, like transcendental intuitionism, but not implausibly subjective either. Then there are moral sense theories and their more plausible variations including mixtures with rationalism. Further, there are analogous mixtures coherently building upon emotional presentation. Such a rational reconstuction, varying the Austrian theory of values as elaborated empirically and logically by Meinong, is in fact the ethical way taken by deep-green theory (for detail see TE and DG). And so on. There is logical scope, then, for quite a variety of ecological meta-ethics, and definitely scope for significant improvements upon those 'developed to date'. As much to the point, there have already been significant developments of some forms of ecological meta-ethics, notably of that theory in effect under criticism, deepgreen theory, which is already better articulated than most conventional ethics. There are several connected parts to this elaboration because it brings into meta-ethics new logical technology, especially world-semantics. The parts, furthermore, have not been duly separated because of a pervasive verificationism living on in Anglo-American ethical theory, which proceeds to equate semantic with epistemic, meaning with method of coming to know, and the like. A first step then in meta-ethical analysis is some proper separation of the parts, such as meaning, epistemic confirmation, and rational justification. Naturally the parts fit together into a larger whole, into the meta-ethical edifice, but simplistic positivistic equations do not satisfactorily explain the integration. 10 As to meaning, deep-green theory can already stand on its record of proferred semantical analyses. 3 Semantics both for axiological terms such as value and bettemess and for deontic terms such as obligation and wrongness have been provided through world semantics (see sv, MD). The deontic theory developed in the process (in MD) offers a considerable improvement over Ross's theory (which supplies no semantics), because it enables the theory-saving artifice of prima facie obligations to be removed and natural language discourse concerning obligations to be recovered. While such semantical advances do not pretend to offer a full account of meaning, as much more remains to be done within pragmatics, they do offer straightforward resolutions both of long-standing ethical puzzles and paradoxes and of several complaints about environmentally deep ethics. A major early problem for a genuinely nonchauvinistic ethics was to give a satisfactory account of ethical terms without reference to favoured biological species, above all to humans. On deep-green theory this was accomplished by a combination of an "annular theory", offering an ethically relevant typology of doers and receivers, with the semantical analyses (see EE and AP for details). By these means, deep-green theory proceeded to remove humans from an essential role in ethics. Humans enter importantly, of course, but only contingently, as certain sorts of valuers and agents, which sorts depending upon their relevant capacities. For example, humans do not inevitably enter, as too many had previously supposed, into every ethical picture, because there were no value judgements without valuers, and all valuers were humans. Both parts of this linkage fail. Most important, values are not tied to valuers or actual valuing. But possible valuers and therewith their valuing can always be dummied in logically. The reason is at bottom that any coherent distribution of values can be regarded as the values of certain possible valuers. Furthermore, contrary to MCCloskey's unsupported charge against such semantical analyses, this does not expose the theory 'to difficulties parallel to those encountered by phenomenalism ... ' (p.60). For phenomenalism attempts a reduction; the semantical theory makes no such attempt. The meta-ethic is non-reductionist; nor is it obliged to rely upon tricks like supervenience. Deep-green theory already had more up on the meta-ethical scoreboard in the early eighties than Ross's theory upon which MCCioskey purportedly proposed to reply. MCCloskey's criticism of ecological ethics as meta-ethically inadequate lapses. As to normative theory, the other prong of his attack, his demands are excessive. Few ethical theories have been stated 'fully and clearly' and 'developed in a systematic, detailed 3 Standing on records is hardly a practice I embrace with much enthusiasm, but sometimes it is inevitable if excess repetition is to be avoided. 11 form' such as Mccloskey appears to expect (e.g. p.60). To take some grand comparisons: Those that are detailed such as Confusianism are not particular systematic, those that are detailed and systematic such as Spinoza's ethic are hardly clear and are likely inconsistent, those that are fairly full and moderately clear such as Sidgwick's utilitarianism are also rather clearly defective; and in the twentieth century, nothing much, ecological or not, matches these grand examples. But to indicate a few details of what is accomplished normatively in deep-green theory:- Non-interference and like principles are defended (cf EE p.174); these afford a basis for integrating standard social justice principles (including obligations to the future), duly amended, with environmental principles. In this way, making use of the annular theory, much of prevailing social ethics, of a radical kind, can be subsumed. In an attempt to be helpful, Mccloskey quite erroneously suggests that 'the normative ethic appears to be base[d] on ... intuitive insights into what is intrinsically valuable and what is intrinsically obligatory, where what is intrinsically obligatory need not be tied to intrinsic value' (p.60, rearranged). What is obligatory, like what is right, does answer back to what is intrinsically valuable, though in more complex fashion than elementary ethical courses care to contemplate (see TE and MD). But what is intrinsically valuable is often not discerned through intuitive insights. The idea that is is part of what lies at the back of the expectation that instant answers can and should be given to any question as to what is intrinsically valuable or the like. Rather what is intrinsically valuable is arrived at through a process of reasoning and coherence-assessment, based at bottom on emotional presentation (for more detail see TE). We offered, furthermore, many examples of items - not only individuals, but species, such as the blue whale, complexes, and ecosystems - that are intrinsically valuable, valuable in and for themselves and not on other counts (such as some of MCCloskey's "intrinsic values" which vanish into economic or aesthetic values). Accordingly, the charge (p.60), 'Nor are the relevant values or principles explained or discussed', loses its force. As to the specific difficulties for an ecological ethic of deep-green kind that MCCioskey alleges, many of these are only encountered upon importing assumptions that the ethics do not include and should not supply. So it is with the assumption that an ecological ethic should assign intrinsic value to all species, even equally to each species, given that it does to some. MCCloskey's own intermediate ethic does not do this, why should an ecological ethic? Some-to-all arguments do not suddenly become valid in deep space. Deep-green theory, in particular, unlike deep ecology, makes no assumptions as to biospecies equality; rather it requires a certain interspecies impartiality. The extent of intrinsic value of a species is assessed in principle, through a multiple factor procedure incorporating value-making features of the species (cf. EE p.168). Mccloskey wheels 12 out the already exhausted examples of disease organisms and parasites, and offers his intuition, a strong human prejudice, that 'there seems to be no intrinsic value in the existence of such species and organisms' (p.61). No doubt such species and organisms do not exhibit intrinsic value in the way or to the extent that conspicuous species near the tops of food chains do. Their biological role and value is different. Their importance, consists, in part, in control, in regulation of the character and the numbers of more valuable species; their biological value is, to stretch a term, primarily facilitative, but often nonetheless, under present ecological arrangements, apparently essential. One reason why MCCioskey fails to observe how easy it is to shift the difficulties he finds so pressing is, of course, that he is trying to make a case against deep positions. Another reason is that he is operating with far too coarse a mesh, both ecologically and socially. Intrinsic value does not come in big indiscriminable unsieved lumps: all species if any, all pleasure if any, all knowledge if any. The need for discrimination becomes evident if added to MCCloskey's list of intrinsic valuables (e.g. p.108) are such standard goals as wealth and power (itself often linked to knowledge). Like wealth and power, human pleasure and knowledge4, for example, are far from invariable goods. Often, like much entrepreneurial information transmitted through expensive systems, they are trivial; sometimes they are positively evil, as pleasure in extensive torture, or practical knowledge of the means of excruciating torture. 5 A finer mesh is needed, and available, a mesh that can be usefully applied in the ecological domain to remove standard "difficulties", as it was applied by Mill, though in a failed attempt to repair utilitarianism. 4. Extending ecological ethics, inadequately, to ecological politics. Ecological politics is a structure grafted onto ecological ethics, in much the way that political theory more generally is supposedly built upon (or alongside) ethics. Politics is essentially concerned with groups, societies and certain social institutions; ethics, so it is said, with individuals. But the distinction is not quite so simple; ethics too concerns groups and interrelations of individuals, normatively. In fact, the exact 4 For these often shoddy goals McCloskey indecently contemplates destruction of the Rottnest quokka, a species McCloskey provocatively presents as 'useless' and 'ugly' (p.61). Judgements of aesthetic and utility are notoriously ideological systemdependent, and here McCloskey flouts his commitment to an old, damaging, and fortunately disappearing, ideology. 5 In any event, Western ethics and ideology much overrate knowledge and information; largely defunct Eastern theories, such as Taoism, have a better appreciation of the importance, and nonimportance, of different kinds of knowledge (cf. Sylvan and Bennett on Taoism). 13 interrelation of politics with ethics, though an issue under investigation since Aristotle sought to settle the matter, remains unclear. Judicious borrowing from logic can help a bit in clarification, in both the general and the ecologically restricted cases. With ethics and politics, or ecological ethics and ecological politics (of given sorts, e.g. utilitarian, deep-green), both considered as theories, the relation is that of extension: the latter extends the former, in fact extends it substantially. For comparison, logical examples of extensions are afforded by the relation of quantification logic to sentential logic, or set theory to quantification logic, or, a little nearer the mark in terms of complexity, classical mathematics to set theory. Ecological politics is not merely - or as regards the pure theory at all - an application of ecological ethics. It requires a considerable amount of further apparatus (typically primitives and defined terms in the extended theory) that does not enter into ethics proper, such as states, leaders, corporations, unions, organisers, and moreover (what correspond to axiomatic constraints) the manifold interconnections of these political items. What kind of extension politics is, or ought to be, of ethics is a more vexed question. In particular (depending on the matching of the politics to the presumed ethics it extends) the extension may not be conservative. For example, theoretical allowance has to be made for the Machiavellian idea that certain political components may be exempt from given ethical constraints, an idea that has proved unacceptable to most philosophers from Aristotle through Mccloskey. The prevailing conservative extension theme is forcefully presented, if in too shallow and individualistic form, by Nozick: Moral philosophy sets the background for, and the boundaries of, political philosophy. What persons may and may not do to one another limits what they may do [politically] through the apparatus of a state, or do to establish such an apparatus. The moral prohibitions it is permissible to enforce are the source of whatever legitimacy the state's fundamental coercive power has (Nagel p.199, endorsing Nozick). In short, should conservative extension be abandoned, rational justification becomes a serious, indeed insuperable, problem. As it happens, the way in which ecological politics proceeds to extend ecological politics (when done conservatively) is admirably illustrated by MCCloskey's practice and development of issues. In virtually every case, the approach adopted as regards the politics of the issue builds directly upon the results reached in the ethical investigation of that issue. However, in the political theory advanced, Mccloskey does not take full and proper advantage of his supplemented ethics, but lapses back into an old-fashioned chauvinism. (He thus resembles a logician, actual exemplars shall go unnamed, who 14 with all the underlying logical technology available to avoid the paradoxes and anomalies of classical set theory, lapses back into these when he makes the extension to set theory.) Once again this abysmal outcome is primarily a result of his tenacious adherence to that ancient greater value prejudice, which vastly overrates humans, their attitudes, freedoms and products, and undervalues natural things, even to the extent of undercutting previously granted intrinsic value (cf. p.111). Mccloskey proceeds to play humans off against environments, assuming of course that humans ought to win hands-down. The resulting theory is ecological only in addressing - in a decidedly unsympathetical way ecologically - ecological problems. Ecologically then, the proferred ecological politics proves exceedingly disappointing; politically, things are little better. A political theory is bound to add to an ethical theory further organisational structure, comprising further structural units (corporations, states, etc.), institutional arrangements (property, markets, etc.), and so on. There are a great many, still illclassified and largely untried, types of options here: options as to what gets added, and how it is adjoined. Among the enormous range of choice McCloskey opts, without much argument, for unimaginative arrangements like those prevailing in the West and North, for a statist and developmental status quo (for which he serves very much as an apologist). He opts for what he is pleased to call 'liberal democratic states' - though the veneer of democracy is thin (control typically being vested with a ruling minority) and liberality is sharply hedged (true-blue liberalism conflicting with statism, in ways thorough-going libertarianism has exposed). Practically, as we know from experience, it is a jerry-built structure; theoretically, as is insufficiently realised, it remains a house of cards. The status quo choice of "liberal democracy" gets confirmed, so Mccloskey imagines, by disposing of but two sorts of alternatives: primitivism, which he regards as substantially self-refuting in presently highly civilized highly warlike times; and totalitarianism, which he regards as the main and menacing alternative. It is a simplistic scheme, leaving out significant alternatives; but such a picture is remarkably widespread, even among academics. While, like most urbanised intellectuals, Mccloskey cannot resist sounding off about any proposed 'return to primitivism', to 'rural communities of the political imagination' (p.109), he does in fact confine his consideration of alternative political arrangements to totalitarian alternatives which would sharply increase the restrictiveness of present statist arrangements. Against totalitarian alternatives, even present inadequate arrangements no doubt look good; but against certain other political alternatives (e.g. decentralised organisation using advanced technology as appropriate), these arrangements look more like a recipe for on-going ecological trouble. Such other alternatives, Mccloskey does not really consider. He has sighted the far ecological right, 15 ecofascism as it is sometimes dubbed, and fires almost all his guns at it. However there is an ecological left, with a longer tradition than the right, which passes unnoticed; yet it offers a vision of new ecological communities in which liberal principles, on the face of it MCCloskey's main concern, are maintained or even enhanced. But, for all its shortcomings, MCCloskey's attempt to get to grips with ecological politics deserves a somewhat fuller discussion than indicated by Goodin's cavalier dismissal: 'The politics discussion just amounts to a bash at the authoritarianism of some of the more rabid ecological doomsayers, propositions which are quite sufficient reductios in and of themselves' (p.344). For one thing, that was how much of the field looked when MCCioskey was helping to put ecological politics on the philosophical agenda. Ecological politics still remained an unfashionable, and in some places dangerous, field at the time MCCioskey was writing. Liberal philosophers with respectable academic positions in North America tended to keep out of the field, which accordingly got left to practical environmentalists, over-enthusiastic in their appeals to the state for tough control and regulation, and to authoritarian academics keen to strengthen totalitarian and isolationist tendencies of states. As MCCioskey emphasizes, Much ecological political writing exhibits two disturbing features that undermine its value. The one feature relates to the readiness of many political theorists on the basis of the flimsiest evidence to waive lightly man's claim to recognition of his human rights on the ground that the ecological crisis is so grave and critical that only the most drastic, desperate measures will succeed. The other feature is the very great confidence in the capacity of states to take whatever action is necessary to avoid the ecological crisis. In fact, the states of the world today greatly contribute to various of the ecologically based problems that confront mankind. They are unworthy of the great faith and trust that many ecological reformers appear to have in them or in the state in the abstract.(p.108). Bravo! But rather than considering carefully dismantling states, in favour of alternative organisational arrangements, MCCioskey leaps immediately in the opposite direction, to the orthodox position that 'a major part of the ecological political problem is that of ensuring that states carry out their ecological responsibilities' - whatever those may be (states do not regard themselves as morally bound, and typically their constitutions are incredibly weak and unspecific, and sometimes evasive on such matters). Indeed he goes further: 'The nation-state needs to be not superseded but complimented by a world political authority' (p .107). Again there is little argument, and no due concern that such an Authority would be yet a further developmental agency operating with tanks and bulldozers. 16 For another, MCCioskey tried to open up or advance several issues in ecological politics (and would have, if his book had existentially impacted and had not been largely bypassed or dismissed). These issues include not merely the standard issues of overpopulation, pollution and unethical technology; more notably, they also include the issue, which has recently received much airing, as to whether environmental demands and regulations interfere damagingly with individual freedoms and other aspects of liberal principles. There are other facets to this that deserve further examination (do it decently, someone!): the extent to which liberal states do and can deliver on environmental matters, as well as the extent of interference with liberties (much turns then on how it is all done). MCCioskey has overestimated the abilities of states to deliver liberal ideals and guarantee liberal principles, such as individual freedom (in fact, to note some lesser infringements, they characteristically coerce citizens in many respects, forcing them into a money economy, to pay taxes and obtain licences, even to serve on juries, to vote, to fight, etc.). If the state promises liberties with one hand, it is busy actually taking liberties away with the other. While we may be stuck with states for the present, as an unpleasant political reality, it is not too difficult to see that there are better unrealised alternatives even from a traditional liberal angle, alternatives that pass unconsidered. And MCCioskey has grossly underestimated the severity of ecological problems states should be trying to solve. In some of his findings, MCCioskey is so wildly astray that his judgement on factual issues and his credibility has to fall under real suspicion. For example: ' ... it is evident that over the whole period of his existence man has only been one relatively minor factor bearing on species survival rates' (p.47)! ' ... man is simply adding more hazards to those created by nature itself for some species' (p.47 continuing). For the next example, by contrast with the previous, MCCioskey might seek refuge in the fact that he was writing back in 1982: 'Few suggest that man can or will destroy the ecosystem of the earth' (p.49). Even so, the news on nuclear winter had broken, and the Greenhouse effect was already worrying some scientists. "Man" appears able to do little that is very wrong; MCCioskey can only bring himself to engage in the mildest of censure: ' ... man could have used DDT to better effect' (p.50). No doubt he could have refrained from using it to significantly better effect. A due adaptation of that Old Testament idea that humans are characteristically radically flawed, regularly and perhaps inevitably sinning in their treatment of the Earth, does not break through in MCCloskey's approach. In fact anti-ecological themes strongly pushed by MCCioskey will break through again and again in what follows. 17 Nor did Mccloskey anticipate the rapid march of ecological history at all well. With his operational assumption that ecological reforms 'would not be popular' (e.g. p.156), he appears to have been swiftly refuted by history. There has been much popular movement in favour of ecological causes. The main resistance to far-reaching reforms has not been popular, but establishment resistance, together with that from business, wealth and privilege, and their hired economic men and thugs. Similarly with his assumptions that reform, or change, would not occur unless the ecological problems were believed 'to be real problems' (p.157) - which of course MCCloskey himself believed they were not by and large, something he deluded himself that he had shown. But popular beliefs have changed rapidly, taking MCCloskey's assumptions under along with old beliefs. In any case, MCCloskey's argument to unpopularity lacks cogency. It is that ecological measures 'may necessitate less convenient, changed lifestyles, many controls and restrictions, increased costs, additional taxes, basic interference with what now are seen as being matters of basic rights .... democratic legislators [cannot] hope to bring about the reforms ... and still retain office' (p.157). Whence, again ecological reformers may look to totalitarian political solutions. So far as I am aware, there have been no such proposals by ecological groups in Australasia. In small measure too, Mccloskey begins to meet his own argument. For measures of the type Mccloskey rightly finds distasteful, have already been run through in contemporary representative democracies; consider security and surveillance, foreign control and surveillance, nuclear power and surveillance, urban restructuring and surveillance opportunities, and so on. Secondly, there are important trade-offs; if these often minor inconveniences are not experienced now, much more drastic and dislocating changes will probably have to be undertaken subsequently. Thirdly, of course, if they are not undertaken now much of immense value will be lost. More direct democracies than we have today, where peoplegovernance and control of established elites is tenuous, would stand a better chance of limiting these losses; properly pluralistic systems would presumably manage better still. But Mccloskey does not address such issues as ecologically improved democracies. Instead he assumes, quite wrongly, that solutions to ecological difficulties will require strong and authoritarian central governments (perhaps both of states and of the world), but that such institutions run directly counter to liberal concerns: 'the enjoyments of many rights and liberties and opportunities to rectify grave injustices' (p.25). So he tears off to address the difficulties of ecological totalitarianism (pp.158-9), well-known difficulties (as Goodin observed) confronting Antipodean non-starters among political alternatives. 18 Without examining other alternatives than certain totalitarian ones, Mccloskey manages to conclude (to his own satisfaction) that 'the only realistic, feasible avenue to ecological political reform is through the political institutions of an open society that respects human rights', what he appears to think is offered by contemporary 'liberal democratic states' (p.159). Naturally deep environmentalists seek open societies that respect rights, including decently discerned human rights. The big trouble is that on these matters, as with environmental matters, contemporary liberal democratic states have performed decidedly sublimenally, i.e. well below adequacy threshold. 6 It is not unreasonable to contemplate alternative political arrangements that perform more satisfactorily. But it is perhaps unrealistic to expect such improved organisational structure to be got into place at all easily or at all. For liberal democratic states retain regional monopolies on violence and other critical control, which, for all the palavering about respecting rights, they do not hesitate to deploy when their power and security are threatened. Nor is Mccloskey, by contrast with libertarians, at all averse to regulations and restrictions and limitations on liberty - except when these put environmental things ahead of humans. For humans, if not animals, things material are supposed to be pretty good in MCCloskey's liberal democratic mixed capitalistic setting. Environmental constraints are not to impose upon or reduce human living 'standards or levels of enjoyment' (p.134) - unless that enjoyment should be profligate, for instance involving conspicuous consumption and waste. Certainly such constraints are not to interfere with morally acceptable human freedoms: such is one side of the proferred dilute liberalism. But unnecessary waste is another thing, and should be curbed, through state guidance and regulation; liberalism here parts company with libertarianism. 'The switch from a resource-profligate society to a resource-liberal one would involve an acceptance of much more state action, more state interference by way of incentives, disincentives, regulations, restrictive laws, and over all planning than now prevails. However, it would not require the loss of basic freedom ... ' (p.134)! Such double-talk certainly makes the heavy liberal case MCCloskey tries to mount against decent environmental concerns - as against decent human concerns - look thin and flawed. Because such regulation does make serious inroads upon capitalistic freedoms, much hangs on the term 'basic', which is not however explained in this context. If, being freedom-loving Europeans, we burn down an empty freeway at speeds in excess of wasteful consumption limitations and we are accordingly locked away for months, then the effect 6 Sublimenal is a satisizing analogue of the maximization ideology's suboptimal. 19 on our basic freedom to life at large is serious. The paternalistic states MCCioskey offers, in significant respects more paternal than those we already have in the West, do not sit so easily with liberalism; patently they are incompatible with libertarianism, which does not brook such restrictive regulation. The critical point is however this: what is permissible in rectifying a resource-profligate society is similarly permissible in reorganising an environmentally-profligate society. Again there need be no loss of basic freedom, where basic is now characterised in terms of whats ethically acceptable. Only the ethics is now a deep environmental ethics. 5. Structuring ecological ethics and politics: towards an improved classification of environmental problems. Environmental ethics and politics are regularly said to be engendered by environmental problems, increasingly severe and encroaching problems. Yet in MCCloskey's text, as in that of his main model, Passmore's establishment text, there is no well-organised classification of environmental problems, only a rather ramshackle list. We can however reach towards an improved classification by considering environmental impact in a dynamic setting (cf. the beginning of section 1). An impact of something is something which comes from somewhere, sources, into something, sinks, parts of environments. In a process diagram, it looks like this: impacts processes sources sinks types of environments participants distinguished agents of impacts recipients of impacts Expanding upon the elements of this process diagram will deliver the sought after improved classification. Firstly, given distinguished background experience, especially with environmental impact equations, a further two-way classification is suggested: in terms of • sorts of impacts, and • types of environments. The latter framework is wide enough (in obvious respects too wide for a tight classification) to include both special concentrated sources such as mines, power stations, factories, and the like, and special sinks such as rubbish dumps, sewerage outflows, and the like. But the framework is not quite wide enough; it is important to factor into types of environments, expected inhabitants of those environments, which are the recipients of impacts (impactees). These will include not only present inhabitants of 20 environments: animals, plants, native humans, for land-surface environments, but also expected future inhabitants, whose likelihood or very existence may be impaired. There are two ways of incorporating these sorts of elements in the general scheme: either expanding environmental components, by having zones and habitats with kinds of expected inhabitants; or distinguishing participants in the impacts, givers and receivers. Here the latter course is preferred; we distinguish also then • kinds of recipients, and as well of course • kinds of impactors. While the kinds of impactors is diverse, including such superagents and nonagents as Nature, Chance, God (as in "acts of God"), and so forth, as well as animals, the main impactors of interest are, presently, humans. Accordingly let us run out the standard environmental impact equation for humans in a region, though it applies to any class of impactors through any kind of impact: EI. Environmental impact (of ... through ... ) = Population size (of ... ) X Resource use per member (of ... ) x Impact (through ... ) per unit of resource use e.g. of humans in USA through atmospheric pollution. Such an impact breakdown leads directly to three major categories of environmental problems, namely a Population a Consumption and use a Technology and waste. Those components act in concert, and, despite well-publicized attempts to load problems onto just one component, evidently all are sometimes important. A more sophisticated environmental impact equation would reduce the aggregation of the equation, EI = P x C x T (in brief, and functional, form), by introducing distributional features, which indicated where and when impact really mattered. Suppose, for example, there are n sufficiently independent regions, as in the following regionalized impact equation: n EI = Pi X Ci X Ti i=l Suppose, for instance, we are investigating the environmental impact of present humans l through industrialization, i.e. EI (present humans through industrialization). Then, on an obvious regional breakdown, the impact is overwhelmingly dominated by three regions: North America, Europe, and North Asia (primarily Japan). If it were not that the rest of the world were locked into this system (and its humans encouraged to applaud 21 and emulate it), supplying much of the raw materials, taking too much of the expensive products and waste, and suffering the pollution effects that spill outside the offending regions, main problems of industrialisation could be isolated in the high latitude N orthem hemisphere. The regionalized environmental impact equation will also serve to better organise widespread assumptions as to how those impacts that are taken seriously can be eroded. Not only is there the illusory prospect of reducing impact to "acceptable levels" by variation of just one parameter - Ci is that invariably favoured by socially-oriented shallower environmentalists; Ti, in the shape of wizard technology, by economists and technocrats (but such technology is likely to have its own impact and thereby to add to environmental problems). There is also the possibility of moving further afield to new regions, where impacts are lower. There are familiar frontier practices ( and a corresponding frontier ethics), which can be seen as reapplied to elements such as industrialisation and its components, pollution and waste. Of course such frontier practices are impoverishing, and too often destructive of further environments and many of their inhabitants; but in any case they are now seriously limited by biospheric limitations of the whole Earth. Many significant types of environment obtain little or no consideration in MCCloskey's survey; e.g. deserts (too many the product of past human activity), urban regions, polar regions, atmospheric zones, and so on. To stay within reasonable bounds, however, not even all the areas of concern that Mccloskey does look at will be examined in what follows. For to try to track Mccloskey in all the areas he does delve into would require an extensive treatise, as he raises many fundamental issues in political theory: to mention two remarkable examples, a brief discussion of 'the right to private property' is tucked away under 'Family Rights and Rights to Reproduce', and of the 'right for education' under 'The Right to Respect as a Person' (p.75ff.) Instead a more detailed treatment of a few of the areas he addresses will be offered (in fact some of the other areas have been investigated elsewhere, in Green Series discussions, or will be). 6. Population impact: the fact of human overpopulation. A major and very conspicuous impact of humans upon the Earth comes through their sheer numbers, which, though already huge, are still growing rapidly, and are overwhelming environmental and social bases for reasonable support in many parts of the globe. MCCloskey's first thesis, which sets the agenda for his entire population discussion, is this (pp 146-7,p.97): that there is no world population crisis, indeed further, NP. The world is not threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future. 22 But instead of coming out directly and cleanly with this preposterous thesis, MCCioskey approaches the business in a typical oblique way, designed to shift the onus of proof, claiming that he has 'argued that a tenable, plausible case had not been made out for believing that the world is threatened by a population crisis in the foreseeable future' (p.146). It is fair to wonder about his experiential basis, whether, for instance, he has travelled through India or visited the vast urban slums of many third-world countries. It is fair to wonder what would make a "tenable plausible case" - proper theoretical business for philosophers, which philosophers have generally steadfastly avoided - or, of immediate relevance, what would constitute a "population crisis", and what counts as "overpopulation". On the last at least we do have a proposal from MCCioskey, 'to use overpopulation to refer to population sizes that exceed a country's or the world's capacity to feed adequately and to make it possible for all to enjoy their basic rights' (p.97). While the proposal is no doubt very convenient for the argumentative route MCCioskey will try to take, a route it already signposts, it is a decidedly chauvinistic and exceedingly shallow suggestion, which is ecologically entirely unacceptable. First, it takes no due account of future humans, or other creatures. But present capacity is achieved, so far as it is, too often through running down present biological and other systems, thereby jeopardising future capacity; decent sustainability is required even by shallow ecological positions. Secondly, the proposal is indecently chauvinistic; it takes account of naught but humans, their basic rights and their feeding. It thus violates the framework MCCioskey elsewhere professes to have adopted. For instance, high populations, which are not MCCioskey overpopulations, may lead, and are leading, to promotion of evil and to gross reductions in intrinsic value, including types of value MCCioskey earlier (somewhat reluctantly) acknowledged. But like all the political applications of the potentially generous ethical basis, that on population takes an ugly anti-ecological tum. It is all humans and humans, humans first, last and only, though humans at brute food subsistence levels or less as it turns out, and is turning out in many regions. Now really the proposal should be relativised, to 'overpopulation of a region', as the awkward disjunction, between country or world, makes evident. Many regions and countries are already seriously overpopulated (even by MCCloskey's slack standards), as he goes on to say. However, so he immediately asserts, 'the world as a whole is not overpopulated' (p.97). Whatever the case for this claim - a defective and disreputable case as will soon appear - plainly some large assumptions go into the proposition that a whole or summation can enjoy certain distribution properties when many of its parts do not: assumptions about the role of international trade, regionalism and self-sustainability on the one side and about summative features on the other. If clothes, for example, are 23 dirty or shabby in many parts, so are they as a whole. Suppose some parts are overpopulated because of constant infringements of basic human rights, infringements presumably traceable back to excess population sizes (though the connection is not made clear enough). Then the whole can hardly but be overpopulated, as it stands, whatever the future prospects for redistribution, reorganisation, and so forth. To evade such problems and to scramble to his conclusion Mccloskey firstly weakens 'basic rights' to 'basic needs' (but rights normally demand more than need satisfaction), and then drops 'basic needs' out altogether. Thus what he finally gets down to is the bare food issue, all else set aside: of whether 'if the food actually produced were distributed and used to the best advantage of all persons in the world' every human could be fed. But, so he claims, 'it is widely accepted' that all can be amply fed (pp 97-8). It is evident that, even if what is so "widely accepted" were true, the outcome would be insufficient to show no Mccloskey overpopulation. Suppose the world has the capacity (and will) to redistribute food to the most advantage. Still, basic food is no assurance of basic rights. Further argument, not supplied, is essential; argument to showing that regional overpopulation, stayed however by bread (but not circuses), does not lead to basic rights infringement, through such media as unemployment, poverty, inequity and so on. Furthermore it is very doubtful that this can be established, for the simple reason that there are connections between these human conditions (however difficult they may be to push into quantifiable or law-like form). Humans do not survive or depend upon food alone. To keep many of them even partly contented, so inflated have their wants and needs become under ideological pressures, will require a very large and very environmentally destructive pie. Humans are now an extraordinarily greedy and destructive species. Though one animal species among thousands, and one biological species among tens of millions, they have taken over most of the Earth and most of its products, so far as they can, for their own uses and purposes. More than 80% of the fruits of photosynthesis, for example, now flow to this one species. Yet perhaps 10% of the world's human population are malnourished, and many millions at least lack other subsistence needs. Even the bare food claim, upon which MCCloskey's whole case depends at bottom, is no longer so widely accepted, since the shock of the North American and other droughts; it was being questioned as MCCloskey wrote. Now however we have available the Brown University study of world food supply in relation to human 24 population. 7 The study is based on the 1986 harvest, which was a world record. The findings were that, with this supply, assuming perfect and equal redistribution, 6 billion humans would be fed a vegetarian diet. Thus by the end of the century, present record supplies will not be able to sustain the world's human population even at vegetarian levels. If the somewhat better South American style diet, with 15% meat, is considered, then only 4 billion humans can be fed; that is, less than the present world population. While if a rather better Australian style diet is contemplated, the number that can be fed declines to 2.5 billion, that is half the present world population. So much for ample feeding. It might reasonably be anticipated that the rest of the argument to NP, no foreseeable population crisis, is hopeless. And it is. All we are offered are, firstly, some reasons, of very variable quality, 'to suspect the most confident, brash predictions' (p.99) - suspicions which seem to include NP within their scope, along with MCCloskey's next speculative thesis. Secondly we are offered the speculative thesis that world food production will grow at least sufficiently to match world population growth. It is a thesis floated largely on technological optimism, a thesis that should be regarded with heavy suspicion given recent serious declines in biological capital: fisheries, soils, forests, and so on, and given apparently increasing climatic instability. To give him his small due, MCCioskey does assert, repeatedly, that there is little ground 'for complacency and inaction in respect of the world's population growth' (e.g. p.99 ); and as well as firing moral shots at 'alarmist predictions ... based on the flimsiest premisses' countering NP (for no problem), he makes heavy moral noises about morally assessing the situation. In any case, he needs to say something like this in order to pull off convincingly his big discussion of the ins and outs of, ethics and politics of, human sexuality and population control. 7. On limiting human populations: some neglected considerations. Hitherto received opinion, in modem Wes tern civilization, has taken the line that culling animal species is perfectly alright, but that culling humans is not, because humans have an unalienable right to life (a right regularly neglected however in times of war, in regressive criminal justice systems, and now questioned as regards poachers of significant animals). Received opinion, which MCCioskey tries to shore up, is now being challenged. Alternative methods of controlling populations of wild animals, to 7 The study is regularly cited by Ehrlich in his talks, lectures and works: see reference. 25 previous technologically primitive ones, are being seriously considered. Another gulf between humans and other sizeable intelligent animals is beginning to close. Unlike some dangerous Christian thinkers, Mccloskey does not cede to humans an unlimited right to procreation. As he says, 'there is no recognised moral, social or legal right for consenting parties to reproduce at will', but 'few philosophers today would seek philosophically to justify prevailing recognised ... restrictions on procreation' (p.150). Mccloskey wishes to impose a restriction as regards adequate provision for offspring; there is no right to reproduction where a requirement of reasonable prospects of adequate provision is not met. This bears heavily, as he realises, and perhaps also inequitably, on impoverished parents in poor communities; the issue is not really resolved (see p.101). But otherwise, in richer countries, the duties of those who would undertake human parenthood are presented as slight. Individuals, acting on their own, have otherwise no duties to restrict the size of their families (for the unMCCloskeyian consequentialist reason that it will have limited practical significance and achieve little). Where overpopulation is an issue, political, not individual, action is what is required. Where overpopulation threatens, individuals 'adequately fulfil their duty if they have only that number of children for which they can adequately care and [very differently, and with major political implications] if they foster and support world action to stabilize the world population and [confirming a right previously hedged] to ensure that all persons enjoy the right, equally with themselves, to have offspring if they so choose' (p.104 ). Otherwise the issue is dumped in the (too hard) political basket, for states and world organisations to try to handle. All this is decidedly unsatisfactory. Most important, there is no right to production of children without limit, even given that they can be "provided for". One reason is that new children produce impacts, and children in quantity seriously interfere with others; so result in significant violations of liberal principles regarding noninterference with others. In rough analogical terms, as the Macs' new building interferes with their neighbours' views, so their new children interfere with the neighbours' freedom and lifestyles and environments, beginning with local noise and crowding and continuing, much further, through taxes for family allowances, for schools and so on, through crowded and polluted parks and beaches and so on. Those assuming (conditional) rights, to reproduce for instance, tend to forget that rights require justifications (they cannot just be pulled out of thin air). But here any straightforward justificatory pattern is upset, because of a very familiar neglect of relations: namely, impacts of new people on environments, and interference of new people with in-place people. A change in attitudes and practices is accordingly warranted. Parties producing larger numbers of children should be regarded as socially and ecologically irresponsible; they should no longer gain special financial support, but 26 perhaps should, on the contrary, be duly penalized. These themes run counter to the main thrust of MCCloskey's discourse on population control, an extensive discussion premised on what he takes to be the improbable hypothesis that a world population crisis eventuates (pp.147-155). It ought to be enough to pull the plug on that discussion, sending intellectual babies with soiled bath water. That voluntary methods of limiting human births 'will not succeed' is MCCloskey's prime thesis (p.147). The support offered for it is characteristic and characteristically inadequate. First the thesis is weakened, and then some restricted and contestable empirical evidence is advanced as suggestive. 'That voluntary methods of checking birth rates are unlikely to be adequate is suggested by the relatively limited success of family planning projects even where [well] backed ... ' (p.147). On the contrary, voluntary methods of checking birth rates, mostly independent of family planning projects, have been substantially successful in many better educated, less impoverished communities. Some of these might even count as spectacularly successful, and more would be if they achieved some real, and sensitive, state support. But there are many powerful interests, especially those emanating from organised religions, operating against delivery of support designed for success. There is a conspicuous difference, again connected with ancient prejudices, between the attitude shown to human populations and the approach MCCloskeyians take to animal populations. Humans have the right, but socially constrained, to continue on their expansive and environmentally degrading course; animals have no such right, because, among other things, they have no rights. 8. On animal rights and supposed political implications thereof. The argument to the conservative result, that animals cannot enjoy (moral) rights, attempts to trade off an argument on which great emphasis is put, that 'there is a vast gap between rights and interests' (p.66). But that attempt depends on a confusion between what rights are - certainly not interests - and what can hold rights significantly - perhaps only items with interests. With that confusion out of the way, MCCioskey still has two main arguments to his shrill conclusion, that 'animals do not, cannot possess moral rights' (p.66 and several other places): a tight redefinition argument, and an environmental chaos otherwise argument. The tight redefinition argument proceeds, by appealing to special features of rights, to tighten up the notion of right so that unwanted (if commonly recognised) classes of right-holders are excluded. Such an argument, widely deployed against animal liberation, takes two main forms: less plausibly, that rights require interests, which 27 animals are alleged to lack, and, more plausibly, that rights have to be suitably exercisable and claimable, feats beyond animals abilities and capacities to perform. Though formerly among the ageing afficiandos of the less plausible Cartesian nointerests approach, MCCioskey now pursues the more plausible form. He appeals first to typical features of rights (though really some combination of these must form an invariant cluster for a decisive argument), such as their being 'foregone, insisted upon, exercised in or contrary to one's interests. For possession of a moral right to be meaningful, the possessor or his/her representative must be able to claim it, exercise it, or the like' (p.66, italics added). Unfortunately for his argument, MCCioskey proceeds, at crucial points, to leave out the representative alternative. Thus while an animal may not be able to claim its rights, a representative can; whereupon talk of claiming a right is not empty (pace p.66). Thus the argument so far is broken-backed. Having recanted on his earlier contention that animals cannot have interests (see p.65), MCCioskey is no longer in a position to preclude the attribution of rights on that ground, that interests are a necessary condition. 8 'We can plausibly claim to have some idea of what is in the interests of an animal. We can have no knowledge concerning how it would exercise its moral rights, if it had any' (p.66). Surely we can. A wombat can exercise its right to proceed along a way in the same way that a human can, namely by proceeding along it, setting aside obstructions, and so on. But MCCioskey proceeds, in a way characteristic of high redefinition strategies, to heighten the requirements. He appeals to features of what he takes to be 'paradigm cases of the possessors of rights, persons, rational, morally autonomous beings' which he couples with the characteristic exercise of rights (p.66). There are, however, other paradigm examples of right holders, such as small children, senile humans, imbeciles, etc. Despite the suggestions, rationality and a high level of autonomy are not required for the possession or exercise of rights. MCCioskey asserts that 'it is capacity for moral autonomy, for moral selfdirection and self-determination, that is basic to the possibility of possessing a right' (p.66). That is a high redefinition, substantially exceeding the requirements normally expected, especially where guardians or representatives are appointed or envisaged. MCCioskey-rights are a quite proper subclass of rights as ordinarily conceived. Even so it may well be that animals can hold them; it all depends upon how much gets pumped into the elusive term 'moral'. Wombats, for example, are not human, do not read and write, are not much given to calculus, do not enter into contracts, and so on; nor do 8 Elliot is quite mistaken in saying that McCloskey's views have not changed since those espoused in 1979 (p.503). Admitting animal interests represents a major change. That animals do, of course, have interests is argued in detail in my 81. 28 many primitive peoples, though humans, engage in any of these activities (though some of them perhaps could with education). But wombats are, by and large, decidedly autonomous, self-determining and self-directed; they exhibit much more independence than most modern humans. Similarly with whales. Despite such familiar findings, MCCioskey takes the following proposition as decisive: 'Consider how we should respond if it were to be determined that a whale or dolphin possessed moral autonomy' (p.66). He does not address the issues raised in this queer pronouncement, but immediately leaps to his sought conclusion against animal rights. Given that moral autonomy is not to the point, except for MCCioskey-rights, the proposition is irrelevant to and not supportive of the conclusion. Without the elusive term 'moral', the proposition is, furthermore, decidedly not a discussion stopper. Most dolphins exhibit a high degree of autonomy, the exceptions being primarily those (improperly) held in captivity, injured in fishing activities, sickened by pollution, and so on. The trouble with the infiltration of morality is that it normally (if wrongly) suggests human activities and human communities - whence what small force MCCloskey's proposition enjoys, as whales as agents fall outside that setting. The argument to environmental chaos, to entirely untoward environmental implications, if rights were ceded to animals, comprises several facets. They are facets that have been seen before, with every legitimate struggle for extensions of rights, such as, most memorably, allocation of rights to enslaved humans. That latter certainly brought some desirable dislocation to social arrangements; so will legitimating animal rights. But it need bring nothing like the complication and aggravations of social and environmental problems that MCCioskey fearfully envisages (p.69, p.122). A first facet concerns conflict of rights. There are of course conflicts of rights between humans and groups of humans, but MCCioskey fears the situation with animals would not merely be more complicated (as it would with much greater numbers) but that 'the difficulty and complexity of this rights calculus' would make it unworkable (p.67). But again he fails to show anything like this. Indeed he immediately weakens his position of apparent strength by looking to an 'easier calculus' where 'man simply protects animals from human violations of animal rights' (p.67). That would be a fine start, though politically virtually all nations and peoples would have to advance a long way to achieve it (Sweden less than most others). While the "easier calculus" does not mean that animals have lesser rights than humans, as MCCioskey implies, what is suggested is important in escaping from difficulties MCCioskey tries to amass. For not all right-holders are on a par, much as not all types of creatures are equal in abilities or capacities. In particular, to get to critical and divisive issues straightaway: it does not follow then from the fact that animals have 29 rights that some of them, domestic ones, cannot be kept, or used - any more than it follows from the fact that humans have rights that some cannot be kept, or employed, for instance as servants. Nor does it follow that dead animals (or humans) cannot be eaten. Nor, most controversially, is it incompatible with animals having rights, that some are killed. For not all rights stand or fall together; a right for continued existence is very different from a right to a decent life or treatment while alive. Furthermore, MCCloskey's invalid arguments to ecological chaos succeed in turning animal liberation into animal libertinism. They do this by familiar slide strategies from some to more to all, from some rights, to many other rights, to the same rights as fully-competent persons. The strategy is coupled with that of assigning to humans more rights than they have, or should hold. Examples include the right to be absolutely where they like or to breed at will. But one human does not have the right to be in any other human's house or bed or space.9 No more do animals, like feral animals or 'disease-carrying pests such as rats and mice'. So, for example, the major conflict MCCioskey alleges with human rights to health dissolves; it depends upon granting excessive rights to rats and mice. With a sensible calculus of rights humans need not be overwhelmed by either animals or other humans; given due constraints on human populations (more than any other animal populations), interference by others could be stabilized at a low level. A further large facet of MCCloskey's argument to chaos doggedly pursues practical and ecological costs of vegetarianism, costs which he considerably exaggerates. But whether he is right about these costs, or not, is a separate issue - irrelevant to the main issue of animal rights. For admitting or stressing animal rights most emphatically does not 'dictate acceptance of vegetarianism as a moral position or practice' (p.68). There is no valid route from rights for animals to vegetarianism, for reasons that have already been very briefly indicated above. 10 MCCioskey has linked the question of animal rights much too closely with positions like that of Singer (an evident target on pp.68-9 of the text). But many more ordinary people and even some philosophers, 11 both before and after Singer, have assigned rights to animals, without commitment thereby to vegetarianism, and without evident (or any) fallacy. As a result or this flawed linkage, 9 While writing this I heard a local airforce contingent claiming its right-to the freedom of Canberra. Plainly it only has a right-to the freedom of only certain cities, and to quite limited things within those cities. 10 A much more detailed case, along with counter-models, can be extracted from my previous work, esp. the Green Series, number 13, i.e.TE (essay 3), and number 2. 11 A neglected early philosopher is Maclver; see esp. his remarks on p.69. 30 MCCioskey makes another interesting mistake: namely 'that the two movements, animal rights on the one hand (the view that some animals possess moral rights) and conservation and preservation on the other', so far from being 'complementary, mutually supportive positions', 'in fact are fundamentally opposed and are such as to be calculated to lead to many major clashes' (p.69, rearranged). While there are major clashes, for example, between moral extensionisms, such as the expanded utilitarianisms of Bentham, Sidgwick and Singer on the one side, and deep environmentalism on the other, there are no clashes of an animal rights position with deep environmentalism . For, very simply, such deep positions accord animals rights. As elsewhere, so with animal rights, errors in the ethical treatment intrude into the supposed political implications. Unremarkably then MCCioskey sees 'the ecological state' as committed to ecological chaos, all of which 'would very seriously curtail human liberty in many ways' and 'create massive theoretical and practical political problems' (p.122). No doubt decent treatment for animals, codified in rights, would restrict human liberty somewhat, as abolition of public spectacles such as hangings, floggings or throwing Christians to hungry lions, curtailed spectator opportunities and freedoms. But the desirable elimination of factory-farmed fast foods and animal-tested cosmetics, or the curtailment of circuses and reformation of zoos, are hardly very serious restrictions on human liberty, or what MCCioskey is thinking of really. He is again thinking of his house full of rats and his garden full of copulating animals, of vegetarianism and protection of rabbits made legally obligatory, and so on (for many such fantasies see p.122). But no such consequences, ensue, without repetition of the errors already exposed in the ethical treatment: inferences from some rights to excessive rights, and so on. Because side-tracked by his own production, by this pantomime of absolutely unconstrained, rampaging, warring and rapidly-multiplyin g animals (i.e. like some humans when ideological controls are lifted, not like most animals), MCCioskey does not address at all the very serious abuses in prevailing present treatment of animals, abuses on farms and in laboratories, at home and in the wild, abuses that should be politically addressed from ethical bases, issues well addressed through rights. An institutionalisation of animal rights would not produce the big problems MCCioskey envisages; after all most people are now represented by professionals in many of their dealings concerning legal rights, a professional paternalism increasingly operates, which 31 subsumes many professionals themselves. On the contrary, such institutionalisation of animal rights, properly done could make for very desirable changes. 12 9. Two other critical features of dominant political ways: the shibboleths of extensive private property and high technology. The orthodox assumption, which McCloskey makes, is that a liberal democratic state will have a mixed (or marginally socially constrained) market capitalist economy. Under the simplistic equations that tend to distort much modem political discussion, even the inadequate qualifications occasionally inserted are forgotten: a liberal democratic state is often equated with institution of market capitalism, indeed too often market arrangements get equated with capitalism. Evidently, however, these equations fall apart under but slight disturbance. Logically they come apart entirely. There are severe logical problems with the very idea of a liberal democracy, which is a dialectical union of individual liberal with social welfare and democratic ideals. For a democratic state, especially should it take popular majoritarian form, can seriously curtail the freedom of minorities (the well-known "tyranny of the majority"). Liberal ends may be better served by a benign dictatorship than by democratic arrangements. Liberality and democracy part company. Similarly individual liberty and statist social welfare. And so on. Certainly liberality, which is the most free ranging of the five big political league players being disentangled, 13 does imply some significant limitations on arrangements, but they may not favour democracy, or capitalism. Fully liberal arrangements should enable a community to opt for democratic organisation, should it wish; but similarly these arrangements should allow the community to choose otherwise, should it want. Also liberal arrangements of a social cast (with decent freedom of the servants) would mean winding back of capitalism. Despite the immense damage illregulated capitalism and market structures can, and do, separately inflict upon ecological and social systems, there is practically no discussion of such matters in MCCloskey, and again little investigation of improved structures or regulation. 14 12 For one thing, it challenges factory farming, as infringing animal rights, in an obvious way. McCloskey avoids the issue when it arises (p.140). 13 In fact four of the five substantially independent players we are reflecting upon market, social welfare, capitalistic, democratic, and liberal arrangements - do not receive an index listing in Mccloskey, while the fifth, liberal, collects many citations and much discussion. 14 A major contemporary myth is that markets and capitalism can flourish without regulation, indeed that they flourish best in a fully deregulated setting. Both 32 As with liberal democracy, so with market capitalism, the components separate. Markets can flourish without capitalism, where for instance agents have sharply limited and bounded budgets and capitalistic accumulation cannot operate. Markets require no liberty in other parts of social life than those involving exchange of certain material goods; they certainly do not require a democratic framework. Capitalism can function without a vibrant free market system; indeed in advanced capitalist states it increasingly does so, with oligopolistic arrangements in place of competitive output markets, vertical integration and contract delivery replacing former input markets, and so on. Capitalism too requires neither democracy nor liberty, indeed too much of either could seriously undermine it. It does however depend upon property, for control and as a store for capital accumulated. In principle, of course, a very limited capitalism could work without private ownership of land and resources, so long as some exchangeable stable form of wealth, such as a sound currency or gold, was available for accumulation and payment of labour. But smart capitalists would rightly feel excessively vulnerable under such arrangements; for they could be wiped out by an outside devaluation of the currency or outside increases in rents on resources and land. In any case, many capitalists (virtually all people of substantial wealth in Australia), and a large array of parasitic middle parties, agents and hangers-on, would be duly despatched along with free-for-all property markets. Having glimpsed MCCloskey's unquestioned commitment to mixed capitalism, it is piquant to behold him begining upon undermining an institution fundamental to historic capitalism, namely private property. Most of MCCloskey's brief discussion of rights to private property (pp. 78-80) focusses upon the labour theory of property, descended from Locke and others, upon which he effects a full demolition job. In fact he severely weakens the case for a substantially unfettered ("free") institution of private property, upon which however the type of liberalism he advances depends. For strong property rights and guarantees are basic to present liberal democratic arrangements, as they are to proposed libertarian alternatives. MCCioskey even tries to close off discussion of the 'political desirability of allowing property rights by way of patent rights to discoveries' in plant and animal breeding, particularly through genetic engineering, on the pretext that these 'cannot reasonably be objected to without the whole private-property system of institutions depend for their operation and for their very survival on regulation, on an appropriate enforceable legal setting. Otherwise, in communities where a certain egalitarianism counted for something for instance, a capitalist would be rash to bank upon holding onto substantial surplus wealth for long. 33 liberal democratic states being questioned' (p.139). Now peripheral cases do not generally threaten the centre, unless, perchance, it is already in some doubt. The extent and character of property is a quite critical, indeed a watershed, issue for environmental politics. For excessive propertarian rights and powers constitute a very serious impediment to sound environmental practice. The reason is simple: the proprietor may be less than well disposed to the environment, and may well permit or enact unsound practices. Yet propertarians often now appeal to a purported need to strengthen and expand the institution of private property - rather that to let it naturally contract - in order to combat environmental problems. Thus such dubious proposals as saleable rights to pollute environments, dump wastes, etc. - licences which look even to the uninitiated like ways of extending, not contracting, pollution and like environmental problems, and which look to the more cynical as ways of circumventing costs and limits environmental constraints impose upon economic activity. 15 The liberal democratic structure to which MCCioskey commits himself to, with its uncritical approach to population and consumption - like market capitalism, with its commitments to expanding populations to ensure growth and profit, expanding markets, enhanced consumption, and cheap labour resources - forces an unduly heavy dependence on technological wizardry. In particular, it requires a technology that will facilitate greatly increased cheap food supplies, without however too rapidly depleting "biological capital". Given recent experience it demands a faith in technology, and the smart science that underwrites it, that is increasingly difficult to justify. Like all too many academics, MCCioskey has that faith. Science should be given entirely free reign, and technology pushed to the hilt. There is a naive optimism in MCCloskey's attitude to science. 'It is not improbable that ultimately, through the investigations of the sciences, we will come ... to have a full understanding of the earth's weather and climatic patterns. Man will be able to use this 15 Such saleable rights also appear to get another foot-in-the-door for bargaining utilitarians, who claim to want no absolute prohibitions, but want to put the whole environment up for negotiation - and ultimately for sale. What are not up for negotiation are the underlying propertarian and utility maximization principles, the insufficiently examined sources of many of the problems. In any case, the evidence now coming in shows that market approaches to pollution, such as saleable rights and pricing controls (like company fines), do not work at all well. Making directors of polluting firms directly responsible, and putting offenders in jail, apparently does. 34 knowledge for his and the earth's best advantage' (p.137). We, the total managers, will know what is "best" for the earth! Despite the 'dangers of misuse', major disasters, global warfare, climatic destablisation, and so on, 'this fact constitutes no reason for holding back the pursuit of knowledge ... ' (p.137). Maximum speed ahead in the glorious pursuit of science, with full anarchistic enthusiasm there. There is, as well, 'no reason ... for entrusting rulers with the control of science' (p.137); science at least is utterly free in MCCloskey's liberal democracy. While Mccloskey wants the state kept out of science (except as a money pump presumably), he wants it actively intervening in technology, not to limit it, but 'acting to ensure that new technologies be developed and used and their benefits widely enjoyed' (p.138). The liberal state is to be actively and heavily involved in technology promotion and delivery - which puts into serious question its presumed neutral regulatory function. Also espoused is a quite insufficiently discriminating attitude to technology. Like most apologists, Mccloskey emphasizes the possible - but generally unrealised - benefits of technology, that technology 'can release persons from much mindless, degrading work. Hence some, even many persons may never need to work' (p.138). For all the talk about the possible benefits of technology, many alleged benefits seldom or never accrue, for instance to shorten substantially people's working hours and give them more worthwhile leisure; and benefits that do accrue are often not well used. Rather technology is primarily funded to maintain or increase market share and profits (which too often end up in conspicuous consumption and waste), thereby inducing cycles of production and waste, more technology to help control the waste, and so on and up. Technology itself is merely of instrumental worth, with many of its instruments and techniques defective, destructive or dangerous, either directly or through eventual side-effects. While some technology is no doubt instrumentally good, much is not. And the balance of good over bad has been systematically exaggerated in Wes tern culture, where more technology is now looked to or required to rectify gross economic and social mismanagement in liberal democratic states. Technology is however no universal panancea. Both on its record, and in terms of its theoretical prospects, the faith being put in it, to "deliver us from evil", is misplaced But, as remarked, MCCloskey has the faith (such episodes as the Green Revolution are seen as unmitigated successes), and enthusiastically expects great things from technology ('genetic engineering ... constitutes a dramatic, exciting breakthrough of major proportions, one that opens up vastly wider possibilities for developing new plant and animal organisms', p.139). Naturally he concentrates on the sunny side of technology, scarcely touching upon the darker aspects. We merely glimpse one darker side of genetic engineering (for which perhaps no further engineering is needed), the edifying spectacle of mass-production of human drones for 35 industrial slavery (p. 139). As to the big problems with this engineering, we are fobbed off with an evasive throw-away, of the kind more typical of politicians, as to 'the need for relevant controls and checks', and no doubt balances, presumably determined by state masters behind closed doors. Instead Mccloskey tries to divert attention by yet another attack on the hypothetical totalitarian ecological state, and the threat of its coercive methods, not those of your normal corrupt intimidatory democratic state, to human liberties. But the smokescreen quickly subsides, our factional text degenerates into notes: 'Relevant point here include ... ' (p.139). Mccloskey would have us locked into state systems that are delivering increasingly negative results for increasing numbers of humans and disastrous outputs for nonhumans and natural environments. By changing political directions significantly, environmental and human affairs could again have an opportunity to flourish. But for much of the environment at least, there is not a lot of time left. REFERENCES D. Bennett and R. Sylvan, Damn Greenies: Australian Perspectives on Environmental Ethics, typescript, Canberra, 1989; referred to as AP. C.D. Broad, Five Types of Ethical Theory, Kegan Paul and Others, London, 1944. R. Elliott, Critical Notice of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Australasian Journal of Philosophy 63(1985) 499-504. P.R. and A.H. Ehrlich, The Population Explosion, Simon & Schuster, New York, 1990. R. E. Goodin, Review of MCCloskey's Ecological Ethics and Politics, Ethics 94(1984) 344-5. A.M. Maciver, 'Ethics and the beetle', Analysis 8(1948) 65-70. H.J. MCCioskey, Ecological Ethics and Politics, Rowman and Littlefield, Totowa N.J., 1983; all page references not otherwise indicated are to this work. T. Nagel, 'Libertarianism without foundations', in Reading Nozick (ed. J.Paul), Blackwell, Oxford, 1981. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, Clarendon, Oxford, 1930. H. Rolston III, Environmental Ethics: Duties to and Values in the Natural World, Temple University Press, Philadelphia, 1988. R. Routley, 'Alleged problems in attributing beliefs and intentionality to animals', Inquiry 24(1981) 387-417. R. Routley and V. Plumwood, 'Moral dilemmas, and the logic of deontic notions', now in Paraconsistent Logic (ed. G. Priest and others), Philosophia Verlag, Munich, 1989; referred to as MD. 36 R. and V. Routley, 'Semantical foundations for value theory', Nous 17(1973) 441-456; referred to as sv. R. and V. Routley, 'Human chauvinism and environmental ethics', in Environmental Philosophy (ed. D. Mannison and others), RSSS, Australian National University, 1979; referred to as EE. R. Sylvan and D. Bennett, 'Tao and deep ecology', The Ecologist 18(4/5) (1988) 148159. R. Sylvan, Three essayes upon deeper environmental ethics, Discussion Papers in Environmental Philosophy, (Green Series) #13, Australian National University 1987; referred to as TE. R. Sylvan, 'On the value core of deep-green theory', typescript, Canberra, 1988; referred to as DG. DEEP ECOLOGY AND DEEP-GREEN THEORY. Deep-green theory is a deep pluralistic environmental position, underwritten by a deep metaphysical theory. It is intended as an alternative, less fraught with problems, to deep ecology. Deep-green theory has developed, in significant part, through fruitful interreaction with deep ecology. Many of its leading ideas can thus be more rapidly introduced by contructing and comparing them with ideas of deep ecology which are already widely diffused (if often in a muddy or muddled way). As a spin-off then, this outline will offer a simple exposition of central ideas of deep ecology, and further criticism of many of them. In any practical showdown, however, deep ecology and deep-green theory are not antagenistic positions but close allies, both deep positions within a wider environmental alliance. Though the rudiments of deep-green theory go back about as far as deep ecology (to around 1973), it remained unnamed until the early 80's (and only achieved initial investigation in Bennett 86). Moreover, it has not hitherto attained in any fuller platform and slogan formulation, such as deep ecology has benefitted (and suffered) from almost since its inception. The term 'deep ecology' was coined by the Norwegian intellectual, Ame Naess, to label an emerging environmental movement. But, despite Naess's commitment to pluralism, it was from the outset constrained to a certain style of environmental position. The notion has since been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several Northamericans, particularly Bill Devall and George Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with Naess (their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end). The notion has caught on outside narrow academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Wes tern Europe, significant areas of natural environment remain and are becoming of increasing public concern. Deep ecology is a radical environmenta l position, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned with the management and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominent social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments. (Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman.) 2 Deep ecology takes off from value theory themes which stand in diametrical opposition to mainstream Western ethical and social theory.1 The first of these themes, the wide values theme, is that what is valuable in or for itself is not confined to human beings or their features (such as their interests, concerns, pleasures, consciousness, etc.), but extends much more widely to other beings. The value of these other systems or creatures of their features is not merely instrumental, aluable as a means to human objectives, but is independent of human concerns; it is in brief nonanthropic. Indeed deep ecology goes further, rejecting the greater value assumption, according to which anthropic values always take precedence over such natural values. How then is value distributed, in particular across the things of the world? It is here that deep ecology and deepgreen theory part company. Deep ecology takes value to be restricted to things that are alive (in some attentuated sense, so it turns out); this is the theme of biocentrism, life-centredness. And it assumes that these things with life are all of equal value; this is the controversial theme of biospheric egalitarianism. A unique assignment of value results. Deep-green theory rejects both these themes. For reason to be given, Deep-green theory is much less specific as to how value is distributed. But it is spread on to things - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals which are not alive, and it does not cover all things that are living. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus Deep-green theory is axiocentric, value-centered. Value in nature is regular coupled with some mix of value-making characteristics, including such defeasible ecological universals as richness, rarity stability, resilience, diversity, and so forth. But there are considerable constraints on how values are derived from any such "objective function". One over or thing constraint, that of impartiality, substitutes for that of egalitarianism. According to the requirement of biospecies impartiality, which excludes certain types of class chauvinism, a thing cannot be ranked as valuable or ahead or another simply in virtue of belonging to some species (e.g. being human); such features are not in themselves value-making characteristics. 1 There are some who account themselves deep ecologists who would repudiate such an approach through value theory, most notably Warrick Fox. 3 Figure 1. A compariso n of Deep Ecology and Deep-gree n theory, in capsule form. 2 Deep ecology biospheric egalitarianism Shared themes or goals I I I I I Deep-gree n. theory wider value theme rejection of greater value assumption, +through ➔ biocentrism ecological universals as defeasible value-making biospecies impartiality , and rejection of class chauvinism axiocentrism characteristics extreme holism natural systems as integral, irreducible cosmic identity moderate holism ultraperson al identificati on maximal satisizing on value self-realisation determinates limited interference only with natural systems; restricted rights thereto commitment to implement principles applications to economics, politics and policy, especially in bioregional ism ➔ environmen tal areas; e.g. regionalism and federalism +- ecoregionalism human population reduction A major difference between the theories lies in the distribution of value (from which much else of ethical consequenc e arises: rights, obligations , and so forth). Deep ecology, like simpler utilitarianism, proposes a unique initial distribution (over a given atomistic base class): each living individual is assigned equal intrinsic value, and nothing else has intrinsic value. Values of other things, complexes, systems and so on, are then in principle open to determinate s by a calculation. It is a type of recipe to which intellectual s bent on numeration and calculation are regularly attracted; pseudo-obj ective variations are to be found not only in utilitarianis m but in economics and in democtrati c political theory, and also in probability theory, where elements of suitable 2 Most of the capsule theses of deep ecology are explained in detail in the critique, CD; many of those of Deep-green theory are explained in FE. 4 initial esembles are assigned equal probability, through a principle of indifference. The practice is also as problematic as indifference principles (cf. CD on deep ecological egalitarianism). Deep-green theory rejects the assumptions upon which the deep ecological distribution depends. It rejects the latent atomism, the idea of ultimates upon which value devolves. More dangerously these days, it rejects the equality assumption. Much as some humans are more valuable than others (on most moral and other counts), so some creatures, some systems, are more valuable than others. DG theory is, quite deliberately, much less specific as to how value is distributed. Often enough, especially in difficult cases, assessment of value is a complex matter which may call for much reflection (for some details see TE, first essay). But certainly value is an unevenly distributed feature of a variety of things, not just at bottom altimates. It is a quality of many items - wholes, collectives, systems as well as individuals - which are not alive; and it does not extend to all things that are living, e.g. malignant virases engineered in biochemical laboratories. Nor is it distributed onto those things that have the quality in an equal fashion, except in the trivial sense that all have or partake of value. Some things that have value are much more valuable than others; there is some weak (and partial) ordering of things with value. It is these things that are worth conserving, preserving, and so on, the more the more valuable they are. Thus the theory is at least weakly axiocentric, value-centered. In fact it is more strongly axiocentric, in two important respects. Firstly, deontic notions such as those of obligation, rights and duties, answer back to axiologic ones (see TE, essay 3). Secondly, more difficult to explain, value penetrates the metaphysics, including what is accounted fact; most strikingly, the choice of actual world itself depends upon value (see DP). AUTHENTIC DEEP ECOLOGY: expositio n, critique, alternati ves PREFAC E No longer is there so much need to chronicle and document the major and serious environmental problems confonting the Earth and its ecosystems. Much of the relevant information - details of the damage, difficulties, devastation, disasters, and dire threats of more - now appears in later chapters of biology and geography textbooks, often in striking pictorial or diagramatic form; and the information is regularly updated by articles, too often environmental horror stories, in popular perodicals or newspapers. While many of the problems are abundantly and glaringly evident, others are more subtle, sometimes more insidious, hidden from view, but bound to emerge in not so long term. So we can take the problems, and further problems, "for granted", though with little comfort or ease. Many were, and are, foreseeable; many were, or could be, avoided or mitigated. Serious though these problems are they are still not being taken with full or due seriousness by those who exercise some control over how relevant things happen. 1 Most states are busy attempting more of what has landed us in some of the worst of these problems: more growth, of economic products, of people, of consumption2 , of energy; more or "better" militarisation; more productivity, of agriculture, with environmental cost-cutting and short-cutting, more development and more consumption thereby of biological capital. Growth remains at the top of most national agendas; it is seen as a panacea for all other problems, economic and security problems of course. Serious environmental problems are still mostly treated as economic "externalities", peripheral but growing nuisances, that we shall have to learn to live with3, but not the "real" problems. We have lived under this dominant destructive ideology for much too long already. It has already led to the devastation of much of the planet Earth, to the loss of much of value, many species, While there is a power structure, and a power elite, in all states (virtually as a corollary of features of the state, such as its monopolies on coercion, currency, etc), it cannot be pretended that there are any impressive control systems. So some of the problems are unintended. Given the propensity for human-developed control systems to function in undesirable ways, e.g. to tend towards militarism and totilitarianism, the lack of satisfactory system is no doubt to the good. 2 So, for example, the USA is pressuring Japan to consume more, internally, to ease American balance-ofpayments problems, and soak up excessive production; there is no pressure to produce less. 3 So, for example, prestigious scientific organisations are preparing to teach us how to live with and love the Greenhouse effect. Many communities have learned to live with damaging and noxious pollution; no doubt they would miss it if it were gone. 2 much irreplaceable wilderness, and has left us with an immense, and sometimes hopeless, clean-up and restoration task. Moreover things will rapidly get worse environmentally if we are not rid of it and its variants. Plainly we need several strategies: a strategy for fundamental change, a strategy (needed first) for what comes after the change, and so on. Deep ecology offers a strategy and an initial structure for addressing these environmental problems, along with proposals for addressing the menacing array of other problems confronting modern industrial societies. It is a strategy which goes much deeper than the pathetic patch-up the damage after it's largely done (pollute, then cleanup or pay a bit) approaches that prevail. For this reason alone, deep ecology deserves to be much more widely known. But there is still no satisfactory text on the topic. This book, while hardly an easy introduction to the subject4 , aims to fill a part of the gap. Perhaps too, it can help serve as a basis for that introductory text that still needs to be written. This text tries to do what the title promises. It begins with a sympathetic exposition of deep ecology. That is necessary. It remains hard to find out what deep ecology (DE) is, as it means so many different things to different expositors and exponents. The matter of different visions and elaborations of DE is taken up in the second part, which provides a detailed critique of DE in its main versions. In the final part, other criticisms of DE, from its rival social ecology in particular, are (negatively) assessed; an alternative to DE, deep-green theory is outlined; and some of the political connections of deeper environmentalism are investigated, including strategies for appropriate revolutionary change. Deep ecology is the most exciting deep environmentalism on the present intellectual market; for all its sortcomings, it is still the most thoroughly worked out widely accessible position. That is one reason why its worth a fair bit of time, my time, in struggling with it and trying to improve it, and your time, in getting to know it. This text grew from a critique of DE along with an unpublished expansion of that critique (called 'Continuin g the critique of deep ecology') and sundry associated articles on deep environmentalism. As an expanded version of critique5 remains the centre of the text, some of what I wrote in prefacing the critique should be repeated. I think, I hope, it merits repetition, as amended. 4 There is a need also, as will be explained in subsequent chapters, for a text that measures up to recognised academic standards, sufficiently complex and full of (bad) argument, in order to put deep ecology firmly on academic agenda, to try to ensure that it is not merely a crude popular movement that can be intellectually ignored. 5 'A critique of deep ecology' Radical Philosophy. 3 It was with considerable ambivalence and some serious misgiving that I first undertook a critique of DE, as it risked offending many friends in the deep ecology movement. It succeeded. The trouble was that when I got down to trying to explain what deep ecology was all about (for a seminar, at which N aess and Devell were present, some years ago), I found myself confronted by the following predicament :- While I applauded much about the deep ecology movement, and what it stood for, I could not find my way to accept deep ecology as formulated by any of its main proponents. The reason was not merely that deep ecology is less than a fully coherent body of doctrine, with, furthermore, many problematic sub-themes, but worse, that much of it departed from the ideals I felt it should be expressing, and that some of it was rubbish. Yet I had no doubt that deep ecology was a worthwhile enterprise (carried on by dedicated and good people), and that something along the lines of a replacement for deep ecology - revamped deep ecology if it is simply a matter of repairs, deep-green theory for more - was very much on the right track. Or to put it slightly differently, while rejecting every formulation of deep ecology, I agreed with the general drift of much of deeper ecology, and with virtually all the careful applications of deep ecology. My attempted resolution went along the lines of critical rationalism (for which I have been criticised). The method was to subject deep ecology to severe criticism, with a view to obtaining thereby an improved, more acceptable formulation, which at the same time met other desirable criteria. However to resort to such critical methods was already to type oneself, as old consciousness and old paradigm still, and to risk alienating part of the deep movement. The risks have been taken: but there are some concessions. In the end, when it comes to applications, to lifestyles and policies, the rational ladder has to be enlarged and also supplemented; for it offers only one distinctive way among many. Though the applications of deep ecology to real-world problems are very important, as already indicated, we shall only reach them and not attempt to develop them very far. However a detailed listing of various important applications that have been made will be given.6 Naess and others have complained, with some justification, that I have not gone out my way to find generous interpretation s of deep ecology, which remove apparent rubbish from it (see Naess RS p.3). It is true that, following the prevailing philosophical mode (by no means always to be applauded), I have not been very charatable (here or in other philosophical critiques). I have treated DE as a find it, hopefully in an expositionally straightforwar d and honest way. I do, however, try to 6 The final part of the background paper on population (Routley 84) provides one application in detail, an application expanding on some remarks of Naess (in 83). And several other examples which Naess has outlined (also in 83) can be similarly elaborated. Gare has attempted a major elaboration applying to science. 4 offer alternatives to DE and improvements upon it when I discover them. Deep-greep theory can be seen as a fairly comprehensive alternative. / ON SOCIAL ECOLOGY A heavy attack on DE, a tirade really, was launched recently by Bookchin. It caught leading deep ecologists - who had rather foolistly seen Bookchim as one of them, though it was obvious enough that he wasn't - off-guard, entirely stunning some of them 1 . Bookchin furthermore went about his frontal attack in a most ungentlemanly and less than American way, using practices and methods that Americans do not use as regards decent fellow countrymen, but reserve for communism and its representatives and others engaged in un-American activities. 2 Intellectual exchanges are supposed, otherwise, to proceed in a nice, collegial way (the knives come out in the back rooms, not on the front pages). Bookchin broke American cultural conventions (which is a main reason why several people, e.g. Sale, failed to comprehend what was going on). There is heaps of straight mudslinging in Bookchin, name-calling, attributions of guilt by very thin associations, ad hominen moves. We shall bypass this unworthy material, much of what there is in the attack, because anyone with decent basic training in logic can document it for themselves, if they can obtain copies of the work (not at all easy in the peripheral world). We shall try to isolate the much slimmer intellectual content of Bookchin's criticism. Should we dig under all the dirt, we find there are some core criticisms of DE, which are for the most part defective, but as well some interesting suggestions, which are worth fossicking out and displaying. There are two key issues. In both Bookchin's criticism repacts, but focusses upon DE, the old-fashioned erroneous socialist condemnation of environmentalism of all types - as not only getting priorities wrong in not putting human societies absolutely first, but worse failing to appreciate that environmental problems are the product of social problems and removed with them. • Ecological problems are at bottom nothing but social problems. This rival reduction theme, which is what justfies the social ecology terminology and approach, also gets stated in various, often weaker or slacker forms: For instance, ecological problems have their 1 The phrase 'off-guard' is from Naess. As to the extent of Bookchin's depth see the Critique. 2 This nasty face of American intellectual activity is well exposed in Chomsky's political writings. For the most part American philosophical periodicals permit only the nice face to be exhibited. For my part I enjoyed some of this outrageous stuff of Bookchin's, which was livily and refreshing after the flatness and dullness of much in Naess's notes, and also by contrast with Bookchin's earlier papers, which are mostly repetitive and often rather vacuous diatribes. 2 roots in social problems, ecological problems have their ultimate roots in society and social problems, etc. But DE, 'despite all its social rhetoric, has virtually no real sense of' this; that is a major (disgusting) trouble with it. The correctness and tellingness of social reduction themes vary more or less inversely, depending in particular upon how far the operative term 'social' is stretched. If all problems concerning "groups" (including single member groups) of "individuals" of any sort (including volcanoes, hurricanes, seiges, etc.) are "social" problems, then evidently all ecological problems become social problems, as these are all concerned in some way with individuals and their relations with their surroundings. But such a misleading adjustment to the theme, rendered near-tautologous by a low redefinition of 'social', is not what Bookchin and other socialists have intended. They characteristically intend by 'social' 'human social', and what they intend to convey by 'the social roots of the ecological crisis' is that it is 'the gross inequities in [human] society' - which should be attended to first- 'that underpin the disequilibrium between [human] society and nature'. 3 Now this strong social bias thesis is interestingly false. Consider counterexamples of the following sort:Imagine mixed capitalistic and welfare socio-economic arrangements had worked and succeeded in eliminating the gross inequities in society, at least in some relatively independent regions of the world, and perhaps even globally. There were, it still seems, real prospects that this could have happened in the 60s, had energy and funds been redirected from military-industrial enterprise to social-industrial activity. A welfare safety net is stretched right across the regions concerned so that no longer is any human homeless or without sufficient nourishment or basic eductional opportunities and so on, so that poverty and all other grosser inequities are eliminated. 4 It is sufficiently evident that even if all this is achieved, many ecological problems will not be addressed, but may be aggravated by the increased industrialisation and economic development involved. The lot of factory farmed animals or of threatened wild species would not be removed, but, if touched at all, 3 Bookchin 87 p.10 where the thesis is inaccurately associated with Kropotkin. 4 Naturally, finer inequities, such as unsatisfactory job relativities, race relativities, etc., will not thereby be eliminated and are perhaps part of "the human condition", some of which many societies will be prepared to live with or ignore. The relatively easy opportunities of the 60s for societies free of grosser inequities (for good or even great societies) may have passed, as certain new social problems have much complicated matters. 3 likely worsened. There is no guarantee that the position of wild and natural regions would thereby be improved, that these regions would be freed from constant inroads by human developmental activity, that the Antartcic would not be citified, and so on. In general, no environmental damage and degradation that did not rebound upon the relevant human social situation would be halted or resolved. Furthermore, not only is the strong social bias thesis false, as well human social concerns do not always come first where ecological depth is attained. Bookchin suggests an historical basis for the strong social bias thesis, that the notion of the domination of nature arose in the first place out of social domination of people by people, women by men, and so on. But that is pseudo-history; for the domination of nature and some appreciation of its operation, reaches as far back, so far as we can see, so far as our records go, as other forms of domination. What is more, even if a real history were like Bookchin's it would offer little support for strong social bias thesis. All it would reveal is that some ecological problems were glimpsed by anology with social problems, not that ecological problems are at bottom social problems and so resolved with them. • • "Second nature", constituted by human society, is uniquely different from first nature, and so naturally and justifiably interferes substantially with the processes of first nature. The unexploited play on "second nature" does nothing to support such intervention; or the contrary, second nature follows nature rather effortlessly without specific reflection. However, the two "natures" distinction, inadequately introduced and incapable of bearing much weight, is applied, in social ecology, to support much human interferenc e and substantial separateness. 'Natural evolution has not only provided humans with ability but also the necessity to be purposive interveners into "first nature", to conscously change "first nature" by means of highly institutionalized forms of community we call "society".' 5 Given the highly artificial and rather accidental social forms now in place, that many humans now suffer or swear under, this is very far from obvious. This second nature vs. first nature division would re-erect the old division and separation , Man vs. Nature, in old-fashio ned football-m ilitary terms, that deeper environmentalism has been concerned to remove. It is human chauvinistic; it ignores the continuity between humans and other creatures, the overlap in incapacities and skills (remembering all the capable animals able to live skilfully off the land and all the incapable humans). As regards relevant skills and capabilities, there is no uniqueness, or singularity, of humans as a whole. It would chauvinistically try to convert being human into a 5 Bockchin 87 p.21. 4 significant moral category, when it is not. 6 It would induce an inverse, obnoxious ranking among biological kinds; first class, matching second nature, and second class, matching first or primitive nature. The division would accordingly offer a springboard to a range of further interference of the sorts of which we have already witnessed much too much. The main thrust of Bookchin's attack is thus an old-fashioned socialist criticism, which fails any longer to impress because of its excess anthropocentrism. Social problems, which are of course often but not always intertangled with environmental problems, are no longer top of action, political, or other agendas; nor are their standard modern rivals, similarly entangled with environmental problems, namely economic problems. There is a third set of problems, neither exactly left nor right, neither exactly social nor economic nor reducing in approved fashion to those would-be universal categories, nor yet forming an entirely independent dimension: namely, environmental problems. Bookchin faithfully rolls out other elements of routine socialist criticism, against deep ecology. Some of these are telling enough, but mostly not new. They include:• a seriously flawed pantheon of heroic figures. Bookchin gets stuck into DEs favourable mention of Heidegger, of course, but he also tries to convey quite by association with Woody Guthrie (p.6), Malthus (p.15) Ehrlich (p.17) and others. Problems with the heroic figures and historical pedigree of DE had already been observed by others, e.g. Sholomowski. • a thin and inadequate historical genesis and setting. In this regard Naess's work is, of course, primarily in the perfectly admissible tradition and company of systematic philosophy and of most science. Deep environmental has, no more than science, to supply at the outset a full historical context in which its ideas are placed (pace. p.5 bottom). 6 So it is argued at length in EP. INTRODUCTION Deep ecology is a major environmental position and movement, one of the most important of contemporary times. In name and in assemblage of themes it is a recently elaborated position, dating back only to about 1973; but most of the themes are older, some of them much older. It is the assemblage, package and the way that has been put to environmental work that is newer and different. The initial assemblage and the name are due to Naess, a principal character (in all senses) in what follows 1. 1. On the deep ecology movement and ideology: their intellectual standing. The expression 'deep long-range ecological movement', of which 'deep ecology' 1s a subsequent abbreviation, was minted by N aess to label an emerging environmental movement . Naess was then (sociological) finder ather than founder of this emerging movement, a movement concerned primarily with the natural environment. In explaining ideological features of the movement Naess set down a number of what he took to be characteristic themes. It is from these themes, with much elaboration and considerable variation, that deep ecology, as a doctrine, has grown. It is with the evolving body of doctrine, the position, that we shall primarily be concerned. Control such as it was, of the doctrine did not long remain with Naess. Like many good promising ideas it was quickly imported into California, where it was modified, and to some extent converted into a further individual consciousness-elevating exercise. Thus the doctrine has been elaborated and further delimited not only by Naess but, in the first place, by several North-Americans, particularly Devall and Sessions, who have on occasion collaborated with N aess, and more recently by various Australians, most notably Fox and Seed.NI Deep ecology has caught on largely outside No attempt will be made to give an account of Naess's philosophy, except insofar as it bears directly on deep ecology, though such an attempt would be worth making. We commend the work (which could simply be entitled Naess ) to others; a smell beginning is made in Naess and Rothenberg. Naess was already a significant, influential, but maverick, figure on the European intellectual scene well before deep ecology was discerned. Naess had been professor of philosophy at Oslo since 1939, a chair he obtained when 27. In early days he was a Norwegian Ayer, likwise basking in reflected glory of a disinfecting logical positivism; but how much Naess subsequently diverged from empiricism can be gauged from his 1971 debate with Ayer (recorded in Reflexive Water). In fact Naess had already began to move out of an empiricist set as a result of his early interesting attempt to carry it towards its logical conclusion, and to do philosophy itself empirically, recorded in Truth as Conceived by those who are not Professional Philosophers. Subsequently Naess traversed a wide and unusual range of philosophical enterprise: scepticism naturally; many of the then fashionable areas, such as communication, semantics and interpretation; and several others that were much less philosophically fashionable, but politically significant, such as Gandhi and pacifism, ideology and failure of objectivity, and of course pluralism. These investigations form the complex backdrop to deep ecology. Unfortunately, despite Naess's longstanding commitment to pluralism, deep ecology was from the outset constrained to a certain unduly narrow style of environmentalismm as will appear. 5 narrower academic circles, especially in North America and Australia, where, in contrast to Western Europe, significant areas of natural environment still remain; these are rapidly becoming of increasing public concern. Deep ecology is a radical environmental pos1t10n, which goes far beyond resource conservation positions (which are typically concerned at best with the management, husbandry and stewardship of resources in long-term human interests); and it offers a much deeper challenge to prevailing attitudes and practices (of the dominant social paradigm), especially those which concern more or less natural environments.N 2 Deep ecology (hereafter is an ideology in the respectible older sense, a system of belief and ideas. It is not an ideology in the post Marxion sense, of such a system characterised by an inflexibility and an unwillingness to listen to other points of view. Quite the contrary. Radical DE may still be, though its radicalness is in decline as it ages and as informed opinion on environmental issues advances; respectable, it is not. In particularly DE is not a respectable academic subject. Though it is arguably the most important movement in environmental philosophy in recent times, it is fl:Ot even mentioned in several recent texts on the topic. There are several reasons for this, ranging from the conservation and close-mindedness, snobbery and bigotry almost, of much contemporary philosophy, to evident presentational deficiencies in DE, its mouldeness, its lack of discriptive and argument, its popular appeal. DE is particularly weak weaker than environmental ethics, which do poorly on these academic indicators - on a run of things that are taken to matter in contemporary ethics; analyses of meanings of key ethical terms, reductions of ethical terms to few primitives, smart arguments, utilitarian-style justifications, etc. That is one reason why it is not part of Anglo-American analytic philosophy; another is that it challenges so much of what analytic philosophy represents and (politically) presupposes. DE scarcely represents, then, many of you will be relieved to learn analytic philosophers' philosophy. N aess believes has been through and seen through that sort of philosophy early in life; and seen that it does not contribute very much to the real features of life and living that philosophy should make significant contributions towards, but mostly does not. As a result you will find very little analysis in DE. Also there is remarkedly little argument, though argument is often taken to be what is distinctive in philosophy. (But that is an Anglo American idea of what philosophy is all about; you find comparatively little argument in much Continental European philosophy - what you do find, even in authors like Kant and Hegel who look superficially as if they are arguing, is mostly patently bad argument, poor at best. DE is much more like European philosophy in tone and style, which helps explain why it is neglected and denigrated in American schools; by contrast, in British philosophy curricula the environment is only just beginning to win any satisfactory attention at all.) 6 These are some of the reasons why, despite its importance, DE goes largely unmentioned in most texts on environmental philosophy and ethics. This says a good deal about the texts, which are mostly not offering satisfactory coverage of their fields (see further chapter 2). But it indicates something too about DE, which is not as intellectually accessible as it could or should be. Moreover, presentation of DE often go out of their way to violate (questionable) academic standards, expecially those for clarity of statement, extent of analysis, and level of argumentation. Deep ecology is an amophous doctrine, as anyone who tries to set down from its sources in a clear and crisp way what its themes are, will readily enough discover. Of course compared with much French philosophy, it is clarity itself; but French philosophy does not provide an acceptable benchmark. A good deal of the obscurity concerning DE results from its varying and different presentations by different expositors. To avoid this problem, we shall, for the most part, follow Naess's elaboration of DE, taking that as fairly authoritative. But the problem is not thereby resolved. Naess's views on deep ecology, its place and importance, and its themes, have changed over the years. Nor are the themes always, sufficiently clear though many of them are succinctly stated. Some of them are said, by disciples or by N aess himself, to be metaphorical. Furthermore, as some important matters go largely unelaborated, for instance the issues of satisfactory methods for achieving ecopolitical change. To surmount these kinds of difficulties, we shall (somewhat presumptuously no doubt) offer our own exposition and elaboration of DE, what we call authentic deep ecology. At least under Naess's conception of DE we are entitled to do this. In part II however, which offers a critique of DE as it has been variously presented, we shall look at the genuine article in its various formulations. Rather than becoming easier with the passage of time, DE has become more and more difficult, and less intellectually tractable as it picks up or toys with environmental fashions, often zanier environmental fads. It is complicated by New themes, often muddy themes, and its solidity is removed by modification or erosion of old themes. Among the new themes picked up, several to be examined critically (in part II), are the Gaia hypothesis, according to which the Earth itself some sort of organic living system. DE is thus an irremedially vague object. Its vagueness has increased with its popularity with its becoming on the green fringe a fashionable, not to say vogue, item (a Foucaultian object). Vague and vogue, a common concotenation. 2. Types of environmental positions: deep environmentalism. 7 What distinguishes an environmental position is a certain level of constraint with respect to the environment, the natural environment especially: not anything goes with respect to nature. In this regard environmental positions contrast with a dominant theme of Western cultural heritage; namely, provided it does not interfere with acknowledged people such as property holders, that people can do more or less what they like with the land, and with what grows and lives there. It is even therefor humans to exploit or manage. This unrestrained position imposes few or no constraints upon treatment of the environment itself. Under it there would, for example, be little compunction about using up material resources, forests, fisheries and so on, immediately or even destroying them. But, because it grants such entitlements to exploitation, the unrestrained position can be excluded from properly moral positions. 2 For it fails to meet the basic universality requirement on moral principles, of independence of person, place or time, a requirement which implies that persons of different races, colours, sexes or ages, or at different places or times are not treated unfairly or seriously disadvantaged. Insofar as the unrestrained position would permit the exploitation, degradation and even destruction, of all present resources and environments, it places future humans at a very serious disadvantage. The position is thus one of expediency, not morality, typically yielding, like economics, evaluative assessments based on short-term narrow local (or national) interests, rather than assessments appropriately based on long-range transnational values. Opposed to the unrestrained position are various environmental positions (what Leopold saw as the land ethic is just one of these). Such positions can be classified - conveniently for subsequent development but in a way that already refines and extends Naess's classification - into three groups: shallow, intermediate and deep. Unlike the unrestrained position, all these positions would conserve and maintain things - materials, creatures, forests, etc. The shallow (conservation) position differs from the unrestrained position primarily in taking a longer-term view and taking account of future humans, their welfare and so forth. It is more enlightened than the unrestrained position in taking a longer-term perspective: hence its alternative description in the literture as resource conservation (thus, e.g., soil conservation organisations). Though this conservation position is only a step away from the unrestrained position, it does pass the test of morality in that future people are not treated unfairly; so it is a very significant step. 2 This is a substantial and controversial claim, especially since it accounts much economic activity unethical in the narrow or semse, as involving practices of expediency, not morality. For the fuller case for obligations and commitment to future humans, see e.g. Routley 81, and other essays collected with it in Partridge 81. This section is drawn from my People vs the Land (84). 8 The shallow and unrestricted positions are closely related by an important feature they share and which justifies lumping them together as shallower positions. They are both highly anthropocentric; they do not move outside a human-centred framework, which construes nature and the environment instrumentally, that is, simply as a means to human ends and values. Thus they take account ultimately only of human interests and concerns; all environmental values reduce to these. It is in this respect especially that these shallower positions differ from deeper, less resource and management and exploitation oriented, positions. According to deeper positions, humans are not the sole items of value or bestowing value in the world, and not all things of value are valuable because they answer back in some way to human concerns. But deeper positions differ in the weight or relative importance they assign to human concerns. According to an intermediate position serious human concerns always come first; and while other things, such as higher animals, have value or utility in their own right, their value is outranked by that of humans. The deep position rejects this assumption, and maintains that even serious human concerns should sometimes lose out to environmental values. Figure 1. The positions separated, and separating principles SHALLOWER UNRESTRAINED DEEPER SHALLOW IMMEDIAIB DEEP MORALITY SOLE VALUE GREATER VALUE REQUIREMENT ASSUMPTION ASSUMPTION (of human apartheid) (of human supremacy) The watershed principle which divides the shallow from the deeper positions is the sole value assumption . According to this major assumption, which underlies prevailing Western social theory, humans are the only things of irreducible (or intrinsic) value in the universe, the value of all other things reducing to or answering back to that of humans in one way or another. This assumption is build into most present political and economic arrangements; for example, only aggregated preferences or interests of certain (present) humans are considered in democratic political choice, and likewise in economic decision making; other creatures and natural items are presented at best through the preference or votes of interested humans. 3 3 The points are explained in more detail in EP, where too, account is taken of the shift from humans to persons (which would be important were it taken seriously and adhered to) and also of the inclusion of 9 Similar assumptions are made in mainstream ethical theories. Typical are reductive theories which endeavour to derive ethical judgements from features of closed systems of humans. Examples are provided by presently fashionable ethical theories, such as standard utilitarianism. 4 According to utilitarianism what ought to be done, as well as what is best, is determined through what affords maximum satisfaction (preference-fulfilment, pleasure, absence of pain, and so on, for other satisfaction determinates) to the greatest number of individual humans. In theories like utilitarianism, the outside world of nature does not enter through direct inputs or outputs, but only insofar as it is reflected in the psychological states of individuals. Such ethical theories are appropriately described as those of apartness or human apartheid. Man is, or is treated as, apart from Nature; there is virtually total segregation. Nature or the land enters only as a remote experiential backdrop, and onstage is the drama of human affairs and interests. However, humans cannot be entirely insulated from their environment; for example, volcanoes affect temperatures thus affecting climate thus affecting crop yield and food supplies. At least limited intercourse with the environment has to be admitted as a result. So, in economics, ethics, and political theory, secondary theories, dealing with linkages to the environment, have been appended (thus, for example, externality theory in economics, some allowances for "side" constraints in more sophisticated utilitarianism, and so on). But the environment remains treated as an awkward or tiresome afterthought or backdrop, a (re-)source and sink, when it is considered at all. There is, however, another approach also with historical standing, vying with (and indeed often confused with) human apartheid, which can accommodate secondary theories a little more satisfactorily. That is the position of superiority or human supremacy, according to which Man, though included in Nature, is above the rest of Nature, meaning ethically superior to it.N While human supremacist positions can incorporate the sole value assumption and thus remain in the shallow ethical area, they have the option of rejecting it in favour of the less objectionable greater value assumption; other things being equal, the value of humans is greater than other things; the value of humans surpasses that of all other things in the universe. This assumption allows that other objects, such as some higher animals, may have irreducible value; what it insists upon is that, at least for "normal" members of respective species, this value never exceeds that of humans. What super-humans. With value for natural items goes, of course, concern, respect, and sensitivity, towards them; but the reverie connection may exhibit occasional failures. 4 But the same holds for other fashionable theories on the American-dominated ethical scene, namely contractualism and libertarianism. More broadly based historical utilitarianisms, which allow for some input from other sentient creatures, are considered below. 10 is generally presupposed is that other objects - animals, plants and their communities - are never of very much importance compared with humans. Though human supremacy has appeared in variants upon utilitarianism (from Hutcheson and Bentham on) where animal pain is taken into consideration along with human, Wes tern ethics and associated social sciences such as demography, economics and political theory, remain predominantly apartheid in form. So in practice does most utilitarianism. 5 It is the repudiation of the greater value assumption that separates deep from intermediate positions. Perhaps the most familiar example of an intermediate position 6 is that of Animal Liberation, in the form in which individual animals (but not plants, forests, ecosystems, etc.) are taken to have value in their own right, though in any play-off with humans, humans win. Under the deep position such an outcome is by no means inevitable and not alway assured; in cases of conflict of animals with humans or natural systems with humans, humans sometimes lose. There are various arguments designed to show that the deep assessment is right, that humans do not always matter7 and, more pertinently, that humans should sometimes lose out. A typical one takes the following form:- Some humans voluntarily lead worthless or negative lives, lives without net value. The point, though not uncontroversial, 8 can be argued even from a shallow utilitarianism. Take for instance a life of pain and suffering and little or no happiness: it has a substantial net negative utility. However, some small natural systems do have net value; one example would be an uninhabited undisturbed island (a live example might be a tropical island before Club Mediterranee depradation). Now consider the situation where the considerable value of a small natural system is to be sacrificed (in a way that shallowly affords no ethical impropriety) on behalf of a set of humans whose lives each have no positive net value. For instance, the system is to be exploited, just for the continued maintenance of these humans, or for their addition (as new settlers) to an established population. Then in such circumstances, these humans lose out; the natural system takes precedence. Similarly, trivial satisfactions of humans do not dominate over the 5 There practice contrasts with what the theory allows or requires. Utilitarianism is like much pollution control, where regulations are on the books or are part of the law, but are or never only very occasionally applied. Utilitarian double standards are further discussed and referenced in DEP #7. 6 Other examples are considered below. Two of the four form of ecological consciousness considered by Rodman fit here (as Rodman has remarked). For instance, falling into the intermediate range are the types of environmental positions adopted by Birch and Cobb, and by Attfield and by many other consequentialists. 7 See the argument of EP, beginning the Last Man argument, p .... ff. See also the initial example of Routley 2 79 .. 8 The point is argued in detail in DEP #3. 11 integrity of rich natural environments. This simple result cuts deeply into (standard shallow) consumer theory, to take just one example of the impact of deep environmentalism. Authentic deep ecology is a type of deep environmentalism. A genuinely ecospheric egalitarianism, such as deep ecology offers, is bound to reject the Greater Value assumption. For under egalitarianism, larger collarations of significant eco-objects outweight smaller groupings of undistinguished humans. Notes 1. All their main work on deep ecology is cited in the reference list at the end. 2. Leading features of Resource Conservation are explained in several sources; e.g. Rodman. 3. Here authenticity is important. As will become evident in part II, certain proclaimed deep ecologists are not prepared to scuttle the Greater Value assumption. As will also become evident, the egalitarian arguments upsetting the Greater Value assumption are build on defective foundations. CONTINUING THE CRITIQUE OF DEEP ECOLOGY As a broad label for something rather environmentally different, and no doubt better, than most ideologies that preceded it, 'deep ecology' is no doubt rather fine. That is how the label often functions, honorifically, for instance in the collection under that label edited by Tobias, which gives deep ecology none but a nebulous content, and which indeed contains many articles (such as the interview with Soleri) in diametrical opposition to the more detailed platform promulgated by the intellectual "leaders" of the deep ecology movements. In fact, a good deal of the more popular appeal of deep ecology has been obtained by vacillation between the more discerning authentic forms and the slack or nebulous forms. The nebulous use of the label has also given cover to some of those who calls themselves 'deep ecologists', enabling them to shed awkward but crucial themes from the more detailed platform (thus e.g. Fox). Many are those who are now pleased to march under the rather fashionable nebulous banner. 1 Many are not deep, in theory or practice, deeply committed, or deeply changed by the march. Purchasing or growing organic vegetables, having spiritual experiences in a special natural place, or practising some oriental art or exercise routine, does not ensure a deepened environmental position, though it can be a step on the way. While nebulous deep ecology is compatible with much that is neither deep nor even significantly ecologically oriented, such as minor lifestyle adjustments within the industrial paradigm, authentic deep ecology, which is not so slack, remains a defective doctrine, itself oscillating between an overpermissive environmental assembly point, fast growing its radical potential, on the one side, and an impermissive, unduly narrow doctrine, dubious or defective in several of its leading themes, on the other side. Some of the worst of these themes, such as biological egalitarianism, have already been criticised in sufficient detail in the original critique. But other features of authentic deep ecology (hereafter mainly DE) were left largely untouched in the original critique, and new features have emerged. The critique thus needs continuing. Since the critique was produced, it has been become more difficult, if anything, to grasp what DE is all about. Even Naess, the founder of the movement, who now tends to adhere much more closely to the platform than other self-proclaimed deep ecologists, is inclined to make I too am happy to march under the nebulous banner, though since my first critique I am no longer particularly welcome. Initially I was cut by about half those individuals and institutions loosely associated with deep ecology, since my critique began circulating. While I am become accustomed to this sort of phenomenon in intellectual areas (criticism induces cool and long at least, even in logic), I didn't expect so much of this given the Christian character of DE.; and such isolation does seriously reduce information sources. 2 apparently large concessions to opposition changes, which however he subsequently more surreptitiously withdraws (of course this is familiar philosophical practice). At other times, he withdraws with one hand what he is offering, some sort of olive branch, with the other. The oscillation can be partly ascribed to conflicting motivation. On the one side, there is the desire, stronger in the founder of DE, Naess, than in his American and Australian prophels, to create a wide constituency, to tum no one away if it can in any way be avoided. But, on the other there is an evident desire to make deep ecology a very select position, for a chosen few, a place to be achieved only after a journey crossing some arduous terrain and involving some difficult life adjustments. Deep ecology lacks the other-worldly and after-life resources which, in some of its religious sources, appear to make for an easy resolution of this type of conflict. I.Further problems with the platform and core platform of deep ecology. It is the platform (at level 2 of the organising "double pyramid" of DE depicted below) that constrains, delimits and defines deep ecology, so far as it is well-characterised. For even this level is not very precisely characterised to put it mildly. Some exponents or practitioners of deep ecology (some of them self-nominated or self-proclaimed) appear to repudiate even the core themes at level 2 (e.g. Fox on axiocentrism). In the face of criticism, Naess himself backtracks as far as he plausibly can, and sometime further. Not only does he considerably muddy the clear waters of doctrine of occasional prosentations, but the doctrine itself begins to disappear, to be qualified away (see e.g. Naess's performance in Resurgance , discussed below). The response to intellectual criticism, which DE has been increasingly encountering as it spreads, has not been an appropriate one of clarifying, and where requisite expounding, the core theory; it has rather been one of retreat and digging in, of trying to hold the temple under seige, through diversionary activity (or by broken-record techniques: simply reiterating parts of the messge not under heavy criticism over and over again). When the critical raid has passed, the priests (and very occassional priestess) of deep ecology reemerge, bearing the original doctrine essentially unchanged. The practice resembles christianity (and too much of the practice of dominant science, the rival Western church). Dealing with deep ecologists is very like dealing with devout christians; some of them one feels sure have only recently changed positional hats, from evangelism to deep ecology (correspondingly, my own position has become that of a black sheep). A good deal of the argumentative practice of deep ecology appears to be explained by its evangelical, and even messianic, character. There is genuine effort to tum no-one, except the most incorrigible moneylenders, away from the temple. Everyone else (except perhaps philosophic critics) is welcome, and encouraged to join in worship. Much like the churches, the founder of the 3 De movement seeks as large a flock as possible. In these democratic days, numbers count (at least under the "right" polling conditions); earlier numbers overted for taxing or tithing purposes. Other high priests are not so sure: there are some critics of the movement, who may be beyond the poles; and surely it should be a little more exclusive. But, in any event, DE is a much more liberal doctrine than one of its sources, christianity, has ever been; it admits coupling not just (so it is said) with all the great religions, but with all the more benign positions and practices that achieve fashionability in California. All not ill-disposed to the natural world and duly acknowledging its value can march under the banner of deep ecology, whose main citadel is Nature. N aess casts the net of deep ecology wide, catching therewith not only many remote supporters, but a number of hostile critics as well, such as latterly Bockshim (p.6). Naess now considers the 8 point platform, formulated by himself and Susians and published in several slightly different forms, as tentatively setting down the 'basic principles of Deep Ecology'. Naess 'look[s] upon the formulations as tentatively expressing the most general and basic views which almost all supporters of the movement have in common' (23.6.88). Thus the 8 point platform (condensed in box 1) provides, in a still vague and tentative sort of way, the core, the core platform, of DE. To get around a small obstacle, let us call those who would adhere to the principles of the core (in some approved formulation) adherents of DE. They are adherents in (simply and literally) holding to the core, the common (intersection of the) platform. They may not be members of the movement in any ordinary sense, in any but the set-theoretical sense, because appropriate intentionality is lacking, for instance they may never have heard of the movement, let alone made any effort to join. Nor need adherents be supporters in the usual sense; support is neither necessary nor sufficient for adherence. A critic such as Bockshim, or myself, can be an adherent without being a supporter, without being supportive. Conversely, a supporter may not be an adherent. The Salvation Army has many supporters, including atheists, who are not adherents. The De movement has many supporters, some of whom call themselves 'deep ecologists', who do not adhere to the core, even more or less. Many of these supporters are shallow environmentalists, who do not accept the key first point, of intrinsic value outside humans, or try to evade it (e.g. by redefinition, or by wrapping up value inextrically in relations to valuers). Since there are, in my experience, many supporters and indeed enthusiasts who turn out to be of this shallow sort, Naess's view is a little puzzling: what does he mean here 'almost all supporters'? Which isolated exceptions does he have in view? Box 1. The core 8 point plat/orm, in capsule form. l. Non-human and human life have intrinsic value: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on earth have intinsic value, inherent 4 value, etc. These values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes. 2. Richness and diversity intrinsic virtues : Richness and diversity of lifeforms contribute to a realisation of these values and are also values in themselves. 3.Humans unjustified in reducing such natural virtues: Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy vital needs. 4.Human (values compatible with) population decrease: The flourishing of human life and culture is compatible with a substantial decrease of the human population. Flourishing of nonhuman life requires such a decrease. 5. Human inte,ference with natural world excessive: Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive and the situation is rapidly worsening. 6. Policies and basic structures must be changed: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies will affect our basic economic, technological and ideological structures. 7.Quality of life should supplant economic standard of living: The change in our attitudes will bring an appreciation of the quality of life rather than adhering to an increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between big and great. We will have a great society with no bigness. 8. Obligation to attempted implementation: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement necessary changes. Most of the core platform is no longer demanding; none of it, except for the last point, specifying an obligation to attempted implementation, requires any commitment in the past of adherents. Mainly adherence to DE, and support of DE, would be very considerably increased were this requirement evaded. A strategy common to econonical practice and sociological research 5 readily presents itself. Let us speak of silent adherents as those who adhere to the core platform, more or less, except that they make no requisite effort to implement it (they may of course have some vague failing of obligation, should they ever reflect on the matter). Even without the benefit of scholarly survey work, it is evident that De would now have a large number of silent adherents, many of whom are not however adherents, being either oblimovish, situated in repressive regions or social situations, or simply uninformed (like indigenous peoples who think here are excessively many excessively interferring humans of Caucasian stock). The core platform represents a surprisingly incomplete and rather ill-organised collocation of principles. The incompleteness is most conspicuous in point 6, which advances no details as to envisaged structural changes. In extenuation N aess pleads that he has 'not has courage to go into detail and define what these different structures will be, because we are going to have a lot of different Green varieties. We shouldn't have one set of structures imposed' (R p.7). The reasoning does not hold up; a range of structures, rather than a unique structure, can easily be defined by constraints well-known ones as it happened. Naess should be encouraged to go on and delimit the structural and policy changes. It is easy to give him a start, drawing upon DE and neighbouring environmental positions. For instance, 6a. The policy objective of maximizing state economic growth should be abandoned in favour of a highly selective approach to such growth. Evidently, there are many different ways such a change in policy can be implemented. Some such change may be suggested by, but is not implied by point 7. 6b. Technology selection should be reoriented to appropriate technology, and away from risky and polluting technology. 6c. Population policies should be directed at decreasing human populations in overpopulated regions. Principle 6c complements point 4, which does not actually enjoin any decrease in human population. And so on, through a well-known list of constraints, with several of them regularly included in principle of alternative social paradigms. Point 5 requires similar elaboration. Another surprising feature is how mild most of these elaborations are, like the core platform itself, which is pretty wishy-wasy when contrasted with what is happening out there environmentally. Many environmentalists now wish to proceed much further, and to witness some real curtailment of heavy broad-acre assaults upon environments, such as extensive clearcutting of forests, over-fishing of shelves, and over-grazing of range-lands, extensive strip and beach mining, broad-acre pollution, and so on. 6 Deindustrialization is not explicitly part of the DE program, and the issue is (perhaps wisely) avoided by some leading proponents of DE. But deindustrialization - a considerable reduction in the levels of industrial activity, particularly the undesirable dangerous destructive prolluting types of industry that conspiciuosly contributed to the first industrial revolution - would emerge from the alternative futures deep ecologists prefer to imagine, with a much smaller, less consumption-oriented,terrestial human population. In any case, deindustrialization is an important environmental objective, for both shallower and deeper ecology. It would assist, most materially, in obtaining some better control on major environmental risks and problems, notably such matters as the greenhouse affect, atmospheric ozone destruction, and acid rain and its fall-out. The idea of progress is, like industry, also under a cloud. It is now naive to assume that progress per se is automatically to be applauded, and that a telling criticism of something is that it would block progress. People are these days a little more discriminating (in some respects); there is progress and progress, growth and growth, coke and coke. Much that was progress, and still is in many quarters, is no longer universally regarded as such, as, for instance, elimination of wetlands, pollution growth, assimilation of indigenous peoples. The 'previously ... dominant [assumption], that non-industrial society would and should progress towards the industrial state and the scientific world view' was challenged, and is increasingly rejected (cf. Naess, on the "status of mythology"). So wishy-washy is the core characterisation of deep ecology that it lets in as deep ecologists all sorts of environmental philosophers who would not previously have made that select hand, philosophers whom main disciples of deep ecology previously did or would have excluded, philosophers whose positions are not deep. If DE is to be more exclusive, it will require more careful, tighter formulation. Only clearly ruled out among environmental philosophers, i.e. those who philosophize about environments and environmental problems, are hard-line human chauvinists, led by Australians, Passmore (in his main conservative persona) and McCloskey. Many of these excluded philosophers would, moreover, subscribe to most of the points in the core platform, as weakly interpreted. It is nowadays a rare thinking person who does not consider that there are severe environmental problems, local and global, about which something, fairly farreaching by conservative political standards, should be done. It is a rare philosopher, who becomes inmersed in a spread of these problems, and who does not develop some environmental commitments, even if a liberalish social agenda continues to dominate an environmental one (and it is fast becoming hard to avoid observing the interpretation of social with broadly environmental problems). While environmental philosophy has, by contrast with economics (now ......... of reaction crises), tended to become progressively more accomodating to what was only a short time ago radical environmental drought, as the magnitude of environmental problems is revealed, deep 7 ecology has moved in the opposite direction, has tried be excessively conciliatory, confusing pluralism with broad consensualism, and lost much of its radical flare. A wide environmental pluralism is just fine; but it does not have to be achieved through consensus, or at the cost of a deep or an ecological platform. A pluralism can be achieved by the joining of different positions. Among the diverse and motley groups of philosophers who now gain entry as adherents of deep ecology, too generously construed, are apparently included those examples:- Example 1. Among extensionists, both utilitarians and ratonalists. Among utilitarians are Singer, and perhaps even Smart on some days. Most turns on how point 1 is construed. Utilitarians in the Benthamite tradition assign intrinsic value to all creatures with preferences, sometimes a or the like, and are concerned with the well-being and flourishing of such creatures. Accordingly they satisfy point 1 if it is read, as it may well be, 'much human and much non-human life'. It all depends upon how the terms 'human' and 'non-human' are quantified. If both are quantified with 'all', the theses becomes implausible (admitting e.g. lab-manufactured abominations as intrinsically valuable), and would exclude some acknowledged deep ecologists. If the terms are more weakly quantified, then environmentally aware and active Benthamites are admitted. An evident dividing line, provided by particular quantification, with 'some', is enough to exclude shallow philosophers. But no quantification will serve to exclude either intermediate positions, which do not adopt a deep value theory, or individualism, such as moral extension positions, almost invariably a spouse. Extensionists more patently included are those of rationalistic persuasion, grouped loosely around Regan in the American South, who have gradually move away from a utilitarian prescriptions, to the view that ethical principles, including those of vegetarianism, can be reached by rational means, by clear, consistent and coherent thinking (thus, it is really a coherence theory of morality). Example 2. More far-reaching informediate positions, which do assign intrinic value less stingily throughout nature, to some non-preference-havers, such as trees, and to some non-individuals, such as forests, but which still adopt a greater value assumption, according to which human values always take precedence over non-human assignments. Examples of this sort the postions deliminated (so far in insufficient theoretical details) by Rolston and Attfield. In fact the positions so far elaborated of this type typically, but hardly inevitably, draw on an enlightened Christian backdrop heavily laced with science (a religious American naturalism, so to say, in Rolston's case). They amount to nonsecular moral extensionisms, by contrast with the secular moral extenionisms of example 1 (to try to squeeze these positions into Rodman's nonexhaustive classificaton of positions). Example 3. Deep-green theorists reject the biocentric restriction sometimes built into point 1, though not in this formulation. This formulation certainly admits Sylvan as an adherent of DE, 8 despite what some deep ecologists have said. According to strict biocentrism however, only what has life (in some sense) can have value. Deep-green theorist see this restriction as very like that imposed by ulitarians, to sentience, or unwarranted, unnecessary and arbitrary. Deep-green theorists, like enviromental resisters, ecodefenders and Earth-Facters, now see the DE platform as much too moderate and quite insufficiently radical. The earlier radicalism of DE has been excessively pruned back, on a mix of dubious grounds: the drive for an environmental consensus (in place of a genuine pluralism), the religo-political quest for a large support Base (which could however be environmentalism broadly, with DE in the vanguard), and the input of conservatizing academic thought and aim of intellectual respectability. In fact DE which does not make much ground academically, as compared with its success outside academia, especially with book-reading environmentalists, would better forget academic success, where it has made progress only among outsiders, not power-players and return to its more radical mission (academics form only a small minority, though one dangerously and influentially supportive, one the whole, of most past environmental excesses and assaults). 2. Variability, antiquity or dubiquity of main themes of deep ecology omitted from the core platform. Some themes have been retained by letting them undergo extensive change. Nowhere is this more conspicuous than with the difficult principle of "biospherical egalitarianism in principle", central to earle DE, which has taken on some remarkable new guises. In Naess, it becomes a curiously qualified principle of rights: that every being has a right to live - unless the basic needs of other beings overrides its rights. In Devall, who prefers to avoid the term 'rights' (the use of which he asserts is metaphorical in Naess, not at all what Naess, who appeals to childrens" usage, asserts), the principle is emptied of main egalitarian content: 'Properly understood, the principle of biocentric equality means that humans are members of the biotic community, not its masters' (p.58). So understood, the principle can be accepted by many shallow thinkers; it is not incompatible with chauvinism, nor with conciderable inequality, nor with greater value invariably assigned to humans, only with a certain domination. It is a sell-out. Few of the supporters of deep ecology (DE) appear to realise how old-fashionedly defective and sometimes inappropriate some of the elements, and most of the methodology, of deep ecology really is. 2 The organic and organistic image, for instance - heavily deployed by one of the heroes of deep ecology, Whitehead - is as old as Aristotle (for some of the history see Berlin). Despite much valiant effort, no one has so far got the image (now redeployed in the extravagent Gaia 2 Recently, Sholomowski has re-emphasized some of these features. 9 hypothesis) - valuable as it may be, chauvinistic as it characteristically is -to work in a very fruitful way. Likewise the drive for self-realisation, is both old-fashioned - it was fostered by the Enlightenment and had its heyday in the 19thC, was decidedly human chauvinistic in its emphases. But perhaps the heaviest residue of old-fashioned inappropriate material is to be found in the methodology of deep ecology, which is mainly transferred from positivism with little alteration. The hypothetico-deductive methodology, for example, appears essentially intact in the double pyramidal diagram (now called 'the apron' by Naess), which one is supposed to shuffle around and descend by deduction. Having descended so, the way back to the top is by intuition of hypotheses, by the hypothetical part of the method. First principles at the top admit of no proof or derivation - because of the character of the one inferential relation admitted, deduction. In other respects, the double pyramid strait-jacket, which is Naess's way of trying to infuse a certain pluralism (a pluralism of fundamental positions at first principles) into deep ecology, is insufficiently specific. It does not explain, for example, how at a practical lower level, either an environmental directive or environmental action is forthcoming. Indeed given restriction to deduction, it cannot explain how these things come about. DE lacks any requisite theory of environmental action. 3 The double pyramid gets stylized in the way on the left; an alternative representation is that on the right (and Naess now has a representation awkwardly superimposed on a mandala):Needless to say, there are problems lacking within DE's easy pluralism. Noone has ever explained how to get the unretracted DE platform derivationally out of - what looks incompatible Christianity. For that matter no-one has shown how to deduce the platform from any of the other, sometimes more congenial, great religions or philosophies. The nearest we seem to get is Naess's sketch of how we derive parts of the platform from his own specially concocted ecosophy. 3. Further flowing of the DE gospel: its heroes, its arguments, .... Deep ecology is a seriously flawed gospel, not only as regards its doctrines and their coherence, but in other surrounding evangelic respects as well. Virtually all the patron saints of DE, the past philosophical heroes (all male) are deeply flawed. Spinoza's views on the place and treatment of animals, for instance, should be entirely disowned by any deeper environmentalist. Even the later "reformed" Heidegger is conspicuously human chauvinistic, too complacent in a human-dominated and tamed landscape, and, (apart from some new-fangled technology and 3 Various old-fashioned, and again defective, models are available to DE, and could be tacked onto the theory, e.g. the belief (or information) and desire (or value) account of intention and action conventionally attributed to Hume. 10 industrialisation) with the established rural way of things in Germany, including significantly racist and sexist ways. The pervasive background four-fold, fitting the cosmological scheme of things in, includes only divinities and humans; wilderness and its creatures are not part of the fundamentals. Whitehead, despite the apparent bounteousness of his philosophical scheme, was a practising christian, committed to a great chain of being with humans at the top of the chain (and thus to a greater value assumption antithetical to DE); he took no significant interest in nature or nonhuman creatures at all, and was very comfortable in the ways of a socio-political order which directly produced present environmental impasses. 4 No doubt the heroes should be differently viewed. Not as patrons, not even as forerunners; but as deep thinkers, from whom certain elements can be drawn in elaborating an environmental philosophy (e.g. parts of a theory of nature, features of process theory, elements of a critique of technology), while much else is discarded. Most of this theoretical work remains to be done. Regrettably the calibre of the arguments for proceeding to a DE position has not improved. N aess has now resorted to making his case in a very conventionalistic populist fashion. People are inclined to respond in such and such a way (favourable to environmental concerns) to so and so questions. Thus, for instance 'there is reasonably widespread agreement that animals, and even plants, have rights' (EIJ p.3). But surely it is largely as a result of environmentalism, which must (and should) be based on something else that people have began to respond thus and so. Naess also argues from the the concern of many people about nature and natural phenomena for their own sakes (the data is however not all that clearcut) to several other conclusions, for instance that political and stilist approaches to the environmental crisis (etc) should be less anthropocentric (EIJ p.5). The arguments are thus close in character to those widely used in arguments in economics and democratic theory; they are none the better for that. The fact that people used to respond favourably to damming up every nearby river and draining all the swamps is not a solid recommendation for such practices. Moreover, such populist considerations hardly win out, as Naess himself explains (p.4). Pressure groups pedalling narrow and sometimes destructive economic ambitions often succeed against democratic opinion. 4. But much criticism of DE is even more seriously flawed. Despite the growing constituency for core princles. De, which Naess will correctly have alluded to here, DE has been portrayed as extremism - especially from the US political right (which tends towards extreme right). What is extreme depends, of course, on where a carping critic is 4 He appears to have owed his appointment to a philosophy chair at Harvard in significient part to the fact that he was in no way a radical, but suited to the conservative scene established there. 11 situated. Gung-ho growth economists are extremists from a deeper environmental situation. No doubt such GG economists would claim that they have reason, not emotion, on their side; but it is a narrow flawed reason, tailored and biassed to their cause, reflecting a different class of emotions, primarily preferences of business communities of humans. In present deteriorating environmental circumstances, clever "extremism" is sometimes exactly what is required - ideas and action that upset, disturb, interfere with, subvert, and eventually overturn, the dominant military-industrial social ethos. Extremism presumably amounts to being isolated on the outer margins of some politically or socially sensitive (more useless) normal distribution, without respectable companions. On many environmentally important issues, DE is no longer in such a position (often instead the power elite would be if it were not so entrenched). Where it is in such a position, then generally it needs to be, and needs to try to swing the norm in its direction or else to gather respectability for that position. What, if anything, supports the charge of extremism, levelled against DE? Such emotionallycharged criticisms from the right tend to be particularly vague. Sometimes DE itself, portrayed as radical environmentalism, and compared with radical feminism, is dismissed as extremist, without indicating where it is considered extreme. In fact, while better developed, less accommodating DE is radical, at least literally in going, as one aspect of its depth, to root issues and assumptions, it is not very politically radical; it does not seriously challenge present political arrangements in the way that ecoanovehism, or even ecosocialism, does. What has infuriated some critics is undoubtedly the DE removal of humans from absolute centre stage, and above all the cavalier or callous way in which some environmentalists have portrayed the demise of unfortunate humans, from the God-given position to having to share the world-stage. There are many different issues tangled up here, and the charges of extremism depends on retaining the confusion, as well as ascribing to DE claims it does not make. DE asserts that irreducible value is not confined to humans, that life other than humans has intrinsic value. Although such a claim is indeed incompatible with the dominant social paradigm, it represents an old challenge, going back in utilitarianism at least to Bentham. As some of those who held or now hold such a position were not, by any means extremists or even radicals (e.g. Sidgwick) the charge against this part of the DE platform, lapses. Similar points apply against any charge of extremism based on the DE assertion (carefully avoided in the core platform) that a substantial decrease in human population is desirable, especially for conservation of the biosphere. Such a theme is increasingly widely maintained, by many respectable figures, far from any fringes. Nor need any extreme, threatening or dangerous, action result from such DE themes. Human population reduction can occur (and is envisaged by Naess to occur) by such unthreatening means as a 12 reduction in birth rates, a demographic transition brought about for instance through improved education and contraception. Yet some coupling to "extreme" action, and adoption or preparedness to adopt such, has to be established if a proper charge of extremism is to sustained (cf. also the OED definition of 'extremism'). Deep ecologists propose no extreme action to reduce human population, no wars, no genecide, nothing macho. Indeed the idea is ludicrous. Deep ecologists tend to be gentle people, who are opposed to violence; they care about humans, who are part of nature (even if too many of them are trying to set themselves above and apart from it). There are individuals and groups, more evident in America than elsewhere, who do adopt an uncaring, and sometimes brutal attitude to other humans, especially those outside America. Ecofascists, like Hardin, to the right of environmental thought, who think that the time for triage has already arrived, and that starving humans in third world countries should be left to fend for themselfes, offer a striking example. But eco-fascism is far from deep ecology, and has been severely criticised by those close to DE (e.g. Bennett and Griffin). It is no doubt troublesome for deep ecology, and convenient for opportunistic critics, if environmentalists with eco-fascist prodivities present themselves as deep ecologists (as has happened, a prominent example being the present editor of Earth First). It is no doubt troublesome for a charitable organisation if members of a mafia present themselves as agents of it and collect on its behalf; it has long been a problem for democracy that fascists can present themselves as democrats, and even put an end to democracy through seemingly democratic methods. Political movements admits of much infiltration, by both well- and evil-intentioned. ANNEX 1. Interesting proposals continue to emerge from the deep literature. One is for an environmental organisation, which might could be called Environment International, parallelling Amesty International , and adopting a similar role with regard to the environment that Amesty does with respect to human rights and political processes (Naess p.4). 2. There are many false "virtues " in contemporary political life that green politics, such as DE is coupled with, will eventually help remove. These include:- • Unity, united front. All that has merit is a certain limited unity in diversity. • Balance. Balance is achieved by resolution of many forces. To shift 13 the balance, then, environmentalists should be as far out as they can (while still being counted in the resolution, not written off). For end political purposes, citing especially credibility doesn't matter, by contrast with countability. Advice to offer more balanced statements and work should be courteously ignored: it is oppositional, political advice. • Two party ideal REFERENCES A. Naess, 'Environmental ethics and international justice', Ecospirit Quarterly IV (1) (198.) 1-7; referred to as EIJ.  Dublin Core The Dublin Core metadata element set is common to all Omeka records, including items, files, and collections. For more information see, http://dublincore.org/documents/dces/. Title A name given to the resource Box 16, Item 1224: Draft chapters and papers on deep ecology Subject The topic of the resource Typescripts draft of contents (2 pages) ; Part 1 Critical exposition, Chapter 1 At the pyramid’s junction: the basics and creed of deep ecology (11 pages) ; Part II Critique of deep ecology, Chapter 5 The initial problem: what on earth is deep ecology? Who is and isn't a deep ecologist? (21 pages) ; A critique of (wild) western deep ecology: a response to Warwick Fox's response to an earlier critique (56 pages) ; Ecological ethics and ecological politics: turning John McCloskey's challenge (36 pages); Deep ecology and deep-green theory (4 pages) ; Authentic deep ecology: exposition, critique, alternatives: preface (4 pages) ; On social ecology (4 pages) ; Introduction (11 pages) ; Continuing the critique of deep ecology (13 pages). Description An account of the resource Papers housed in folder marked "Deep Ecology". Creator An entity primarily responsible for making the resource <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org/items/browse?search=Richard+Sylvan&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bjoiner%5D=and&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Belement_id%5D=39&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Btype%5D=&amp;advanced%5B0%5D%5Bterms%5D=&amp;range=&amp;collection=&amp;type=&amp;user=&amp;tags=&amp;public=&amp;featured=&amp;exhibit=&amp;geolocation-mapped=&amp;geolocation-address=&amp;geolocation-latitude=&amp;geolocation-longitude=&amp;geolocation-radius=10&amp;submit_search=Search+for+items">Richard Sylvan</a> Source A related resource from which the described resource is derived <span class="MuiTypography-root-125 MuiTypography-body2-126">The University of Queensland's <a data-testid="rek-series" href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/records/search?page=1&amp;pageSize=20&amp;sortBy=score&amp;sortDirection=Desc&amp;searchQueryParams%5Brek_series%5D%5Bvalue%5D=Richard+Sylvan+Papers%2C+UQFL291&amp;searchMode=advanced">Richard Sylvan Papers UQFL291</a></span>, Box 16, Item 1224 Publisher An entity responsible for making the resource available <a href="https://antipodean-antinuclearism.org">Antipodean Antinuclearism: (Re)constructing Richard Routley/Sylvan's Nuclear Philosophy</a> Contributor An entity responsible for making contributions to the resource <span>This item was identified for digitisation at the request of The University of Queensland's 2020 Fryer Library Fellow, </span><a href="https://najtaylor.com" target="_blank" rel="noopener">Dr. N.A.J. Taylor</a><span>.</span> Rights Information about rights held in and over the resource For all enquiries about this work, please contact the Fryer Library, The University of Queensland Library. Format The file format, physical medium, or dimensions of the resource [160] leaves. 157.42 MB. Type The nature or genre of the resource Manuscript Identifier An unambiguous reference to the resource within a given context <a href="https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:20027f1">https://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:20027f1</a> Coverage The spatial or temporal topic of the resource, the spatial applicability of the resource, or the jurisdiction under which the resource is relevant Australian National University Office - Typing Table at End of Desk Australian National University Office Australian National University Office > Typing Table at End of Desk Box 16: Green Projects in Progress